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# PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

> *a*. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
>
> *b*. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
>
> *c*. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
>
> *d*. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
>
> *e*. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government. The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

This volume was initially prepared under the general supervision of Fredrick Aandahl and, at a later stage, of William Z. Slany, his successor as General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. John P. Glennon, Charles S. Sampson, and William F. Sanford, Jr., assisted in final preparation. Neal H. Petersen was responsible for the planning, review, and editing of the volume. Mr. Petersen compiled the documentation on the President's Committee on International Information Activities and collaborated with Lisle A. Rose in the preparation of the documentation on atomic energy and regulation of armaments. Mr. Rose prepared the compilations on national security policy and the foreign information program.

Rita M. Baker of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) performed the technical editing under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber. The index was prepared by the Twin Oaks Indexing Collective.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
*The Historian*
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

# CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE .......... III

LIST OF SOURCES .......... VII

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS .......... XI

LIST OF PERSONS .......... XV

PART 1

United States national security policy: U.S. objectives and programs for national security; estimates of threats to the national security; military posture and foreign policy; organization for national security .......... 1

PART 2

Policy of the United States with respect to atomic energy and the regulation of armaments; President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal of December 8, 1953; other foreign policy aspects of U.S. development of atomic energy .......... 845

Discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada regarding the danger of general war with the Soviet Union and the use of United States bases in the United Kingdom and Canada in the event of general war; arrangements for emergency use of U.S. strategic bases in foreign areas .......... 1590

The United States foreign information program .......... 1591

The report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953 .......... 1795

INDEX .......... 1903

# LIST OF SOURCES

This list provides a brief description of the unpublished sources which, in addition to the central decimal files of the Department of State, were used in the preparation of the volume. Published primary materials which were consulted are cited where appropriate throughout the volume.

*Department of State*

A/MS Files, Lot 54 D 291

Consolidated administrative files of the Department of State for the years 1949–1960, as maintained by the Management Staff of the Bureau of Administration.

Atomic Energy Files, Lot 57 D 688

Consolidated collection of documentation in the Department of State on atomic energy policy for the years 1944–1962, as maintained principally by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs but also by other offices of the Department of State.

CON Files, Lot 53 D 223

Files of the Office of Security and Consular Affairs from 1946 to 1953. Includes general administrative records, consular management files and miscellaneous subject files of divisional components of the office.

Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Disarmament Files, Lot 58 D 133

Consolidated collection of documentation in the Department of State on the regulation of armaments and disarmament for the years 1942–1962.

INR Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

INR Files, Lot 59 D 27

Miscellaneous files for the years 1948–1954 as retired by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research including master file of minutes of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC).

IO Files, Lot 60 D 463

Official United Nations documentation for the years 1946–1956, as maintained in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

IO Files, Lot 71 D 440

Master files of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the United Nations General Assembly for the years 1945-1965, maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence for the years 1947-1953 of the Policy Planning Staff.

PPS Files, Lot 65 D 101

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence for the year 1954 of the Policy Planning Staff.

PSB Files, Lot 62 D 333

Master file of minutes and papers of the Psychological Strategy Board for the years 1951-1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the heads of foreign governments for the years 1953-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/AE Files, Lot 68 D 358

Files relating to atomic energy policy matters for the years 1950-1967, maintained initially by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs and later by the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs.

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the years 1949-1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Secretary's Letters, Lot 56 D 459

Correspondence of the Secretary of State for the years 1945-1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/P-NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950-1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/P-NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948-1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947-1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for the years 1947-1963.

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 66 D 148

Miscellaneous files concerning subjects considered by the National Security Council during the period 1949-1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

State-JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1951-1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954-1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission at the United Nations.

*United States Department of Energy*

Atomic Energy Commission Files

Files of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, retained by the U.S. Department of Energy.

*United States Information Agency*

USIA Files, Lot 56 D 581

Miscellaneous files of the United States Information Agency.

USIA Files, Lot 60 D 322

Chronological files of the Director of USIA for the period of the 1950s.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas*

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952-1959. Dulles was Secretary of State, 1953-1959.

Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: The Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council

Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

Eisenhower Records

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (White House Central Files), including the daily appointment books of the President.

C.D. Jackson Papers

The papers of C.D. Jackson, 1931-1967. Jackson was Special Assistant to the President, 1953-1954.

Project "Clean Up"

Project "Clean Up" collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1953-1961.

Staff Secretary Records

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952-1961 (records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell).

*Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri*

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File (PSF)

Papers of Harry S. Truman as President, 1945-1953, maintained by his personal secretary.

*Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey*

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, including a daily log of his meetings and appointments as Secretary of State, 1953-1959.

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Editor's Note—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

**A**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration
**ADCOM**, Advisory Commission (or Committee)
**AE**, atomic energy
**AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission
**AFN**, Armed Forces Network
**A/FS**, Director General, Foreign Service, Department of State
**A/MS**, Management Staff, Department of State
**ANZUS**, Australia, New Zealand, United States
**ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
**ARA/P**, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
**BBC**, British Broadcasting Corporation
**BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
**BW**, biological warfare
**CA**, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
**CEA**, Council of Economic Advisers
**CEV**, Churchill-Eden visit
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency
**COMINT**, Communications Intelligence
**CON**, Office of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
**CPC**, Combined Policy Committee
**CS**, Division of Central Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State
**CSC**, Coal and Steel Community
**CW**, chemical warfare
**DAC**, Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament
**DC**, United Nations Disarmament Commission
**Delga**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
**Depcirtel**, Department of State circular telegram
**Deptel**, Department of State telegram
**DMPA**, Defense Materials Procurement Agency
**DMS**, Director for Mutual Security
**DOD**, Department of Defense
**Dulte**, primarily a series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while absent from Washington; also used as a series indicator for telegrams to Dulles from the head of the United States delegation at an international conference
**ECA**, Economic Cooperation Administration
**ECOSOC**, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
**ECSC**, European Coal and Steel Community
**EDC**, European Defense Community
**EPC**, European Political Community
**EUCOM**, European Command
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
**FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
**FBO**, Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, Department of State
**FCDA**, Federal Civil Defense Administration
**FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
**FECOM**, Far East Command
**FE/P**, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
**FI**, Foreign Service Inspection Corps, Department of State
**FOA**, Foreign Operations Administration
**FY**, fiscal year
**FYI**, for your information

**G**, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
**G-2**, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional level or higher
**G/PM**, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs
**GA**, General Assembly of the United Nations
**Gadel**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
**GER**, Bureau (from 1953, Office) of German Affairs, Department of State
**GER/P**, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau (from 1953, Office) of German Affairs, Department of State
**GSA**, General Services Administration
**H**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
**HICOG**, United States High Commissioner for Germany
**IAC**, Intelligence Advisory Committee
**IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency
**IAE/S**, Departmental Staff, Commission on Educational Exchange, United States International Information Administration
**IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
**IBS**, International Broadcasting Service
**ICIS**, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
**ICS**, Information Center Service
**IE**, Intelligence Estimate (Department of State)
**IFI**, Field Programs, United States International Information Administration
**IIA**, International Information Administration
**IIA:IPO**, Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Administration
**IIC**, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
**IMS**, International Motion Picture Service
**IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
**JAEIC**, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
**JCAE**, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
**JIC**, Joint Intelligence Committee
**KT**, kilotons
**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
**LOC**, line of communication
**L/P**, Assistant Legal Adviser for Public Affairs, Department of State
**L/UNA**, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
**MDAP**, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
**MGB**, Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security of the Soviet Union)
**MSA**, Mutual Security Agency
**MVD**, Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del' (Ministry of the Interior of the Soviet Union)
**NAO**, New York Administrative Office, United States International Information Agency
**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
**NCFE**, National Committee for a Free Europe
**NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
**NEA/P**, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
**niact**, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
**NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate
**NSC**, National Security Council
**NSRB**, National Security Resources Board
**OBF**, Office of Budget and Finance, Department of State
**OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
**ODM**, Office of Defense Mobilization
**OEEC**, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
**OII**, Office of International Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
**OIR**, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
**OM**, operations memorandum
**ONI**, Office of Naval Intelligence
**OOF**, Office of Operating Facilities, Department of State
**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense
**OWI**, Office of War Information
**P**, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
**PAO**, Public Affairs Officer

**PER**, Office of Personnel, Department of State
**POC**, Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee
**POW**, prisoner of war
**PPS**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
**PRS**, Program Planning and Evaluation Staff, Department of State
**PSB**, Psychological Strategy Board
**PSF**, President's Secretary's File (Truman Papers, Truman Library)
**PWR**, pressurized water reactor
**RAC**, Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments
**reftel**, reference telegram
**REP**, Division of Foreign Reporting, Department of State
**RFA**, Radio Free Asia
**RFC**, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
**RFE**, Radio Free Europe
**RIAS**, Radio in the American sector of Berlin
**ROK**, Republic of Korea
**RW**, Radiological warfare
**S/AE**, Office of the Special Assistant (after May 1954, Consultant) to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
**S/IAE**, Office of the United States Representative for International Atomic Energy Negotiations
**S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
**S/S-S**, Committee Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
**SAC**, Strategic Air Command
**SACEUR**, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
**SC**, Security Council of the United Nations
**SD-MICC (SD-MIC)**, State-Defense Military Information Control Committee
**SE**, Special Estimate
**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
**SY**, Division of Security, Bureau of Administration, Department of State to June 1953; thereafter, Office of Security, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
**SYG**, Secretary-General
**TAC**, Tactical Air Command
**TC**, Division of Language Services, Department of State
**TCA**, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State
**Tedul**, primarily a series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while absent from Washington; also used as a series indicator for telegrams from Dulles to the head of the United States Delegation at an international conference
**Tousi**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Information Agency from posts abroad
**U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State
**UK**, United Kingdom
**UNA**, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
**UNA/IC**, Division of International Conferences, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
**UNA/P**, United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
**UNA/R**, Refugees and Displaced Persons Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
**UNC**, United Nations Command
**UNDC**, United Nations Disarmament Commission
**UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
**UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
**USAF**, United States Air Force
**USCIB**, United States Communications Intelligence Board
**USDel**, United States Delegation
**USGS**, United States Geological Survey
**USIA**, United States Information Agency
**USIE**, United States Information and Education (program)
**USIIA**, United States International Information Administration
**USIS**, United States Information Service
**Usito**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Information Agency to posts abroad
**USUN**, United States Mission at the United Nations
**VOA**, Voice of America

# LIST OF PERSONS

EDITOR'S NOTE—The identification of the persons in this list is generally limited to positions and circumstances under reference in this volume and is confined to the 1952-1954 period. Where no dates are given, the individual usually held the position throughout that period. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. This list does not include individuals referred to only in passing, although such individuals are sometimes identified in context as their names appear.

ACHESON, Dean, Secretary of State until January 20, 1953.

ADAMS, Sherman, Assistant to the President after January 20, 1953.

ADENAUER, Dr. Konrad, Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

ALLEN, Raymond B., Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, January-August 1952.

ALLEN, Ward P., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

AMORY, Robert, Jr., Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency, from March 17, 1953; Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence from November 6, 1952; Assistant from February 19, 1953; Deputy for Intelligence from May 1953; Member of the Solarium Special Committee, 1953.

ANDERSON, Robert B., Secretary of the Navy after February 4, 1953; Deputy Secretary of Defense after May 3, 1954.

ARENDS, Representative Leslie C. (R-Illinois), House Majority Whip, 1953-1954; Member of the Armed Services Committee.

ARMSTRONG, W. Park, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State.

ARNESON, R. Gordon, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs until April 1954.

ARNOT, Charles P., Assistant Chief, International Press and Publications Division, United States International Information Agency; Assistant Administrator, International Press Service, after February 14, 1952.

ATTLEE, Clement R., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1945-1951; thereafter, Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons.

AUSTIN, Warren R., United States Representative at the United Nations until January 22, 1953.

BACON, Ruth E., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

BARBOUR, Walworth, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after May 26, 1954.

BECHHOEFER, Bernhard G., Officer in Charge, International Security Affairs, Department of State, until April 10, 1954; Special Assistant to the United States Representative for International Atomic Energy Negotiations after December 1, 1954.

BECKER, Loftis, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, January 1, 1952-April 30, 1953.

**Berding**, Andrew H., Assistant Director (Policies and Programs), United States Information Agency, after November 23, 1953.

**Bickel**, Alexander M., Special Assistant to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after August 24, 1953.

**Bidault**, Georges, French Minister of National Defense, 1952; Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 8, 1953–June 19, 1954.

**Block**, Ralph J., Acting Director, Foreign Policy Information Staff, Department of State; after August 16, 1953, Chief of the General Policy Information Staff, United States Information Agency.

**Bloomfield**, Lincoln P., Member, United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1953; Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, 1953; after July 1954, Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

**Boggs**, Marion W., Coordinator, National Security Council Staff Assistants, 1952; Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants, 1953–1954.

**Bohlen**, Charles E., Counselor of the Department of State and Member, Senior Staff, National Security Council, until March 1953; Ambassador in the Soviet Union from April 20, 1953.

**Bonbright**, James C. H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; after April 1954, Special Assistant to the United States Permanent Representative in Europe.

**Bonesteel**, Brigadier General Charles H., III, USA (Colonel until January 24, 1954), Assistant for National Security Council Affairs, Department of Defense, and Defense Member on the NSC Planning Board after June 1953.

**Bonnet**, Henri, French Ambassador in the United States.

**Bowie**, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, and State Member on the National Security Council Planning Board from May 18, 1953.

**Bracken**, Thomas E., Assistant Legal Adviser for Public Affairs, Department of State, until February 1954.

**Bradley**, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, until August 14, 1953.

**Bridges**, Senator Styles (R–New Hampshire), Senate Minority Leader, 1952; President pro tempore, U.S. Senate, and Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, 1953–1954.

**Brownell**, Herbert, Jr., Attorney General of the United States from January 21, 1953.

**Bruce**, David K. E., Ambassador in France until March 10, 1952; Under Secretary of State, April 1, 1952–January 20, 1953; Consultant to the Secretary of State until February 18, 1953; thereafter, Observer at the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community, at Paris, and Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community.

**Bundy**, McGeorge, Professor of Government, Harvard University; Secretary to the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, Department of State, 1952.

**Burns**, Dr. Arthur F., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, 1953–1954.

**Bush**, Dr. Vannevar, President of the Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C.; Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 1941–1946.

**Byroade**, Henry A., Director of German Affairs, Department of State, until April 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs from April 14, 1952.

**Cabell**, Lieutenant General Charles Pearre, USAF, Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until 1953; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence after April 23, 1953.

**Cabot**, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs after February 27, 1953; Ambassador in Sweden after May 6, 1954.

**Campbell**, John C., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1953–1954; Member of Task Force "B", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Carney**, Admiral Robert B., USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1952; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, 1952–1953; Chief of Naval Operations after August 17, 1953.

**Carns**, Brigadier General Edwin H.J., USA (Colonel until 1953), Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1952–1953; Secretary, 1953–1954.

**Carroll**, Brigadier General Paul T., USA (Colonel until 1953), Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer at the White House from January 21, 1953; died September 17, 1954.

**Chase**, Joseph, Member of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs, 1952–1953.

**Chase**, Warren M., United Nations Planning Staff Adviser, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until September 27, 1953; thereafter, Special Assistant to the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

**Cherwell**, Lord (Frederick Alexander Lindemann), British Paymaster-General and adviser to Prime Minister Churchill on scientific affairs.

**Churchill**, Winston S. (Sir Winston from April 24, 1953), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury.

**Clark**, William L., Assistant Director for the American Republics, United States Information Agency, after December 23, 1953.

**Cohen**, Benjamin V., Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, 1952.

**Cole**, Representative W. Sterling (R–New York), Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1953–1954.

**Collins**, General J. Lawton, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army, until August 14, 1953; U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee and Standing Group, August 1953–October 1954; Special Representative of the President in Vietnam with the rank of Ambassador after November 3, 1954.

**Compton**, Wilson S., Administrator, United States International Information Administration, January 1952–February 1953.

**Connors**, W. Bradley, Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans, United States International Information Administration, after March 25, 1952; detailed to the National War College, 1953–1954; Public Affairs Officer and Attaché in the United Kingdom after July 4, 1954.

**Conolly**, Admiral Richard L., USN, President of the Naval War College until 1953; Member of Task Force "C", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Cootes**, Merritt N., Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after August 26, 1952; Officer in Charge of Swiss-Benelux Affairs after August 29, 1954.

**Craig**, Horace S., Assistant Director, Office of Evaluation and Review, Psychological Strategy Board, 1952–1953.

**Cutler**, Robert, Administrative Assistant to the President, January 21–March 22, 1953; thereafter, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953.

**Dean**, Gordon E., Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission until June 3, 1953.

**Deane**, Major General John R., USA, Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union, 1943-1945; Member of Task Force "B", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Dickey**, John S., President of Dartmouth College; Member of the Secretary of State's Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 1952.

**Dixon**, Sir Pierson (John), British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until February 1, 1954; Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations from March 13, 1954.

**Dodge**, Joseph M., Director of the Bureau of the Budget, January 21, 1953-April 15, 1954; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy from December 1, 1954.

**Draper**, William H., Jr., United States Special Representative in Europe after January 18, 1952; U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, April 1952-June 1953.

**Dulles**, Allen W., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 26, 1953; thereafter, Director of Central Intelligence; Member of the Secretary of State's Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 1952.

**Dulles**, John Foster, Consultant to the Secretary of State until April 1952; Secretary of State after January 21, 1953.

**Eden**, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

**Eisenhower**, General of the Army Dwight D., USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until May 30, 1952; President of the United States after January 20, 1953.

**Eisenhower**, Milton S., brother of the President; President of Pennsylvania State University; Member of the President's Committee on Government Organization from 1953; Special Ambassador and Personal Representative of the President on Latin American Affairs from 1953.

**Elliott**, William Y., Assistant Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, 1952-1953; ODM Representative on the Planning Board of the National Security Council, 1953-1954.

**Fechteler**, Admiral William M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until August 16, 1953; thereafter, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

**Ferguson**, John H., Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1952-1953.

**Finletter**, Thomas K., Secretary of the Air Force until January 20, 1953.

**Fisher**, Adrian S., Legal Adviser of the Department of State until January 27, 1953.

**Flemming**, Arthur S., Assistant to the Director (Manpower), Office of Defense Mobilization, 1953; Director of ODM from 1953.

**Foley**, Edward H., Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury until January 20, 1953.

**Foster**, William C., Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1953.

**Fowler**, Henry H., Administrator, Defense Production Administration, 1952-1953; Assistant to the Director (Production), Office of Defense Mobilization, 1952-1953.

**Franks**, Sir Oliver, British Ambassador in the United States until February 1953.

**Gerhart**, Major General John K., USAF (Brigadier General until 1953), Deputy Director, Directorate of Operations, United States Air Force, 1952; Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1952-1954; JCS Representative on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council, 1952-1953, and on the NSC Planning Board, 1953-1954.

**Gerrety**, Joseph M., Head of the Executive Secretariat of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Administration, until June, 1953; Information Specialist, United States Information Agency after August 16, 1953.

**Glazebrook**, George P. de T., Minister, Canadian Embassy in the United States, after December 1953.

**Gleason**, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

**Goodpaster**, Colonel Andrew J., USA, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, 1952–1954; Member of Task Force "C", Project Solarium, 1953; Staff Secretary to the President after October 10, 1954.

**Gorrie**, Jack, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, 1952–1953.

**Gray**, Gordon, Director of the Psychological Strategy Board until January 1952; Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953.

**Gromyko**, Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1952 and after April 1953; Ambassador in the United Kingdom, August 1952–April 1953.

**Gullion**, Edmund A., Counselor of Embassy at Saigon, 1952; Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after September 26, 1952.

**Haden**, Allen, Chief of the Area Policy Planning Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Administration (United States Information Agency after August 1953), December 1952–March 1954.

**Hagerty**, James C., Press Secretary to the President after January 21, 1953.

**Hall**, John A., Chief of the Office of Special Projects, United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1952–1954; Director of the Office of International Affairs, USAEC, 1954.

**Halleck**, Representative Charles A. (R–Indiana), House Majority Leader, 1953–1954.

**Harlow**, Bryce N., Administrative Assistant to the President after January 21, 1953.

**Harriman**, W. Averell, Director for Mutual Security until January 20, 1953.

**Harris**, George L., Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1953.

**Heeney**, A.D.P., Canadian Ambassador in the United States after August 3, 1953.

**Henry**, Barklie McKee, New York banker; Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953.

**Hensel**, H. Struve, General Counsel, Department of Defense, August 17, 1953–March 4, 1954; Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) after March 5, 1954.

**Hickerson**, John D., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs until July 27, 1953.

**Hobby**, Oveta Culp, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare after April 11, 1953.

**Hoover**, Herbert Jr., Consultant to the Secretary of State after October 14, 1953; Under Secretary of State after October 4, 1954.

**Hoover**, J. Edgar, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

**Howe**, Fisher, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State.

**Hughes**, John C., Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953; United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council at Paris after June 12, 1953.

**Hughes**, Rowland R., Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1953–1954; Director after April 15, 1954.

**Hull**, General John E., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, until October 6, 1953; thereafter, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command in Korea and Commander in Chief, Far East.

**Humelsine**, Carlisle H., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration until February 13, 1953.

**Humphrey**, George M., Secretary of the Treasury after January 21, 1953.

**Hurtado**, Charles V., Chief of the Latin American Branch of the International Press Service, United States International Information Administration (United States Information Agency after August 1953).

**Huyler**, Coulter D., Jr., Special Assistant in the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, after November 9, 1952; transferred to the United States Information Agency and detailed to the Department of State, August 1, 1953; Attaché at Paris (NATO), after August 22, 1954.

**Jackson**, C. D., Special Assistant to the President, February 16, 1953–March 31, 1954; Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953; Member of the United States Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954.

**Jackson**, William H., Chairman of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953; former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (1950–1951).

**Jessup**, Philip C., Ambassador at Large until January 19, 1953.

**Johnson**, Joseph E., President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Member of the Secretary of State's Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 1952.

**Johnson**, Senator Lyndon B. (D–Texas), Member of the Armed Services Committee; Minority Floor Leader, 1953-1954.

**Johnson**, Robert L., Administrator, United States International Information Administration, February–August 1953.

**Kennan**, George F., Ambassador in the Soviet Union, May 14, 1952–September 19, 1952; Member of Task Force "A", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Key**, David McK., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (International Organization Affairs from August 25, 1954) after December 18, 1953.

**Keyserling**, Leon H., Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers until January, 1953.

**Kimball**, Arthur A., Assistant Administrator, Office of Management, United States International Information Administration, 1952–1953.

**Kimball**, Dan A., Secretary of the Navy until January 20, 1953.

**Kirk**, Admiral Alan G., USN (ret.), Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, 1952–1953.

**Kitchen**, Jeffrey C., Acting Chief of the Policy Reports Staff, Department of State, after May 26, 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 9, 1952–January 23, 1953; Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, January 23, 1953–October 10, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

**Knowland**, Senator William F. (R–California), Member of the Appropriations Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; Member of the Armed Services Committee, 1952, and the Foreign Relations Committee, 1953–1954; Senate Majority Leader, 1953-1954.

**Kyes**, Roger M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 2, 1953–May 1, 1954; Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953.

**Lalor**, Rear Admiral William G., USN (ret.), Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1952–1953.

**Laniel**, Joseph, Prime Minister of France, June 28, 1953–June 19, 1954.

**Larmon**, Sigurd, advertising executive; Member of the United States Advisory Committee on Information; Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953.

**Lawton**, Frederick J., Director of the Bureau of the Budget until January 20, 1953.

**Lay**, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

**LeBaron**, Robert, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Defense, and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) until August 1, 1954.

**Lemnitzer**, Lieutenant General Lyman L., USA (Major General until August 1, 1952), Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, United States Army, after August 1, 1952; Member, Task Force "C", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Lie**, Trygve H., Secretary-General of the United Nations until April 10, 1953.

**Lilienthal**, David E., Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, November 1946–February 1950.

**Lincoln**, Colonel George A., USA, Member of Task Force "A", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Lindemann**, Frederick Alexander. *See* Cherwell.

**Livermore**, Shaw, Assistant to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until January 1953.

**Lodge**, Henry Cabot, Jr., Senator (R-Massachusetts), 1952; United States Representative at the United Nations after January 26, 1953.

**Loper**, Major General Herbert B., USA (ret.) (Brigadier General until 1952; retired 1953), Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Army, 1952–1953; Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Defense, and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), after August 9, 1954.

**Lourie**, Donold B., Under Secretary of State for Administration, February 16, 1953–March 5, 1954.

**Lovett**, Robert A., Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1953.

**MacArthur**, Douglas II, Counselor of Embassy in France until October 15, 1952; Counselor of the Department of State after March 30, 1953.

**MacKnight**, Jesse M., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

**Makins**, Sir Roger, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until December 30, 1952; Ambassador in the United States after January 7, 1953.

**Malenkov**, Georgiy Maksimilianovich, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union until March 1953; thereafter, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Member of the Presidium (Politburo until October 1952) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

**Malik**, Yakov Alexsandrovich, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until March 1953; thereafter, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

**Mao Tse-tung**, Chairman, Central People's Government Council, People's Republic of China, until September 1954; thereafter, Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

**Martin**, Jacques, First Secretary, French Embassy after June 1953.

**Martin**, Representative Joseph M., Jr. (R-Massachusetts), Minority Leader of the House, 1952; Speaker of the House, 1953–1954.

**Matthews**, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until October 11, 1953; Ambassador in the Netherlands from November 25, 1953.

**McCardle**, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs after January 30, 1953.

McCarthy, Senator Joseph R. (R-Wisconsin), Chairman of the Government Operations Committee, 1953-1954.

McClurkin, Robert J. G., Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, until September 9, 1954; thereafter, Acting Director.

McCormack, Major General James, Jr., USAF, Member, Task Force "B", Project Solarium, 1953.

McCormack, Representative John W. (D-Massachusetts), Majority Leader of the House, 1952; Democratic Whip, 1953-1954.

McIlvaine, Robinson, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs after July 19, 1953; Special Assistant after March 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs after July 19, 1954.

McMahon, Senator Brien (D-Connecticut), Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; died July 28, 1952.

McNeil, Wilfred J., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Menon, V. K. Krishna, Representative, Indian Delegations to the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952-1953; Chairman of the Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session, 1954; Representative on the Trusteeship Council, 1954.

Merchant, Livingston T., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until March 24, 1952; then Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe, at Paris, until March 11, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after March 16, 1953.

Meyers, Howard, Member of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr., Assistant Staff Secretary to the President after January 21, 1953.

Moch, Jules, French Representative to the United Nations Disarmament Commission; French Representative to the Subcommittee of Five of the Disarmament Commission, 1954.

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union after March 1953; Member of the Politburo (Presidium, from October 1952) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Montgomery, Edward P., Chief of the Current Information Policy Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Administration (United States Information Agency after August 1953), 1952-1953; Acting Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, 1954.

Morton, Thruston B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations after January 30, 1953.

Murphy, Charles S., Special Counsel to the President until January 20, 1953.

Murphy, Robert D., Ambassador in Belgium until March 19, 1952; Ambassador in Japan, May 9, 1952-April 28, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, July 28, 1953-November 1953; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs after November 30, 1953.

Murray, Thomas E., Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

Nash, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 10, 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), February 11, 1953-February 28, 1954.

Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

Nitze, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until April 1953.

Nixon, Richard M., Senator (R-California), 1952; Vice President of the United States after January 20, 1953.

NOLTING, Frederick E., Jr., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1952–1953; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after August 4, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after January 4, 1954.

NOYES, Charles P., Representative of the Department of Defense on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council, 1952–1953.

O'CONNOR, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State after January 21, 1953; Special Assistant after February 21, 1954.

OPPENHEIMER, J. Robert, Director of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey; Chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the United States Atomic Energy Commission until August 8, 1952; Chairman of the Secretary of State's Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 1952.

PEARSON, Lester B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

PENFIELD, James K., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until August 1954; thereafter, Deputy Chief of Mission in Austria; Member, Task Force "B", Project Solarium, 1953.

PERKINS, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until January 31, 1953.

PERSONS, Major General Wilton B., USA, Special Assistant to the President after January 21, 1953.

PETERSON, Val, Administrative Assistant to the President, January 21–March 1, 1953; thereafter, Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

PHILLIPS, Joseph B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, March 6–October 23, 1952; Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, until June 30, 1954.

PHLEGER, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State after February 2, 1953.

POPPER, David H., Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, until October 24, 1954; thereafter, Director.

PRATT, James W., Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1954.

QUARLES, Donald A., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) after September 1, 1953.

RABI, Isidor I., Professor of Physics at Columbia University; Member of the General Advisory Committee of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; Chairman after October 1952.

RADFORD, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, until July 10, 1953; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after August 15, 1953.

RADIUS, Walter A., Director of the Management Staff, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, from July 1952; Operations Coordinator in the Office of the Under Secretary of State, September 1953–November 1954; thereafter, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

RAINE, Philip, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, after January 22, 1952.

RAYBURN, Representative Sam (D–Texas), Speaker of the House, 1952; Democratic Floor Leader, 1953–1954.

RAYNOR, G. Hayden, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.

REINHARDT, G. Frederick, Counselor of Embassy in France; Member of Task Force "C", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Ridgway**, General Matthew B., USA, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, until May, 1952; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, June 1952–May 1953; Chief of Staff, United States Army, after August 15, 1953.

**Roberts**, Edward V., Chief of the News Policy Staff, Office of Policy and Programs, United States Information Agency, 1953–1954.

**Robertson**, Walter S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs after April 8, 1953.

**Salt**, Barbara, First Secretary, British Embassy in the United States.

**Saltonstall**, Senator Leverett (R–Massachusetts), Member of the Committees on Armed Services (Chairman, 1953–1954) and Appropriations.

**Sanders**, William, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, and Planning Adviser, United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until October 11, 1953.

**Sandifer**, Durward V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs until February 28, 1954.

**Sanger**, Richard H., Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, 1953–1954.

**Savage**, Carlton, Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

**Sawyer**, Charles, Secretary of Commerce until January 1953.

**Schwinn**, Walter K., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until November 5, 1954.

**Scott**, Robert H. (Sir Robert from June 10, 1954), British Minister in the United States from July 15, 1953.

**Scott**, Walter K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration until March 21, 1954; thereafter, Director of the Executive Secretariat.

**Shepherd**, General Lemuel C., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

**Smith**, Gerard C., Special Assistant to the Commissioner, United States Atomic Energy Commission until April 12, 1954; thereafter, Consultant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs.

**Smith**, Rear Admiral H. Page, USN (Captain until 1953), Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense, 1952–1953; Member of Task Force "A", Project Solarium, 1953.

**Smith**, General Walter Bedell, USA, Director of Central Intelligence until February 9, 1953; Under Secretary of State, February 9, 1953–October 1, 1954.

**Smyth**, Henry D., Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission until September 30, 1954.

**Snapp**, Roy B., Secretary to the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

**Sohm**, Earl D., Chief, Committee Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, after March 31, 1952; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Administration after February 17, 1953.

**Sprague**, Robert C., Chairman of the Board of the Sprague Electric Company; Consultant to the National Security Council and the Senate Armed Services Committee on Continental Defense, 1953–1954.

**Staats**, Elmer B., Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board, 1953–1954.

**Stalin**, Generalissimo and Marshal of the Soviet Union Iosif Vissarionovich, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; died March 5, 1953.

**Stassen**, Harold E., Director for Mutual Security after January 20, 1953; Director for Foreign Operations after August 1, 1953.

**Steel**, Sir Christopher E., British Minister in the United States, 1952–1953; Permanent British Representative to the North Atlantic Council and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, at Paris, after August 18, 1953.

**Stegmaier**, John L., Member of the Division of Public Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until March 1954; thereafter, Acting Officer in Charge of Public Affairs.

**Stephens**, Thomas E., Special Counsel and Appointments Secretary to the President after January 21, 1953.

**Stevens**, Robert T., Secretary of the Army after February 4, 1953.

**Stoessel**, Walter J., Jr., Member of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1954; Acting Director in Charge of Soviet Affairs after March 1954.

**Straus**, Richard, Member of the Office of German Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1954; Acting Public Affairs Adviser, 1953.

**Strauss**, Lewis L., Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission after July 2, 1953; also Special Assistant to the President on atomic energy matters after March 9, 1953.

**Streibert**, Theodore C., Director of the United States Information Agency after August 1, 1953.

**Taber**, Representative John (R–New York), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, 1953–1954.

**Talbott**, Harold E., Secretary of the Air Force after February 4, 1953.

**Taylor**, Lieutenant General Maxwell D., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, United States Army, 1952–1953; Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea after February 1953.

**Thurston**, Ray L., Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1954; Director after May 26, 1954.

**Tomkins**, Edward E., First Secretary, British Embassy in the United States.

**Truman**, Harry S., President of the United States until January 20, 1953.

**Tufts**, Robert W., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until April 1953.

**Twining**, General Nathan F., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 1952–1953; Chief of Staff after June 30, 1953.

**Utter**, John E., Consul, Embassy in France, until March 20, 1952; Director of the Office of African Affairs, Department of State, after September 2, 1952.

**Vandenberg**, General Hoyt S., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, until June 29, 1953.

**Van Hollen**, Christopher, Staff Member, Executive Secretriat, Department of State, until December 1954.

**Vedeler**, Harold C., Officer in Charge of Polish, Baltic, and Czechoslovak Affairs, Department of State.

**Vyshinsky**, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs until March 1953; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations, 1953–1954; died Novembver 22, 1954.

**Wadsworth**, James J., Acting Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952–1953; Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations after February 23, 1953; also Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission after August 1953.

**Wailes**, Edward T., Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (then Personnel and Administration from March 26, 1954), May 29, 1953–June 22, 1954; Ambassador in South Africa after September 15, 1954.

**Wainhouse**, David W., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, until February 1954; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (International Organization Affairs from August 25, 1954).

**Washburn**, Abbott M., Executive Secretary of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953; Deputy Special Assistant to the President, 1953; Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency after November 30, 1953.

**Watts**, Philip H., Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff, 1952–1954.

**Waugh**, Samuel C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs after June 5, 1953.

**Wiley**, Senator Alexander (R-Wisconsin), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1953–1954.

**Wilson**, Charles Edward, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until January 1953.

**Wilson**, Charles Erwin, Secretary of Defense after January 28, 1953.

**Wisner**, Frank, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.

**Wood**, C. Tyler, Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe, 1952; Associate Deputy Director, Mutual Security Agency, 1952; Deputy to the Director, MSA, 1953; Member, Task Force "A", Project Solarium, 1953; United Nations Command Economic Coordinator (Seoul, Korea), Foreign Operations Administration, 1953–1954.

**Zarubin**, Georgiy Nikolaeyevich, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 1952; Soviet Ambassador in the United States after September 25, 1952.

**Zorin**, Valerian Aleksandrovich, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, also Soviet Representative at the United Nations, 1952–1953.

# POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS; PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S "ATOMS FOR PEACE" PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 8, 1953; OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY [1]

## *Editorial Note*

On January 11, 1952, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 502 (VI): "Regulations, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; International Control of Atomic Energy". The resolution, originally sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, was approved by a vote of 42–5–7, with the Soviet Union in opposition. According to the provisions of the resolution, a Disarmament Commission was established under the Security Council with the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The resolution dissolved the Atomic Energy Commission and recommended to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission on Conventional Armaments (accomplished by the Council on January 30, 1952). Under Resolution 502 (VI), the Disarmament Commission was directed to prepare proposals for the regulation of armaments and the international control of atomic energy, and to submit a first report by June 1, 1952. For the text of Resolution 502 (VI), see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, volume I, page 613; or Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* 2 volumes (Government Printing Office, 1960), volume I, pages 337–339.

Regarding events leading to the adoption of Resolution 502 (VI), see National Security Council Progress Report, January 29, 1952, page 859. For detailed documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume I, pages 443 ff.

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 443 ff. and 685 ff. For documentation on U.S. national security policy, see pp. 1 ff. Documentation on discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada concerning the threat of general war with the Soviet Union is scheduled for publication in volume VI. For additional documentation on nuclear weapons strategy, see vol. V, Part 1, pp. 482 ff.

For extensive additional information on U.S. atomic energy policy, see Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield, 1947–1952: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, volume II (University Park, Pa., The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969).

For information on the operations of the Disarmament Commission, see Bernhard C. Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations on Arms Control* (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1961). Bechhoefer was Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, during 1952–1954. See also Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I; Department of State, *United States Efforts Toward Disarmament: Report to the President by the Deputy U.S. Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission*, Publication 4902 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953); and *The Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1952, 1953, and 1954 (New York, United Nations Publications, 1953–1955). Unpublished materials, including records of the Commission, are in Department of State Lot files 58 D 133 (Disarmament files) and 60 D 463 (IO files).

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Truman-Churchill Talks"

## *Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson,* [1] *to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 15, 1952.

Subject: Follow-Up of Truman-Churchill Talks: [2] Technical Cooperation in Atomic Energy

At the Truman-Churchill meeting on Monday afternoon, January 7, the Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom hoped for the maximum amount of cooperation with the United States in the field of atomic energy to the extent permitted by United States legislation. He wanted Lord Cherwell to discuss the matter further with the AEC and also with General Smith of CIA. The President responded that he was quite agreeable to having talks on technical cooperation proceed as suggested and thought that what the Prime Minister was asking made good sense to him. He stressed particularly that he thought it was important to cooperate in trying to find out what the Russians were doing.

The requested meetings of Lord Cherwell with the Commission and with General Smith were held on Thursday, January 10. The first, dealing with the general field of technical cooperation in atomic energy, was held in Chairman Dean's office. Among those present on our side were Commissioner Smyth, Commissioner Murray, Mr. LeBaron, and myself. Lord Cherwell was accompanied by Sir Roger Makins, Sir Christopher Steel, and two technical advisers. Mr. Dean stated that the Commission was anxious to give full effect to the views expressed in the Truman-Churchill meeting and intended to take a more liberal view in interpreting the nine areas of cooperation set forth in the *modus vivendi* [3] and also to examine most sympathetically with the United Kingdom specific cases of cooperation which might be worked out under the recent amendment to the Act. [4] Mr. LeBaron, while subscribing to the idea that specific cases should be examined on their merits, went on at some length to state to all present that inasmuch as the Pentagon had not participated in the activities culminating in the recent amendment he thought that he and the JCS might have some difficulty in going along with specific proposals that might be drawn\up. He inferred that the JCS and his office might come up with different answers in the light of what he termed their "constitutional responsibilities for the national security". Without further characterization of the views stated by Mr. LeBaron, it seems clear that the spirit and intent of the Truman-Churchill exchange has not been instilled in Mr. LeBaron. This was evident to all participants at the meeting.

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[1] Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs.

[2] British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill visited Washington Jan. 5–9 and 16–18, 1952, for talks with President Truman on a wide range of issues, including atomic energy. For documentation on the question of emergency use of U.S. bases in Britain and on the Truman-Churchill conversations, see volume VI. Regarding atomic energy aspects of the talks, see also Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 573–575, and Margaret M. Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952*, 2 vols. (London, Macmillan, 1974), vol. I, pp. 410–414.

I understand that Lord Cherwell will have, in all probability, spoken to the Prime Minister about this meeting. It is possible, although not certain, that Churchill may wish to speak either to the President or to Secretary Lovett about the Defense attitude as revealed in this meeting. You will probably want, therefore, to alert the President and Secretary Lovett to this possibility. When you do so you may wish to suggest that steps be taken within the Department of Defense that the President's views on this matter be made clear and that his policy should be followed.

As to the second meeting with General Smith on scientific atomic energy intelligence cooperation, positive progress was registered. General Smith undertook to press vigorously for a wider exchange of information in this field. He pointed out to Lord Cherwell that we would have to go the route laid down in the recent Atomic Energy Act amendment. He thought that the case was quite clear cut and should not encounter any serious obstacles. I believe that Lord Cherwell and his colleagues were pleased with the outcome of this meeting.[5]

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[3] The *modus vivendi* for cooperation in the field of atomic energy was recorded in the minutes of the Combined Policy Committee, Jan. 7, 1948; for text of the minutes, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, p. 679.

[4] Reference is to P.L. 82-235, Oct. 30, 1951, which amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 in order to permit the exchange of certain types of atomic energy information with other nations. For documentation on the 1951 amendment, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 685 ff.

R. GORDON ARNESON

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[5] Apparently, no further negotiations concerning the exchange of atomic energy information occurred during the Churchill visit, nor did the communiqué of the conference mention the subject. The President and the Prime Minister did discuss other atomic energy matters—use policy and the possible disclosure of wartime understandings—on Jan. 18. For minutes of that session, see volume VI.

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S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 120 Series

## *Report to the President by the National Security Council*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 16, 1952.

NSC 120/2

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON COMMUNICATION OF DATA TO CANADIANS CONCERNING NEW ORE REFINERY

References:

A. NSC 120[2] and NSC 120/1[3]

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 16, 1952[3]

C. Public Law 235, 82nd Congress

At the 111th meeting[4] with the President presiding, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, considered and adopted the reference draft report on the subject (NSC 120/1), subject to the addition of a sentence at the end of paragraph 3 to take account of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated by the reference memorandum and appended hereto. The report, as amended and adopted, is enclosed.

Accordingly, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, submit the enclosed report to the President for his consideration in response to NSC 120 as a written recommendation pursuant to subsection 10

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[1] By memorandum of Jan. 17, Executive Secretary Lay informed the National Security Council that President Truman had on that day made the determination recommended in paragraph 5 of this report and had so advised the Atomic Energy Commission. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 120 Series)

[2] For NSC 120, Dec. 21, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 794.

[3] Not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 120 Series)

[4] Jan. 11.

(a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended by Public Law 235, 82nd Congress.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

## REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON COMMUNICATION OF DATA TO CANADIANS CONCERNING NEW ORE REFINERY

1. At the direction of the President, the National Security Council, with the participation of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has considered the letter to the President from the Atomic Energy Commission, dated December 19, 1951,[5] and the report attached thereto[6] in which the Commission requested that the President act favorably in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10 (a) (3) and 5 (a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended by Public Law 235, 82nd Congress, so as to permit a proposed arrangement whereby:

a. The Atomic Energy Commission may communicate to the Canadian Government such restricted information as may be necessary to enable the Canadians to design, construct and operate a uranium ore refinery incorporating the most recent U.S. technology, and which would be capable of processing all Canadian ore concentrates to a product meeting specifications as a feed to the U.S. metal production chain.

b. The Atomic Energy Commission may authorize a U.S. company to assist the Canadians in this program.

2. In this connection the National Security Council notes that:

a. The Atomic Energy Commission has unanimously adjudged that the common defense and security would be substantially promoted and would not be endangered if the Commission enters into and carries out the specific arrangements referred to in their letter of December 19, 1951 and more specifically described in the report attached thereto.

b. The proposed arrangement does not involve the communication of restricted data on design and fabrication of atomic weapons.

c. The proposed arrangement does not involve a nation threatening the security of the United States.

d. The restricted data involved will be limited and circumscribed to the maximum degree consistent with the common defense and security objective in view, and in the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission and under the conditions specified in the report attached to the Commission's letter of December 19, 1951, the recipient nation's security standards applicable to the data involved are adequate.

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[5] The reference letter was circulated in NSC 120, Dec. 21, 1951; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 795.

[6] Not printed.

e. This exchange of restricted information will be limited, under the proposed arrangement, to processes involving current and presently contemplated United States refineries and will not involve processes of entirely different natures which may be developed in the future. Within the above limitation, this proposed arrangement envisions a continuing exchange of restricted information between the Canadians and the Atomic Energy Commission in those phases of development, design and operation which will allow the Canadians to operate at the highest possible efficiency the uranium refinery or refineries which will be constructed by the Canadians.

3. The National Security Council also notes the degree of security sensitivity of the restricted data involved and the adequacy and sufficiency of the security safeguards undertaken to be maintained by the Canadians, as described in the Atomic Energy Commission's letter of December 19, 1951 and the report attached thereto. In addition, it is noted that the detailed agreement will contain an understanding that the Canadian Government will not reveal any of the data to any other nation.

4. Under these conditions the National Security Council concludes that the proposed arrangement will be advantageous to the security of the United States from the viewpoint of domestic, foreign and military policies.

*Recommendation*

5. The National Security Council, with the participation of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, therefore recommends that the President determine that:

a. The proposed arrangement, under the conditions specified above and by the Atomic Energy Commission in its letter of December 19, 1951 and the report attached thereto, would substantially promote and would not endanger the common defense and security of the United States, giving specific consideration to the security sensitivity of the restricted data involved and the adequacy and sufficiency of the security safeguards undertaken to be maintained by the recipient nation.

b. The common defense and security will not be adversely affected by the Atomic Energy Commission's authorizing a United States contractor or contractors to assist the Canadians in carrying out the proposed arrangement, under the conditions specified by the Commission in its letter of December 19, 1951 and the report attached thereto.

Appendix

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

SECRET WASHINGTON, 16 January 1952.

Subject: Communication of Data to Canadians Concerning New Ore Refinery

Reference: NSC 120/1

In considering both a memorandum from the Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to NSC 120, and NSC 120/1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the following views which are forwarded for the information of the National Security Council. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the memoranda referenced above* and NSC 120/1 and have determined that the proposed arrangement would not endanger, but would substantially promote the common defense and security of the United States. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the detailed agreement should contain an understanding that the Canadian Government will not reveal any of the data to any other nation".

For the Secretary of Defense:
K. R. KREPS
*Colonel, USAF, Deputy Director*
*Executive Office of the Secretary*

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*The memorandum initiated by Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to Atomic Energy Commission with respect to NSC 120, and a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense requesting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 120/1. [Footnote in the source text. Neither memorandum is printed.]

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Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "Atomic Energy—Expansion of the Fissionable"

## *Memorandum for the President* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1952.

The following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the meeting on January 16, 1952 of the Special Committee of the Na-

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[1] The identity of the drafting officer is not indicated on the source text, but presumably was NSC Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr. By memorandum of Jan. 14, Lay had notified the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that the President would meet with the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, as well as the Directors of Defense Mobilization and of the Bureau of the Budget, in the Cabinet Room of the White House on Jan. 16 immediately following the regular NSC meeting which would begin at 3:30 p.m. Lay includ-

*Continued*

tional Security Council on Atomic Energy, consisting for this purpose of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Defense Mobilization, at which you presided. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Brig. General H. B. Loper also attended the meeting.

The President stated that in anticipation of this very important meeting he had outlined an agenda which he proposed to follow if the members of the Special Committee found this agreeable. The President then read the items on this agenda.

The President then went on to say that it seemed to him that the fundamental problem involved in consideration of the proposed program for the expansion of fissionable materials production, was the impact of such a program on other vital programs in the rearmament effort on which we were presently engaged. It would be up to the Department of Defense representatives to tell us now their view of the relationship between these various parts of the rearmament effort and which among them were most important. Of particular concern, he added, was the problem of fitting the proposed expansion of fissionable materials production into the general objectives of the Department of Defense as set forth in the recently developed budget for Fiscal Year 1953. Mr. Wilson, added the President, would have to know the facts about this impact if he were to judge its effect upon other programs and upon the civilian economy. Moreover, the President wished to have the whole problem thoroughly thrashed out in the present discussion so that a wise decision could be reached. He then invited Secretary Lovett and General Vandenberg to speak first on the military requirements as presented by the Department of Defense.

Secretary Lovett began his statement with a brief summary of the background of the present proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a 50% expansion of plutonium production and a 150% expansion of oralloy production over and above the amounts contemplat-

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ed in his Jan. 14 memorandum an announcement of the agenda for the Jan. 16 meeting which would consist of oral presentations: (a) by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding increased requirements for atomic weapons and the military considerations involved therein; (b) by the Secretary of State concerning the desirability of increased production of atomic weapons in the light of possible future international developments affecting national security; (c) by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission concerning the feasibility of proposed programs for expanding fissionable materials production; and (d) by the Director of Defense Mobilization regarding the effect on the national economy and on other defense programs of the proposed expansion of fissionable materials production. (Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "Expansion of the Fissionable")

On Jan. 17, Lay circulated to the same addressees a summary memorandum of Presidential action at the Jan. 16 meeting. (Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "Expansion of the Fissionable") ed by the present expansion program of the Atomic Energy Commission. Secretary Lovett noted the original request of Senator McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee, and indicated that the Joint Chiefs' statement of requirements, originally drawn up in October 1951, was a response to Senator McMahon's request.[2] Secretary Lovett pointed out that planning for the proposed expansion had had to be carefully related both to practical feasibility and to fiscal considerations. He further noted that recent technological advances opened up the prospect of almost limitless possibilities in the use of fissionable materials. Accordingly it was necessary, in formulating the military uses of the fissionable materials production, to take account of weapons which could now be used for tactical as well as for strategic purposes, and by the Army as well as by the Air Force and the Navy. It was no longer necessary to think only in terms of indiscriminate bombing of targets, but of selective strategic bombing and of increasing possibilities for the use of atomic weapons for tactical purposes. It was with all this in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed in October on the magnitude of their requirements and on the desirability of the . . . expansion which they were now presenting.

Moreover, Secretary Lovett added, the Joint Chiefs were concerned not only with the need for an increase in the stockpile of available atomic weapons, but with the desirability of meeting their requirements at an earlier date than could be reached under presently planned production. Secretary Lovett then stated the figure which constituted the minimum requirements of the three Services, which figure they desired to reach at the earliest possible date. With existing and presently planned facilities, this figure could not be reached until 1965, but if the October recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were followed, they hoped to reach this goal five years earlier, in 1960. In short, said Secretary Lovett, the expenditure of the five billion dollars which the . . . program would cost, would enable the Joint Chiefs of Staff to attain their minimum requirements five years earlier.

The President inquired whether the . . . program thus described by Secretary Lovett was an addition to the expansion program upon which we were now engaged.

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[2] In a Senate speech of Sept. 18, 1951, Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, advocated rapid expansion of the atomic energy development and production program with a view to achieving a maximum nuclear defense posture. During the remainder of 1951, the Joint Congressional Committee and the Executive Branch, particularly the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, engaged in extensive consideration of possible expansion of the atomic energy program. For additional information, see Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 556–572.

Secretary Lovett replied in the affirmative, and then asked General Loper to explain the details more fully by the use of charts.

When General Loper had concluded his presentation, Secretary Lovett said it was important to emphasize the fact that in view of the length of time which would elapse before the completion of the new expansion program, the most severe impact, financially and materials-wise, would not be felt until most of the other rearmament programs had been completed. Indeed, continued Secretary Lovett, he had been greatly surprised and relieved that the impact was not worse than it actually was, and he pointed out his conviction that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had tried to exert all possible restraint in the formulation of their requirements.

Secretary Lovett said that General Vandenberg was better qualified to explain the problems and responsibilities with which, as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, he was now charged. These included the air defense of the United States, strategic operations of the NATO forces, and also a very large-scale tactical air operation requiring perhaps nine thousand conventional aircraft. Secretary Lovett pointed out that colossal savings in the costs of the energy release required to do this job could be expected from the use of atomic weapons, which were, he said, the most efficient energy-releasing units that the world had ever seen. One ton of TNT used in ordinary bombs now costs $1,700. The same explosive effect could actually be obtained from fissionable materials at a cost of only $23.

Secretary Lovett then asked General Vandenberg to enlarge on the subject with which he had been dealing.

General Vandenberg explained the difficulties that the three Services had encountered in their attempt to make a judicious division of the atomic weapons resources available to them. He pointed out that recent technological advances had brought in the Army, as well as the Air Force and the Navy, as having legitimate demands on the stockpile of weapons. While we knew much less about the target systems for the Soviet Union than we had known for Germany in the last war, it was believed that there were . . . Soviet targets which would have to be destroyed if the war-making potential of the USSR were to be destroyed in the event of war. It would be impossible to accomplish this task unless many more bombs were available. Moreover, room must be left for a considerable margin of error in our knowledge of significant targets in the Soviet Union. General Vandenberg concluded by restating Secretary Lovett's minimum requirements figure.

The President then turned to Secretary Acheson and inquired his opinion as to the possibility that present disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union might lead to a situation in which firm agreements could be achieved.

Secretary Acheson said that he was obliged to reply that any such disarmament agreement was highly unlikely in the course of the period covered by the JSC expansion program. He added his own emphatic agreement with the recommendations of the Department of Defense, stated that he felt it was very important to assure these minimum requirements in weapons, and stated his belief that the impact of the new program would probably come at a time when the economy of the country could stand it.

The President observed that the dilemma in which we found ourselves was not unlike that occasioned during the last war by the necessity to manufacture poison gasses even though we devoutly hoped that they would not have to be used, which turned out to be the case.

Secretary Lovett commented that while the analogy was a good one, in point of fact fissionable materials, unlike the gasses alluded to by the President, were not entirely wasted but could be reworked and used again.

Mr. Dean agreed in general with Secretary Lovett's point, but emphasized that if you were thinking of using increased amounts of fissionable materials for peacetime purposes, you would certainly not build the kind of facilities which were contemplated in the present expansion program. In short, said Mr. Dean, we must not kid ourselves that this production will have peacetime uses, even though the materials themselves would not be dissipated and indeed would be usable even after five thousand years.

The President observed that none of us need worry about conditions after five thousand years. What concerned him was the overhead that is needed and what constituted waste over and beyond the fissionable materials themselves. He presumed this included the cases for atomic weapons and the like.

Mr. Dean reiterated that from the point of view of peacetime uses the facilities at Oak Ridge and Hanford, and so on, must be described as wasted. You would not build such facilities for production for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Dean then went on to state his general position with respect to the . . . expansion program. He pointed out that because the AEC had not come out strongly in favor of this expansion, it was not to be inferred that the AEC opposed it. What he and the other Commissioners wanted was to assure that the problem was discussed in the National Security Council, where all the pertinent considerations could be thoroughly explored.

Mr. Dean then discussed the problems of the rate and timing of fissionable materials production, under various alternative programs, by the use of charts. These indicated, according to Mr. Dean, the critical importance of time as the determining factor in any judgment with respect to the desirability of the proposed program.

Secretary Lovett concurred that the value which we put on getting our requirements in 1960 instead of 1965 was indeed the decisive factor, and in this point there was unanimity among the military. The Soviets, he said, were building up to a point where their atomic capability would soon become very dangerous.

General Vandenberg enlarged on this point by indicating that the time will come when both the United States and the Soviet Union will have sufficient stocks of atomic bombs to deal one another the gravest kind of blow, or, as he put it, "do a job on each other." After that point has been reached, said General Vandenberg, all bombs would in a sense be surplus and the crucial advantage would lie with the power which was in a position to make the best tactical use of atomic weapons. The danger point, he said in conclusion, would be at the point when the Soviet Union would be in a position to employ atomic weapons for tactical purposes, which point he estimated would be about 1955.

Mr. Dean then changed the subject, and pointed out the necessity for very high priorities if the dates and demands of the proposed expansion were to be met and results to be achieved in 1957 or 1958. We are already slipping some six months, he added, on the present expansion program. Certainly, without higher priorities than have been given to the present program, it would be impossible to achieve the results contemplated in the . . . program.

The President then inquired Mr. Wilson's views on the problem.

Mr. Wilson replied that he wanted to explain and justify the points which he had stressed in his letter of January 7 to the Council on this subject.[3] He admitted that the problems which had so concerned him in this letter had been substantially clarified and answered by the discussion he had listened to in this meeting. The only unanswered question and problem now seemed to him to be the possibilities which might exist for substantially increasing production of fissionable materials in the facilities which now existed or were now being built. Is it reasonable to assume, he inquired, that the AEC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken into consideration the potentialities for large increases in production prior to 1955 which would flow from technological advances in existing or planned facilities? If the answer to this question was "yes", said Mr. Wilson, he would then go along with the proposal for the . . . expansion. In other words, if we have assured ourselves that, even taking into account the possibilities of increasing output from the existing and planned facilities, there is no hope of reaching the minimum requirements stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then Mr. Wilson certainly favored the five billion dollar expansion program.

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[3] Not found.

In reply to Mr. Wilson's question, Mr. Dean said that while undoubtedly considerable increases were to be anticipated through technological improvements, it would still be impossible to close the gap and meet the JCS minimum requirements without their proposed expansion program, in the time limit they desired.

Mr. Wilson then added that one other very good reason for this five billion dollar insurance policy was the possibility suggested by Secretary Lovett and General Vandenberg, that atomic weapons would replace in part conventional weapons. Doesn't this view, suggested Mr. Wilson, indicate that we should be able to save on other armament to the amount of one billion dollars a year?

Secretary Lovett and General Vandenberg agreed that substitution was possible, and pointed out that this was illustrated by what had been said earlier as to the saving in the use of TNT.

Mr. Wilson said, "Okay, this is not so much an increase, then, as a substitution." As for impact, he continued, he was not in a position to answer with certainty as yet, but it was his preliminary judgment that the program was feasible from a materials point of view. The resources of certain metals, notably copper, would be heavily strained, but, speaking frankly, in view of the obvious need for the expansion and in the light of what had been said about the phasing out of the programs, Mr. Wilson believed we ought to undertake the expansion and that we could do it. This would mean that we would have to continue cut-backs on civilian production in certain areas beyond the time when he had expected that it would be possible for civilian production to go back to normal—for example, in copper and nickel.

The President inquired if there were any possibilities for substitution of metals, as, for example, silver.

Mr. Wilson replied in the affirmative, and said that these were constantly being explored.

Secretary Lovett said that if the heaviest impact came in 1954 we would not necessarily be in the position of having to make further cutbacks on the civilian economy, but we would not be able to restore the cuts which had previously been made.

Mr. Wilson replied that perhaps the picture was not as bad as that, but that we might find ourselves able to restore only approximately 50% of the cuts which had thus far been made in the civilian economy. Generally speaking, said Mr. Wilson of the proposed expansion program, "we can do it."

The President remarked facetiously to Mr. Wilson that by 1954 he might very well have Taft [4] for his boss, and that perhaps Senator Taft would know how to do all these things.

Mr. Wilson responded with the statement that he doubted very much whether he personally would have Taft for his boss.

Turning to Mr. Lawton, the President then summed up the sense of the meeting by saying that those present had presented the Director of the Budget with what was apparently a general agreement, and that for that reason he had best go ahead with the proposed expansion program.

Mr. Lawton said that he had but one question to raise, and that concerned the prospects and means for assuring the continuous flow of ores from foreign areas.

Mr. Dean said that he had one final point to make, which was to warn that the effect of accepting the new 50%-150% program was going to be felt before 1954 as well as afterward because the AEC would have to begin at once to put in the orders for pumps and other requirements, to select and place its contracts, to select its sites for the new facilities, and to complete the other basic preparations.

To this, Mr. Wilson replied, "It can be done", and the President added the words, "Let's make every effort to get it done."

After a brief discussion of the problem of finding the needed power resources, concerning which point the President commented on the difficulties he had earlier encountered in asking for very moderate increases in the production of aluminum, the President ended the meeting with the statement: "We will do it, and it's now up to Mr. Dean to take steps to head off a few prima donnas." [5]

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[4] Senator Robert A. Taft (R., Ohio).

[5] On Jan. 17, following a meeting with President Truman, Senator McMahon announced that the President had approved an expanded atomic weapons program. Regarding Senator McMahon's statement, see *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1952, p. 60; and Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, p. 578.

At his news conference on the budget, Jan. 19, the President announced that he planned to ask Congress for the authority to spend between $5 and 6 billion over a period of approximately 5 years for the expansion of the production of fissionable material; see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952-53*, p. 55.

S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112 Series

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 29, 1952.

Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 112, "Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments". [1]

NSC 112 was approved as Governmental policy on July 19, 1951. It is requested that this Progress Report (as of January 7, 1952) be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

The National Security Council at its 106th Meeting, October 23, 1951, as action number 578 b, [2] noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would undertake to reach an agreement, for submission to the President, as to the position of the United States Delegation at the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations with respect to a proposal for limitation of armed forces and armaments, in accordance with the policy established in NSC 112. The two Secretaries accordingly agreed upon the "Outline of Program for Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and Armaments" attached hereto as Appendix A and submitted it to the President on October 24, 1951. [3] The President approved it on the same date.

After discussion the governments of France and the United Kingdom joined this Government in sponsoring for consideration by the Sixth General Assembly proposals for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments consistent with Appendix A. A joint statement on the subject by the three governments was accordingly released on November 7, 1951. The President a few hours later made a broadcast address on the subject, and the Secretary of State devoted to this subject a large part of his address on November 8, 1951 during the opening general debate of the General Assembly. A resolution sponsored by the three governments for consideration by the Assembly was made public on November 18, 1951. [4]

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[1] For the text of NSC 112, a report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

[2] In NSC Action No. 578, taken by the NSC at its 106th meeting, Oct. 23, 1951, the Council called for the development of an agreed position on the regulation of armaments, as described below. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action, 1951")

[3] Appendix A is not printed here, but text of the outline of the program, submitted to the President on Oct. 24, 1951, is printed in telegram 2418 to Paris of that date; see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 559.

[4] For the tripartite draft resolution, submitted on Nov. 19, 1951 (UN doc. A/C.1/667), see *ibid.*, p. 584.

The Soviet Representative promptly made it clear that the views of the Soviet Union on this question differed widely and fundamentally from those of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, and on November 24, submitted counter-proposals in the form of extensive amendments to the three-power resolution. [5] Since regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces would clearly be impossible without the cooperation and support of all four governments, the First (Political and Security) Committee of the Assembly after public debate adopted on November 30 a resolution, sponsored jointly by Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, establishing a subcommittee, consisting of the President of the General Assembly, as Chairman, and representatives of the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The subcommittee was instructed to seek to formulate proposals acceptable to all four powers for the regulation of armaments and armed forces and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and to report to the Committee by December 10.

Private discussions in the subcommittee resulted in no apparent progress toward reconciling the fundamental differences in views, although some agreement was reached on procedures. The Chairman therefore prepared and on December 10 submitted to the First Committee a memorandum approved by the four other members of the subcommittee outlining the differences in views and the areas of agreement disclosed by the discussions.

After further public debate the First Committee on December 19 adopted the resolution in Appendix B [6] by a vote of 44 in favor to 5 opposing (the Soviet bloc, consisting of the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Poland), with 10 abstentions from voting (Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen) and one member of the United Nations absent (Burma). The Department of State expects the resolution in Appendix B to be adopted by the General Assembly by about the same vote. [7]

The resolution in Appendix B does not differ in any fundamental respect from the draft resolution originally introduced by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, although minor amendments were accepted in order to secure a maximum affirmative vote. The Soviet Union has indicated that in spite of its opposition to the resolution it intends to participate in the work of the new Disarmament Commission.

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[5] For text of UN doc. A/C.1/688, containing the Soviet amendments, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1951 (New York, United Nations Publications, 1952), pp. 163–164. For the reaction of the United States to these proposals, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 592 ff.

[6] Appendix B is not printed here, but see the editorial note, *ibid.*, p. 612.

[7] See the editorial note, p. 845.

The areas of agreement and disagreement between the Soviet Union and the other three powers may be summarized as follows: The Soviet Union joined the other three in advocating the establishment of the new Disarmament Commission to supersede the two previously existing commissions. However, it has shown no indication of any willingness to modify its previous position on any substantive phases of this question. The Soviet Representative made it clear that his government would not accept a *balanced* reduction of armed forces and armaments; that it would not agree to *progressive* disclosure and verification; and that it would not agree to a plan for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons which involved international ownership of important atomic energy facilities. It appeared that in the field of atomic energy control the Soviet Union would not be willing to go further than to grant limited rights of inspection—precisely how limited is not clear. The main features of the Soviet proposals on substantive phases of the question were: 1) That the General Assembly forthwith "declare an unconditional ban on atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this ban". The ban would apparently apply to the use and to the assembly of such weapons but not to the production of fissionable material or of other weapon components which might be used for other purposes. (In defending this proposal the Soviet Representative declared that "no sober-minded person could believe that the bomb could be produced or used after it had been outlawed by the Assembly".) 2) That the Assembly recommend that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union within one year after passage of the resolution each reduce by one-third the armaments and armed forces at its disposal at the time of passage. 3) That the Assembly instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare and to submit to the Security Council by February 1, 1952, "a draft convention providing for measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions relating to the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use, solely for civilian purposes, of the atomic bombs already produced, and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the said convention", and to prepare and to submit to the Security Council within three months "practical proposals for the application" of the Assembly's recommendation concerning the one-third reduction of armaments and armed forces. And 4) that the Assembly "invite the governments of all states, both Members of the United Nations and states not at present members of the United Nations, to examine at a world conference [to be convened at the earliest possible moment and in any case not later than June 1, 1952,][8] the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also of practical measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over the enforcement of such prohibition." The Soviet proposals contemplate disclosure of information about the matters to be controlled, inspection for control purposes, and establishment "within the framework of the Security Council" of an international control organ. But the Soviets declined to consider the establishment of any control system until after the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Egypt was the only state, other than the Soviet Union and its satellites, which proposed and insisted on bringing to a vote an amendment to the three-power resolution unacceptable to this Government. The Egyptian Representative expressed the opinion that the three-power proposals were a constructive plan earnestly presented but that they did not deal squarely enough with the problem of atomic weapons. He therefore proposed the addition to the three-power resolution of a directive to the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly immediately to begin a study of the unconditional prohibition of the use (but not the production) of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction with the object of "establishing" before the end of the current session of the Assembly a draft treaty providing for such a prohibition. In this connection the Egyptian Representative cited the convention barring the use of poison gas. The Soviet bloc supported this amendment. It was voted on in two parts, a preamble paragraph and an operative paragraph. The proposed preamble paragraph was defeated by a vote of 14 in favor to 35 opposing, with 5 abstentions, and the proposed operative paragraph by a vote of 9 in favor to 39 opposing with 9 abstentions. States in addition to the Soviet bloc which voted in favor on one or both occasions included Lebanon, India, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq. States which abstained included Argentina, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt (second votes), Iran, and Equador.

An interesting sidelight may be found in the reasons for that action given by states which abstained from voting on the resolution as a whole:

> Pakistan gave as its reason that while there was much in the three-power resolution that Pakistan could support, it should not commit itself in view of its probable membership in the new Disarmament Commission.

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[8] Brackets in the source text.

Indonesia gave as its reason that the main task now was to bring the great powers together.

Syria gave as its reason that under present circumstances it could not support the proposals of either side.

It is the intention of the Department of State to keep attention in the Disarmament Commission focused on the problem of disclosure and verification, principally for the reasons set forth in Conclusion m on page 9 NSC 112.[9]

DEAN ACHESON

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[9] The reference paragraph reads as follows: "A proposal for an international system of phased disclosures and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, as the first step in implementation of a program for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments (including international control of atomic energy), with adequate safeguards, would be advantageous to the United States if accepted by the USSR and would be advantageous to the United States for its propaganda value even if rejected by the USSR."

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy, 1950-1955"

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, 6 February 1952.

Subject: Department of Defense Interest in the Use of Atomic Weapons.[2]

1. I have asked the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to deliver by hand the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject, with which I concur.

2. These views are being forwarded to you at the President's direction with the request that the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy provide him with recommendations on action to be taken in this connection.[3]

ROBERT A. LOVETT

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[1] A notation on the source text reads: "For limited distribution to the Special Committee on Atomic Energy *only*."

[2] For previous documentation regarding U.S. policy with respect to the use of atomic weapons, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 802 ff.

[3] On Feb. 8, S. Everett Gleason, Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, forwarded copies of this memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission as members of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy. In his memorandum of transmittal, Gleason indicated that the views of the JCS had also been sent directly to the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the AEC by the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee. Gleason added: "In accordance with the desire of the President, it is requested that you furnish this office with a statement of your recommendations to the President on action with respect to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject". (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use")

Enclosure

## STATEMENT OF THE VIEWS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTEREST IN THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

1. It is United States policy on atomic warfare that, in the event of hostilities, the Department of Defense must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan accordingly.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a statutory responsibility to act as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and to the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged with the preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of United States military forces.†

2. The steadily increasing quantity of completed atomic weapons has, among other things contributed to a broad and far-reaching evolution in United States military concepts in the fields of strategy and tactics as well as in the size, nature, mission, training, and equipment of our armed forces for war. The Strategic Air Command (SAC), as now constituted and equipped, has to a large extent developed around the atomic weapon. Furthermore, developments now underway in the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and in Naval and Marine aviation are pointed toward full exploitation of their capabilities in this field. The acquisition by the United States of its foreign bases has been dictated largely by atomic weapon considerations. The atomic weapon now influences, among other things, the configuration of all aircraft which are to be capable of carrying the atomic weapon, the design and modification of aircraft carriers, the mission and equipment of guided missile units, and the development of guidance systems, bombing systems, and certain special types of artillery. It must be recognized, therefore, that the atomic weapon has become such an integral part of our plans and preparations for the conduct of a major war that it constitutes a vital element in the attainment of full military preparedness on the part of the United States.

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*See paragraph 12 of the Conclusions to NSC 30. [Footnote in the source text. The reference paragraph reads as follows: "It is recognized that, in the event of hostilities, the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan accordingly." For the complete text of NSC 30, "United States Policy on Atomic Warfare", Sept. 10, 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, p. 624.]

†See Section 211, Public Law 216, 81st Congress. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to the National Security Act amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 578) and in particular to the section defining the mission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.]

3. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are charged with the actual employment of a major weapon in combat, must possess the requisite freedom of action to conduct military operations in an emergency with maximum effectiveness. It is essential that such military operations be properly planned; that appropriate steps be taken to provide physical facilities for their support; and that other necessary measures be arranged for the swift execution of such plans under adequate security precautions. In face of a military emergency, any arrangement which inhibits military freedom of action to meet such an emergency will expose the United States to unreasonable and unnecessary risk of mistake, confusion, and failure to act with the speed and precision which the circumstances require. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot, therefore, agree to any other agency interposing itself between them and the President in submission to him of recommendations for a military course of action; nor could they agree to any such other agency having a voice in determining how, when and where such military operations are to be conducted.

4. In light of all the foregoing, it is apparent that responsibility for those aspects of atomic weapons which involve military operations or have a serious impact on such operations must, subject to the authority and direction of the President, rest with the Department of Defense. Conversely, responsibility for production of fissionable or fusionable material and for scientific research and development of atomic weapons rests with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The philosophy is that the latter agency is a producer; the former, the consumer.

5. In consonance with the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following specific areas of responsibility of the Department of Defense, including their relationship to those of the AEC, in the atomic weapon field:

a. *Atomic Weapons Requirements*

(1) The basic development of requirements for complete weapons which in turn establishes the production program, including the production goals and production rates of fissionable material, has its genesis in war plans and is therefore a responsibility of the Department of Defense. This declaration of responsibility, however, is not intended to preclude a review of the statement of requirements to determine the impact of the program on the national economy. Actually such a procedure may be an appropriate step in arriving at the best possible statement of requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection, therefore, to a review of proposed programs for the attainment of production requirements and comment thereon by the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the National Security Council prior to the presentation of the statement to the President;

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff look to the AEC for vigorous efforts in the fields of research and development of atomic weapons, of production of fissionable materials, and of fabrication of atomic weapons. The ideas and suggestions of the AEC are welcomed on new weapons, improvements to available weapons, and any technical considerations affecting their employment. In this connection, the Department of Defense is now exploring how it may more effectively assist the AEC in developing new types of weapons. The decision, however, as to whether such weapons, or the modifications of such weapons affecting yields, quantities, or deliverability, best fill military needs must remain a responsibility of the Department of Defense. It follows that the Department of Defense must be responsible for finally establishing the desired military and technical characteristics of atomic weapons;

(3) In summation, it is a unilateral responsibility of the Department of Defense to determine how many and what types of atomic weapons are needed for the defense and security of the United States. The present arrangement is to state these requirements in terms of weapons three years in advance, and thereafter as production objectives in terms of annual rates of production of fissionable material. This should be adequate for long-range production programming on the part of the AEC.

b. *The Delivery Methods to be Used.* The particular method of delivery of an atomic weapon on a selected target must be related to the nature of the target, the depth of penetration required to reach it, the strength of its defenses, as well as to innumerable other factors of the military situation which bear upon the execution of the mission. An evaluation of these military factors will determine the Service to which is assigned the delivery role: The Army by artillery; the Navy by carrier-based aircraft, Marine aircraft, or anti-submarine aircraft; or the Air Force by aircraft of SAC or TAC. Eventually it may be possible for all three Services to employ guided missiles as a delivery vehicle. Basic budgetary considerations of the Armed Services include the provision of these delivery vehicles for atomic weapons. The decisions as to the particular atomic weapon and vehicle to be used and the precise nature of the method to be employed in its delivery are purely military in character, and hence the responsibility for making them must reside in the Department of Defense.

c. *The Military Determinations of Where and How*

(1) United States policy states clearly that the decision as to the initial employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the President when he considers such decision to be required.‡ The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully in accord with this policy;

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‡See NSC 30. [Footnote in the source text.]

(2) The statutory responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the strategic direction of the armed forces requires them to make the military determinations concerning the use of atomic weapons once the President has directed the initiation of atomic warfare. Atomic weapons, as do other military weapons, constitute an integral part of the means by which war is waged. Therefore, the decision as to where, how, in what numbers, and in what types atomic weapons will be employed must be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces; and

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged by law with the responsibility of advising the President on military matters, including the use of atomic weapons. They believe themselves fully prepared to furnish such advice as may be necessary to meet the requirements of the President. Moreover, they feel that the Department of Defense possesses competence in the realms of both the military and the technical considerations involved in the use of atomic weapons and should therefore constitute the principal source of advice to the President on this subject.

d. *Security*

(1) *Physical Security.* Under current agreements, the AEC bears the initial cost of construction of all Zone of Interior storage site facilities within the security areas required for surveillance, maintenance, assembly, and storage of atomic weapons. The Department of Defense bears the cost of all operation, maintenance, and security of the sites except salaries of the small number of AEC personnel involved and certain tools and equipment required for testing and assembly work. Physical security should, therefore, be a military responsibility and is presently provided by the military. In any event, the stockpile has grown to such proportions that problems of surveillance, maintenance, and security are beyond the present capabilities of the AEC;

(2) *Communication of Restricted Data to Another Nation.*

(a) Exchange of information in the scientific and technical fields should be accomplished through the Combined Policy Committee (CPC), [4] the imparting of each item of information being contingent upon the unanimous approval of the American members of the CPC (who include the Chairman of the AEC) and final specific approval by the President. The information should be limited to carefully circumscribed scientific and technical data, the area of which has been the subject of precise definition, and these data must not be capable of expansion to include weapons information or information of direct benefit to any nation in its weapons fabrication program; and

(b) Communication to another nation of such information on atomic weapons as is essential for the conduct of combined operations with that nation as an active and important ally of the United States, and for the actual exchange of fissionable material or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such combined operations, should be accomplished through the medium of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces; and

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[4] Regarding the Combined Policy Committee, see the minutes of the American Members of the CPC, Apr. 16, p. 885.

(3) *Security of Weapon Deployments.* The present system of divided responsibility for the storage, surveillance, maintenance, and security of the stockpile of atomic weapons is inimical to the best interests of the United States. This arrangement results in a basic division of authority and responsibility between two coequal agencies for the provision of a military weapon in operating condition for war use. It is not now possible to implement operations involving atomic weapons without transmitting information pertaining to the nature and direction of those operations through nonmilitary channels and through the hands of numerous individuals whose participation in the operations is unnecessary. In a recent readiness measure of great sensitivity, knowledge of the matter became alarmingly widespread, leading to the conclusion that under the present system deployments cannot be made without many individuals in the Department of State and in the AEC, including storage site and even contractor personnel, becoming aware of them. This dangerous security situation will persist so long as custody of atomic weapons remains vested in the AEC. Until such time as the President sees fit to direct the transfer of full custodial responsibility from the AEC to the Department of Defense, this security hazard may largely be overcome, and at the same time military readiness and operational flexibility increased, by the establishment of a reservoir of finished weapons in the complete custody of the military. Such a state of improved "readiness to use" atomic weapons should not be confused with "authority to use". The redeployment of any of these weapons, as desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of current war plans, would be subject, of course, to the approval of the President.

National policy concerning the authority to employ atomic weapons would not thus be prejudiced in the slightest degree, the Department of Defense seeking by this measure only to improve the mechanism by which this powerful and possibly decisive weapon may be brought swiftly and securely to bear against an enemy after the President has issued a directive that its use be initiated.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 126 Series

## *Report to the National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
NSC 126

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1952.

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AMERICAN WEAPONS

At the direction of the President, the Council and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in 1950 took under consideration the general problem of weapons information, including atomic weapons, in order to make appropriate recommendations to the President on the subject. Subsequently the President on December 5, 1950 issued a directive on "Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy" which is attached hereto. [2] The NSC Staff kept the problem under continuing review and on November 21, 1951 the Senior NSC Staff agreed that the matter should be referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for appropriate action.

The enclosed memorandum on the subject by the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator of the recommendations contained in paragraph 4 a thereof as approved by the Psychological Strategy Board, including the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

It is recommended that, if the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator concur in this recommendation, the Psychological Strategy Board's enclosed memorandum on the subject be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve its transmittal to all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S.

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[1] Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

[2] The directive, not printed, specified that all statements on foreign policy be cleared in advance by the Department of State, that all statements on military policy be cleared in advance with the Department of Defense, and that advance copies of statements on either subject be submitted to the White House for information.

Government together with a Presidential directive along the lines of the draft directive enclosed. [3]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (Allen) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 27, 1952

Subject: PSB action on Publicity with Respect to Certain American Weapons

1. A series of conflicting statements made last fall by high officials of the Executive Branch of the Government produced considerable public confusion as to the facts concerning our atomic and related developments. They raised doubts as to the degree of unity and confidence within the Government on the purposes of these weapons. Particularly, they gave rise to considerable fears abroad, as to U.S. intentions with respect to the use of these weapons.

2. For these reasons, the Psychological Strategy Board at its 4th meeting, October 25, 1951, directed the preparation of a staff study on the problem. At its seventh meeting, December 20, 1951, acting on the recommendations contained in the staff study, PSB created a committee chaired by the Director, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, to prepare a "national information policy" on the subject.

3. It was agreed at the Senior NSC Staff Meeting of November 19, 1951, to refer to PSB for appropriate action, in connection with this project, a draft report by the NSC on "Release of Information Regarding New Weapons," dated July 5, 1950,[4] action on which had not been completed.

4. The attached memorandum, Subject, "Memorandum on Public Statements with Respect to Certain American Weapons" has been prepared in response to the above Board action.

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[3] By memorandum action of Mar. 27, the Council and the reference agency heads concurred in the recommendation. In a memorandum of the following day, Lay informed the Council and the agency heads that "the President has this date approved the recommendation of the Psychological Strategy Board contained in paragraph 4-a of the reference report on the subject, and has referred the report to the Press Secretary to the President to arrange for the issuance of a Presidential directive to appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government along the lines of the draft directive contained therein." (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 126 Series)

[4] Not printed.

a. At its 10th meeting, February 21, 1952, the Psychological Strategy Board approved the memorandum, recommended that it be transmitted to appropriate departments and agencies as an enclosure to a Presidential directive (draft attached), and directed that its views be communicated to the Executive Secretary, NSC. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator joined in this approval and these recommendations.

b. The committee also examined the question of the adequacy of speech clearance machinery as it relates to statements covering these weapons. It concluded that the machinery created within departments and agencies in response to the Presidential Directive of December 5, 1950, "Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy," should be used for the enforcement of the attached memorandum rather than that a new clearance procedure should be established.

For the Psychological Strategy Board:
R.B. ALLEN

[Subenclosure]

## MEMORANDUM ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AMERICAN WEAPONS

The fact of American atomic superiority undoubtedly has a deterrent effect on Soviet leaders. Whether unconsidered statements about atomic and other new weapons produce any significant deterrent effect on the Kremlin may be doubted.

While well-considered statements on atomic and other new weapons can develop confidence in the determination and strength of the U.S. and the rest of the free world, ill-considered statements on these subjects can be used by the Soviet-led Communists to encourage a belief that the U.S. might use these weapons in a reckless, irresponsible way.

Within the U.S. itself, ill-considered statements about these weapons may create a false sense of security, lead to expectation of miracles in war and possibly jeopardize the maintenance of a balanced defense program, both military and civil.

It follows that we must be extremely careful in our public statements about atomic weapons. The same applies to guided missiles and biological, radiological and chemical weapons.

Before statements and releases on atomic and other new weapons are made, these questions should be answered:

1. Will this information strengthen the morale of the free world?
2. Will this statement at this time help the American public to understand and accurately appraise the capabilities of these weapons?

3. Will this statement create the fear that the U.S. may act recklessly in the use of these weapons?

In the months ahead, as new developments in these weapons transpire, we must so present that information to the world as to buttress the confidence of the free world in America's sense of responsibility for the maintenance of the peace as well as of the fundamental values of the West.

*Note:* Statements prepared in pursuance of this memorandum shall be cleared in conformity to the President's directive of 5 December 1950, "Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy." It is understood also that statements dealing with atomic weapons developments should be cleared with the Atomic Energy Commission.

[Here follow a draft letter of transmittal from the President to Secretary Acheson, intended to serve as a prototype for circulation to all Departments concerned of the PSB Memorandum on Public Statements With Respect to Certain American Weapons, and the text of the Presidential Directive on Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy, December 5, 1950.]

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330.13/3-352

## *The United States Atomic Energy Commission to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)*

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 3, 1952.

DEAR MR. HICKERSON: The Commission has received your letter to Dr. Smyth of February 18, 1952, with the attached document identified as DAC D-1/1, with annexes.[1]

We have particularly noted Annex II, entitled *Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification, Atomic Armaments,* as developed by an informal interdepartmental working group.

There are a few observations and a few suggested changes in Annex II which we feel should be considered by the Department of

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[1] The letter from Hickerson to Commissioner Henry D. Smyth is not printed. (330.13/2-1852) Draft paper DAC D-1/1 of Feb. 15, dealing with disclosure and verification, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "DAC") The final agreed U.S. proposal on this subject was submitted to the Disarmament Commission on Apr. 5 as "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments," UN doc. DC/C.2/1. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* vol. I, pp. 346–356.

Documents bearing the indicator "DAC" were prepared by the Interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission, which first met on Jan. 21, 1952, and subsequently met nine times in 1952 and 1953. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer of UNP was Chairman of the Working Group, which included representatives of State, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Documentation generated by the Working Group is in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "DAC".

State and the Department of Defense. We are transmitting herewith a copy of a revised Annex II containing these changes.

It is our feeling that the present Stage IV should be broken into two stages. A new Stage IV which would be limited to (a) of the present Stage IV, namely, "Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons for fissionable or other materials."

We would then suggest a new Stage V which would embrace the present (b) Stage IV, namely, "Location, numbers, and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand."

We feel very strongly that there should be consideration given to the compelling need to achieve complete agreement on an effective plan for the international control of atomic energy prior to entering into Stages III, IV and V.

A final observation is that the accumulation of fissionable material by the Soviet Union and the United States in the past several years makes it increasingly difficult to provide assurance by purely technical methods that a country such as the Soviet Union has disclosed and reported accurately the stocks of fissionable material produced. This observation does not affect the adequacy of the present U.N. plan for the international control of atomic energy but it does suggest that complete assurance cannot be gained from purely technical methods utilized in the verification and inspection process.

Sincerely yours,

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Gordon Dean
*Chairman*

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[Enclosure]

*Revised Draft Prepared by the United States Atomic Energy Commission*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

## ANNEX II

## PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION

### STAGE I

*Disclose*

(a) Location of all installations directly concerned with atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites.)

(b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the product material and the process used in each instance.

*Verify*

(a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have been declared.)

(b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external examination of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function.)

### STAGE II

*Disclose*

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.

*Verify*

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stage I.

### STAGE III

*Disclose*

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities.

(b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process.

(c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

*Verify*

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I and II.

(b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records.

(c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

### STAGE IV

*Disclose*

(a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.

*Verify*

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III.

### STAGE V

*Disclose*

(a) Location, numbers, and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites.

*Verify*

(a) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III and (a) above.

Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, Folder 2.D.12

## *Paper Approved by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Lovett), and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Dean)* [1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] 8 March 1952.

### TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS (RAC) [2]

1. The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC) shall consist of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission with designated alternates. The United States Representative at the Seat of the United Nations may be represented at any or all meetings of the Committee.

2. The Executive Committee shall be responsible for:

a. The formulation of plans and policies respecting the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.

b. The development and approval of detailed plans within established policies, in the field of its competence.

3. The Committee shall have an Executive Secretary, designated by the Department of State representative with the concurrence of the remaining members, and its own Secretariat. There shall be a Committee Staff composed of designated representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense (including a representative from each military department) and the United States Atomic Energy Commission, when appropriate, to prepare material for the Committee's consideration. The United States Representative at the Seat of the United Nations may provide a representative at any or all meetings of the Committee Staff.

4. In fulfillment of its responsibilities as set forth in 2, the Committee may (1) employ consultants, (2) assign work to personnel and staffs already available within the Governmental agencies represented, and (3) establish special groups or sub-committees.

5. The Committee Staff will submit recommendations on matters of major policy within its jurisdiction to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and where appropriate to the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission for their approval.

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[1] A typed notation on the source text reads: "Effective 8 March 1952."

[2] The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, which functioned from 1947 to 1950, was reactivated in order to facilitate interdepartmental policy formulation. Correspondence between the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission in early 1952 resulting in the reactivation of RAC is in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "RAC (New Series)".

6. Actions of the Executive Committee will be forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council for appropriate action by the National Security Council if the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission should so desire.

7. The Department of State representative on the Executive Committee shall be responsible for the transmission to the United States Mission to the United Nations of necessary instructions, policy guidance and information. The Department of Defense shall arrange for the transmission through the Joint Chiefs of Staff of appropriate parallel instructions and information to the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.

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330.13/3-2252

## *The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)*

SECRET WASHINGTON, 25 March 1952.

DEAR MR. HICKERSON: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the draft paper entitled "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments," as submitted to the Department of Defense by your letter to Mr. Nash of 18 February 1952. [1] It is their belief that the draft paper is, with the one exception noted in the following paragraph, consistent with the spirit and intent of NSC 112. [2] Subject to the modification set forth in the succeeding paragraph, the draft paper is considered a suitable basis for the submission by the United States Representative of proposals on this subject to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

In order that the security interests of the United States may properly be protected, NSC 112 stresses throughout that a program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must provide for the administration of adequate safeguards by a competent international authority with appropriate status, rights and powers. It is felt that the United States' proposals on disclosure and verification, which is the first step in carrying out the program envisaged in NSC 112, should not fail to reflect this. Accordingly, it is recommended that the paragraph under "*U.S. Proposals*" in the draft paper be amended by adding a sentence which reads: "The permanent machinery to be established must provide adequate safeguards under a competent international authority having appropriate status, rights and powers."

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[1] The letter from Hickerson to Nash is not printed. (330.13/2-1852) The draft paper, DAC D-1/1, Feb. 15, is also not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 872.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

With reference to paragraph 5 of the draft paper and in light of current circumstances in which it appears that good faith must be proven in its entirety, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unwilling initially to table the complete body of disclosures included within the first stage at the very outset of the program of disclosures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore would recommend stipulating that initially the disclosures and verifications within the first stage, at least, must proceed step by step within that stage, progressing from the less sensitive to the more sensitive information.

Annex II to the draft paper does not stipulate that aerial survey is intended to be an adjunct to the verification scheme. Inasmuch as aerial survey is inherently a part of the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and is also provided for in each stage of the verification scheme for armed forces and non-atomic armaments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe aerial survey should likewise be stipulated as a part of the verification procedure under atomic armaments in order that the United States' proposals may not have to be subject to interpretation in this regard.

Subparagraph (b) of Stage II, Annex III, concerned with disclosure and verification of atomic armaments, refers to reactors operating at a level of 1 MN or more. The term "1 MN" apparently means 1 megawatt and should appear in the papers as "1 MW."

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of Defense:
MARSHALL S. CARTER
*Brigadier General, USA*
*Director, Executive Ofc*

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "H-Bomb Report to Pres."

### *Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Dean)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 28 March 1952.

Subject: Intensification of the Thermonuclear Weapons Program

Recent developments in thermonuclear weapons are so significant that I feel our effort in this field should be re-evaluated by our Special Committee of the National Security Council.

As you know, the President in his January 31, 1950 letter to Mr. Lilienthal, directed that the scale and rate of effort in the thermonuclear program be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense and that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier program be undertaken concurrently.[1] These matters have been a subject of continuing study by the Military Liaison Committee who have kept me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed. Recently, I sent Mr. Dean a copy of my reply to Senator McMahon in response to a question from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as to Department of Defense views on the present thermonuclear program.[2]

While I agree that the present thermonuclear program constitutes a satisfactory response to the Presidential Directive in terms of technical feasibility and on the basis of facts then known, there is a growing feeling in the Department of Defense that intensification and broadening of effort should be initiated *now* in view of the probability that the present approach to thermonuclear weapons *may* succeed. My purpose in raising the question at this time is the realization that a considerable period will be necessary to organize the personnel and facilities required to sharply expand existing weapon development activity. I am also informed that this subject has been discussed by the Commission and that the matter is still under review.

The urgency with which we must approach this problem is determined in large measure by our estimates of the probability that the Russians may achieve a thermonuclear weapons capability. Information which has been presented to me suggests that we can only assume that the Russians may be as far along as we are. In this connection, I call your attention to the views of the three Secretaries as expressed in the document attached. Further, I refer you to the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in their memorandum of November 23, 1949, copy attached.[3] General Bradley tells me that the Joint Chiefs are preparing a more detailed military requirement in the light of recent thermonuclear progress.

Possession of thermonuclear weapons in relatively small quantities—of the order of 100—in such form that they can be readily delivered, would constitute a military potential of the greatest possible significance. It would be disastrous if the Russians should succeed in developing such a potential in advance of the United States.

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[1] See the Report by the Special Committee of the National Security Council to President Truman on Development of Thermonuclear Weapons, Jan. 31, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 513.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. I, p. 595.

I suggest that the Committee discuss this matter at the earliest possible moment.

WILLIAM C. FOSTER

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[Annex]

### *Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of the Army (Alexander), the Acting Secretary of the Navy (Whitehair), and the Secretary of the Air Force (Finletter) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 27 March 1952.

Subject: Action Necessary to Achieve a Thermonuclear Weapon Capability

On 23 November 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which they stated, among other things, that the possession of thermonuclear weapons by the USSR without such possession by the U.S. would be intolerable and recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission take steps to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon. The President on January 31, 1950 wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission directing the Commission to proceed to determine the technical feasibility of the thermonuclear weapon, the scale and the rate of effort to be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, and directing that the necessary ordnance program and carrier program be undertaken concurrently.

Recent developments in experimentation by our own scientists have shown that there is a serious possibility that the Russians will be successful in developing a thermonuclear weapon. We are informed by competent authorities, including those at Los Alamos, that Klaus Fuchs [4] possessed and may be presumed to have transmitted to the Russians a full understanding of the Los Alamos thermonuclear weapon feasibility report of April 1946. As you know, this report contained all the essential ideas which led to the Greenhouse George shot in May 1951. [5] The George shot in turn demonstrated the principle . . . which greatly increased the probability of a practical and economical thermonuclear weapon and thus precipitated our current redirected development program.

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[4] British atomic scientist arrested for espionage in February 1950.

[5] For documentation on nuclear weapons testing in 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 685 ff.

Therefore we must assume, for planning purposes, that the Russians have at their disposal all the essential ideas which led to our present thermonuclear program.

In this connection, there is persuasive evidence that the Russians are now producing both enriched Uranium and Plutonium. This is a new development, since the first two Russian shots contained Plutonium only, while the third was a composite of Plutonium and Uranium. The fact that the Russians have developed production of enriched Uranium means that they are faced with no *major* production problems in developing thermonuclear weapons, since we are informed that the production of Lithium-6 and Deuterium is simple and cheap by comparison.

In contrast to this Russian activity, the U.S. thermonuclear effort was small between the years 1946 and 1950. Action was resumed only after the first detection of the Russian fission bomb explosion. We have been informed that accordingly it is wholly possible that the Russians may be abreast of, or even ahead of, us in the development of thermonuclear weapons.

For these reasons we recommend that you take up with the Special Committee of the National Security Council designated by the President to advise him on atomic matters the desirability of a directive to the Atomic Energy Commission to intensify its efforts in the development of thermonuclear weapons. Specifically, we recommend that you seek the support of the Special Committee for the rapid development of a second thermonuclear weapons laboratory. We do not suggest that this be the limit of the intensification of our thermonuclear program, but rather that it be a first step. Our broader suggestion is that the prestige and authority of the National Security Council and the President be placed back of a vigorous directive for the speeding up of the thermonuclear program.

ARCHIBALD S. ALEXANDER FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR

THOMAS K. FINLETTER

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*Editorial Note*

During the period April 1952–April 1954, the United States conducted four series of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

The first series, designated Tumbler-Snapper, was conducted at the Yucca Flat test site in Nevada between April 1 and June 5, 1952. The tests involved one-kiloton atomic devices set off both from towers and by air drops. The objective of these tests was to learn more about the dust "sponge" effect and the relationship of dust to radiation. (Memorandum for the files by R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs, January 22, 1952, G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Nuclear Testing, Tumbler-Snapper")

The second series took place at Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific and involved the first thermonuclear or "H-Bomb" detonation. No formal announcement was made of these two tests, which took place on October 31 and November 15, 1952, under the designation Ivy, and security restrictions were maximized. (Rodney L. Southwick, Assistant Chief of the Public Information Service, United States Atomic Energy Commission, to Arneson, December 10, 1952, G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Nuclear Testing Ivy")

The third series of tests was again conducted at Yucca Flat between March 17 and April 6, 1953, and was designated Upshot-Knothole. Limited public access in the form of admission of state and municipal civil defense directors and representatives was permitted on a "one-shot basis" as was limited media representation. The purpose of these tests was to measure and assess nuclear blast effects upon dwellings, shelters, automobiles, etc. Only atomic devices were detonated. (Memorandum by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State and others, February 21, 1953, G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Nuclear Testing, Upshot-Knothole")

The fourth and final series of tests again took place at Eniwetok between February 28 and May 5, 1954 under the code designation Castle. The purpose of these tests was to further perfect the thermonuclear weapons first tested during the Ivy shots of November 1952. Public attention quickly focused on these tests as a result of the radiation poisoning of crew members of the Japanese fishing boat *Fukuryu Maru* which had strayed too close to the test site area. For documentation on public concern in Japan, the Marshall Islands, and the United States over possible widespread contamination of the seas and atmosphere as a result of nuclear testing, and on the statements by United States Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis L. Strauss, Secretary Dulles, and United States Representative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., justifying the need for testing and minimizing the widespread risks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 29, 1954, page 466; April 12, 1954, pages 548–549; April 19, 1954, pages 598–599; June 7, 1954, pages 886–887; and June 14, 1954, pages 926–928.

Department of State files contain only the most limited and fragmentary information concerning the above tests. Numerous documents are missing from the G/PM files cited above as well as from the S/AE files, lot 68 D 358, with only the covering sheets and memoranda available to indicate their subject and, occasionally, to provide a brief summary of content. Further information on the United States nuclear and thermonuclear testing programs in 1952–1954 is in Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, page 673; and in Samuel Glasstone, editor, *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, United States Atomic Energy Commission, April 1962), pages 672–673.

During March and April 1954, as part of the follow-up campaign to President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations on December 8, 1953, the United States Government released to the public an unclassified motion picture account of the Ivy thermonuclear test series of October 31 and November 15, 1952. For information on the events leading to this decision, see the progress report of the Working Group on Implementation of the President's United Nations Speech, April 30, 1954, page 1403.

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Chronological"

## *Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Cohen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 15, 1952.

Subject: Status of the Disarmament Commission Work.

The Disarmament Commission has now been meeting in New York for the past several weeks during which the United States has made general statements of our objectives and has presented the Commission with a detailed proposal on the subject of verification and disclosure.[2] During this period there have been the usual verbal exchanges between the principal delegations of the Western Powers and the delegation of the Soviet Union. From these exchanges, from my discussions with other members of the Commission and from the reactions of the press and public, certain trends have clearly emerged.

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[1] Drafted by James W. Barco of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs. Copies were sent to Bechhoefer, UNP, and to William Sanders, Special Assistant and Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

On Mar. 7 President Truman approved a memorandum by Secretary Acheson of the same date recommending that "Benjamin V. Cohen, of New York, who has represented this country at the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the General Assembly, be appointed Deputy Representative of the United States of America on the United Nations Disarmament Commission." (330.13/3–752)

[2] Reference is to UN doc. DC/C.2/1, "United States Working Paper Submitted to the Disarmament Commission: Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments, April 5, 1952." For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 346–356.

One of these is that our friends on the Commission as well as the public are beginning to feel that the Western Powers, and the United States particularly, do not have at the present time a comprehensive pattern of proposals which would serve to meet in a satisfactory compromise the position of the Soviet Union. Our friends realize that even if we adopt a more affirmative and flexible position we may fail to obtain Soviet agreement, but they feel that we must do something to correct the impression that we are almost as unyielding and inflexible as the Soviet.

The French, British and Canadian delegations have indicated that they feel that on certain points we should be prepared now to explore new approaches to the Soviet position. These points involve the problems of the length of time required to carry out the stages in disclosure and verification and the possible telescoping of these stages; the character of the control organization to be set up for atomic energy (i.e. whether this control organization must be based on "ownership" by the International Community or whether a reasonably effective system of controls through inspection and supervision can be devised); the possibility of agreeing upon some limitation and/or reduction at the end of the first or second stages of disclosure and verification; and the possibility of agreeing upon a new formula which would provide for prohibition of atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction to be effective upon certain conditions precedent having been fulfilled. It is my impression that these questions will be pressed by our friends as time goes on.

It is in this connection that I hope it will be possible to develop the U.S. position along more positive lines than we have thus far been able to do. Specifically, I would suggest that urgent consideration be given to the imperative need for a directive from the President to the highest authorities concerned in the U.S. Government indicating the importance he attaches to these authorities giving active and affirmative assistance in developing a positive program. The Department is now receiving adequate advice from the Defense authorities on what to avoid in our statements in the Disarmament Commission, but there is an obvious lack of constructive suggestions coming from the cooperating agencies of the Government for positive proposals. I would like to urge that the Secretary and the President encourage the taking of a fresh look at some of the positions which have been established now for several years, in the hope that answers can be found to the points that will undoubtedly be raised by the French, British and Canadian delegations. Also in this connection, I would suggest that the Panel of

Consultants[3] with research aid from the Ford Foundation be activated as soon as possible in order that we may avail ourselves of any contribution that they may have to offer. There is a crying and urgent need for something like an Acheson-Lilienthal plan[4] for armaments other than atomic. And in the meanwhile there is need for some specific even though limited proposals for immediate action in the field of limitation and reduction. It is also important whether we ultimately change our position or not that we undertake a comprehensive review of our position regarding the UN plan for atomic energy in light of developments since its adoption.

General Eisenhower in his first annual report to NATO[5] said that in the building of our military, economic and moral strength through NATO, "the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disarmament negotiations." It seems to me that General Eisenhower has struck the right note, and that meanwhile and without delay we should be making serious preparations so that we will have some constructive proposals to make if and when the Soviet Government is ready to negotiate.

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[3] Regarding the Panel of Consultants, see the minutes of the meeting of the Secretary of State with that body, Apr. 28, p. 896.

[4] *A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, March 16, 1946*, Department of State Publication 2498 (Government Printing Office, 1946). For documentation on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which provided the basis for U.S. proposals on international control of atomic energy of 1946, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 712 ff.

[5] The report by General Eisenhower was released on Apr. 2; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 14, 1952, pp. 572–579.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Combined Policy Committee"

## *Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, April 16, 1952, 3:30 p.m.*[1]

TOP SECRET

Present:

*Members*

Secretary of State Acheson

Secretary of Defense Lovett

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[1] The Combined Policy Committee, which was charged with overall coordination of cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, was established under the terms of the Quebec Agreement signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill on Aug. 19, 1943; for text of the Quebec Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 1117–1119. For the minutes of the last previous meeting of the CPC, Aug. 27, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 763. For the minutes of the last previous meeting of the American members of the CPC, see *ibid.*, p. 755.

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Dean

*By Invitation*

Robert LeBaron, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense on Atomic Energy Matters

John A. Hall, Atomic Energy Commission

*Secretary*

R. Gordon Arneson

*I. Indian Monazite*

Secretary Acheson reviewed the history of the Pawley negotiations for Indian monazite which had culminated in an agreement between Dr. Sir S. S. Bhatnagar and Ambassador Pawley to submit three points to their respective governments for consideration (Tab A).[2] Secretary Acheson understood that the Atomic Energy Commission, after due consideration of the proposals Ambassador Pawley had brought back with him, had decided that from a strictly business point of view it would not be able to support the proposals as stated. However, he understood that the Commission was prepared to lend support to the Departments of Defense and State should they wish to continue the negotiations on the basis set forth in the Bhatnagar-Pawley note. Secretary Acheson reviewed the domestic supply situation, pointing out that increased tonnages of monazite were in sight from domestic sources and that promising new technical developments enabling industry to treat a mineral known as bastnasite for its rare earth constituents would apparently ease the supply situation as far as domestic industry was concerned by quite a large factor. He recalled that there would in all probability be available from other sources over the next three-year period very sizeable tonnages of monazite: 9,000 tons from South Africa and 7500 tons from Brazil.[3] If the Indian negotiations were consummated on the basis contemplated, an additional 7500 tons would be available over the three-year period, making a total of 24,000 tons.

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[2] The note signed by Dr. Sir S. S. Bhatnagar, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, and William D. Pawley, Special Consultant to the Secretary of State, Sept. 25, 1951, is not printed. For documentation on negotiations between the United States and India regarding raw materials, see vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1633 ff. For previous documentation on atomic energy aspects of U.S.-Indian relations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 694 ff. Unpublished material on the Pawley mission and other U.S.-Indian negotiations regarding atomic energy-related raw materials is in files 891.2546 and 493.918, and in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "India".

[3] For the text of an agreement with South Africa concerning uranium dated Jan. 4, 1952, see vol. XI, Part 1, p. 902. Unpublished documentation on atomic energy aspects of U.S.-South African relations is in file 845A.2546 and in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "South Africa". For documentation on monazite negotiations with Brazil, see vol. IV, pp. 570 ff. Unpublished documentation on U.S.-Brazilian atomic energy questions is in file 832.2546 and in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Brazil". For previous documentation on atomic energy-related negotiations with both South Africa and Brazil, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 750 ff. and 696 ff.

Chairman Dean stated that the AEC had a very tentative stockpile requirement for 2,000 tons of thorium oxide of which 1,000 tons were already available in the slag dumps situated in the back yard of the Lindsay Light and Chemical Company in the West Chicago plant. The Atomic Energy Commission considered the South African offers which had very recently been made to be most attractive. The suggested price was low both in terms of quoted price per ton and in terms of the fact that it would not be necessary to assist South Africa in the erection of a processing plant. The Commission did appreciate, however, that there might be other considerations of a military or political nature which made it desirable to continue negotiations with India for monazite along the lines that had been established by Bhatnagar and Pawley in their earlier talks. If this were the case, the Commission would, of course, interpose no objection. The Commission also realized that it was desirable to make arrangements to prevent Indian monazite or its derivatives from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Lovett felt that the negotiations should be continued for several reasons:

1. To acquire thorium for stockpile if necessary;
2. To obtain the various collateral benefits in maintaining faith with the Indian Government, especially as regards other strategic materials;
3. To keep the embargo on monazite lifted.

He said he was having the lawyers in the Department of Defense look into the question whether Defense might purchase thorium for stockpile. He was anxious that the United States Government not appear to be welching on its negotiations. It was exceedingly desirable that no action be taken on this problem which might cause the Indians to turn to the Soviet Union. With regard to financing Secretary Lovett understood that the Munitions Board would be in a position to obligate funds up to mid-1954.

Chairman Dean said the Commission would find it difficult to justify an expenditure of $7,500,000 annually for the purchase of 2500 tons of monazite, particularly since most of the constituent elements of monazite were rare earths for which the Commission had very little need. One could never be certain that new uses for rare earths might not be found; however, none of any consequence had thus far arisen. Even if there were increased demand for rare earths, it seemed probable that such demand could be met from the new bastnasite possibilities which had just developed. As to the

Commission's interest in thorium from which is derived the fissionable isotope U-233, considerable uncertainty existed. If the tentative stockpile of 2,000 tons of thorium were converted with a 10% efficiency to U-233, this would result in 200 tons of fissionable material which for any envisageable program was a very large amount.

Secretary Lovett felt that a strong case could be made here for preemptive options even though U.S. need for the material appeared to be considerably less than had formerly been thought. While it would be difficult to justify a deal on the thorium base alone, he felt the United States would be justified in entering into arrangements for general stockpile purposes. As to the South African situation, he recalled that an ugly race problem was brewing there which might lead to serious unrest and possibly to civil war thus making South Africa a rather uncertain source of supply.

On the assumption that 800 to 1,000 tons of thorium was required to bring the stockpile up to 2,000 tons of thorium, Secretary Acheson pointed out that the lower figure could be obtained by taking the monazite tonnages envisaged from Brazil and South Africa. In order to reach the higher figure, it would be necessary to add the proposed tonnages from India. This arithmetic was based on the assumption that monazite would contain an average of 5% thorium oxide. Secretary Acheson reverted to the difficulties that had been experienced in the past from the Lindsay Light and Chemical Company which was now bitterly opposed to the proposed Indian negotiations. He hoped that if the Munitions Board were prepared to take an active interest in the continuation of negotiations it would be prepared to take the heat from the Lindsay Company. As far as the Department of State was concerned, it was anxious that if there were a present or foreseeable future interest in the United States Government for monazite and/or its constituents, it would be very desirable for the negotiations to be continued in some form or other. It seemed clear that if the negotiations were now allowed to lapse it would be highly improbable that they could again be renewed. Even in the unlikely contingency that they could be renewed, it seemed obvious that the circumstances would be less favorable than presently seemed to be the case. He recalled that the Pawley mission had gone out to India a year ago when there was great pressure from the Congress to write specific language into the India wheat bill requiring India to repay the wheat loan by the export of strategic materials. Ambassador Pawley had succeeded in keeping such language out of the bill by his undertaking to go to India to see what could be done by way of negotiation to secure desired strategic materials, including monazite. In view of this past history and the success thus far registered in attempting to break the Indian embargo, it would be most unwise to allow the negotiations to lapse unless it was clear that the United States Government would have no foreseeable future interest in monazite and its derivatives.

Secretary Lovett felt that the prime objective in continuing negotiations should be to secure options for preemptive purchase. He felt that the need for U-233 would become increasingly greater. There were many new developments in the weapons field which would greatly proliferate the demand for fissionable material. A new guided missile, the Nike, recently proof tested, demonstrated the possibility of delivering atomic warheads by such means. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were becoming increasingly worried about the security of overseas sources of supply. The Soviet submarine menace was taking on increasingly grave proportions. It would appear common prudence to bring into the continental confines of the United States any and all strategic materials against the day that they might be needed.

Chairman Dean pointed out that U-233 possessed certain advantages over plutonium and U-235 as a fissionable material. Its critical mass was smaller and it seemed to possess certain inherent stabilities which were greater than the other two. On the other hand, in order to convert 2,000 tons of thorium to say 1600 tons of U-233, 2,000 tons of U-235 would be burned up in the process. In the light of this technical fact it was difficult to see what net gain would result from the production of U-233.

Mr. LeBaron stressed the problem of lead time, pointing out that it would be at least 18 months before one could be sure whether U-233 could be proven a desirable weapons material. He felt it would be a mistake to establish artificial ceilings on our weapons program when these ceilings might turn out to be far too low in the light of technological developments.

Chairman Dean said he thought it would be desirable to keep a foot in the door in the Indian monazite situation but suggested it might be desirable to cut down the tonnages which Pawley would be authorized to negotiate. His suggestion was that the tonnage of monazite to be contracted for annually should be cut from 2500 tons to 1,000 tons. Secretary Lovett agreed, suggesting that the commitment be to purchase an amount not in excess of 1,000 tons of monazite annually. He went on to say that he thought Ambassador Pawley should be instructed to get a commitment in writing from the Indian Government if possible that it would not ship monazite or its derivatives to any iron curtain country. Both Secretary Acheson and Chairman Dean agreed that this would be desirable.

Chairman Dean inquired as to the term of contract that should be contemplated. Secretary Lovett felt that it should not be open-ended. Mr. Arneson suggested that the contract might be drawn in such a way as to commit the United States to take stated tonnages of monazite for the period required to amortize the processing plant, this to be followed by a series of successive options to buy. Mr. LeBaron pointed out that a limit on the term of the contract would probably find expression in the period in which the Munitions Board is authorized to make funds available from unvouchered sources, namely to mid-1954.

Mr. Arneson inquired whether the Atomic Energy Commission was prepared itself to give, or to use its good offices to secure from industry, the technical assistance which would be required in the erection of the processing plant. Chairman Dean agreed that the Commission would be in a position to do so.

Mr. Arneson inquired whether it was the sense of the meeting that Pawley should be told that the United States Government could entertain no interest in the third item of the Bhatnagar-Pawley note, namely titanium. It *was agreed* that this was so.

At Secretary Acheson's suggestion, it *was agreed* that instructions consonant with the agreement that had been reached in the meeting should be sent to Ambassador Pawley through Defense channels after appropriate clearance with the three agencies represented.

*II. Chairman of the CDA* [4]

Secretary Lovett explained that his concern about the nomination of Marion Boyer [5] to be Chairman of the CDA stemmed from his conviction that Mr. Boyer already had too much to do and should not be given additional burdens which would take him away from his main job which was to expedite the expansion program.

Chairman Dean pointed out that the CDA load was not a heavy one. The Agency was in large part a mechanism whereby tripartite arrangements with the United Kingdom and Canada were formalized and expedited. The focus for determining the rate and scale of effort for the United States ore procurement program was in the Raw Materials Division of the Atomic Energy Commission and not in the Combined Development Agency. As to the suggestion that had been made in Mr. Lovett's letter of February 15, 1952 (Tab B), [6] that an outside body might be established to help the Commission to expedite its raw materials procurement program, Chairman Dean thought this would be most unwise. He referred to the fact that the Commission already had available the services of a Minerals Advisory Committee composed of 12 members who are the most eminent authorities in the minerals field in the country and their services were available to whatever extent required. Finally, Chairman Dean said it would be unwise for the Agency Chairman to be one of the Atomic Energy Commissioners. He recalled that Sumner Pike[7] had never been happy with the arrangement when he was the Agency Chairman for it had meant in effect that as Commissioner he was placed in the role of taking positions in the CDA subject to a review of those positions by himself as a Commissioner together with his colleagues. This was an altogether awkward situation which should not be repeated.

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[4] The Combined Development Trust (CDT), subsequently renamed the Combined Development Agency (CDA), was established by the Agreement and Declaration of Trust, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on June 13, 1944; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 1026-1028. The CDA operated under the direction of the Combined Policy Committee, for the purpose of securing control and insuring development of uranium and thorium supplies located outside of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Dominions.

[5] Marion W. Boyer, General Manager of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

[6] Not printed.

Secretary Lovett referred to the very great accelerations that had been introduced into the atomic energy program and felt that the ore procurement program should be required to keep pace. Engaged as we were in a program which might make the difference between our survival or not, he thought that no effort should be spared to press the program forward with all possible haste. Chairman Dean agreed, but pointed out that this had little to do with the CDA or its chairmanship.

Secretary Lovett said he appreciated the points that Chairman Dean had made in connection with a suggestion for an outside agency and also saw the force of the argument against the appointment of an AEC Commissioner as Chairman of the Agency. Secretary Lovett said that his concern over the Boyer appointment was twofold. First, he did not wish to waste an asset, namely Mr. Boyer's abilities as General Manager of an expanded program, by pulling him away for CDA activities. Second, he was most anxious that every effort be bent to support the expanded programs that had already been set in motion. Having stated his apprehensions, Secretary Lovett said he realized that the problem was essentially one of management within the AEC and would have to be left in the final analysis to the Commission to work out. Chairman Dean said that he would be glad to reexamine the matter to see whether there was someone else within the Atomic Energy Commission who might be named as Chairman of the Agency. Secretary Acheson expressed the view that the decision as to nomination of the Agency Chairman should rest with Chairman Dean and he hoped that a satisfactory solution would be found.

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[7] Member of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1946–1951.

### *III. Ore Procurement Policy*

Secretary Lovett said he wished to take the opportunity to revert to another matter which had been discussed earlier in the working group of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, namely the question of United States ore procurement policies. Chairman Dean recalled that under the latest expansion program which had been approved by the President, ore requirements projected to 1958 were set at 9,200 tons annually of virgin feed. In approving the expansion program the President had approved a policy of stockpiling additional tonnages of ore over and above the estimated 9,200 ton requirement figure up to an annual rate of 12,500 tons by 1961. The Commission was seeking to obtain maximum additional tonnages primarily from foreign sources.

Secretary Lovett outlined the context in which this problem had arisen. He recalled during the November hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Defense had been sharply criticized for not having established larger military requirements for atomic weapons. In earlier expansion programs it had been found that ore was the limiting factor and while it did not appear to be the limiting factor in the current situation, it might again become so. Commissioner Murray had recently written a letter to the Special Committee of the NSC [8] stating that in his view much larger tonnages of ore could be obtained if more aggressive procurement policies were pursued. Because of the earlier criticism to which Defense had been subjected to by the JCAE, Secretary Lovett felt it was incumbent upon him to raise the question.

In response to a query from Secretary Lovett, Chairman Dean said that an ore stockpiling program would not necessarily mean extensive processing of the ore thereby increasing the cost factor, but that such ore as might come to hand could be processed through the green salts stage and stockpiled in that form.

Mr. LeBaron felt that the Commission should undertake a detailed study of the possible tonnages of ore that might be obtained at various cost levels to see what the economics of the situation would be. He felt that such a study should concentrate on securing ore from sources other than high cost shales and phosphates. He felt the Commission should embark upon a program of securing maximum ore tonnages so that raw material would never in the future have to be considered a limiting factor in the atomic energy program.

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[8] The letter by Commissioner Thomas E. Murray has not been found. Drawing in part on his experience with the Atomic Energy Commission, 1950–1957, Murray set forth his views on various atomic energy issues in *Nuclear Policy for War and Peace* (Cleveland and New York, The World Publishing Company, 1960).

In response to Chairman Dean's comment that the military establishment should set requirements, Secretary Lovett pointed out that a top limit on military requirements for weapons was infinite. In reality the Joint Chiefs of Staff had, in connection with the recent expansion program, come up with an agreed minimum requirement. Requirements are certain to be increased. With the very rapid strides that are taking place in the guided missile field, it seemed obvious that more and more demand would be placed on production of atomic weapons.

Chairman Dean stated that the Commission was constantly seeking out new sources of ore supply wherever and whenever possible. He thought it would be a mistake to formalize tonnage requirements as of any given date since new possibilities of ore supply appeared constantly to be developing. To set firm figures within specified time limits would require the Commission to launch a very extensive program for the exploration of shales and phosphates. In his view it would be better to leave it to the Commission to exploit all new possibilities as they arose without running into exorbitant costs. He felt that a thorough study of the relationship between costs vs. tonnages which might be obtained would require 6 months time and he felt it would be better to do a thorough job even if this period of time was necessary rather than come to premature judgments.

Secretary Lovett, characterizing the nature of modern armament as exceedingly complicated and costly, said that unless it were possible to rely more and more on atomic weapons as a means of shrinking the size of the military budget, we may well find ourselves running into astronomical rearmament cost figures. With many new developments imminent in terms of tactical use, increased number of targets, the possibility of use of atomic weapons by the Navy and Army, there would appear to be virtually no limit to the military requirements for atomic weapons that could be generated. When atomic weapons are fashioned in a variety of standard sizes and with a high degree of reliability, the day will arrive when atomic weapons will be looked upon as ammunition rather than special weapons. Secretary Acheson suggested that when we get into a period of vastly increased military requirements for atomic weapons it seemed likely that even if ore were in plentiful supply, it would be found that there were other limiting factors in the economy which would put ceilings on atomic weapon production. Mr. LeBaron agreed that this would probably be so. He was anxious, however, that we avoid any situation where ore procurement policies might place an arbitrary ceiling on the atomic energy program.

It was understood that the Atomic Energy Commission would undertake a detailed study of ore procurement policies with particular reference to the relationship between tonnages and costs. It was recognized that such a study would take some months to prepare and that the matter should be reviewed again when Chairman Dean was able to report that the study had been completed.

R. GORDON ARNESON

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330.13/4-1552

## *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1952.

Subject: Disarmament: Memorandum of April 15, 1952 from Mr. Cohen [1]

I have the following comments on the five points mentioned in the attached memorandum from Mr. Cohen to you:

Point 1. I agree with Mr. Cohen that it would be helpful if the President should indicate to the Secretary of Defense and probably also to General Bradley his continued interest in the development of a constructive and comprehensive program of disarmament. I believe that such an indication would be more effective if it were on an informal and confidential basis. For example, it might be desirable for the President to bring the matter up informally at a meeting of the National Security Council. It should be stressed that operating relationships between the Department of State and the Department of Defense on this subject are on a cordial and cooperative basis. We need to ensure that the officers of the Department of Defense adopt a more positive attitude despite the fact that they are participating in an activity which, in general, is unpopular in Defense.

Points 2, 3 and 4. Mr. Cohen has been informed of the steps that have been taken and that we plan to take on these matters, and which generally parallel his recommendations.

Point 5. We have explored these ideas both in the Department and with other Agencies but nothing has yet materialized.

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[1] See the annex below.

[Annex]

### *Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Cohen) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1952.

Subject: Disarmament.

As a reminder I list the points we discussed together today.

1. President to urge Defense Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff to see that Pentagon takes an active part and interest in developing a constructive and comprehensive program of disarmament.

2. Prompt setting to work of Panel of Experts [2] with competent and resourceful executive secretary to develop constructive programs—with research assistance from Ford Foundation as well as the Government (Pentagon and State).

3. Preparation of an Acheson-Lilienthal Report on armaments other than atomic. (Perhaps under Panel's auspices with Pentagon's aid).

4. A comprehensive review of the UN (Baruch) Plan [3] to determine whether any changes appropriate in view of developments since its adoption. (Perhaps under Panel's auspices with Pentagon's aid.)

5. Immediate need for finding quickly a few definite proposals for limiting or prohibiting particular types of armaments or appropriations pending the working out of a more comprehensive plan.

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[2] See the minutes of the meeting between the Secretary of State and the Panel of Consultants on disarmament, Apr. 28, p. 896.

[3] Reference is to the proposals advanced by Bernard M. Baruch, the U.S. representative, at the first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, as subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly. For documentation on U.S. proposals during 1946 regarding the international control of atomic energy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 712 ff.

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### *Editorial Note*

On April 24, the United States introduced in the United Nations Disarmament Commission a proposal on Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program. The proposal was circulated as UN doc. DC/C.1/1. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I, pages 357–358. For statements made by Benjamin V. Cohen, Deputy United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission, in Committee I of the Commission regarding the proposal and the general United States position, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 12, 1952, pages 752–753. For certain remarks by Cohen before Committee II of the Commission on April 25, see *ibid.*, pages 753-755.

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330.13/4-2852

## *Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretary of State With the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 28, 1952.

Present:
The Secretary
Mr. Gordon Dean, Chairman AEC
Dr. V. Bush
Dr. Robert Oppenheimer
Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. John Dickey
Mr. Joseph Johnson
Mr. Harry [*Horace*] Smythe [2]
Mr. John D. Hickerson—UNA
Ambassador Benjamin Cohen
Mr. William Sanders—UNA
Mr. John Ferguson—S/P
Mr. Joseph Chase—S/AE
Mr. Benjamin [*Bernhard*] Bechhoefer—UNP
Mr. Ward Allen—EUR

The Secretary opened the meeting by expressing gratitude to the consultants for agreeing to serve on the advisory panel to assist the Department and Ambassador Cohen. He stated that it is a matter of concern to us that, notwithstanding the yeoman service which Ambassador Cohen has given and the work which is under way in the Department, we are in a sense not as far along on the disarmament problem as we were when we took the initiative in the General Assembly last fall. It is of course partly because we were then talking only in generalities and efforts to work out concrete, specific plans are naturally more difficult since they run into habits of thinking and established patterns of thought. Both the Department of Defense and Department of State are open to criticism for a certain laxity in our attitude to date.

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[1] The Department of State announced on Apr. 28 the establishment of a panel of consultants to advise and assist the Department of State and other agencies in connection with the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The announcement indicated that the panel members were: Vannevar Bush, Carnegie Institute of Washington; John Dickey, President, Dartmouth College; Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Joseph E. Johnson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director, Institute for Advanced Study. It was stated that the panel would meet frequently with government officials as its work progressed, and that the consultants had held their initial series of conferences that day. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 19, 1952, p. 792)

[2] Dr. Horace Smythe of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

In connection with the work of the panel the Secretary raised the question of an Executive Secretary, recalling the helpful work done by Mr. Herbert Marks in the development of the atomic energy plan. Mr. Hickerson reported that efforts are being made to obtain the services of a qualified person on a permanent basis and that in the meantime Mr. Allen had been loaned from EUR to pinch-hit.

In describing the job to be done the Secretary referred to three major aspects:

(1) The necessity of making some proposals and taking some steps in the Disarmament Commission between now and the next GA. Failure to do so would subject us to criticism in the UN and would forfeit the advantage gained by our previous initiative.

(2) The longer-range task of working out a comprehensive plan for armed forces and non-atomic armaments comparable to the UN plan in the atomic energy field. This panel is the best body to do that if it has full support from the State and Defense Departments and the AEC.

(3) The additional task of reviewing the UN plan for atomic energy. Although this was done in a cursory fashion last fall it should in effect be a continuing task.

The Secretary pointed out that this work in the disarmament field has a very important connection with the whole problem of relations with the USSR. Whatever the other elements in any overall settlement with the Soviet Union, one essential element is the withdrawal of their forces from the center of Europe. The difficulty arises not so much from the size of Soviet forces (Soviet armed forces were large during the years before World War II but did not then cause great concern) but from the fact that now Russian forces are closer to western borders and there is no longer a strong Germany and a strong Japan on either side. Soviet justification for the presence of their troops is a legitimate concern in preventing the repetition of attacks against the USSR as occurred in World Wars I and II. This point must be met if there is to be a settlement. Although Secretary Byrnes [3] thought it could be met by treaties for the disarmament of Germany, it seems clear that this is impossible because of the cynical Soviet attitude toward treaties and because from a realistic point of view treaties have validity only so long as they are in the national interests of both parties to continue to adhere to them.

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[3] James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, July 1945–January 1947.

Therefore, if it is possible to work out agreement on a disarmament plan that would "shorten the reach" of all nations it would be possible for the Soviets to move their troops out of Europe without the complete evacuation of US troops which the Soviets now demand. If no one had forces with long-distance striking power it should be possible for token US forces to remain in Europe without arousing excessive Soviet concern.

Thus the disarmament work is far more than a propaganda exercise. It may be the thing, together with growing western strength and a desire for settlement, that could bring about a real settlement.

Referring to the Far East, the Secretary pointed out that a disarmament plan which materially shortened the reach of the major powers would have far-reaching effects. It would of course increase the likelihood of the emergence of local Communist-led movements that would not and could not be met by US or UN forces. It might be possible and necessary to find some other methods for building strength in that part of the world.

Mr. Hickerson, in response to the Secretary's request for comments, referred to President Truman's disarmament speech,[4] pointing out the two roads to security: the hard road of building strength and the preferable road of mutual disarmament. He emphasized that it is not inconsistent to pursue both simultaneously and referred to a sentence omitted from the President's speech that "we will match the USSR in honest balanced reduction of armaments or we will outmatch them in military strength".

Ambassador Cohen stressed the importance of the disarmament work in helping to dispel suspicion at home and abroad as to the purpose of our buildup and the intended use of our power. Referring to General Eisenhower's closing paragraph in his last NATO report, Ambassador Cohen thought it vital that we convince the world we are preparing for the time when accommodation and settlement will be possible. The panel can give a positive push to this effort. The review of the atomic energy plan assumes added desirability because of the feeling on the part of the UK and France that the US has adopted the attitude that this plan represents the last word in the field. The French, it is apparent, fail to understand the timing of the UN control plan and both the French and the British share the feeling that some changes are required if there is to be agreement with the Soviets. In countering French and British desires for revising the staging of the UN plan, Ambassador Cohen has to date maintained the position that any shift may be made only after thorough review and only after the Soviets give a clear indication of what they would be willing to do.

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[4] Reference is to the President's radio and television "Report to the American People on International Arms Reduction", Nov. 7, 1951; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951,* pp. 623–627.

Mr. Gordon Dean referred in passing to an immediate problem with the relationship between the disarmament work and the immediate problem with which he is faced with presenting to Congress in the near future a request for a much expanded atomic energy program. He felt it important that this be played so as to dovetail with and not undercut the work in the disarmament field. This basis of the Congressional position is military necessity in a very unsettled world and he requested any guidance that might be offered in order in the presentation not to undo the disarmament efforts. In response Ambassador Cohen recognized that there is of course no easy answer and suggested that we must be careful to indicate that any real developments in the disarmament field would of course produce a change in the program but that until that time comes it is vital to move ahead with the present expanded program.

Dr. Bush, pointing out that the panel is approaching the problem today in a necessarily different framework from the framework in which the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was developed, emphasized the importance of keeping in mind the effect on US public thinking. He suggested the possibility of finding some token or symbolic element in a nation's armed strength, agreement on the control of which would be relatively easy but as to which failure of performance would not jeopardize our security. For example, heavy tanks were important during World War II but are now gradually becoming obsolete as a weapon of war, or possibly even long-range bombers would fall in this category as an example which though trivial, would decrease the reach of the major powers. If such could be found agreement on its abolition might prove an entering wedge to agreement on more important aspects, and the effect would be salutary even though guarantees of performance were not forthcoming.

Mr. Johnson desired to underscore the physical importance of retention of the initiative in this field of the US, reporting that the effect upon the informed Europeans last fall of the introduction of US, UK, French proposals was electric and did much to dispel the feeling that US with its drawing strength was impetuously prepared to force the issue with the Soviets. Commenting on Dr. Bush's suggestion of reaching agreement on the abolition of a relatively unimportant element, Mr. Johnson cautioned that this might involve the danger that USSR would seize upon the concept of abolition without inspection and seek to apply it to the whole disarmament field, thus undermining our own position on control of atomic energy.

Mr. Dulles indicated his hesitation and skepticism of any success in the work, referring to himself as one of the few living relics of the extensive and fruitless disarmament discussions between World Wars I and II. However he agreed upon the importance of presenting our present buildup as defensive in character and agreed that our disarmament work should help in that connection. He wondered whether it would not be possible through disarmament proposals to try to obtain greater information on Russia's actual military strength. He remarked in passing that so long as the Soviets continue as at present to put great emphasis in their buildup on such weapons as MIG 15's and not on TU 4's (long-range bombers) there is some hope that Soviet intentions are defensive and not offensive.

In answer to Mr. Dulles' question, Ambassador Cohen referred to US working proposals on disclosure and verification as having the effect of obtaining additional information on Russia's military strength without which any disarmament plans could not be implemented. Referring to his immediate problem within the Commission Ambassador Cohen urged that we take a stand on the size of armies at an early stage. This would of course present more problems to the Russians than to ourselves since their large armies are believed to constitute a main element in their strength. At the same time proposals for reduction of large armies would show our sincerity in desiring actual reduction and limitation.

In response to Mr. Johnson's question as to the priority of agreement upon disclosure and verification, it was agreed that our position is still as the Secretary stated it in Paris, i.e., that we would either work out agreement on and implement a system of disclosure and verification *before* proceeding to agreement on actual reduction or would work out agreement on both *simultaneously*.

Mr. Dickey sought further clarification as to how the Secretary desired the panel to operate, i.e., whether it was expected that like the Acheson-Lilienthal group the panel would produce its own report or whether it is to serve as a critic in the development by the government of its own plan which the government would then put forward as a government position. Mr. Hickerson said in effect that this question was really open but that for the immediate job of initial proposals in the Disarmament Commission, he expected the panel would act more in the role of critics. In amplification Ambassador Cohen suggested that for the long range task of a comprehensive plan he thought it would be best for the panel to act as a separate expert body to develop the principal lines of the program. We could then consider how the organization can work in filling in the details of a comprehensive plan. At that point it might be that we would want to co-opt additional personnel which together with some or all of the present group would take over the actual formulation of a concrete plan.

Dr. Oppenheimer expressed the view that in addition to the objective of strengthening the defense of the West and the objective of eventual agreement on a specific disarmament plan, there was a third objective in our work which is the continuance of a really secure US in the sense of a US that cannot be shattered as military power.

In closing the discussion, the Secretary suggested that the long-range task of developing a comprehensive plan will probably prove to be more difficult than the task faced by the Acheson–Lilienthal group since the fact that atomic energy can be controlled through control of only two basic elements provided a manageable framework for that work. He spoke again of the major preoccupation which is the relationship between disarmament and other major world problems, suggesting that in that connection the panel would want to look at our current armament program to see where it is headed and the consequences. We are moving faster in the atomic energy field than in other fields but in our general buildup effort it is very possible that we may be breaking ourselves in an effort to do what really can't be done. In short, can we accomplish what we are now undertaking? If not what alternative roads are open to us? In that sense it may be that disarmament will prove to be an essential part of our program and of our goals for the future.

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330.13/4-2852

## *Minutes of Meeting With the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament at the Department of State, April 28, 1952, 11:30 a.m.* [1]

SECRET

DAC-C-M-1

Present:

*Consultants*

- Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
- Dr. Vannevar Bush, Carnegie Institute of Washington
- Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Dr. John S. Dickey, Dartmouth College

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[1] Present at this meeting were members of the interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission.

Dr. Allen Dulles, CIA
*State*
Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen
Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. William Sanders, UNA
Mr. John H. Ferguson, S/P
Mr. Bernhard Bechhoefer, UNP
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
Mr. Warren Chase, UNA/P
Mr. Howard Meyers, UNP
Mr. James W. Barco, UNP
Mr. Robert Warren, S/S-S, Secretary
*Defense*
Col. A. B. Swann, OSD
Capt. H. Page Smith, OSD
*AEC*
Dr. H. D. Smythe

1. The new Panel of Consultants met with the Secretary at 11:30 and discussed the background of the present situation in the field of disarmament. [2] After the meeting with the Secretary the Panel reconvened with members of the Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission.

2. Mr. Hickerson explained that the consultants had been called together on an urgent basis to help the Government work out disarmament proposals. He stated that the current working papers submitted for the consideration of the consultants were the result of a great deal of thought and effort on the part of various U.S. agencies. He added that when the tripartite proposal was made at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, many people had been inclined to dismiss it as a propaganda exercise. Such was definitely not true. The U.S. is inherently a nation which maintains small military forces, then is forced to build them up frantically when a crisis approaches. He cited the standing forces available at the beginning of World Wars I and II as examples. The U.S. would like to achieve the stability and security the world seeks by a great reduction in armaments and we should not be deterred by the unlikeliness of any proposal being accepted by the Russians. He stressed that any proposal for reduction of armed forces and armaments would have to provide for continual disclosure and verification to be realistic.

One U.S. working paper to be submitted to the Disarmament Commission is a three-pronged attack upon the problem. It would contain:

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[2] See the minutes of the meeting with the Secretary, *supra*.

1. Provision for a manpower limitation upon armed forces, including security, para-military and police organizations, that would be related to the total population of the various countries of the world. It is envisaged that a figure of 1% and overall ceiling of 1,500,000 might be the starting point;

2. Possibly a reference to a limitation providing that no more than say, 5% of the Gross National Product of a nation might be used in building and maintaining armed forces. It was pointed out that the U.S. was currently spending 18 1/2% and that during the peak of W.W. II the amount had been 45%. There is no comparable figure available for Russia;

3. A reference to the necessity for balance between the branches of armed forces within a country and to relating armaments to permitted manpower.

Mr. Oppenheimer inquired as to whether certain weapons such as guided missiles would be entirely prohibited. Mr. Hickerson stated that perhaps such things as bacteriological warfare would fall in this category, as would other weapons. However, the immediate problem was to present a simple proposition directed at reduction.

Mr. Hickerson reviewed developments within the UN Disarmament Commission describing the five stage, progressive plan that the U.S. has suggested for disclosure and verification. [3] Each of the stages would be completed before any of the subsequent steps would be undertaken. Comments had been invited upon this working paper and the Russian reaction had been to regard it as an American effort to get intelligence.

Ambassador Cohen explained that the U.S. is faced with the problem of convincing the world that the disarmament discussions were more than a mere talk fest. He had found it extremely difficult to develop any proposals that were not either obviously to our advantage or equally to our disadvantage. The paper now under discussion was the only approach that seemed balanced. To push forward too vigorously in the atomic field would place the U.S. in a precarious position. The feeling was that it might thus be well initially to undertake a limited approach to disarmament, starting with actual manpower limitations. The figure of 1% and the ceiling of 1,500,000 were not absolutes. There would have to be variations possible to prevent disequilibriums dangerous to peace.

Some of the difficulties of this arrangement were discussed. The question of what to do about the satellites was considered as well as the fact that the vast population of China in the Soviet bloc might well be countered by the inclusion of India in the free world. Mr. Cohen pointed to the effect that the proposal would have upon the European defense community. Mr. Oppenheimer raised the question of controlling the training of reserves, pointing out that an active reserve training program might be able to circumvent the controls. Mr. Ferguson suggested that the 5% gross national product limitation might prevent this method of evasion. However, it was pointed out that this safeguard was not present if the manpower proposal was presented as a single approach. Mr. Cohen agreed that the manpower facet of the problem was meant only as a starter. Mr. Dulles asked if inspection and control was not assumed and was told that it was. Mr. Meyers raised the possibility of handling the reserve problem through a procedure of counting only "average daily effectives" and of controlling the supply of supporting weapons which any modern force would require. Mr. Oppenheimer described his feeling that the whole issue was so complicated that for the U.S. to continually refer to this series of undefined problems made us appear insincere. He felt that it would be better to institute a very concrete suggestion. Mr. Cohen concurred and Mr. Ferguson suggested that since the Secretary had already used the figures one million and 1% this country might stick to that figure leaving it to our allies to suggest any change.

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[3] See footnote 2, p. 883.

Mr. Oppenheimer inquired as to the military's position on the one million-1% formula and was told that it had been approved last summer but it had not been considered in conjunction with the present proposal. The formula has never been specifically mentioned in any public U.S. proposals.

Mr. Dickey expressed grave misgiving as to whether the disarmament program was starting from the right point. The American public is extremely skeptical now about disarmament discussions when we are rearming, and if the public feels that the American proposal is contradictory, they will not support it. He pointed out that the manpower problem of the build-up was just beginning to get acute. Ambassador Cohen stated that the manpower problems of the build-up were not directly related to the disarmament proposal, since the numerical limitation plan outlined what we would do only if assured that the Soviets were willing to provide systematic and orderly safeguards. At this point Mr. Dickey raised the problem of when this nation can begin to slacken off in its defense build-up. He felt world opinion would take more seriously a disarmament proposal that had a definite relationship to Korea and possibilities of a standstill arrangement. Mr. Bush felt that this consideration might be taken care of in the scheduling of the paper in the UN, to which Mr. Dickey replied that his main preoccupation was that the question be given high level consideration. Mr. Oppenheimer felt that any proposal advanced by the U.S. should follow 3 criteria: (1) it should seize the initiative, (2) it should cause us to take action if accepted, (3) it should not be hedged about by many qualifying phrases as to the years required for implementing it. He believed that the public was too familiar with proposals of the latter type. Ambassador Cohen agreed that the current proposal had to be concrete and positive but it must be remembered that offsetting any real disarmament has to be a long process. Mr. Dulles inquired as to the possibilities of asking the Soviet delegates what disarmament terms they would accept. The sense of the group was that this was not advisable. Mr. Cohen pointed out that an immediate standstill arrangement might come close to Soviet wishes but would probably be unacceptable to us.

Mr. Sanders pointed up the basic inconsistency between simultaneous armament and discussion of disarmament. Any percentages limiting manpower would spotlight this inconsistency. He thought there was a tremendous need for education in the field. Ambassador Cohen suggested that, in order to make it clear that the U.S. was not abandoning its interest in disarmament, it might be desirable to use General Eisenhower's statement as a starting point.

Mr. Oppenheimer asked Ambassador Cohen to review the advantages of submitting the numerical limitation working paper. (DAC D-8).[4] Ambassador Cohen urged that the Working Group should find one or two specific items to highlight the disarmament question in the forthcoming General Assembly. He reported that, despite our initiative in Paris, there was much world feeling that the whole disarmament question was a mere recital of the same old platitudes.

Mr. Dulles inquired whether the U.S. ought not have one of its allies present a proposal and then have it accepted by the U.S. Ambassador Cohen thought our predominant position required us to put forward the major proposals. Mr. Hickerson stressed the point that the proposal should be made as simple as possible and should stress that the U.S. was anxious to implement any agreement immediately. Mr. Oppenheimer believed that since the proposal, as presented, would result in something we wanted, i.e., less Russian troops, it would be judged a purely propaganda maneuver without any chance of success. He asked whether our past proposals in the Disarmament Commission were ever accepted seriously. If not, our main preoccupation should be with the effect of our suggestion upon world opinion. Mr. Johnson did not believe that it was necessary to raise the question at this point. He thought the U.S. might do as well to follow through on the disclosure and verification plan.

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[4] Reference is to the paper prepared by the interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission entitled "Proposals for Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces", Apr. 24, 1952, not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "DAC")

Ambassador Cohen replied that there was no intention of dropping this plan, but that in order to maintain the initiative we had to have something concrete in limitation. Mr. Bush agreed with this thesis but stated that, like Mr. Dickey, he was concerned with the point at which the arms race would be concluded.

The session adjourned for lunch with the Secretary after agreeing to reconvene at 2:00 p.m.

*Afternoon Session*

After the general discussion of the luncheon period, Ambassador Cohen reopened formal consideration by stating that even the Disclosure and Verification Paper was not one that our allies will consider as very positive since it does not touch on limitation and reduction and, hence, does not answer the constant Soviet charges. What we lack is a concrete proposal in this field. Mr. Oppenheimer asked if a prudent unilateral disclosure of certain less sensitive information by the U.S. might be the answer. It was pointed out that the Soviets would think that any American disclosures would be only such as were already well known and would be interpreted as an attempt to gain intelligence on Russian forces. Ambassador Cohen felt that unilateral action would only involve the U.S. in deeper trouble. He stated that our allies do not consider us reticent on Disclosure and Verification but rather feel that we are not positive enough on limitation and reduction.

Mr. Johnson raised the question of whether the British, who were particularly sensitive to the publication of troop data in 1946, would feel the same at this time. Mr. Hickerson stated that there was an indication to this effect when Mr. Hohler of the Foreign Office was over here in October.

Mr. Dulles asked whether there were any comprehensive United Nations figures on the status of the world's various armed forces. He was told that present UN documents were limited to synthesizing the past efforts of the League of Nations in the field of disarmament and that there were no good UN figures, particularly with reference to the Soviet Union. The Russians have even refused to provide accurate general population figures for the recent United Nations World Population Survey.

Ambassador Cohen was requested by Mr. Oppenheimer to indicate what he thought were the greatest problems faced in presenting the proposed working paper. The Ambassador replied that he believed the free world reaction in the General Assembly was crucial, and that there was also the problem of dealing with the various counter-proposals that might come from other member states. The French have been particularly restive about the lack of American positive action. The Soviet delegate had attacked our disclosure and verification proposal as only diversionary and insisted that what was needed was a basic decision to reduce conventional arms and to prohibit atomic weapons.

Mr. Sanders asked the consultants if they, on the basis of their wide experience in the various fields of governmental research, might have any general information that would be helpful in the implementation of the present proposal. He was particularly concerned with what safeguards in the industrial field should be made the subject of further research between now and June 1, while a simultaneous examination of the basic principles was taking place. The old RAC paper on the Soviet disarmament positions was mentioned, and it was agreed that this would be obtained. Mr. Johnson also presented the possibility of using the research that Mr. Gordon and General Strong had done in preparation for the San Francisco conference.

Mr. Oppenheimer thought there were two problem areas that might well be studied further: (1) the industrial control approach to disarmament preparation, particularly the question of the petroleum industry; (2) a basic consideration of procedure. The problem of disarmament should become simpler as the approach taken becomes broader but this does not actually happen. He suggested that the Working Group might attempt to thin the question out so that it was not necessary to be faced with such a mass of detailed factors.

Ambassador Cohen stated that his proposal was one attempt at this problem, but that Mr. Oppenheimer's analysis of the problem really went further. As the consultative panel began functioning the whole question of disarmament might well be considered and then we would be in a position to present the concrete proposals needed, both as to a simple non-atomic control plan and a workable approach to atomic limitation.

Mr. Bush asked whether, in addition to the approaches that would limit manpower and the use of more than five percent of the Gross National Product for armed forces, a third approach might be that of basic raw materials control. Such a study would certainly be easier than the complete industrial survey being discussed. The question of limiting industrial power as such was raised but discarded when Mr. Bush pointed out that the United States uses a great deal more power to produce a product than the Soviet Union requires for the production of a comparable article. Nonetheless, it was felt that power consumption was a very good index by which to detect a change of policy on the part of a potential aggressor.

Mr. Johnson inquired what other disarmament proposals had been considered and rejected before the presentation of the present paper Ambassador Cohen replied that the problem had not been one of choosing alternatives, but rather of finding any formula that would permit separating the question of atomic and conventional disarmament without prejudice to our interests. The present working paper had resulted from a review of principles adopted in the past.

Mr. Dulles recommended aircraft and aircraft armaments control as an area in which Disclosure and Verification was relatively simple.

Mr. Oppenheimer observed that making the approach on the basis of one item had all the disadvantages of the Disclosure and Verification Paper and none of the advantages of a general approach.

Mr. Oppenheimer stated that while there was certainly some uneasiness in the minds of the consultants, they were perfectly aware that the proposal was drafted only after thorough consideration of the possibilities and that they ought to support the concept that a simple proposal of this nature was needed. Mr. Bush said his position would be that, before we withdraw entirely from any effort to reach agreement in the atomic weapons field, we ought to reconsider the UN plan for atomic energy control, and that while any such study would not be ready before June 1, we might be able to discover an opportunity for definite action later. We will have recommendations on this point at the next Panel meeting.

Mr. Hickerson asked Ambassador Cohen for the time table on the working paper, and inquired whether a decision might not be withheld until the next consultants' meeting. The Ambassador stressed the fact that the US delegates were greatly hampered by not having something positive to submit. He felt that to merely submit the numerical limitation proposal as a topic to be discussed was not concrete enough and that it would be suggesting something that we were unprepared to follow-up. Disarmament Commission hearings began over a month ago and the American proposal should have been ready in final form then. Mr. Dulles inquired whether the Soviets had produced any proposals of their own at this session and was told that Soviet ideas all called for immediate decisions for prohibition of atomic weapons and general reduction without safeguards. Mr. Dulles further inquired whether there was any way by which a proposal could be introduced by the French and British with the U.S. playing a supporting role. The Ambassador replied that the French had submitted a proposal of their own on the atomic prohibition question, but that it had not as yet received French governmental approval. This proposal would compress the five stages into three with atomic weapon prohibitions taking effect at the end of the first stage. With respect to the Canadians, he pointed out that there was a tendency to want to move faster than the United States was willing to; that to push them might result in embarrassment to us. Mr. Hickerson said that it was expected that the British would balk at some features of the U.S. disclosure and verification proposals.

Summarizing his objections, Mr. Dickey conceded that there was definitely a need for positive initiative, but that there was the problem of acceptance by the American people; that any proposition aimed at getting agreement to limit armed forces some years in the future was almost irrelevant in the popular mind today. He felt that the government had to consider at some point just where the present buildup would reach its optimum point and stop. The public believes that this question is being considered in government councils, yet such is not true. For the proposed disarmament program to carry any conviction, it would be necessary to indicate on what terms, and when, we would accept a standstill arrangement. All of this was contingent, of course, upon a satisfactory outcome in Korea. This standstill point, for the realization of our policy, was not a matter for the consultants' decision but rather the concern of the State and Defense Departments; but to pose the disarmament proposal without this decision would result in seriously crippling the rearmament program.

Ambassador Cohen felt that the United States would accept a standstill arrangement the moment any satisfactory treaty was signed, but that he could not accept Mr. Dickey's thesis that a 50% decline in our own armed strength would not get serious consideration in public opinion. Soviet agreement would be the *sine qua non* in the picture. The U.S. would consider this point as a beginning rather than an end. Clarification of armed forces strength should enable us to develop agreements in the atomic field.

Mr. Meyers asked whether Mr. Dickey's position was not actually a case of developing a suitable time table for reduction of armed forces and armaments and deciding when the specific reductions should take place. Mr. Dickey thought that the *sine qua non* of being taken seriously was not Soviet agreement, but rather some consideration of when the present buildup could end. Ambassador Cohen believed that if such was true, the U.S. had made a mistake at the Paris meeting in introducing the disarmament proposals. What Mr. Dickey proposed went much further than an arms reduction. He thought that unless the U.S. was to lose ground between now and the convening of the General Assembly, it would be necessary to have some specific proposal in the disarmament field; that he had been driven to supporting the numerical limitation proposal for lack of anything better. However, if some equally effective program could be formulated, he would be only too happy to present it. Mr. Chase suggested that if it was important to talk to the Soviets about some standstill agreement, the UN was not the proper forum. To this, Mr. Dickey replied that if such was the case the consultants ought to be so informed.

Mr. Hickerson closed the meeting by stating that some type of standstill agreement was implicit in the implementing of a disarmament proposal; that there was small hope of any working paper being adopted by all members of the Disarmament Commission; but that a firm decision regarding clearance of a paper for submission in the Commission should be made in the very near future.

[Annex]

## SUGGESTIONS RE PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH ELABORATION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS (REFERENCE: RAC (NS) D-1a) [5]

### I—ARMED FORCES AND NON-ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

A. *Types of forces, armaments and materials:*

1. Armed forces—inclusion of para-military, security and police forces, trained reserves, definition of mass armies;

2. Definition or list of standard armaments;

3. Definition or list of other weapons;

4. Definition or lists of basic materials useable exclusively, primarily or substantially for the manufacture of armaments.

B. *Limitation and Allocation of Armed Forces and Armaments:*

1. Determination of maximum permitted levels of national armed forces: (Reference: DAC D-6) [6]

(a) Criteria and factors to be considered and relative weight to be given them:

> (1) Factors relating to the country—population, size, geographical features, etc.;

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[5] RAC (NS) D-1a of Apr. 11, 1952 is entitled "General Views of the U.S. Concerning Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments". It is one of the first papers drafted by the reconstituted Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments. (See the paper approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Mar. 8, p. 876.) This paper was also known under the designation DAC D-4a (see footnote 1, p. 872) and a copy is in the Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments; Documents April 1952-February 1955".

[6] Interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission Draft Paper entitled "General Views of the U.S. Concerning Determination of Overall Limits and Restrictions on all Armed Forces and all Armaments, including Atomic Weapons", Apr. 14, 1952, not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "DAC")

(2) Relationship of country to regional and other political groupings;

(3) Defense by metropolitan powers of their non-self-governing and trust territories;

(b) Methods of adjustment of permitted levels to reflect changes in conditions.

2. Determination of maximum permitted levels and kinds of armaments (Reference: DAC D-6)

(a) Criteria for determining maximum permitted levels of standard armaments--relationship to permitted levels of armed forces;

(b) Criteria for determining maximum permitted production of standard armaments—relationship to gross national product—adjustment for production for permitted export to other countries;

(c) Limitation of army, naval and air bases, facilities and installations.

3. Allocation of armed forces and armaments within permitted national levels.

4. Treatment of non-atomic weapons other than permitted standard weapons.

C. *Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments:*

Determination and synchronization of stages to reach permitted levels.

D. *Controls and Safeguards and Enforcement Machinery:*

1. Disclosure and verification (both a safeguard and a partial precondition to the institution of a control system); (Ref: DC/C.2/1) [7]

2. Nature of other controls—supervision, management, ownership, destruction;

3. Points in the economy at which controls must be applied—stages in the processing of essential basic materials and stages in the manufacture of armaments;

4. Controls over international commerce in armaments and in materials used exclusively, primarily or substantially for armaments;

5. International organs for implementation—nature, composition, size of personnel, location, financing, methods of reaching decisions, relationship to existing US organs; (Ref: DAC-D3a) [8]

6. Determination of what constitutes minor and major violations; methods of reaching decision on violations and punishment; types of punishment to be imposed.

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[7] See footnote 2, p. 883.

[8] Interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission Paper entitled "Methods of Implementing and Enforcing the Disarmament Program", Apr. 15, 1952, not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "DAC")

### II. ATOMIC ENERGY

Reappraisal of UN atomic energy plan to determine possible improvements and degree of flexibility in details. (First, Second and Third Reports of UNAEC).

### III. GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. What further information and research is necessary to provide adequate basis for intelligent resolution of the above problems?

2. How should the elements of the disclosure and verification system, the UN atomic energy plan, and plans for limitation and control in the non-atomic field be synchronized, i.e., what is the desirable time-table and what flexibility is possible in the sequential relationships? (Ref: DAC-7)[9]

3. What segments (if any) of a comprehensive plan can be segregated and put forward in the Disarmament Commission separately at least in general terms in the immediate future? (Ref: DAC D-8)

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[9] "U.S. Position on Procedure and Timetable for Giving Effect to Disarmament Program", Apr. 18, 1952, not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "DAC")

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330.13/5-152

## *The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash)*[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1952.

DEAR FRANK: We are enclosing for your consideration a re-draft of a working paper intended for submission in Committee I of the Disarmament Commission, entitled "Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces" (RAC (NS) D-4).[2] This paper has been revised in the light of the comments made during the April 29 meeting of the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments (RAC), to take account of the views advanced by yourself and Ambassador Cohen, as well as my own remarks.

This paper was prepared at the urgent request of Ambassador Cohen who stated in a memorandum to me dated April 17:

> "As I have indicated in previous conversations and memoranda, there is an immediate need for concrete proposals in specific areas where early agreement might be reached. This need has been emphasized also by the French, British and Canadian Delegations in

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer and Meyers of UNP on Apr. 30.

[2] Dated Apr. 30, 1952, not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "RAC (NS) Documents")

their discussions with the United States Delegation. In particular, it has been felt by all of us that concrete proposals in the field of limitation and reduction which could be related to an early stage of disclosure and verification would provide a fertile field for the work of the Commission and would be an effective answer to the Soviet charges that we are seeking only intelligence information, without being prepared to carry out any actual disarmament.

"If such a proposal can be presented to the Disarmament Commission for consideration at this stage of the work, it seems to me that we would have achieved a major portion of our immediate objective. By having ourselves made proposals for a relatively comprehensive system of disclosure and verification and an immediate program of reduction and limitation, we would have retained the initiative and demonstrated the seriousness of our purpose. Such proposals, taken as a whole, would be not only defensible before the General Assembly and world opinion but might provide the starting point for serious and concrete progress in the field of disarmament. I should like to feel that we could begin discussions on something of this kind at the earliest possible date with our French, British and Canadian colleagues, and therefore hope that you will find it possible to initiate immediate consideration within the RAC group."

We believe that these proposals should be submitted by the United States Representative as a working paper, rather than as a position to which the United States Government is formally committed. The Committee of the Disarmament Commission dealing with the proposals would produce recommendations which would be submitted to you and cleared prior to their formal adoption by the Commission. As stated in a previous letter, this procedure has a number of advantages among which are that it gives our representative a desirable latitude in his tactical approach to the Commission's problem. We are, accordingly, at this time suggesting general guidance concerning the positions taken in this paper rather than a formal clearance of the paper. The formal clearance of the United States position will take place prior to formal Commission action.

From the standpoint of the tactical situation existing in the Disarmament Commission, it would seem desirable to submit a working paper to the Commission sometime during the first week of May. In view of the early deadline, we should appreciate your consideration of this paper as a matter of importance. The paper will be considered simultaneously in the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We are also submitting the paper at this time to the Atomic Energy Commission for its comments, although the paper does not directly involve problems relating to atomic energy.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN D. HICKERSON

330.13/5-552

## *Memorandum by William Sanders to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1952.

Subject: Your meeting with the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, May 6.

You may wish to brief the Consultants at the meeting tomorrow on developments since your last meeting with them on April 28. [2] The following items might be covered:

1. There has been no meeting of the Disarmament Commission during this period.

2. The British have informally submitted to our UN Delegation their initial reactions to the US proposals for disclosure and verification. [3] They have characterized our proposals as being much more extensive than the UK had anticipated, and they welcome the US proposals as effectively countering one of the main Soviet themes to the effect that disclosure was to proceed by such slow stages that nothing substantial would ever be revealed. The UK would prefer that there be eight stages, with the early disclosures involving less sensitive matters so that verification would be correspondingly easier. Specifically, the UK dislikes the introduction of aerial surveys in the first stage of disclosure and verification. The UK also believes that disclosure should be related as closely as possible to concrete proposals for reduction of armed forces and armaments.

3. On May 2, at a meeting of the Canadian, French, UK and US Delegations, Ambassador Cohen referred to our difficulties with the French and UK comments and suggested that it was premature to propose publicly changes in the US plan for disclosure and verification until there was some sign of real interest on the part of the Soviet Delegation. He believed that, when the time came, we should be able to agree among ourselves on a satisfactory number of stages, but that to put forward publicly now widely differing points of view would provide the Soviets with a propaganda advantage. The British agreed with this point of view. Since Mr. Moch was not present the French Delegation's attitude was not declared.

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[1] Drafted by Howard Meyers of UNP. Sanders was Special Assistant and Planning Adviser to Assistant Secretary Hickerson.

[2] For the minutes of the meeting of Apr. 28, see p. 901.

[3] Reference is to the U.S. proposals contained in UN doc. DC/C.2/1, Apr. 5; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 346-356.

We know that Mr. Moch favors fewer stages and that he links prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments to the system of disclosure and verification rather than to the system of controls.

4. You may wish to bring the Panel up-to-date on the revision of the working paper on "Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces" (RAC (NS)D-4).[4]

5. On May 3, the UK gave our Mission comments on the US draft paper on reduction of armed forces, agreeing with the initial limitation of forces to 1,500,000 but suggesting a formula utilizing one-fourth of one percent of the population of non-self-governing territories and one percent of the population of metropolitan territories. The British believe that dependent areas should be separated from metropolitan areas in making calculations, so that emphasis can be placed upon maintaining law and order and protecting inhabitants of dependent areas, without over-emphasizing interest in overseas territories and without giving the advantage to Western powers which would be received by lumping together dependent and metropolitan populations.

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[4] The draft working paper under reference, dated Apr. 30, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "RAC (NS) Documents")

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330.13/5-652

## *Minutes of Meeting With the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament at the Department of State, May 6, 1952, 10 a.m.* [1]

SECRET

DAC-C M-2

Present:

*Consultants*

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Carnegie Institute of Washington

Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dr. John S. Dickey, Dartmouth College

Dr. Allen Dulles, CIA

*State*

Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen

Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA

Mr. William Sanders, UNA

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[1] Presumably drafted by Horwitz.

Mr. John H. Ferguson, S/P
Mr. Bernhard Bechhoefer, UNP
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
Mr. Robert Tufts, S/P
Mr. Paul Nitze, S/P
Mr. Leonard J. Horwitz, S/S–S, Secretary

I. *Discussion of Working Paper for Committee I of the Disarmament Commission.*

1. *Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces.*

*Discussion:* After a brief introduction by Mr. Sanders, of current activities in the Disarmament Commission, an extended discussion ensued as to the adequacy of the U.S. working paper and the reactions of other DAC delegations to our proposals.[2] Ambassador Cohen reviewed the position of the French delegation on our disarmament proposal and mentioned the French desire to reduce the number of stages in the disclosure and verification process from 5 to 3. He also mentioned that the British delegation is most anxious to present a proposal which the USSR might be more disposed to accept. Mr. Bechhoefer, further commenting on the British position on this matter, stated that in his opinion, they were not seriously advancing the proposal of increasing the number of stages from 5 to 8, but they generally had mixed feelings on the proposal and they wished to devise some formula by which there may be a more gradual advance toward disarmament than the one suggested by the U.S. Mr. Sanders commented that the British feel strongly that the proposal on limitation of armaments must be intimately related to a reduction plan containing a numerical limitation formula, whereas the French delegation wants to link the problem of reduction with that of control. Ambassador Cohen stated that the numerical limitation formula that we have set forth is an essential component of any disarmament effort, but it is only one of other essential components which must not be ignored. Mr. Sanders stated that generally the British are willing to go along with our proposals until they come to the matter of counting populations of non-self-governing territories for evolving a figure upon which armaments will be based. Ambassador Cohen commented that the British have not fully completed their thinking on the matter and although they like the simplicity of our approach, they tend to think that our proposal is so drawn that much greater strength would appear to accrue to the forces of the free world than to the Soviets, and the British are anxious to correct this situation.

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[2] Reference is to Working Paper UN doc. DC/C.2/1, Apr. 5, 1952; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 346–356.

2. Dr. Bush suggested that in trying to tie all threads together, it seemed a little strange that the limitations formula should be based on the criteria of population, and he indicated a desire to see the base broadened. A brief discussion ensued at this point on the impact of the formula for limiting arms based on population in countries, such as India and Pakistan, with their peculiar problems both in matters of populations and of mutual antagonisms. Dr. Johnson suggested that it would be desirable if the Canadian delegation could come up with an acceptable proposal on the numerical limitations question that would take the promoting initiative away from the U.S. Ambassador Cohen mentioned the desirability of getting some nation, other than the U.S., to come forth with an acceptable proposal although he cited the dangers which may result if the French come through with some unacceptable proposal which would highly complicate the situation. We had to consider the need of interesting the French delegation in our general approach without encouraging them to come up with a proposal of their own which could possibly result in serious complications and adverse propaganda.

3. At this point, there was discussion of certain points in the subject paper, RAC (NS) D-4,[3] where several minor additional changes were agreed to for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of parts of the paper. Dr. Oppenheimer, commenting on the subject paper, expressed the view that although it is not a paper which would inspire enthusiastic support, it is apparently the best that can be done at the present and for that reason must be considered satisfactory.

4. A brief discussion arose at this point as to the impact of the Communist BW charges on the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission concerning our general disclosure and verification proposals which were submitted April 5th. Dr. Oppenheimer suggested that the question of insuring adequate safeguards against BW is certainly a baffling one and that unless one begins to think in terms of an international control organization similar to the proposed International Atomic Energy Authority, it would be extremely difficult to evolve effective control in this field. Ambassador Cohen stated that the only thing that can be done is for the development of a complete and approved system of disclosure and verification which would be a prerequisite to any successful disarmament procedure. Dr. Bush described the quandary in which the U.S. finds itself in that we cannot discuss the BW control question except in terms of the disclosure and verification procedures, in

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[3] The reference draft working paper, Apr. 30, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "RAC (NS) Documents")

order not to do violence to our position on atomic energy, and yet we do not have enough information on the technical feasibility of disclosure and verification in the BW field. Besides, we cannot now state that we will not use BW except in retaliation. It was generally agreed that we could not take a different position in the Disarmament Commission on the matter of BW than we have already taken on the matter of atomic energy.

II. *General Discussion of Disarmament in Relation to Major Political Questions.*

5. Mr. Hickerson introduced this discussion by recalling that the League of Nations had made an arduous effort to evolve appropriate relationships between security and disarmament. At that time, they believed that the proper approach required the priority of disarmament over security. Currently within the UN framework, the emphasis is being directed toward the priority of security over disarmament. In the long view, it would appear that either approach has not effectively solved the problem, and it would therefore lead one to the obvious conclusion that only through the solution of basic political issues between the great powers of the world can both security and disarmament be achieved. However, in view of the exigencies of our international position, it was considered desirable that we should not insist that a settlement of basic issues be a pre-condition for disarmament, since to do so would insure that any of our disarmament proposals would not be taken seriously by the peoples of the free world. We have agreed, however, that a fundamental pre-condition for disarmament would be that fighting must stop in Korea. Both the President and the Secretary of State in their public utterances have said that discussion of the problems of disclosure and verification should be advanced as a matter of priority, but approval of such procedures should not be considered as a pre-condition to effective efforts by all nations to solve the other elements of a disarmament program.

6. Mr. Nitze, reviewing the development of the U.S. policy on disarmament proposal, stated that the work on this matter had been going on for approximately a year before the U.S. made its formal proposal at the U.N. General Assembly. The real work on it started at the Big Four Deputy Meeting in Paris which met to prepare an agenda for possible talks between the Big Four Foreign Ministers. It was agreed at that time that if there was a disposition on the part of the Russians to accept the inclusion of "disarmament" in the proposed agenda, it would have been possible to carry on such discussions within the context of the proposed Big Four meeting, but in the absence of any favorable Russian interest in this matter, we avoided bringing the subject up although we continued to work

on it. In our view, while we have a desire to reduce tensions and move forward on this issue, it is obvious that we cannot go any where unless there is a similar disposition on the part of the Russians. In evolving our thinking on this matter, consideration was given to the major political problems of our day that have produced these tensions. Such problems include the matter of German unification and its relationship to the West, the Austrian Peace Treaty, the implementation of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, the holding of free and democratic elections in the Balkan countries, and the withdrawal of Russian forces along the Bug River. It was necessary to survey and evolve a policy as to what actions we believed should be taken in order to reduce the tensions caused by these important issues. Also current Far Eastern problems had to be taken into account in considering any general settlement and reduction of world tensions.

[7.] Dr. Bush inquired as to how far we will go in disarmament discussions if no truce is achieved in Korea. Mr. Nitze stated that there would be no chance of our putting into effect any disclosure or verification procedures without some kind of settlement, i.e., armistice in Korea. Mr. Nitze stated that it was our feeling that unless there is at least a desire by the Communist to agree to a Korean armistice, there would be no chance of putting into effect a limitation of armaments scheme.

8. Ambassador Cohen pointed out that if we can get the Communists to agree to a reduction and limitation plan to a certain extent, in the event that future aggression should take place after their agreement to such plan, such aggression would automatically relieve parties to the agreement of any obligations incurred in the agreements. Mr. Nitze pointed out that there is inherent danger in going through with the process of disclosure and verification and then finding ourselves faced with a new aggression. In that eventuality, the free world has nothing left to expect but general war as a means of forcing a solution. Dr. Dulles inquired as to whether there had ever been a comprehensive study on the matter or whether or not competitive arms races resulted in anything other than war. Dr. Bush pointed out that an entirely new situation exists in view of the existence of the atomic bomb and other modern weapons. He stated that no aggressor ever started a war in which he knew he would "get licked", but in modern war it is obvious to all that the chances of achieving victory without the consequences of overwhelming material destruction are small and certainly creates a new situation and perhaps enhances the chances of achieving a successful disarmament agreement.

9. Dr. Dickey inquired as to whether there is any evidence on how the Russians view our arms buildup and the extent of Soviet

fear of these arms buildup. Mr. Nitze mentioned that back in September 1950, Vishinsky had a meeting in New York with satellite delegations to the UN and told them "not to get worried about the U.S. arms buildup because, he stated, we just couldn't keep it up for very long." Mr. Nitze remarked that there is evidence that the Soviets are persuaded that our buildup is not going along as fast as we thought it would go. There is some intelligence which indicates that the Russians told the Chinese recently that U.S. arms production is lagging badly and that the success of our arms buildup is greatly in danger. Of course, it must be understood that the Soviet Union might have been making these statements for its own special reasons and should be viewed in the light of what they hope to achieve from their satellites. At this point, there was a brief discussion on the ability of the U.S. to maintain a high level of armament production over a long period of time.

10. Dr. Johnson inquired as to the possibility of achieving a "standstill" agreement with Russia. Mr. Nitze explained that a "standstill" agreement involves a matter of definitions and categories which are extremely difficult to achieve. He said that such problems of ascertaining parity on matters of replacements, training, etc., make a practical agreement on this basis fairly impossible. He said that it seemed to him that if there was a general interest in reducing tensions that our original approach is the more desirable. In response to a question by Dr. Johnson as to whether our present armament reduction effort was designed to reestablish a balance of power between the Soviets and U.S., Mr. Nitze stated that we believe we may have a deterrent to Soviet aggression which probably will not be achieved until after 1954. Mr. Tufts remarked that both nations are striving for a preponderance of power rather than a balance of power. Mr. Nitze described the following as elements of our power to deter the USSR from moving in Europe: (a) our forces in Europe, (b) our atomic power, (c) our arms production potential, and (d) the fact that the U.S. was involved in Europe from the beginning and has a vital stake and interest in that area. Dr. Johnson inquired as to whether with all these elements would it not be possible to foresee a point at which a Soviet move in Europe is probably remote and at that point could we not then propose a "standstill" agreement. Dr. Bush replied at this point that if what Dr. Johnson proposed was proper, then it would also be possible to achieve a complete settlement of political tensions as well as agreement just to disarmament.

11. Dr. Oppenheimer remarked that time is not necessarily on our side and stated that if the time arrives when Europe does not look like a primarily attractive target to the USSR, then we lose in that area an element of power in that we have concentrated a pre-

ponderance of our forces in that area at the expense of others. Mr. Nitze stated that two forces seem to be running in opposite directions. First the fact that our forces in being are constantly being increased, and secondly that the Soviet capabilities of waging atomic warfare are also being increased. Dr. Bush suggested that a vital factor of power is our ability to deliver our atomic bombs to the heart of Soviet power, and he believed that our capabilities to do this may tend to diminish much quicker than those of the Soviets to do likewise against the U.S. Dr. Bush stated that it is not more difficult to defend ourselves from air penetration than for Soviets to do so, and although our defensive capabilities are adequate at present, they may get less adequate as time goes on. Dr. Dickey posed the question of the stability of U.S. public support for our rearmament effort and inquired as to how long we can expect such support to continue. Dr. Bush stated that Communist rejection of our atomic energy proposals have strengthened U.S. public support for our atomic energy program and have permitted large appropriations for the program. Dr. Oppenheimer stated that at present our atomic energy program is relatively cheap but may become more expensive as time goes on. Mr. Nitze stated that it is the Department's belief that we cannot fail to do something that we consider to be vitally necessary just because we are not assured of broad public support for such an action.

12. Mr. Tufts commented that it is possible to achieve a military "standstill" but quite impossible to get a "political standstill". At this point a discussion ensued as to the appropriate definition of what a "standstill" would be. Mr. Nitze stated that "freezing" in itself is not a possibility, but it is useful only as an approach to and a step forward toward the main objective of achieving an agreement. But in the long run if you have the basic pre-conditions to get forward toward this objective, it may not be necessary to stop at the "freezing" point and may be possible to advance directly to the ultimate objective. Mr. Ferguson commented that you limit yourself in the time factor if you depend on a "standstill" alone to achieve your desired objective.

13. Dr. Dickey asked Mr. Nitze about his interpretation of the long-range significance of an armistice in Korea if it is achieved and its general relevancy to the entire disarmament question. Mr. Nitze stated that it is the Department's feeling that the Russians do want an armistice at some point. They feel that their effort in Korea is essentially an extended position and that there is great danger that the conflict may get out of hand and spread to the Far East as a whole. Our view is that the Russians do not want the conflict to spread. However, the Russians do get a short range benefit from Korea although they are conscious of the long range disad-

vantage in the event that the fighting should spread. Of course, it is a matter of concern to the Department that the Soviets may actually do something concrete to reduce tensions which would have the effect of persuading the free world to let down its guard and neglect its armament effort. Mr. Ferguson commented that in the event an armistice is not achieved, our public reaction may be violent to the point where the public may begin to favor a preventive war. It was generally agreed among all persons that the last thing the U.S. wants is a unilateral "standstill" in rearmament which is a possibility. Dr. Bush inquired as to what Soviet views are toward the possibility of negotiations with the West at this time. Mr. Nitze said that there are terms on which the Soviets would want an armistice in Korea. However, the usual Soviet tactics in armistice negotiations require that they do not permit any matter to be dropped until they are sure that no more concessions are obtainable from their opponent. Mr. Nitze stated that the main snag in our armistice negotiations have now been narrowed down to one issue—that of the POWs, and it does introduce a very serious substantive problem for the Chinese Communists. For in this situation, there is a greater will of the Soviet Union to settle on the POW matter than there probably is on the part of the Chinese. Of the 20,000 Chinese prisoners, 15,000 refuse to go back to their homeland. This is an extremely difficult pill for the Chinese Communists to swallow. Mr. Ferguson stated that although the Chinese personally want to take a strong position on the POW issue, they have equally strong desire to continue obtaining Soviet equipment and if a strong attitude on the POW position interferes with our achievement of this second objective, it would seem plausible that they may tend to yield to the wishes of the Soviet Union and permit the consummation of an armistice. Mr. Nitze cited as an indication of the Reds' interest in achieving a settlement the fact that the Chinese Communists provided the original request for undertaking a general screening operation among POW's in our hands.

13. [*sic*] Dr. Johnson inquired as to whether there is any necessary relationship between the Soviet activities in Korea and current activities on the U.S. domestic policy scene. Mr. Nitze replied that he doubts whether there is any necessary connection and said that the Soviets have always considered U.S. domestic policy to be important factors in their calculations, but the extent to which these considerations have affected their thinking is at the present not easily ascertainable. Mr. Nitze stated that results of our screening operation are certainly of a great psychological advantage to our side. Mr. Nitze stated that if the Communists violate an armistice, then the rules of the game which we have been observing so far will be abandoned; he remarked that the major reason why we

do not take vigorous action against the Chinese Communists so far is because of our belief that the Sino-Soviet Pact of 1950 would force the Russians to enter hostilities and begin a general war. However, if a future armistice is violated, we cannot permit the Chinese Communists to go unpunished. In general, Mr. Nitze stated that our intervention in Korea has had little external effect on the Soviet regime in the Kremlin. Mr. Dulles stated that Stalin still has control of the Kremlin, and he will get more cautious as he goes along. He probably sees no reason why he should risk his glory and reputation by entering into any foolhardy adventures, and for this reason some believe that Stalin's continued control of the Kremlin introduced an element of moderation into Soviet behavior. Mr. Nitze stated that Stalin's decision to go into Korea resulted from a compromise between two schools of thought within the Kremlin, and it is now evident that he was wrong. One group expected the overwhelming support of the South Korean people once the North Koreans began their military action. The second group felt that North Korean action could unite Korea regardless of South Korean support. Both groups refused to take seriously possibilities of U.S. intervention. Mr. Nitze also commented that the Chinese Communists have the capability of carrying on concrete military action against both South Korea and South East Asia. In this regard, the fiction of utilizing "volunteers" is no longer useful to the Chinese Communists. Information which would indicate that approximately 100,000 or more Chinese Communists are operating in aggressive military action in South East Asia would be ample evidence on which to request U.N. action.

14. At this point a discussion ensued as to the propaganda advantages of the Disarmament Commission deliberation to the Russians. Mr. Nitze stated that the Russians probably think that it is a good propaganda forum, but they do not want to see progress made on disarmament. He emphasized that when the U.S. put forth its disarmament proposal, it was set forth as a serious proposal and was deliberately so devised that it would not be primarily a propaganda maneuver for the reason that the U.S. Government would have to "live with" that proposal for a long time. Obviously, whatever the U.S. says in the Disarmament Commission, the Soviets are going to make propaganda attacks on us. We design our essential preparations of this disarmament proposal to exclude any obvious propaganda features in it. It was agreed that the Soviets did not approve the idea of a Disarmament Commission which was created as a result of our original proposal.

14. [*sic*] At this point, Mr. Dulles proposed that effort should be made to test the sincerity of Soviet interests in disarmament by proposing to them in the Disarmament Commission that each side

open for inspection by a neutral UN commission just one factory or one armament installation in each country for inspection in order to ascertain the feasibility of such an inspection procedure, as well as establishing before the world the sincerity of both sides in advancing disarmament proposals. It was agreed that the idea merited further serious consideration with a view toward possible action. Dr. Bush at this point also suggested that another opportunity for a test case against the Soviet Union would be to provide a situation in which no overt inspection of the Soviet territory would be required but by which the U.S. could be assured of the sincerity of Soviet position on disarmament. Such a test case which would not require inspection and control could possibly be provided by telling the Soviets that we would agree not to test an "H" bomb providing we have their assurance that they likewise would not test an "H" bomb. This would provide an opportunity for us to know whether or not the Soviets keep their word without requiring us to inspect their territory. Dr. Bush stressed the fact that he is only projecting such a proposal as an illustration of the type of situation that may be devised although he does not wish this proposal to be taken as a firm proposal. Mr. Ferguson commented that he was dubious of the utility of Dr. Bush's proposal in that by ignoring the inspection and control aspects of such a disarmament proposal you essentially remove the flavor and core of the U.S. argument on the absolute necessity for priority on disclosure and verification in any disarmament arrangement and would therefore lead many to believe that disclosure and verification is not essential. Mr. Dulles suggested that possibly we may invite the Soviets to attend our next atomic bomb test on the condition that they permit us to attend their next atom bomb test. It was agreed that the three above-mentioned proposals merited careful consideration by the officials of the Government. It was agreed informally that efforts would be made to get Mr. George [*McGeorge*] Bundy as Executive Secretary for the panel and arrangements would be made for the panel to meet at Princeton University in the next few weeks.

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330.13/5-852

## *Memorandum for the Files* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1952.

Subject: Decisions reached by Panel of Consultants on Disarmament in private meeting Tuesday, May 6.

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[1] Drafting officer is not identified on the source text.

1. By general acknowledgment Dr. Oppenheimer became Chairman of the Panel.

2. It is decided that the next meeting of the Panel should take place in Princeton, May 16, 17, and 18, and that only members of the Panel would be present in addition to its Executive Secretary.[2]

3. It was decided to seek the services of Mr. McGeorge Bundy as permanent Executive Secretary of the Panel and that arrangements should be made for the necessary administrative action to permit him to be present at the May 16 meeting.

4. Panel decided to broaden its terms of reference in order to address itself at least initially to the question of whether there is any place for any serious work in the field of disarmament in promoting the security of the U.S.; in other words, whether there is any relationship between serious disarmament work and U.S. security. It is to this set of problems that the Panel will address itself at its next meeting. It may well be, in the view of Dr. Oppenheimer, assented to by the Panel, that this inquiry will produce a negative answer.

Dr. Oppenheimer indicated that he would try to have for the panel a paper setting forth his views on some of the basic considerations bearing on this question. He felt it essential in order for the Panel to discuss what it had in mind that full "Q" clearances be obtained for all members in advance of the meeting.

5. It was Dr. Oppenheimer's view, assented to by the other members, that there is no way in which the existing State and Defense Departments' staffs working on the problem of disarmament can or should be geared to the work of the Panel at this stage. The Panel is not in a position to give any specific guidance to these staffs and there is no way in which the staffs can be of assistance to the Panel in preparation for its forthcoming meetings.

6. At Dr. Oppenheimer's suggestions the following preparations should be made for the next meeting:

a. Mr. Dulles will provide an account of the present efforts to revise NSC-68 and NSC-114.[3] Mr. Dulles will investigate with Messrs. Ray Allen and Tracy Barnes of the Psychological Strategy Board any current thinking of the Board that will bear upon any problem before the Panel.

b. Dr. Oppenheimer and Mr. Allen will get in touch with the State Department's Planning Staff to see whether the Panel might obtain in writing or orally further thinking of the Staff on the relationship of disarmament work to major political problems.

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[2] Informal minutes of the May 16–18 meeting are in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Panel of Consultants."

[3] For text of NSC 68, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security", Apr. 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 234. For documentation on the NSC 114 Series, dealing with national security programs, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 1 ff. For documentation on overall national security policy during the 1952–1954 period, see pp. 1 ff.

c. The State Department will endeavor to supply any information on U.K. or French thinking on the basic questions and, if possible, a paper identifying the elements in the present situations which are different from the situations in which disarmament has been discussed in the past.

d. Dr. Oppenheimer will request Mr. Bundy to provide the Panel with information concerning the research being undertaken in Cambridge under the direction of Dr. Max Millikan.[4]

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[4] Director of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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330.13/5–1352

## *The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 13 May, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to a proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the United Nations, authorizing the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission to make a statement on the United States' position with respect to a system of disclosure and verification, including atomic energy.[1] The proposed message, which representatives of the Department of State assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 April 1952[2] was intended to be in consonance with national policy, included the following statement:

> "I can state without equivocation that, if agreement can be reached upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the U.S. would be prepared to proceed through all stages of such a system before agreement had been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy."

It appears to the Department of Defense that acceptance by the United States of the proposed language in the foregoing quoted statement would constitute an extension of the policy contained in NSC 112[3] and would permit a degree of atomic disclosure which, in the opinion of this Department, would jeopardize the security of the United States, unless there was prior agreement to and development of the control procedures encompassed within the United Nations plan or any other plan equally as effective.

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[1] The subject message has not been found in Department of State files.

[2] A copy of the Department of State informal draft substance of discussion at the State–JCS meeting of Apr. 23 is in State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417.

[3] For text of NSC 112, "Formulation of a U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

At the request of Mr. Nash, who had been furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the proposed message, Mr. Hickerson agreed on 29 April 1952 not to dispatch the message.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which I am in general agreement, are forwarded herewith. In view of the great importance of the question involved, it is recommended that there be undertaken through the machinery provided by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, or perhaps through the National Security Council, the establishment of this Government's position on the relationship between the proposed system of disclosure and verification, the plan for international control of atomic energy and an international program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

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[Enclosure]

## *Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 30 April, 1952.

Subject: United States Position on Regulation of Armaments and Armed Forces.

1. Reference is made to a proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation, United Nations, authorizing the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission to make a statement on the United States position with respect to a system of disclosure and verification, including atomic energy. This proposed statement was discussed at length with representatives of the Department of State on 23 April 1952. At that time the representatives of the Department of State assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed statement is intended to be in consonance with national policy.

2. It is requested that you note particularly the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the proposed statement, which reads:

> "I can state without equivocation that, if agreement can be reached upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the US would be prepared to proceed through all stages of such a system before agreement had been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy."

3. United States policy on disarmament is contained in NSC 112. When the President approved this document, he specifically approved a statement of Basic Principles and the Conclusions. These Principles, together with the initial Conclusion, are listed in the Appendix hereto [4] for ready reference. The Basic Principles may be summarized as follows:

a. A system of disclosure and verification is but one facet of the larger problem of the regulation of armaments and armed forces;
b. United States security demands that the first step in the regulation of armaments be achievement of international agreement on at least the general principles involved; and
c. The international control of atomic energy must be based on the United Nations Plan, or a no less effective plan.

The initial Conclusion states in substance that a system of disclosure and verification logically would be the first step in the implementation of an agreed international program for the regulation of armaments.

4. It appears to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that acceptance by the United States of the language in the proposed Department of State message would seem to constitute a change in basic United States policy. It would go even beyond the statement made by Mr. Acheson to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 [*19*] November 1951, in which he said that the United States would agree to the determination by the Disarmament Commission, as an administrative matter, when disclosure should progress from one stage to the next. [5] It should be borne in mind that the rules of voting procedure for the Disarmament Commission do not require unanimity, and thus the United States would be denied the power of the veto to prevent the progress of disclosure from stage to stage if at any time circumstances are such as to prejudice United States security.

5. Acceptance of the philosophy underlying the proposed message would commit the United States:

a. To take disclosure and verification out of the framework of control and regulation of armaments and armed forces;
b. To pursue a system of disclosure as an end in itself;
c. To disclose data concerning its complete atomic energy program, including details of design and fabrication of atomic weapons, to an international agency which has no authority, no control, no ownership of facilities, but merely a right of inspection. This inspection might in practice be considerably circumscribed by a State entering into the arrangement solely in order to serve its own ends, thus nullifying the effectiveness of the system;

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[4] The appendix, entitled "Excerpt from NSC 112", is not printed.

[5] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 3, 1951, pp. 879-889, or *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 309-320.

d. To disclose, in effect, all current results of research and development programs including guided missiles, bacteriological warfare, and chemical warfare, among others; and

e. To abrogate the United Nations Plan for the control of atomic energy without the substitution of another for it.

6. The course of action described in paragraph 5 above would appear to require permissive legislation from the Congress. This would require justification before the Congress of a plan for the United States to make complete disclosures of atomic data to an agency which does not possess adequate powers and authority for the exercise of control. From the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this degree of atomic disclosure to such an agency is not justifiable.

7. The possible effects of the proposed Department of State message might seriously jeopardize the security of the United States. The Soviet Union has been assisted in becoming a formidable military menace by a number of things it has obtained from the Western World. Its TU-4, the backbone of its long-range air force, was copied from a B-29 illegally interned following a forced landing in Soviet territory. Its jet engine in the MIG-15 is a development of a British 3500-lb. thrust jet engine given the Soviets after the war. The implosion principle was obtained by the Soviets through the espionage of Fuchs. It is likely that the Soviets have obtained a gunsight from an F-86 which made a forced landing in an area under Soviet control. From the military viewpoint, it would be most unwise for the United States to make a further addition to this growth in Soviet military knowledge by agreeing to exchange with the Soviet Union complete data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons. It is in this area that the United States possesses qualitative as well as quantitative superiority and, in all likelihood, would be giving up far more than it could hope to receive in return. Accordingly, the disclosure of such data by the United States might well have the effect of advancing the date when the Soviet Union would be capable of approaching atomic parity with the United States.

8. The Department of State representatives in their discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the President's speech on 7 November 1951 [6] with respect to a plan for reducing armaments constituted a change in the United States policy set forth in NSC 112. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied carefully the text of the President's radio address of that date and are unable to arrive at the same interpretation placed upon it by rep-

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[6] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pp. 623–627.

resentatives of the Department of State. The President, after describing the several parts of the disarmament program, said:

> "Such a program would have to be agreed upon by all the countries having substantial military power and ratified according to their own constitutional practices."

This statement would seem to imply that an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention, embodying at least the general principles for a program of control and regulation of armaments, would be entered into by the participating nations.

9. With respect to atomic weapons, the President in his radio address stated:

> ". . . the plan already approved by a majority of the United Nations fits right into this present proposal of ours for the control and reduction of armaments . . . atomic energy would be controlled under the provisions of the United Nations plan. We continue to support this plan as it now stands . . ."

It should be noted that the United Nations Plan, among other things, provides for the following:

a. A strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection;

b. Such an international system of control and inspection should be established by treaty or convention. The system of control should become operative only when those Members of the United Nations necessary to assure its success by signing and ratifying the treaty have bound themselves to accept and support it;

c. The treaty should include establishment in the United Nations of an international control agency possessing adequate powers and properly organized, staffed, and equipped; and

d. The treaty should embrace the entire program for putting the international system of control and inspection into effect.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that if the Department of State is able to negotiate agreement upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, if necessary before agreement has been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy, it will have succeeded in creating the conditions which well might result in a fundamental, and perhaps even a major, alteration in the Soviet system. As a tactic, therefore, it might be desirable to make some concession from established policy. The danger to the United States seems to lie in the extent to which disclosures can be agreed to and still not impose intolerable or unacceptable risks upon United States security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, are strongly of the opinion that the United States should not be committed to make disclosures of atomic data beyond Stage III prior to reaching agreement on an effective system for control of

atomic programs. It is in Stages IV and V that the United States presently possesses, to a maximum degree and in the area of greatest sensitivity, qualitative as well as quantitative superiority. [7]

11. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a course of action which would possibly lead to the disclosure of the Atomic Energy Program beyond Stage III, even if accompanied by such process of verification as might be granted by the USSR, would jeopardize the security of the United States unless there is prior agreement to and development of the control procedures encompassed within the United Nations Plan or any other plan equally as effective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that reliance upon any other safeguard would be illusory.

*Recommendations*

12. a. In light of all of the foregoing, and in any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as military advisors to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, recommend urgently against any course of action under which the United States might offer to proceed beyond Stage III of any system of disclosure and verification in advance of prior agreement on the other features of the United Nations Plan, including its terms of control of atomic energy;

b. With specific reference to the proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation, United Nations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that it not be dispatched, and further that, in the interests of national security, any instructions to the United States Delegation reflect the views outlined in the foregoing; and

c. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform the Department of State of the substance of these views.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
*Chairman*

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[7] Reference is to the stages set forth in UN doc. DC/C.2/1, Apr. 5, 1952; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 346–356.

330.13/5–1352

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of May 13 [2] commenting on a proposed message to the United States Delegation to the United Nations concerning certain phases of the work of the Disarmament Commission.

The position that the United States has taken in the Disarmament Commission is actually in general conformity with the recommendations contained in the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The statement quoted from the proposed message to the United States Delegation and to which exception was taken in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum related to a contingency which, in all probability, would not, in fact, arise.

I am fully in accord with your suggestion that our Government's position be established as rapidly as possible on the relationship between the proposed system of disclosure and verification, the plan for international control of atomic energy, and an international program for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces armaments. It is clear from the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission that the United States will be required to take some position on this subject in the near future. In fact, two members of the Commission, France and Pakistan, have already given to the United States Delegation on an informal basis drafts of proposals which deal with this problem. The machinery of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments would seem suitable to conduct the preliminary studies in connection with such a position and I have suggested that arrangements in this regard be expedited. Unquestionably parts of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be useful in establishing such a position.

As I stated previously, the proposed message to the United States Delegation to the United Nations which is the subject of your letter has not been and will not be dispatched.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
JOHN D. HICKERSON
*Assistant Secretary*

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer and cleared by Sanders of UNA and by Arneson.

[2] *Supra.*

Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "Atomic Energy—Expansion of the Fissionable"

## *Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the President*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 20, 1952.

Pursuant to your authorization, each member of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy has reviewed and restated his position regarding the Special Committee's recommendation for the planned additional expansion of the atomic energy program, in the light of the request by Senator Maybank, of the Senate Appropriations Committee, as reported by Mr. Dean in his attached letter of May 8, 1952. [1]

The replies of each member of the Special Committee are enclosed herewith for your consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Annex 1]

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 14, 1952.

Subject: Secretary of State Position on the Atomic Energy Commission's Expansion Program.

Reference: Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State dated May 14, 1952, entitled "Expansion of the Atomic Energy Program". [2]

1. In accordance with the request contained in the referenced memorandum, I have reviewed the position of the Department of State on the planned expansion program of the Atomic Energy Commission in the light of current and possible future developments on the international front.

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[1] Neither the request from Senator Burnet R. Maybank of South Carolina nor the letter from Gordon Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, has been found in Department of State files. Senator Maybank was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Independent Offices.

In a letter of May 28, to Senator Maybank, President Truman stated that the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy had confirmed the necessity for the expansion program. The President's letter concluded as follows: "I wish to urge upon you and your committee the importance to this Nation and the rest of the free world of undertaking this expansion program without delay." For the full text of the letter, released by the White House on May 29, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–53*, pp. 384–385.

[2] Not found.

2. The planned expansion program will not begin to give results in the form of additions to the United States atomic weapons stockpile until about 1956. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Department, the planned expansion program is essential to the national security to cover the period roughly from 1956 on, when the atomic capabilities of the USSR will presumably be substantial. A U.S. capability to deal repeated atomic blows at the USSR production potential together with a sufficient quantity of atomic weapons for battlefield use may then be an essential factor serving not only as a deterrent to possible Soviet aggression but also as additional reasonable assurance of victory for the United States and the free world should a war be thrust upon us. The planned expansion program will help achieve this capability. It is the view of the Department of State that the planned expansion program should go forward.

DEAN ACHESON

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[Annex 2]

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

SECRET WASHINGTON, 16 May 1952.

Subject: Expansion of the Atomic Energy Program

1. I refer to your memorandum of 14 May 1952, subject as above, which forwarded a letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission dated 8 May 1952 and requested a review and restatement of position regarding the atomic energy expansion program which was recommended to the President on 16 January 1952 by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy. [3]

2. I have reviewed my position on this expansion program as stated in my memorandum to you dated 11 December 1951 and reaffirm my strong support for the program. [4]

3. The objective of the Department of Defense in recommending the program for expansion of atomic energy production facilities, now under consideration in the Congress, is to afford the United States a greater advantage from this powerful weapon in any conflict with the Soviet Union or any other active enemy of the United States. To achieve this aim, we place no limit on the extent of the use of atomic or any other weapons, nor do we believe that the use

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[3] See the memorandum for the President, Jan. 17, p. 851.

[4] Not found.

of large numbers of atomic weapons against an enemy would have an adverse effect on neutrals or potential allies.

4. Military requirements for atomic weapons are formulated by the same process as are requirements for any other weapons. The individual Services calculate their needs, based on missions assigned them by approved war plans, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff adjust and balance these needs as best possible to assure maximum effectiveness of the combined military resources.

5. Prior to formulation of the atomic weapons requirements, upon which the currently recommended expansion has been based, the Department of Defense has not stated a pure atomic military requirement irrespective of raw material resources and production capabilities. Previous military requirements have been stated only within the availability of source materials as predicted by the Atomic Energy Commission and balanced production facilities designed to convert source materials into fissionable materials under an economically operated program.

6. In the past, the predicted availability of uranium ore has been the limiting factor in programs for the development of processing capacity. This factor no longer obtains. It is now clear that, under an aggressive ore procurement policy, we can base fissionable material production capacity on the requirements for the end product, rather than on the availability of raw materials.

7. The expansion program now recommended is the result of a carefully calculated analysis of the role of atomic weapons in augmenting our military capacity. It has been developed from this analysis that, in addition to strengthening and extending the strategic role of atomic weapons, atomic developments in both weapons and delivery systems have demonstrated the feasibility of a highly effective tactical application. This application would include delivery by both land- and carrier-based fighter, fighter-bomber and light bomber aircraft, as well as by guided missiles, guns and rockets. These tactical applications, as progressively developed and supported by an adequate stock of fissionable materials, will go far toward providing the free world a means of balancing the superior manpower and the advantage of surprise and initiative held by the Communist forces. Military requirements for atomic weapons as determined today are based on broad and flexible applications. They arise, primarily, from the necessity of meeting Communist aggression by more extensive use of our superior industrial and scientific resources rather than by attempting to match our potential enemy man-for-man. To do so requires a definite minimum number of atomic weapons. This minimum requirement cannot be obtained too soon. We recognize that, with any degree of expansion that might be conceived, results in terms of additional weapons over

those to be provided by the present program cannot be attained for several years. This fact, however, does not in any way reduce or otherwise affect the need.

8. Expansion of production facilities to meet this goal is not more important than expanded efforts to assure greater deliverability of atomic weapons. However, the expansion of production facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission is not influenced by the imponderables which are inherent in providing greater probability of delivery on target. The expansion program provides only an increase in the atomic ammunition. These imponderables include Soviet offensive capability; Soviet capability to destroy our delivery capabilities; weather conditions which will exist over targets; and the reliability of intelligence as related to target information. As a result of a study of these factors, the Department of Defense considers the recommended expansion program to be the most feasible way in which to provide our Armed Forces with the greatest possible military power and within the minimum period of time.

9. Two important questions have arisen as to the extent and timing of the recommended expansion and its effect upon over-all military requirements for conventional munitions and forces. With respect to timing, the proposed program, if approved and initiated at an early date, will provide the Armed Forces with their absolute minimum requirements of atomic weapons by numbers and types approximately five years earlier than will the present program. The respective dates are 1960 and 1965. As far as can be determined now, the five-year difference may mean the difference between victory and defeat.

10. We can complete the proposed plant expansion in about five years at an average cost of less than a billion dollars a year. The tremendous addition to the power of the United States resulting from the product of these new plants will be out of all proportion to their dollar cost. As a dividend payable in more peaceful times, the energy content of the fissionable material from these plants should be a substantial supplement to the natural fuel resources of this country—resources which our other defense preparations are depleting at an alarming rate. It is impossible to determine with precision what level of expenditure will assure the nation's security, but I know of no better insurance against the risk that our other military preparations prove insufficient than to build up our atomic plant capacity to the level justified by the uranium prospects. In the light of present day costs of preparing for, to say nothing of fighting a war, the premium for such insurance appears to be quite modest.

11. Concerning the effect of this recommended expansion upon current budgets of the Department of Defense, it is to be borne in

mind that a large part of our current budget is for the expansion of our capability to deliver atomic weapons and the integration of that capability into our over-all fighting potential. The strength, compositions and equipment programs of the Armed Forces, as provided for in current budgets, are based on a progressive program of supplementing and, in part, replacing conventional weapons systems by atomic weapons systems. Clearly, to accept any reduction in our planned and programmed fighting potential in anticipation of ultimate replacement by an atomic weapon potential yet to be achieved would be to gamble recklessly with the security of the nation.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

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[Annex 3]

### *Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1952.

Re: Expansion of the atomic energy program

Reference is made to your letter of May 14, 1952, which in turn referenced my letter to you of May 8, 1952 relative to the request of the Independent Offices Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee to secure a review by the members of the National Security Council of the expansion program.

As the Commission representative on the NSC Special Committee, I can state to you at this time that the AEC position with reference to the importance, the feasibility and the cost of this program is the same as when the matter was presented to the National Security Council earlier this year. Nothing has occurred which would change our recommendations. As indicated in my letter of May 8, 1952, however, we believe that the total estimated capital cost for the program will be less than our original estimate.

GORDON DEAN

[Annex 4]

## *The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (Steelman) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1952.

DEAR MR. LAY: At the time of the consideration by the National Security Council of the planned additional expansion of the atomic energy program, former Defense Mobilizer Charles E. Wilson personally participated in an active role. He also directed studies of the feasibility of the program in terms of its impact upon the economy and upon our mobilization effort.

Since that time, it has become increasingly clear that this program can be integrated into the future plans for expansion of various segments of the mobilization effort. Its impact upon materials, power supply, and manpower have been taken into consideration in the estimates of over-all feasibility made by the several mobilization-planning agencies.

I am, therefore, able to re-affirm the original approval of the program on feasibility grounds which was given by this office when it was considered by the Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. STEELMAN

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330.13/5–2152

## *Memorandum by William Sanders to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1952.

Subject: Status Report on Disarmament

### A. *The Pre-Seventh GA Period*

1. If and when the paper on numerical limitation of armed forces [RAC (NS) D–4] [2] is submitted in the Disarmament Commission, we will have reached our immediate objective of demonstrating US initiative in seeking agreement on disarmament. Our proposals will represent the "balanced" approach required by the situation confronting us in the Commission. This will mean, I hope, that the tac-

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[1] Sanders was Special Assistant and Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. The memorandum was drafted by Howard Meyers of UNP.

[2] RAC (NS) D–4, Apr. 30, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "RAC (NS) Documents") Brackets in the source text.

tical situation will no longer force us to make substantive proposals before we have thought through the entire problem.

2. Our activities between June 1, the date of the Commission's first report, and the opening of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly will probably be confined to a holding operation. We should persuade the members of the Disarmament Commission to concentrate discussion on the proposals already submitted, plus the informal suggestion raised by various members, rather than on introducing any comprehensive proposals. However, we may submit a comparatively noncontroversial paper, such as the one on control organs. We should also not rule out entirely the possibility of an additional proposal in the reduction field—the NSRB may come up with a useful idea.

3. We have considered whether the June report should contain a summary of the proposals and discussions or simply a brief recital of the organization of the Commission, the meetings held, and the text of the substantive proposals in the form of annexes. We have elected the latter alternative as the most suitable for this first step and, in fact, as the only one that would at this stage be supported by our principal friends. The Secretariat has already prepared a draft report along this line and the Commission meets tomorrow to consider the draft.

4. It is as yet too early to decide what our approach should be to disarmament at the Seventh GA but my present thinking is that the item should not be spot-lighted, unless there is no escaping this because of Soviet propaganda. Although it will by that time be evident that there is an impasse in the Commission I think it will be to our advantage to demonstrate that we want to keep the door open for further discussions in the Commission after the Assembly.

B. *The Comprehensive Plan*

Following approval of the June report the Disarmament Staff will, in addition to necessary backstopping of the discussions in the Commission, concentrate on developing a comprehensive disarmament plan. The main segments of this program are set out in the attached Annex.

C. *The Propaganda Program*

Because of pressure of other affairs and the lack of personnel in the P Area, we have not succeeded in our efforts to have a full-time Officer assigned to disarmament work. I recently had conversations on this matter with Mr. Howland Sargeant[3] and he has informed me that he is working out some arrangement to take care of our needs. This is, of course, an extremely important aspect of our program and I am concerned that we have accomplished so little in firming up a positive and imaginative approach to the problem.

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[3] Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

### Annex

### *Paper Drafted in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

## PRINCIPAL PROJECTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT PROGRAM

(As of May 21, 1952)

a. Revision of DAC D-6 [4] into a paper on the general views of the US concerning overall limitations and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments. This revision will suggest studies in specific fields, such as: identifying the other "essential components"; allocation of armed forces; standard armaments for those states with substantial military power; whether it is possible to eliminate certain categories of weapons from standard armaments which support permitted armed forces, etc. Once the main elements have been earmarked, specific studies can be farmed out, within the Government or as special projects financed by outside sources.

b. A paper on the relationship between disclosure and verification, the atomic energy plan, and reduction of armaments. Preliminary studies on this paper are now under way in the DAC group.

c. Integration into our general program of the substantial contribution which we expect from the National Security Resources Board. It is anticipated that the NSRB will make suggestions concerning controls of manpower, raw materials and finished products. Such suggestions will be relevant to the development of the disclosure and verification program, as well as to the problems of limitation and reduction.

d. A paper on the levels of armed forces and armaments preliminary to balanced reduction, which suggests the levels which the West must reach before it will be feasible to commence reductions in the light of Soviet strength. A first draft of this paper has already been produced by UNA/P.

e. A paper on the time table and procedures for putting into effect the disarmament program and another paper on the control organs necessary for disclosure and verification, atomic energy control and general reduction have been drafted and are in the process of revision.

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[4] DAC D-6, "General Views of the US Concerning Determination of Over-All Limits and Restrictions on All Armed Forces and Armaments, Including Atomic Weapons", Apr. 14, 1952, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "DAC")

f. A summary of the relationship between political settlements and disarmament is in first draft and has been circulated in the Department for clearance prior to submitting it to RAC. With S/P approval, copies have been handed the Panel of Consultants.

g. Develop, if possible, a two-way traffic of ideas between the Department's staff and the Panel of Consultants, through the intermediary of Mr. Bundy. While there may appear to be a duplication of effort between the studies suggested in the preceding paragraphs and the work of the Consultants, the government must carry on these studies in order to develop its own ideas on a comprehensive disarmament plan.

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330.13/5-2152

## *The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET WASHINGTON, 21 May 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to Mr. Nash, dated 1 May 1952,[1] enclosing for this Department's consideration, a draft of a working paper intended for submission in Committee I of the Disarmament Commission, entitled "Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces" (RAC (NS) D-4).[2]

The working paper has been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their comments, in which I am in general agreement, are enclosed herewith.

It is the view of the Department of Defense that the proposal contained in RAC (NS) D-4, specifying a numerical limitation of armed forces, does not constitute, in itself, a sound and comprehensive approach to the problem of the formulation of a plan for the regulation of conventional armaments and armed forces. The proposal, if made, should be clearly regarded as a political expedient. It should serve only as a means of initiating detailed discussions during which all the complex factors of the problem of disarmament will be considered in order to arrive at a solution which, in the final stage of negotiations, will be in treaty form. In any event, it is essential that the proposals contained in the working paper should be amended in accordance with paragraph 8 of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 912.

[2] RAC (NS) D-4, Apr. 30, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "RAC (NS) Documents")

Subject to the above comments, I approve RAC (NS) D–4 for appropriate use by the United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the light of the urgent political necessity for a proposal by the United States in this specific field.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

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[Enclosure]

## *Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 20 May 1952.

Subject: Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces—RAC (NS) D–4

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of 7 May 1952, subject as above,[3] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the draft paper on the above subject, RAC (NS) D–4, dated 30 April 1952, prepared in the Department of State.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the proposal by the Department of State that the United States Representative submit the subject document to the Working Committee of the Disarmament Commission as a working paper rather than as a position to which the United States Government is formally committed. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have confined the expression of their views contained herein to general remarks addressed to the concept of a numerical limitation of armed forces. In any event the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that they will have opportunity to make detailed comments on major specific recommendations of the Committee of the Disarmament Commission prior to formal adoption by the Commission.

3. In the Conclusions of the basic paper it is stated, among other things, that the following formula might be considered as a basis for discussion in the Committee of the Disarmament Commission:

"a. The maximum level of armed forces of a state should not exceed the lower of the following figures:

"(i) 1% of its population

"(ii) A fixed numerical ceiling—say between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000.

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[3] Not found in Department of State files.

"b. Relatively minor adjustments upward and downward would have to be made in some areas to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace.

"c. While states should not be permitted to exceed maximum levels, they should not be required to raise their armed forces to such levels."

4. A preliminary analysis of the level of armed forces which would result from the application of such a formula, assuming it is possible to obtain international agreement thereto, indicates that there would occur a marked shift in the present global imbalance of armed force levels. The numerical superiority of forces now existing within the Iron Curtain countries would be eliminated and this superiority in the level of armed forces would pass to the United States and its Allies. This generalized statement describes merely a numerical transition which does not by itself necessarily bear an important relation to the effectiveness of armed forces. Further, in order to view this purely numerical consideration in its proper perspective, it must be recalled that only three of the Iron Curtain countries, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, are members of the United Nations. Unless separate negotiations could be successfully concluded with those non-member states of the Soviet hegemony (including Communist China), it is unlikely that any numerical advantage of substantial degree would accrue to the West.

5. Even though a numerical advantage to the West (an advantage perhaps more apparent than real) were to accrue from the application of the proposed formula, such result must be considered in the light of numerous and serious disadvantages from the military point of view. These disadvantages are summarized in the following subparagraphs:

a. The application of the formula results in a level of armed forces fixed by a figure which is merely a figure, bearing no relation to strategic considerations or to the specific security requirements of any state; consequently the figure would be unrealistic and impermanent, as would any other figure chosen at random for this purpose;

b. The proposal fails to recognize the necessity for achieving at least agreement upon the solution of current major political issues and a reduction of world tensions prior to the initiation of any part of the programs for reducing the level of armed forces;

c. While the proposal is not inconsistent with the framework of NSC 112 or with statements made by Secretary Acheson in his speech before the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations, disarmament should not be considered out of context in its relation to the world situation and the United States policies as expressed in NSC 68/4 and NSC 114/2;[4]

d. Implementation of the proposal may create such major regional imbalances of armed strength as seriously to affect the security of certain of our allies;

e. Merely advancing the proposal will have a serious impact on United States as well as on world public opinion. It may so fix the minds of the people in the Western nations upon relaxation of the armament burden as to have a catastrophic effect upon the rearmament program and conceivably on the conduct of present hostilities in Korea; it would probably delay arms programs; it might even bring about a degree of disarmament on the side of the West alone, thus imperiling the gains which have thus far been made only by heavy sacrifice;

f. Implementation of the proposal would militate against the conduct of the hostilities in Korea and in Indochina and against the fulfillment of United States commitments world-wide;

g. The proposal not only assumes that the USSR can control the policies, military programs, and the aggressive acts of all of her satellites, but also that she will *agree* to do so, and that she will, in fact, abide by the letter and spirit of such an agreement;

h. The proposal tends to overemphasize the purely numerical quality of armed forces and the contribution this quality makes toward the decision to launch aggression; history is replete with examples of decisive defeat inflicted upon numerically superior forces by small, well-equipped, mobile forces employing sound tactical doctrine;

i. The concept of the proposal seems postulated upon the theory that reduction in armaments will lessen world tensions. Actually, a limitation of armed forces which bears no relation to strategic considerations may prove to be an invitation to aggression; and

j. The proposal is unlikely to be meaningful unless it has as a prerequisite the means for demonstrating good faith on the part of the USSR and its satellites in order that the enforcement problem may be reduced to manageable proportions.

6. On balance, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, are of the opinion that the concept of a numerical limitation of armed forces set forth in the Department of State paper is not suitable for submission as a working proposal to the Committee of the Disarmament Commission; and that its submission would not be consistent with the security interests of the United States.

7. If political considerations are determined, nevertheless, to be so important as to override the military views set forth in para-

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[4] For text of NSC 68/4, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," Dec. 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 467. For text of NSC 112, "Formulation of a U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments", July 6, 1951, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477. For extracts from NSC 114/2, "U.S. Programs for National Security", Oct. 12, 1951, see *ibid.*, p. 182.

graphs 5 and 6 above, the proposal contained in the Department of State paper should be clearly regarded and handled as a political expedient suitable for use only as a counterproposal to the Soviet proposal to reduce the existing levels of armed forces by one-third in one year, and not one suitable for implementation. The proposal, if made, should serve only as a means of initiating detailed negotiations during which all the complex factors which contribute to the enormity of the problem of disarmament will be considered and applied in order to arrive at an acceptable and realistic solution which, in its final stage of negotiation, will be in treaty form.

8. With specific reference to paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of the Department of State paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned at the suggestion that an agreed reduction of existing armed forces might commence upon the determination by an international agency that an appropriate stage of the disclosure and verification plan had been completed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reaffirm the statement made to you in their memorandum of 11 March 1952, subject: "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments," [5] that a program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must provide for the administration of adequate safeguards by a competent international authority with appropriate status, rights, and powers.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the foregoing, and that these views be communicated to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W.G. LALOR
*Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)*
*Secretary*

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[5] The memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Mar. 11, has not been found in Department of State files. However, the position of the JCS was outlined by Secretary Lovett in a letter to Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson dated Mar. 25, p. 877.

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103 AEC/5-2352

## *The United States Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of State*

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 23, 1952.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: We have received a copy of the letter of May 13, 1952, from the Secretary of Defense to you, [1] and have noted the views of the Department of Defense expressed in that letter with respect to the principle of agreement on the international control of atomic energy as embodied in the United Nations plan, or an equally effective plan before the completion of the stages of disclosure and verification.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 926.

You will recall that the Atomic Energy Commission's views on this subject were expressed in my letter to Assistant Secretary Hickerson, dated March 3, 1952.[2] In paragraph 6 of that letter we stated that:

> "We feel very strongly that there should be consideration given to the compelling need to achieve complete agreement on an effective plan for the international control of atomic energy prior to entering into Stages III, IV and V of [Disclosure and Verification]."[3]

We note further the suggestion of the Secretary of Defense that there be undertaken the establishment of this Government's position on the relationship between the proposed system of disclosure and verification, the plan for international control of atomic energy and an international program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.

The Commission representative, Dr. Smyth and staff, will be prepared to associate themselves with representatives of the Department of State and the Department of Defense in any discussions on this subject.[4]

Sincerely yours,

United States Atomic Energy Commission
Gordon Dean
*Chairman*

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[2] *Ante*, p. 872.

[3] Brackets in the source text.

[4] In his reply of June 18, Hickerson first briefly reviewed the contents of Dean's letter, then added: "As you are doubtless aware, this matter is being studied and a paper is being prepared through the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC). Members of the staff of the Atomic Energy Commission are participating actively in this study." (103 AEC/5–2352)

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy, 1950–1955"

### *Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 27, 1952.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Department of Defense interest in the use of atomic weapons, [2] referred to me as a member of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, have been reviewed carefully by my colleagues on the Atomic Energy Commission and myself. Our views on this statement are attached hereto.

There are a number of important matters raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that deserve special comment by the Commission. It is, therefore, recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement be reviewed in the light of these remarks and the statements of the Atomic Energy Commission responsibilities set forth in the attached statement.

The Commission notes with particular concern the Joint Chiefs statement that "The present system of divided responsibility for the storage, surveillance, maintenance and security of the stockpile of atomic weapons is inimical to the best interests of the United States." This is considered to be an assertion unsupported by evidence. It is the view of the Commission that the "best interests of the United States", in so far as atomic weapons are concerned, is measured directly in terms of readiness to deliver effectively atomic attack when ordered. The actions taken by the Commission to effect the maximum degree of readiness are set forth in detail in the attached statement.

In consonance with the Commission policy to provide those weapons required by the JCS to meet their standards of operational readiness, the AEC is prepared at any time to work out a plan with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to Presidential approval, to provide the reservoir of additional weapons in DoD custody that may be required.

GORDON DEAN

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[1] By memorandum of June 2, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted copies of this memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950–1955")

[2] *Ante*, p. 864.

[Enclosure]

## THE VIEWS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ON THE JCS STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

1. The Atomic Energy Commission has considered carefully the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the responsibilities of the Department of Defense in the use of atomic weapons and record herewith their views on this statement. Although most of the areas defined as responsibilities of the DoD do not conflict with the responsibilities of the AEC, there are some specific points that do and others that require clarification, and the important issue of transfer of custody of atomic weapons is raised.

2. Referring to the statement of views of the JCS, the last sentence, paragraph 3, and the last sentence, paragraph 5c(2), quoted below, probably should be clarified in order that these statements may not be misinterpreted as being in conflict with responsibilities of the NSC in advising the President regarding the use of atomic weapons contemplated in the NSC study dated 27 April 1951 [2] now pending:

> "The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot, therefore, agree to any other agency interposing itself between them and the President in submission to him of recommendations for a military course of action; nor could they agree to any such other agency having a voice in determining how, when, and where such military operations are to be conducted."
>
> "Therefore, the decision as to where, how, and what numbers, and in what types atomic weapons will be employed must be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; . . . ."

Presumably the JCS have taken into consideration the NSC paper referred to, and the intent of their statements concerns initial recommendations to the President regarding the use of atomic weapons. The words, "how, when, and where" are widely inclusive, however, and by inference are in conflict with the NSC statement referred to above which states:

> "In the event of a positive decision, the President will authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons *under such conditions as may be specified.*"

The "conditions" referred to here presumably would have been determined by the President upon advice of the NSC and conceivably might place restrictions on "when and where" atomic weapons would be used.

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[2] See footnote 4, p. 969.

3. The JCS have stated the DoD responsibility for determining weapons requirements in paragraph 5a(1). The Commission of course agrees that it is the responsibility of the DoD to estimate the number of weapons needed to implement war plans, and is glad to note the further statement that such requirements should be reviewed in the terms of their impact on the national economy. Presumably the first point in such a review would be the present and potential production capacity of AEC plants. This would continue the present common sense practice whereby formal and informal discussions of needs and capabilities occur between the DoD and the AEC before annual requirements are frozen. It is the Commission's opinion that it is appropriate for the JCS to determine these requirements in terms of numbers of weapons and desired yields, but that the determination of the production rates and production goals for fissionable material to meet these requirements is a responsibility of the AEC. In this connection therefore, the Commission wishes to differ on one point in paragraph 5a(1). The relevant portion reads:

> "The basic development of requirements for complete weapons which in turn establishes the production program, including the production goals and production rates of fissionable material, has its genesis in war plans and is, therefore, a responsibility of the Department of Defense."

and is repeated in paragraph 5a(3):

> "The present arrangement is to state these requirements in terms of weapons three years in advance, and thereafter as production objectives in terms of annual rates of production of fissionable material."

Fundamentally, the principal technical feature influencing the yield of atomic weapons is core design in terms of fissionable material content. Production rates of fissionable material to meet requirements for weapons in terms of numbers and yields is established properly, therefore, by these technical considerations. As the responsible agency for nuclear design, the AEC is the appropriate agency, subject to approval of the President, to establish production rates of fissionable material to meet atomic weapon requirements. Further, the JCS statement implies that the entire AEC production effort is directed solely toward weapon requirements. Whereas this certainly is now very nearly so, it may not always be the case and other factors than weapon requirements will determine total material production rates.

4. The most important AEC responsibility in the weapons development field is to assure that progress in the development and utilization of nuclear energy is advanced to the maximum extent and

kept ahead of similar effort in other nations, and to do this by directing its effort toward new and radical development and the application of these to specific military uses. The Atomic Energy Act directs, and the country expects, the Commission to assume this responsibility—one that is far broader than the fulfillment of a status only as producer for the military, and one that requires Commission participation in matters stated by the JCS to be strictly military.

5. The AEC cannot accept as unilateral the responsibility of the DoD for the establishment of technical characteristics and requirements for atomic weapons. Rather, it is appropriate for the AEC to maintain a status of advisor to the DoD in these matters. To arrive at military requirements, all factors that bear on methods of conducting warfare must be considered. Most of these factors, either in a particular system or in over-all requirements, stem from military operational concepts and considerations, and it is from these, therefore, that military characteristics and requirements must largely be determined. In atomic weapons, one predominant factor among these is the body of characteristics fixed by their basic nuclear design. Maximum exploitation of the potential capabilities of nuclear type weapons will require that the advice of the AEC in their development and utilization continue to be made available to the Military. Hence, it would appear that in the field of engineering of basic nuclear development into weapons and in the establishment of weapons characteristics and requirements, the AEC should assume a role of technical advisor for the DoD.

6. The current arrangement between the AEC and the DoD for the operation of the weapon storage sites, under which important responsibilities have been delegated to the DoD, is explicit evidence of AEC agreement with the principles set forth in paragraph 5d(1) regarding physical security of weapons. It appears worthwhile to point out, however, that the last sentence of this paragraph, quoted as follows, is subject to misinterpretation.

> "In any event, the stockpile has grown to such proportions that problems of surveillance, maintenance and security are beyond the present capability of the AEC."

The AEC has pursued vigorously all means of fostering the technical capability of the military establishment in handling atomic weapons. To this end more and more responsibility for maintenance, surveillance and security has been delegated to the DoD. Had another course been taken, the AEC would have provided within its own organization the means for performing these necessary functions.

7. We assume that paragraph 5d(2) of the JCS paper which discusses exchange of scientific and technical information with other nations is not intended to affect exchanges of restricted data under the Technical Cooperation Program established by the *Modus Vivendi,* [3] exchanges in the raw materials procurement program, and exchanges of commonly held data under the tripartite declassification program involving Great Britain, Canada and the United States.

8. We interpret paragraph 5d(2) as dealing only with exchanges under the recent amendment to Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 235–82nd Congress). [4] That amendment authorizes the Commission, subject to the approval of the President, to communicate certain scientific and technical information to another nation "when in its unanimous judgment the common defense and security would be substantially promoted and would not be endangered." Restricted data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons is excluded. The amendment requires that the written recommendations of the National Security Council must be submitted to the President before he makes his determination.

9. In view of this latter requirement, we think that the JCS view that the imparting of each item of information be contingent upon the unanimous approval of the American members of the Combined Policy Committee should not be accepted. Similarly since the members of that Committee will have a voice in any recommendation made by the NSC to the President, there is no necessity for a requirement that exchanges "should be accomplished through the Combined Policy Committee (CPC)." Such a requirement is administratively undesirable. Once the President has approved an exchange of scientific and technical information under the amendment, the responsibility for accomplishing the exchange is and should continue to be an administrative function of the Commission. The JCS state that such "information should be limited to carefully circumscribed, scientific and technical data, the area of which has been the subject of precise definition." With this, the Commission is in disagreement for two reasons. First, it establishes different criteria than that specified in the statute. Second, it may well be the advantage of the United States to engage in considerably broader exchanges of information than indicated by the JCS. Should this occur, the Commission will be duty bound to insist that appropriate methods be established to accomplish such interchanges.

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[3] See footnote 3, p. 847.

[4] See footnote 4, *ibid.*

10. In connection with the statements in the JCS paper regarding the communication of atomic weapons information to another nation, the above-mentioned amendment to Section 10 of the Act again should be noted. That amendment excludes exchange of information on design and fabrication of atomic weapons. Additional legislation may be required to permit the JCS to communicate such information essential for the conduct of combined operations and for the actual exchange of fissionable or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such combined operations. It is understood that such legislation is contemplated by the DoD. In any event, the Commission should be kept informed of such exchanges of information to the extent necessary to permit it to discharge intelligently its responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to consider questions of declassification of restricted data. The Commission will also need to be informed of such exchanges of information in order to function intelligently in its sphere of cooperation with other nations.

11. The Commission notes with concern and as an assertion unsupported by evidence the JCS statement that "the present system of divided responsibility for the storage, surveillance, maintenance and security of the stockpile is inimical to the best interests of the United States." It is the view of the Commission that the "best interests of the United States," in so far as atomic weapons are concerned, is measured directly in terms of readiness to deliver effectively atomic attack when ordered. The Commission has acted positively and without reservation within the framework of the Act and the expressed policies of the President to provide the maximum degree of readiness for the execution of its responsibilities both in normal and emergency conditions.

12. The emergency plan for transfer of atomic weapons has been kept under constant review in order that weapons may be transferred with rapidity and without confusion. Tests of this plan have been carried out to the satisfaction of both the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the Commission, from which it may be concluded that no delay in weapon readiness will result in its execution. In carrying out its field service or stockpile responsibility the AEC has employed the DoD to do most of the actual work involved in order that the technical capability of the military personnel may be developed to the maximum. Weapons for training assembly teams and delivery crews have been furnished as requested by the DoD, and recently the entire stockpile of weapons has been made available for this purpose under a plan as proposed by the military. Every request of the DoD for war reserve weapons for strategic deployment has been met. In this connection the Commission recently has stated its desire to provide weapons to the DoD

for deployment anywhere on the globe to meet operational readiness commitments. The Commission therefore, has taken all steps within its power to provide a degree of readiness consistent with the best interests of the United States.

13. The question of the custodial responsibility for the war reserve stockpile of atomic weapons has been raised several times in the past. Decisions in the matter have been influenced by the technical capability of the military establishment to assume this responsibility and by the considerations of policy involving international and domestic affairs. It is the view of the Commission that the DoD is now capable of assuming completely the responsibility for maintenance, surveillance and security of war reserve weapons, including both nuclear and non-nuclear components. The Commission recognizes that the policy questions involving the relationship of the responsible custodian to domestic and international affairs still exist.

14. The JCS have expressed a need for "a reservoir of finished weapons in complete custody of the military" in order to increase operational flexibility and military readiness. As pointed out above the Commission recently has stated to the Secretary of Defense its desire to provide weapons to the DoD for this purpose. It is not now known to the AEC however how many weapons in the custody of the DoD will satisfy these requirements. The Commission is prepared to discuss this matter fully at any time desired by the JCS. Inherent in any decision in this regard is the requirement that the AEC retain custodial control of a portion of the stockpile. This will form a reserve pool of weapons and provide a standby stock of weapons available for carrying out major modification and modernization programs and other desirable activities in connection with the stockpile as a whole.

15. Custodial responsibility for stockpiled weapons involves maintenance of the weapons, performance of routine functional surveillance, introduction of minor modifications and the preservation of the physical security of the weapons and the storage sites. These responsibilities must be assumed by the DoD upon any transfer of custodial responsibility. In addition, arrangements must be agreed upon to permit the AEC to have access to the entire stockpile of weapons in certain cases, and to assure that the AEC is provided with information obtained in surveillance operations which is required to carry on the AEC quality control program. In this way the AEC could continue to have available a basis for directing needed improvements in current and future manufacture and required modification and major stockpile retrofit, thus insuring the continued availability of weapons of the most advanced design.

330.13/5-2852

## *Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1952.

Subject: Working Paper for Submission to United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Enclosed herewith for your information is copy of a working paper which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France intend to submit to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations prior to June 1st—probably on May 28. [2]

The paper suggests that one essential element in the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the numerical limitation of armed forces. It goes on to advance, for purposes of discussion, a formula along the general lines set forth in your address of November 7, 1951. [3] The proposed formula is (1) that the United States, the USSR and China have equal armed forces, of say, 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 and France and the United Kingdom have equal armed forces of, say, 700,000 to 800,000; (2) that all other countries agree on ceilings fixed in relation to the armed forces of the five powers and with a view of avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world. Such ceilings would normally be less than one percent of the population and not in excess of current levels.

The Soviet Union has contended with some success on the propaganda front that the Western Democracies do not wish reduction in arms but merely wish a vast intelligence operation. It is believed that if this proposal can be introduced in time to be included in the First Report of the Disarmament Commission, which will be submitted to the Security Council about June 1st, some of the effect of the Soviet propaganda will be offset.

The submission of a document along these lines as a working paper in the Disarmament Commission has been approved by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments (RAC), consisting of representatives of the Department of State, Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission. It is fully within the framework of NSC 112 [4] approved by you.

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer on May 27. Telegram 7043 to Secretary Acheson at Paris, May 27, also drafted by Bechhoefer, transmitted substantially the same information contained in this memorandum. (330.13/5-2752)

[2] The enclosed working paper, not printed, was introduced (with minor drafting changes) at the 12th Meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission, May 28, 1952, as UN doc. DC/10, "Proposals for Fixing Numerical Limitations on All Armed Forces". For the text of DC/10 and the remarks delivered by U.S. Representative Cohen on the occasion of its submission, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 365-369, or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1952, pp. 907-911.

[3] See footnote 4, p. 898.

DAVID BRUCE

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[4] For text of NSC 112, "Formulation of a U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments", July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

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Truman Library, PSF-Subject File, "Atomic Weapons, Thermonuclear"

## *The Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (McMahon) to the President* [1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: More than two years ago you directed that the H-bomb program go forward.[2] The historic rightness of your decision, in the defense of our country and in the defense of peace, cannot be questioned. I write you today because I believe that further action is necessary by way of laying down requirements for H-bombs in quantity. Only the President of the United States should decide this issue.

It now seems likely that not merely one but several types of H-bombs can be constructed. The explosive power of each of these weapon types is expected to be equivalent to some millions of tons of TNT and very possibly tens of millions of tons of TNT. The early doubt whether this weapon could be made at all has almost disappeared. Likewise it seems that the weapon will be of manageable proportions from a delivery viewpoint, such that it could be carried in existing-type aircraft. A deliverable prototype H-bomb is anticipated by 1954 or sooner. The first A-bombs cost our nation about $2 billion; I estimate the first H-bombs may cost less than one tenth of this sum.

Since your original instructions two years ago had to do mainly with *development* efforts, my specific purpose in writing you is to recommend a new directive covering *production* efforts—how many H-bombs we need and how soon. As you know, certain questions on the scope and scale of the hydrogen program are now pending before the National Security Council, and some studies are underway. I very much hope that the problem will be met squarely in all of its implications for our defense.

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[1] A copy of this letter is in G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "H-Bomb Report to the President".

[2] For documentation on President Truman's decision of Jan. 31, 1950, to proceed with the development of the hydrogen bomb, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. I, pp. 419 ff., and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 493 ff.

A basic element in this problem is tactical uses. If the H-bomb is only a strategic weapon, then the number that could profitably be employed against an aggressor may be comparatively limited. If, however, this weapon is to have sweeping tactical applications against enemy military targets in case of war, then the number which we could profitably employ is apt to be very great.

A related question is the percentage of our existing and anticipated atomic stockpile that should be made available for hydrogen weapons. Ordinary A-bombs, of course, may be used to produce atomic explosions or else to set off vastly more powerful hydrogen explosions. Should 10%, or 50%, or 90% of the atomic stockpile be assigned to the accumulation of a hydrogen stockpile? A third basic element in the problem is the estimated costs—over and above funds we already plan to spend on the atomic program—for manufacturing various numbers of H-bombs: For example, 100, 500, 1000, 1500, etc.

In other words, the fundamental issue is to what extent the H-bomb will be our primary nuclear weapon and the A-bomb a secondary or special-purpose weapon. I would not be of most help to you, as you confront the momentous problem of hydrogen requirements, unless I stated frankly my own belief that H-bombs can and must rapidly be made the primary weapon.

There are those who hesitate even to estimate military requirements until a specific hydrogen weapon type has been field-tested. It is true that we do not know today whether a particular H-bomb model will take out, for example, a circular area which has a radius of seven miles or only six miles. But, as I have noted, we have every expectation of achieving a deliverable prototype by 1954 that will introduce a new order of magnitude in firepower. To wait upon a prototype perfect in the last details before laying down quantity goals for H-bombs may well delay us two or three years.

I do not think anyone familiar with the technical facts can say that mass production of H-bombs within the next few years is beyond our capability. Cost figures of course contain a number of variables and uncertainties at the present time. I estimate, however, that a program designed to make the H-bomb our primary nuclear weapon would add perhaps $200 to $300 million annually to the expenditures we already contemplate for the Atomic Energy Commission. The important point is that the cost—relative to guns or tanks or planes or even to our present outlays for A-bombs—would be small. In my sincere judgment, the need is not huge funds—it is a bold decision to attain H-bombs in real quantity as quickly as possible.

It seems to me self-evident that, so long as the arms race continues, the ineluctable logic of our position leaves us without choice except to acquire the greatest possible firepower in the shortest possible time. It seems to me equally self-evident that the basic decisions on H-bomb requirements must be reached now.

Attached to this letter is a chronology which I had prepared on the leading events in the formulation of our atomic production policy over the past six years.[3] The chronology is a long one, and some parts of it do not make for happy reading. In case you find it difficult to agree with the views expressed in this letter, I hope that you will not think it presumptuous of me to request that you and your highest counsellors read the attached paper. I profoundly hope that, six years hence, our military planners will be able to look back upon their recommendations in the hydrogen program and find satisfaction in the fact that some of the early delays encountered in the atomic program were not repeated.

I am sure I do not need to say that I write this letter with intense personal anguish. I share what I know are your own feelings of horror at the thought of these hideous weapons entering into the arsenals of the world. Yet overwhelming American superiority in H-bombs may well be the decisive means of keeping open the future for peace. It is one of the paradoxes of history that the President, who has worked harder and done more for world peace than any of his predecessors, has also been required—in behalf of peace—to meet the issue of hydrogen weapons.

If we carry on the fight for peace which you have launched, I remain convinced that we will yet win through to victory without war.

Very respectfully yours,

BRIEN MCMAHON

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[3] Not printed.

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330.13/6-252: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations*[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1952—6:37 p.m.

465. Re Disarmament. In answering Soviet questions concerning reference to China in numerical limitation proposals and any further questions directed to same subject Dept suggests following

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer; cleared by Perkins and Martin of CA, Bacon of FE, and Meeker of L/UNA; approved by Sanders of UNA.

general principles. (1) Preferable to confine answers to specific questions and not anticipate issues which may be raised in further questions. (2) General line on initial answer is that for purposes of these proposals China is geographic area and that accordingly proposals applicable to armed forces of China Mainland. (3) In referring to further procedural steps in securing disarmament, i.e., consultations among concerned states and world conference—important to avoid any implication that Commies will necessarily continue to be in control of China Mainland in future or that proposals portend any change in US policy of dealing with National Govt as Govt of China. If necessary to deal at all with future representation suggest use line that all authorities having substantial military power must be heard to bring them into effective system of disarmament. (4) FYI US position is that sovereignty over Formosa not yet finally determined therefore seek to avoid issue of whether Formosa part of China for purposes of determining numerical ceilings.

ACHESON

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PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy"

## *Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1952.

*Problem*

To determine the desirability of proceeding with the thermonuclear test now scheduled for December 1952. [2]

*Discussion*

The problem can be considered in terms of four of its aspects:

An international agreement not to conduct further tests as a part of a disarmament program;

An international agreement as a means of avoiding the successful development of thermonuclear weapons by either side;

The desirability of a test before the United States is prepared to produce weapons and at a time when any successful test in the thermonuclear field may have a significant effect on Soviet decisions;

The effect of the Presidential election on the decision to proceed with a test in December.

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[1] A handwritten notation on the margin indicates that the Secretary had returned the source text.

[2] Regarding U.S. nuclear and thermonuclear testing between 1952 and 1954, see the editorial note, p. 881.

### 1. *An International Agreement as Part of the Disarmament Program*

The proposal that the United States offer to enter into an agreement with the USSR that neither will carry out any future atomic or thermonuclear tests has been advanced in the context of the work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. It is urged that we need to determine whether there is any possibility of agreement with the USSR, and to do that we must come forward with a simple proposal on a vital matter, uncomplicated by the qualifications relating to inspection and verification that have accompanied all of our previous proposals in the disarmament field.

There is no reason to suppose that the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on one specific matter would provide any reliable indication of the possibility of reaching agreement on other questions. The Soviet Union presumably looks at each proposition on its merits, just as we should and do.

On the merits, the proposal that we agree to forego any further tests does not seem designed to be a step toward the regulation and limitation of armaments.

Such an agreement would not bring a halt to thermonuclear development programs, and each side would attempt to put itself in a position that would assure the greatest probability of being able rapidly to manufacture successful weapons in the event of a violation of the agreement. The arms race would not end; it would merely be somewhat more concealed.

It is possible that having had 27 tests as against 3 Soviet tests we would have some continuing advantage in such a concealed technological arms race. If the Soviets made this estimate of the situation, it is doubtful whether they would accept the proposition. They would probably either reject it overtly on these grounds as being manifestly unfair, or would couple the proposition with an absolute prohibition on the use of atomic weapons which we would be unable to accept.

On the other hand, the state of Soviet art may be such that they might consider an agreement prohibiting further tests would slow down our thermonuclear developments while permitting them to close the gap in their own development to a point where they would be ready to test such a weapon and go rapidly into production once a test were made. If such a Soviet estimate turned out to be correct, they might accept the agreement and we might find that we had suffered a substantial loss in position without having made any substantial step forward to a comprehensive and satisfactory program for the control and regulation of armaments.

If an agreement were concluded, we would be a little less sure that we were pursuing the most desirable lines of development, but other aspects of the armaments picture would remain unchanged. Ground forces would be unaffected, and positions vital to the West would continue under threat in Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Both sides could go on building up their stockpiles of atomic weapons and increasing their capabilities for delivery.

If there is any widespread belief that some kind of an agreement with the Kremlin on some subject would be a signal that further agreements were possible, then it would certainly be undesirable to conclude an agreement to conduct no more tests. An agreement of that sort might merely lull the gullible and mislead the men of hope and good will. This is a particularly clear danger in view of the fact that it would seem to be impossible to be sure that the method for detecting tests now in use would in all circumstances give us notice of any Soviet tests. If a real premium is put on concealment, it would probably be possible to devise tests that would escape detection. To provide adequate assurance that Soviet tests would be known to us, some form of inspection and verification within the USSR would probably be required.

It is conceivable that there might be merit in a broader proposal involving simultaneously (a) an agreement for no more tests (present detecting techniques eventually to be supplemented when the appropriate stage of verification is reached under (c) below); (b) an agreement prohibiting aggression and prohibiting the use of atomic weapons in the absence of aggression; and (c) an agreement providing for the immediate and continuing implementation of a system of census and verification, all as first steps toward a comprehensive program for the regulation and limitation of armaments. It is doubtful, however, whether such a broad program could be proposed or negotiated in an election year.

### 2. *An International Agreement as a Means of Avoiding Further Thermonuclear Development*

Apart from the arguments discussed in the preceding section, the desire for an international agreement that will somehow halt the full development of a thermonuclear program by the Soviets or ourselves appears to come from a deep sense of disquiet at the prospect that science will soon cross the threshold of discovery into a new period of horribly destructive power.

Those who hold these views treat the ability to manufacture successful thermonuclear weapons as much more than a development of capability different in degree; it is regarded as a development of capability different in kind.

The destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons is portrayed as something so devastating that the whole nature of military action is radically altered and the prospect of permanently contaminated atmosphere is held up in horror before the mind's eye. While thermonuclear weapons would have great destructive power, it appears to be possible to develop atomic weapons of far greater power than any tested to date, and it also appears that some of the more lurid claims for thermonuclear weapons are exaggerated.

The revulsion at the development of a thermonuclear capability is, however, certainly understandable, but the confrontation that has led us to put so much of our energy and such quantities of our resources into the atomic and thermonuclear programs will not be altered by a standstill arrangement. Before we can contemplate the prospect of slackening our determination to convert our technological superiority into new weapons of increased destructiveness, we would require a far broader alteration of present conditions.

There is, also, another facet to the probable outcome of the tests that are planned. If the U.S. atomic capability is dramatically increased in the near or medium term through the development of thermonuclear weapons, this accretion of effective power may serve as an instrument for securing the objectives expressed in NSC 68 [3] without war. Even with very great risks of war, we might conclude that it was necessary to use our newly increased power as a lever for accomplishing our objectives if we believed that time would run against us in the future and its direction could not be reversed by any action on our part.

At such time as we might decide to use a temporary and massive power advantage, it would probably be necessary and desirable to hold out alternatives to the USSR, one of which would certainly have to encompass a comprehensive program for the regulation and limitation of armaments.

It might therefore be said that if no real progress toward disarmament can be achieved now, rapid and successful development in the thermonuclear field might create the conditions for arriving at general disarmament in the future. In any case, it is clear that a standstill agreement on further tests would not have the effect of terminating scientific development in the thermonuclear field; it would only add an element of some uncertainty to the course of the development, perhaps to our disadvantage.

3. *Desirability of a Test in 1952 Before the United States is Prepared to Produce Weapons*

Various factors converge which might make 1952 a climactic year. These include the Japanese Peace Treaty and the security arrangements with Japan; the apparent impasse in the Korean armistice negotiations; and the contractual relations agreement with

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[3] For text of NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", Apr. 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 234–292.

Germany, the EDC Treaty, and the amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty commitments to cover Western Germany.

The two years since the communist attack on Korea have been a period of foundation-building for the West which is about to begin paying off in terms of production and a steadily improving state of readiness. For the Soviet system it has been a period of continued, intensive, and large-scale military build-up. These political-military developments may lead the Soviet rulers to estimate that if they are going to become involved in general war within the next several years, 1952 is probably a better year than 1953 or subsequent years are likely to be.

The successful explosion of a thermonuclear device could accentuate the danger that the Soviet rulers might decide to force a showdown on a major issue and to move militarily if the West did not accept terms satisfactory to them, for it would indicate that within a relatively short time (a year or two) the West might develop a thermonuclear capability which, together with other developments, the USSR might believe would radically alter the relationship of forces between East and West. It would thus be in Soviet eyes an additional factor weighing on the side of a decision to move militarily against the West before this relationship becomes radically altered to the advantage of the West. It may be that the Kremlin has already discounted our thermonuclear development, but we cannot assume that the Soviets would regard such a development only as one of degree.

The situation would be very different if thermonuclear developments could be so arranged as to give us a substantial thermonuclear capability concurrently with or shortly after the first test. In this way an important new deterrent would be created at or about the same time as the test. In any event it would be highly advantageous for political reasons to hold the period between the first test and the development of a substantial capability to the shortest time consistent with the rapid development of thermonuclear weapons.

To reach a decision as to the desirability of a test before the United States is able to produce weapons, it is therefore necessary to know how much the development weapons would be retarded by a delay of the test now planned for this fall, and to weigh this retardation against the disadvantages which may be involved in the test of a non-weapon type. From the information available, the proposed test in the fall appears to be one that will have considerable importance to future developments. If that is, in fact, the case, the test should not be delayed on political grounds.

4. *The Desirability of a Test Before January 20, 1953*

It is important that the President be able to react promptly and decisively and with confidence of national support to Soviet political or military actions following our first thermonuclear test and that he be in a position to announce the test in a manner best calculated to forestall further Soviet action and to best present the position of the United States.

These considerations suggest that there should be consultation with the new President after the election or with the two candidates before the election. If, as a result of such consultation, there is found to be a strong objection to a test prior to the beginning of the new President's term, it would be desirable to postpone the test. In the absence of a strong objection, however, the test should be carried out in December as now planned.

The complicated physical arrangements required to conduct the test constitute an additional reason for continuing to plan on the basis of a December date, since it would probably be impossible to advance the time if a later date were now decided upon.

The public announcement of the test and the statement of U.S. policy concerning this new development will be of great importance. If the test is held in December, it would be desirable for the newly-elected President to associate himself with the announcement and statement.

*Conclusions*

We should plan to proceed with the test in December, unless it is determined that, without retarding the thermonuclear program, the test could be delayed until such time as the U.S. is believed to be able to produce thermonuclear weapons.

If consultations with the newly-elected President or the two candidates reveal a strong objection to a test in December, it should be delayed until after January 20, 1953.

We should seek to associate the newly-elected President with the announcement and statement to be made in connection with a test in December.

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Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "Atomic Weapons, Thermonuclear"

## *The President to the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (McMahon)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1952.

DEAR BRIEN: I have carefully studied your letter of May 30, 1952 [1] regarding the so-called H-bomb Program.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 955.

I am glad to have this expression of your views since I know they are based on a patriotic concern for our national security and on the magnificent work which you have done as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The questions which you raise are ones to which I have been giving very serious thought since my basic decision to proceed with the development of the H-bomb. As you know, I have had the Special Committee of the National Security Council keep this matter under continuous study as this program progressed, in order to make appropriate recommendations to me as warranted by developments. I am accordingly referring your letter to the Special Committee for its consideration in this connection.[2]

You can rest assured that your views will be given the careful study which they deserve.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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[2] On June 12, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted Senator McMahon's letter and the President's reply to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who comprised the Special Committee of the NSC on Atomic Energy. (Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "Atomic Weapons, Thermonuclear")

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950-1955"

## *Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson[1] to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1952.

Subject: Resolution of the Responsibilities of the AEC, the JCS, the Departments of Defense and State With Respect to Various Atomic Weapon Matters Requiring Presidential Decision

### *Background*

On February 8, 1952 the Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC transmitted to the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the AEC for consideration and appropriate recommendation to the President a JCS paper setting forth the JCS views on the Department of Defense interest in the use of atomic weapons (*Tab A*).[2] This paper had been transmitted to the Executive Secretary by Secretary Lovett with his concurrence.

It was the initial view of the working group of the Special Committee of NSC that the JCS paper was so wide of the mark in some of its assertions that an effort should be made through discussion to get it rewritten. It was hoped that by this procedure the issues could be put in proper perspective prior to bringing the matter to the attention of the principals. To this end the draft views of the Department of State on the JCS paper were prepared (*Tab B*).[3] This paper has not been circulated to the other members of the working group of the Special Committee inasmuch as the meetings designed to bring about a modification in the JCS views have never been called.

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[1] Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs.

[2] For text of the JCS paper, see p. 864.

Meanwhile the AEC has given its reactions to the JCS paper. These views are attached as *Tab C*.[4]

It now seems unwise to attempt to persuade the JCS to withdraw and rewrite its paper. The views of the Department of State with respect to the JCS paper could be made a matter of record as are those of the AEC. It would appear, however, that the most important and useful point to concentrate on is to get agreement as to the substantive recommendations which should be made to the President by the NSC Special Committee on the issues raised by the JCS paper. It is thought that the most desirable next step would be for you to meet with the Chairman of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC, and the Executive Secretary of NSC with a view toward making appropriate recommendations to the President.

Four issues are involved:

1. The procedures whereby the President may most effectively obtain advice whenever he is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons and to decide other related matters such as the deployment of atomic weapons;
2. The manner in which atomic weapon production programs should be established;
3. The question whether an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 should be sought which would enable the military to transmit to other nations such information on atomic weapons as is essential for the conduct of combined military operations and which would also permit the exchange of fissionable material or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such operations; and
4. The question whether a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons should be turned over to the complete custody of the military.

*Discussion*

1. *The Procedures Issue.* You will recall that more than a year ago a staff study was prepared (and circulated to the members of the working group of the Special Committee) outlining procedures whereby the President might most effectively obtain advice when-

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[3] *Infra.*

[4] See Dean's memorandum of May 27 and its enclosure, p. 947.

ever he is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons.[5] This study, with certain changes, is attached as *Tab D.*[6] The views of the JCS and the Department of Defense on this study have never been received unless the tabbed JCS paper may be considered in part responsive. While formal comments of the AEC have not been received, I understand from discussions with the Commission that it is in general accord with the procedures outlined.

Other Presidential decisions short of decisions on use, such as proposed deployments of atomic weapons (non-nuclear and/or nuclear components), have as a matter of practice been taken by the President only after he has received the advice of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the AEC. It would appear highly desirable and timely that these procedures, both as regards Presidential decision on use and on actions involving the deployment of atomic weapons, should now be firmly established.

2. *Atomic Weapon Production Programs.* It is suggested that existing procedures be continued with, however, some clarification as to the respective responsibilities of the agencies directly concerned. As is evident from the JCS paper and the AEC views (*Tabs A* and *C* respectively) the chief difficulty here lies in defining the respective roles that the JCS and the AEC should play in the process. As in any other military requirement field, it is clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should state the purely military requirements for atomic weapons. The JCS asserts, however, that its responsibility should extend to determining the fissionable materials production goals, production rates, and the means for attaining them. The JCS paper asserts that it is a unilateral responsibility of the Department of Defense to determine how many and what types of atomic weapons are needed for the defense and security of the United States. This assertion overstates the case. More properly its responsibility should be to establish military requirements for numbers and types of atomic weapons needed for the defense and security of the United States. Once such military requirements are established, the President, with the advice of the Special Committee of NSC, determines the nation's atomic weapon program only after all factors, both military and non-military, have been taken into account.

3. *Amendment of the Act.* This proposal is long overdue. It is evident in connection with NATO planning that our military authorities are presently under considerable handicap in that they are unable to discuss in any useful way the role of atomic weapons in

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[5] See the draft memorandum by Arneson, dated Apr. 24, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 820.

[6] For the revised study, dated June 11, 1952, see p. 973.

combined operations.[7] This creates an unnatural non-atomic sort of world which does not comport with reality. The precise text of the amendment which the Department of Defense would sponsor is not yet in hand, but it is understood that present Defense thinking is concerned with the type of information involved in military planning. I understand that the proposal of the JCS paper that there should also be a simplified procedure for the exchange of information in the scientific and technical fields designed as a substitute for the recent amendment to the Act has now been withdrawn.

4. *Military Custody of Weapons.* The proposal that a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons be turned over to the custody of the military would appear to be consonant with the trend toward deployment of atomic weapons to overseas bases. In the interests of readiness to use in the event a decision to use is made by the President, it would appear highly desirable that atomic weapons be deployed to overseas bases as soon as the necessary facilities and the necessary political arrangements can be negotiated. Moreover, with the steady increase in the size of the atomic weapon stockpile there would appear to be good reason to have additional numbers within the continental limits of the United States under the control of the military. From the technical point of view, the AEC must continue to have access to the complete stockpile in the interest of maintaining quality control and in order to make such modification and improvements in stockpile models as technical advances may make possible. Placing atomic weapons under the custody of the Department of Defense in order to increase readiness to use must be accompanied by clearly established procedures by means of which authority to use would be sought. The procedures set forth in *Tab D* are designed to this end. The question as to what portion of the national stockpile should be turned over to the custody of the military is one which will require further careful study. If a decision in principle is taken, it is suggested that the AEC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to work out together specific proposals in this regard for the consideration of the President with the advice of the Special Committee.

*Recommendations*

With the concurrence of Mr. Matthews and Mr. Nitze, I recommend:

A. That you meet with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Executive Secretary of NSC and endeavor to secure agreement on the recommendations which follow for submission to the President.

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[7] For documentation on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO planning, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 482 ff.

B. That the following resolution be made of the issues that have been raised by the JCS paper:

1. *Procedures on use.* That the recommendations contained in the attached staff study (*Tab D*) be submitted to the President for his approval and that existing procedures whereby the Special Committee advises the President on other actions short of use, such as the deployment of atomic weapons, be continued.

2. *Establishment of atomic weapon production programs.* That the JCS be charged with responsibility for stating the military requirements for the numbers and types of atomic weapons needed for the defense and security of the United States and that thereupon atomic weapon production programs should be established by the President after taking into account the views expressed to him by the other agencies concerned, namely the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of State, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, in order that all other aspects of such programs can be given proper weight.

3. *Legislation.* That the JCS proposal for legislation which would permit, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of the President, communication to another nation of such information on atomic weapons as is essential for the conduct of combined operations and for the actual exchange of fissionable material or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such combined operations should be actively pressed; and, accordingly, that the Department of Defense should bring the matter up for the early consideration of the President with the advice of the Special Committee.

4. *Military custody of atomic weapons.* That the proposal that a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons be turned over to the custody of the military be agreed in principle subject to further study and the submission of specific proposals by the AEC and the JCS as to the portion of the national stockpile which should be so turned over, such study to be made available to the Special Committee in order that it may make its recommendations thereon to the President before final decision.

That the foregoing agreement in principle be subject to the understanding that the procedures as set forth in *Tab D* will be followed when the President is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons and subject to the understanding that the Special Committee of NSC will advise the President on closely related matters such as the deployment of atomic weapons.

R. GORDON ARNESON

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy, 1950-1955"

## *Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1952.

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE COMMENTS ON JCS PAPER ENTITLED "STATEMENT OF THE VIEWS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTEREST IN THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS" [2]

The following views of the Department of State are numbered according to the paragraphs of the JCS paper:

1. It is recognized as stated that the "Joint Chiefs of Staff have a statutory responsibility to act as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and to the Secretary of Defense." In this connection, however, it is important to point out that the National Security Council has a statutory responsibility to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security". In the view of the Department of State, the question of the use of atomic weapons clearly falls within the above category. Accordingly, the Special Committee of the National Security Council, which the President has designated to pass upon atomic energy matters requiring his decision, has a responsibility to give advice to the President on this question.

2. No comment.

3. The Department of State is not aware that any proposal has been made that "any other agency" interpose "itself between [the JCS] [3] and the President in submission to him of recommendations for a military course of action". If the view of the JCS contained in this paragraph has reference to a staff study submitted to the members of the Special Committee for consideration on April 27, 1951, [4] it would appear that the JCS has misread the conclusions of this study. The study recognizes that the initial recommendation for use of atomic weapons should originate with, or be referred to, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The suggested procedures whereby the

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[1] By memorandum of June 11, Secretary Acheson transmitted this paper to NSC Executive Secretary Lay for distribution to the other members of the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy Matters. Lay forwarded copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission by memorandum of June 12. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950-1955") Copies of Department of State comments and the memoranda of transmittal are in the Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "Atomic Weapons".

[2] *Ante*, p. 864.

[3] Brackets in the source text.

[4] Not conclusively identified in Department of State files, but see the draft memorandum on the subject by Arneson, Apr. 24, 1951, in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 820.

President may secure the advice of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is not intended to interpose any agency between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President in the submission of recommendations for a military course of action but rather to carry out the President's wishes expressed in his letter of August 25, 1950[5] which stated in part as follows:

> "I am asking that the Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, which consists of Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, pass on the directives which I have to make, that affect all three of those Departments. I informed the Secretary of State of the action which had been taken, and instructed the Secretary of Defense that these actions must be considered by this Committee of the National Security Council before I shall approve any further actions. In that way everybody interested will know exactly what is going on."

As to the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "nor could they agree to any such other agency having a voice in determining how, when and where such military operations are to be conducted", it should be pointed out that there are grave political considerations involved in determining how, when and where. The Department of State does not feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the power or the authority to delimit the President's choice of advisers on a matter which is so fraught with consequences not only military but also non-military in nature. The Department of State considers that it has a responsibility which it cannot relinquish for advising the President on the questions of how, when, and where. It considers that the President may, if he deems it necessary, delimit the manner in which, the extent to which, and the time when the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct the employment of atomic weapons. In this connection it will be recalled that NSC 30[6] states in part (paragraph 11):

> "The type and character of targets against which atomic weapons might be used is primarily a function of military selection in the preparation and planning of grand strategy. In this case, however, there is the additional requirement for blending a political with a military responsibility in order to assure that the conduct of war, to the maximum extent practicable, advances the fundamental and lasting aims of United States policy."

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[5] The quotation below represents the substance of a letter from President Truman to Gordon Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Aug. 25, 1950. (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission files)

[6] NSC 30, "U.S. Policy on Atomic Warfare", dated Sept. 10, 1948, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 624–628.

4. The comments in 3 above apply in part to the first sentence of paragraph 4.

5. a. (1) The first sentence is not clear. If it is intended to mean simply that the basic development of military requirements for complete weapons is a responsibility of the Department of Defense, no exception can be taken. If, however, this sentence is meant to say that it is a responsibility of the Department of Defense not only to develop requirements for complete weapons but also to establish the production program including the production goals and production rates of fissionable material, then it would appear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are assigning solely to the Department of Defense functions in which it shares responsibility with other agencies.

(2) No comment.

(3) The Department of State cannot agree with the first sentence as written. In its view the responsibility of the Department of Defense would be more accurately stated as follows: "In summation, it is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to establish military requirements for numbers and types of atomic weapons needed for the defense and security of the United States." In this connection, the Department of State would point out that final decision within the Executive branch as to the nation's atomic weapon program rests with the President who makes such decision only after all factors, both military and non-military, have been taken into account.

b. The Department of State considers the stated view that "decisions as to the particular atomic weapon and vehicle to be used and the precise nature of the method to be employed in its delivery are purely military in character" may oversimplify the problem. Such questions as type of weapon (e.g. H-bomb) and method of delivery are related to the problem of target selection and may have an important bearing on the outcome of conflict and the possibilities of winning the peace once victory is assured. To the extent that this is so, the Department of State considers that it has a proper interest in this matter.

c. (1) No comment.

(2) The views expressed in paragraph 3 above apply with equal force here.

(3) The nub question is not whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel fully prepared to furnish such advice as may be necessary to meet the requirements of the President, nor whether in their view the Department of Defense possesses competence in the realm of both the military and the technical considerations involved in the use of atomic weapons and should therefore constitute the principal source of advice to the President on this subject, but rather wheth-

er the President desires advice from other agencies. It is clear from the President's letter of August 25, 1950 previously cited that he does—specifically from the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in addition to the Secretary of Defense.

d. (1) No comment.

(2) (a) If this paragraph is in effect recommending that a new amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 should be sought in regard to methods whereby information in the scientific and technical fields can be exchanged with other countries, the Department of State feels that such proposal is untimely. The recent amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 [7] has not yet been long enough in force to make possible a determination whether the procedure provided is too cumbersome. It would appear to the Department of State that an amendment designed to simplify the procedures provided in the recent amendment would be exceedingly unlikely of success at this time and might well jeopardize whatever efforts are made to secure a different sort of amendment designed to carry out the objectives set forth in the immediately following paragraph (b) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper.

(b) The Department of State supports the basic objective which is sought in this paragraph. It recognizes that the JCS and the Department of Defense should originate those proposals involving interchange of information on atomic weapons with other nations. In view of the foreign policy implications of actions envisaged in this paragraph as well as the technical problems of declassification involved, it considers that the President will want the views of the Department of State and of the Atomic Energy Commission before taking final action on such proposals. It is presumed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in making this proposal, envisage securing the requisite amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

(3) The sequence of argument in this paragraph seems to imply that as a result of AEC custody of atomic weapons an unnecessarily large number of people in the Department of State are aware of any proposed or actual deployments of atomic weapons, either complete or non-nuclear. The Department of State considers this to be a *non sequitur*. In the last sentence of the paragraph the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the redeployment of any atomic weapons from the proposed reservoir of finished weapons in the custody of the military would be subject of course to the approval of the President. It is the necessity for Presidential approval, plus his express desire that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission give him

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[7] See footnote 4, p. 847.

advice on such matters, which brings about the fact that a strictly limited number of people in the Department of State must be aware of the proposals or the actions taken.

As to the substantive proposal of this paragraph, namely, "the establishment of a reservoir of finished weapons in the complete custody of the military," the Department of State sees a good deal of merit in this recommendation. With growing numbers of weapons in the stockpile and the development of overseas bases to which deployments are being made, it would appear eminently sensible to place under the custody of the military a percentage of the national weapons stockpile in order to increase "readiness to use" capabilities. The percent of stockpile to be turned over should be such as to meet deployment requirements as well as a minimum operational requirement within the continental limits of the United States. The remainder should, however, remain in AEC custody. Moreover, it would appear necessary that the AEC continue to have access to the entire stockpile from time to time in order to maintain quality control and to carry out modifications and redesign as dictated by technical advances.

As the JCS paper points out, a distinction must be drawn between "readiness to use" and "authority to use". The Department of State can support the proposal for a reservoir of atomic weapons under military control only if it is understood that the procedures outlined in the attached paper are followed with respect to a decision to use atomic weapons. Owing to the complex foreign relations issues involved, it is also essential that the Department of State participate fully in decisions with respect to deployments to overseas bases.

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use policy 1950-1955"

## *Staff Study Prepared by Representatives of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1952.

*The Problem*

1. To outline procedures whereby the President may most effectively obtain advice whenever he is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons.

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[1] On Oct. 23 S. Everett Gleason, Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, transmitted a copy of this study to President Truman. Gleason's memorandum of transmittal reads as follows: "The enclosed study, outlining procedures whereby the President may most effectively obtain advice when he is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons, the conclusions of which have been approved by the Special Com-

*Continued*

*Background*

2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which vests in the Atomic Energy Commission ownership of all fissionable materials, provides that:

> ". . . the President from time to time may direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense . . . ."

3. On September 10, 1948, the Executive Secretary submitted a report to the National Security Council on "United States Policy on Atomic Warfare" (NSC 30).[2] This report dealt with the feasibility of formulating at that time policies regarding the use of atomic weapons. The analysis stated "the United States has nothing presently to gain, commensurable with the risk of raising the question, in either a well-defined or an equivocal decision that atomic weapons should be used in the event of war." On the other hand, it was pointed out that in the absence of an established and acceptable system of international control of atomic energy, this Government should make no commitment which would deny it the right to employ such weapons in the event of actual hostilities. The report came to the following conclusions which were subsequently adopted by the National Security Council on September 16, 1948:

> "12. It is recognized that, in the event of hostilities, the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize, promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interests of national security and must therefore plan accordingly.
>
> "13. The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required."

In view of the adoption of these conclusions no action was taken at that time (a) to obtain a decision either to use or not to use atomic weapons in any possible future conflict, or (b) to obtain a decision as to the time and circumstances under which atomic weapons might or might not be employed.

4. In the course of the last two years it has become established practice for atomic energy matters requiring Presidential decision, which affect the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, to be referred to the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy for consideration and

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mittee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, is submitted herewith for your consideration." (Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "NSC Atomic, Atomic Weapons—Procedures on Use")

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 624–628.

such recommendations as it sees fit to make to the President. This procedure was underscored by letter of the President dated August 25, 1950,[3] which stated in part as follows:

> "I am asking that the committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, which consists of Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, pass on the directives which I have to make, that affect all three of those Departments. I informed the Secretary of State of the action which had been taken, and instructed the Secretary of Defense that these actions must be considered by this Committee of the National Security Council before I shall approve any further actions. In that way everybody interested will know exactly what is going on."

The occasion for the foregoing statement arose in connection with the strategic deployment of non-nuclear components to overseas areas, a preparatory action approved by the President which did not include authority to use atomic weapons.

5. The Quebec Agreement of August 19, 1943,[4] governing collaboration among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the field of atomic energy provided, among other things, that "we [the United States and the United Kingdom][5] will not use it [the atomic bomb] against third parties without each other's consent." The Quebec Agreement was superseded by a *Modus Vivendi* adopted on January 7, 1948,[6] which specifically provided that "All agreements between the three governments or any two of them in the field of atomic energy shall be regarded as null and of no effect." Certain exceptions were made but none of them relate to the question of use of atomic weapons. The *Modus Vivendi* contains no language relating to this question. The Joint Communiqué issued at the end of the Truman-Attlee talks on December 8, 1950 stated: "The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation." The Joint Communiqué issued on January 9, 1952 concerning the Truman-Churchill talks stated:

> "Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Govern-

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[3] See footnote 5, *supra*.

[4] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 1117-1119.

[5] Brackets throughout this document appear in the source text.

[6] See footnote 3, p. 847.

ment and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

"We share the hope and the determination that war, with all its modern weapons, shall not again be visited on mankind. We will remain in close consultation on the developments which might increase danger to the maintenance of world peace."

. . . . . . .

7. During the General Assembly in the Autumn of 1950, a move by the Soviet Union to secure UN approval of a resolution which would brand the first user of atomic weapons as a war criminal was roundly defeated. As a counter to this move, the General Assembly approved, on November 17, 1950, a resolution which stated, among other things, that it was indispensable for the realization of lasting peace and security, that every nation agree "to accept effective international control of atomic energy, under the United Nations, on the basis already approved by the General Assembly, in order to make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons." It reaffirmed that "whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interests of a foreign power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world." It determined that it is indispensable for the realization of lasting peace and security "that joint united action be taken to meet aggression wherever it arises." [7]

8. On several occasions within the past two years the President has publicly stated that he is prepared to make a decision as to the use of atomic weapons when circumstances so require. On April 6, 1949 he stated: ". . . if it [a decision to use the atomic bomb] has to be made for the welfare of the United States, and the democracies of the world are at stake, I would not hesitate to make it again." [8] On November 30, 1950 the President stated:

"Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon.

"However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon." [9]

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[7] For text of the Soviet draft resolution, Oct. 23, 1950, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* vol. I, pp. 248–250. For text of General Assembly Resolution 380(V): Peace Through Deeds, Nov. 17, 1950, see *ibid.*, pp. 260–261. Related documentation is included in material on proposals for strengthening the United Nations against aggression, in *Foreign Relations,* 1950, vol. II, pp. 303 ff.

[8] For the full text of the address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949,* p. 197.

[9] For the text of the press release quoted here, see *ibid., 1950,* p. 727, footnote 3.

9. It is recognized that responsibility for advising the President as to the military desirability of the use of atomic weapons, as is the case with any other weapon in our national armory, rests with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Responsibility for advising the President as to the political aspects of the use of atomic weapons rests with the Secretary of State. Military considerations and political considerations are often inextricably interrelated. By law, the power to decide on the use of atomic weapons rests with the President.

10. Once a decision is made that atomic weapons should be used, the President will give the necessary directives to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation.

11. The means whereby the President may receive promptly the advice of the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission need to be identified.

*Analysis*

12. Unless there is an initial determination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the use of atomic weapons in a given situation is militarily desirable, it is difficult to see how the question of such use can arise in any realistic way. In the event that pressures build up for the use of atomic weapons in other quarters, it would appear that the first question which would require answering is whether such use is militarily desirable. Accordingly, the matter should originate with, or be referred to, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

13. In the event a recommendation for use is made to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military reasons for the recommendation, and the intended employment, should be stated.

14. After a recommendation for use is made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President will want, in addition to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the views of the members of the Special Committee on the political, military, and technical considerations involved.

15. If time and circumstances permit, the Congress would pass and the President would approve a Joint Resolution "declaring war", before atomic weapons were employed. In the past such resolutions have provided: (1) that the state of war between the United States and the———Government which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; (2) that the President is authorized and directed to employ the entire military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the———Government; and (3) that to bring the conflict to a successful termination "all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States." A resolution

in these terms would clearly authorize the President to use atomic weapons and any other weapons he considered necessary to bring the conflict to a successful termination.

16. However, atomic weapons are uniquely suited for surprise and possibly decisive attacks, without warning and without formal declaration of war by the enemy. In case of a surprise attack upon the United States, it would be necessary, in the interest of national defense, to launch an immediate atomic counter-attack. In such event, the President would take action under his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief, consulting with appropriate leaders of the Congress at the earliest possible moment. In contingencies short of a surprise attack upon the United States, the President will doubtless want to consult appropriate Congressional leaders before making a decision.

. . . . . . .

*N.B.* It is not intended that the procedures set forth in the conclusions which follow should await last-minute developments which may require immediate decision in the midst of inevitable confusion and uncertainty. It is thought that the need for decisions as to use of atomic weapons will more probably grow out of a period of increasing tensions. In such circumstances it is expected there will be time in which the President, by means of the procedures outlined below, can secure from the Departments and agencies of Government most directly concerned tentative conclusions and recommendations concerning the use of atomic weapons in the light of existing and emerging situations.

*Conclusions*

1. In making any decision regarding the use of atomic weapons, it is considered that the President will want, at minimum, the views of the following:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
b. The Secretary of Defense
c. The Secretary of State
d. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission

2. Any recommendation to the President regarding the use of atomic weapons by the Armed Services should initially be made by, or be referred to, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in view of their "statutory responsibility as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." In presenting their views the Joint Chiefs of Staff should:

a. Set forth the factors that were taken into account in arriving at its recommendation.

b. Identify, in general terms, the intended employment of the weapons.

3. Before the President makes a final decision, in order to provide him with a means for obtaining a full exposition of the factors involved from the officials listed in 1. above and in view of the statutory responsibility of the National Security Council to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security", a meeting of the President with the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be convened to consider any recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the use of atomic weapons.

4. Time permitting, consultation with Congressional leaders should take place before a decision to use atomic weapons is implemented.

5. Additional actions to be decided upon at such meeting would include the extent, nature, and timing of consultations with, notifications to, or requests for action by

a. Other departments and agencies of the Government (the other members of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, Civil Defense, etc).
b. The American people.
c. Other governments (especially those whose consent is required before their bases can be used by the United States for atomic strikes).
d. The United Nations.

6. In the event of a positive decision, the President will authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as may be specified.

*Recommendation*

7. That this staff study be made available to the President.

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330.13/6-1152: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 11, 1952.

7301. For Dunn [2] from Hickerson. Re Disarmament. Fol FYI as background material connection Deptels 7300 June 11 and 6459. [3]

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP. The time of transmission is not legible on the source text.

[2] James Clement Dunn, U.S. Ambassador in France.

[3] Telegram 6459 to Paris, May 2, repeated for information to USUN as 414, presented the views of the Department concerning a draft treaty on disarmament which Jules Moch, the French Representative on the Disarmament Commission, had informally presented to Ambassador Cohen on Apr. 23. The draft was characterized by the Department as "almost completely objectionable" and "contrary to

*Continued*

On May 27 Jules Moch submitted to UK-US Dels DisarmCom redraft his suggested treaty attempting establish co-relationship between chief components disarmament program: atomic energy control, elimination mass destruction weapons, reduction armed forces and conventional weapons, disclosure and verification system. Present draft does not meet most of basic objections earlier draft. Moreover we consider any treaty on subj premature until we know substance components, which Moch has not suggested. Such treaty shld be final step both for components and their relationship, not first step as proposed by Moch. Even if treaty modified meet all our views, US cld not support until considerably greater progress achieved in developing entire program.

This comment and certain other general objections already conveyed to Moch by USRep DisarmCom, as informal rather than governmental views. Moch said draft was approved by Fr Govt; that he disagreed with our views re tactics and thought necessary introduce some paper on co-relation principal components; that he was anxious learn further US and UK views on treaty. These will be furnished. UKDel, alarmed by draft treaty, has suggested their FonOff ask Ambassador Paris tell Fr Govt treaty raises difficult and needlessly embarrassing problems, particularly re atomic energy; that is highly inadvisable submit treaty to DisarmCom.

Airgram follows containing text Moch draft and our principal objections.[5]

ACHESON

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past positions of Fr as well as of US, i.e. treaty wld provide for prohibition of atomic weapons and cessation of manufacture before estab of effective controls of atomic energy." (330.13/5-252)

Telegram 7300 reads in part as follows:

"Dept concerned that attitude and approach by Moch to work of Disarm Comm reflects apparent desire reach agreement on disarm plan with USSR or provide sufficient appearance of progress, in either case at possible expense of what US regards as essential elements any workable disarm prog in order provide grounds for Socialist and other groups Fr and West Eur seek delay ratification of EDC treaty and contractuals. There has been no indication from USSR that it is seriously interested in any real progress on disarmament at present but Dept fearful Sovs may exploit Moch's attitude and his various proposals to embarrassment western powers in Disarm Comm and with possible deleterious effects on ratifications.

"Convey discreetly FonOff our concern with matter." (330.13/6-1152)

[5] Instruction 286 to Paris, June 13, transmitting the text of the draft and comments on it, is not printed. (330.13/6-1352) Moch outlined his proposals at the 16th Meeting of the Disarmament Commission, June 30, 1952; for the substance of his remarks, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Special Supplement No. 1, Second Report of the Disarmament Commission*, pp. 122-125.

700.5611/6-1352

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1952.

### MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON JUNE 12, 1952 AND ACTION TAKEN AT CABINET MEETING JUNE 13, 1952

Item No. 5

ATOMIC ENERGY MATTER

I informed the President of the situation which had arisen as the result of the memorandum of the JCS [1] and suggested that, if he approved, I would call a meeting of Defense and AEC and attempt to get agreed recommendations or, at any rate, some recommendations for his action. He said that he wished me to do this.

Yesterday afternoon I spoke to Mr. Foster, [2] who was already working on the matter, believed that it could be solved, and said that he would speak to me at the Cabinet this morning.

This morning he said that he approved of calling a meeting, and suggested that I set it up for Monday or Tuesday of next week. [3] He made the following suggestions: (1) That Mr. LeBaron, who he believed would be tractable, should be included in the meeting, as well as General Bradley. As the result of this he thought that both Mr. Dean and I should be accompanied by someone from our agencies. I said that I would ask Mr. Arneson to attend. (2) He said that he thought a solution was possible along the lines of the staff memorandum on procedures and also along the lines of the AEC's reply to the JCS, which he thought would be satisfactory to Defense.

Mr. Arneson should, therefore, set up a meeting. I believe that the recommendations made in Mr. Arneson's memorandum to me [4] will be acceptable.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 864.

[2] A copy of the memorandum of the telephone conversation between Acheson and Foster, June 12, is in file 117.2/6-1252.

[3] June 16-17.

[4] Dated June 10, p. 964.

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## *Editorial Note*

For the text of the address delivered by President Truman in Groton, Connecticut, at the keel laying of the U.S.S. *Nautilus*, the first nuclear-powered submarine, June 14, 1952, see *Public Papers* *of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–53*, pages 425–429.

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330.13/5–2152

## *The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received your letter of May 21, 1952, [2] relating to a working paper intended for submission in Committee I of the Disarmament Commission, entitled, "Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces", RAC (NS) D–4. [3]

In the light of the urgent political necessities for proposals in this specific field, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly submitted a paper on this subject in Committee I of the Disarmament Commission on May 28, 1952. A copy of the working paper is enclosed. The submission of the paper was made through statements by the representatives of the three sponsoring governments. A copy of the statement of Ambassador Cohen, the United States Deputy Representative, is also enclosed. [4]

The paper, as submitted, is in some aspects altered in form from the original working paper which was the subject of your letter and of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanying your letter. We have sought, in the revised paper and Ambassador Cohen's statement, to follow as closely as possible the chief points contained in your letter and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum. We believe that most of these points were, to a considerable extent at least, taken into consideration in the original paper.

All alterations were fully discussed on an informal basis with representatives of the Department of Defense. Some were made in order that the paper might be submitted as a tripartite working paper rather than solely by the United States. We believe that the paper, as submitted, is in full conformity with NSC 112 [5] and the President's address of November 7, 1951 on the subject of disarmament. [6]

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer on June 11, and cleared by S/AE and, in draft, by Ambassador Cohen and Ferguson of S/P. It was transmitted to the Secretary for his signature by Assistant Secretary Hickerson by memorandum of June 11. (330.13/5–2152)

[2] *Ante*, p. 941.

[3] RAC (NS) D–4, Apr. 30, 1952, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "RAC (NS) Documents")

[4] The working paper (UN doc. DC/10) and the statement by Ambassador Cohen are not printed here, but see footnote 2, p. 954.

[5] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

[6] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, pp. 623–627.

The memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanying your letter, in my opinion, raises some problems which should be considered carefully. In enumerating the disadvantages to Western democracies of a proposal such as that contained in the working paper under review, the memorandum suggests, among others the following considerations.

> "5. e. Merely advancing the proposal will have a serious impact on United States as well as on world opinion. It may so fix the minds of the people in the Western nations upon relaxation of the armament burden as to have a catastrophic effect upon the rearmament program and conceivably on the conduct of present hostilities in Korea; it would probably delay arms programs; it might even bring about a degree of disarmament on the side of the West alone, thus imperiling the gains which have thus far been made only by heavy sacrifice;
>
> "i. The concept of the proposal seems postulated upon the theory that reduction in armaments will lessen world tensions. Actually, a limitation of armed forces which bears no relation to strategic considerations may prove to be an invitation to aggression;".

In paragraph 6, the memorandum implies or suggests that the submission of the paper "would not be consistent with the security interests of the United States."

It should be emphasized that the suggestion on the numerical limitation of armed forces does not stand alone, but is merely one criterion for a comprehensive program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, as set forth in NSC 112 and in the President's address of November 7, 1951. It was intended that the paper be introduced solely for the purpose of initiating discussion of this important aspect of the program. Under such circumstances we did not consider that the introduction of this paper could have consequences for the present rearmament program or the hostilities in Korea beyond those of the program as a whole.

In connection with subparagraph i, we recognize that a limitation of armed forces which bore no relation to strategic considerations might well prove to be an invitation to aggression. Therefore the paper sought to indicate the relation of limitations to strategic considerations, and was meant to serve as a basis for discussion within the policy expressed in NSC 112. In connection with the first sentence of subparagraph i, however, we call your attention to the statement of the President, of November 7, 1951, which seems to indicate a different view from that expressed in the memorandum. The President said, "We believe deeply that discussions of this question in the United Nations can and should begin now, even though tensions are high. Indeed, one way to reduce these tensions is to start work on such proposals as the one we are now making."

It is our understanding of NSC 112 that the Government decided to go forward with proposals for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, because on balance it was considered to be to our advantage. We assume that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not intended to call into question the policy determinations of the National Security Council and the President, expressed in NSC 112 and that our respective staffs will continue their work on the details of a program based on such policy determinations.

I greatly appreciate the excellent cooperation which we have received from the Department of Defense in connection with this matter.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950-1955"

## *Informal Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy Affairs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, June 17, 1952*

TOP SECRET

Present:
The Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson
The Under [*Deputy*] Secretary of Defense, Mr. Foster
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Dean
The Executive Secretary of NSC, Mr. Lay
Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Mr. LeBaron
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Mr. Arneson

Secretary Acheson listed the four issues that were raised by the JCS paper which had been transmitted to the Special Committee by the Secretary of Defense on February 6, 1952.[1] These issues were:

1. The procedures whereby the President may most effectively obtain advice whenever he may be called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons and to decide other related matters such as the deployment of atomic weapons;

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[1] *Ante*, p. 863.

2. The question whether an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 should be sought which would enable the military to transmit to other nations such information on atomic weapons as is essential for the conduct of combined military operations and which would also permit the exchange of fissionable material or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such operations;

3. The question whether a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons should be turned over to the complete custody of the military; and

4. The manner in which atomic weapons production programs should be established.

It *was agreed* that these were the issues raised and that they should be dealt with in order.

A. *Use Policy*

It *was agreed* that the staff paper which had been prepared by the working group of the Special Committee [2] was acceptable in all its major aspects and, subject to a modicum of further editing by the working group, should be submitted for approval by the Special Committee and subsequent transmittal to the President.

B. *Legislation*

General Bradley spoke to the need for greater flexibility in handling atomic weapons information in dealing with United States allies in SHAPE planning. In the present circumstances it was not possible to share any information concerning the characteristics of atomic weapons with the other representatives in SHAPE. SACEUR had been forced to set up special American staff mechanisms to deal with atomic weapons data. This was a most unsatisfactory arrangement and should be corrected. Chairman Dean stated that the AEC would be favorably disposed to any legislation which the Department of Defense might wish to sponsor in order to secure greater flexibility in dealing with atomic weapons data in NATO and other planning. Mr. LeBaron inquired whether some interim arrangement pending the passage of an amendment to the Act might be worked out. Would it be possible, for example, to determine that certain external characteristics of atomic weapons, i.e., size, weight, shape, yield and military effects, were no longer Restricted Data within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946? Chairman Dean stated that he thought this might be possible and certainly ought to be looked into. He felt that if this line of approach were taken it would be necessary, of course, to inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the problem and secure their support. General Bradley said that this sort of interim arrangement would be very helpful and should be worked out if at all possible. Mr. LeBaron pointed out that this session of Congress did not seem a propitious time to attempt to secure the requisite amendment to the Act and thought that this interim proposal would help until such time as legislation could be secured. Secretary Acheson inquired whether the proposal involved complete declassification of the data in question or not. General Bradley replied that the objective would be simply to remove such information from the category of Restricted Data while keeping the necessary security classification thereon. It was not intended that the information be made public.

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[2] Dated June 11, p. 973.

It was agreed that the AEC, in consultation with Defense, should see what could be done about determining that certain external characteristics of atomic weapons no longer constituted Restricted Data and that the findings should be reported back to the Special Committee for consideration.

C. *Custody*

Chairman Dean stated that the AEC fully appreciated the need for maximum readiness to use and that every effort should be made to avoid delay in the event of an emergency. The Commission was prepared to support the deployment of atomic weapons to foreign bases as such bases became available for United States use provided the Department of Defense would take the responsibility for the security of the sites, make the necessary arrangements for evacuation, and take the necessary steps to insure that atomic weapons so stored did not suffer any physical deterioration. The Commission was also prepared to support a proposal for turning over to the custody of the military such numbers of atomic weapons as might be agreed should be stored at fully operational bases in the United States. He pointed out that the Commission was also concerned, however, that whatever arrangements were made would be such as to make possible the continuing efforts of the AEC to keep the stockpile of atomic weapons completely up to date and that accordingly arrangements should be made for access of AEC personnel to carry out modernization and major retrofit operations.

General Bradley stated that the JCS felt there was an urgent need for some atomic weapons to be under the custody of the military right away for use in the event of an emergency. The Chiefs were also concerned about the need for improving security in the event of an emergency movement and felt that this might best be fostered if a portion of the stockpile were now placed under military custody. Chairman Dean said that under existing arrangements only a very small number of people knew about movements that might take place. Once a Presidential decision had been obtained only eight people in the AEC were informed, and from the AEC the chain of communication was directly to Sandia and thence to the appropriate storage site. In an instance which had occurred earlier, of the fairly large number of people who knew about the operation by far the greater percentage were military personnel. Under [*Deputy*] Secretary Foster stated that in his view the primary need for military custody of a portion of an atomic weapon stockpile arose from readiness rather than security requirements.

Mr. LeBaron stated that the JCS was giving consideration to the numbers of atomic weapons which should be placed under military custody. The tentative number which had been suggested seemed to him much too large. Both General Bradley and Under [*Deputy*] Secretary Foster agreed that this was so and that further study should be given to this question in order to bring the number down to more realistic proportions.

Chairman Dean reiterated that as soon as certain operational bases were prepared to receive atomic weapons the AEC would be willing to turn over full custody of and responsibility for these weapons to the military subject to the requirement that access be given for AEC personnel to maintain the weapons and to make such modifications as were indicated from time to time.

General Bradley spoke about the interest of the Chiefs in utilizing aircraft carriers for storage purposes, the idea being that weapons so stored would not necessarily be carried on strikes directly from the aircraft carriers but might be put in at some land base for strike operations.

It *was agreed* that the AEC and Defense should work out together the means whereby a portion of the atomic weapons stockpile should be turned over to the custody of the military, this objective being approved in principle. It *was further agreed* that the results of such joint study should be referred back to the Special Committee for further consideration.

D. *Atomic Weapons Production Programs*

Chairman Dean felt that the views of the AEC as expressed in its letter of May 27, 1952 [3] and the views of the JCS were not far apart and could easily be resolved, perhaps simply by greater precision of language.

It *was agreed* that the AEC and Defense should study the matter further and seek to come up with a joint statement of the position, such statement to be referred back to the Special Committee for further consideration.

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[3] *Ante*, p. 947.

*Proposed Exchange of Information With the United Kingdom in a Certain Specified Area* [4]

At Mr. Lay's suggestion, Chairman Dean reported briefly on the objections that had been raised to the proposed exchange by certain members of the Joint Committee. He stated that Senator Hickenlooper, [5] who was in the forefront of opposition, had said he would not raise his voice publicly against the proposed exchange although he would probably vote against it in the Committee.

It *was agreed* that the Special Committee should recommend to the President that the proposed exchange could go forward as outlined in the NSC paper on the subject, it being understood that in the event that opposition on the part of any member of the Joint Committee appeared likely to take the form of public opposition the proposed exchange should not go forward. It was recognized that in the event public opposition should arise it would not be possible to proceed with the proposed exchange even on an alternative and more truncated basis.

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[4] By memorandum of June 11 to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence, NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated a draft report on a proposed exchange of certain restricted data with the British Government. The recommended exchange was intended to further the collection of intelligence on aspects of the Soviet atomic energy program. The draft report was prepared by designated representatives of State, Defense, AEC, and CIA. In a memorandum of June 26, Lay informed the Secretaries of State and Defense that the President had that day approved the recommendation contained in the report and that the AEC and CIA had been appropriately advised of the decision. The draft report and related documentation are in G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Nuclear Sharing-UK". A copy of the report as submitted to President Truman on June 26 and other pertinent papers are in the Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "NSC Atomic, Atomic Energy-UK".

[5] Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Iowa), Member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

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## *Editorial Note*

The Secretary of State's Panel of Consultants on Disarmament met at Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 19–21. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Joseph E. Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy, the Executive Secretary, were present throughout. John S. Dickey was present on June 19 and 20. Allen W. Dulles and Vannevar Bush were unable to participate. The meetings were held mainly for the purpose of discussing general aspects of the question of disarmament with a number of visiting experts. No conclusions were formally recorded. Ten pages of minutes of the sessions, prepared by Bundy, are in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Panel of Consultants on Disarmament".

## *Editorial Note*

On July 15, President Truman signed H.R. 8370 (Public Law 82-547; 66 Stat. 637), the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1953, which included an appropriation of $2,986,894,000 for the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

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## *Editorial Note*

On August 12, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France introduced a Supplementary Tripartite Paper on Force Levels (UN doc. DC/12) in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. A working document proposing the limitation of arms by type and quantity, UN doc. DC/12 was intended to supplement UN doc. DC/10 submitted by the three nations on May 28. (Regarding UN doc. DC/10, see the memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President, May 28, page 954.) For the text of UN doc. DC/12 and the statement concerning it delivered in the Disarmament Commission on August 11 by Benjamin V. Cohen, the Deputy United States Representative, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 20, 1952, pages 290–293. UN doc. DC/12 is also printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I, pages 370–372.

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy"

## *Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1952.

Subject: Time of the H-Bomb Test This Fall [1]

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[1] Preparations for the probable hydrogen bomb tests in the autumn of 1952 (see the editorial note, p. 881) had been proceeding for some time. In a memorandum of a luncheon meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board, June 26, David Bruce recorded agreement that a special panel on the "Psychological implications of projected thermo-nuclear bomb tests" should be estabished with Arneson as chairman. (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, "Atomic Energy") In a memorandum of Aug. 13, Jeffrey Kitchen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, recorded Acheson's agreement with Lovett at a White House meeting on Aug. 12 that Lovett should discuss with Bruce various arrangements that would have to be made for the tests including what public announcements should be made and how, and Acheson had subsequently requested that Arneson "prepare to discuss this matter in detail and relay the necessary information to Mr. Bruce". (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, "Atomic Energy") For further documentation on the origins and activities of this special panel—designated "L" Panel, see the draft memorandum by Arneson, Sept. 29, p. 1017.

In discussing this problem with the Secretary you may find the following observations helpful:

1. If the target date of November 1 remains unchanged, the actual shot may not take place until later if (a) weather is unfavorable, or (b) technical difficulties arise. Nevertheless the possibility remains that the target date of November 1 could be met on the nose. The question then arises as to when the event will become publicly known. The explosion may be of such magnitude as to be visible and audible for several hundreds of miles in which event knowledge that a very large detonation had taken place might become known from the area itself. On the other hand whether knowledge generates from the area itself or not (and it is thought that the Task Force itself would be hermetically sealed away from public contact for at least a week except for air crews who will fly back to the States radioactive cloud samples for analysis), it appears plain that the danger of leakage in Washington would be very high: from the Pentagon, from the AEC, or from the scientific community.

2. If the target is shifted beyond the date of the election there would be no knowledge of the shot itself publicly available until the campaign was over. However, with the very strong feelings evident in the Pentagon against delay, it appears plain that a decision to postpone until after the election would become widely known in this country prior to November 4. This would catapult the matter into the middle of the campaign in a most unfortunate way and would make the test a political football. In the light of the position taken by Secretary Lovett, namely that he does not want to have any part in any decision calculated to bring about a delay in the test on political grounds, and inasmuch as the Department of State has expressed concern on this matter, it would inevitably develop that the Department of State would be charged with having played politics with the atom.

3. The Department of State has been giving consideration over the past several weeks to the possible foreign policy repercussions of forthcoming thermonuclear events. It has not come up with any strong foreign policy considerations which would require on these grounds alone that the test be postponed until after November 4. We cannot be certain that the test may not produce serious repercussions on the international scene but such repercussions do not appear likely.

4. The political considerations attendant on the forthcoming tests appear to be essentially domestic in nature. Had it been possible (and the discussion with Secretary Lovett this morning clearly indicates it is not) for Defense, State and AEC to agree among themselves to recommend that the test be held over until after the elec-

tion, this would have been a happy solution. However, in view of (1) the determination of the Department of Defense to proceed on schedule, namely toward the target date of November 1 unless overruled by the President, (2) the fact that while a majority of the Commission would vote in favor of postponement but will not do so unless the proposal is made by someone else, and (3) the fact that no one of the three agencies involved has jurisdictional responsibility for passing upon domestic political considerations as such, it would appear that the matter must be left to the President to decide.

5. The AEC today sent a letter to the President requesting authority to use a certain amount of fissionable and fusionable material for the forthcoming Fall test program. This letter will indicate that the material is to be expended in tests to be held early in November. According to established practice this AEC request will be referred by the President to the Special Committee of NSC for its recommendation before he takes final action. Special Committee consideration of this request would afford a natural occasion to secure a resolution of the problem of time.

6. When the Secretary is called upon to vote on the AEC request, I would recommend that he concur in the release of fissionable and fusionable material as requested but add a comment along the following lines: The Department of State has no strong foreign policy objections to the tests being conducted in the early part of November. It perceives that there may be strong objections on domestic grounds, but feels that this aspect of the matter can be judged only by the President.[2]

R. GORDON ARNESON

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[2] As noted above, Gordon Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, sent a memorandum on Aug. 15 to the Secretaries of State and Defense, who were the other members of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, requesting approval for Operation Ivy, the proposed thermonuclear tests scheduled for Nov. 1, 1952. A copy of Lay's letter of transmittal of Aug. 15 is in G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy", with the handwritten notation that Dean's enclosed memorandum had been returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. On Sept. 10 the President approved the recommendation of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy that Operation Ivy proceed as requested by the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (Memorandum by Lay to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Sept. 10, 1952, G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy")

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense had already issued a brief press release on Sept. 9 noting that in the autumn months Joint Task Force 132 would hold atomic tests in the Pacific. (Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 590–591)

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy Armaments"

## *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Ferguson) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1952.

Subject: Work of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament

I understand that Allen Dulles is coming in to speak to you this afternoon about the work of the Consultants on Disarmament. I think it would be useful if you knew of the conversations that Paul and I and Bob Tufts have had with them on a number of occasions during the past few months.

Just after the Consultants assembled for their first meeting, they asked Paul and me to talk with them, and Bob Tufts joined us for the discussion. It was a very preliminary conversation but it was apparent that the Consultants were interested in the broad analysis of our foreign policy and the general outline of the strategy the Government had laid out for the next five to ten years. The Consultants felt, as we do, that disarmament could not be separated from the other problems with which we are confronted and could not be achieved except in the context of changed political conditions.

We were invited later in the spring to come and talk with them at Princeton and, since neither Paul nor I could do so, Bob Tufts went up and spent a day there. Again the discussion was very general, but there was some attention to the nature of a disarmament program envisaged by the proposals introduced last fall in the United Nations, on which S/P had done most of the preliminary work with the Defense Establishment.

Later, I had several informal talks with Dr. Oppenheimer, and with Mac Bundy after he became the Secretary of the Group, and it was clear that they wanted to go beyond the task of helping Ben Cohen in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and hoped in the course of the summer to move beyond the proposals of last fall and to provide an original contribution to the work.

The Consultants have been meeting during August in Princeton, Cambridge, and Hanover, and invited me to come up to Princeton two weeks ago to spend a day with them. I did go up, after they had talked among themselves for two days. Dr. Bush and Allen Dulles had to leave before I arrived, but apparently the discussion in Princeton had revolved around the specific idea of Dr. Bush concerning the possibility of a stand-still agreement.

In their discussion of such an agreement, they related it to the proposed tests this fall, and raised the possibility of proposing a stand-still agreement before either side moved further in the thermonuclear field in order to see whether a broader agreement on disarmament could be worked out. They considered the same range of questions that we covered in a memorandum to you two months ago with respect to the paper that Dr. Bush had handed you.[1] I think the two respects in which the Consultants viewed the problem differently than we were (1) that they regarded the test this fall as being the main event and not merely a preliminary affair in the development of a fusion weapon, and (2) that they believed the new administration should have an opportunity to decide whether there were possible proposals that would improve the chances of making progress toward a disarmament program, which a thermonuclear test now would prevent.

I might add that in the course of their discussion they had all agreed that no stand-still agreement would be feasible except for a limited period of time (one to two years) and as a prelude to a more general agreement in the disarmament field.

In the course of our discussion it became clear that they were disturbed about presenting their views on this matter formally, when the preparations for the tests this fall had progressed so far. They realized that it would be most difficult to alter the schedule except in a minor way, and they were afraid that the effort to postpone the tests for any substantial period of time might have undesirable effects that would cancel out any possible advantages. They did ask me, however, to bring to the Department's attention the ideas they had been talking about, and I met with Mr. Bruce, Gordon Arneson, and Doc Matthews on my return and described our talk. It was felt here that the considerations they advanced should not lead us to advise a postponement of the autumn tests until after the first of the year.

I do not know that I have much more to add, except that I had a letter from Mac a few days ago saying they were continuing their meetings, and they still hoped to have a report early in the fall which might add something to the present proposals in the disarmament field.

JOHN H. FERGUSON

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[1] A handwritten marginal notation at this point reads: "6/9/52" an apparent reference to the memorandum by Nitze to Acheson of June 9, p. 958. The paper from Dr. Bush has not been conclusively identified, but for an expression of the views of the Panel of Consultants on this subject, see the unsigned and undated memorandum, p. 994.

### *Editorial Note*

For text of UN doc. DC/15, United States Working Paper Submitted to the Disarmament Commission: The Bacterial Weapons Question, September 4, 1952, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* volume I, pages 381–382, or Department of State *Bulletin,* October 27, 1952, pages 671–672.

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Panel of Consultants on Disarmament"

## *Memorandum by the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

## THE TIMING OF THE THERMONUCLEAR TEST

### INTRODUCTION

As members of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, we have been attempting to reach useful conclusions about problems of American policy with regard to the limitation and control of armaments. Early in our work, as a part of a review of the development of armaments, our attention was called to the plan to test a thermonuclear device in November of this year. As we have continued to explore the problem of finding a way to work toward a moderation of the present arms race, we have become increasingly convinced that the projected test may be an event of considerable import for the future. We have found many considerations which argue for a postponement of this test until its full and future implications can be dealt with by the next Administration; we have also found that there are a number of considerations, some of them clearly important, which weigh against such a postponement. This account attempts to spell out and assess these varying considerations, and to state our own balance of feeling, which is that if certain important conditions can be met, it would be wise to postpone the scheduled test until 1953.

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[1] The date and distribution of this unsigned memorandum cannot be conclusively established. The cover sheet bears a penciled notation "9/5/52," but that may be an indication of the date received or filed rather than the date drafted or circulated. Since the Panel had considered the question of the timing of the thermonuclear test for some months, this paper may have been prepared prior to Sept. 5. According to testimony by Oppenheimer on Apr. 16, 1954, the panel had discussed its views regarding possible postponement of the thermonuclear test with the Secretary of State during the autumn of 1952 but had made no written report. (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board, Washington, D.C., April 12–May 6, 1954* (Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 247–248)

In reaching our conclusions, we have proceeded from a primary concern with the relevance of this test to the whole range of questions affecting the limitation and control of armaments; this was the only proper course for a Panel of Consultants on Disarmament. Moreover, we have not undertaken any comprehensive study of the whole range of opinion and judgment that exists in the government; our assignment has been to consult with the Secretary of State and officers of his Department. But the problem of armaments is not a narrow one, and we have been forced to consider questions which are the primary concern of professional soldiers and others. This overlap we fear is inevitable. Our judgments may be right or wrong, but we have not been able to disentangle ourselves from these problems. Unless he examines the character of weapons and the meaning of negotiations, one can hardly have sensible ideas as to how negotiations about weapons can be made useful.

The account which follows falls into five sections. Section I explains why we think this test of a thermonuclear device is so important, and why we think that so many new elements have appeared since thermonuclear development was first ordered in 1950 that the present plan to test a weapon in November is in itself a determinable event which deserves all the care and study that are given to major new problems. Section II suggests some of the disadvantages which we think may result from holding this test on schedule. Section II [*III*] deals with the possible advantages of postponing the test. Section IV is concerned with the disadvantages of postponement; we discuss some which seem to us not persuasive, and some which seem to us highly important. Section V presents our mixed conclusions.

## I. THE PLAN FOR A THERMONUCLEAR TEST CALLS FOR A NEW DECISION

### A. *Character of the Test.*

A test of a thermonuclear device is planned by the United States Government for the month of November, 1952. This device is the product of many years of study, culminating in two and a half years of intensive technical effort which began after the Government's decision in 1950 to proceed with the development of a thermonuclear weapon. Great technical advances have been made in this period through a combination of good luck, great skill, and high dedication. This first test may not work, but among leading students of the problem there is now very little doubt that the scientists concerned are on the right track.

If this test is successful, it will have an explosive power one hundred to one thousand times as great as that of the atomic bomb used at Hiroshima. It will thus be something more than one more in a series of scientific tests. It will be impossible to conceal the fact that this event has taken place, and very difficult to conceal the fact that it is an event of great portent for all men.

The device which is to be tested is not a weapon; it is very heavy and it needs much mothering. In its present form it could not be delivered by any ordinary military means. But the fact that it is not a weapon is important only in terms of time; if the device works, there will be thermonuclear weapons in a very few years, and compared to this test, the test of the eventual weapon will be a discounted anticlimax. About the so-called hydrogen bomb there has always been this one great question: "Is this possible?" This question will be answered if the projected test succeeds.

The test, then, will be a great event if it succeeds. Any such event, in the normal course of administration, is carefully studied by those in authority in order to be sure that it is managed in the best possible way. In the case of this test, however, there is naturally a disposition to believe that the basic decision is past, on the ground that the large questions were those raised and decided when it was originally determined that it was right to try to make a hydrogen bomb. This decision was reached by due process. Should we not regard this test, however striking its results may be, as the natural and routine consequence of the earlier decision? The question is important, because Government cannot permit itself the luxury of perpetual self-doubt.

We think that it may be more accurate to conceive of the decision to conduct a thermonuclear test in November as essentially a new decision, deserving the close attention and mature consideration of the highest officers of the Government. We think that much has changed since 1950, and we think also that the very magnitude of the technical accomplishment urges a review of its meaning.

Many relevant changes have occurred since 1950. First, the course of thermonuclear research has modified one set of fears which lent urgency to the quest for a hydrogen bomb. It no longer seems likely that Fuchs could have been of much help to the Russians in this field, since the information he could have supplied them has turned out in our experience to be misleading.

Second, we now think we know how to make a thermonuclear device that works, and we also think we can make it into a weapon fairly soon. In 1950 the decision to proceed could not but be stimulated in part by the very uncertainty and ignorance that surrounded the problem; now we know what we are trying to do. The decision to learn about a matter is quite different from a decision to act on what has been learned.

Third, our own stockpile of atomic weapons is very much larger than it was in 1950, and it will be larger still by the time the present thermonuclear device can be turned into a weapon. Moreover, extensions of atomic weapons techniques are making available fission weapons of a yield thirty-fold greater than that of the original bombs; weapons of this size are large enough to deal with nearly all important Russian targets. While these changes could in large measure be foreseen in 1950, a stockpile on hand is quite different in its impact on thought from one which is merely on order.

Fourth, present thinking about development of actual weapons with a thermonuclear component is aimed at a set of bombs very much smaller in yield than the projected test will be if it measures up to its reasonable possibilities. There is something odd in the prospect of a test which may be some ten times as powerful as any weapon we plan to produce for at least the next few years.

Fifth, our experience in Korea and in building NATO has deepened our national understanding of the complex task of resisting Soviet aggression and working for freedom. It is now much more clear than it was two years ago that it is vitally important to distinguish among different kinds of strength and force, using only those which effectively advance our chosen purposes.

Sixth, since the decision of 1950 the United States has made a major effort in the United Nations to assert and demonstrate the American interest in the balanced reduction of armaments. On the whole this effort, so far, has had good results on world opinion; but its future may be sharply, perhaps decisively, related to the proposed thermonuclear test. This connection is emphasized by the fact that the General Assembly will be meeting in November, at the very time when the test is now scheduled to take place.

Seventh, it has turned out, quite by accident, that if it goes off on schedule, the test will take place either just before or just after Election Day. In either case, it will come in the last months of what the world now knows to be an outgoing Administration. This accident of timing may affect the impact of the test in a number of ways.

Taken together, these changes from the situation of 1950 persuade us that it is proper to raise the question whether or not the projected test should proceed on the present schedule. We turn, then, to the principal considerations which seem to us to argue for a postponement into 1953.

## II. THE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF CONDUCTING THIS TEST

### A. *The Test Will Assist the Russian Development of a Hydrogen Weapon.*

It seems to us almost inevitable that a successful thermonuclear test will provide a heavy additional stimulus to Soviet efforts in this field. It may well be true that the Soviet level of effort in this area is already high, but if the Russians learn that a thermonuclear device is in fact possible, and that we know how to make it, their work is likely to be considerably intensified. It is also likely that Soviet scientists will be able to derive from the test useful evidence as to the dimensions of the device.

It may be argued that if we are worried by the incentives which our new discoveries provide to the Soviet Union, we shall have to abandon all research and development. The complaint has force, but it is important to observe that the American thermonuclear device is a very special case. First, it is a quite remarkable and complex technical accomplishment—something of a different order from the ordinary new device which the enemy will inevitably discover for himself in good time. Second, it is a device such that the very act of testing it is public and revealing. Third, national prestige is identified to a unique degree with prowess in atomic weapons. Fourth, and perhaps most important of all, thermonuclear weapons may be far more valuable to the Soviet Union than to the United States; this last point is so important that we argue it separately below.

### B. *A Thermonuclear Arms Race May Not Be in the American Interest.*

Any successful test in a new technical field inevitably accelerates developments in this field throughout the world. Yet such is the character of the hydrogen bomb that we cannot help feeling that the United States might be better off if no such weapons existed, even from the immediate military standpoint. The West seems to offer more targets appropriate for such a weapon than does the Soviet Union, and the hydrogen bomb is a relatively more valuable part of one's arsenal if the number of fission weapons available is small; it amplifies the yield of a given amount of fissionable material. Since for the predictable future the United States should have a very much larger number of ordinary atomic bombs than the USSR, we conclude that the advantage of a hydrogen bomb is considerably greater for the Russians than for the Americans.

C. *The Test Will be a Barrier Against Work for the Limitation of Armaments.*

The United States is publicly committed to the notion that the objective of arms reduction is real and important; in the last year, the American government has taken the lead in reopening discussion of disarmament in the United Nations. This policy and these efforts are likely to be prejudiced if the projected tests should be successful, especially as it would explode in the middle of the annual meeting of the General Assembly.

Above and beyond the question of embarrassment to our policy and our negotiators, moreover, there is the fact that the forthcoming test has a special significance in the international arms race. A successful test will mark our entrance into a new order of destructive power, and this is the last point of departure now in sight. There is no other foreseen stage in technical development at which it will be so natural to say "stop, look, and listen." If the test is conducted, and if it succeeds, we will lose what may be a unique occasion to postpone or avert a world in which both sides pile up constantly larger stockpiles of constantly more powerful weapons.

D. *The Test Will Have an Unsettling Effect on Free Nations.*

While some in free countries (perhaps particularly in Great Britain) may welcome the November test as an indication of growing American deterrent strength, it seems likely that an explosion of this character will, on balance, be disturbing to most of the non-American, non-Soviet world. It will lend color to the arguments of those who falsely maintain that the United States is irrevocably committed to a strategy of destroying its enemies by indiscriminate means and at whatever cost. It cannot but add to the fears of those Europeans who recognize that a poker game played with hydrogen bombs is one in which only the two great Powers could buy any chips.

E. *It May Have a Hardening Effect on the United States.*

We think that there is danger lest a preoccupation with destructive weapons should tend to obscure the subtle and varied character of the ways in which we must try to cope with the Soviet Union while avoiding a third world war. We think this preoccupation might be considerably stimulated by the feeling that "we are successfully entering the field of hydrogen bombs." (This sort of loose interpretation of the projected test seems to us almost inevitable.) To put it another way, we think it important that the balance of action of the American Government should have the public meaning that our policy is flexibly designed to cope with both the Soviet Union and the dangers of all-out war; such a balance of action is already hard to achieve, and this test might be a further heavy weight on one side.

F. *The Test Comes at a Bad Time.*

Those charged with the responsibility for thermonuclear development have been under urgent orders to develop a hydrogen bomb as rapidly as possible; every priority has been given to this program, and it has been assumed that no consideration of politics or policy should weigh against the need for speed. As a result the first full-scale thermonuclear test has been scheduled without regard to any considerations except those of making headway toward a weapon. And by accident it happens that unless a postponement is ordered this test will take place in November, during the last months of an outgoing Administration. We must unhappily state our feeling that this may be the wrong time for an act of such importance.

A thermonuclear test conducted in November, 1952, however carefully considered and however cautiously explained, will be the act of a government not destined to carry the responsibility for policy in 1953 and after. The test will raise questions of purpose and meaning which simply cannot be answered except by the new Administration. What is its bearing on our attitude toward the control of atomic energy and the limitation of armaments? What does it mean with reference to our war strategy? What significance has it for our Allies? How is it relevant to a policy of "negotiation from situations of strength?" To these questions the outgoing Administration may well feel that it has good answers; the trouble is that in November, 1952, the only effective answers will be those that come from the next Administration. Yet the President-elect will hardly be in a position to give a genuine account of the meaning of a great action in which he had no part. Any explanation he might casually attempt would be a dangerous and misleading pretense. We are forced to the conclusion that if the consequences of conducting this test are as large as we think, the decision belongs to the incoming and not the outgoing Administration.

We do not find this conclusion easy to reach; still less would it be easy to state in a report to an official of the outgoing Administration. We emphasize the fact that this is not at all a matter of the Administration's qualifications to make the decision. The question here is not one of rival qualifications; it is rather this: "When and by whom, in the interest of American peace and security, can this decision best be taken?"

Even if it be agreed that the basic problems posed by this great new technical advance are problems which belong to the next Administration, it may still be thought that the basic task of those now holding responsibility is to duck no hard choices, and to continue to act in full responsibility until the new Administration is installed. This position in our view still misses the main point. Except in cases of urgent crisis, the great responsibility of an outgoing Administration is to help get the new men off to a good start. The American tradition both expects and honors acts of restraint by executives alive to the claims of those who are about to take on the enormous responsibilities of high office.

## III. THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF A POSTPONEMENT

### A. *A Responsible Government.*

If it should be possible to postpone the present test with some understanding in the Government and with no great public outcry, the whole matter can then be examined and judged by an Administration fully responsible for the next few years of American policy and answerable for the meaning of its actions. This is the largest and most certain gain which we see in a postponement. A new Administration's decision to test or not to test could have the character of a fully considered commitment to the future in a sense not possible in November.

### B. *The Possibility of an Agreement to Abandon Atomic Tests.*

Until we have tested thermonuclear devices there remains one opportunity for an international agreement on armaments which would avoid the overwhelmingly difficult problem of disclosure and verification. An international agreement to conduct no more atomic tests could be monitored by each major government on its own. It is a technical fact that no important atomic explosion can take place in the Soviet Union without our knowledge, and there is no reason why the Soviet Union should not develop the same capacity for detecting our tests, if it has not already done so. It is possible to bury a test so far underground that the only thing known about it is that it took place, but this piece of knowledge is all that is needed to monitor such an agreement. Thus an agreement of this character has the unique characteristic that it separates the problem of limitation of armament from the problem of "inspection." Moreover, such an agreement would have real meaning, since for some time to come no nation will have any proven thermonuclear weapons if it is unable to conduct and learn from the thermonuclear tests.

Yet no agreement prohibiting atomic tests could have much meaning if it continued over a long period as the only existing international understanding on armaments. Eventually, even without tests, hydrogen devices would be constructed which would have an increasing likelihood of effectiveness. Gradually, too, the refinement of technique and the increase of stockpiles of fissionable material would make the lonely agreement not to test seem bizarre and irrelevant. But for a limited period such an agreement would provide a reasonable assurance against the hazards of a stockpile of hydrogen bombs. In such a period the very existence of an agreement might be an occasion to move forward to more comprehensive and durable areas of agreement.

We recognize that the Soviet Union might well reject any proposal for the abandonment of atomic tests even if such a proposal were made at a time when it involved a limitation upon American development. The Russians would certainly be suspicious. They might simply denounce the proposal as unfair, since we have had many more tests than they. They might also think that the proposal stemmed from American inability to reach a workable design for a thermonuclear device (which might have the effect of moderating their own thermonuclear efforts). They might respond by trying to entangle the American proposal in their own propaganda for a general prohibition of atomic weapons. In general it is quite possible that the Soviet Union would react in an unconstructive way.

But the important point is not that a proposal of this character might be rejected. The main consideration, to us, is that this may be a real chance to inquire into Soviet intentions and attitudes. So great is the damaging effect of our ignorance of the pattern and content of Soviet Power that we should always be glad to find a topic on which discussion itself may be illuminating. A proposal of this character, seriously and carefully advanced to the Soviet Government, should produce valuable evidence of the degree to which the rulers of the Soviet Union understand the character of the race in weapons of mass destruction. It would certainly provide a medium in which the basic American concern with the implications of the arms race can be forcefully presented.

The basic attractiveness of the notion of a standstill in atomic tests is that it offers to the American Government something which is exceedingly difficult to find—an opportunity to reinforce its verbal adherence to the idea of disarmament with a visible and measurable action. Such an action might strongly reinforce all those abroad who believe in the good faith and peaceful purpose of the United States, and it could turn the mind of the American nation itself to the fact that policy in the 1950s must combine strength with moderation and firmness with flexibility.

We are not wholly clear that it would be wise to try for an agreement prohibiting atomic tests; the proposal is simple, but its effects would be complex. But we believe that there is at least sufficient merit in this notion to make it highly desirable that it should be given full consideration by those who will have the responsibility for American policy in future years. We also think it plain that the idea will have no real chance of success unless it is pressed before we have conducted a successful thermonuclear test. In this sense it is a striking example of the critical character of the problems which are posed by the plan for a test, and a specific reinforcement to our basic feeling that the decision on a thermonuclear test should be postponed.

## IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST POSTPONEMENT

In the course of considering the implications of the proposed test, we have dealt with certain of the arguments which can be raised against any postponement; in particular we have made it plain that we do not think the test is unimportant, and that we do not think it is truly covered by any decision made in 1950. There remain a number of more important arguments to which we now turn.

### A. *We Need All the Strength We Can Get.*

The basic argument against postponing the scheduled thermonuclear test is that it is desperately important for the United States to keep ahead in the race for hydrogen bombs. The test will help us to make such weapons sooner; therefore, the argument runs, it must not be delayed.

This feeling of urgency about the production of a hydrogen bomb has a number of causes. The most striking and powerful is the feeling that it would be disastrous if the Russians should get the H-bomb first. It is widely believed that the only possible counter to such a Soviet success would be the prior possession of hydrogen weapons by the United States, and it is claimed that the United States would face catastrophic danger if there should be a time in which the Russians had hydrogen weapons and we did not.

We think it far from clear that the only possible way in which we can counter a Russian hydrogen weapon is to have more such weapons of our own. The military position of the two countries is such that the hydrogen bomb is not likely to be a decisive addition to our armory, whether or not the Russians have such a weapon. We now have a substantial stockpile of atomic bombs of various sizes; bombs with many times the power of the Hiroshima weapon are now in production. Our stockpile is growing rapidly, and it is deliverable in a sense that no hydrogen device can be for a considerable time. There is a growing opinion that the basic retaliatory power of this atomic stockpile would be only moderately increased by the addition of hydrogen bombs, since there are very few targets in the Soviet Union large enough to demand the use of weapons more powerful than those we are already making.

But in any case no one would suggest that we should give up our work on hydrogen weapons. All that we are urging here is a possible postponement of a full-scale test to permit a fully responsible decision on the whole problem of thermonuclear development. Before the Russians can have hydrogen weapons in any real sense, they too will need tests, and it would naturally be a part of any decision to delay our own tests that any Russian test would be met by the prompt reinstatement of our test program.

Plainly, we cannot assert that no risk whatever is involved in any decision which would delay the time at which we have thermonuclear weapons. There is always some risk in any decision to delay the development of any weapon. But in our view the risk involved in postponing the presently scheduled test is not large enough to weigh heavily against the arguments in favor of postponement.

A complementary argument for gaining all available forms of strength is that only strength can persuade the leaders of the Soviet Union to desist from their aggressive activities. Many able men argue that quite irrespective of the special problem of Soviet development of thermonuclear weapons, American possession of such weapons would give the United States another and desirable kind of strength which would help to soften the policy of the Soviet Union. On this view, any failure to press forward would only be misunderstood in the USSR as a sign of weakness; to refrain from testing would be to throw away an evident advantage in return for nothing, since the USSR will go all out to get hydrogen bombs of its own no matter what we do.

While we fully agree with the basic notion that the Soviet Union is influenced by strength, we think it far from clear that all kinds of strength are equally adapted to this purpose. In particular we are persuaded, in the light of our experience with the atom, that the kind of strength embodied in a hydrogen bomb will not persuade the Russians to mend their ways.

The hydrogen weapon would certainly give us a new kind of power in the area of weapons of mass destruction; but consideration of our present stockpile, and of the problems of delivery on the Russian target system, suggests that it would be a limited addition even in this area. It is true, of course, that it would increase the total explosive power of the American stockpile, and in so doing it might permit uses of fission weapons which are currently uneconomical or marginal. In time this could become a substantial addition to American arms. But it is not for us an addition so decisive in character that a limited delay in its production is intolerable.

### B. *Arguments Relating to the Morale of Scientists and the Convictions of the Executive Branch.*

We have now to consider certain arguments which in our view may weigh heavily against a change in present plans.

First, this test has now been in preparation for many months; ships and scientists are already in action and the whole enterprise has acquired a momentum such that if it were now arrested (or if the task force were to proceed to its destination and carry out other planned tests, omitting the thermonuclear attempt), there would necessarily be repercussions among all those who have been working intensively toward an assigned objective. A last-minute postponement of the thermonuclear test might create among many of the personnel of the A.E.C. a feeling that the political arms of the Government were arbitrary and uncertain in judgment, and unless an understanding of the reasonableness of such a decision could be communicated to these men, it might have serious adverse effects on our technical progress in the field of atomic weapons.

But not only are ships and men on the move; minds throughout the Government have accepted and are set on the decisions which are leading to the test. Considerations such as those which impress us may be wholly unconvincing to able and dedicated men who are fully persuaded that we need to have a hydrogen bomb as soon as we can. Strong convictions of this character exist, we think, in all departments of the Government. If this be the state of mind of the executive branch (and if the view of the legislature should be at least equally energetic), a sudden decision to postpone might be far from having the concurrence of the Government as a whole; even if the President should himself decide to order postponement, he might have to act as the leader of a divided and even hostile administration. Such an apparently arbitrary and unsupported postponement would hardly lay a favorable groundwork for the actions of a new administration.

It is not for us to attempt an accurate estimate of the actual state of mind of the members of the Government, whether they be scientific leaders or policy makers. Neither should we try to assess the degree to which present opinion might be modified if the question were fully reconsidered. These are matters well beyond our assignment. All that we can conclude from this discussion of possible disruption and opposition is that these possibilities are real and important. If the President is to make a new decision, we think it highly important that this decision should have understanding concurrence among interested senior officials, and that it should be accompanied by a substantial effort to make the change of plans intelligible to those concerned with the test.

There is a final difficulty which is not without its opportunities. It does not seem likely that a decision to postpone the test could be reached and carried out without a public statement at some stage; too many people are involved, and the necessary explanation could hardly be kept within the Government for very long. It will thus be necessary to cope effectively with the difficulty of explaining the decision without seriously limiting freedom of action for the future. But we believe that the act of explanation offers also a great opportunity for a declaration by the President showing affirmative statesmanship in the cause of peace and our country's security. We think that the decision to postpone a test, with all its difficulties, yet offers a chance to combine words and action in a fashion that may have spectacular meaning for our own people and for all who seek the double goals of peace and freedom.

### C. *What Could Follow Postponement?*

The largest and most difficult of the objections to a postponement is the simple question of what we would do with it if we got it: what line of policy should we pursue to make use of the time that is gained? We have argued the claims of a new Administration, but this claim may not be decisive if in the end the new Administration has no other alternative than to re-schedule the test as quickly as possible. We cannot avoid the question of what we want to do while this remarkable new device is not being tested. Even if we answer this question by saying that the United States should press for an agreement to prohibit all atomic tests, we are faced by the fact that such an agreement will have a fairly short life if nothing else is added. In other words, in order to feel confident about any single step to make disarmament less unlikely, it is necessary to have in mind some reasonable sense of the way in which the whole subject of arms limitation fits into the whole of policy.

Our basic assignment has been to consider this larger question. We have been forced to recognize the strength of the following three propositions which are exceedingly hard to reconcile with one another. First, no limitation of armament is feasible unless it becomes a part of a larger understanding of some sort. Second, most sorts of understanding with the Kremlin are either impossible or undesirable or both; we do not know that peaceful co-existence is possible, but it is plain that even if it be possible, it cannot be comfortable or cordial. Third, unless armaments are in some way limited, the future of our whole society will come increasingly into peril of the gravest kind.

Wrestling with these propositions, we have concluded that just as their toughness arises from the fact that they must be taken together, so the beginnings of a resolution, if there is one, will be found only when policy is constantly based on all three propositions. It is our feeling that in recent years it has become increasingly difficult to keep our attention fixed on the third proposition—the one which asserts that the whole of our society is in grave and growing danger. Yet it is the reality of this third proposition which makes inapplicable the flawless logic that can be built on the first two propositions taken alone. And it is this reality which leads us to conclude that it is not really necessary—or even possible—that we should know where any given effort to restrain the arms race may eventually lead. What is necessary is rather that we should lose no chance that is not totally foreclosed by the irreducible necessities of our defense of freedom. Before we test a thermonuclear device, we should be quite certain that this moment does not offer us some chance of recognizing all three of the hard realities of our time. We are not sure that it does, but we are far from sure that it does not, and we see no signal danger in a moderate delay.

There is a more modest, and perhaps more persuasive response to those who ask where we are heading. It is that in dealing with the vast and secret Soviet Power, we know only what we find out, and we find out mainly by experiment. For all our policies there is dire need of information about the power and purposes of the Soviet rulers. Opportunities of learning even a little about this matter are not so frequent that they should be cast away simply because we are not sure of all the steps in a possible future course. The principal cause of this uncertainty, after all, is the very fact of our massive ignorance of the Soviet ruling mind.

So on balance, though we recognize the uncertain and unpredictable future of a decision to delay a thermonuclear test, we would accept this as inherent in any attempt to deal wisely with our mounting peril.

## V. CONCLUSION: LET US POSTPONE THE TEST IF SUCH A DECISION CAN BE UNDERSTOOD, EXPLAINED, AND PROPERLY SUPPORTED

Taken together, the arguments for a postponement of the projected thermonuclear test seem to us persuasive. We think that November is not a good time, and we think that the decision should be made by the next Administration. We think that this is a fateful step, and that before it is taken the next Administration should be quite sure that there is no better use to be made of all that we have learned since 1950. We are not persuaded by the claim that postponement would bring unacceptable dangers, and while we admit that it is not clear where a postponement would lead, we have to note that this ignorance applies to any effort to limit the current power struggle. We think the test should be postponed, and though our first concern is with the limitation of armaments, we think that postponement remains desirable when judged from the broad standpoint of the national security.

The reservation which we set to our conclusion is that we cannot urge a decision to postpone the test unless it proves possible to obtain for such a decision some measure of support and understanding from the senior government officials primarily concerned, to make the decision reasonably intelligible among those who have worked to make the test possible, and to explain it publicly without seriously limiting the freedom of the next Administration. We fully understand that it may not be possible to meet these conditions, but it is not for us to judge such a question. We cannot by a prejudgment of the temper of the Government excuse ourselves from the obligation to record our considered opinion that under the conditions we have stated, the postponement of the scheduled test not only is desirable, but could become a decisive act of statesmanship.

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330.13/9-552

## *Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1952.

Subject: Meeting with Members of Panel of Consultants on Disarmament.

*Problem:*

To advise Messrs. Robert Oppenheimer and John Dickey of the views of the Department concerning a report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament.

*Discussion:*

1. Mr. Allen Dulles saw you on September 2 [2] to arrange an appointment with you for Saturday, September 6, for Messrs. Oppenheimer and Dickey [3] in order that they might discuss the following with you:

(a) "What is the wise thing for the Panel to do?" (b) "Should the Panel make a report?" (c) "Should the Panel terminate its work until the advent of the new administration or should it continue?"

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[1] Drafted by Bloomfield of UNA; concurrence by S/AE.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found.

[3] No record of such meeting has been found; possibly the meeting between Cohen and Oppenheimer on Sept. 11 was arranged as a substitute. See the memorandum of conversation by Cohen, p. 1013.

2. It is difficult to answer any of these questions because of our lack of information concerning the work of the Panel to date. We do know that the Panel concluded at an early stage that it would be necessary to examine the whole range of armaments in a broad context of political relationships rather than to deal with any of the specific problems confronting us in the United Nations. We have not attempted to discourage this expanded approach, and we have accepted the necessity of awaiting their findings before knowing to what practical use they could be put in our disarmament operations.

3. We are as yet uninformed as to the tenor of their thinking, the flavor of their conclusions, and the timing of their recommendations, if any. It is our feeling that we cannot advise them regarding their report until we have some idea of what that report might contain.

*Recommendations:*

In this setting, our reactions to the three specific questions put to you by Mr. Dulles are as follows:

1. "*What is the wise thing for the Panel to do?*"

The Panel should indicate to the Department in any manner it sees fit what the results have been of its deliberations in order that the Department can then advise as to the next step.

2. "*Should the Panel make a report?*"

We have been expecting a report of their work but until we know what their conclusions are we cannot advise as to the nature and use of the report. With regard to the problem of press leaks, our major concern is that there be no premature publicity on possible revisions in the UN atomic energy plan. If the report is Top Secret it should certainly be assured of adequate security. UNA's primary concern, as the action office with respect to the disarmament program in the United Nations, is to have useful ideas from the Panel which will facilitate the discharge of our responsibilities. Whether the report is written or oral is essentially immaterial. It occurs to us that their hesitation on this score may be due to a reluctance to submit negative findings. We can only repeat that we seek enlightenment and assistance from them, whatever their findings may be.

3. "*Should the Panel terminate its work until the advent of the new administration or should it continue?*"

It is difficult to recommend on this without full knowledge of implications or repercussions which the Panel may have in mind. The timing of their report is a matter which they themselves would doubtless want to weigh carefully in the light of its potential usefulness to the government. It is conceivable that recommendations involving any major new approach to the problem are not feasible until the end of the year. Their concern regarding timing should of course be considered in that light, and clearly they would share the Department's conviction that disarmament must not become a political football. Needless to say, the Department would not want to be in the position of appearing to suppress any report the Panel may make. We have not in fact seen that there is any necessary connection between the elections, and either the work of the Panel or our efforts in the UN.

In this connection, we feel very strongly that the US Government has maintained a successful initiative in this field and has an unusually favorable position vis-à-vis the USSR as a result of our efforts to date. We recommend that no steps be taken or decision reached which would affect this initiative without the most careful examination of all aspects of the problem.

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950–1955"

## *Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Lovett), and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean)*[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1952.

Subject: Agreed Concepts Regarding Atomic Weapons

References:

A. Memo for Secretaries of State and Defense and Chairman, AEC, from Executive Secretary, NSC, same subject, dated August 5, 1952[2]

B. Memo for Secretaries of State and Defense from Executive Secretary, NSC, same subject, dated August 18, 1952[3]

The Secretaries of State and Defense concurred in the amendments to the enclosure to Reference A on the subject, proposed by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission as indicated in Reference B. The Secretary of Defense, in concurring in these amendments, made the following comment: "The Department of

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[1] A typewritten notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum and its enclosure were reclassified as Secret on Sept. 30, 1952, by James S. Lay, Jr.

[2] This memorandum, not printed, circulated a draft statement of agreed concepts regarding atomic weapons prepared by designated representatives of State, Defense, and the AEC. It is filed with an earlier draft, circulated by Lay on July 3. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950–1955")

[3] The memorandum of Aug. 18, not printed, transmitted proposed amendments to the draft statement proposed by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Use Policy 1950–1955")

Defense is informed that the changes in text proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission in the subject paper are designed to clarify its language and not to alter its substance".

Accordingly, the enclosed statement of "Agreed Concepts Regarding Atomic Weapons", as amended and adopted by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, was submitted to the President for his consideration, together with advice that the question of the classification of certain atomic weapons data as it affects SHAPE planning is being investigated by the Atomic Energy Commission in consultation with the Department of Defense and that the findings will be reported back to the Special Committee for subsequent consideration.[4]

The President has this date approved the enclosure as the basis for the preparation of detailed papers designed to carry out these agreed concepts.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Annex]

## *Statement Adopted by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy*

### AGREED CONCEPTS REGARDING ATOMIC WEAPONS

1. *Function of this Special Committee of the National Security Council in Advising the President on Use of Atomic Weapons*

a. By law, the National Security Council is to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security." By direction of the President, the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is to "pass on the directives which I have to make, that affect all three of those Departments."

b. The above directives are interpreted to mean that the President wants the advice of the Special Committee before making any decision regarding the major production objectives of the atomic energy program, the preparatory deployment of atomic weapons, and the use of atomic weapons. This is not interpreted as limiting the statutory function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense."

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[4] A copy of the memorandum submitted to President Truman on Sept. 10 and its enclosure, the statement on agreed concepts on atomic weapons approved by State, Defense, and the AEC, is in the Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "NSC Atomic—Atomic Weapons Agreed Concepts".

2. *Use of Atomic Weapons*

In the event of a positive decision, the President would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as the President may specify.

3. *Atomic Weapons Stockpile Custody and Operation*

a. *Custodial Responsibility.* The Department of Defense should have custodial responsibility for stocks of atomic weapons outside of the continental United States and for such numbers of atomic weapons in the continental United States as may be needed to assure operational flexibility and military readiness for use subject to 2, above. The Atomic Energy Commission should maintain custodial responsibility for the remainder of the stockpile of atomic weapons.

b. *Provision of Storage Facilities.* Each agency should provide the facilities for storage of atomic weapons over which it maintains custodial responsibility. However, where custodial responsibility may be changed by Presidential directive without physical movement of weapons, reimbursement for existing storage facilities should not be required.

c. *Physical Security and Operation of Storage Sites.* In the interests of operational readiness and economy of personnel, the Department of Defense should provide the physical security and the services required for the operation of all storage sites for atomic weapons. For storage facilities for which the Atomic Energy Commission is responsible, the services provided by the Department of Defense should include normal administrative services, and, under the technical supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission, the performance of such maintenance, surveillance, modernization, and modification work as is determined appropriate for accomplishment at the site.

d. *Access to Atomic Weapons.* The Department of Defense should provide the Atomic Energy Commission with surveillance information on atomic weapons under Department of Defense custody, and access to such weapons for such purposes as the Atomic Energy Commission may determine to be necessary, including the determination of the effects of environmental and operational conditions and rotation, modification and major retrofit programs.

4. *The Establishment of Military Requirements and Characteristics of Atomic Weapons*

a. The Department of Defense should state its military requirements for numbers and types of atomic weapons, including the desired military characteristics thereof.

b. The Atomic Energy Commission should propose rates of production and production goals for weapon materials in the light of stated military requirements and of the Commission's capabilities for meeting these requirements.

c. The President, in the light of a and b above, will determine the atomic weapon production program.

d. In consonance with the responsibility of the Department of Defense to indicate the desired military characteristics of atomic weapons, the Department of Defense should establish appropriate criteria and conduct such tests and evaluations, beyond those conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission, as deemed necessary to ascertain the acceptability of weapons to meet these military characteristics.

*Note:* Approved by the President on September 10, 1952, as the basis for preparation of detailed papers designed to carry out these agreed concepts.

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330.13/9-1152

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Cohen)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1952.

Subject: Panel of Consultants on Disarmament

Participants: Robert Oppenheimer—Disarmament Panel
B. V. Cohen—UNA

Dr. Oppenheimer came to see me to tell me something about the work of the Panel.

Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the Panel had taken their work seriously and had done considerable hard thinking on the subject. He emphasized that the Panel had, he thought, made very considerable progress in educating themselves so that individually and as a group they could be much more helpful than when they first started their work last spring.

While the Panel was working on their report, they did not contemplate making their report until after the turn of the year. Mr.

Oppenheimer stated that the Panel did not think it wise to hurry their report, as it was not likely to be particularly helpful in dealing with the disarmament problem in the setting of the UN Assembly. The report apparently is directed at the problem of armament as well as disarmament and the conditions necessary to make possible serious discussion of disarmament. I gathered that Mr. Oppenheimer and the Panel were of the opinion that until we were on better speaking relations with the Soviet Union there was little advantage in pressing disarmament proposals unduly or trying to elaborate proposals in any great detail. Apparently the Panel thought that there was danger in aggravating fears and tensions by pressing unduly discussions in forums when there was little prospect of reaching agreement.

Mr. Oppenheimer stated that he was aware that we could not drop, and probably should not drop, the disarmament discussion in the UN, but until there was some change in the US-Soviet relations, we could not be hopeful of any success except possibly from a propaganda or public relations point of view. He thought what we had done in the summer in the Disarmament Commission was helpful in revealing a willingness on our part to discuss disarmament and to take a flexible and less rigid approach to some of the problems than we had previously. But he doubted whether we could do much more.

Mr. Oppenheimer also indicated that he and the Panel thought we should give considerable thought to what might be the reactions to the forthcoming atomic tests. He apparently had some discussion with the Secretary on this subject.

B. V. Cohen

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330.13/9–1752

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs Planning Staff*

TOP SECRET [Washington,] September 17, 1952.

Subject: Work of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament.

Participants: McGeorge Bundy—Secretary, Panel of Consultants
Lincoln P. Bloomfield—UNA/P

*Note:* Much of what Mr. Bundy reported to me he later repeated in a meeting with Messrs. Sanders, Bechhoefer, Meyers, Warren Chase, Niemeyer and myself.

Mr. Bundy reported as follows:

1. The five members of the Panel think "astonishingly alike" on the problems they have considered. The general framework of their

considerations has been the place of disarmament in its overall policy setting. They have had very intensive discussions, but their thinking requires more shape before it can be "crystallized".

2. In Bundy's words, the Panel is "unable to persuade itself that disarmament is not of major importance". In their opinion, the arms race is becoming increasingly dangerous, and the Government is not currently taking all necessary steps to meet that danger. The Panel feels that our overall policies should rest on an acute awareness of this danger, but at the same time they are unsure that they could recommend any positive steps which would carry assurances of success in their undertaking.

3. These premises have led the Panel to the conclusion that limitation of armaments should become a central part of the purposes of U.S. policy to a far more meaningful extent than at present.

4. Because, in the view of the Panel, this is not now the case but should be and perhaps will be in the future, it is essential that we keep our public positions on disarmament extremely fluid. We must not foreclose the possibility of limited agreements in the future by pushing ourselves into rigid positions today because of tactical necessities. They feel that so long as genuine negotiations are impossible, some hardening of our public position is inevitable, but we should resist the tendency to allow the situation in the UN to snowball out of manageable proportions and should keep to a minimum statements on this subject which are too specific. In this connection, they feel that real agreements can only be developed outside of the publicity attending United Nations discussions and, repeating their earlier thought, in an atmosphere in Washington of the highest policy awareness of the imperatives of this problem with full understanding of the need for *quid pro quos*.

5. The Panel sees its principal task as conveying this awareness to the Government, if only by indicating their own reading of the high spots of this problem. They are unhappy with the paradoxical security situation which makes it impossible for them freely to exchange ideas and thoughts with the UNA Disarmament Staff which has the action responsibility in the Department for this problem, and they intend to recommend that whatever group is charged with this responsibility in the Department be located considerably closer to the summit both for this reason and because of the central importance of the problem.

6. I inquired about their deliberations on the specific tasks we had set forth for them. Regarding a "Non-atomic Baruch Plan", they felt one would be possible to develop, but would be an unhelpful exercise. If agreements ever become possible, reliance will have to be placed on "broad safeguards against big violations" rather than on any detailed blueprint. Regarding the UN Atomic Energy

Plan, they felt that it was originally developed at a time when there was considerable political flexibility and an acceptance of the need for tight technical controls. By contrast, there is now very little political flexibility which leads them to conclude that a "loose" technical approach is the only one possible. They feel that the UN Plan is out of date, largely because it bears the stigmata of protracted unsuccessful negotiations. At the same time, they feel it would be undesirable to attempt to make minor changes in the Plan in order to make it more "realistic" with concomitant propaganda advantage, since this might prejudice any really meaningful revisions at a more propitious time. It is their feeling that no understanding will be possible in this area unless it is a part of a larger political understanding.

7. The Panel wishes us to know that its members are available for individual or collective consultation on current aspects of our task, at the pleasure of the Department.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD

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Truman Library, PSF-Subject file, "NSC Atomic, Atomic Weapons—Thermonuclear"

## *Memorandum by the United States Atomic Energy Commission to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 18, 1952.

The Commission believes that an indispensable part of any announcement of a successful Ivy shot would be a clear renewal of America's assurances to the world of its peaceful intentions.

Such a milestone in the evolution of military application of atomic energy might also present a unique opportunity to the United States to offer once again to the USSR to negotiate for a realistic international control agreement. Such an offer would at least tend to neutralize Russian propaganda capitalizing on this American development. And it might well remove the international control issue from dead center and start up new negotiations containing some measure of hope.

Of course such proposal should leave no room for interpretation that the United States would forego use of any weapon (if required) until international control becomes a reality.

H. D. SMITH
*Acting Chairman*

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[1] By memorandum of Sept. 19, Lay transmitted this document to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "'L' Panel"

## *Draft Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1952.

*The Problem*

To explore means of exploiting forthcoming thermonuclear developments to the advantage of the United States.

*Facts Bearing on the Problem*

1. On November 19, 1949 the President designated the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission as a Special Committee of the National Security Council to advise him whether the United States should proceed with the construction of "super" atomic weapons. [2] The President stated that he wished the Committee to analyze all phases of the question including particularly "The technical, military and political factors" and "to make recommendations as to whether and in what manner the United States should undertake the development and possible production of 'super' atomic weapons."

2. The Special Committee completed the study assigned to it on January 31, 1950. [3] It made the following recommendations to the President:

> "a. That the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of effort to be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense; and that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier program be undertaken concurrently;
>
> "b. That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union;
>
> "c. That the President indicate publicly the intention of this Government to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, and that no further official information on it be made public without the approval of the President."

3. The considerations which led to recommendation b above are set forth in the Special Committee report as follows:

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[1] No subsequent version of this memorandum has been found.

[2] For President Truman's letter to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Sidney W. Souers, dated Nov. 19, 1949, establishing the Special Committee, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. I, p. 587.

[3] The "Report by the Special Committee of the National Security Council to President Truman," Jan. 31, 1950, is printed *ibid.*, 1950, vol. I, p. 513.

"It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudges the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons—viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the USSR."

4. By letters dated January 31, 1950 to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, [4] the President directed "the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."

5. Concerning the international control of atomic energy, NSC 68, prepared in response to this Presidential directive, states in part

"At least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that '. . . the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure . . . their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field. . . . As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy.'

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[4] For text of the letter from President Truman to Secretary Acheson, Jan. 31, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 141.

> "In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place." [5]

6. Subsequent NSC studies concerned with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union have periodically reaffirmed the basic theses of NSC 68.

7. By action of the PSB of July 26 [*June 26* ?], 1952 [6] an *ad hoc* panel was established under the chairmanship of a representative of the Department of State "to formulate a policy for the political and psychological exploitation in the U.S. national interest of thermonuclear developments, both U.S. and Soviet." Its tasks were broken down into three parts as follows:

> "a. To make recommendations with respect to the desirability, timing and manner of publicly reporting the thermonuclear test scheduled for the Autumn of 1952.
>
> "b. To formulate contingency guidance to minimize the political and psychological disadvantages which might accrue from Soviet thermonuclear developmental successes.
>
> "c. To formulate recommendations, as feasible, concerning the exploitation of thermonuclear developments subsequent to the Fall test."

The Panel addressed itself first to a. The Panel's recommendations of August 19, 1952 with respect to the public reporting of the tests this Fall have been approved by the agencies concerned. These recommendations were as follows:

> "A. The general operating plan for the public reporting of the Ivy tests, assuming that there is no real or fake USSR announcement of its own thermonuclear tests before the first Ivy shot, be as follows:
>
> > "(1) *In the period before the first detonation:*
> >
> > "(a) In the late Summer make a terse announcement by the Department of Defense and the AEC stating that Joint Task Force 132 will conduct a series of weapons developmental tests in the Autumn months of 1952 (Appendix A).
> >
> > "(b) Make no other announcement having any possible relation to the tests during this period unless it appears strongly likely that Soviet propagandists will make their own announcement and interpretation regarding the tests.
> >
> > "(c) In the case that it does appear likely that Soviet propaganda will speak out on the subject, make our own announcement, putting the fact of the tests in the light which offers the best promise of undercutting the effects of the probable Soviet propaganda announcement.

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[5] For the complete text of NSC 68, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," Apr. 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 234.

[6] See footnote 1, p. 989.

"(d) In the case that without advance knowledge on our part a Soviet propaganda attack on the tests is unleashed, what the United States should say can be determined with finality only at the time and in the light of the nature and circumstances of such Soviet attack. The Panel should continue to give consideration to this contingency.

"(2) *In the period after the first detonation:*

"(a) In the case that visible or otherwise detectable phenomena have become widely known and news stories and comment of a speculative sort are being published, issue a statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission immediately after the detonation of general content such as that in Appendix B.*

"(b) In the case that the phenomena or activities are not widely detected and there are few or no speculative news accounts, hold announcement until the conclusion of the test series. At that time issue announcement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of general content such as that in Appendix C.†

"(c) There should be no Washington press conference for the task force Commander and other DOD and AEC officials; the press announcement and news conference for purposes of distributing credit and kudos to the various elements of the task force should be sited at Honolulu.

"(d) The several interested Government Agencies and Departments should take steps to ensure that official comment on the test results does not go beyond what is issued by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Appendix A and B or C)." [7]

8. The announcement set forth in Appendix A was issued on September 9, 1952.

9. During this period the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission had been giving considerable thought to the question whether the Ivy test series should be postponed until some time after the election. By action of the President dated September 10, 1952, on the recommendation of the Special Committee, the release was authorized of the requisite amounts of fissionable and fusionable material for tests scheduled

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*In the event that the thermonuclear test is partially or wholly unsuccessful the statement in Appendix B would presumably not be necessary but a statement along the general lines of the statement in Appendix C should be used. [Footnote in the source text. Appendix C is not printed. A slightly revised text was issued by the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on Nov. 16, 1952; for text of the press release, see p. 1042.]

†In the event that the thermonuclear test is partially or wholly unsuccessful the statement in Appendix B would presumably not be necessary but a statement along the general lines of the statement in Appendix C should be used. [Footnote in the source text.]

[7] For a copy of the full *ad hoc* panel report of Aug. 19, 1952, see G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, " 'L' Panel".

to take place in early November 1952. It was understood that the question of exact time should continue under review.

10. By action of the Executive Secretary of NSC on September 17, 1952,[8] inasmuch as the *Ad Hoc* Panel of PSB had been dissolved, further political and psychological exploitation of thermonuclear developments was assigned to the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy.

11. Throughout the course of the developments listed above, particularly in recent months, arguments have been advanced from various quarters that the forthcoming thermonuclear test may well represent a point of no return, that once the test is successfully conducted and becomes known the chances of bringing about effective international control of atomic energy will become hopeless, and that therefore, some means be found whereby negotiations be undertaken afresh with the Soviet Union to see whether some acceptable arrangement could be found which would avert the descent into the Maelstrom. In this connection, representatives of the Department and the AEC have recently had a series of discussions with the two representatives from the French AEC, Dr. Francis Perrin and Dr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, who were sent over at the behest of M. Jules Moch[9] to examine the possibilities of devising an international control system based on "continuous inspection". Confining their consideration to scientific and technical aspects of control only, the French participants felt that a technically adequate system could be devised short of the UN plan. (See Appendix D for a record of the conversations.[10]) The attached letter from the Atomic Energy Commission (Appendix E)[11] raises the question whether the forthcoming test might be utilized to "reactivate" negotiations with the USSR. Subsequent inquiry has revealed that the AEC has no specific proposals to suggest in this connection.

12. A different manner of approach has also been suggested. It is argued that the forthcoming thermonuclear test by itself or coupled with the possession of thermonuclear weapons at a later date (one year to 18 months at the earliest) should be used in some way to moderate the aggressiveness of the Kremlin's behavior and to

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[8] Executive Secretary Lay's action was transmitted in a memorandum of Sept. 17 to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, " 'L' Panel")

[9] Moch was French Representative on the Disarmament Commission and a member of the French Delegation to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.

[10] Appendix D, attached to the source text, is not printed. Detailed minutes of the conversations with the French representatives, which occurred on Sept. 9 and 11, are in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Chron".

[11] Appendix E is not attached to the source text and has not been found. However, there is attached to the source text an "Addendum", dated Oct. 2, presumably by Arneson, entitled "Timing of the Approach" which summarizes, in two pages, arguments for and against approaching the Soviet Union prior to the test.

build therefrom toward acceptable settlements including the international control of atomic energy.

*Analysis*

1. In examining various alternative courses of action it is essential to keep in mind one fundamental point. The Soviet Union is not likely to accept any settlements which the West seeks whether it be the international control of atomic energy or other settlements of a more political nature unless it is confronted with a situation where failure to accept such settlements leaves it with less acceptable alternatives. In retrospect it seems plain that there are two main reasons why the Soviet Union has not to date accepted effective international control of atomic energy. The first obviously is that effective control requires a serious and irreparable breach of the iron curtain. The second is that the Kremlin does not find the absence of international control an unacceptable situation. A similar calculus would appear to apply to the other settlements which the West seeks to attain.

2. If the foregoing point is valid, there would not appear to be much point in a course of action which seeks to water down the requirements of international control in the hope that the Soviet Union would agree. Attempts to devise a looser control system are destined to break on the following dilemma: a system acceptable to the Soviet Union is without value as a control system and is, accordingly, unacceptable to the West. The key to effectiveness, whatever the words used, is the opening up of the Soviet Union. The West cannot settle for less. The Soviet Union cannot permit this vital blow to their system.

3. We must examine then whether any hope can be found in looking at the problem from another point of view. Unless it is judged that the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point where a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place or is imminent, no control system of the requisite effectiveness to the West can be negotiated with the Soviet Union. The question then remains whether forthcoming thermonuclear event could be used as a means to force the Kremlin to bring about a drastic change in its policies or to accelerate the time when such change would take place.

4. In the consideration that was given by the *Ad Hoc* Panel of the PSB to the question of what should be publicly reported concerning the tests this fall, the underlying thesis was that the event should be somewhat underplayed rather than exaggerated. This was done in view of the fact that for some time after the test the United States would not possess a thermonuclear capability in being. It is estimated that at least a year, perhaps 18 months, will

be required before thermonuclear weapons of a deliverable character will begin to go into stockpile. In such circumstances, it was felt that it would be most unwise to exaggerate the importance of the event in the view of the lively possibility that our bluff might be called. This same consideration would appear to have a bearing on the question whether the tests this fall could be used to bring pressure on the Kremlin to accommodate itself to an open world. It would appear that if pressure is to be brought seriously to bear it must await not only the acquisition by the United States of a thermonuclear capability but also the requisite build-up of NATO and other forces.

5. One might consider, however, whether it would be possible to plant a seed, warning the Kremlin of the shape of things to come. Such an operation would require the most meticulous consideration and a decision taken only at the highest level. It might be useful, however, to sketch in most general terms an operation that might be considered. While holding firm in the UN negotiations, neither putting forward new proposals nor retreating from the old, plans could be laid for a direct approach to the Kremlin. In considering the timing of the approach it would appear unwise to attempt to do this prior to the test. To do so would only lead the Kremlin to believe that we were engaging in a policy of bluff.‡ A more propitious timing would appear to be after the tests had been completed and have become publicly known. The approach outlined below might be made during the incumbency of President Truman or might become one of the first acts of the incoming President. The approach would be to point out to Stalin that U.S. progress in the thermonuclear field has interjected a new element in the international scene and will have an important bearing on the attitude the United States will take toward those actions of the Soviet Union which are aggressive in nature, inimical to the interests of the Western world, and might bring about global conflict. It might be desirable not to mention thermonuclear developments in the approach but simply to stress the growing build-up on all fronts, leaving the event of a thermonuclear test to speak for itself. An approach along either of these lines should be cast in such a way as not to take on the attributes of an ultimatum but rather should stress that this attitude would be the inevitable reaction in the minds of the American people to inexorable developments. Such an approach should not in the first instance include any specific proposals for settlement but it should be left that the United States

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‡For further analysis of the problem of timing see Addendum (opposite). [Footnote in the source text. Reference to the Addendum is presumably to the same document mentioned in footnote 11 above.]

would be pleased to hear any proposals for settlement that the Soviet Union might wish to make. Unless the Kremlin evidenced a genuine interest in securing settlements acceptable to the West, specific proposals by the West to this end would not appear worthwhile.

7. The approach outlined above might in some ways be more effective and run less danger of being interpreted as an ultimatum if it were done in the name of the outgoing President. By reason of his "emeritus" status President Truman could very properly appear in the role of an interpreter of the will of the American people while at the same time, in view of the fact that he will soon be relieved of responsibility as President of the United States, it would be clear that his approach could not be construed as an ultimatum. His doing it would help to enhance the sense of inevitableness of the course of events and the response of the American people thereto. If this approach were taken, it would, of course, be absolutely essential that the President-elect be fully aware of it and approve of it. As to timing, it would appear that the approach should not be made immediately after the test but perhaps should be left until the very end of President Truman's term, such as late December or early January.

8. If the approach suggested were to be undertaken at the instance of the new President, the warning would have a more foreboding quality inasmuch as it would come from the responsible head of the Government, presumably at the very peak of his support from the national electorate. This being so, in order to avoid the quality of an ultimatum, the approach might have to be considerably more gentle and would require even greater stress on the theme of inevitability.

9. Whether the foregoing suggestion commends itself or not as an action to be undertaken in the near future, it would seem that any attempt in the future to break the impasse between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and the rest of the Western world on the other, should be on a bilateral basis rather than through any UN Town Meeting approach. A bilateral approach does, of course, raise a thorny problem as to whether and in what manner the subject should be handled with Allies. Whether an early approach to the Soviet Union is indicated as a result of forthcoming thermonuclear events will require much careful study, but it would appear that in any event this Government should address itself most seriously to the question as to the form, content and timing of bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union to see whether any *modus vivendi* can be arrived at. Concurrently, in order to increase the deterrent value of these developments and to enhance our position of strength, civil defense measures along the

lines laid down in the Project East River [12] reports should be pressed with all vigor.

### Appendix "A"

## JOINT RELEASE

### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION [13]

The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission today announced Joint Task Force 132 will conduct tests in the autumn months of this year looking toward the development of atomic weapons. The tests will be held at the Commission's Pacific Proving Grounds on Eniwetok Atoll of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific. They will be conducted under full security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Only official observers of the United States Government and members of the task force will be present at the tests. The organization of Joint Task Force 132 under the command of Maj. General Percy W. Clarkson [14] was announced February 18, 1952.

### Appendix "B"

## STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In recent days Joint Task Force 132, operating for the Department of Defense and the United States Atomic Energy Commission has detonated an experimental device at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This detonation was one in our 1952 series which, like the 1951 series, looks toward further development of various types of weapons releasing the energy resulting from fission of heavy elements or fusion of light elements. The tests are being conducted under the full security restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act and no further facts on them will be issued.

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[12] See footnote 2, p. 20.

[13] This press release was issued on Sept. 9, 1952.

[14] Maj. Gen. Percy W. Clarkson, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Armed Forces, Pacific.

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Combined Policy Committee"

## *Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, October 9, 1952, 2:45 p.m.*[1]

TOP SECRET

Present:

*Members*

Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson

Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett

Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Dean

*By Invitation*

Robert LeBaron, Deputy to Secretary of Defense on Atomic Energy Matters

Col. Donald G. Williams, Department of Defense

John A. Hall, Atomic Energy Commission

*Secretary*

R. Gordon Arneson

### I. *Uranium Ore Policy*

Mr. Acheson referred to a letter from Mr. Dean to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, dated September 16, 1952, setting forth the Commission's view that a procurement goal of 12,500 tons of uranium oxide annually should be established. (Tab A)[2] Mr. Acheson stated that the ore procurement policy as set forth in this memorandum was concurred in by the Department of State. Mr. Lovett stated that it had the concurrence of the Department of Defense. It was *noted* that the policy as set forth would be the interim goal of the AEC pending the completion of the study which the Commission representative had agreed at the April 16, 1952 meeting[3] would be undertaken and that on conclusion of this study the goal would be reexamined. Mr. Dean reported that Mr. Robert Smith had been engaged by the Atomic Energy Commission to do the study and that the Commission would press forward with it as promptly as possible.

### II. *Report on Status of Present and Prospective Uranium Ore Production Programs*

At the request of Mr. Acheson, Mr. Dean reviewed the status of procurement programs in the various countries, both present and prospective. Mr. Dean's recital was along the general lines set forth in Tab B.[4] The following additional points were made:

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[1] Prepared by Arneson.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For the minutes of the meeting of Apr. 16, see p. 885.

A. *South Africa*

Mr. Dean stated that Commissioner Glennan[5] and Mr. Jesse Johnson[6] were at present in South Africa on the occasion of the opening of the first uranium plant. While the present production goal is 4,000 tons annually, Mr. Dean expressed the hope that it might be possible to raise this figure to 5,000 tons annually.

B. *Australia*[7]

Mr. Dean alluded to certain difficulties that had arisen in connection with the draft Rum Jungle Agreement, particularly an amendment proposed by the Australians which would establish a minimum price of $11.00 per pound. The Atomic Energy Commission intended to oppose this change on the ground that it would establish highly undesirable precedents in connection with earlier agreements, particularly with Belgium, South Africa and Canada. In fact, if the $11.00 minimum concept were accepted in the Rum Jungle contract and this proviso were extended to earlier agreements it would cost the United States some $30 million. Mr. Lovett agreed that we should strongly oppose the $11.00 minimum and suggested we might ask the United Kingdom to assist in holding the line. Mr. Dean reported that the British were equally opposed and were expected to lend us full support. Mr. Dean reported that the prospects were, provided the Rum Jungle arrangements were worked out satisfactorily, that we would be getting approximately 200 tons a year from Australia by 1954, a figure which would be raised to 400 tons by 1955 and continue at about that rate for the life of the agreements.

C. *Canada*

Mr. Dean reported that Mr. C. D. Howe[8] had recently been in Washington and that the Commission had gone to considerable lengths to impress Mr. Howe with the urgent need of the United States atomic energy program for increased tonnages of uranium. Mr. Howe had been shown the Fernald operation, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River. Mr. Howe was evidently impressed with the magnitude of the United States production program and had stated that he would do everything in his power to see that the Canadian contribution of ore would be increased to the maximum extent possible. Mr. Lovett reported that the Canadian Minister of Defense, Mr. Claxton,[9] had told him recently that Mr. Howe was indeed much impressed as a result of his visit with the need to get on with increased uranium production for the benefit of the United States atomic energy program.

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[4] Tab B, "Report on Status of Present and Prospective Uranium Ore Production Program," is not printed.

[5] T. Keith Glennan, Member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

[6] Jesse C. Johnson, Director of the Division of Raw Materials, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

[7] Documentation on the question of Australian uranium is located in file 843.2546 and in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Australia".

[8] Canadian Minister of Defence Production; also Minister of Trade and Commerce.

D. *Belgian Congo*

Mr. Dean reported that Commissioner Glennan and Mr. Johnson would be visiting Shinkolobwe in the course of their current trip. Deliveries of ore from the Congo had been low in the past two months. This was not, however, cause for concern inasmuch as the typical pattern seemed to be that while there was normally a fall-off in shipments in the autumn of each year the deficit was invariably made up in a rush of shipments before the end of the year. The Commission was anxious to talk with Mr. Sengier and Mr. Robilliart[10] on their arrival, currently scheduled for early November, as to the possibilities of securing the renewal of the 1944 Agreement.[11] While it was recognized that the current agreement would run until early 1956, it was felt that it was not too soon to give consideration to the possibilities and the conditions under which an extension might be worked out. Mr. Lovett stressed that Mr. Sengier was the person to talk to on this matter and suggested that the Commission might wish to explore with Mr. Sengier the possibilities of securing a temporary extension of the agreement or even an expression of intent to do so. It *was agreed* that the Commission should discuss this entire problem with Sengier on his arrival.

E. *Morocco*[12]

Mr. Dean reported that the Commission was not too happy about the provision in the draft Moroccan Agreement which provided that France would obtain twenty percent of the output for its own program. On balance, however, the Commission felt that it should go ahead, recognizing that it was inevitable that suppliers would wish to reserve certain quantities for their own programs. He remarked in this connection that a type precedent had, in fact, been established in the Australian Radium Hill Agreement which provided that United States takings would be governed by the Australian requirement that three years' reserve of ore should always remain in the ground to meet Australian needs. Mr. Lovett agreed that arrangements calculated to meet the requirements of the supplier nation might well be inescapable and stressed the desirability of a policy of preemptive buying which might make it necessary to accept such arrangements even though they were not ideal from our point of view.

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[9] Brooke Claxton.

[10] Edgar E. B. Sengier and Hermann Robilliart, ranking officials of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga.

[11] Reference is to the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium relating to uranium, Sept. 26, 1944; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 1029.

[12] Documentation on the question of Moroccan uranium is in file 871.2546 and in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "France" (also 57 D 688, "Morocco").

F. *Latin America*

Mr. Dean said that the Atomic Energy Commission felt it would need additional help from the Department of State in getting on with certain of the negotiations in Latin America. Mr. Acheson responded that the Department would be more than glad to do so. Mr. Arneson mentioned that steps were already being taken with the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to see whether certain of the negotiations might be reinvigorated. With respect to the monazite negotiations with Brazil, Mr. Dean reported that the Commission felt it would be able to meet Brazilian wishes in connection with the return of small quantities of uranium found in the thorium sludges. On balance, the Commission was optimistic that negotiations could be satisfactorily concluded on monazite and thorium. With respect to uranium exploration program in Brazil, it seemed clear that the Brazilians were not prepared to take this matter up in any vigorous way until the monazite-thorium negotiations had been successfully completed. One of the difficulties in getting on with the uranium aspect of the negotiations, apart from the priority of the monazite-thorium problem, was the fact that Brazil had not organized any effective exploration program and seemed rather reluctant to accept assistance in this regard.

G. *The United States*

Mr. Dean reported that 800 tons were expected out of the Colorado plateau in the current year and that the return would rise to more than a thousand tons annually by 1954. Mr. LeBaron commented that in his trip through the Colorado plateau area he was struck by the shortage of drilling equipment and in general a lack of sense of urgency on the part of the people on the ground. He had the impression that with a greater amount of effort the output in this area might be increased five-fold. Mr. Dean stated that there were many details concerning the Colorado plateau operation which would have to be in hand before the Committee could make a useful judgment as to the desirability and the means whereby output could be increased. He suggested that the Commission should supply an analysis of this situation.* As to the phosphate situation, Mr. Dean stated that the Commission has developed processes for the extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid produced in connection with commercial operations for phosphate chemicals and phosphate fertilizers. These processes have been proven by pilot plant operations and are expected to provide uranium at a reasonable cost—on the order of $15.00 to $18.00 per pound of $U_3O_8$. One full-scale plant is in production and several others are being built. Negotiations are underway for the construction of additional plants.

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*See Tab C. [Footnote in the source text. Tab C, a memorandum dated Oct. 27, 1952, from Dean to Arneson, concerning the increase in the amount of uranium coming from the Colorado Plateau, is not printed.]

By-product production is limited by the amount of phosphoric acid produced in connection with commercial operations. Based upon presently operating facilities, and additional facilities which are planned by industry, available uranium production from this source is expected to be on the order of 300 tons per year by 1955 and may be increased to around 400 tons by 1958 to 1960. As to recovery of uranium from shales, the Commission considered this to be a very unlikely project. Present estimates would indicate that the cost per pound of recovered uranium would be on the order of $60.00. Research, however, was continuing on shales. The Committee shared the view of the Commission that this did not seem to be a profitable line of development.

H. *Portugal* [13]

Mr. Arneson reported that our Ambassador, Mr. Cannon, [14] had raised with the Foreign Minister the question whether operations could be expanded and an intensive prospection program undertaken. In the absence of Salazar [15] who was away on vacation, the Foreign Minister was quite noncommittal. Ambassador Cannon was expected back in the United States momentarily and opportunity would be found to discuss the problem with him further. Mr. Acheson recalled that he had discussed this problem with Mr. Salazar on the occasion of the Lisbon NATO meetings. [16] He had found Salazar was not particularly anxious to accede to a program of greater exploitation of Portuguese uranium resources. He had the impression that Salazar would be content to leave the ore in the ground against the day that it might fetch a higher price. It *was agreed* that the problem of Portuguese negotiations should be discussed afresh with Ambassador Cannon as soon as possible to determine how best to proceed.

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K. *Spain* [17]

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[13] Documentation regarding uranium in Portugal is in file 853.2546 and in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Portugal".

[14] Cavendish W. Cannon.

[15] Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Premier of Portugal.

[16] For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon Feb. 20-25, 1952, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.

[17] Documentation on Spanish uranium is in file 852.2546 and in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Spain".

Mr. Arneson reported that Assistant Secretary Perkins had discussed with Ambassador MacVeagh[18] recently in London the question of timing of an approach to the Spaniards. The consensus of their view was the status of military negotiations and of MSA negotiations should not stand in the way of uranium negotiations and that an approach could be made whenever the Commission desired to do so.

III. *Proposed Military Inspection of Chief Uranium Mining Areas of the World*

Referring to his letter of August 11, 1952 (Tab D),[19] Mr. Lovett said that the question here was whether any additional stimulation of the sort suggested in the letter would be useful at this time. He suggested that a collateral purpose of a military inspection would be to examine into security problems in the various areas. Mr. Dean said that he had considerable misgiving as to the efficacy of such a trip in increasing uranium production. He felt that such a trip might have an adverse effect on negotiations that were continuing, some of which were on a particularly personal basis as with Messrs. Sengier and Robilliart and quite delicate as in the case of the Australian negotiations. Mr. Lovett recalled that the original proposal had been confined to the Congo, Canada, and South Africa. With respect to the Congo, Mr. Acheson pointed out that the Belgians were most sensitive about having visitors to the Congo and that this would militate against the proposal.

Mr. Arneson reported that Ambassador Cowen,[20] as a result of a considerable incursion of United States officials into the Congo from other agencies, had strongly recommended recently that future trips be very carefully screened to avoid arousing the sensitivities of Belgian and Congo officials. As to Canada, Mr. Lovett felt the recent visit of Mr. Howe had accomplished the needed objectives and that there was no need for a military inspection trip to Canada at this time. Concerning the Union of South Africa, Mr. Dean said the Commission felt the Glennan-Johnson trip would serve a very useful purpose in stimulating even greater effort on the part of the South Africans, particularly on the part of the mining interests whose wholehearted cooperation was essential. Mr. Acheson stated that from the political point of view it would seem most untimely to consider any such trip to the Union of South Africa. He alluded to the difficulties the United States would have with South Africa in the forthcoming General Assembly. Mr.

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[18] Lincoln MacVeagh, U.S. Ambassador in Spain.

[19] Tab D, a letter from Lovett to Acheson concerning a possible military inspection of uranium ore sources, is not printed.

[20] Myron M. Cowen, U.S. Ambassador in Belgium.

Lovett concluded that from the recital that Mr. Dean had given earlier it seemed apparent that events had overtaken the suggestion for a military inspection trip and in his view such a trip involved excessive risk without profit. This view was concurred in by the other members.

IV. *Security in Raw Materials Producing Countries*

Mr. Acheson recalled that under NSC 29 [21] the Department of State was given responsibility for coordinating plans and activities designed to improve industrial security in those facilities situated in foreign countries which were of strategic importance to the United States. He suggested that it would be useful if the Atomic Energy Commission, with its direct relations with the uranium producing countries and the mining interests involved, could prepare a report of the status of industrial security in the areas of interest to them. If such report were prepared and made available to the Department of State, arrangements could then be worked out to see what further steps needed to be taken, . . . . Such report would be particularly helpful if it contained the AEC views as to the need for additional security measures. Mr. Dean stated that the Commission would be glad to prepare such report and work with the Department of State in carrying the project forward. In this connection he said that the Commission was concerned about the dangers that might exist in the calcining plant in South Africa. . . .

R. GORDON ARNESON

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[21] NSC 29, "Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries", Aug. 26, 1948, is not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 29 Series)

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy"

## *Memorandum for the Files by R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1952.

Subject: Time of Thermonuclear Test

Prior to taking up other aspects of thermonuclear developments at a meeting in his office at 4 p. m. Thursday, October 9,[1] the Secretary inquired as to the exact status of timing of the thermonuclear test this Autumn. Secretary Lovett said that the President had asked him to see to it that the situation develops in such a way that the test did not take place until after November 4. Mr. Acheson inquired whether this view had been expressed to Mr. Lovett after the two of them had seen the President.[2] Mr. Lovett responded that this was the case and went on that what the President had in mind was that arrangements should be made for slowing up deliveries of equipment or some other technical obstacle be found to prevent the test from taking place before the election. The President wanted Mr. Lovett to get word to Mr. Dean to make sure that this would be taken care of. Mr. Dean said that no machinery to accomplish this objective had yet been set up. He had thought that inasmuch as General Clarkson, the Task Force commander, was responsible to General Collins it might prove necessary to work through that channel. Mr. Lovett pointed out, however, that the President wanted this to be done without the generation of any official documents. This, he went on, virtually necessitated using some channel other than the military. The President had asked Mr. Lovett when they talked last about this as to who would inform General Clarkson that all technical arrangements had been finalized. Mr. Lovett had said that this would be Dr. Graves.[3] The President thereupon commented that the matter should be taken care of through Gordon Dean who could give the necessary instructions to Dr. Graves. Finally, Mr. Lovett said that the President wanted to be informed when the necessary arrangements had been made. In conclusion it was left that Mr. Dean would take the necessary steps to see that the President's wishes were met.[4]

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[1] For the memorandum covering the major portion of the meeting, see *infra*.

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[2] The meeting under reference has not been identified.

[3] Dr. Alvin C. Graves, Scientific Director, Pacific Proving Grounds.

[4] The detonation of the thermonuclear device at the Eniwetok test site took place as originally scheduled on Oct. 31, 1952, local time, Nov. 1 Washington time. The reasons for the President's request for postponement and for the decision to proceed with the test as scheduled have not been clearly established on the basis of documentation in Department of State files or the Truman Library. The events preceding the test are described in Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 590–592, and in Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1956), pp. 313–314.

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## *Memorandum for the Files by R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

### MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL HELD IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Thursday, October 9, 1952, 4 p. m.

Present:

Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson

Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Dean
James Lay, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff
R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to Secretary of State

Mr. Acheson felt that the Special Committee should examine the question whether there was any action the United States might wish to take vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on the occasion of, or as a result of the forthcoming thermonuclear test. No specific proposals had been formulated, and, indeed, he was not inclined himself to advocate an approach, but he thought that the forthcoming event was of sufficient significance to warrant taking the time of the Special Committee to consider whether there were any actions which should be taken. His own view in thinking about the problem was that the Soviet Union had not in the past been under any compulsion to agree to effective international control of atomic energy: they had been quite content with a situation of no control. He had not been able to discover any new element in the forthcoming event which would change this situation. He felt that when the United States possessed a thermonuclear capability the Soviet Union would not be particularly troubled but would simply work toward the day when it, too, would have thermonuclear weapons in its arsenal and thereby in a position to inflict great damage on the United States in the event of war. While a thermonuclear test would represent a significant event, he did not feel that the possession of thermonuclear weapons in the hands of both the United States and the USSR would radically alter the damage that might ensue in the event of war. To be sure, the same damage could be done perhaps with fewer sorties but that no new order of magnitude of devastation was necessarily involved. While his own conclusions were along the lines he had indicated, he felt nevertheless the problem should be brought to the attention of his colleagues. He asked Mr. Nitze to expand somewhat further on the possibilities that had been thought about.

Mr. Nitze said that one of the suggestions that had been heard was that an attempt should be made to get an agreement from the Soviet Union to have a moratorium on further tests. It took only superficial analysis to conclude that such a proposal would not be to the advantage of the United States inasmuch as in all probability even if the Soviet Union were to agree to such a moratorium they would doubtless proceed in every way possible short of tests to improve their thermonuclear as well as atomic position against the day they were prepared to violate the moratorium. This would put the United States at a distinct disadvantage inasmuch as it would, in all probability, live up to the terms of the moratorium. A rather more complicated possibility was then examined. Perhaps the moratorium idea could be coupled with an agreement for disclosure and verification along the lines that had been advanced in the United Nations. An examination of this possibility indicated that such an arrangement would be to the advantage of the United States inasmuch as the moratorium would then have teeth in it and could be presumably enforced, or at minimum, notice of violation could be had. However, when one examined the chances of Soviet acceptance of such a proposal, the likelihood seemed very dim indeed. In this connection Mr. Nitze said one then had to analyze whether the chances of Soviet acceptance would be better if the approach were made before or after the test. He had found it difficult to see that there would be any net advantage one way or the other. Moreover, an attempt to negotiate this proposition out prior to a test ran the very serious danger that the Soviets would stall indefinitely thereby delaying our thermonuclear tests. In conclusion, therefore, an analysis along the lines indicated would appear to make any proposal for an approach to the Soviet Union at this time or in the near future highly dubious. The Department felt, however, that the matter should be discussed.

Mr. Lovett responded most energetically to the matter that had been raised. He felt that any such idea should be immediately put out of mind and that any papers that might exist on the subject should be destroyed. He was deeply troubled that this was the kind of thing that might very well be traced back to fellows like Dr. Oppenheimer whose motivations in these matters were suspect. He thought it would be most unfortunate if any word of this subject leaked out and if Oppenheimer's name were linked with it in any way because he was afraid that there might soon be some adverse developments with respect to Oppenheimer. He stated that he and Mr. Dean had recently been discussing the doubts that had arisen about Oppenheimer's motivations and what to do about it.

Mr. Dean felt that the forthcoming test was a very significant event and felt that it might be used as an occasion to renew our efforts to secure international control of atomic energy and regulation and reduction of armaments generally. In response to a question from Mr. Nitze, Mr. Dean acknowledged that such a move would be designed primarily for propaganda purposes.

Mr. Arneson expressed the view that any proposal for an approach to the Soviets had to be viewed in the light of the basic analysis of NSC-68 which had been periodically reaffirmed in subsequent NSC studies. That analysis stated that it was unlikely that meaningful negotiations could be had with the Soviet Union unless and until the Soviets found that failure to agree to settlements placed them in an untenable position. As regards international control of atomic energy, it was clear that the Soviets had refused effective international control for two basic reasons: (1) effective control would exact too high a price, i.e., would cause an irreparable breach of the iron curtain, and (2) the Soviets did not find the absence of international control an unacceptable situation. It did not appear that a forthcoming thermonuclear test would in any way change the negotiating situation. One might consider whether negotiations could be more favorably considered when the United States had thermonuclear weapons in being and an effective deliverability capability.

Mr. Dean referred to the recommendations that had been made by the PSB concerning public announcements of the Ivy series. He felt that the proposal not to say anything about the first test in the series unless forced to by imminence of a leak was unrealistic and that it probably would be necessary to volunteer some statement concerning this first test as soon as it was over. Mr. Lovett, on the other hand, expressed opposition to saying anything about the thermonuclear aspect of the Ivy series and stated he was not in agreement with the recommendations of the PSB. Mr. Acheson stated that it was evident that this matter required reconsideration and that this should be done. Mr. Lay agreed that he would call together the appropriate representatives from the three agencies to take another look at the problem.

The meeting rose at 4:45 p.m.

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G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy"

## *Memorandum for the File, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Arneson)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1952.

Subject: Advance Notification to the United Kingdom and Canada of United States Atomic Tests

By memorandum of October 13, 1952 [1] I requested the views of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on the question whether the United Kingdom and Canada should be given advance notification of the forthcoming Ivy series along the lines of notification previously given for earlier test series. By memorandum dated October 15 [1] from Mr. LeBaron I was informed that the Secretary of Defense concurred in the proposed advance notification. On October 22 I met with Acting Chairman Smyth and Commissioners Murray and Glennan to discuss in detail the various problems presented by the proposal. It was the consensus of the meeting, after some discussion, that I should proceed with the advance notification on the Ivy series as in the past. I pointed out that my general advance notification to the British and the Canadians would be followed at a later date by more precise notification through AFOAT channels of the exact time of the shots and of the meteorological conditions existing at the time in order to facilitate British and Canadian interception of the clouds. No objection was raised in the meeting to this follow-up procedure, it being recognized that such information was operationally necessary in carrying out technical cooperation in Area 5 under the *modus vivendi.* [2] By memorandum dated October 23 from Mr. Hall [3] I was informed that the Commission concurred in the proposal for advance notification with "the suggestion that the United Kingdom could be informed in the near future that the Ivy test is planned for the early part of November."

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[1] Not printed. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy")

Following on these concurrences I informed Mr. Eddie Tomkins, British Secretary of the CPC, and Mr. George Ignatieff, Canadian Secretary of the CPC, of the forthcoming Ivy tests along the following lines:

1. The forthcoming tests would be two in number.
2. The test series was scheduled to begin early in November. The exact time would be in large measure dependent on weather conditions which tended to be quite uncertain at this time of the year in the Eniwetok area.
3. The procedure followed in the past, namely notification as to exact time and attendant meteorological conditions, would be forthcoming in due course through AFOAT channels.
4. No inkling was given, or asked, as to the nature of either shot.

The notification as set forth above was given to the two named individuals orally on the afternoon of Friday, October 24, 1952.

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[2] For text of the *modus vivendi*, see the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, Jan. 7, 1948, in *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, p. 679.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Panel of Consultants on Disarmament"

## *Memorandum by the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [New York, undated.]

### A Draft Summary of the Line of Argument Agreed on November 15th [1952] at a Partial Meeting of the Panel in New York City

A. *As a nation we have got into a position such that it is hardly thinkable for us to undertake any serious effort to limit the arms race—or even to moderate our own dependence upon an unlimited use of the largest possible weapons.* We are committed to the development of ever more powerful weapons; both the precedent of 1945 and our own present public national position commit us to the use of such weapons where necessary in the event of hostile aggression. By federal law, we are committed to a policy of noncooperation and unilateral decision in all of these matters of atomic energy. More and more, both in our grand strategy and in our specific effort to defend the continent of Europe, we are dependent upon our prowess in the field of weapons of mass destruction. And finally, it seems at least possible that military considerations will require us, in the event of war, to launch our massive attack with a rapidity and violence that will make all previous examples of "total war" seem pale and incomplete.

B. *The contest in producing weapons of mass destruction is proceeding grimly at an ever more rapid pace.* The atomic bomb, in itself, is a weapon of a new order of destructive power. What is less well understood is that it is a weapon of such a character that once any nation knows how to make an atomic bomb, it can expect the total destructive force of its stockpile to multiply at a quite extraordinary rate of speed. The rate of growth of the American stockpile has been startling, and there is no reason to suppose that a similar development is not occurring in the Soviet Union. This is true when we consider simply the rate of expansion of the supplies of fissionable material; the point becomes still sharper if in addition we bear in mind the possibilities of weapons with a thermonuclear, or a biochemical, component. In the end it even becomes necessary to consider the unmeasured but real possibility of a contamination of the atmosphere. The destructive power of atomic stockpiles is of a wholly new order, and in this sense it creates a new and fearful connection between the United States and the U.S.S.R. We seem to be moving toward a situation in which each of the two great powers may have the capacity to wreck the society of the other. Without venturing to predict whether or not, in such a world, catastrophe might be averted by the fear of retaliation, the panel is persuaded that life in such conditions would be inevitably shadowed by fear and anguish compared to which our present troubles would seem light indeed.

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[1] Drafting information and distribution is not indicated on the unsigned source text.

C. *Yet the Panel has not tried to sketch a full and workable scheme for safety—or even to decide whether it can be national policy to work for the adoption of any such scheme.* (Here it may be necessary to explain briefly how we distinguish a "full and workable" scheme from the sort of proposals made in the United Nations thus far—and to remark that we have tried to sketch for our own use some outline of the balance of considerations as it now stands.) We are persuaded that these questions can have no fixed answer, for the outlines of what it seems wise to work for can change rapidly as time passes. Moreover, the proper shape of a scheme for arms control—even in the light of the grim prospect sketched above—must depend on a full estimate of national policy and not simply upon a study of the contest in armaments. So a judgment on this matter would in reality take the Panel beyond its assignment.

D. *This Panel does not think that either the Soviet danger or the great effort to establish a collective defense in the free world is unimportant.* On the contrary, it believes that there is pressing urgency in guarding against the one by doing all we can to develop and strengthen the other. Much of the strength of the United States and her allies must currently come from weapons of mass destruction. Nor is there anything remote or trifling in the problems suggested by such words as Berlin, Korea, Iran, and Indo-China—to say nothing of the Saar, Trieste, Suez, and Kashmir.

E. *Still, the Panel has not been able to persuade itself that this double goal is sufficient; in its view the character of the arms race is such that policy should be based on three points and not two; the meaning of armaments should be placed fully on a level with the menace of the Soviet Union and the urgency of the defense of the free world.* This is exceedingly difficult, for there are many kinds of activity which serve one concern while damaging another—and in some cases it is quite impossible to give full weight to all three. On the other hand, we believe that there are several important steps which can be of real and general value in such a three-point policy and our only firm conclusions relate to six steps of this kind. These conclusions are firm enough to make up for our hesitation in other matters.

F. *In the light of these considerations, we reach the following conclusions:*

1. *There is need for candor about the arms race.* The Government should adopt a policy of candor about the character of major weapons, their expanding rate of production, and the enormous and important fact that they are possessed by both sides. There is need for candor both within the Government and outside it—to our people in general and to all responsible officers of the Government in particular. This means that a very much wider circle of officals should know about the arms race, think about it, and talk about it.

2. *There is need for a focusing of responsibility in the Government for both thought and action.* All major decisions and plans for the development and use of armaments, and all deliberations about their regulation, should have the same care and consideration which are now given to the largest aspects of our resistance to Soviet expansionism and our efforts to organize the free world. Neither plans for strategic bombardment, at one extreme, nor details of disarmament proposals, at the other, should be left to agencies of limited and specialized responsibility. Nor should large decisions in other fields be taken without a full awareness of their meaning with respect to armaments.

3. *There is need for a wholly new order of effort in defending the North American continent against weapons of mass destruction.* The arms race, in our view, carries enormous dangers to the whole of American policy through the fact that the U.S.S.R. may soon be able to strike a crippling blow against the United States. Such a development would have the gravest kind of adverse effect on all our policies, and we believe that there is urgent need for a major effort to strengthen our continental defense. We would emphasize that one great way to reduce the danger of all weapons is to reduce their effectiveness. There is probably no complete safety in continental defense, but the more that we can get, the better. This is something that can be done even while real arms regulation seems unattainable—and the Panel also believes that each improvement in continental defense may make it less necessary to insist on totally ironclad schemes of arms regulation.

4. *There is need for a gradual abandonment of the initiative in advancing new proposals for disarmament through the United Nations.* We find with regret that the policy of advancing proposals for disarmament through the United Nations is losing its usefulness. These proposals seem almost inevitably unreal, framed as they are without any real hope that the Russians will accept them. They seem to suggest that there is available as a real possibility a world of full safety and peace—and this is not really the case at the present. While recognizing that it will not be possible to change our tack suddenly or without preparation, the Panel believes that precisely because the problem of arms regulation is so important it should not now be handled by public discussion in commissions of the United Nations. Of course the United States cannot prevent others from advancing their proposals, but the Panel believes that

it can use its right to analyze and comment on any such proposals to clarify the fact that these discussions do not at present really serve the common cause.

5. *There is need for a new level of understanding with our major allies on the meaning of atomic armaments.* The Panel is persuaded that it is important to get a better understanding with our allies on atomic problems. (This view is generally shared in the Department of State, and so it will probably not be useful to press our reasoning here. Our view of course is that there is need for a common approach to such problems as using atomic weapons in Europe and planning for a possible scheme of adjustment in which the danger of these weapons might be reduced; we are also concerned with the broad objective of holding the free world together.)

6. *There is need for increased attention to the possibilities that may be found in serious communication with the U.S.S.R.* The Panel believes that one of the central difficulties in all our policy is a fearful ignorance of Russian capabilities and intentions—and that some of our gravest dangers lie in the possibility that Soviet leaders may misread the realities of the arms race and of our own determination. We think that the United States has the diplomatic skills to open serious and significant conversations bearing on such problems, and we believe that even if such conversations should not develop at present into any real negotiations (which may well be impossible), they would bring us much important information and perhaps decrease the likelihood of a disastrous miscalculation on either side.

G. *The Panel is uncomfortably aware that its conclusions are none of them easy to execute—and that in the view of many they are highly debatable.* While the Panel is in no position to assess the strength of any opposition to the views it has expressed, it seems important to observe that it may be better that proposals of this kind should be ignored than that they should be raised at a time and in a manner such that they could only be rejected with a net loss to the general view which the Panel holds. This does not mean that all difficult courses are undesirable—or that in the view of the Panel the true test of any policy is its current popularity in the Government. But we are a panel of consultants, and we must recognize that what we urge must be weighed against other realities than those which it has been our assignment to consider.

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy"

## *United States Atomic Energy Commission Press Release* [1]

No. 456 WASHINGTON, November 16, 1952.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION [2]

Joint Task Force 132, operating for the Department of Defense and the United States Atomic Energy Commission, has concluded the third series of weapons development tests at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Like the Greenhouse series 1951, it was designed to further the development of various types of weapons. In furtherance of the President's announcement of January 31, 1950, [3] the test program included experiments contributing to thermonuclear weapons research.

Scientific executives for the tests have expressed satisfaction with the results. The leaders and members of the military and civilian components of the Task Force have accomplished a remarkable feat of precision in planning and operations and have the commendation of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

In the presence of threats to the peace of the world and in the absence of effective and enforceable arrangements for the control of armaments, the United States Government must continue its studies looking toward the development of these vast energies for the defense of the free world. At the same time, this Government is pushing with wide and growing success its studies directed toward utilizing these energies for the productive purposes of mankind.

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[1] A notation on the source text reads: "For immediate release Sunday, November 16, 1952."

[2] In a memorandum of Nov. 12, NSC Executive Secretary Lay informed AEC Chairman Dean that the President had that day approved the issuance of this announcement. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, "Ivy") The hydrogen bomb test had occurred on Nov. 1, Washington time.

[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 141.

Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Chron"

## *Report Prepared by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1952.

### STATUS REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION [2]

*1. Establishment of the Disarmament Commission*

General Assembly Resolution 502(VI) of January 11, 1952 [3] established the United Nations Disarmament Commission to take the place of the existing United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The Disarmament Commission is composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada, and is directed by this resolution to prepare draft proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties for submission to a conference of all states, concerning: (i) regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; (ii) elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; (iii) effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, with the present United Nations plan being used as the basis for the Commission's considerations until a better or no less effective plan is devised; (iv) progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic, this problem to be considered as a first task; (v) methods for fixing over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and armaments, and for determining the allocation within their respective military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments; (vi) the establishment of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty or treaties; (vii) an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament program.

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[1] The source text is accompanied by a covering memorandum by David W. Wainhouse, Director of UNP, to Arthur C. Nagle, Acting Chief of the Policy Reports Staff, dated Nov. 26, which reads as follows: "The attached report is submitted in accordance with your request for a summary of the status of the Disarmament Commission's work, for use as a briefing document for Mr. Dulles." John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State on Jan. 21, 1953. For documentation on the foreign policy aspects of the transition of administrations in January 1953, see vol. I, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.

[2] More detailed information on this subject is contained in Department of State position paper SD/A/C.1/393/Rev.1, "Regulation, Limitation and Balanced reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments: Report of the Disarmament Commission", comprising 20 pages, and dated Oct. 3, 1952. The position paper was prepared as guidance for the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly which opened on Oct. 14. (IO files, lot 71 D 440) The delegation discussed disarmament at its third meeting, Oct. 16. (IO files, lot 71 D 440, "Delegation Minutes") The subject, however, was not addressed by the General Assembly until early 1953.

[3] See the editorial note, p. 845.

### 2. *Disarmament Commission Activities from Establishment Until Present*

The Commission held its first meeting on February 4, 1952, and carried on its discussions with considerable regularity throughout the year until the opening of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly. During its meetings, the Commission considered the following working papers:

(a) "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of All Armed Forces and All Armaments, Including Atomic" (UN Doc. DC/C.2/1, April 5, 1952). [4]

(b) "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program" (UN Doc. DC/C.1/1, April 24, 1952) setting forth objectives and principles to guide the Disarmament Commission.[5]

(c) "Proposals for Fixing Numerical Limitation of all Armed Forces" (UN Doc. DC/10, May 28, 1952), suggesting possible levels of armed forces for the five Great Powers with negotiated ceilings for all other states having substantial military power.[6]

(d) "Supplement to Numerical Limitation Paper" (UN Doc. DC/12, August 12, 1952), suggesting procedures for working out ceilings on armed forces and the armaments to support these forces.[7]

(e) "Summary of United States Proposals for Elimination of Bacterial Weapons in Connection with Elimination of all Major Weapons Adaptable to Mass Destruction" (UN Doc. DC/15, September 4, 1952).[8]

All these papers were submitted by the United States, individually or, as in the case of the numerical limitations paper and its supplement, jointly with the UK and France. Most of the other members of the Commission, while advancing views for discussion, did not present formal papers.

The Soviet Union continued to insist upon its often-rejected proposals for one-third reduction of armed forces and armaments by the Big Five; a "paper" prohibition of atomic weapons through a mere declaration these weapons should be prohibited, with prohibition to be effective at the same time as the institution of agreed controls over that prohibition; disclosure only of official data on armed forces and armaments; and inspection on a "continuing basis" but with no right to "interfere in the domestic affairs of states." [9] The USSR also charged that the United States was using

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[4] See footnote 1, p. 872.

[5] See the editorial note, p. 895.

[6] See footnote 2, p. 954.

[7] See the second editorial note, p. 989.

[8] See the editorial note, p. 994.

[9] For the Soviet draft resolution "Measures to Combat the Threat of a New World War and to Strengthen Peace and Friendship Among the Nations", UN doc. A/C.1/

*Continued*

bacteriological warfare in Korea and China, and called for prohibition of BW and ratification of the 1925 Geneva BW Protocol.[10]

### *3. Future Work of the Disarmament Commission*

Subject to a possible reevaluation of our policy with respect to disarmament negotiations, it is the current estimate of the Department, concurred in by Defense, that the United States should continue efforts in the Disarmament Commission or elsewhere as appropriate, to obtain, if possible, some agreement with the Soviet Union on Disarmament. At the present, disarmament activities return little but propaganda benefits but these are sufficiently large, in our estimate, to warrant continuation of our efforts in the Disarmament Commission. There are two basic motivations for such activity: (a) the need to demonstrate that a door is open to the Soviet Union to reach accommodation with the West in this important security field, through peaceful means; (b) the strong popular desire for disarmament among the peoples of the Free World which requires that we show by concrete proposals the desire of the Western governments to relieve them of the burdens of armament by attaining security through safeguarded reduction of armed forces and armaments.

In the Disarmament Commission, while avoiding where possible "freezing" positions, the United States should concentrate efforts on basic principles and concepts of the plans which the Commission has been directed to work out, and should attempt to induce the Commission to avoid over-immersement in details. It should be made clear that the United States believes the best approach to achieve disarmament is by practical negotiations, not by abstract formulae, and that attempts should not be made to fill out details until the Soviets affirm their willingness to negotiate, which they have not done yet. With this in mind, in the coming year, the U.S. might present working papers on some of the following topics, presently under study by the Department of State Disarmament staff in conjunction with other agencies:

Technical safeguards (military and industrial); co-relationship between principal components of a comprehensive disarmament pro-

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698, Jan. 12, 1952, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* vol. I, p. 340. For the Soviet draft plan of work introduced in the Disarmament Commission, Mar. 19, 1952 (UN doc. DC/4/Rev. 1), see *ibid.*, p. 344.

[10] For the Soviet proposal "Consideration of the Question of the Impermissibility of the Use of Bacterial Weapons," Aug. 27, 1952 (UN doc. DC/13/Rev. 1), see *ibid.*, p. 381. For text of the Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, see 94 *League of Nations Treaty Series*, p. 65, or *Disarmament and Security, A Collection of Documents 1919–1955:* Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament (Committee Print), 84th Cong., 2d sess. (Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 169.

gram; establishment of international control organs; identification of major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; certain military-political problems relevant to establishing numerical ceilings on all armed forces; distribution of permitted armed forces within national military establishments; means of determining standard armaments to support permitted armed forces; treatment of violations.

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## *Editorial Note*

On December 1, James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, transmitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, enclosing a list of "Atomic Energy Policies Approved by the President on Recommendation of the National Security Council or its Special Committee". Lay's memorandum indicated that the list had been prepared, with the approval of President Truman, for the information of President-elect Eisenhower. Lay's memorandum and the attached 20-page list are in G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, box 565.

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Chron"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Bernhard G. Bechhoefer* [1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 5, 1952.

Subject: Disarmament—Control of Atomic Energy

Participants: Ambassador Cohen
Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, Department of State Consultant
M. Jules Moch, French Representative
M. Jacques Tine, French Embassy
Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, State Department Adviser on Atomic Energy
Mr. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, U.S. Delegation

At a lunch on December 3 in Ambassador Cohen's suite, Vanderbilt Hotel, M. Moch reiterated a number of views which he had previously expressed either in public or to Ambassador Cohen in discussions in connection with the work of the Disarmament Commission.

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[1] Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs, Department of State; member of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly.

According to the dateline of the source text, this memorandum was drafted on Dec. 5 and typed on Dec. 6.

He stated that he had no doubt that the dominant motive of the Soviet Union was to control the entire world and that the Soviet Union would use the most devious techniques to accomplish its objectives. He inferred that the present stress on rearmament in Europe was playing into the hands of the Soviet Union. He stated that without question the living conditions in the Soviet Union had materially improved since 1945. He further stated that the present Five-Year Plan placed greater stress on consumer goods and that if the present objectives were attained, the standard of living in the Soviet Union in 1956 might be as high as in Western Europe. In that event, it would be difficult to keep Western Europe non-communistic. He, therefore, felt that less stress should be placed upon armaments and more stress upon improving living conditions in Western Europe.

Ambassador Cohen wondered if M. Moch's interpretation of the objectives of the Five-Year Plan were sound. He showed M. Moch an article in the *Reporter* which analyzed the Five-Year Plan and came to the opposite conclusions, i.e., the new Five-Year Plan continued to place greater stress upon arms than upon bread and butter.

M. Moch pointed out that the present emphasis on rearmament of necessity was leading Western Europe to permit the rearmament of Western Germany. He stated that he would personally vote against and oppose any move which permitted the rearmament of Western Germany and he doubted whether more than one-third of the deputies would support such a move.

M. Moch suggested that the time might be ripe for bringing forward a new atomic energy plan which would avoid the concept of international ownership that had been so distasteful to the Soviet Union. He stated that as an international socialist he personally strongly favored international ownership of atomic energy installations. However, control of atomic energy through continuous inspection might be adequate and might be acceptable to the Soviet Union. He believed that the Soviet Union had made a significant change in its policies through agreeing to "continuous inspection" of atomic installations. Ambassador Cohen and Dr. Oppenheimer both took issue with M. Moch on this subject. Ambassador Cohen pointed out that we had made it perfectly clear to the Soviet Union both in a statement in the Disarmament Commission and informally, that we attached no magical significance to the term "ownership". Nevertheless, we had no responses to our overtures and the Soviet Union refused even to discuss what it meant by "continuous inspection".

Dr. Oppenheimer stated that if our sole important difference on control of atomic energy centered on the problem of ownership, he would have few worries. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was quite prepared to continue their existing policies of building up stockpiles of fissionable materials without any international supervision. The crux of the matter was that the Soviet Union was unable to accept a friendly solution of the armament problem which would pierce the Iron Curtain.

Dr. Oppenheimer indicated that he had no easy solution for the armament problems. The one thing, of which he personally was certain however, was that realistic negotiations for disarmament could not be successfully carried out in the United Nations. It would be impossible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to introduce into the United Nations any proposal which would have the effect of even slightly diminishing their security. In other words, each United States proposal must help us from a security standpoint more than it helps the Soviet Union; and any Soviet proposal must help the Soviet Union more than it helps us. With such an approach, there is no possibility of agreement. He felt that if we could come to grips with this problem at all, it will be through a forum that is not exposed to the public gaze. Even secret discussions in the United Nations would be unsatisfactory since the only assurance of a secrecy which the United Nations can give is limited both in extent and from the standpoint of time.

M. Moch brought up the question of adequacy of the United Nations atomic energy plan in the light of recent developments in the field of thermodynamics. Dr. Oppenheimer assured M. Moch that this development had been foreseen and taken into consideration at the time that the United States originally proposed the plan. Therefore, this factor would not affect the plan.

Dr. Oppenheimer admitted that the present plan was not entirely artistic or logical or feasible. However, he pointed out that the plan emerged from an international situation which was far less tense than that existing body. If today we should decide to attempt to produce a new plan, because of existing international tension, it would be far less artistic and far less adequate than the old plan.

M. Moch referred to the draft treaty which he had prepared the past winter and repeated that this treaty represented the policy of the French Government. Ambassador Cohen and Dr. Oppenheimer both agreed with M. Moch that at some time it would be necessary to indicate the exact stage in disarmament when we would cease to produce atomic weapons and when we would dispose of existing stockpiles of weapons and existing fissionable material. However, it would be next to impossible to propose a treaty suggesting the exact sequence of events in connection with such processes, until we had at least some idea of the type of approach to the problem that would be satisfactory to both the Soviet Union and to Western democracies.

M. Moch recited with great pride his own achievements in resisting communism in France. When he became Minister of the Interior, the Ministry was riddled with communists and the security forces, upon which he could place reliance, were few and weak. He recalled that in the first week, when he was Minister of the Interior, the communist trade unions called a general strike. He arranged for technicians from the Navy to take over and operate the power plants and subways in Paris. However, he purposely avoided actually taking over the power plants and subways until the communist newspapers had gone to press. Therefore, the morning after the strike had been called, the average Parisian was confronted with the following situation. He was sold a communist newspaper which had headlines "Paris has not electricity, nor subways". After purchasing the communist newspaper, the average Parisian would then notice that the electric lights were operating and would go down into the subway and find the subways also in operation. He said that this dramatic episode destroyed the threat of the strike.

M. Moch indicated that he would return to France next week and probably would not be present when the General Assembly finally got around to dealing with the disarmament problem. He seemed to be extremely gratified to have the opportunity to discuss problems in connection with atomic energy on a frank and informal basis with Dr. Oppenheimer and Mr. Arneson.

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PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy"

## *Notes of a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State, December 30, 1952, noon* [1]

TOP SECRET

Subject: Proposal That the President Make a Statement Concerning Recent H-Bomb Developments

Present: *Department of State*
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Arneson
*Department of Defense*
Mr. Foster
Mr. Finletter
*Atomic Energy Commission*

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[1] Drafted by Arneson.

Dr. Smythe
*White House*
Mr. Murphy

At Mr. Acheson's request, Mr. Foster outlined the way in which the problem had arisen. He recalled that the PSB some months ago, in its deliberations on the question what should be said about the then-prospective thermonuclear test, had concluded that the event should be handled in a matter of fact way, with emphasis on under-playing rather than over-playing it. Moreover, it was felt that such statement should be issued by the AEC rather than by the White House. Under this policy the Atomic Energy Commission released its statement of November 16, 1952.[2] In recent weeks, the Joint Secretaries of the Department of Defense had been giving further thought to the question of what might be said. They received a briefing from Norris Bradbury of Los Alamos [3] on the outcome of the thermonuclear test. The Joint Secretaries felt that a weapon was in the offing which, in sufficient numbers, might have the power to destroy the world. They felt that the public should have knowledge of this development in the hope that such awareness might make it possible for statesmen, by renewed efforts, to bring about effective international control of these and other weapons. The Joint Secretaries concluded that a Presidential statement on this subject was desirable. They thought there might be a real advantage if such a statement were a joint enterprise between the incoming and the outgoing Presidents. There might even be some advantage, in order that there would be no question that a statement represented the true voice of the United States Government, that it be joined in by the Congress. Mr. Foster said that he had raised this problem informally with the PSB, with Mr. Murphy, and finally with the President. The President indicated that he thought it was appropriate for this Administration to make some sort of report on thermonuclear developments. Mr. Finletter had thereupon been asked by the Joint Secretaries to prepare a draft which was now before the meeting.[4] In recapitulation, Mr. Foster said that the Joint Secretaries were in basic agreement on three points:

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[2] *Ante*, p. 1042.

[3] Norris E. Bradbury, Director of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; Professor of Physics at the University of California, Berkeley.

[4] The "Finletter Statement", which has not been found, was discussed by Secretary of State Acheson and President Truman on Dec. 29. Acheson's memorandum of that conversation reads as follows: "The President is aware of Mr. Finletter's activities in regard to this statement. He is quite clear that no statement should be put out until it has been wholly cleared with State, Defense, and AEC. It will be submitted to us in due course. The President had thought that it might be desirable to put this out on the last day of the year. He has no desire to rush it." (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, " 'L' Panel")

1. That the American people should be informed of the order of magnitude of the thermonuclear explosion;
2. That the American people should be brought to realize the seriousness of the problem raised by this new development; and
3. That no clear solution to these difficulties seemed at hand.

Mr. Foster reported that the consensus of the PSB was that neither the test nor any statement about it would have any impact on the Soviet Union, particularly its people. It seemed, moreover, that the possession of thermonuclear weapons would not give any particular military advantage to the United States. He said that Mr. Bruce doubted very much the merit of having the statement made jointly by President Truman and President-elect Eisenhower. He pointed out that Secretary Lovett was strongly opposed to any further statement on this subject. The question now before the meeting was what should be done.

Dr. Smyth said that the Commission agreed that something might appropriately be said about thermonuclear developments, that there would be some advantage in making the nature of the developments better known to the American people, but that the Commission was troubled by the suggestion of a separate statement on this subject and were also concerned about the manner suggested for doing it.

Mr. Acheson said that he was very troubled indeed by the proposal that had been made. He had thought a good deal about it since the subject was first broached to him and he was certain that a great deal of harm and surely no good could come from the proposal. He summarized four considerations which led him to this conclusion:

1. *To issue a horrendous statement such as the one proposed without suggesting any solution to the situation would generate a sense of utter frustration and lead to public clamor that something be done, however foolish.* He stressed that there existed no possibility of doing anything about international control at this time. This was a conclusion that the Department had arrived at only after much soul searching. He recalled that he had appointed a panel to look into the question as to what might be done about disarmament in general. He said that the Panel had come to the conclusion, a conclusion which he fully supported, that we had reached the end of the road as far as disarmament was concerned, certainly for some time to come.[5] We were in a position where we were negotiating with ourselves on this subject. In the past year the United States had put forward a series of proposals in the Disarmament Commission each of which got nowhere with the Soviet Union but

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[5] See the report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, p. 1056.

which led to urgings from our friends that we make additional proposals. Such an operation was bootless. Our representative in the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Cohen, was given instructions to begin tapering off the negotiations and to avoid any further entanglement in fresh proposals. It was crystal clear that disarmament could not be achieved by itself but only in the context of many other conditions precedent in terms of East-West settlements and that without a change in the entire negotiating environment disarmament negotiations were doomed to failure. In this context, it seemed to him that to excite the American people again, thereby giving rise to a new spate of guilt feeling and public handwringing, would be a considerable disservice and would lead to many bad developments. He recalled that guilt feelings have mounted from time to time in the past, particularly in connection with the original decision to go ahead to test feasibility of thermonuclear reactions. In face of the realization that nothing can be done about international control, to proceed now in any way to frighten the American people even more would lead to the very serious consequence that the Soviets would take advantage of the hysteria and sense of frustration thus created to press us to accept the abolition of atomic and hydrogen weapons which then we would be under great pressure to do by our own people and our friends. There was no point in letting such a situation develop.

2. *The recent Stalin letter.* A statement by President Truman along the lines indicated might well be interpreted by many as an attempt by the President to "muscle in" on the Eisenhower–Stalin exchange.[6] It was clear that a Truman statement would not trouble the Soviets in any way but it might well lead to their insistence than any Eisenhower–Stalin meeting have as its first objective the abolition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. With Soviet policy, and support therefore, embedded in concrete we would end up with a predicament where the people of the United States would be running around like frightened sheep in the pasture, urging all manner of follies upon the Administration.

3. *Effect on the NATO build-up.* The proposed statement would doubtless have a most seriously adverse effect on the NATO build-up. NATO members would argue that their efforts were of little avail, indeed less than useless, when the world was likely to be subjected at any time to the devastation wrought by both sides by the use of hydrogen bombs. Such an attitude would be fatal to the build-up of strength in Western Europe.

4. *NSC Special Committee views.* Earlier consideration by the Special Committee of NSC on this subject took into account the fact that a thermonuclear test still left us a long way from possession of deliverable H-bombs. The Special Committee, therefore, had concluded that the policy should be adopted of playing down the thermonuclear test and that stress should be placed on the growing

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[6] On Dec. 24, the Soviet Embassy in Washington had released the text of replies by Stalin to questions by correspondent James Reston of the *New York Times*. Stalin had indicated that he did not regard war as inevitable and would welcome diplomatic conversations with representatives of the incoming Eisenhower administration. For the text of the Reston–Stalin exchange, see the *New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1952.

development of a family of weapons of varying sizes without stressing that H-bomb developments presaged a whole new order of magnitude of destruction.

Mr. Acheson asked what good would a Presidential statement do? He felt that the American people probably already had enough information about thermonuclear developments. He doubted whether they needed to know with any greater accuracy than they did what the prospective yield would be from thermonuclear weapons. This seemed so to him at least until such time as the United States in fact possessed deliverable thermonuclear weapons. It seemed to him that the Eniwetok developments and the lessons learned therefrom gave added emphasis to the need for an adequate early warning system and a much more effective system of continental defense.[7] He felt that this was a problem to which the Department of Defense should more vigorously address itself. As to the suggestion that a solution for all these difficulties lay in the development of some sort of world government, he was fully convinced that this route offered no solution. In summation, Mr. Acheson said he could see no useful purpose to be served by the proposal.

Mr. Foster said that there would appear to him to be one positive development that would arise from the production of thermonuclear weapons—that was that the existence of such weapons in numbers might make it possible for us to free large quantities of fissionable material for tactical uses. Reverting to the main point of the argument, he said he thought there might be a one in 10 million chance that a fuller recognition by the people of the United States of the nature of this new development might somehow generate new solutions for the peace of the world. The human soul, sufficiently aroused, might yet find a solution. To this, Mr. Acheson responded that the heart of the difficulty lay not in any defect in Western souls but rather in the souls residing in the Kremlin.

Mr. Finletter, by way of footnote, said he wished to correct an impression that seemed to be popular in Washington these days to the effect that the Air Force was neglecting our air defense. He characterized the assumption of a technological break-through as erroneous. Reverting to the main point of the discussion, he said that he had served in this operation solely as amanuensis for the Joint Secretaries and had discussed his draft with Mr. Murphy in only an informal, preliminary way. He felt that Mr. Acheson's arguments against the proposal were overruling and that unless the President saw fit to overrule the Secretary of State he felt that the whole project should be scrapped. He pointed out, however, that the President has shown a constant concern about atomic developments and that he appeared to have a very real interest in saying something about thermonuclear developments at this juncture. He felt that the President could not remain silent on the subject.

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[7] For documentation on continental defense, see pp. 1 ff.

Dr. Smyth reported that the terrific success of the Eniwetok test had rather changed the thinking in the AEC as to the significance of the event and would appear to support having something said about the implications thereof.

In response to a question from Mr. Foster, Mr. Murphy stated that it seemed to him imperative that the President make some reference to this development in the State of the Union Message. He felt that this was the minimum that was required. The query was whether a separate statement was warranted or desirable. Mr. Murphy went on that as he had recently learned more about the true nature of the Eniwetok experiment he felt strongly that there was need for the American people to have more information. Mr. Nitze expressed the view that the State of the Union Message would appear to be the most appropriate vehicle for any Presidential comment, for then such comment would appear in a suitable context.

Mr. Foster then read four points which one of the wiser and more knowledgeable scientists in this field thought should be made publicly:

1. The recent test gave a much larger energy release than heretofore.
2. This event underscored the greater necessity for effective international control.
3. Stress the constant striving of the U.S. for peace.
4. In the interests of national security nothing further would be said about the status of development or production of thermonuclear weapons.

Mr. Acheson said that those four points seemed to him to be the major ones.

Dr. Smyth said that the Commission would favor having an appropriate passage drafted for inclusion in the State of the Union Message. The Commission would oppose the issuance of a separate statement which could only appear as apropos of nothing.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether he should inform the President that the sense of the meeting was that an appropriate statement should be prepared for inclusion in the State of the Union Message. Mr. Acheson said that such recommendation would certainly have his endorsement and, as he had gathered, that of the AEC. Mr. Foster said that as far as the Department of Defense was concerned it was clear that Secretary Lovett opposed saying anything on this subject. On the other hand, the Joint Secretaries felt that some statement should be issued concerning the new order of magnitude that had been attained through thermonuclear processes.

In summary Mr. Acheson said he thought that the State of the Union Message was the appropriate context in which this matter should be dealt with. In such context thermonuclear developments could be set alongside our efforts across the board to negotiate acceptable settlements with the Soviet Union. He thought the statement should mention the growing destructive power of atomic weapons and that this fact lent increased seriousness and gravity to the need for securing adequate settlements with the Soviet Union. He strongly urged, however, that nothing should be said which would leave the impression with the American people that they had been derelict in their duty. Anything that was said about thermonuclear developments and indeed the entire burden of the State of the Union Message should focus on the Kremlin as the culprit rather than the American people and the rest of the free world.

After the meeting broke up Secretary Acheson, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Arneson discussed further how best to proceed. The consensus was that it probably would not be necessary to try to institutionalize the views of a group on this subject through a paper for the Special Committee of NSC. It seemed clear that Mr. Murphy would reflect back to the President the strong views of at least most of the discussants that a separate statement should not be issued but that appropriate comment should be inserted in the State of the Union Message. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Arneson should work closely with Mr. Shulman[8] in drafting an appropriate passage in the State of the Union Message. The Secretary further suggested that we should prepare what we thought ought to be said rather than wait for others to prepare their own drafts.[9]

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[8] Marshall D. Shulman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

[9] President Truman discussed nuclear weapons and disarmament in the course of his State of the Union message of Jan. 7, 1953. With regard to the hydrogen bomb test, the President stated: "And recently, in the thermonuclear tests at Eniwetok, we have entered another stage in the worldshaking development of atomic energy. From now on, man moves into a new era of destructive power, capable of creating explosions of a new order of magnitude, dwarfing the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." For the complete text of the message, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952-53*, pp. 1114-1128. The passages dealing with nuclear weapons and disarmament are on pp. 1124-1126.

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## *Editorial Note*

In a letter dated January 12, 1953, Benjamin V. Cohen, Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, submitted his resignation to President Truman. At the same time, Cohen presented a report to the President on the work of the Disarmament Commission and the role of the United States in it. For the text of the letter and the report, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 26, 1953, pages 142-154.

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Panel of Consultants on Disarmament"

## *Report by the Panel of Consultants of the Department of State to the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 1953.

### ARMAMENTS AND AMERICAN POLICY

### *Letter of Transmittal*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have the honor to transmit with this letter a final report of the work of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament appointed by you in April, 1952. This report reviews some of the realities of the present contest in armaments and aims at an understanding of what these realities mean for the policy of the United States. It is our response to the suggestion made by you at our last meeting, [2] that a written record of our principal conclusions would be useful.

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[1] This report includes an explanatory note drafted by Chase of S/AE and Bloomfield of UNA/P, dated Feb. 17. It states that certain passages of the report had been rewritten by the Department of State and the AEC so as not to reveal technical information determined to be restricted data under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, but that the burden of the argument of the report had not been altered in any way. Copies of this report are also in file 330.13/1-1553 and S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95. A brief summary prepared for Walter Bedell Smith, the new Under Secretary of State, is in file 611.0012/2-953. No copy of the unexpurgated version of the report has been found in Department of State files.

By memorandum of Feb. 4, NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitted a copy of the report to the Council's Senior Staff. (S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) On the same day, Arneson of S/AE transmitted a memorandum to AEC Commissioner Henry D. Smyth enclosing a copy. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Panel of Consultants on Disarmament") By letter of Feb. 5, Assistant Secretary Hickerson sent a copy to Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. (330.13/2-553)

On Feb. 6, Hickerson transmitted a copy of the report to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the new U.S. Representative at the United Nations. Hickerson's accompanying letter reads in part: "The consultants completed their report around the middle of January 1953 and handed it to Mr. Acheson, the outgoing Secretary of State. Mr. Acheson thanked the members of the panel for their work and said that he would lay their report before Mr. Dulles. . . . Secretary Dulles has not yet had a chance to read this report. It therefore has no status other than that of the views of the consultants themselves. . . . We will let you know as soon as we are in a position to do so any views which the Secretary may have on the report." (330.13/2-653)

Regarding NSC action on the report, see the extract from the memorandum of discussion at the 134th meeting of the Council, Feb. 25, p. 1110.

[2] No record of the meeting under reference has been found.

It is perhaps appropriate here to give a short explanation of the course of work your Panel has pursued. Our most concrete assignment was to consult with responsible officials on some of the problems of the formulation of the United States position in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. But our first discussions in the Department of State made it clear that none of us would feel able to give really effective counsel on the subject until we had a fuller understanding of the basic facts and relationships of modern armaments. Recognizing the need for such basic inquiry, you encouraged us to consider the problem of arms limitation in the context of a general study of the political meaning of modern weapons in the present deeply divided world. This we have done, and our work has confirmed us in the belief that the proper center of study in these matters is not arms regulation in itself, but that larger range of problems which fall under the general heading of Armaments and American Policy—and we have titled our report accordingly.

In its line of exposition this report follows in general the course of our work as a Panel. First it states some of the considerations which have seemed to us, from the beginning, to cast doubt on the value of developing further proposals for arms regulation. Second, it examines what is known of the present arms race, reaching the conclusion that whatever may be the difficulties of arms regulation, it remains urgent to conduct our affairs with a full awareness of the peculiar and increasing danger of the contest in weapons. The last section of the Report opens with an attempt to state our sense of the ways in which it is possible to make a connection between the dangers of the arms race and the realities of national policy. In the context of the existing world situation, the drafting of detailed blueprints of general arms regulation has seemed to us a dangerous and misleading exercise, and we have been forced to the conclusion that the relevant and useful field of action is much broader, embracing the whole of the way the United States thinks and acts about arms and national policy. We have limited to a short annex some observations on the way in which it may be well to think about schemes for arms regulation if a chance for real negotiations on this subject should at some time appear.

In the main body of the last section of this Report we recommend a number of changes in the present posture and policy of the United States. These recommendations grow out of our attempt to understand the connection between the dangers of the arms race and the necessities of present policy. They suggest courses of action which appear to us to have the critically important characteristic that they combine two essential values: they offer some promise of helping to moderate the consequences of the present contest in weapons, and at the same time they seem to us desirable also in the context of the great contest between Western freedom and Soviet totalitarianism.

The subject of armaments in relation to national policy is evidently so large and complex that no Panel like this one can pretend to have exhausted it. In this Report we have tried only to state certain central ideas quite briefly. We have rested our argument on a still more compact statement of the realities of the present situation; technically qualified advisers within the government can of course give further analysis of the important complexities of these matters, both in the field of armaments and in that of international politics. We are highly sensible of the modest value which must always be attached to the work of Consultants.

Limited as it is by compression and omission, this Report still deals with a number of large questions of national policy, going well beyond our immediate assignment, and in some cases even beyond the direct concern of the Department of State. Yet we feel certain that this is nothing but the inevitable consequence of the realities of the problem of armaments. That these questions are central to national policy is simply a result of the fact that the problem of armaments is itself at the heart of our national security.

We should like to underscore the meaning of our unanimity in signing this report. We came to the work of this Panel from five different backgrounds of interest and activity, and at first we had as many approaches to the topic. We have also had the advantage of fruitful consultations with a number of responsible and knowledgeable men, both with respect to the technical facts and with respect to the political background, and much of our thought has been affected by these consultations, though none of those with whom we consulted can be held responsible for the views expressed here. The members of the Panel have worked together now for many months, and what has emerged and is here recorded is a general view which no one of us held before. This we now respectfully submit to you.

In terminating our assignment we should like to record our indebtedness to our Secretary, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. This indebtedness is very great indeed, for he has given our work a continuity and a record without which it would not have been possible.

VANNEVAR BUSH
JOHN S. DICKEY
ALLEN W. DULLES
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON
ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
*Chairman*

## PART I

## THE DIFFICULTIES OF ARMS REGULATION*

The international limitation of armaments is a goal of policy which it is singularly difficult to reach—at least on terms that are compatible with national safety. Obviously it is always possible to disarm oneself—a nation can always abandon its defenses by its own free decision. But it is quite another matter to secure an international understanding such that it becomes possible to limit armed forces without endangering the stability of policy and the very safety of the nation. The record of American efforts to get arms regulation—and indeed the whole history of international negotiations on armaments in recent decades—makes these points very clear.

What makes this difficulty important is that the goal itself is so desirable. For a very long time men of sense and vision have dreamed of beating swords into plowshares, and in recent generations, as the world's weapons have increased in destructiveness, this dream has become steadily more insistent. The climax has come with the development of atomic weapons, and we may take as a symbol of the urgency of the desire for arms regulation the fact that the American presentation of this subject to the United Nations opened with the words, "We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead."

Yet the very effort which was formally launched with these words is perhaps the best single illustration of the difficulties of arms regulation. The proposals of the United States were the result of the most searching study, and they were presented with genuine good will in a major attempt to bring a terrifying new force under international control, even at a time when the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons. But in all the debate and discourse which has followed on Mr. Baruch's opening speech there has never been any real sign that agreement was remotely likely. There has not even been any genuine negotiation. The representatives of the Soviet Union have increasingly used this subject and this forum as opportunities for propaganda, and as its hopes of a genuine negotiation have faded, the United States has sometimes seemed to follow suit. Eventually, weary of this frustration, the diplomats of the West closed down the discussions of atomic energy and reported their inability to make progress. In 1951, still sensitive to the deep need for some forms of arms limitation, the United

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*Though we were appointed as Consultants on Disarmament, we have found that this word is in many contexts too sweeping, and we have preferred to speak of the regulation or limitation of armaments. [Footnote in the source text.]

States offered some new and general proposals, and discussion was reopened in the newly established Disarmament Commission. While it was probably useful at first in demonstrating the continued good intentions of the United States, this new effort has had no effect whatever in stimulating a more constructive response from the Soviet Union. The discussions in the Disarmament Commission now seem quite unrelated to any genuine negotiation looking toward arms regulation, and our own view, developed later in this report, is that the United States should now begin to disengage itself from them.

There can be little doubt that the principal cause of difficulty, here as in so many other places in the postwar world, has been the nature of Soviet policy and the behavior of Soviet representatives. Over and over again, in the discussions of arms regulation as elsewhere, it has been demonstrated that the Soviet concept of negotiation in good faith is entirely different from that which is followed, or at least honored, in the West. The general record of the Soviet Union in diplomacy is one in which the meaning of words has been distorted, the privacy of discussions violated, and trust repaid by trickery. And these are only the surface manifestations of a system of power and behavior which seems deeply hostile to the whole concept of human liberty, and to the United States and its government in particular. It seems clear that this hostility now involves such devices as the Iron Curtain, which in and of itself constitutes a block to any real discussion of arms regulation, since there can be no confidence in any agreement if there is not some way of finding out at least in general terms whether it is being kept. And it may be that it is inconceivable to Soviet leaders that there should be such a thing as a common interest in limiting an arms race; their hostility may be so deeply rooted that they simply cannot understand the idea that agreement might be of benefit to both sides. But it is not necessary to press these speculations further. It is clear beyond the need for argument that Soviet behavior has been a major obstacle to the international regulation of armaments.

Soviet intransigeance has been paralleled by developing changes in United States policy which have also had a limiting effect on the discussions in the United Nations. These developments are themselves in the main an indirect product of Soviet behavior. In the years since 1946 it has become apparent that the West has a need for substantial rearmament. In the context of a major international effort to develop strength it is not easy to give serious attention to discussions of arms regulation, and it seems clear that its concern for the uninterrupted development of its own strength has reinforced the United States in a growing reluctance to put much faith in discussions already frustrated by the acts of Soviet representatives. These general obstacles to serious discussion received a weighty and concrete addition in the outbreak of war in Korea. So for different but compelling reasons both great Powers have in separate ways contributed to a situation in which the discussions in the United Nations have ceased to have any relevance to arms regulation as a real goal of policy.

The experience of recent years seems to indicate plainly that it is hard to make progress in the limitation of armaments when there is a high level of tension in the international political situation. And this conclusion can be powerfully reinforced by the experience of efforts to regulate armaments in the years between the two World Wars. Because these efforts occurred in a time of much greater international cordiality than our own, their failure is particularly instructive.

Two great efforts at arms regulation occurred in these years. One was the effort at naval limitation, centered on the US, Great Britain, and Japan; it resulted in the treaties signed at Washington in 1922 and at London in 1930. The other effort was the prolonged discussion of general arms reduction, centered in Europe, and mainly concerned with ground and air forces, which never reached any result at all. Both efforts obviously failed to prevent war, and it can be argued that the naval treaties, in the long run at least, did real damage to the cause of peace. Their supposed success may have made the Western nations slow in resisting the Japanese expansion which eventually went so far that war in the Pacific became unavoidable.

These two episodes seem to teach that efforts to achieve any limitation of armaments can do no good unless they are closely integrated with the adjustment of the real problems of international affairs. What meaning there was in the Naval Treaties of Washington and London was directly related to a political *status quo* in which the peace of the Western Pacific was in effect confided to the care of the Japanese Empire. So long as this trust was not abused, there was no harm in the Naval Treaties. When this part of the arrangement broke down, under the pressure of Japanese expansion, the whole settlement became a dangerous deception; arms limitation was neither possible nor desirable when the political premises on which it rested lacked validity.

In Europe, the same basic point was demonstrated in a different way; the fact that the negotiations on arms reduction never escaped from the futility of constantly expanding paper plans was a direct result of the fact that they were never effectively integrated with the realities of European security. The result was that history went down one path while the negotiations for arms regulation went down another, until at last when the Disarmament Conference was ready to have its first decisive meeting in 1933, Adolf Hitler was already in power, and it had become urgent for men of good will to turn their thoughts from the control of armaments to the control of aggression by armed strength.

It seems clear from the experience of the 20's and 30's that no good can come of efforts to consider the problem of limitation of armaments in a vacuum. For 1953, this means simply that it is essential to consider this problem in the light of the great contest between the free world and the USSR. This contest now demands of the United States and her allies and friends a great effort to strengthen their collective defenses. Any genuine regulation of armaments must somehow be connected with such a change in this general situation that the regulation has a chance of survival.

But the differences between the free world and the Soviet Union are so deep-seated that no genuine, large-scale political settlement seems likely within the present generation. Even if present tensions should eventually decrease, there would remain divergences too deep for trust or friendship. If anything has been made plain since 1945, it is that the world in which the United States finds itself is one in which there also exists a great and hostile power system. Policies that cannot survive in such a world must be discarded.

The argument thus far strongly implies that no real progress is at present likely in the field of arms regulation. This is our own view—and we think it has been increasingly the view of the American government. While American representatives in the United Nations have constantly asserted their desire for progress, it has been clear, since the General Assembly session of 1951, that in the view of the United States progress cannot be made while such issues as that of Korea remain unsettled. The dominant sentiment in recent years seems to have been that there can be little hope of real settlement until the strength and stability of the West has been clearly established. An important school of opinion would go further, arguing that a real settlement will become possible only when the dominant power and influence of the Western coalition has forced the Soviet rulers to release their grip on some of their present holdings. In the present context there is no need to decide which of these views is correct. They are alike intending to see the question of arms regulation as fundamentally excluded by the present critical contest. What we now have, increasingly, in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations is not a genuine discussion of arms regulation but a propaganda contest.

The regulation of armaments, then is very difficult—and for the moment at least it seems impossible. In the pattern of policy which can be built on this general view there is a clarity which makes it relatively easy to proceed to decision and action, at least in the field of armaments. What is needed, it would seem, is a level of armed strength which will permit the free world to deter or if attacked to defeat the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately the argument cannot safely be ended here. Even though no arms regulation is now possible, there are factors in the present arms race which have a meaning so large and pressing that arms policy cannot safely be based on the simple assumption that the one object is to "get ahead of" the Soviet Union. Our situation is much more difficult than that. Modern armaments are at once urgently necessary and extraordinarily dangerous, and wise policy must constantly be aware of both the need and the danger. This means that the notion of arms regulation, however little it may have a direct present application, should not be put permanently out of mind. And even for present policy a view of armaments which gives full weight to their danger as well as their necessity has considerable implications. So we turn, in Part II, to the considerations which indicate that the present arms race has a special meaning and danger.

## Part II

## The Character of the Atomic Arms Race

In assessing the character of the present arms race we have learned most by considering the contest in atomic weapons. This contest appears to have three properties which in combination give it special meaning such that the atomic arms race is now a political fact in its own right. First, it is a race in which unprecedented destructive power is accumulating, probably on both sides, at a quite phenomenal rate. Second, this new order of destructive power has the effect of putting both the heart of the Soviet Union and the heart of the United States into the front line of any major military contest. Third, the United States is heavily committed to a swift and almost unlimited use of atomic retaliation in the event of major Soviet aggression. Each of these properties deserves examination.

### A. *The Rate of Production*

Although it is no secret that both the United States and the USSR are engaged in the production of atomic bombs, and although it is impossible for any serious student to be ignorant of the fact that atomic bombs are instruments of a wholly new order of destructive power, the special character of the race in atomic weapons is not well understood. Just because the atom is so dangerous men have hesitated to think hard about it. The very high level of security surrounding some of the most important facts of atomic weapons has operated to reduce the quantity and quality of responsible discussion. This has been true almost as much within the government as outside it, since responsible officials are among the first to avoid any hint of trespassing upon restricted ground. It therefore seems a necessary part of this Report that there should be included here a sober statement of the central facts of the atomic arms race as they are known to those who are fully informed in the American government.

Unfortunately there is little direct information about Russian atomic operations. The Russians are known to have exploded three bombs; at least two, the first and third, were of good efficiency, having a design like American models of 1945 and 1948; these bombs are known to have contained plutonium and uranium-235, so that it may be assumed that the USSR has supplies of both these substances. It is likely that the Russian production of plutonium is more than a hundred kilograms a year. From this sort of information it is not possible to make any close estimate of Soviet atomic strength. But while it would be helpful to know just how much fissionable material the Soviet Union now has, there is much to be learned from considering the general nature of atomic development, and here we can readily learn from the American experience.

It is now just a little over seven years since the first atomic explosion occurred, in July 1945. In that first year only a handful of bombs was available, and for four years thereafter the United States made no great effort to increase its facilities for the production of fissionable material; important efforts to expand our facilities began only in 1949, after the first explosion in the Soviet Union. The amount of fissionable material on hand is steadily increasing so that, in event of hostilities, there would be available atomic bombs of many sizes, deliverable by a variety of carriers, the total of their effect having a destructive power thousands of times the destructive power loosed on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.†

Since 1949 there have been launched four successive programs of expansion of fissionable material production capacity; production will continue to increase rapidly through the next decade.

This increase in the stockpile of fissionable material does not mean either a proportional increase in the number of weapons nor a proportional increase in the destructive power on hand. Three distinct factors bring this about:

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†It is important to understand the limits of the meaning which should be attached to figures about atomic stockpiles as used in the Report. Since atomic weapons can be made in widely different sizes and since a given amount of fissionable material can be used to make a few big bombs or many smaller ones, no one precise figure for the number of bombs that can be put together at any time has much meaning. [Footnote in the source text.]

1. Constant improvement of atomic weapon design,
2. Variable requirements for military use, and
3. Development of thermonuclear weapons.

Improved design of atomic weapons makes it possible to derive greater destructive power from a given quantity of fissionable material or conversely to achieve a given destructive effect from a smaller quantity of fissionable material. At the same time, military planning requires the stock of atomic weapons to be distributed at many locations, for delivery in a number of sizes varying from atomic artillery to bombs to be used in long range bombers. Destructive power per weapon is similarly a variable, subject to military planning. The development of thermonuclear weapons tends to increase considerably the available destructive power of our stockpile without an increase in the number of atomic weapons.

All the elements to date in the atomic weapons field heavily underline this conclusion: The atomic bomb is not simply the most powerful weapon in history; it also seems to have the characteristic that the amount of destructive power available from each pound of fissionable material on hand at any one time tends to multiply at a quite extraordinary rate.

There is nothing in this pattern of development which is necessarily peculiar to the United States; a similar pattern is by no means unlikely in the case of the Soviet Union, since the possibility of rapid development is inherent in the nature of atomic technology.

Fissionable material does not wear out, and the process of producing it almost inevitably leads to technical improvements which increase the rate of production. There is no permanently important shortage of raw materials for any great Power. Compared to other military items, moreover, atomic bombs are cheap. The Soviet Union started later than the United States, and her effort is probably smaller in scale, so that she may never have as many bombs as the United States at any given time, but she can easily have as many at any time as the United States had a few years previously. This means that the time when the Russians will have the material to make 1000 atomic bombs may well be only a few years away and the time when they have enough to make 5000 only a few years further on. Any sensible forecast must assume that within our time Soviet atomic weapons may be numbered in five figures. The Russians may not have so large a stockpile so soon—but it is also possible that they have it sooner. On the subject of Soviet work in the thermonuclear field we know nothing of any real value, but it would be the height of folly not to expect that in time the Soviet Union will learn what we have learned.‡

There is much debate in the United States Government currently as to what number of atomic bombs delivered on the target is enough to cause the destruction of a large modern industrial society beyond the hope of recovery. In such discussions much depends on what is meant by destruction; a society may still have military strength, for example, at a time when it is already dead for most purposes. Some students guess that for the United States a few hundred bombs on target would be enough; others think that by careful planning and preparation we could survive up to 2500. In the case of this latter estimate, the term "survival" must have a rather specialized meaning; 2500 atomic bombs of presently known Soviet design would have an explosive energy equal to that of 100 million tons of high explosive—or 400 times the total load dropped on Germany by allied bombers in World War II.

There is one important limitation upon these overwhelming and entirely possible figures. When atomic bombs are numbered in the thousands it is no longer the number of atomic weapons, but the effectiveness of the instruments of delivery which is the primary limitation upon the scale of the damage which can be done to an enemy, and it is just this fact which makes it important not to jump to the hasty conclusion that because the atomic stockpiles are rapidly multiplying, there can be no defense against an eventual annihilating attack. As atomic bombs increase in number, each additional weapon becomes increasingly cheap and easy to get, until in one sense it becomes possible to think of atomic bombs as just another and better kind of ammunition. But it is quite another matter to develop a military force capable of ensuring the delivery of massive numbers of bombs. For while bombs are tending to become cheaper, all experience indicates that aircraft to carry them are steadily growing more expensive, and effective guided missiles of long range seem likely to be at least equally costly. Modern aircraft, moreover, have a very high rate of obsolescence, and the job of maintaining a capability once developed can be formidable when the plane on which it is based is outmatched by defensive developments.

So it is important to observe that beyond a certain point the problem of delivery tends to become more important than the problems of development and production. This point has probably already been reached in the United States. This general characteristic of atomic armaments is of high importance, because it means that the constantly expanding stockpiles cannot in and of themselves bring catastrophe. It will be necessary for those who wish to have a full use of their atomic ammunition to spend great efforts on carriers of one sort or another, and it will be possible to attempt a defense against such carriers. There are some students, we know, and some high officers of the government, who do not believe that there can ever be any worthwhile defense against atomic attack. Others sharply disagree, and this matter urgently needs authoritative settlement. We ourselves believe that there is urgent need for a greatly increased effort in this area, and we think such an effort would constitute a real contribution to a constructive policy toward modern armaments; this conclusion is argued below in Part III.

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‡ In this discussion of the future we have somewhat discounted the possibility that the Soviet Union might as a matter of policy desist from continuous development in the field of atomic weapons. [Footnote in the source text.]

Important and valuable as air defense may be, however, it will be a pleasant surprise if the defense is ever able to knock down or deflect as many as four out of five of the attackers, and at present we should be lucky to get one in five. When these figures are combined with the estimates given above of the number of bombs on target that are needed for a knockout blow, some painful conclusions emerge. Even a combination of the most optimistic assessments leads to the theoretical conclusion that, if she is willing and able to build a sufficient strategic air force, the Soviet Union may be able to destroy our economy beyond the hope of recovery when she has 15,000 atomic bombs, while she might well have this ability when she has as few as 600. The lower figure might be reached in a few years, and the upper is not out of reach within the next two decades.

When any great power has achieved a five figure stockpile of atomic weapons, moreover, it will probably have placed itself in such a position that its basic destructive power cannot be destroyed by any single surprise attack by any enemy. The mechanics of a mass surprise assault are singularly complex, and large stockpiles can be widely dispersed—especially as smaller aircraft become capable of delivering atomic bombs. If the atomic arms race continues, therefore, we seem likely to have within a relatively few years a situation in which the two great powers will each have a clear-cut capacity to do very great damage to the other, while each will be unable to exert that capacity except at the gravest risk of receiving similar terrible blows in return. And this situation is likely to be largely unaffected by the fact that one side may always have many more weapons than the other. There is likely to be a point in our time when the Soviet Union will have "enough" bombs—no matter how many more we ourselves may have.

Were it not for the fact that it is so near and so plainly important, the topic of the probable behavior of men and nations in such a situation might well be avoided on the ground that it defies an answer. Whatever else may be said of it, it is plainly unprecedented. The power which will exist is not the power to win an ordinary military victory. It is rather the power to end a civilization and a very large number of the people in it.

It is conceivable that a world of this kind may enjoy a strange stability arising from general understanding that it would be suicidal to "throw the switch". On the other hand it also seems possible that a world so dangerous may not be very calm, and to maintain peace it will be necessary for statesmen to decide against rash action not just once, but every time. In particular, since the coming of such a world will be gradual and since its coming may or may not be correctly estimated in all countries, there is a possibility that one nation or another may be tempted to launch a preventive war "before it is too late", only to find out that the time for such a blow has already passed. No one can be sure what will happen, but this much seems evident: the prospect is one which makes it clear that the present contest in atomic weapons is highly relevant to our national policy.

### B. *The New Proximity of the US and the USSR.*

The power and rapid growth of atomic stockpiles affect the safety of the great powers in a peculiar and extraordinarily significant way. The atomic weapon is more than just a great addition to their strength at the boundaries where their other interests conflict (though in Europe at least it is this, too). It is also an instrument which brings the two great powers into the direct range of each other in a way which no other weapon at present permits; in this sense atomic weapons and modern aircraft in combination have revolutionized the geography of contemporary warfare.

The first rule of strategy, after all, is to concentrate force at a decisive point. In former times this meant that the proper center of attention was the enemy's army, not his capital or his treasure house. But today it means that the right target is the industrial and social base of the enemy's power—because today as never before this industrial and social base can in fact be destroyed. This is not to say that armies are now negligible, or even that atomic weapons will be used only in massive blows at the industrial cores of Russia and the United States. It is only to emphasize that the cities and people of these two great sub-continents are now in the front lines, with a certainty and finality that must not be obscured by any feeling that nothing so much like comic-strip fantasy can possibly be true.

This change is of great importance. The usual pattern of military conflict between great rival power systems is one in which the blows are struck at the margins where their territories meet. Thus the age-long contest between Islam and Western Christianity ebbed and flowed over great ranges of territory, and only very rarely was there combat near the center of either power system. Now the two great Powers find themselves strategic neighbors, and their rapidly increasing atomic strength makes this new nearness a major matter. It is not necessary here to attempt any assessment of its whole meaning; it is enough to note simply that it is the contest in modern weapons which has had this effect, and that for both Powers it is an effect of great political importance.§

### C. *The Character of American Policy Toward the Production and Use of Atomic Weapons.*

In the decade since it embarked upon its first efforts to produce an atomic weapon, the United States Government has faced a series of decisions as to the way in which it would deal with the military uses of atomic energy. The cumulative effect of these decisions has been to create a situation in which it is increasingly possible that there may be an unlimited use of weapons of almost unlimited destructive power.

The first great decision, of course, was the decision to try to develop a weapon; this decision was taken in wartime, and in the shadow of the possibility that the Nazis might be well ahead in their development of such weapons. From this decision there came atomic weapons. A similar decision, from a similar concern, was reached in 1950 when the Government began its intensive effort to develop thermonuclear weapons. Then it was the tension of a "cold war" and the gnawing fear that the Russians might be ahead of us which were decisive. From this decision we are getting hydrogen bombs.

Having developed something which looked as if it would have military value, the United States was faced in 1945 with the question whether it would use its new weapon. Taking the position that the fundamental wickedness is war and not weapons, the American government determined in 1945 that it would use the new weapon to complete its victory over Japan; it has been a constant part of American policy since that time that in the event of an act of aggression, the American government would feel free to use atomic weapons.

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§Although the present contest, by the size and power of its weapons, is fundamentally unique, there are two highly pertinent parallels in the recent history of European armaments. Both the building of a German Navy in the decades before 1914 and the building of a German Air Force in the 1930's tended to pull Great Britain into the front lines of strategy, and both of these developments had profound political effects. [Footnote in the source text.]

The third element in the American position on atomic weapons has been the determination of the United States to retain in its own hands the authority to determine whether, where, and how it proposes to use its atomic bomb. The atomic bomb is thus treated differently from other weapons. Both in Korea and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the military effort of the United States is combined with that of other nations and operated under the authority of agencies that include many other countries among their active members. Especially in the case of the defense of Europe, it is evident that the considerations which govern allied decisions are not those of any one nation but those which are worked out together in the councils of a great coalition. The one military element of the defense of Europe for which this is not true is the atomic bomb.

A fourth American decision, reached only gradually, and at least partly in response to Russian development, has been the decision to proceed toward the production of as large a stockpile as is practicable, as rapidly as possible. At first it was supposed that a few atomic weapons would be decisive in any future war, and that any large stockpile would be unnecessary. But closer study indicated the unreality of this view, and in recent years it has increasingly been felt that there is almost no limit to the number of bombs which would be desirable. Production is now being widely expanded, and further large expansions appear likely.

Fifth, the United States not only maintains a right to use atomic bombs, but does in fact now plan to use them in the event of a major war, and this plan is not at present dependent upon the prior use of such weapons by any possible aggressor. It is true that there is some lack of clarity in the intentions of the United States in the Far East, and it appears to us that the problem of determining the place of atomic weapons in policy toward that part of the world has been very incompletely examined by the American government. But in Europe the commitment to atomic weapons is clear-cut, and it seems reasonably plain that if any conflict anywhere should develop in such a fashion that both the United States and the Soviet Union became heavily engaged, the United States will use atomic weapons. Indeed, such is the present state of American weapons and military capabilities that no other course would seem possible.

Finally, it is at present probable that the atomic tactics of the United States in any major war would involve an immediate and overpowering strategic blow designed to put as many atomic bombs as possible on strategic targets within the homeland of the enemy country. It seems likely that once the switch is thrown, the American Strategic Air Command will be ordered to act with utmost speed to destroy the war-making power of the Soviet Union. Practical considerations seem to indicate that if such an attack is to have its best chance of effectiveness, it must be conducted with great rapidity and with a maximum concentration of force. In such planning there cannot easily be any abatement of the attack for political or other considerations, and there can hardly be any selection of targets on other than a strictly military basis; the presence or absence of people becomes irrelevant, except as they are producers and therefore military targets. The object of the attack is to "saturate" the defense, and the whole concept seems closely connected with a sense that defense against this kind of warfare—for us as for the enemy—is now not really possible.

This, then, is the pattern of the development of American policy toward atomic weapons in the last decade. Since the initial decision to develop such a weapon the United States has decided to use it, to keep its control wholly unshared, to make as many as possible, to plan for their use, and to base that plan centrally on the concept of an immediate and devastating strategic blow at the center of hostile power. The decision to conduct this operation would at present be uniquely American, and it now has the first claim upon the supply of atomic weapons.

Two additional characteristics of present American policy increase the significance of the current commitment to immediate and massive retaliatory action. First is the fact that in spite of the very considerable effort of rearmament which has been undertaken, this massive attack upon the industries and the population of the Soviet Union appears to be the major offensive capacity of the United States. This is not simply one way of dealing with the Soviet Union in the event of war; it appears to be the only way now seriously considered as a pathway to victory or even to an acceptable end of hostilities. Second, this intensive preoccupation with the development of a massive capacity for atomic attack is not matched by any corresponding concern for the defense of the US in case of a similar attack on the part of the Soviet Union. Indeed both the public and the responsible military authorities appear to be persuaded that the important characteristic of the atomic bomb is that it can be used against the Soviet Union; much less attention has been given to the equally important fact that atomic bombs can be used by the Soviet Union against the United States. This situation results partly from the pattern of our atomic decisions, partly from the natural impact of the sound military doctrine of the offensive, and partly from an apparent reluctance to face the simple but unpleasant fact that the atomic bomb works both ways.

In addition to its preparation for massive and immediate strategic counterattack, the United States Government has given attention to other uses of atomic weapons in support of local campaigns, and these other uses are of great importance. Conspicuously, the defense of Europe is more and more predicated upon the employment of atomic weapons for a number of purposes such as counter air attack and the destruction of communications centers. And on the battlefield it may be that the bomb will become half of a new kind of nutcracker in which ground troops force the enemy to concentrate while the bomb forces him to disperse. Thus even the areas which have hitherto been reserved for so-called "conventional" weapons will increasingly have an atomic component. From the point of view of the effectiveness of the defense in very difficult circumstances, this development is altogether understandable, but there is no escape from the fact that it still further increases our general dependence upon atomic weapons in any major contest.

Atomic weapons have still another significance for Europe, and this too is connected with the meaning of the American dependence upon these weapons. As the Soviet stockpile increases, the threat to both the United States and to Europe will steadily grow, but this growth may be quite uneven for the two areas. Geography has provided the United States with real and considerable advantages in the difficult enterprise of defense against atomic attack, for distance is the most important single element on which to base a defensive system; it provides time and space in which to work. Europe is very close to the Soviet Union, and while even in Europe it would be foolish to abandon the effort to develop a partially effective defense, there can be no doubt that a relatively small number of atomic bombs and a relatively simple delivery system would give the Soviet Union a very heavy atomic capability with respect to Western Europe. In such a situation it may be that the American atomic bomb will be useable only at the risk of truly horrible losses in Europe, and while this prospect might not in fact be sufficient to lead the American government to abandon its reliance on such weapons, it can hardly be denied that in a situation of this sort the balance of feeling and action in Europe might be sensibly altered for the worse. Thus in Europe there are at one and the same time powerful factors which tend to recommend an increasing dependence upon atomic weapons, and possible future developments which make that dependence dangerous. We have here one more illustration of the degree to which it is impossible to separate what is done about armaments from the whole of national policy.

There have been many causes for the fact that American atomic policy has developed as it has, and no one need suppose that there has been at any stage of its development any easy alternative to the course that has been followed. But this course has brought the United States into a posture of considerable rigidity, in which there are many dangers. In a world in which atomic war could only bring general catastrophe, it cannot be anything but dangerous that American policy should have no other alternative but a recourse to the atom as a response to many possible emergencies. The character of the atomic weapon makes it evident that the world is not going to have many more modern wars; but for the United States and its institutions this is cold comfort—for us it remains a first necessity that the number of atomic wars be zero. In this light it becomes the coolest kind of understatement to assert that the present arms race is highly relevent to the shaping of national policy.

## Part III

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The discussion in Part II makes it plain that the present arms race contains real dangers and has high political importance. The unprecedented contest in the development and production of super weapons, the new nearness of the USSR and the USA and the rigid commitment of American policy to a heavy dependence upon atomic weapons—these three elements in combination give most persuasive reasons for wishing that there were some way to get these weapons under control. A good look at the facts, in other words, substantiates and underlines the natural view that a world made safe from atomic weapons would be a good thing if we could get it.

Fundamentally, and in the long run, the problem which is posed by the release of atomic energy is a problem of the ability of the human race to govern itself without war. There is no permanent method of exorcising atomic energy from our affairs, now that men know how it can be released. Even if some reasonably complete international control of atomic energy should be established, knowledge would persist, and it is hard to see how there could be any major war in which one side or another would not eventually make and use atomic bombs. In this respect the problem of armaments was permanently and drastically altered in 1945.

In 1947 Colonel Stimson wrote that "lasting peace and freedom cannot be achieved until the world finds a way toward the necessary government of the whole. . . . The riven atom, uncontrolled, can be only a growing menace to us all. . . ." Institutions that lead to a growth of international community have a special importance and value when a proper weight is given to the meaning of the atom. But there cannot be any institutional guarantee of world peace until the whole pattern of present dangers and tension has been drastically modified. The United States cannot deal with the present Soviet threat and the present weaknesses of the free world by wishing them out of existence. So while we recognize the long-term significance of the ideal of community, and while we are convinced that it is possible to conduct our policy with due regard to this continuing objective, we are persuaded that present policy toward armament must also be governed by nearer considerations.

One path toward a lawful community, and a path with urgent relevance to armaments, is of course the notion of international arms regulation. This Panel has not easily abandoned the effort to find some way in which serious negotiations looking toward a regulation of armaments might now be undertaken. Such a way may exist, but we have not been able to find it. Over and over again we have moved in unhappy concern from our sense of the dangerous arms race to our sense of Soviet intransigeance, and we have never been able to find any proposal or set of proposals which did not appear to be either dangerous for us, in the position in which we now find ourselves, or unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Many of the difficulties which occur in any such enquiry have been recounted in a sketchy way in Part I of this report. Most of them turn upon the character and behavior of the Soviet Government. Perhaps the central and most serious obstacle has been the strong likelihood that the Soviet Union simply does not have any interest in a settlement except on terms that would be ruinous for the United States. And this indifference appears to be connected to two attitudes which deeply conflict with the requirements for any agreed regulation of armaments. First, the concepts of isolation and secrecy, symbolized in the Iron Curtain, appear to be not simply an accidental external manifestation, but rather a central and sustaining pillar of the whole system of Soviet power. Second, it seems all too likely that in the Soviet mind there is no room for the notion that there can be difficulties and dangers common to both the Soviet and the non-Soviet world. Yet without some access through the Iron Curtain, and without some sense that there is mutual advantage in settlement, there can hardly be any prospect of an agreed limitation of the arms race.

In addition to the peculiar difficulties of the Soviet Union, we must bear in mind what may be called the normal difficulties of any regulation of armaments. Two in particular are worth recalling—the complexity which seems to develop in any effort to arrange for a balanced and acceptable international limitation, and the connection which inescapably ties problems of armaments to general questions of international politics. We think that perhaps the problem of complexity is not wholly unmanageable; while written instruments might well be impracticable, it is not impossible for friendly nations to accomplish similar results simply by a series of interlocking actions that are not formally embodied in a treaty. Between friendly states this kind of *détente* has often occurred.

In this connection, we are persuaded that the specific objections raised against the present United Nations Atomic Energy Plan by the Soviet Union should not be counted among the really serious obstacles to arms limitation. That plan has had great merit, and we do not think it would be wise now to attempt to modify it by new proposals in the United Nations; but it is not the only conceivable way of dealing with the problem, and it is perhaps not even the most appropriate method in the present world, with present problems of armaments.||

But if it is possible to conceive of ways in which one could deal with the problem of complexity, it is not easy to be so hopeful about the prospects for a level of political understanding which might permit a sustained agreement on the limitation of armaments. The contest between the Soviet Union and the non-Soviet world has produced tensions and unsettled major problems in almost every continent. There are situations which are unacceptable, in the long run, to one side or the other, and sometimes to both. Nor are these merely points of political disagreement. There is fighting in Malaya, organized conflict in Indo-China, and open war in Korea. The Korean war, moreover, involves the United States in an area of high strategic concern, while at the same time it engages the prestige and honor of the United Nations as a whole. A pattern of international tension which includes an open war is not one in which it is easy to suppose that a political platform for arms regulation can readily be established.

We seem to be left with three general propositions which are hard to reconcile with one another. First, no regulation of armaments, however limited, has ever proved feasible except as part of some genuine political settlement; in the present situation, atomic stockpiles are a central part of the American strategy of defense, and it seems impossible that they should be regulated without other major adjustments both in armaments and in the general balance of international relations. Second, most sorts of understanding with the Kremlin are now either unobtainable or inacceptable or both; even if peaceful coexistence is possible, it cannot be comfortable or cordial, and it certainly seems unlikely to involve anything that could be called a general settlement, for some time to come. Third, unless the contest in atomic armaments is in some way moderated, our whole society will come increasingly into peril

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||In Annex I we append a short discussion of some of the general considerations which lead us to believe that a rather different sort of scheme may now be appropriate. [Footnote in the source text.]

of the gravest kind. The task of framing and pursuing a national policy which is solidly based on all three of these propositions cannot be easy.

Simply stated, the difficulty we face is that we must deal with both the Soviet Union and the arms race. In recent years, American policy has been heavily preoccupied with the Soviet danger, and most of our actions have been responses to Soviet actions and threats. In particular our policy toward atomic weapons has been hardened and sharpened in the contest with the Soviet Union until there is now in our posture a rigidity and totality of commitment which seem very dangerous. In one sense, of course, the whole contest in weapons is primarily a result of Soviet behavior. But it is important to conduct this contest on terms that preserve our own freedom of action and give proper weight to the transcendent dangers of the weapons themselves. The analysis in Part II of our position on atomic weapons shows that new measures are needed if we are to attain the flexibility which is essential to any effort to play an active and not a passive role in these affairs.

Flexibility—freedom of action—seems to us, indeed, to be the first basic requirement for American policy in the present situation. It would be very easy for this nation, in the face of the double dangers of Soviet totalitarianism and atomic war, to let events develop so that in the end a catastrophe of some sort became unavoidable.

The meaning of freedom of action may perhaps be sharpened by considering its relevance in a range of policy wider than that of armaments alone. The great constructive steps of American policy in recent years, in the European Recovery Program, in NATO, and in the reconstruction of Japan, have aimed to restore the freedom of action of the free nations, to regain the initiative, and to create a situation in which the non-communist world is sufficiently strong and united to be able to go about the works of freedom in peace.

This attempt to regain the initiative through a policy of collective action and effort seems highly relevant to the problems and dangers of the arms race itself. One of the great hopeful possibilities of the present lies in the development by every available means of the social and political coherence of all the non-Communist nations. More specifically, the strengthening of the ties that connect the non-Soviet world is one of the great lines of policy which may be helpful in reducing the dangers of a world full of atomic weapons. Decisions about armaments should be closely related to this objective, which often has requirements more subtle than those of a purely military estimate.[¶]

In the field of armaments, quite obviously, there can be no complete freedom of action. It is always within the power of the enemy to impose upon us a heavy level of effort and a sustained emphasis upon armed strength. What is not inevitable is a rigid commitment to a specific form of military action. It is important to understand that an arms race is not something either black or white—either totally unlimited or firmly regulated by international treaties. The problem of arms policy is to develop the kind of strength which may be needed to reduce the Soviet danger while at the same time keeping to a minimum the danger of a catastrophic resort to atomic weapons on both sides. In such an effort there are useful steps which fall far short of a treaty of arms regulation. Any development which gives us freedom to reduce our own commitment to the use of atomic weapons will tend to decrease the possibility of an atomic war. So too will measures which combine a defensive character with a deterrent effect upon the Soviet Union. For it is always possible that a real decrease in the sharpness of the arms race itself might be achieved by acts and not by treaties.

Even negotiation, which seems so remote, so unmanageable at present and unlikely in the immediate future, is not to be wholly dismissed. The dangers of the arms race are at least as great for the Soviet Union as they are for the United States, and the passage of time may well increase the pressure on the Kremlin for serious consideration of alternatives to its present policy. It would be unwise to neglect the possibility that negotiation may become feasible in the reasonably near future. It seems important that American policy should not permit the continuance of a situation in which our own rigidities would inhibit us from creating an opportunity to negotiate.

The problem of policy toward armaments, in short, is at present centrally a problem of increasing the freedom of action of the American Government. The recommendations which follow suggest certain changes in policy and posture which would in our view begin to increase the flexibility of our policy toward armaments. They offer ways in which we can make it less likely that the result of the present crisis will be an all-out atomic war. Taken together they will sensibly increase the chance of finding a way toward a real moderation of the present contest, and they may somewhat increase the currently slender chance of a genuine settlement and a comprehensive regulation of armaments.

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[¶] While it seems to us plain that the development of the Atlantic Community is of the highest importance, we think it equally clear that it is urgent—though no doubt difficult—to develop appropriate lines of connection and joint action in other parts of the world. [Footnote in the source text.]

Important as these objectives are, however, we would not present these recommendations if we were not persuaded that they serve a broader purpose as well. The whole of our analysis has made it clear to us that the dangers of the arms race cannot be separated from the reality of the Soviet threat and the need for collective strength in the free world. What persuades us of the soundness of our recommendations is that they seem serviceable and indeed highly desirable when considered in this broader framework of our principal national purposes, and when measured against the deepest traits of our national tradition.

The five recommendations which follow are not intended to be exhaustive or even very systematic. Yet in various ways they relate to those aspects of the problem which seem to us most important. The first is concerned with the way in which our government and our people are able to think about these matters. The next two indicate two specific ways in which we think a balanced judgment should lead to changes in our approach to problems of the defense of the free world. One of these ways relates to our allies and is in a sense a statement that the kind of adjustment in thinking about the problem which we urge here at home is needed also with our allies. The other has to do with the direct defense of the United States. Our last two recommendations deal with the ways in which it seems wise to talk about the problem of armaments in diplomatic discussion; we urge a decrease in the level of American activity in the United Nations and an increased attention to problems of direct communication with the Soviet Union.

1. *Candor to the American Government and People.*

We think it of critical importance in the development of a national policy which takes full account of the realities of the arms race, that the United States Government should adopt a policy of candor toward the American people—and at least equally toward its own elected representatives and responsible officials—in presenting the meaning of the arms race. The best and wisest government, in this country, is always dependent in large measure upon the support of the American people, and this support, if it is to have the strength and solidity which are necessary in great affairs, must rest upon an adequate basic understanding of the realities of the situation. What is true of the people as a whole is true also of large numbers of officials who staff the government at levels below the highest and whose activities have much to do with the execution of policies determined at the top.

The central fact on which this Report is based is one of which the American people and most of their government are not responsibly aware. It is that the American stockpile of atomic weapons has been increasing rapidly for the past seven years and is likely to multiply at least as rapidly in the immediate future. The pattern of atomic development is such that what is true for the United States can well be true, in essence, for the Soviet Union. Within the time span of current planning\the Soviet Union may have many hundred atomic bombs; within ten or fifteen years she could have several thousand.** This prospect is necessarily one of very great danger.

We believe that the American government and people are at present very far from showing a responsible awareness of this danger, and accordingly we believe that it is a matter of urgency that such awareness should become much more widespread. The only way we know of to accomplish this task is for those who are fully informed on the subject of atomic energy to take the rest of the government and the people into their confidence by a straightforward statement of the size and shape of the growing destructive power of atomic weapons. Such a statement should include an effectively informative account of the quantities and rates of increase which are involved. We believe, in short, that it is essential for the American Government and people to know the basic meaning of the atomic arms race.

We think it difficult to overestimate the importance of such an act of candor. It has been our experience that without a direct and informed understanding of the rates of atomic development, most men are reluctant to give full value to warnings which they hear from others. The more responsible the citizen, indeed, the more he is likely not to pay full attention to the problem of atomic weapons as long as present security restrictions are enforced. A man who is in the habit of trying to think in rational terms will naturally hesitate to attempt a judgment on any matter on which he knows himself to lack important information; he will tend to leave the problem to those who know the facts.

In addition to providing the facts and figures, the United States Government should direct public attention specifically and repeatedly to the fact that the atomic bomb works both ways. The official position of the United States toward the Russian atomic bomb has been that this development is simply something we expected and planned for. This position may well have been desirable at the time

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**We should repeat our warning that estimates of numbers of bombs can be no more than rough indicators of the level of atomic armament; but in any case the actual quantities are not nearly as important as the fact that they are bound to multiply in time. [Footnote in the source text.]

of the first Soviet explosion, in order to prevent a possible reaction of hysteria. But three years have passed; the present danger is not of hysteria but of complacency. Official comment on atomic energy has tended to emphasize the importance of the atomic bomb as part of the American arsenal. There is an altogether insufficient emphasis upon its importance as a Soviet weapon, and upon the fact that no matter how many bombs we may be making, the Soviet Union may fairly soon have enough to threaten the destruction of our whole society. In these matters, there is no substitute for authoritative official warnings. It is well known that this is a topic surrounded by secrecy, and the only voice which has full authority is that which comes from high in the government.

We believe, then, that the United States government should tell the story of the atomic danger, and in particular we believe that it should explain the rate and impact of atomic production, that it should emphasize the growing capability of the Soviet Union, and that it should direct attention to the fact that beyond a certain point we cannot ward off the Soviet threat merely by "keeping ahead of the Russians." We believe that official disclosure and recognition of these realities is the basic condition for a sound national attitude toward the problems of the atomic arms race.

Objections to this course usually rest on two basic arguments. The first is that if American people learn of their peril, they may either lose heart in the struggle to stand firm against Soviet expansionism or perhaps go overboard in favor of a preventive war. The second is that it would be folly to let the Soviet Union know either our level of atomic armament or the character of our fear of atomic attack. We are not persuaded by either of these contentions. We are wholly persuaded that this country does better when it knows the truth, and we would not want to be in the shoes of a government which had to deal with a nation which awoke to reality after a long period of concealment and deception. And while we are not sure it would be good to keep our proper fears a secret from the Soviet Union, we are sure that it cannot be done. This is the sort of country which has no way of concealing its basic concerns from foreigners except by concealing them from its own people, and in matters of this kind that price is much too high. As for our supply of atomic weapons, we think it is now fully large enough to make it highly desirable that Soviet leaders should be left in no doubt about it. The extreme secrecy which now shrouds this matter seems to us a plainly obsolete remainder from the days when there were very few bombs indeed and it was important not to have our weakness known. There are many things about atomic energy which it is highly important to keep secret as long as we can, but the general size of our supply of atomic weapons is no longer one of them.

Just as our own inquiry has been based throughout on a sense of the central importance of the realities of the atomic contest, so we think that there can be no appropriate adjustment of American policy until these realities are brought home to the American government and people. As long as the truth of the atomic arms race is buried in a very few informed minds (and often pushed back out of daily consideration even by those who know the truth), there is no possibility of framing policy in such a fashion as to take due account of the national danger. American foreign policy rests upon two great internal forces; one is the power of public opinion, and the other is the interplay of energies in a large and sprawling government of checks, balances, offices, and men. At present both of these great forces, in very large measure, are governed by a basically insufficient assessment of the realities of the world in which we live. It is bad enough to be in a very dangerous world; it is still worse to be unaware of the danger.

We believe that nothing else is possible, in all that bears upon decreasing the national peril, until the government and the people are accurately informed. In the end, it is the province of the nation to make its own foreign policy, and we are not among those who believe that we are necessarily wiser than the people and government of the United States, *when they are truly informed.* The analysis which we have attempted rests on our own conviction that the danger of the atomic arms race is great and growing. Other and better conclusions may be reached by others, starting from a similar awareness of danger; we hope that this may be the case. It is precisely because we respect the power and judgment of our government and people that we so strenuously object to a situation in which all Americans except a handful of overworked and harried officials are deprived of basic information which is not worth keeping secret.

2. *Atomic Armaments and the Unity of the Free World.*

We think it is urgently important that the American Government should undertake to bring its policy toward atomic weapons into harmony with its policies for the development of a lasting community of free nations.

We have already stated our conviction that it must be a major objective of American policy to increase by all available means the sense of community of the non-Soviet world. Undertakings and institutional developments which serve this end are among the indispensable safeguards against the outbreak of war; if the free world weakens, the danger of atomic weapons must increase, and the reverse is also true. In a general sense, therefore, any contribution to the strength and unity of the free world is likely to be helpful in reducing the danger of atomic armaments.

But just as the successful pursuit of national policies in the United States demands a relationship of trust and candor between the government and the people, so in the affairs of the non-Soviet world there can be no real mutual security without mutual confidence. At present there is danger that a failure to reach some common understanding on matters of atomic policy will gravely weaken the mutual confidence of the major free nations.

We think it is time for the whole problem of the use of atomic weapons to be shared in considerable measure with the major nations with which we are allied.[††] The military importance of such trust is almost self-evident and has recently been emphasized by General Bradley, but we think there is also great political value to be gained from spreading the responsibility for judgment on these matters.

No small part of the uncertainty which surrounds the field of atomic weapons derives from a widespread feeling that the United States is clutching the atom to its bosom and may at any moment get angry and hurl it in the general direction of the Kremlin. This feeling, in our view, is quite unjustified, and in fact the United States government has constantly given important weight to the fears and feelings of its allies. But the appearance of aloofness has been maintained, and this appearance does no good and much harm. The balance of feeling of the free world would be improved if it were generally understood that the United States considers the use of atomic bombs to be a legitimate area of allied discussion.

We also think that if the major allies of the United States can be given a sense of shared responsibility, their understanding of the weapon and its political meaning may be improved. The course of the atomic arms race has much meaning for Europe—there is high significance both in the increasing role of atomic weapons in the defense of Western Europe and in the increasing danger which arises from European vulnerability to Soviet atomic bombs. If the major countries of the Atlantic community approach these dangerous questions separately, it is hard to see how they can avoid serious misunderstandings which can only increase their difficulties. A somewhat different but important difficulty could also arise with some urgency in connection with the Far East. It may be hard to get general agreement on these matters, but clearly some candor in discussion and some common responsibility in planning are essential first steps.

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[††] This recommendation does *not* relate to the special problem of technical collaboration on the making of atomic weapons. [Footnote in the source text.]

In urging a higher level of inter-allied communication on the problems of the atomic arms race, we are certainly not suggesting that the United States Government should tie its own hands and surrender the right to decide for itself, in an emergency, whether and how it will use its atomic weapons. No allied connection need have this effect. What we are urging is rather that all the allied states stand to gain if they can reach a common appreciation of the character of the problem. If this is to be done, the first condition is that they be reasonably frank with each other.

### 3. *American Continental Defense.*

No problem has forced itself upon us more insistently and regularly, in the course of our work, than that of the defense of the continental United States. Nominally this question would seem to fall outside the range of our assignment, but in fact it is impossible to consider the problem of armaments and policy without giving careful attention to the whole subject of defense against weapons of mass destruction. Arms regulation and continental defense are complementary methods of achieving the goal of safety against the danger of a surprise knockout blow. They are thus interlocked in a variety of ways, and no policy can be consistent and effective unless it applies to both subjects the same fundamental attitude. It is not too much to say, in our view, that unless continental defense is taken seriously, arms regulation must seem a foolish goal, while if real attention is given to defensive measures, the whole approach to moderating the dangers of the arms race may become more manageable. Let us try to explain these conclusions.

In at least five ways, an intensified effort of continental defense can serve to improve the position of the United States Government with respect to the threat of atomic destruction. First and most obviously, every improvement in our defenses delays the time at which the Soviet Union will be able to strike a knockout blow—or to put the matter another way, it reduces the amount of damage which the Russians can do at any one time. Any such improvement also makes it more difficult and expensive to achieve any given result, for while bombs are relatively cheap, bombers are not.

Second, the very act of increasing our attention to continental defense is bound to help in developing a healthy sense of the dangers of the atom. Evidently the sense of danger and the level of effort on continental defense are interlocking; each increase in one will help to increase the other. Equally clearly there is a point at which both could become excessive—but we think it plain beyond argument that this point is not yet in sight.

Third, both as it improves our defensive capacity and as it sharpens our awareness of danger, a continental defense effort will help the United States Government take a posture in which it can face the possibility of serious negotiations on the regulation of atomic weapons. In thinking about such negotiations it is important to raise the ceiling of our danger and to be clearly aware that the ceiling is there; both these purposes are served by an intensified effort to protect ourselves.

Fourth, an improved continental defense is highly desirable from the point of view of its effect on the Soviet mind. It cannot be read as an aggressive move, and it should constitute real evidence of the fact that we believe atomic weapons to be dangerous for all concerned. It will also serve, in the measure of its apparent effectiveness, to dissuade Soviet leaders from attempting any catastrophic attack.

Finally, we should note that geography makes the Soviet atomic bomb such a grave threat to Europe that it seems improbable than any real safety can be achieved by any practicable effort. But if the United States can maintain some immunity to a knockout, the American connection may yet serve to protect the Western Europeans and so to quiet their fears. In this sense an improved continental defense is important to the whole free world; it may be at least in part a substitute for the very difficult and perhaps impossible task of defending Western Europe against the Soviet atomic threat.

In summary, then, we think it plain that there is every reason to proceed with greatly intensified efforts of continental defense. The only conceivable objection to such efforts would be a demonstration that they cannot have any significant success, and those of us who have looked at the problem believe that the balance of the evidence runs the other way. It is true, of course, that it will hardly be possible to achieve 100 per cent safety, and it is unlikely that the best efforts can bring us very close to that figure. But it is important always to remember that what we are trying to defend ourselves against is a knockout blow; in such a defense every little bit helps, and a relatively modest improvement may at any one time be decisive. We have tried to inform ourselves of the balance of scientific and technical opinion in the field of continental defense, and we are persuaded that at costs which are moderate in comparison with the total defense budget highly important progress can be made in providing an early warning system, in improving our set of weapons for knocking down bomb-carriers, in our anti-submarine defense, and in our planning for rapid recuperation after attack.

Moreover if research and development in this whole area are given a proper priority, still more impressive gains will become likely; the pattern of scientific research on military problems has regularly indicated that we tend to make most progress in those areas where we care most and try hardest. Such progress might even give increased hope for the air defense of Europe.

In closing this section we should perhaps note one set of objections to an intensified continental defense effort which seems to us to fall wide of the mark. It is sometimes argued that there is grave danger in giving greater attention to this area, since such a change would require a lessening of our attention to the development of our strategic air capability. This argument seems to us to be based on the mistaken notion that we must have one or the other and cannot have both.

4. *Disengagement from Disarmament Discussions in the United Nations.*

We think it is time for the United States to minimize its participation in the discussion of problems of disarmament in the United Nations. These discussions have no real connection with the problems around which they seem to turn, and this disconnection can be misleading. Men tend to suppose either that there is a real connection, which would lead them to think of arms limitation in a most inaccurate way, or else—and this is still worse—they reach the conclusion that the United States is cynical about disarmament and is trying merely to press for some propaganda advantage. The subject of armaments is too important, and the real interest of the United States in limiting the arms race is too great for these disadvantages to be outweighed by considerations of psychological warfare.

In making this recommendation we do not wish to be understood as asserting that it was a mistake to do what was done. That is emphatically not our view. From the initial proposals of the United States Government in 1946 right through to the present day, there has been a constant and genuine effort to show the good will of the American position. But each major effort has come sharply to a halt against the wall of Soviet intransigence. And just as it seemed wise by 1948 to stop the detailed discussion of the problem of atomic energy because it had become an empty routine, so we think it is now time to recognize that the whole approach to arms regulation through commissions of the United Nations is unproductive and even misleading.

Naturally it is not desirable that the United States should announce its new view all of a sudden and without preparation. A shift of this sort should be foreshadowed by a period in which attention is directed to the fact that there has so far been no helpful response from the Soviet Union on any point. Depending on the readiness of the United States to proceed toward some sort of serious negotiations, it might also be well to indicate the view that one reason for minimizing discussions in the United Nations is that it may be possible to make better progress elsewhere. In any case, we are not suggesting anything abrupt or unprepared.

Our general belief that discussion in the United Nations should be minimized is matched by our feeling that there is nothing to be gained by a public revision of any of the proposals which the United States has supported during the last six years. In particular, we think it would not be useful to attempt a new and modernized version of the United Nations Plan for the control of atomic energy. Our feeling is that this plan bears the marks of its year of birth, and we are persuaded that what seemed right in 1946 is no longer wholly relevant in 1953; the world we now have is in many respects different from that of 1946, and these differences are important. But the fundamental difficulty here is not in the fact that the plan is six years old; it is rather in the fact that full-fledged plans presented publicly by one side are no longer the best method of seeking a workable arrangement. A modified version of the United Nations Plan might be relatively easy to prepare, but it would not have any real meaning, and as it aged, it would raise more doubts than it resolved. The United Nations Plan has the great merit that it is a monument to real hopes and good intentions; we do not see that it is a good idea to peck at it.

5. *Communication with the USSR.*

We believe that a real effort should be made to find ways of communicating with the rulers of the Soviet Union on the range of questions posed by the arms race. Even though serious negotiation hardly seems possible at present, we think that the lesser act of genuine communication could do no harm and might have real value.

An obvious reason for a constant effort to keep open the channels of communication is that it may permit us to detect any changes in the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the conflict with the West. It is possible, for example, that in the period of the succession to Stalin there may be such a change. It is also possible that the arms race itself may tend to modify Soviet thinking; a new attitude may develop as growing armaments on both sides bring us to a time when the two Powers have "enough" power to strike each other truly staggering blows.

But beyond these specific and speculative possibilities there are more general grounds for continuing communication. Two disquieting elements in the present arms race are the possibility that Soviet rulers may seriously underestimate the importance of atomic weapons and the certainty that the American government is forced to work on the basis of an extremely limited and speculative understanding of Soviet capabilities and intentions. There is a chance that serious communication might be of some use in both of these matters. The danger of the arms race must be much increased if Soviet leaders fail to understand its real character; we believe that careful communication may materially reduce the chance of a disastrous Soviet miscalculation. And although we fully understand that it is not easy to decipher the true meaning of Soviet acts of communication, we think that even the most practiced deceiver tells more than he intends, and we are persuaded that it would be good to have a continuous record of the way the Kremlin sounds in communication on this subject.

We are inclined to emphasize the value of listening for sounds from Soviet representatives rather above that of any communication that the United States might be able to make, at least at the beginning. It is far from certain that we have it in our power at present to make ourselves heard and understood in the Kremlin; this is no argument for not trying, but it does suggest that it may be wise to think first of the values that may be derived from listening.

It takes two to communicate, and it is always possible that our best efforts to open conversation might be rebuffed. Of the five recommendations in this report, this is the one which depends on some response from the Soviet Union, and it is important to recognize this dependence. But we are persuaded that the United States has the diplomatic skills which would permit it to test the possibilities of communication without running any important risks, and we think it well worth it to try. If communication should prove possible, it would have just that real relationship to the dangers of our present situation which the present discussions in the United Nations lack, and in this sense it would be a fitting demonstration of the real American policy toward armaments.

The five recommendations with which we have concluded our work are none of them easy to carry out. In one form or another proposals like these have been made before and have met different kinds of opposition which prevented their acceptance. All of them will meet opposition of some sort now. It is not the province of a Panel of Consultants to decide whether it is practical now to try to overcome this opposition; that is a tactical decision and it is not our business. What we can say is that these are proposals of such a character that if they are to be carried out, they should be carried out thoroughly and well; none of these things is worth doing badly, and if they can be done only halfheartedly and against crippling resistance, they should not be done at all.

One general requirement is however suggested by all five of our recommendations: it is that there is no escape from the fact that the problem of modern armaments is intimately connected with the largest and most critical problems of national policy. The importance of the arms race is such that it is closely related to our policy toward ourselves, toward our major allies, toward the national defense, and toward the Soviet Union. This sharp relevance, in our view, argues strongly for a close coordination of the basic authority and responsibility for all major problems of atomic armament. We believe that these matters deserve the constant and serious attention of the highest officers of the government.

In the end a Panel of Consultants cannot chart a course for those who hold responsibility. Our effort of description, analysis, and recommendation cannot be more than a piece of evidence to be judged by men who must chart their own course. We would not have it otherwise. The essential component in any resolution of our difficulties must be creative leadership.

## Annex I

## SOME POSSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A REALISTIC AGREEMENT ON THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

In our re-consideration of the broad problem of plans for armaments regulation, our first and most important conclusion has been that blueprints for arms regulation are now undesirable. Even if the United States were presently embarking on the long process of negotiating a Convention or instrument for the regulation of armaments, much that is vital to the character of any such instrument would depend on the course of the negotiations and on political matters which lie well outside the field of armaments. Thus, even if immediate negotiations were likely, we should need not a blueprint but rather a sense of the objective and a plan of procedure. But since we fear that at present it is hardly possible for the United States to undertake serious negotiations, our own suggestions must pertain to the future and must have a political context which is now almost wholly unknown. In these circumstances any blueprint would necessarily involve large assumptions about the political situation.

A further disturbing element in all blueprints for arms regulation is that if they are to be made public they must take account of our present fears as well as our future hopes—so they must not seem to offer any possibility that at any stage the Soviet Union might gain any advantage in the power contest. Thus the tendency is to create plans which proceed toward a reduction in arms by a set of stages each one of which tends if anything to improve the American position, and when such plans are considered from the standpoint of the Soviet Union they are likely to seem quite unreal. This unreality seems to us to be dangerous, for these paper plans seem to assert that there is such a thing as a scheme for arms regulation which is without risks and sacrifices. In a world in which Soviet power is real and great, it seems to us unwise to offer such false hopes to the people of the free nations.

It seems more sensible to consider the problem as extremely difficult, intimately connected to political problems of all sorts, and not susceptible to easy answers. This more realistic approach leads at once to the conclusion that proposals for arms regulation should be judged against the existing dangerous and unpleasant situation, and not against some arbitrary vision of a world of total peace and harmony. And this conclusion in turn suggests that the basic requirements for a useful regulation of armaments may be somewhat different from those which most American discussion has assumed. In our view any study of arms regulation which keeps the present realities firmly in mind will tend to reach certain general views which we wish rather to sketch than to elaborate in detail.

First, since the peculiar danger of the present arms race derives from the growing possibility that the two great Powers may soon be able to strike each other direct and crippling blows, the basic objective of any scheme of arms regulation should be to eliminate this capability. This is not the same thing as eliminating all atomic bombs, since it is now clear—as it was not in 1945 and 1946—that atomic bombs can be decisive only if they are delivered on the target in considerable numbers. (The American requirement for a knockout atomic attack on the Soviet Union now runs well into four figures.) Moreover in strategic attack on a great power aircraft and missiles are quite as essential as atomic weapons, and they are much more expensive. It seems reasonable to say, then, that much would be achieved if it should be possible to get a reduction in the size of stockpiles and bombing fleets such that neither side need fear a sudden knockout from the other. Such a reduction would not give assurance against the use of atomic weapons, but it would give protection against the danger of a surprise knockout blow, and this is the danger which is so critically important in its political meaning for both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Another general proposition which seems relevant is that any scheme of arms regulation which is to have a chance of acceptance by the Soviet Union must take into account the depth of the Soviet attachment to the principle of the Iron Curtain. There can be no arms regulation without some sort of inspection—and on this basic notion there can hardly be any shift in the American position. But it is important, in the interest of political reality, that such inspection do as little violence as possible to a principle which seems to stand near the center of the Soviet system. It is possible to argue, of course, that there can be no real safety until we have an open world, and the argument has force, but to accept it entirely would be to defer all hope of arms regulation until after a revolution had occurred in Russia—and perhaps still further, for it is far from clear that a new Russian revolution would bring an open society. For the present, it seems better to take some account of the Iron Curtain.

A third general proposition about arms regulation is that it should not increase other dangers while it attempts to eliminate the threat of a sudden knockout. For United States policy this clearly means that there would have to be a considerable reduction in conventional weapons to balance any limitation on the instruments of mass atomic attack. The American atomic weapon is now being used not only as a balance to the Soviet atom but also as a counterweight to the massive Soviet armies; if it were abandoned, those armies would have to be considerably trimmed. (But this last requirement might be modified insofar as non-Soviet "conventional" armed strength can become a counterweight to the Soviet armies.)

These three general propositions are very far from exhausting the topic of realistic approaches to arms regulation, but taken together they do make it possible to sketch the broad outlines of a kind of arms regulation which does not seem quite so unreal as most of the detailed plans that have been put forward in recent years. This somewhat more robust sort of scheme would be characterized by a basic agreement to reduce all major forms of armament well below the point where they threaten destruction to other major powers; such an agreement should be designed to provide wide margins of safety. In keeping with these wide margins, the scheme could get on with a relatively simple system of inspection, designed to prevent any major violation from going unnoticed, but not pretending to guarantee against relatively minor and inconclusive breaches of the agreed levels. Probably it would be more accurate to describe this sort of inspection as a form of "facilitated intelligence"—it would aim at nothing much more elaborate than the provision of the sort of information that was readily available in all modern countries—not excluding Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany—until the days of the Iron Curtain. Intelligence and inspection can be made far more effective and less burdensome by the development and use of the increasingly sensitive techniques of scientific intelligence.

We have devoted some attention to the technical problems of such a relatively simple and sturdy scheme of arms limitation, and they do not seem unmanageable. In particular we believe that it would be possible to sketch a proposal for the atomic component of such a scheme which would eliminate the danger of an atomic knockout and at the same time avoid the comprehensive and elaborate mechanisms of the current United Nations Plan. The one limitation we must set to this conclusion is that as time passes it must become steadily more difficult to establish any form of control of inspection which would guarantee against the possibility that a decisive stockpile might be successfully hidden away and never be missed by those conducting the initial inspection of plants and production records. No system of checking past production by examining plants and records can be wholly free from the possibility of error, and the sum of the possible errors will at some stage be greater than any acceptable level. The advent of thermonuclear devices makes this reservation still more important.

Skimpy as they are, these comments on the problem of plans for arms regulation do suggest that there is no basic difficulty in the many technical questions which have been debated back and forth in the United Nations in recent years. There will be real issues in any serious negotiation for a limit on armaments, but there are certainly ways of meeting whatever is real in the sort of objections the Soviet Union has so far put forward.

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "NSC Papers, 1953-55"

## *Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1953.

Subject: Second Progress Report on NSC 112, "Formulation of a United States Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments".

1. *Courses of Action Fully Implemented:*

NSC 112 was approved as Governmental policy on July 19, 1951.[1] It is requested that this Progress Report as of January 15, 1952 [*1953*] be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

The NSC at its 106th Meeting on October 23, 1951, as action number 578 b, noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would undertake to reach an agreement, for submission to the President, as to the position of the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations regarding a proposal for limitation of armed forces and armaments, in accordance with the policy established in NSC 112. The two Secretaries agreed upon such a position and submitted it to the President, who approved it on October 24, 1951. This position, when submitted to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, in a resolution sponsored by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, after slight modification resulted in approval by the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly (with the Soviet bloc opposed) on January 11, 1952, as Resolution 502(VI).[2]

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[1] For text of NSC 112, dated July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

By this resolution, the General Assembly established a Disarmament Commission, composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada, and directed the Commission to prepare draft proposals to be embodied in a treaty or treaties for submission to a conference of all states, concerning: (i) regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; (ii) elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; (iii) effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, with the present United Nations plan being used as the basis for the Commission's considerations until a better or no less effective plan were devised; (iv) progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic, this problem to be considered as a first task; (v) methods for fixing over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and armaments, and for determining the allocation within their respective military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments; (vi) the establishment of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty or treaties; (vii) an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament program.

The Disarmament Commission held its first meeting on February 4, 1952, and carried on its discussions throughout the year until the opening of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.

A principal thesis of NSC 112 was that attention should be kept focused, in any international discussions on disarmament, upon the problem of disclosure and verification, in order to test Soviet willingness to accept effective inspection, because it would be acceptable to the U.S. if accepted by the U.S.S.R. and advantageous to the U.S. for its propaganda value if rejected by the U.S.S.R., and because it was the first step in implementing a disarmament program. The U.S. on April 5, 1952, submitted to the Disarmament Commission "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of All Armed Forces and All Armaments, Including Atomic" (UN Doc. DC/C.2/1). [3] The Soviet Union attacked this paper, and the emphasis on disclosure and verification as the necessary first step in implementing a comprehensive disarmament program, as proof that the U.S. desired only a gigantic intelligence program and was uninterested in reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments. The other members of the Commission indicated that it was necessary that the Commission discuss other elements of the work assigned by the General Assembly. Consequently, it proved impossible to focus the attention of the Disarmament Commission principally on the disclosure and verification paper and, after relatively little discussion on this subject, the U.S. proceeded to develop and submit the following working papers, cleared throughout the Government, concerning other elements of a comprehensive disarmament program:

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[2] See the editorial note, p. 845.

> Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program (UN Doc. DC/C.1/1, April 24, 1952) [4] setting forth objectives and principles to guide the Disarmament Commission; Proposals for Fixing Numerical Limitation of all Armed Forces (UN Doc. DC/10, May 28, 1952), [5] suggesting possible levels of armed forces for the five Great Powers with negotiated ceilings for all other states having substantial military power; Supplement to Numerical Limitation Paper (UN Doc. DC/12, August 12, 1952), [6] suggesting procedures for working out ceilings on armed forces and the armaments to support these forces; Summary of U.S. Proposals for Elimination of Bacterial Weapons in Connection with Elimination of All Major Weapons Adaptable to Mass Destruction (UN Doc. DC/15, September 4, 1952). [7]

The Soviet Union continued to insist upon its often-rejected proposals for one-third reduction of armed forces and armaments by the Big Five; a "paper" prohibition of atomic weapons through a mere declaration these weapons should be prohibited, with prohibition to be effective at the same time as the institution of agreed controls over that prohibition; and disclosure only of official data on armed forces and armaments. The U.S.S.R. also charged that the U.S. was using bacteriological warfare in Korea and China, and called for prohibition of B.W. and ratification of the 1925 Geneva B.W. Protocol.

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[3] See footnote 1, p. 872.

[4] See the editorial note, p. 895.

[5] See footnote 2, p. 954.

[6] See the second editorial note, p. 989.

[7] See the editorial note, p. 994.

The U.S.S.R. in addition proposed in the United Nations Security Council, on June 15, 1952, that the Council urge all states to ratify or accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol if they had not yet done so. On June 26, the Soviet motion failed by a vote of 1–0 with 10 abstentions, since most of the Council members believed that this question was properly within the jurisdiction of the Disarmament Commission, which was considering the problem of prohibition and regulation of armaments.

In the Security Council on June 20, the U.S. submitted a draft resolution by which the Council would request the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the aid of such scientists and experts as it might select, to investigate the charges concerning the use of B.W. by UN forces in Korea, and report the results to the Security Council as soon as possible. The United States' Representative pointed out that the Soviet Union Representative had attempted to make a careful distinction between B.W. charges and the resolution calling for ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol because the introduction of the germ warfare charges inevitably invited investigation into the charges. He furthermore suggested that U.S.S.R. Representative Malik had attempted to invoke the Geneva Protocol in order to cast the invidious implication that U.S. failure to ratify the Protocol was proof that the United States wanted to have a free hand to wage germ warfare. On July 3, 1952, a Soviet Union veto prevented passage of the U.S. resolution, although all other members of the Security Council had approved the resolution. The U.S. immediately introduced another draft resolution, which concluded from the refusal of those making the charges to permit an impartial investigation that the charges must be presumed to be without substance and false, and condemned the fabrication and dissemination of such charges. The U.S.S.R. cast its 50th veto to prevent passage of this resolution.

At the 30th Meeting of the Disarmament Commission on October 1, the Commission adopted the report which summarized its activities (UN Doc. DC/20)[8] by a vote of 11–1 (U.S.S.R.). Consideration of this report was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly which opened its Seventh Regular Session in New York on October 14, but the item had not been reached by the time the session was suspended on December 22. The item will be discussed when the Assembly reconvenes in the early spring of 1953.

On October 17 the Polish delegation submitted a resolution[9] which was referred for consideration to the General Assembly's Political Committee, but also was not reached before the session was suspended. The portion of this resolution involving disarmament was almost word for word identical with the proposals made by the Soviet Union at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in Paris in 1951. This part of the Polish resolution put forward the time-worn Soviet proposals for one-third reduction of the armed forces of the Five Great Powers within one year; submission of full data on armaments by these Powers; calling of an international disarmament conference by the Security Council "as soon as possible"; adoption of a decision on unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and establishment of strict international control over the implementation of that decision; adherence to the 1925 Geneva poison gas and bacteriological warfare Protocol by all states which had not ratified or adhered to the Protocol. Finally, the Polish resolution requested a General Assembly declaration that participation in NATO could not be reconciled with membership in the United Nations and called upon the governments of the United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France and China to conclude a peace pact.

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[8] United Nations, *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Special Supplement No. 1. Second Report of the Disarmament Commission.*

[9] UN doc. A/2229.

On October 20, 1952, the United States filed as an urgent and important matter a request to add to the General Assembly's agenda an item entitled "Question of Impartial Investigation of Charges of Use by United Nations Forces of Bacteriological Warfare". [10] In its explanatory memorandum, the United States referred to the Communist propaganda campaign to inspire hatred of the United States and to discredit United Nations action in Korea, and cited the fabrication of "scientific evidence" by so-called investigation commissions carefully selected to ensure they were biased. Note was taken that these charges had just been repeated in the present session of the General Assembly by representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union; that the charges themselves, coupled with the refusal of those making the charges to agree to an impartial investigation, impaired friendly relations and created a situation which should be considered by the General Assembly as an urgent and important matter and on which appropriate action should be taken. On October 21 the United States request was also added to the agenda of the General Assembly but was not discussed before the Assembly suspended its session in December, and will be considered in the Spring of 1953.

2. *Courses of Action Currently Being Implemented:*

The Department of State's Disarmament Staff, in conjunction with other agencies represented on the Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission (DAC) and certain consultants, is presently working on the following projects among others, with the intent of developing papers which may possibly be presented in the Disarmament Commission after appropriate modification for public presentation:

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[10] UN doc. A/2231.

> Technical safeguards (military and industrial); Co-relationship between principal components of a comprehensive disarmament program; Establishment of international control organs; Identification of major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; Certain military-political problems relevant to establishing numerical ceilings on all armed forces, distribution of permitted armed forces within national military establishments, and means of determining standard armaments to support permitted armed forces; Treatment of violations.

In addition to these studies, there is a Panel of Consultants to the Secretary of State which has independently examined the entire range of disarmament-security problems. The consultants are: J. Robert Oppenheimer, Vannevar Bush, John Dickey, Allen W. Dulles, Joseph E. Johnson. The Panel has now concluded its work with the submission to the Secretary of State of a study concerning armaments and American policy, which embodies the findings and recommendations of the Panel and will be available to the incoming Secretary. [11]

DAVID BRUCE

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[11] *Supra.*

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330.13/2-453

*The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)* [1]

SECRET PERSONAL [WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1953.

DEAR CABOT: When you were in Washington the week before last, I turned over to you the position paper on the subject of Disarmament which was prepared for the first part of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, [2] together with the resolution which we had discussed with the British, French and Canadians. [3] I hope you have had a chance to read these papers and that you can give me your reaction at an early opportunity.

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer (UNP) and Sanders (UNA).

[2] Position paper SD/A/C.1/393 Rev. 1, "Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments: Report of the Disarmament Commission", Oct. 3, 1952, not printed. (IO files, lot 71 D 440)

[3] See enclosure 1 to the memorandum from Smith to Lay, Feb. 17, p. 1104.

I know that the new administration will wish to re-examine at an early moment the entire United States position on disarmament. This is as it should be. However it is my belief that, while such a re-examination may alter the course of action which we pursue in the Disarmament Commission when it reconvenes in the spring or summer, it would not affect our position in the second half of this session of the General Assembly. I believe that our present position—which merely renews the life of the Commission, commends the Western democracies for their constructive efforts, and lightly criticizes the Soviet Union for its obstruction—is satisfactory for the purposes of the reconvened session. In other words, the General Assembly at this session is merely being informed of the work of the Commission during the past year and requested to permit the discussions to continue. I do not see that we can do less than this, and if it is decided that we can do more, the framework will be available.

On the subject of the further work of the Disarmament Commission during the coming year, it is my view that unless there is a definite change in the situation the United States should in general not take the initiative and let others bear the burden of submitting further proposals in the Commission.

If you believe that it will be helpful, we shall be glad to submit to you some ideas and suggestions for the initial United States statement to the Committee on this item.

Sincerely yours,

John D. Hickerson

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## *Editorial Note*

Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson visited Washington in February 1953 for talks with high-level officials of the Eisenhower administration. During the course of these discussions various problems relating to atomic energy and disarmament were reviewed. For documentation on Pearson's visit, see volume VI.

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Uranium 1954"

## *The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 16, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will recall that in the course of the Commission's briefing session with you on January 9, 1953, [1] it was emphasized that the Commission's program is dependent on supplies of uranium from abroad. In order to illustrate and emphasize our dependence on overseas uranium supplies and our urgent desire to seek out new uranium sources, we should like to outline the present status of our raw material relationships in certain countries and particularly stress areas wherein we feel more vigorous action must be taken in the future than has been taken in the past. We feel that actions taken in Belgium, South Africa and Australia have been very gratifying. However, in other areas such as Latin America, Portugal, Spain and France, this government has not achieved its objectives. These objectives are simple—to gain the agreement of the government concerned for a joint uranium exploration program and, if and when found, to make uranium available to the United States.

The Atomic Energy Commission does not have permanent representatives abroad for the purpose of negotiating uranium arrangements. We are prepared, however, to send members of our staff at any time to any place to assist in the development of our objectives. However, we rely heavily on Department of State personnel to make effective approaches to the governments concerned in order to provide a basis for the eventual development of mutually satisfactory raw material procurement contracts.

### *Belgium*

From 1944 to the present time the Belgian Congo has been the major source of uranium for the Commission's program. The contract is a commercial one in the sense that it does not run between governments but between the United States-United Kingdom procurement agency (established during the war and known as the Combined Development Agency) and a private Belgian corporation. However, in addition there is a governmental agreement between the United States, United Kingdom and Belgium which contains the assurance on the part of Belgium that we have first option on the material as well as our assurance to the Belgian Government that when atomic power becomes commercially feasible the Belgian

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[1] No record of the briefing has been found in Department of State files.

Government will be brought into this area on an equitable basis.[2] The most important information relating to research and development of atomic power desired by the Belgians is presently classified by the Commission and therefore has not been made available. The Commission and the United Kingdom, however, have tried to assist the Belgian Government in a variety of ways to establish a small atomic energy project by providing the Belgian scientists with information which has been declassified.

An immediate and important objective of the Commission is to extend the present Belgian arrangements beyond the present termination date of February 1956 and at the same time, provide a basis for continuing the cordial relationships with the Belgian Government and the private mining interests that we have enjoyed in the past. This will mean that we undoubtedly will have to provide more technical assistance for their atomic energy program than they previously have received. However, further technical assistance would come under areas which are presently classified and in order to provide such assistance within the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, the Commission must determine that the security of the Belgian project is adequate, as well as that Belgian uranium contributes substantially to the common defense and security of the United States.

In December 1952, I suggested to Governor Ryckmans,[3] the Belgian Commissioner of Atomic Energy, that we would like to hold discussions looking forward to an extension of the tripartite agreement on uranium. Governor Ryckmans, after consultation with Foreign Minister Van Zeeland,[4] has informed me that the Belgian Government would be happy to hold such discussions in the near future. We are now awaiting formal word of the Belgian Government as to when and where they would desire to hold these discussions.

*South Africa*

The second area of importance is South Africa. Within two to three years South Africa will be our most important uranium supplier. The relationships with the South African mining interests and with the representatives of the Union Government on the South African Atomic Energy Board have been exceedingly cordial and sympathetic from the earliest discussions. The South Africans have pushed forward with great energy and enthusiasm the construction of uranium extraction plants. The South African arrangements which are between the Combined Development Agency and the South African Atomic Energy Board provide for the deliveries of uranium through 1964. While the United Kingdom has been active in developing the South African supply, the United States has played the major role and has taken the initiative because of its greater need for uranium.

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[2] For text of the agreement of Sept. 26, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 1209.

[3] Pierre Ryckmans.

[4] Paul Van Zeeland.

Diplomatic negotiations are not required in this area inasmuch as the present arrangements provide a basis for a continuing expanded program. The Commission naturally has an important interest in the political and economic stability of this area, however, and it is hoped that American policy towards the Union of South Africa takes into account the substantial contribution that this country will be making to the strength of the United States.

*Portugal*

Small British uranium mining holdings were purchased by the Combined Development Agency in 1945 in Portugal. These holdings are administered by the Ministry of Supply but financially supported on an equal basis by the United States and the United Kingdom. The existing governmental agreement is between Portugal and the United Kingdom and terminates in 1957. This agreement is exceedingly restrictive and limits the size of the Portuguese uranium program and the exportation of uranium from Portugal to 100 tons per annum. Additional promising uranium areas have now been brought to our attention. The United States and the United Kingdom desire to hold discussions with the Portuguese with the objective of gaining agreement to an expanded production program in Portugal.

This question was raised with Salazar in the Summer of 1952 and earlier by Commissioner Murray. However, as yet, the Portuguese Government has not given any indication as to whether it would view with sympathy a larger and more aggressive exploration and production program.

*French Morocco*

Since 1949 the Commission has been anxious to conclude arrangements wherein uranium and exploration and possibly production could be developed in Morocco. On the advice of the Department of State, this subject was not taken up with the French Government until the Spring of 1952, at which time a draft agreement was concluded in Paris and referred to both governments for consideration.

The Commission, as well as the Department of State, have approved the draft agreement which provides for a joint exploration and development program in French Morocco. The Commission is awaiting formal approval of the French Foreign Office of this agreement.

*Spain*

The Commission is interested in establishing an exploration program in Spain. This subject was raised by Commissioner Murray with Franco[5] in October 1951 and subsequently by the American Ambassador in December 1951. Further discussions have not taken place with the Spanish authorities pending the conclusion of the military aid discussions which we understand have taken place during 1952. We have been advised, however, that the American Ambassador has recently raised this subject again with Franco.

*Australia*

In June 1952 and January 1953, agreements were signed for eventual production and procurement of uranium from Australia for the Combined Development Agency. The first arrangement concerns the Radium Hill deposits in South Australia and the second arrangement concerns the Rum Jungle deposit in the northern territory of the Commonwealth. Further exploration and development may prove that the Australian potential is substantial.

The relationship with Australia on this subject has been most cordial. The agreements are signed and the present problem is to assure rapid and efficient production in those areas. Australia too is interested in atomic power and undoubtedly will ask this government in the foreseeable future to supply technical information and assistance for its own atomic energy program.

*Canada*

Canada, since 1946, has been second to the Congo as the important source of uranium from abroad. The Canadian-United States relationship has been direct and most cordial. In the case of Canada, the contracts are between the Commission and the Eldorado Mining Company, Ltd., Canada (a Canadian Government corporation). We have great hopes that new prospects, particularly in the Lake Athabaska area, will make Canada one of the most important uranium sources in the world. Much is still to be done to assure a continuing enthusiasm on the part of the Canadian Government to develop this area.

It may be necessary to hold discussions with the Canadians in the near future to determine if there are ways and means by which the Commission could assist the Canadians in accelerating and expanding their exploration and production program.

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[5] Generalissimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, Chief of State of Spain.

*Latin America*

In February 1951, the Commission advised the Secretary of State that it desired to open discussions with most of the Latin American countries for the purpose of starting extensive exploration programs for uranium. Approaches have been made to the governments of Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Bolivia by the Department of State. The results have been exceedingly disappointing. No arrangements have been concluded and at the present time the United States Government has not achieved a firm agreement with a single country in Latin America wherein that country agrees to an extensive exploration program and eventual sale of uranium to the Commission, although in the case of Bolivia and Colombia, the governments appear receptive.

Despite the various political problems which must be faced in Latin America, such as internal political disturbances and the lack of a sense of the urgency of western defense on the part of the Latin American republics, it is clear that the entire approach to the Commission's objectives in Latin America must be reexamined by the Commission and the State Department and carried forth, it is hoped, with vigor and understanding by our representatives abroad in the ensuing months.

In summary, our immediate problems relate to the following areas:

*Western Europe;*

1. The extension of the Belgian uranium agreement;
2. Development of uranium exploration and procurement programs in Portugal, Spain and French Morocco.

*Latin America;*

1. Develop uranium exploration and procurement programs with several Latin American countries including Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

We send this report to you concerning the status of our procurement objectives abroad because we feel these objectives to be of urgent importance to the United States. We hope that this feeling of urgency can be communicated and emphasized to State Department personnel in the field and that our Ambassadors abroad accordingly will emphasize the importance and urgency of this subject to the heads of State of the various countries in which we are interested.

The Commission is anxious to have an opportunity to discuss our problems with the new officials of the Department of State who will be responsible for the areas of interest to us. The Commission would also like to be given the opportunity to discuss its raw material objectives with the appropriate new Ambassadors before they proceed to their missions abroad.

The Commission liaison officer with the Department of State, Mr. John A. Hall, will be prepared to meet with the appropriate members of your staff in order to make the necessary arrangements for a more detailed discussion of our various problems and to develop briefing sessions as suggested above.

Sincerely yours,

GORDON DEAN

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "NSC Papers, 1953-1955"

## *Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 17, 1953.

Subject: Annex to Second Progress Report on NSC 112, "Formulation of a United States Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments", dated January 19, 1953 [2]

Pursuant to the decision of the National Security Council's Senior Staff at the February 12, 1953 meeting, the following additional material is transmitted to the Council for consideration in connection with the Second Progress Report on NSC 112:

1. Proposed draft resolution concerning Disarmament, which was to be introduced during the consideration of the item in the second half of the 7th General Assembly. This resolution was tentatively agreed to by Representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada and France.
2. Suggested additional paragraph to draft resolution, to be added if strong support for such addition is obtained in confidential discussions with other delegations to the General Assembly.
3. Additional paragraphs to be added to Second Progress Report on NSC 112 and to replace Section 2 of this report entitled "Courses of Action Currently Being Implemented". These additional paragraphs reflect developments since the filing of the Second Progress Report.

It is requested that this information, together with this memorandum, be circulated to the members of the National Security Council for their information as an "Annex" in connection with the consideration of the Second Progress Report on NSC 112.

WALTER B. SMITH

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[1] By memorandum of Feb. 17, Lay transmitted copies of this paper to the members of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Acting Director of Central Intelligence. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "NSC Papers, 1953-1955")

[2] For text of the second progress report, see p. 1091.

[Enclosure 1]

## DRAFT RESOLUTION CONCERNING DISARMAMENT

*The General Assembly*

*Recognizing* that

(1) Under the Charter of the United Nations all states are bound to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(2) The aim of a system of world-wide disarmament is to prevent war and release the world's human and economic resources for the purposes of peace;

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Disarmament Commission, [3] commends the Commission for its efforts to carry out the instructions of the Sixth General Assembly, and commends the initiative of members of the Commission in submitting constructive proposals to the Commission;

2. *Reaffirms* General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) and requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work for the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans providing for:

(a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments,

(b) The elimination and prohibition of all major weapons, including bacteriological, adaptable to mass destruction, and

(c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, the whole program to be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no state would have cause to fear that its security was endangered.

3. *Requests* the Commission to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council no later than September 1, 1953.

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[3] United Nations, *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Special Suppl. No. 1.*

[Enclosure 2]

### *Suggested Insert to be Added Between Operative Paragraphs One and Two of the Draft Resolution, if Substantial Support Can be Obtained from General Assembly Delegations*

"*Notes* with regret the introduction into the discussions of issues extraneous to the Commission's tasks and the obstacles to achievement of agreement resulting from lack of a positive spirit of cooperation on the part of one of the Members of the Commission."

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[Enclosure 3]

### *Additional Paragraphs to be added to Second Progress Report on NSC 112 and to replace Section 2 of this Report entitled: "Courses of Action Currently Being Implemented"*

2. *Courses of Action Currently Being Implemented.*

The United States during the first year of the Disarmament Commission made it clear to the world that we were ready, willing and eager to work out a comprehensive disarmament program. Furthermore the United States showed its willingness to commence negotiations on any of the major aspects of such a disarmament program. It has now become apparent that Soviet policy will not permit at this time any genuine negotiations on disarmament.

President Eisenhower in his inaugural address deals with this problem in his first "fixed principle", which is stated as follows:

> "Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those who threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace. For, as it must be the supreme purpose of all free men, so it must be the dedication of their leaders, to save humanity from preying upon itself.
>
> "In the light of this principle, we stand ready to engage with any and all others in joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations, so as to make possible drastic reduction of armaments.
>
> "The sole requisites for undertaking such effort are that—in their purpose—they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all; and that—in their result—they provide methods by which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out its pledge." [4]

In view of this principle, the United States intends to point out in the Disarmament Commission the futility of working out details of a disarmament program in the absence of Soviet willingness to negotiate in connection with the general proposals already submitted to the Commission. Until the Soviet Union indicates such a willingness to negotiate, the United States believes that the Disarmament Commission discussions will be fruitless and if directed toward a detailed program rather than general principles, could create a misleading impression of progress.

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[4] For the full text of the Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1953, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 1-8.

The pursuit of this course of action in the Disarmament Commission will probably lead, in the absence of a change in Soviet attitude, to an adjournment of Disarmament Commission discussions at such time in the future as the remaining members of the Commission (other than the Soviet Union) likewise become convinced of the futility of further discussions.

It will still be necessary for the United States to develop its position on disarmament both in order to express our views in connection with proposals which may be made in the Commission by other states, and to be prepared in the event of a change in Soviet policies. The Department of State in connection with other interested agencies and certain consultants is currently working on several projects along these lines.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 132d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 18, 1953* [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 132nd meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding, the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations, the Military Liaison Officer, the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Feb. 19. A briefing memorandum from Assistant Secretary Hickerson to Secretary of State Dulles, Feb. 16, drafted in anticipation of Council discussion of disarmament matters at this meeting, is in S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

. . . . . . .

3. *Armaments and American Policy* (Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953)[2]

The President inquired of the other members of the Council as to whether they had read the report of the Panel of Consultants on the subject, and said that he expected them all to do so and to be thoroughly familiar with the conclusions and recommendations. The President himself expressed a high opinion of the report, but queried one of the conclusions, to the effect that it was bad psychologically to continue our talk about disarmament in the United Nations. Perhaps it was, and in any case he wanted the views of the members as to whether it was really wise to disengage from such discussions.

Secretary Wilson said it seemed to him that we needed a new approach to the problem. It was no longer possible to continue to talk out of both sides of our mouths at the same time, on the one hand urging an increase in the level of armament for the defense of the free world, and on the other urging the virtues of arms limitation. In any case, Secretary Wilson felt that it would be most desirable to outline what kind of a peace we should seek to impose in the event that we could not avoid war with the Soviet Union.

*The National Security Council:*[3]

a. Noted the oral comments by the President regarding the report by the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament circulated via the Senior NSC Staff by the reference memorandum.

b. Agreed to consider the report at the meeting of the Council on February 25.

4. *Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments* (Progress Report, dated January 19, 1953,[4] by the Under Secretary of State on NSC 112; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 17, 1953)[5]

After Mr. Cutler had explained the Progress Report, Secretary Dulles stated that the position which the United States would take at the forthcoming UN General Assembly on this subject would be in the nature of a temporizing position. He was not yet prepared to adopt a policy of disengagement from discussions of limitation of armaments, and still believed it to be good propaganda at least to continue these discussions. He asked General Bradley's view of this position, and General Bradley responded by saying that he saw no objection to a continuation of the discussions as long as the program for verification of armaments went hand-in-hand with any program for their limitation.

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[2] Lay's memorandum transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff the Report by the Panel of Consultants, p. 1056.

[3] Paragraphs a-b constitute NSC Action No. 716. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

[4] *Ante*, p. 1091.

[5] See footnote 1, p. 1103.

Secretary Dulles emphatically agreed with this, and repeated that the U.S. position was essentially a delaying tactic calling for a new report at the General Assembly next September.

The Vice President inquired whether it might not be possible to make some kind of sensational offer on the disarmament side, which the Soviets would of course not accept, and which would therefore put them on the spot. If it were possible to make such an offer, the Vice President believed that the effect on world opinion would be very favorable to the United States.

Secretary Dulles replied that earnest thought should certainly be given between now and September to the Vice President's suggestion. It was obvious to him, he said, that we had squeezed all the juice out of our last proposal.

Mr. Stassen warned that the USSR was certainly going to react in the near future to this and to other policies of the new Administration. This might take the form of renewed pressure on Berlin or Macao, but it was most likely to take the form of a new peace offensive. We must be ready to deal with this when it occurred.

*The National Security Council:* [6]

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the references and of the oral remarks of the Secretary of State, which set forth the proposed U.S. position on disarmament at the forthcoming meeting of the UN General Assembly.

b. Agreed to explore, between now and the next UN General Assembly meeting in September, the possibility of a new U.S. proposal on this subject.

5. *Breaches of Security*

At this point in the discussion the President said that he desired to introduce a problem not on the agenda but which had greatly disturbed him. This was the loss of a vitally important report prepared by the technical staff of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. This consisted of a summary of a report on the development of the H-bomb which had not only been prepared by this technical staff, but classified "Secret" instead of "Top Secret" by this same staff and accordingly sent by registered mail to a college professor at Princeton. There were only three people who could have let it out, and the President said that had they been in the armed forces they should have been shot. In any case, the security problem has got to be licked. It was his understanding that the present technical staff of this Committee will be abolished when a new chairman is finally chosen, but this was simply to lock the barn door after the horse had been stolen. The President confessed that he was frankly frightened, and did not know how to proceed.

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[6] Paragraphs a-b constitute NSC Action No. 717. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

Various members of the Council expressed doubt as to whether the loss of this paper could conceivably be attributed merely to carelessness, and thought rather that this was an indication of espionage and treason.

The Vice President suggested that every member of the present Joint Committee staff should immediately undergo a complete FBI check.

The President inquired whether the members of the Joint Committee could be persuaded to ask Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to take custody of the files of the technical staff before any more papers were lost or dispersed when that staff was abolished.

The President suggested that the Vice President talk to Messrs. Cole and Hickenlooper to this end, without, however, revealing the precise paper that had been lost.

*The National Security Council:* [7]

Noted the President's reference to a serious breach of security which had been reported to him by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the President's firm insistence that action be taken to prevent such breaches of security from occurring in the future.

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S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[7] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 718. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 134th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 25, 1953*[1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 134th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3 only); General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for Items 1, 2 and 3 only); the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

. . . . . . .

3. *Armaments and American Policy*[2] (Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953)[3]

As the Council turned to this report, Chairman Dean of the Atomic Energy Commission entered the Cabinet Room and took his place at the table.

Mr. Cutler briefly explained the background of the paper and read its five principal recommendations.

Thereafter the President inquired who had set up the Panel, and was informed that it had been done by the State Department. The President said that it seemed to him strange that two eminent scientists had been put on the Panel and that they had immediately moved out of the scientific realm into the realms of policy and psychology. Their recommendations plainly went beyond the law, by which the President presumably meant the Atomic Act of 1946. The President stated that he could see no sense in this and in his experience, notably as President of Columbia, most scientists concerned with atomic problems had no real grasp of the security issue and were generally anxious to reveal what they knew to any and all their fellow scientists. It would have seemed better, said the President, to have had two panels rather than one.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Feb. 26.

[2] Copies of a briefing paper for the Secretary of State prepared apparently within the Policy Planning Staff, in anticipation of this discussion, are in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments", and in S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112.

[3] Lay's memorandum transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff the Report by the Panel of Consultants, p. 1056.

Mr. Dulles,[4] as a member of the Panel, explained to the President that he and his colleagues had never been expected to approach the problem as a scientific one, and they had all been tremendously impressed with what he called the problem of "enoughness". This he explained as the problem which would exist when the Soviet Union possessed a stockpile sufficient to deal the United States a damaging blow, regardless of the fact that the United States might itself possess a much larger stockpile of weapons.

Mr. Cutler added that it seemed clear to him from his reading of the report that the members of the Panel were very greatly disturbed at the public apathy and lethargy about the atomic problem. It was for this reason that their first recommendation, with respect to explaining to the American people the "enoughness", had been made.

The President expressed his opposition at this stage to indicating to the American people anything about the size of our stockpile of weapons, and Secretary Wilson joined him by stating that it seemed foolish to scare our people to death if we don't need to and can't really do anything about the problem.

Mr. Dulles replied that the recommendation to inform the American people more fully about the situation which would prevail when the Soviet stockpile had grown large enough to deal this country a critical blow, was not for the purpose of scaring our people but of giving them a realistic picture of the dilemma in which they would find themselves.

Secretary Humphrey said that in any case there was no use whatever in blowing hot and cold with the public on the atomic situation, frightening them one day and reassuring them the next. As he saw it, the present Administration was engaged in a dual effort to restore a more normal American economy and at the same time to put the nation in a posture of prolonged preparedness, the idea being that this would frustrate Stalin's design of destroying the power of the United States without war through the sapping of its economic health. Accordingly, continued Secretary Humphrey, we must presently make a choice between this twin objective of a stronger and more normal economy together with an adequate posture of defense, or if it was deemed necessary we must take a much more aggressive position vis-à-vis the Soviet menace and raise to new heights our defense expenditures. If we chose the latter alternative it would certainly be necessary to revert to controls over the economy.

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[4] Allen W. Dulles.

The President replied that in his opinion the Administration had certainly not removed controls in order to give our citizens an easier time. It had been done because the Administration was convinced that a freer and a more normal economy would in the long run provide the nation with greater economic strength. It seemed to the President much better not to scare the people now, because if we do so they are bound to ask why we let up on the controls.

Mr. Stassen noted that in any case we must make clear to the public that the Administration's decision to drop controls was by no means to be interpreted as a proposal to let down our defense program.

At this point the President inquired as to Mr. Dean's reaction to the first recommendation of the Panel's report.

With respect to blowing hot and cold, Mr. Dean asked permission to restate the philosophy of the Atomic Energy Commission when it had presented to the Congress its most recent expansion program in the field of atomic energy. The Commission had argued that in the matter of atomic preparedness time was of the essence and that by virtue of the proposed expansion program we would obtain our objectives much sooner than otherwise. The vote in Congress had been very close, and Mr. Dean expressed the hope that the Commission's approach had been the right one and that when they had to go through the process again next spring the Council would feel that they should follow the same line.

The President said that it would make us look very silly if at this stage we reversed the field and called off the expansion program which had been approved. The facilities under it would have been half built and therefore a complete loss, and further losses would result from the cancellation of contracts which had been entered into.

Mr. Dean expressed vigorous support of the President's view, as well as the hope that nothing would be done to stop the present expansion program.

The President then reverted to the "enoughness" problem and inquired whether, when we finally achieved a sufficient stockpile of weapons, it would be possible to turn the atomic energy program toward peaceful uses.

Mr. Dean replied that with respect to fissionable material the answer was in the affirmative, but that it would be deceiving our people if we were to allow them to believe that the expensive gaseous diffusion plants which existed or were being built could ever be exploited for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Cutler then turned to Mr. Dean and asked him expressly for his views on the first recommendation of the Panel report. Should we give to the American people the information recommended therein?

In reply, Mr. Dean stated that he was more anxious that the USSR should be aware of our very great atomic strength than anyone else. He dreaded to think what might happen if, when Marshal Stalin retired from his office, it should occur to him to make some such statement as President Truman had made when he returned to Independence.[5] It would be utterly tragic if by some such occurrence the Soviet Government and people were left with the impression that the United States did not have a very great atomic capability, since they might then feel that they could move against us with comparative impunity.

The President then inquired of Mr. Dean why the AEC wanted to have one "open" shot in its forthcoming test series in Nevada.

Mr. Dean explained that the chief purpose of the "open" shot was to provide the Federal Civil Defense Administration with information as to the effect of such a shot.

The President asked if the Russians wouldn't know that we had in fact made ten shots. Was there any way of disguising this, and if there was not, could the Russians possibly underestimate the size of our stockpile? In short, asked the President, isn't it a plain fact that the information which the members of the Panel were so anxious to give to the American people was indeed already getting out to them?

Mr. Cutler broke in to say that according to his understanding the Panel was making a strong recommendation that the people of the United States be informed about what was called the "enoughness" problem and its significance for them. "I read in this report", continued Mr. Cutler, "that the people of the United States are mature and should be informed in so far as compatible with security."

The President agreed with Mr. Cutler's statement as to the maturity of the American people, but remained unconvinced of the desirability of the first recommendation. He then inquired as to the next move.

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[5] On Jan. 26, 1953, former President Truman told the press that he doubted that the Soviet Union actually possessed the atomic bomb. On Jan. 30, AEC Chairman Dean issued a formal reply taking issue with Truman's statement. Senator Hickenlooper and Representative Cole of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy also issued a statement denying the validity of the former President's contention. For these statements and additional information on the reaction to Truman's remarks, see *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1953, pp. 43, 45.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council turn the Panel report over to the Senior NSC Staff to come up with a study of ways and means of carrying out its five major recommendations.

Mr. Dean added that he thought a small *ad hoc* group should study how best to implement these recommendations, on the theory that this was the only way that their feasibility could be tested. Mr. Dean suggested that Dr. Vannevar Bush seemed a very suitable person to head such an *ad hoc* committee.

*The National Security Council:* [6]

a. Discussed the recommendations of the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament contained in the report on the subject circulated by the reference memorandum.

b. Referred the report to the Senior NSC Staff, directing it, with the assistance of Dr. Vannevar Bush, one of the Panel, to report back to the Council on possible means of carrying out the recommendations.

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S. Everett Gleason

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[6] Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 725. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

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PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy—Armaments 1952–1953"

## *Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion, Member of the Policy Planning Staff* [1]

TOP SECRET [Washington,] March 4, 1953.

Subject: Consultants Report on Disarmament [2]

The following comments relate to the "Recommendations" of the paper in reference; to the Annex to that paper and to some drafting points in its "Discussion" section.

In my opinion, this excellent study is particularly valuable for its recommendations on information policy. My chief reservations have to do with the position presented in the Annex ("Some Possible Characteristics of a Realistic Agreement on the Regulation of Armaments"), which suggests that the principal element of some future arms control plan might be the reduction in atomic stockpiles and numbers of bombing airplanes below the level which could threaten irreparable damage to the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., together with the acceptance of a limited inspection scheme which "takes some account of the Iron Curtain". These proposals are, I think, inadequate and represent a sharp break with American thinking to date on the necessities of an atomic energy control scheme which would present more safeguards than dangers. In presenting these ideas, however tentatively and hypothetically, the Report does not, in my opinion, satisfactorily explain why our existing plans for international control are no longer valid.

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[1] Gullion had served as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters in 1947 and 1948. In that position, he was the ranking official concerned with the Department's atomic energy policy on a day-to-day basis. This memorandum was directed to Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and John H. Ferguson, Deputy Director.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1056.

*"Recommendation 1: Candor to the American Government and people."*

I believe this recommendation is very convincing, although the military establishments and the AEC may have some difficulty with it. The report disposes of possible objections by pointing out that our stockpile is now "fully large enough" so that revelation of its range might have a salutary, rather than a merely enlightening effect on the Soviet Union. It is difficult to see how the American people can be brought to do the hard thinking required about foreign policy, armaments policy and civil defense unless they have some knowledge of their atomic situation comparable to that presented in this report.

*"Recommendation 2: Atomic Armaments and the Unity of the Free World".*

Under this heading the Consultants propose greater freedom in exchange of information on the "character of the problem" of the use of atomic weapons with our allies and friends. However, in a footnote, they expressly state that their recommendations do not "relate to the special problem of technical collaboration on the making of atomic weapons". Apparently what the Commission favors is more inter-allied discussion of the strategic and battlefield situations in which atomic weapons might be used, with indications and contra-indications and the trend of American thinking on these subjects. This is a field in which we are apparently only feeling our way at present in view of the various restrictions upon our "freedom of action". I think the language here reflects this groping approach. This recommendation is certainly good as far as it goes. I agree that this kind of exchange should be fostered, and believe that the Consultants are well advised in citing General Bradley's emphasis on the military importance of confidence among allies.

The recommendation disclaims any idea that "we give up our right to decide for ourselves in an emergency whether or not we will use our atomic weapons". Now, the line between the kind of exchange of information which can be permitted on "use" and that which cannot does not appear very firm. Perhaps it cannot be at this time. In any case, the approach our Government is now apparently using and which is inferentially endorsed by the Commission serves to narrow the "twilight zone" of uncertainty.

My major objection at this point is to the limited scope of the recommendation. Possibly the Consultants did not wish to court a controversy which might obscure their principal recommendations, but by excluding from consideration the topic of "technical collaboration", I believe they are by-passing an essential question in the atomic field which they are in a better position than anyone else to tackle.

The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) are a sore point in our relations with the United Kingdom and Canada. These nations have a case for thinking that the Act excludes them from scientific and technical information which they believe was promised them during the war at the highest level in accordance with an agreed division of labor in atomic research and a sharing of raw materials in which they had the advantage. This controversy has a long and very secret history and involves the division of power in foreign affairs under the American system between the executive and the legislature. The whole subject has been obfuscated by the discovery of spies in the British and American atomic energy establishments and this makes it difficult to approach it in the most rational manner. But at least we know now that the British have the bomb, that Canada is able to produce the bomb and that a number of other countries can do so in the relatively near future. Above all, we know that the Soviet Union incontestably has atomic weapons. The reasons for the rigid restrictions in the McMahon Act therefore no longer seem valid and, in fact, are possibly detrimental to our own interest. I believe that a great chance of dealing with this question will have been lost if this new Commission reporting to a new Administration does not face the issue squarely.

*"Recommendation 3: American Continental Defense".*

The effectiveness of these very valuable recommendations largely depends upon a freer atomic public information policy, as postulated in the first two recommendations of the Report.

*"Recommendation 4: Disengagement from Disarmament Discussions in the United Nations".*

The sense of this recommendation is that further such discussions within the organs of the United Nations should be minimized. This course has, in fact, been pursued by the United States since 1948.

I agree with the Consultants' statement that the approach to arms regulation through commissions of the United Nations has hitherto been "unproductive", but it is less clear what the report means when it says it has been "misleading". It is true that these discussions, as they have progressed, have become increasingly unrealistic and assumed the character of set pieces in a propaganda morality play.

Early in the debate, most of the U.N. nations made the U.S. plan their own. It is probably counter-productive to belabor this fact now. However, this section of the report seems to dismiss the U.N. Plan in a somewhat casual fashion. It is referred to merely as "bearing the marks of its birth" and as a "monument to real hopes and good intentions". Yet neither here nor elsewhere in the report do I find any systematic re-evaluation of our original proposals. Clearly the Consultants consider them at an impasse because the Soviets will not accept them, but if there is anything about the original plan which is no longer valid or technically feasible, it is not cited.

We used to think that it was the minimum for a scheme which would not permit more dangers from abuse than it prevented. But in hinting at the feasibility of a less thorough plan, the Consultants do not show why we were wrong. If it be argued that bomb-for-bomb "conventional" atomic weapons are less the "absolute weapon" than we had supposed, then we should recall the threat of the thermo-nuclear weapon.

I do not know what the Consultants have in mind when they say that "A modified version of the U.N. Plan might be relatively easy to prepare."

"*Recommendation 5: Communication with the U.S.S.R.*"

Certainly any further constriction of the channels of communication with the U.S.S.R. would be a tragic mistake if it choked off a signal coming from them to us of their belated recognition of the vital need to do something to avert atomic catastrophe.

But, I believe the Consultants' recommendations are vague and might even be interpreted to suggest more than they intend. At the outset, they propose that a "real effort" should be made to find ways of communicating with the rulers of the Soviet Union. "*Serious* negotiation", it is conceded, is hardly possible at present, but "the lesser act of *genuine** communication can do no harm and might have real value." Apparently, we are at the least to keep up a "continuous record of the way the Kremlin sounds in communication on this subject." Moreover, says the report, it is more important for the time being to "listen for sounds from Soviet representatives" than to make many of our own.

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*Underscoring supplied. [Footnote in the source text. Printed here as *italics*.]

I find it difficult to imagine how this particular conversational ball would be put into play. It seems to me to enter into a general discussion with the Soviet Union which would include consideration of armaments control, (which may be what a "real effort" would imply) but to arrive at these discussions prepared to hear sounds but make none. What would be the United States position? What would be the agenda? How is it proposed to get the Soviets to talk sense?

Although the recommendation cites the need for a "real effort" perhaps it means to do no more than to endorse continuance of the effort through routine diplomatic contacts. This may be preferable, provided our formal diplomatic representatives have an informed idea of the nature of the sounds they are to "listen for".

It is disturbing that nothing is said here about the role of our allies in such a contact with the Soviets, especially since one medium of multilateral communication will be closed down as discussion in the U.N. is curtailed and since, if the Recommendations of the Annex are adopted, the Allies would be left in a position of great danger vis-à-vis Soviet atomic power, while the United States' peril would have been reduced.

*The Annex: "Possible Characteristics of a Realistic Agreement on the Regulation of Armaments".*

The most noteworthy feature of this paper is found in the Annex, which suggests the possibility at some future time of a plan of control of much different character than the U.S. and the U.N. have heretofore supported.

I understand that the Annex is regarded as tentative, hypothetical, contingent and not an integral part of the paper, and that these qualifications are supposed to be found both in the letter of transmittal and in the Annex itself. I do not, however, find this disclaimer spelled out sufficiently.

The Annex suggests three possible features of a control plan:

> (a) That atomic stocks and bombing fleets would be reduced in the United States and the U.S.S.R. to a level from which neither great power could inflict decisive damage on the other.
>
> (b) Contingent upon this action there would then be what the Consultants call a "relatively simple system of inspection, designed to prevent any major violation from going unnoticed;" and
>
> (c) There would be a "considerable reduction in conventional weapons to balance any limitation on the instruments of mass atomic attack."

These proposals amount to a major departure from the scheme of control conceived by the United States and adopted by most of the other nations. All of these points have in one form or another been rebutted or refuted by our own representatives in supporting the

U.S. plan; nor, except for saying that the original plan "bears the marks of the year of its birth" and that a new plan must "take some account of the Iron Curtain" does the Consultants Report say what is wrong with the old one.

The principal objection to the first new proposal is that such a reduction in atomic stocks might leave the United States and the U.S.S.R. in relatively less danger from each other, but it would expose our European and British Allies to mortal peril. Moreover, although the Consultants may not have so intended, the Report can be read as meaning that this state of affairs would have been arrived at in discussions conducted largely bilaterally by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Secondly, as to inspection, the United States has previously maintained that only complete ownership by an international authority of fissionable material and its close control from the time of its severance from its place of occurrence in nature to its ultimate fabrication would suffice to guard against diversions, illicit production and stockpiling. The Annex does not cite any developments other than Soviet objection to real inspection which would make this position any less valid. It does argue that a lesser surveillance would become feasible after stockpiles are reduced. The latter solution, as indicated above, is not itself without dangers, nor does it follow that the requirements for inspection are reduced thereby. As the Consultants themselves point out, the development of thermonuclear devices calls for a more stringent rather than a less rigid inspection system; and so does the discovery of additional source materials and improvement in production techniques.

In essence, the Consultants propose to accommodate a plan for control of atomic energy to the persistence of the Iron Curtain, provided atomic stockpiles are reduced. Nothing is said about whether reduction of stockpiles is to precede setting up a control plan, or the converse; we may, in fact, be in the position of accepting a Soviet timetable we have hitherto rejected.

Perhaps no plan can be produced that does not involve lifting the Curtain. In fact, the political condition precedent which the Consultants envision as making negotiation with the Soviet Union feasible would probably have to involve substantial dissolving of the Curtain. In that case, the control plan we would favor would possibly not be that described in this report.

In any case, the proposals in the Annex represent such a drastic change that, it seems to me, they should be expounded and justified by some such reasoning process as that of the original Acheson-Lilienthal Report. It is not enough merely to say, as the new report does, that "we believe that it would be possible to sketch a proposal for the automatic component of such a scheme which would eliminate the danger of an atomic knockout and at the same time avoid the comprehensive and elaborate mechanisms of the current United Nations Plan."

Finally, as has been often pointed out in American consideration of the problem, there are dangers in linking a reduction of atomic stockpiles to a reduction in conventional weapons and land armies. It would be much easier for the Soviet Union to remobilize any elements disbanded under such a scheme than it would for us to try to recover the atomic stockpiles which have been "reduced". Incidentally, nothing is said here of another problem which has troubled the U.S. planners, and that is the disposition of fissionable materials. Does "reduction" mean destruction or disposal and, if so, by what physical means, and in what place and under what political controls? And is it desirable and justifiable to sterilize or destroy (if that were possible) this valuable source of energy?

With reference to certain points in the "Discussion" section, I offer the following comments:

(a) The use of atomic weapons in the Far East.

The report argues that American thinking has been unclear and inadequate with respect to the proper occasions and methods for use of atomic weapons in the Far East. This view can be supported, I believe, by reference to the course of the Five-Power Military Conversations of October, 1952 on counteracting possible Chinese aggression in South East Asia.[3] It is not clear whether the use of atomic weapons would be necessary to interdict a Chinese advance and whether the difference between American and British estimates of the size of the air force required could be explained by the lack of agreed terms of reference in respect of atomic weapons. Perhaps the Policy Planning Staff might appropriately interest itself in this subject.

(b) "Flexibility".

I may have missed the point here, which can perhaps be blamed on the vagueness of the language as well as on my imperfect understanding. My difficulty is with the report's use of this term and its synonym "freedom of action". By "flexibility" the Consultants apparently mean: 1) that we should be able to exchange information on the facts of atomic life more freely with other nations of the free world; and 2) the possibility of relaxing a "rigid commitment to specific forms of military action" in our strategic planning, i.e., an all-out use of atomic armaments in case of general war. In view of what follows in the report, the Consultants may also mean that we are now too rigidly committed to one particular scheme for control of atomic energy.

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[3] For documentation on the conference under reference, see vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 230 ff.

The language of this section perhaps suffers by attempting to convey by implication something which the Consultants seem reluctant to state unequivocally: 1) that the curbs on exchange of information ought to be lifted; 2) we should be considering some orientation of our military potential other than major dependence on atomic weapons; and 3) that the UNAEC plan for the International Control of Atomic Energy is no longer applicable.

The stipulations about "flexibility" and "freedom of action" might be less vague if they were not so widely separated from the specific recommendations which they may be intended to foreshadow, and which are developed subsequently in the report, as for example, for a new plan for control of atomic energy based on a reduction of stockpiles. Unfortunately, as they are used at this point, it looks as if the Committee were girding itself to make drastic recommendations but was not prepared to go beyond circumlocution in describing them.

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S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 145

## *Report to the National Security Council by the Atomic Energy Commission*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY [WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1953.

NSC 145

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICAL NUCLEAR POWER

At the direction of the President the enclosed letter to the President on the subject from the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, together with its attachments, is circulated herewith and is being scheduled for discussion at the next meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, March 11.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

## *The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean) to the President*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY WASHINGTON, March 4, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The work of the Atomic Energy Commission has advanced to the point where it is timely to attempt to formulate a national policy looking to the development of practical nuclear power. The matter has added current importance because budgetary and legislative action will be required for any policy adopted.

The need for an early statement of policy is further accented by the approaching hearings of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the subject of nuclear power at which time the Commission will be required to express its opinion on this subject.

We are, therefore, forwarding the attached statement outlining the Commission's policy views on the development of nuclear power. We propose, unless you would prefer a different course of action, to express these views at the Congressional hearings and to indicate to the Joint Committee that they will form the basis of a report which we are preparing for your consideration. This latter report will include an analysis of budgetary implications and detailed legislative recommendations, and will, of course, be submitted through the Director of the Bureau of the Budget for coordination with other interested Executive agencies.

Along with the policy statement we are including a statement of objectives planned to implement that policy.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter with you.

Respectfully yours,

GORDON DEAN

[Subenclosure 1]

## STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT

1. We believe the attainment of economically competitive nuclear power to be a goal of national importance. Reactor technology has progressed to the point where realization of this goal seems achievable in the foreseeable future if the nation continues to support a strong development effort. It would be a major setback to the position of this country in the world to allow its present leadership in nuclear power development to pass out of its hands.

2. Accordingly, we recognize it as a responsibility of the Commission to continue research and development in this field and to promote the construction of experimental reactors which appear to contribute substantially to the power reactor art and constitute useful contributions to the design of economic units.

3. In addition, it is the conviction of the Commission that progress toward economic nuclear power can be further advanced

through participation in the development program by qualified and interested groups outside the Commission.

4. We recognize the need for reasonable incentives to encourage wider participation in power reactor development and propose the following moves to attain this end:

a. Interim legislation to permit ownership and operation of nuclear power facilities by groups other than the Commission.

b. Interim legislation to permit lease or sale of fissionable material under safeguards adequate to assure national security.

c. Interim legislation which would permit owners of reactors to use and transfer fissionable and by-product materials not purchased by the Commission, subject to regulation by the Commission in the interest of security and public safety.

d. The performance of such research and development work in Commission laboratories, relevant to specific power projects, as the Commission deems warranted in the national interest.

e. More liberal patent rights than are presently granted to outside groups as may seem appropriate to the Commission and consistent with existing law.

f. Consideration of a progressively adjusted code for safety and exclusion area requirements as may appear reasonable in the light of operational experience with reactors. Competent state authorities will be encouraged to assume increasing responsibility for safety aspects of reactor operation. Financial responsibility associated with reactor operation will be assigned to the owners, in keeping with normal industrial practice.

g. Giving full recognition to the importance of reactor technology to our national security, a progressively liberalized information policy in the power reactor field as increasing activity justifies.

5. It is the objective of this policy to further the development of nuclear plants which are economically independent of government commitments to purchase weapons-grade plutonium.

6. We view the next few years as a period of development looking toward the realization of practical nuclear power. On this basis we conclude that the time is not yet at hand for the report called for in Section 7(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (see Appendix).

[Subenclosure 2]

## PROPOSED PROGRAM IN SUPPORT OF THE AEC STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT

1. In implementing the AEC "Statement of Policy on Nuclear Power Development", there are three pending developments which could well materialize in the near future. The initiative for the first of these rests with the Commission itself and will entail a direct outlay of some $15 million in Federal funds. The second and

third developments will rely primarily on private financing but will require Government support spread over several years. These projects are as follows:

a. *Construction of an experimental power reactor having an electric power output of about 7,500 KW, to be financed by the Atomic Energy Commission.*

Of the four reactor types currently showing promise as electric power producers, the sodium-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor appears to be in the most advanced technical state and ready for pilot plant test. Construction can be started as soon as funds are made available. It is hoped that a successful pilot plant would encourage private industry to construct full-scale units of this general design.

b. *Construction by private industry on a partial risk basis of a full-scale (100,000–200,000 electrical KW) power reactor of conservative design.*

For example, a group of privately-owned utilities has indicated an interest in pooling resources to enable the early construction of a full-scale power plant with private funds, on the condition that the Commission is willing to protect the owners against excessive losses. Power from such a reactor might be consumed by the Atomic Energy Commission. In the interest of gaining early operational experience with a large nuclear power plant, the Commission would look with favor on a proposal of this kind provided the required guarantees proved to be reasonable. Construction might commence within a year after agreement is reached on this subject.

c. *Construction of a full-scale power breeder by an industrial group employing risk capital.*

To further the attainment of this goal, the Commission believes it is in the public interest to offer reasonable assistance by the National Laboratories in support of this type project over the next few years.

2. Looking beyond the immediate future, we visualize that during the next ten-year period:

a. Various types of power reactors will progress to the stage where pilot plant construction will be warranted. Requests by the Atomic Energy Commission for funds to build two or three additional prototype power reactors are likely.

b. Government development efforts involving the use of unique Commission facilities and skills will be made available to responsible groups who are seeking the goal of economic nuclear power independent of financial commitments from the Government. These services will be offered only to the extent that they do not conflict with the weapon or military reactor program requirements.

3. We estimate that the programs envisaged in paragraphs 1 and 2 over the next ten years might require Government financing of the order of $10,000,000 a year. This estimate will be subject to considerable revision in coming years depending on the number of reactor designs tested, progress in reactor technology, and the

amount of industrial interest and investment in the power reactor field.

4. In view of the time which must necessarily elapse before any reactor which could produce both power and weapon grade plutonium would come on-stream, the Commission does not recommend support for private projects based on a Government commitment to purchase weapons grade plutonium.

## Appendix

*Section 7 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946*

Report to Congress.—Whenever in its opinion any industrial, commercial, or other nonmilitary use of fissionable material or atomic energy has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value, the Commission shall prepare a report to the President stating all the facts with respect to such use, the Commission's estimate of the social, political, economic, and international effects of such use and the Commission's recommendations for necessary or desirable supplemental legislation. The President shall then transmit this report to the Congress together with his recommendations. No license for any manufacture, production, export, or use shall be issued by the Commission under this section until after (1) a report with respect to such manufacture, production, export, or use has been filed with the Congress; and (2) a period of ninety days in which the Congress was in session has elapsed after the report has been so filed. In computing such period of ninety days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days.

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PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments 1952-1953"

## *Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1953.

*Problem:*

To develop a Department of State position on NSC 145—A Report to the National Security Council by the Atomic Energy Commission on the Development of Practical Nuclear Power.[1]

*Background and Discussion:*

See Annex I.

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[1] *Supra.*

*Recommendations:*

It is recommended that the Department of State strongly support the objectives of the Atomic Energy Commission report. In so doing, the following points should be made:

1. The early development of useful nuclear power by the United States, with its tremendous implications for the future of mankind, would be additional and dramatic evidence of the peaceful and humanitarian policies of this government. It would give tangible evidence to refute the oft-repeated Soviet charges that the United States is interested only in the destructive aspects of atomic energy, while the Soviet Union has been developing it for peaceful purposes. If some other country, particularly the Soviet Union, developed useful atomic power first, it would be a major psychological, cold war setback to the United States.

2. The legislation required to permit industry to participate in the development of useful nuclear power should be so drafted as to enable the United States to deal with certain foreign countries in this area, not only to assure the continuance of the flow of uranium and other raw materials to the United States from present suppliers, but also to stimulate such a flow from other potential producers. It might also be possible to use such a card to bind our allies closer to us and even influence certain countries presently neutral to be more positively cooperative.

3. The implications of a relaxation in domestic controls and safeguards over this industry has a bearing on our position on the international control of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Commission should be asked to keep this factor in mind as the proposed program develops in order to determine whether practical experience might give some new ideas and safeguards which might properly become a basis for any modification in the United States position on international control of atomic energy, should such a modification become either necessary or desirable.

R. GORDON ARNESON

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### Annex I

### BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of the subject report is to establish an Administration position on, budgetary support, and appropriate legislative action for, a program for the development of practical nuclear power by the Atomic Energy Commission with the assistance of industry to the extent possible. In order for industry to play a role in this field, legislation amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is necessary. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy will hold hearings on this problem in the near future. The Atomic Energy Commission desires legislative action at this session of the Congress.

Varying types of power reactors are contemplated, with varying degrees of Commission and industry development and construction. The Atomic Energy Commission also hopes to avoid, as not pertinent to the present problem, controversy as between public and private power.

The Department need not become involved in the technical aspects of the matter. However, there are a number of very real foreign policy implications in the development of nuclear power, whether by the Atomic Energy Commission or by industry, or both, and regardless of the reactors used.

It would be a very serious blow to the United States if another country developed useful nuclear power before the United States did. If the Soviet Union did so, it would give tremendous weight to their oft-repeated charges that the United States is developing atomic energy only for destructive purposes, while the Soviet Union has been developing it for peaceful purposes. If some country other than the Soviet Union should do so, a similar but somewhat less damaging comparison might still be made. On the other hand, the development of atomic power together with legislation which would permit of some non-Atomic Energy Commission participation in its development and use could put the United States in a very advantageous position vis-à-vis foreign countries. Those countries which are actual or potential producers of uranium for the United States program have been putting on increasing pressure to acquire from us some of the benefits derived from their uranium. We have, in fact, a specific commitment—yet to be implemented—to Belgium in this regard. If we were in a position to be more forthcoming than present legislation permits, we would be able not only to assure continuance of present supplies of raw materials, but also enhance the possibilities of increasing our sources of supply. This card in our hands might also be of some use in bringing other allies and even neutrals closer to the United States.

Another aspect of this development of real interest to the United States concerns its implications for the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy. This plan provides safeguards against violations and evasions, including not only inspection, but also international ownership of source and fissionable material, and international ownership, operation, and management of facilities making or using dangerous (militarily significant) quantities of fissionable material. These safeguards closely parallel the safeguards provided in our domestic legislation. Under the proposed legislation, there will be some relaxation in such controls and safeguards. We may well be under some pressure, both at home and abroad, to modify our position on the international control of atomic energy accordingly.

At the Senior Staff meeting on Monday, March 9, at 2 p.m., Mr. Nash of the Department of Defense indicated that although neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Secretary of Defense had seen the Atomic Energy Commission report, Mr. Nash felt that the Department of Defense would support the objectives of the report. Mr. Bromley Smith [2] made the points covered in paragraphs 1 and 2 under *Recommendations* above. Mr. Cutler was impressed by them and requested that the Secretary of State restate them at the NSC meeting. [3]

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[2] Bromley K. Smith, Alternate Department of State Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.

[3] See the extract from the memorandum of discussion at the 136th meeting of the NSC, Mar. 11, *infra*.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, March 11, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 136th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1 only); General Collins for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

### *1. The Development of Practical Nuclear Power* (NSC 145) [2]

At Mr. Cutler's request, Chairman Dean expanded on the contents of NSC 145, and explained to the Council why he regarded the proposals therein as of very great importance. He noted that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 reposed responsibility for the development of atomic power for peaceful purposes in the Commission. It had been impossible to do very much in this area in the past, but in the course of the next five years Chairman Dean anticipated intensive development of power reactors, and NSC 145 represented a policy and the outlines of a program for that period.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Mar. 12.

[2] Dated Mar. 6, p. 1121.

Chairman Dean also explained the requirement of the Atomic Energy Act for a report to Congress by the AEC at such time as the development of practical nuclear power seemed feasible. He did not believe, however, that the time had yet come for such a formal report to the Congress. He proposed instead that the Commission should express the views outlined in NSC 145 to the Joint Congressional Committee orally in the course of hearings next month.

At the conclusion of Chairman Dean's statement, the President expressed the view that there was no use in the Commission talking to Congress until it had placed at least an informal written report, on the anticipated development of the next five years in this area, in the hands of the Congress. If this were done, the interested parts of the Executive branch could examine the written report of the Commission and thereafter follow the order and procedure which had been laid down for the Commission in the Act of 1946. The President stressed that this written report would not be final or complete, but would at least set forth the anticipated development of practical nuclear power.

Secretary Wilson said that it certainly seemed to him that the proposals set forth in NSC 145 were crowding things a bit, and the President noted that in various conversations on this subject with industrial leaders he had noted a general desire on their part to produce plutonium and thereafter to sell it to the Government at a certain price. This amounted to an indirect subsidy. The President likewise warned that the program outlined in NSC 145 still had important defense implications, and for that reason he felt that the AEC should as far as possible at the present time follow the course laid down in Section 7 (b) of the Act of 1946.

Secretary Wilson, reverting to his earlier statement that we were pushing things too fast, suggested delay for another six months before we followed any course of action in this field, which would amount to Government subsidization of industry.

There then ensued a discussion as to the probable size of a Government subsidy to private industry in this field over a period of some ten years. The President estimated that the subsidy would probably amount to $100,000,000.

Mr. Dodge expressed the opinion that in any event the AEC should not talk at this time to the Congress about any specific program for interesting private industry in the production of nuclear power. He was inclined to think that the President's estimate of $100,000,000 might be low, and he also anticipated that there will be demands at once for a subsidy of perhaps $10,000,000 in the 1954 budget.

Commenting on this discussion, the President made it clear that he was in disagreement not with the Commission's conclusions in NSC 145, but with the manner in which it proposed to present its policy and program to the Congress. Such a policy and program the President believed should be presented not merely by the Commission but by the whole Executive branch of the Government, including of course the Bureau of the Budget.

Secretary Dulles then inquired of Chairman Dean what activities were being undertaken by other countries in the development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

Chairman Dean replied that little or nothing was known about any programs in the Soviet Union, but that very strong incentives in this direction had developed in the United Kingdom and in Canada, and, to a lesser extent, in other smaller countries.

Secretary Dulles said that it would look very bad if the United States lagged behind the others.

Chairman Dean expressed strong agreement with the Secretary of State, but then reverted to the subject of subsidy, pointing out that the objective of the current AEC proposal was to encourage risk capital, and he did not feel that there was need to fear excessive subsidies.

The President, however, stuck to his point, and stated that in a recent conversation with Mr. Charles Thomas (President of the Monsanto Chemical Company) he had deduced that there would have to be at least a subsidy in the shape of a guaranteed Government price for purchases of plutonium from a private industrial concern. It was only on this or a similar basis that private capital would go ahead.

At this point in the discussion, Secretary Humphrey suggested that the problem presented in NSC 145 be handed to the recently established Consultants to the NSC, pointing out that Mr. Thomas was himself a member of this group. [3]

The President stated that these Consultants had a lot of other things to do, but Mr. Cutler interposed to say that the issue under discussion could be raised at the scheduled AEC briefing of these Consultants.

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[3] Regarding the establishment of a committee of civilian consultants to advise the NSC on the cost of basic national security policies, see the editorial note, p. 244.

Mr. Cutler then reverted to the question of the psychological effects of such a program for the development of practical nuclear power as proposed in NSC 145. He also felt that the Council should look into the possibility of sharing knowledge in this area with the allies of the United States. On these points he requested the opinions of Chairman Dean and Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles answered that he believed that the United States should assume leadership in this very important project.

The President then stated to the Council that it seemed to him that the most specific immediate problem was that of constructing a pilot plant for production of nuclear power.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the opinion that it would be impossible for the Government to contemplate making any deal with private industry until such a pilot plant had actually been constructed. To do otherwise would simply be putting the cart before the horse. In Secretary Humphrey's opinion, it would be OK if private capital could be induced to build such a pilot plant, but he had doubts about it if the Government was obliged to do it alone. Chairman Dean confirmed that it was the objective of the Commission's report to induce private capital to build this pilot plant, but warned that it might nevertheless be necessary for the Government to offer some kind and degree of financial assistance. That, said Secretary Humphrey, was precisely what worried him.

The President then interposed to suggest a resumption of discussion of the psychological aspect of the plan in NSC 145. What would happen to the United States from the psychological point of view, he inquired, if news of this proposal got about the world and we were then unable to bring it off successfully? Clearly, such an effect would be disastrous, and to the President, the correct approach to the problem seemed plainly further investigation in a quiet way to explore the possibilities for success in the enterprise.

Secretary Humphrey agreed very emphatically with this view, and said that it was the very reason why it was necessary first to build a pilot plant. This would enable us to get the data and, on the basis of the results, to proceed further or not, as seemed indicated.

While not disagreeing with this position, Chairman Dean said he thought it ill-advised to limit ourselves to one Government-built pilot plant. We would get ahead much more rapidly with our problem if industry could be induced to participate in the construction of a pilot plant. This, however, would plainly require changes in the law as set forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

The President replied that he certainly saw no reason not to explore desirable changes in the law. Furthermore, he obviously welcomed the participation and the views of private industry. That was all clearly to the good. With which Secretary Humphrey agreed, provided the expense was also assumed by private industry.

Secretary Wilson, on the other hand, prophesied that private industry would not be much interested in any proposition of this sort for at least a couple of years if industry were not subsidized by the Government.

It seemed to be the consensus that subsidization was to be avoided. Whereupon the President suggested that the desirable action was to move toward modification of the current legislation in order to permit private capital to share in this enterprise if it could be induced to do so. Meanwhile he thought we should go ahead also on plans for a pilot plant.

Secretary Wilson expressed the belief that before the Government moved ahead to build any such pilot plant, it would be highly desirable to see some figures, computed by responsible people, on the relative costs to produce power by nuclear, in comparison to other, processes. He believed that it was foolish to go ahead with any expensive pilot plant until there was evidence that it could produce power at a sufficiently low cost to compete with other methods. At the present time, Secretary Wilson estimated that atomic power costs would be in the magnitude of ten times the cost of already available power. Why waste money this way when we need it so badly in other areas?

The President then inquired whether any member of the Council objected to steps being taken at once by way of proposing changes in the existing law to put private industry on notice as to possibilities open to it, but leaving out the pilot plant and the subsidy issue for the time being. No one, said the President, wants to put a halter on United States industry if the halter were no longer necessary. Indeed, the President went on to state, he could be persuaded to agree to at least some modest subsidy, perhaps $4,000,000, if as a result of changes in the law private industry should turn up with something promising in this field.

The discussion then turned to the form of a report to be presented to the President by the Atomic Energy Commission as to the desirable revisions in the law. Chairman Dean pointed out that in a very broad way the necessary changes had already been set forth in NSC 145, but that he could do it in greater detail if the President thought this useful.

General Collins stated that if the Council agreed to the preparation of such a report by the Commission, he desired to point out that the military felt that there were a number of other changes which should be made in the law when it was amended, notably changes which would enable this Government to share certain information in the atomic field with our allies in the interests of national security.

The President agreed that Chairman Dean's report should contain not only proposed revisions in the law to encourage the development of practical nuclear power, but changes such as those suggested by General Collins and changes which might appear desirable at this time to other departments and agencies of the Government.

Chairman Dean agreed to canvass the other departments and agencies in order to include their recommendations in his report on desirable changes in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

*The National Security Council:* [4]

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject and agreed:

(1) To refer the report to the Consultants established by NSC Action No. 726–c, to obtain their views regarding the proposals set forth therein. [5]

(2) That, pending receipt of such views, no additional funds for a pilot plant should be authorized, other than the approximately $3,000,000 presently included in the Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954 budgets.

(3) That no subsidy to private enterprise should be contemplated, at least until further developmental work indicated the necessity therefor.

b. Noted the President's desire that the Atomic Energy Commission submit to him, in non-technical language, those changes in the Atomic Energy Act which would appear desirable at the present time, both for the development of practical nuclear power and for other purposes, so that these changes may be considered by all interested departments and agencies.

*Note:* The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation. [6]

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S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[4] Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 733. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

[5] For the substance of NSC Action No. 726–c, see the editorial note, p. 244.

[6] The Council at a special meeting on Mar. 31, discussed at length the question of nuclear power in the context of overall national security programs and their costs. For the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, see p. 264. Agreed policy on nuclear power and the amount to be allocated for the atomic energy program in general was included in NSC 149/2, "Basic National Security Policies in Relation to Their Costs", Apr. 29, 1953; for text, see p. 305.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments 1952-1953"

## *Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the NSC Senior Staff*[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1953.

Subject: Armaments and American Policy

References:

A. Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953[2]

B. NSC Action No. 725[3]

C. Record of Meeting of Senior NSC Staff, March 2, 1953, item 3[4]

It will be recalled that the National Security Council at its 134th meeting directed the Senior Staff, with the assistance of Dr. Vannevar Bush, to report to the Council on possible means of carrying out the recommendations of the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, as contained in the report circulated by the reference memorandum of February 4. The Senior Staff constituted an *ad hoc* committee to prepare an initial draft report for consideration by the Senior Staff with the advice and assistance of Dr. Bush.

The following officials have been designated to serve on the *ad hoc* committee:

State—Gordon Arneson (Chairman), John Ferguson
Defense—Charles P. Noyes
AEC—Roy B. Snapp
CIA—William P. Bundy
PSB—Horace S. Craig
Executive Secretary—Philip H. Watts

To initiate preparation of the report called for by the Council, "Armaments and American Policy" is being scheduled as item 1 on the agenda for the meeting of the Senior Staff on Monday, March 16, 1953 at 2:30 p.m.[5] Dr. Bush and the *ad hoc* committee are being invited to participate in the meeting on this item.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[1] Copies were transmitted to Dr. Vannevar Bush of the Panel of Consultants and to the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee designated in this memorandum.

[2] Lay's memorandum transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff the Report by the Panel of Consultants, p. 1056.

[3] For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114.

[4] The record of meeting indicates that the Senior Staff "Discussed procedure for preparing the reports called for by NSC Action No. 724-b and constituted an *ad hoc* committee, composed of State, Defense, AEC, CIA and PSB representatives (with Civil Defense participation as required), to consult Dr. Vannevar Bush and prepare an initial draft report for consideration by the Senior Staff with the participation of Dr. Bush." (S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Planning Board Meetings 1953-1954")

[5] See summary of meeting, *infra*.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments 1952-1953"

## *Summary of Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy and the Senior Staff of the National Security Council, March 16, 1953* [1]

TOP SECRET

Present were:

James Lay, Presiding
Robert Cutler
Vannevar Bush
*John Ferguson
Frank Nash
Robert Amory
C. Dillon Glendinning [2]
Robert Finley
George Morgan [3]
Frank N. Roberts [4]
*Charles Noyes
*Gordon Arneson
Roy Snapp
Horace Craig
Lt. Col. E.F. Black
Everett Gleason
Marion Boggs
Bromley Smith
Harry Schwartz [5]
*Philip H. Watts
Other military officers

Mr. Lay welcomed Dr. Bush and thanked him for his willingness to advise with the *Ad Hoc* Committee which had been established to study the recommendations of Report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament. [6] Dr. Bush said he was embarrassed to be the only member of the Panel so called upon and suggested that other members be consulted.

Mr. Lay explained that the NSC had discussed the Panel's Report in some detail, considered it an excellent piece of work, and wanted concrete proposals for carrying out the Report's recommendations and the implications of any suggested courses of action.

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[1] Prepared by Philip H. Watts, Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. According to the source text, the asterisks denote "Members of *Ad Hoc* Comm".

[2] Deputy Director, Office of International Finance, Treasury Department; Acting Treasury Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.

[3] PSB Adviser, NSC Senior Staff.

[4] Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, Senior Military Adviser, Mutual Security Agency; MSA Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.

[5] Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

[6] For the report of the Panel of Consultants, see p. 1056.

In the ensuing discussion, Mr. Cutler expressed a real sense of urgency in placing before the NSC a study on Recommendation I, dealing with candor to the American Government and People. He directed the *Ad Hoc* Committee to address itself to this Recommendation in the first instance and to have its report ready early in April. He suggested that it be as short as possible and, to be of maximum effectiveness, it should be in the hands of the Senior Staff before April 6th so that it could be considered by the Council on April 8th.

In the course of the meeting, Mr. Cutler made the following points:

1. The Council is very interested in the Recommendations of the Panel's Report.
2. In considering Recommendation I, the Council raised questions as to (a) what is to be gained by greater candor with the American people; (b) what are the people to be told after you have scared them; and (c) what courses of action and what programs must be undertaken to alleviate the danger and to assure the people that all is not lost.
3. There is a possibility that conditions behind the iron curtain may be deteriorating.
4. The death of Stalin[7] introduces a new factor—transfer of power at first looked smooth but indications are that this may not be so.
5. The Administration has pledged itself to balance the budget and cut taxes but if broad programs for continental and civil defense are undertaken this would not be possible.

Dr. Bush made the following points during the meeting:

1. The American public is already being told quite a lot but not officially and authoritatively.
2. There is much greater danger from lethargy on the people's part than from panic.
3. The Administration has much more to gain from being frank and telling the truth about the seriousness of the situation than from sitting tight and doing nothing about the dangers in spite of the pressures to reduce taxes. By greater candor, a new atmosphere will be created in the country.
4. More frankness is needed also among officials of Government. There has been far too much stress on secrecy.
5. If budget cuts have already been decided upon, then it will be impossible to carry out civilian and continental defense recommendations of Panel's Report—substantial amounts of money could be saved in Defense Department.
6. People should be told the nature of the atom race, especially that *it's a 2-way affair.*
7. The H-bomb changes the nature of the world in which we live.

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[7] The death of Stalin had been announced on Mar. 5.

It's another breed from the A-bomb. New York City could survive 2 or 3 A-bombs but one H-bomb and no more N.Y.C. There is all too little intelligent thought being given to change created by the magnitude of destructiveness of H-bomb. Time is coming when danger of annihilation is imminent on both sides.

8. $3–5 billion over next few years applied to continental and civilian defense would help greatly and postpone day when situation will be acute. There is no air-tight defense but every bit helps to reduce the enemy potential. Also Soviet thinking can be affected and they can be kept in such doubt about the effectiveness of our defenses as to create a real deterrent to attack.

9. Technical advances are important, especially guided missiles and dopler [*Doppler*] radar.

Mr. Nash suggested that members of the Council would be helped in their thinking if Dr. Bush could lay before them the ugly facts.

Mr. Nash said that the Kelly Committee report was not due until early in April.

Mr. Nash raised the question of whether the peaceful uses of atomic energy could be used as an antidote to the disclosure of facts on the H-bomb.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean) to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President*

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1953.

DEAR MR. CUTLER: When the Commission's power policy was presented to the National Security Council on March 11, 1953, [1] the President suggested that a preamble might be added to the policy statement, [2] with special reference to Section 7 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act and the development of industrial interest in the potentialities of nuclear power.

Enclosed, for addition to the proposed Statement of Policy for Nuclear Power Development, is a Preamble which has been approved by the Commission. It might be helpful if this could be distributed to the panel of consultants and other participants in the meeting on this subject scheduled for March 31, 1953. [3]

Sincerely yours,

GORDON DEAN

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[1] For the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at the 136th meeting of the NSC, Mar. 11, see p. 1128.

[2] The policy statement is in NSC 145, Mar. 6, p. 1121.

[3] A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the enclosed statement was read at the NSC meeting of Mar. 31. The source text is filed with the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, printed on p. 264.

[Enclosure]

## PREFACE TO STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT

1. From the time the first self-sustaining nuclear chain reactor was demonstrated ten years ago, the eventual technical feasibility of nuclear power has been accepted. Developments in nuclear reactors since that time, including submarine power plants and production of token quantities of electric power by the Experimental Breeder Reactor and the Homogeneous Reactor Experiment, have served to reinforce confidence in the ultimate commercial practicability of nuclear power. Additional evidence of this confidence is reflected in the increasing interest on the part of industry to contribute more fully to this development.

2. However, the general availability in this country of relatively inexpensive sources of energy such as coal, oil, and hydro power, places a severe economic requirement on competitive nuclear power. A nuclear plant built on the basis of today's technology could not compete with conventional power. Yet it would be misleading to evaluate the future prospects for economic nuclear power on the basis of estimates of near-future performance. We must understand that the nuclear reactor research of the past years served specialized military needs and was not aimed specifically at the production of economic power. Although a difficult development period lies ahead, there is considerable optimism that economic nuclear power can be attained within a few years.

3. It is the judgment of the Commission that now is the time to announce a positive policy designed to recognize the development of economic nuclear power as a national objective. An important element of this policy is to promote and encourage free competition and private investment in the development work, while at the same time accepting on the part of Government certain responsibilities for furthering technical progress in this field to provide a necessary basis for such development.

4. While we conclude that atomic power has not yet been developed to the point of economic use, and that the time is not yet at hand for the report called for in Section 7 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act, we do believe it is imperative that we create a favorable atmosphere which will hasten that day. We believe that the United States should continue in its present position of leadership among

those nations striving to promote the peacetime applications of atomic energy. As a nation we should not delay the development of this great potential source of energy for constructive purposes until circumstances force us to attempt its practical realization on a short time scale.

5. To this end, the Atomic Energy Commission has endorsed, as a basis for discussion with other executive agencies and the Congress, the attached statement of policy on the development of nuclear power.

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330.13/4-253

### *The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1953.

DEAR CABOT: As you will remember, we had anticipated that the United States would follow a line in the United Nations Disarmament Commission which would involve a relaxed attitude and relatively little activity in the Commission. [2] Such a position would spring naturally from the contrast between the adamantly obstructive attitude which the Soviet Union had exhibited in the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission thus far and our own record of cooperativeness and flexibility.

It seems fairly certain, however, as a result of recent developments, that such a position cannot be followed. The succession of Soviet overtures for settlement of outstanding differences has extended itself to the field of disarmament. The Soviet Union has indicated its intentions in a number of ways—particularly through submitting a more flexible resolution in connection with the Disarmament item in the General Assembly and through the unprecedented step of voting in favor of most sections of the resolution supported by the United States. [3]

It thus seems quite possible that we may have a considerable degree of activity in the Disarmament Commission with possible new proposals from the USSR and from states trying to bridge the gap between U.S.-USSR, as well as any proposals which we may wish to put forward. All this will involve a great deal of work within the United States Government both in New York at the

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer and Meyers of UNP.

[2] See the letter from Hickerson to Lodge, Feb. 4, p. 1096.

[3] For information on disarmament discussions in Committee I of the General Assembly, Mar. 18-21, and subsequent action by the General Assembly in plenary session, see the editorial note, *infra*.

United Nations and in Washington. Down here, we have to carry on our operations on an inter-Agency basis because of the major role played both by Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Previously, Ambassador Austin has acted as the Representative of the United States on various United Nations Commissions but a Deputy Representative was also designated, who in many instances, including disarmament, carried on most of the work. We would hope that you would be willing to act as the Representative on the Disarmament Commission and give these problems as much of your time as possible. However, it seems advisable to appoint a Deputy Representative, who would devote full time to the problems of disarmament and would be able to work with the Departments of State and Defense and the United States Atomic Energy Commission here in Washington, as well as to participate in the activities of the Disarmament Commission in New York.

I would greatly appreciate your views on these matters, believing that we should make the appropriate decisions on these problems as soon as possible in view of the vast amount of ground which we must cover before the Disarmament Commission resumes its sessions—which presumably will be in May.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN D. HICKERSON

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## *Editorial Note*

Committee I of the General Assembly considered disarmament from March 18 to March 21, 1953. It discussed two draft resolutions—one introduced by the United States and 13 other nations (A/C.1/L.30), and one by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.31). The 14-power proposal was substantially that contained in the first enclosure to the memorandum by Smith to Lay, dated February 17, page 1104. The Soviet proposal condemned the Western position in the Disarmament Commission. It also provided for the study by the Commission of measures for the reduction of great power forces, and the prohibition of atomic, bacterial, and other weapons of mass destruction, and of procedures for strict international control. The Soviet draft resolution was defeated in the Committee on March 21 by a vote of 41-5-13. The Committee then approved the 14-power resolution by a vote of 50-5-5.

In plenary session of the General Assembly, the 14-power resolution was slightly modified by Soviet amendment and passed (52-5-3) as General Assembly Resolution 704 (VII) "Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments—Report of the Disarmament Commission", April 8, 1953.

For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* volume I, pages 383–384. Resolution 704 (VII) differed from the draft resolution, printed as the first enclosure to the memorandum by Smith to Lay of February 17, in that the approved resolution did not commend the Disarmament Commission for its efforts to date, but did contain a final phrase expressing the hope that all members of the Commission would cooperate in efforts to produce constructive proposals.

For additional information on consideration of disarmament by the General Assembly at its Seventh Session, see *Yearbook of the United Nations,* 1953, pages 258–262; *U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1953* (Government Printing Office, 1954), pages 54–56; and Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control,* pages 202–207.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Combined Development Agency-General"

### *Memorandum for the Files, by J. Bruce Hamilton* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1953.

There follow notes on the meeting of the American Side of the Combined Development Agency on Monday, April 13. A copy of the Agenda is attached. [2]

Present at the meeting were Mr. Marion Boyer, Chairman, [3] Messrs. Hall, [4] Mitchell, [5] A. A. Wells, Faulkner, [6] J. Johnson [7] of the AEC; Dr. C. K. Leith, Consultant; Mr. Bruce Hamilton, Department of State.

1. Arrangements were discussed for the several meetings this week with the Belgians looking to a renewal of the governmental agreement on the Congo uranium ore.

2. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the expansion in the mining and development programs in the Congo should be started in the fairly near future in order that the results could become available under the renewed agreement. Thus he felt it might be impractical to delay the start of these programs until a renewed agreement had been finalized, especially if this should require a year or more. Mr. Wells pointed out that the proposed development program would

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[1] Hamilton served in the office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters.

[2] Not printed.

[3] General Manager of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

[4] John A. Hall, Director of the Office of Special Projects, AEC.

[5] William Mitchell, General Counsel of the AEC.

[6] Rafford L. Faulkner, Assistant Director for Foreign Procurement, Division of Raw Materials, AEC.

[7] Jesse C. Johnson, Director of the Division of Raw Materials, AEC.

not be required to meet our demands under the present agreement but would be required if the agreement were renewed.

3. There was a brief discussion of the problem of the corporate entity under the Moroccan Agreement. General Counsel Mitchell stated that he had hoped to talk with Mr. Jesse Johnson on this point to find out just what was required and to assist in finding a way for doing it. In these circumstances it was decided to forego further discussion of the subject at this meeting.

4. Mr. Hall recalled that the Commission had been invited by the Spanish Government to send geologists to Spain for a uranium survey. He pointed out that the invitation was a very general one and that further discussion in Madrid would be required to develop details of a working program and to determine the extent of the indicated Spanish commitment to make uranium available to the United States. It was pointed out that Ambassador Dunn [8] had presented his credentials on April 9 and could shortly be expected to take up the atomic energy problem on the basis of the instructions which had gone forward some time previously.

Dr. Leith asked whether this agreement would include Spanish Morocco. Mr. Hall responded that pending further conversations with Spanish authorities, this point could not be determined. Dr. Leith thought that it would be desirable to include Spanish Morocco, pointing out that geologically, French and Spanish Morocco were pretty much the same.

5. Reference was made to the fact that the British have requested 500 tons of $U_3O_8$ in the 1953 allocation. [9] In addition to the stock of unallocated Congo ore in the U.K., there would be required 185 tons to round out the 500-ton figure. Although there are in the U.K. 110 tons of Portuguese ore, the U.K. has indicated that it would prefer to use other ore, probably South African, and would consider making the 110 tons available to the United States. Mr. Faulkner pointed out that under such an arrangement, 75 tons of ore from current production would be required to complete the U.K. allocation. It was felt that an attempt should be made to get the British to reduce their requirement by this amount and it was proposed to raise the subject with Sir John Cockroft. [10] Since, however, it has been learned that he will not be in Washington for these sessions on the Belgian Agreement, there was some question

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[8] James Clement Dunn, U.S. Ambassador in Spain.

[9] The request was transmitted by Ambassador Makins to Secretary of State Dulles in a letter of Apr. 2, not printed. (Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Raw Materials")

[10] Director of Britain's Atomic Energy Research Establishment.

as to whether the subject could be discussed with his replacement, Mr. J. V. Dunworth.

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7. Discussion of Latin American programs centered on Argentina and Brazil. Mr. Faulkner reviewed the developments in Argentina involving Mr. Price, concluding by observing that the Embassy in Buenos Aires has been asked to bring this problem officially to the Argentine Government. Mr. Boyer noted that the Argentine sample which had been analyzed by the AEC was a very high grade one. It was also noted that the Argentine ideas of ore prices seemed unrealistically high.

Regarding Brazil, Mr. Hall observed that a visit from Admiral Alberto[11] was anticipated in the near future and also that Mr. Max White of the USGS would be available prior to that time to give his ideas and advice on the Brazilian situation as he had learned it from his experience of the last eight or ten months.

Mr. Johnson observed that the Pocos de Caldos ore is a complex zirconium-uranium ore and foresaw, in addition to technological problems, an economical problem regarding disposition of the zirconium. He added that Brazilian ideas of zirconium prices, even unrelated to uranium, were quite high.

8. Other subjects: Mr. Boyer noted that the recently issued report of General Smith had been critical of the CDA's efforts in regard to areas under British jurisdiction. He mentioned specifically Northern Rhodesia, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. Mr. Hall pointed out that under the terms of the CPC, the CDA was specifically excluded from British territories as it was from American territories such as Alaska. Mr. Boyer felt, nevertheless, that the CDA should go over the situation and prepare a response to this criticism. Dr. Leith suggested that we might simply ask the U.K. authorities as a matter of information what had been done about looking for uranium in these areas. Mr. Hall observed that the U.K. seemed to be increasingly sensitive concerning the important role played by the U.S. in the significant uranium operations in Australia and the Union of South Africa.

Dr. Leith said that on the basis of his recent trip to Mexico he, with some temerity, wished to express the idea that uranium exploration operations were being delayed by the necessity of working through the Department of State. Mr. Hamilton responded that it was undeniably true that a certain element of delay was entailed in working from the Commission to the State Department, to the Embassy. It was his firm opinion, however, that this delay was inconsequential compared with the considerable delay encountered in getting the Latin American authorities to take action on the problem. Mr. Boyer stated that the CDA would take note of this discussion.

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[11] Adm. Alvaro Alberto, President of the Brazilian National Research Council.

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## *Editorial Note*

On April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors on "The Chance for Peace". During his remarks, the President proposed that a mutual lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union might at once include and lead to "the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world." For sections of the address relating to the question of regulation of armaments, see Annex B to NSC 112/1, "Possibility of a New United States Disarmament Proposal in the Eighth General Assembly", September 1, 1953, page 1204. The full text of "The Chance for Peace" speech and additional documentation on its origins and implementation are included in the compilation on the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union in volume VIII. It is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 27, 1953, pages 599-603, and *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pages 179-188.

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330.13/4-2853

## *The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, April 28, 1953.]

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic and has the honor to refer to the oral *démarche* made April 8, 1953 by M. Henri Ruffin, First Secretary of the Embassy of the French Republic. M. Ruffin requested the formal views of the United States Government concerning the draft proposals on disarmament previously submitted confidentially to the United States Mission to the United Nations by M. Jules Moch on May 27, 1952, the outlines of which M. Moch introduced in the United Nations Disarmament Commission on June 24, 1952. [2] The United States Mission to the United Nations, on June 12, 1952, transmitted informally to the Delegation of France to the United Nations the comments of the Department of

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP.

[2] Regarding the Moch proposals of 1952, see telegram 7301 to Paris, June 11, 1952, p. 979.

State concerning M. Moch's draft treaty, as attached hereto.[3] The Department of State desires to reaffirm these views, believing that the objections to M. Moch's proposals contained therein are as fully applicable at the present as they were when first made to the Delegation of France to the United Nations.

The Department of State is cognizant of the desire of the Foreign Office for continuation of the past close cooperation between the United Nations Delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States Mission to the United Nations will, of course, consult with the Delegation of France and with other friendly delegations represented on the Disarmament Commission, in order to ensure that all possible progress is made in the Commission's consideration of the tasks with which it is charged. Whether or not there is any progress of this nature depends largely upon the attitude demonstrated by the Delegation of the Soviet Union. As President Eisenhower said in his speech of April 16, 1953,[4] the United States welcomes any honest act of peace on the part of the USSR; cares nothing for mere rhetoric; and seeks "sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds".

This Government hopes that the Government of France will continue its friendly and close cooperation in the Disarmament Commission, to the mutual benefit of both countries.

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[3] Not printed.

[4] See the editorial note, *supra*.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 143d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 6, 1953*[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 143rd meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 7.

President; Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

. . . . . . .

*1. The Large Ship Reactor and Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Programs* (NSC Action No. 768–e; NSC 149/2) [2]

Mr. Cutler sketched the background of Council action on this item. He reminded the Council that it had eliminated the sodium graphite reactor which was to have been built in connection with the Atomic Energy Commission's objective of realizing practical nuclear power for commercial purposes. Mr. Cutler also reminded the Council that it had eliminated, in so far as the interest of national security was concerned, the two programs calling for the construction of the large ship reactor and the aircraft nuclear propulsion reactor.

Since the Council had taken these actions, continued Mr. Cutler, the Department of Defense had revised its position on the aircraft nuclear propulsion program, while the AEC had come up with a new position with regard to the future of the large ship reactor program. Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Strauss to inform the Council of these new positions.

Admiral Strauss dealt first with the new views of the Department of Defense on the aircraft nuclear propulsion program. While the Department of Defense did not propose to revive a program which would result in the actual completion of an aircraft propelled by nuclear power, which would have cost approximately $1 billion, it had nevertheless come to the conclusion that certain research and development activity on this program should be continued. The cost would amount to some $29 million from AEC in FY 1954 and something over $14 million in FY 1955. As its share, the Department of Defense would contribute something over $9 billion [*million*]. Admiral Strauss stated that the revised objective no longer contemplated actually building the aircraft reactor, but the program would be continued to the point of proving the possibility of successfully building such a reactor. The revised views of the Department of Defense were that such expenditures for such an objective would pay off.

As for the large ship reactor program, which the Council had decided it was not necessary in the interests of national security to proceed with, Admiral Strauss said the Atomic Energy Commission had come up with a new possibility. It proposed to continue work on this reactor, not in order to produce an aircraft carrier propelled by nuclear power, but to produce a reactor which might produce electric power as a substitute for the sodium graphite reactor which had been previously eliminated. In short, the AEC is asking authorization to proceed with the large ship reactor program divorced from its military aspects. The Commission felt that their proposal had had great value in filling the gap in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, which would exist until such time as private capital could be induced to finance such projects. The AEC, concluded Admiral Strauss, had in mind a pilot plant to test nuclear power possibilities.

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[2] For NSC Action No. 768, see footnote 7, p. 300. For text of NSC 149/2, Apr. 29, see p. 305.

The President stated that the issue before the Council was this: The Council had earlier determined to eliminate the large ship reactor and the aircraft reactor on grounds that neither was currently essential for reasons of national security. The Department of Defense had now modified its views and was stating that research and development on the aircraft reactor should be continued on a more modest scale. The AEC was suggesting continued development of the large ship reactor with a non-military objective in view. The AEC had informed him, said the President, that development of a power reactor should be continued by the Government until such time as private industry was ready to take over. The question is, do we agree with these two positions? The President said that he believed that we should. We have gone so far with both these programs, governmentally, that the Council should be willing to authorize the expenditure of additional funds for the programs until the atomic energy law could be changed and private capital appeared willing to invest in the enterprise.

Secretary Humphrey sought a specific answer to the question whether the proposals advanced by Admiral Strauss contemplated continued Government expenditure over a considerable period, or whether Admiral Strauss contemplated private interests taking over in the near future.

Admiral Strauss said that both courses were likely, depending on whether and when private industry could be induced to take over.

The President pointed out that it was quite possible that further work on the nuclear power reactor might lead to the conclusion that its construction was not feasible. We should then, of course, have to drop the program.

Admiral Strauss, however, stated his conviction that construction of the power reactor was feasible. The real problem was the high cost of this power per kilowatt hour.

Secretary Wilson observed that unless the cost of electric power produced by this reactor could be lowered to compete with other sources of electric power, the reactor was certainly not feasible.

Mr. Dodge inquired whether the program contemplated a complete reactor or a mere pilot plant.

Admiral Strauss replied that the objective was to produce a full reactor. A pilot plant couldn't determine costs of power per kilowatt hour. He pointed out, however, that the cost of building this full reactor would be much less than the cost estimated for the sodium graphite reactor which had been eliminated from the AEC budget. The reason for this was that the Navy had already carried its large ship reactor so far along, and the AEC could now take over where the Navy left off.

Commissioner Murray summed up the position of the Commission on this matter. He estimated that the total cost of completing the full reactor would be approximately $100 million. Large as was this sum, Commissioner Murray felt that unless it were expended, the prospects for developing peaceful uses of atomic energy would be very dim indeed, and we would have fooled the public on the great issue of peacetime uses.

Secretary Humphrey inquired if, as Commissioner Murray had stated, the Council was initiating a program which it would cost $100 million to complete, whether the Council was really changing its earlier decision not to compete with private industry and private capital in the field of practical nuclear power. He felt that the Council should have a clear answer to this issue.

Admiral Strauss said that as it seemed to him, the decision was rather one to try to salvage money already spent by the Government on the development of a power reactor. In effect, what the Council would be doing, if it agreed to the AEC's proposal to take over the large ship reactor program, would be to put in some $25 million in FY 1954 and 1955 in the hope that before we reached the ultimate expenditure of $100 million, private industry would come in and take over.

The President remarked that this was precisely the point he wished the National Security Council to be aware of. Certainly, he said, he had no desire to go against the earlier decision of the Council to seek to persuade private industry to exploit the field of practical nuclear power. It was our intention, continued the President, to proceed with the attempt to modify the Atomic Energy Act in order to open the field to private industry. Meanwhile, however, we do not wish a gap to exist in this field or to throw away Government money already spent in research and development of the large ship reactor.

After further discussion of expenditure figures and savings in the next two fiscal years, the President turned to Admiral Strauss and asked him directly whether he favored carrying on the large ship reactor program. Admiral Strauss replied that he did, and the President stated that he agreed.

*The National Security Council:* [3]

a. Confirmed the action taken in NSC Action No. 768–e to eliminate, as not required from the viewpoint of national security, the existing programs for the large ship reactor and aircraft nuclear propulsion.

b. Adopted the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Defense for a new program of nuclear propulsion for aircraft, which selects the air cycle drawn wire and the super-critical water-liquid fuel system as the most promising possibilities to date for further exploitation in the interests of national security. This new program is estimated to result in expenditures during FY 1954 of $9.6 million by the Air Force and $14.2 million by the Atomic Energy Commission plus $13.8 of AEC funds from previous years' appropriations.

c. Adopted the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission that the pressurized light water program and related research be continued, pending the availability of private financing, in the interests of nuclear power development. This program is estimated to result in expenditures by the Atomic Energy Commission of $11.9 million in FY 1954 and $12.8 million in FY 1955, and no expenditures by the Navy. Including these expenditures, carrying the full program to completion is estimated to cost the Government approximately $100 million, unless private financing should become available before completion.

*Note:* The above actions subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation.

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S. Everett Gleason

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[3] Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 779, May 6, 1953. (S/S–NSC files, "NSC Records of Action")

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 151 Series

## *Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board* [1]

SECRET
NSC 151

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1953.

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ARMAMENTS AND AMERICAN POLICY

References:

A. NSC Action No. 725 [2]

B. Memo for NSC Planning Board from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953. [3]

The enclosed interim report by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Armaments and American Policy of the NSC Planning Board, which the Planning Board has considered and concurred in, is submitted herewith pursuant to Reference A, for early consideration by the Council of the Recommendations contained in pp. 3–4 [4] thereof. Also enclosed for Council information is an Annex to the report containing an outline of the type of information to be released under the proposed policy. The *Ad Hoc* Committee and the Planning Board had the assistance of Dr. Vannevar Bush in their preparation and consideration of the enclosed report.

The enclosure relates to the possible means of carrying out Recommendation One by the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament in the report circulated by Reference B. The *Ad Hoc* Committee is preparing another report on other recommendations made by the Panel of Consultants.

It is recommended that if the Council adopts the Recommendations contained herein that they be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them and direct their implementation in accordance with paragraph 3–d thereof by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Psychological Strategy Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Here follows a table of contents]

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[1] Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114.

[3] The memorandum of Feb. 4, transmitting the Report of the Panel of Consultants, is not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) For the text of the Report, see p. 1056.

[4] Reference is to pagination in the source text; for the recommendations, see p. 1152.

[Enclosure]

## INTERIM REPORT BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE NSC PLANNING BOARD ON ARMAMENTS AND AMERICAN POLICY

### INTRODUCTION

1. *Panel Recommendation on Candor Toward the American People.* The first recommendation of the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament was that the United States Government "adopt a policy of candor toward the American people—and at least equally toward its own elected representatives and responsible officials—in presenting the meaning of the arms race."

a. *Objective.* The objective would be to secure support of the American people for necessary governmental actions which would rest on an adequate understanding of the realities of the situation. To achieve such an understanding, the Panel urged that the facts of atomic developments in this country and the Soviet Union be explained, and that the implications of these facts for the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union be set forth. The Panel was of the opinion that a policy of candor with respect to the atomic arms race could be executed without causing the American people to lose heart in the present struggle or to seek a solution through preventive war. It also concluded that our proper concern about the danger of the arms race should not, and could not, be kept a secret from the Soviet Union.

b. *Change in Existing Policy.* This policy would constitute an important change in existing policies, a change which arises from the altered circumstances in a developing world situation. The U.S. Government would be taking a new initiative in deciding to inform the public of the facts as to the armaments race and its official analysis of those facts. It would involve a decision to reveal certain facts about the arms race not only on one occasion but also over a period of time. If it were to be successful, it would be necessary to secure an understanding by the Congress of the reasons for such a policy. It would almost certainly require some mechanism by which information now available and subsequently developed and the implication thereof could be considered and decided at a high level of the Government in terms of the advisability of its public release.

2. *Nature of Information to be Released.* The recommended policy does not require the public exposure of atomic energy "Restricted Data" of a technical nature and it need not embrace material which would compromise intelligence sources. With these areas of information excluded, the judgment involved in deciding whether or not to release material will consist of balancing the advantages and disadvantages from the point of our national security interests and from the standpoint of achieving the objective of an informed public understanding of the problems involved. There is set forth in

the Annex to this paper the type of information which might be made available to the American people if a policy of candor is accepted. None of the information included in the Annex includes "Restricted Data" or information which would compromise intelligence sources.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

3. With respect to the first recommendation of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, we recommend:

a. that an affirmative policy of candor toward the American people be adopted;

b. that a policy of continuing candor on the atomic arms race be accompanied as it develops by public indications of such decisions as may be taken with respect to national security programs. It should be recognized that the degree to which the objective of such a policy will be achieved in the initial stages will be affected by the Government's ability to inform the public of its views on the programs required to deal with the dangers involved in the atomic equation;

c. that the agencies of the U.S. Government should not restrict the distribution within the Government of material involving information about atomic energy and the atomic equation (other than "Restricted Data" of a technical nature) more rigidly than other information of comparable security classification. Officials of the U.S. Government whose responsibilities would be carried out more effectively with such information should have access to it;

d. that a government agency such as the Psychological Strategy Board (which would be augmented for this purpose by the addition of interested agencies not now represented thereon) be made responsible for considering information now available and subsequently developed on the atomic arms race and for making recommendations on the advisability and timing of public release. This agency could also be given responsibility for recommending the release of information in other matters (such as chemical and biological warfare) related to the security of the United States.

## DISCUSSION

### I. *Essential Elements of a Policy of Public Candor*

4. It would be possible to adopt a policy of telling the American people certain facts about the atomic weapons race, but to do so in such a way that information would appear only sporadically and as forced by events. On this basis information would be released as it was necessary to deal with "leaks" through unofficial sources or when it was thought to be necessary in connection with specific programs or proposals which the Government wished to advance.

5. This would not amount to a very great alteration of present practice and it has the disadvantage that the information made public might be increasingly discounted on the ground that it was

aimed at frightening the people or the Congress into support of particular actions. Moreover, the impact of the facts would tend to be dispersed, as it has been in the past, and the picture in the public mind would tend to be blurred.

6. Instead of a negative policy of disclosing information when forced by events, the Panel proposed an affirmative policy of candor on its own merits.

7. Such a continuing program of publishing information and the implications thereof would be an important new policy for the administration in a matter bearing directly on our national interests and the individual lives of our citizens. It would mean that the President and his principal officers would regularly take the people into their confidence in the conviction that in a democracy an informed public is the best safeguard against extreme public reactions, such as fright and despair on the one hand or an impulsive sentiment for preventive war on the other. The objective is to secure an informed and careful public consideration of the problems arising from the facts disclosed so that the American people will remain steady and determined and will give their support to the necessary actions of their Government.

8. This policy should also stress the following related aspects of atomic energy:

a. No physical phenomenon is inherently good or bad in itself. Atomic weapons must be considered a part of our total weapons system, so that the question of morality will relate only to the way in which this or any other weapon is used. This will give us greater freedom of action with respect to all elements of our military strength.

b. Atomic energy is *not* something unique and apart from other new developments in technology. Atomic energy is an integral part of the new and tremendously constructive technology of western civilization. Developments in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can in the foreseeable future have immense practical and economic benefits. Our national atomic energy activities are and should be increasingly related to other areas of governmental and industrial activity. These constructive aspects of our atomic energy program will help the public to understand the importance of continued progress in the atomic field.

## II. *Relevant Considerations in Carrying out a Policy of Continuing Public Candor*

### A. *Relation to National Security Programs*

9. With the facts about the atomic equation officially before them, the public is certain to become increasingly concerned about our national security and our national defense programs.

10. Our present large atomic capability and the development and importance of our strategic air power are widely known and should

continue to be emphasized, along with other elements of our military strength, as vital to our national security. A failure to continue to emphasize the deterrent effects of our ability to project our power abroad might result in excessive preoccupation with defense at home.

11. Public knowledge of the dangers to the United States from a Soviet atomic attack and from such other lesser means of destruction as biological and chemical warfare is likely to focus particular attention on problems of continental defense, both civil and military. This aspect of the policy of continuing candor will raise special problems which could be dealt with in several ways:

a. It is possible to decide to withhold the disclosure of the facts about the atomic arms race for a year or so in order to give more time for study of the problems of continental defense (civil and military) and for decisions with respect to the programs to be undertaken. The difficulty is that unofficial disclosure is likely to continue and, as the facts become known more fully by this means, the public will grow increasingly critical of its Government for trying to keep it in the dark. Here public reaction is unpredictable, and might result in fright or demands for precipitous action as easily as public support for sensible programs.

b. If a continuing policy of candor beginning soon is decided upon, before definitive decisions have been made with respect to all aspects of programs of increased civil and military continental defense, disclosure could be accompanied by general assurances that the Government is moving forward in the development of continental defense programs. Such general assurances may not be wholly effective in view of the recent unofficial publication of much of the material in the East River Report [5] and the Summer Study Group, Project Lincoln, since it is already widely thought that there are specific programs which can be undertaken provided enough funds are appropriated for the purpose.

c. A policy of continuing candor beginning soon can be accompanied by an announcement of at least the initial decisions with respect to additional programs of civil and military continental defense. Such a program of disclosure would be an evolving one and should also be tied in with later decisions on defense programs, as they are taken.

B. *Relation to the Situation Abroad*

12. With respect to the U.S.S.R., the information which would be released to the American people both about developments here and in the Soviet Union need add but little to what the Kremlin already knows. Where the information might not be known to them, disclosure would be undertaken only if it were determined to be to the net advantage of the United States. In fact, a policy of candor, coupled with adequate defense programs, might assist in bringing

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[5] Regarding Project East River, see footnote 2, p. 20.

home to the Soviet leaders the dangers to their own regime in the atomic equation and minimize the likelihood that they will overestimate the chances of a quick and easy victory over the United States.

13. In Western Europe, protection of the great deterrent power of U.S. atomic strength is regarded as crucial. Although the Europeans already recognize that they do not have the same opportunities as we do for improving their defense against atomic weapons, they can accept their vulnerability as long as they can place reliance on the deterrent power of our atomic strength and on the ability and willingness of the United States to use atomic weapons in the event of war.[6] Unless the U.S. power base is regarded as secure, a public exposure of the dangers in the atomic arms race would have serious adverse effects in Europe. Such adverse effects would be compounded if there were created a fear on the part of the Europeans that the vulnerability of our population centers might even make us unwilling to use our atomic strength in the event of war.

C. *Congressional Support*

14. The adoption of a policy of public candor about the atomic arms race will be a sufficiently sharp reversal of policy to require an understanding on the part of the Congress of the objective of the program and the way in which it would be conducted. Advance consultation with the Congress would also provide an opportunity to discuss the meaning of the atomic arms race directly with the members of the Congress as a special aspect of the policy of candor.

D. *Timing*

15. If the policy of continuing candor is decided upon, the program might begin late in May or in June. By this time the Administration will have reached decisions about next year's programs and will have received and considered various studies now in preparation on continental defense. The policy should probably be launched by a Presidential statement of some kind in order to secure maximum attention from the public and to indicate that the Government is embarking on a new approach to the problems faced by the United States. An example of a setting for such a statement that would appear natural to the public would be the conclusion of the present series of atomic tests toward the end of May.

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[6] For documentation on the developing interest of U.S. officials in the relationship of nuclear weapons to the defense of Western Europe and the need to inform NATO allies of the determination to place a nuclear shield around Western Europe, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 482 ff.

III. *Candor Within the United States Government*

16. In its first recommendation the Panel of Consultants also suggested that there be much wider familiarity with atomic matters within the Government. Obviously, the information made public will itself reach Government officials, but considerably greater information could be opened to responsible officers in the Government than it is desirable to expose publicly. Atomic matters are so central to many of the problems with which the Government must deal, that a wider understanding of the implications of atomic energy is needed.

17. Material that falls within the classification of "Restricted Data" which involves technical information should continue to be handled in accordance with its sensitivity. Other matters involving atomic energy and the atomic equation, classified as "Top Secret—Security Information" or less, should be available to officials in the Government whose responsibilities would be carried out more effectively with knowledge of such information. In addition to availability of documents, as such, it would be desirable to have broader participation by officials dealing primarily with atomic energy matters in the consideration of problems of national security.

18. In short, no distinction should be made between atomic energy matters and other matters in this respect. For example the special precautions applied to NSC 68 for over two years, even though it contained no "Restricted Data", greatly limited its distribution within the U.S. Government and prevented an adequate understanding on the part of many officials who might have made a contribution to the manner of dealing with the problems involved.

19. Greater candor within the U.S. Government should logically include state and local government officials. The leadership for many parts of the continental defense program rests with these officials, and the information to be released should include material they need to carry out their responsibilities properly. Obviously, there will be a marked difference between the security requirements applicable to state and local officials and those applicable to the availability of information within the Federal Government.

IV. *Candor with Allied Governments*

20. The second recommendation in the Report of the Panel of Consultants was that the U.S. should give its major allies a sense of shared responsibility through an increase in their understanding of the political and military implications of atomic weapons. The Panel specifically excluded from its second recommendation the special problem of technical collaboration on the making of atomic weapons.

21. A policy of public candor in the United States with respect to the atomic arms race will, of course, also reach the general public in allied countries. But, just as greater information can be made available to responsible officers of the U.S. Government than can be publicly disclosed, there is certain additional information in the atomic field which, if exchanged with allied government officials, would increase their capacity to deal wisely not only with such problems as those that arise in connection with NATO but also with non-military matters of common concern or mutual benefit.

22. The Atomic Energy Act has been interpreted to prevent any *substantial* disclosure of information relevant to an understanding of the use of atomic weapons to allied government officials. This inhibition, however desirable it may have been in the past, now prevents our allies from acquiring an adequate understanding of some of our policies and actions and will tend progressively to become a more serious divisive factor in our relations. A balance will have to be struck between security considerations and the advantages of disclosure, but within appropriate limits the present inhibition could be removed in the national interest.

*Ad Hoc Committee:*

State—Gordon Arneson (Chairman); John Ferguson
Defense—Charles P. Noyes
AEC—Roy B. Snapp
CIA—William P. Bundy
PSB—Horace S. Craig
Executive Secretary—Philip H. Watts

[Subenclosure]

## Annex to Interim Report on Armaments and American Policy

### OUTLINE OF TYPE OF INFORMATION TO BE RELEASED

(It is understood that the information listed in this Annex will not necessarily be covered by a single statement, or in any specified period of time. An initial statement, covering most of the facts identified in this Annex and pointing out their meaning for the arms race, will probably be desirable in launching the policy.)

*Section I—Statement of Policy*

1. The administration has determined upon a policy of candor.

2. Reasons for new policy and its significance for the American people and government.

### *Section II—Outline of Information to be Made Available as to the Significance of the Atomic Armaments Race*

3. The *basic* international situation is unlikely to change and a long-term view is necessary.

4. *The fundamental points:*

a. Although the U.S. now has and expects to maintain a substantial lead over the USSR in atomic weapons available, the time is coming within a very few years when the USSR will have a supply of atomic weapons sufficient, if delivered on target, to injure the U.S. critically. It will not be possible to provide an ironclad defense against delivery of at least part of this supply of weapons.

b. In these circumstances, continued U.S. atomic superiority and well protected strategic striking power will still constitute vital elements in the strength of the U.S. and the free world and a substantial deterrent to deliberate Soviet initiation of general war or to Soviet action involving the grave risk of general war.

> *Note:* The Committee anticipates that the information released will include a more exact statement or statements on the degree of defense possible against presently known and definitely foreseeable means of delivery. No statement along these lines is included in this Annex since the subject is now under study by responsible groups within the government, and since the Committee recommends that whatever is said in the present connection be related to continental defense programs. (See page 3 and the discussion on pages 5 through 7.) [7]

5. *Nature of atomic weapon development.* U.S. experience demonstrates that atomic weapon development, like the development of other members of the family of weapons, proceeds very rapidly after an initial stage is passed. This rapidity applies to increase in weapon stockpiles, increase in rates of production, increase in destructive power of individual weapons, and increased variety of uses. In the case of atomic weapons, such rapid development can be achieved without disproportionate use of national resources. The subsidiary facts behind this conclusion may be publicly stated as follows:

a. In the closing days of World War II, our entire *stockpile* of atomic weapons consisted of the two that were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Since that time our production of weapons has proceeded on a constantly and rapidly increasing scale.

b. *The destructive power* of individual weapons has been greatly increased by improved design. Within the range of fission weapons available today are weapons having a destructive power——— [8] times that of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima type bombs. One such weapon, if dropped on a major U.S. city, would totally destroy an area of———square miles and cause major damage in an area of———square miles. Total casualties might be———.

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[7] Reference is to pagination in the source text.

[8] The omissions in this section are in the source text.

> *Note:* The Committee believes that the above comparisons and estimates of damage might be stated in general terms (such as "many, several", etc.) or expressed in specific figures, as determined by the Council.

c. The feasibility of *thermonuclear energy* release has been demonstrated by tests. We know that thermonuclear explosions can produce even greater destructive power than fission weapons. The destructive power already demonstrated in the fission field is so great that it is doubtful whether the added power demonstrated as feasible for thermonuclear explosions will essentially alter the nature of the atomic equation.

d. *Economy.* Through technical improvements it has been found possible to employ substantially smaller quantities of fissionable material to produce equivalent destructive power.

e. *Greatly increased supplies of fissionable material* can be achieved through the use of new facilities and through improved production techniques. The U.S. rate of production of fissionable material is now many times what it was in 1945. To a certain extent such increased rates of production are inevitable in the production process, even without added facilities.

f. The U.S. has developed weapons for a wide *variety of uses,* including tactical employment in warfare in support of troops in the field. Such development is a natural outcome of an atomic weapons program.

g. There is no *obsolescence* of fissionable materials.

h. Compared to conventional weapons, atomic and thermonuclear weapons are *cheap* in terms of destructive effect, both as regards money and as regards use of scarce national resources.

6. *Soviet capabilities.* The USSR has passed the initial stages of atomic development and will be able to do in all important respects everything that the U.S. has done and can do in the future, both in the fission and in the fusion field. The subsidiary facts behind this conclusion can be publicly stated as follows:

a. The temporary U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons ended in the fall of 1949 with the first atomic test in the USSR.

b. In the three and a half years since that time, the USSR has been producing atomic weapons for its own stockpile.

c. The requisite raw materials, power resources, industrial facilities, and scientific skill are available without undue strain on Communist resources.

d. There are no scientific or technical processes available to the U.S. which could not in time be discovered by Soviet scientists and technicians. This includes knowledge of thermonuclear reactions and techniques.

e. On the basis of these factors, it may be reliably estimated that within two years the Soviets will probably have a stockpile numbered in the hundreds, and not many years thereafter in excess of a thousand.

7. *Means of delivery.* Under the weapon availability conditions stated above, not the number of weapons, but the effectiveness of the means of delivery will become the limitation of the scale of damage that can be accomplished by the U.S. or by the USSR. In this field the publicly presented picture can be as follows:

a. The U.S. has developed several means of delivery. Our strategic airforces, together with their system of bases, are being expanded to effect rapid delivery of nuclear weapons.

b. The USSR now has adequate means of intercontinental delivery. These methods will almost certainly improve substantially over the next few years. (See note below.)

c. Over a period of 10–15 years, we must expect radically improved methods of delivery to be developed. Defense against these methods will present new and very serious problems.

> *Note:* As stated in the Note to paragraph 4 above, the Committee expects that the information released will include a statement or statements on the degree of defense possible against presently known and definitely foreseeable means of delivery.

8. *Peaceful uses of atomic energy.* As atomic development progresses further, substantial peaceful uses are possible. Within a few years, if sufficient effort is made, these uses may make a real contribution to the resources and living standards of the free world nations.

9. *Morality of atomic weapons.* The atomic weapon differs only in degree from other weapons. This difference has decreased with the development of varied atomic weapons and with improvements in other types of weapons. Moral objections to the use of atomic weapons should be on the same basis as for other weapons capable of destroying life and inflicting damage.

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S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112

## *Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 26, 1953.

Subject: Policy Guidance Governing United States Activities in the United Nations Disarmament Commission from May through September 1953

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[1] This memorandum and its attachments were originally circulated as document RAC (NS) D-5a Final, May 11, 1953. (330.13/6–453) The source text is accompanied by a covering memorandum of June 3 by NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitting this memorandum and its attachments to the members of the Council, the Secretary

*Continued*

1. Under its terms of reference (Attachment A [2]), the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC) is responsible for formulating plans and policies respecting regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and the development and approval of detailed plans within established policies in the field of its competence.

2. Pursuant to the unanimous decision of RAC taken at a meeting on May 11, 1953, it is requested that the attached memorandum (Attachment B) be circulated to the members of the NSC for their information. This sets forth the policy guidance adopted by RAC governing United States activities in the United Nations Disarmament Commission from May through September 1953, the period between the anticipated resumption of the Disarmament Commission's activities and the convening of the next regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. RAC considers that this specific policy is consonant with general United States policies concerning the recent Soviet "peace offensive", and the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission will be given guidance in conformity with this policy.

3. The NSC has directed a review of United States policy towards regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments established by NSC 112; [3] has specifically requested exploration of the possibility of a new United States proposal on disarmament between now and the next Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1953 (NSC Action No. 717 of February 20 [*18*], 1953 [4]); and has requested in conjunction with the two previous tasks an evaluation of the fourth recommendation of the Report of the Panel of Consultants entitled "Armaments and American Policy",* covering disarmament discussions in the United Nations. The attached RAC policy guidance is adopted pending completion of these studies.

WALTER B. SMITH
*Acting Secretary of State*

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of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] Not printed here. For the terms of reference of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC), Mar. 8, 1952, see p. 876.

[3] For text of NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

[4] For NSC Action No. 717, see footnote 6, p. 1108.

*See Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, "Armaments and American Policy", dated February 4, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. The memorandum of Feb. 4, transmitting the Report of the Panel of Consultants, is not printed. (S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) For the text of the report, see p. 1056.]

CHARLES E. WILSON
*Secretary of Defense*
GORDON DEAN
*Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission*

Attachment B

## POLICY GUIDANCE GOVERNING UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION FOR THE PERIOD MAY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1953

### PROBLEM

To determine the course of action to be followed by the United States in the meetings of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations until the General Assembly reconvenes in September 1953.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The complexities of disarmament are such as to afford the Soviet Union an opportunity for prolonged negotiation under the guise of sincerity without any important modification of basic position. If the United States now presses for extensive negotiations on disarmament and, as seems likely, there are no basic Soviet concessions, there is danger that this might seriously complicate the possibility of settling other outstanding issues where because they are less complex a greater opportunity may exist for progress. Conversely, successful negotiation of some of these other major differences might serve to strengthen world trust and enable the concurrent resumption of substantive disarmament negotiations.

2. United States activity in the Disarmament Commission limited primarily to an exploration of the Soviet disarmament position and its intentions in this field would be in conformity with the President's speech of April 16, 1953 [5] which states that as progress toward settlement of certain major political issues "strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world".

3. However, it will be necessary in the Commission to do considerably more than rely on the past Soviet record of intransigence as an indication of the impossibility of progress, in view of the ostensible shift in Soviet attitudes toward disarmament following the death of Stalin; the April 16, 1953 statement of President Eisenhower on this subject; and the probable activities of other members of the Commission in the light of these two developments.

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[5] See the editorial note, p. 1144.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In the Disarmament Commission, the United States should as far as possible avoid using the discussions as a primary vehicle for exploring apparent changes in overall Soviet policy.

2. Pursuant to this policy, the United States should not now initiate major substantive action in the Disarmament Commission, but should limit its participation primarily to an exploration of the Soviet disarmament position and its intentions in this field.

3. Within the general framework of the preceding recommendations, the United States should:

a. Endeavor to induce other members of the Disarmament Commission to join the United States in pressing the Soviet Union to explain and elaborate its position;

b. Reiterate before the Disarmament Commission the basic principles and concepts which must underlie any program for safeguarded disarmament and ascertain the extent to which the Soviet Union is willing to accept, as a basis for negotiation, proposals in the Disarmament Commission along these lines, previously introduced or supported by the United States.

c. Attempt to induce the Commission to avoid immersion in details beyond existing papers until agreement has been obtained on these general principles.

4. In order to meet the exigencies of the tactical situation in the Disarmament Commission and in order to take advantage of any progressive steps taken by the Soviet Delegate, the United States Government should have ready for use, when deemed appropriate, working papers on the following subjects:

a. The nature and functions of an international control organ which would supervise the putting into effect and operation of a comprehensive disarmament program, in the event that such action might clarify the Soviet position or might be made necessary by positions taken by other Members of the Commission.

b. U.S. views in broad outline only on the problem of obtaining an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes, as suggested in the President's speech of April 16.

c. Correlation of the principal aspects of a comprehensive disarmament program. (A paper on this subject should be introduced only if absolutely necessary to preserve the United States tactical position.)

5. In the event a new situation is created as a result of progress in negotiation of other outstanding major political issues which demonstrates the possibility of agreement in other areas or through concrete concessions made by the USSR in the disarmament field, the United States should be prepared to go forward in elaboration of the disarmament program. The exact procedure for

going forward should be determined by subsequent policy directives, but could be either:

a. Elaboration in the Disarmament Commission of a safeguarded disarmament plan providing for balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the international control of atomic energy based on the United Nations or a no less effective plan, in accordance with existing policy directives as they may be modified as a result of pending long-range studies.†

b. Discussion of the problem of disarmament in private Great Power talks, together with a decision of the Disarmament Commission whether or not to adjourn its operations pending the outcome of such discussions.

## DISCUSSION

1. Prior to the recent change in the Soviet Government and the ostensible shift in policies which accompanied the succession, the persistent attempts on the part of the United States to reach an agreement on disarmament in the United Nations, dating from 1946, had been blocked effectively and completely by Soviet intransigence. The record clearly demonstrates there was never any real sign that agreement was likely nor was there ever even any genuine negotiation, certainly at least since 1947. It is apparent that the USSR was interested in the discussions only from the point of view of their propaganda value. Consequently, the disarmament proceedings became quite unrelated to any genuine negotiation.

2. The problems of disarmament are so complex as to offer the Soviet Union ample opportunities for prolonged negotiation without major changes in its basic position. Without definite Soviet concessions likely to lead to substantive progress in the field of disarmament, extended discussions on this matter in the Disarmament Commission and consequent overemphasis by the United States of its disarmament position might complicate the possibility of settling other major political issues with the USSR. In addition, such extended discussions could prejudice subsequent achievement of agreements in the disarmament field. Accordingly, in the absence of such encouraging concessions from the USSR, the United States should engage in these discussions in the Commission only to the

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†*Note:* The NSC has directed a review of United States policy towards regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments established by NSC 112; has specifically requested exploration of the possibility of a new United States proposal on disarmament between now and the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1953 (NSC Action No. 717 of February 20 [*18*], 1953); and has requested in conjunction with the two previous tasks an evaluation of the fourth recommendation of the report of the Panel of Consultants concerning "Armaments and American Policy" which recommends a gradual disengagement from disarmament discussions in the United Nations. [Footnote in the source text.]

extent necessary to expose the Soviet disarmament position and to counteract Soviet use of the Disarmament Commission as a forum for their propaganda.

3. The recent change in Soviet tactics manifested in the so-called "peace offensive" embraced the field of disarmament, among others. In the debates of the 7th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, during recent weeks, the Soviet Union has attempted to create the impression that it has shifted its position in an effort to narrow the differences with the West, thus to permit genuine negotiation on disarmament problems in the forthcoming meetings of the Disarmament Commission. These changes may be summarized in substance as suggesting a willingness on the part of the USSR to drop its former insistence on a flat 1/3 reduction of armed forces and armaments by the 5 Great Powers, to abandon insistence on a "paper" declaration by the General Assembly banning atomic weapons without safeguards, to indicate a readiness to consider detailed proposals for an international control organ which would put into effect and supervise a comprehensive disarmament program, and to admit the program should be carried out in such a way that no state would have cause to fear its security was endangered (possibly by stages). The true significance of these Soviet moves in the field of disarmament is not clear. They are at present so vague and contradictory in nature that they cannot be accepted as demonstrating Soviet desire to negotiate logically and honestly on the substance of disarmament. They are certain, however, to lead to extended discussion in the Disarmament Commission with attendant international publicity, and this may be the chief purpose of the USSR in this field. In fact, it appears logical to accept the estimate of the Intelligence Advisory Committee on this subject contained in SE-42: *Current Communist Tactics.* [6] Paragraph 7 of this estimate, dated April 16 [*24*], 1953, states that "The Kremlin will probably continue to make proposals for general disarmament, but we believe that these will be made for propaganda effect and not in the expectation that they would be accepted by the West".

4. The meaning of all the various conciliatory gestures and statements of the Soviet Union and Satellites which have been issued in recent weeks is equally vague. The Soviets may have decided to make real concessions and to introduce an era of "peaceful co-existence", or they may intend no real concessions, but are merely launching new tactics in pursuit of their longstanding policy of dividing and confusing the West. In any event, it is believed that the

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[6] Scheduled for publication in volume VIII.

following thesis should serve as principal guide for United States activities concerning disarmament activities in the United Nations:

a. If the United States now presses for extensive negotiations on disarmament in the United Nations and, as seems likely, there are no basic Soviet concessions, there is danger that this would offer the USSR propaganda benefits and might seriously complicate settling major political issues where a greater opportunity exists for immediate progress since armaments are essentially symptoms of these political controversies although exacerbating them;

b. Conversely, successfully settling or negotiating towards settling some of these other major political issues might improve the international climate and enable concurrent progress to be made in disarmament negotiations on substance;

c. Consequently, in the Disarmament Commission, the United States should, as far as possible, avoid utilizing disarmament discussions as a primary vehicle for exploring apparent changes in overall Soviet policy;

d. This would mean concentrating on exploring the Soviet positions in such manner to force the USSR to disclose whether it is willing to negotiate genuinely on the subject of disarmament or whether the apparent change in the Soviet attitude is intended solely for propaganda and tactical purposes.

5. On the other hand, it must be recognized that United States tactics in the Disarmament Commission cannot rely *primarily* on the past record of Soviet intransigence as an indication of the impossibility of making progress toward an agreed disarmament program—which was essentially the policy suggested in the Annex to the Second Progress Report on NSC 112, Section 2, February 17, 1953.‡ Three factors render this approach unworkable:

a. The ostensible shift in the Soviet attitudes toward disarmament made during the 7th Regular Session of the General Assembly, and heralded by USSR Representatives as intended to narrow disagreements with the Western powers in order to permit progress in the Disarmament Commission. The Soviets have thus placed themselves in a far better tactical and propaganda position which cannot be adequately countered or exposed by the United States by merely harkening back to the USSR's past record.

b. President Eisenhower's April 16, 1953 speech called on the Soviet leaders to demonstrate by deeds their desire for peace, declaring the first step must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea, followed by an end to attacks in Indo-China and Malaya and the working out of just political settlements for other serious issues between the free world and the Soviet Union. Thereupon, "As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of arms now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements." These agreements could include limitation of the size of the military and security forces of all nations, agreed limits on that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes, atomic energy control, limitation or prohibition of other weapons of great destructiveness, and a system of adequate safeguards including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations. The position taken by the President in his speech reaffirms the general validity of the holding operation concept in the Disarmament Commission advocated in the Recommendations above, in that it calls for simultaneous progress on many fronts in our attempts to diminish world tensions. The very fact that the President has again raised the question of disarmament and made proposals, however, indicates the necessity for doing something more in the Commission than merely to rely on the past Soviet record of intransigence as an indication of the impossibility of progress.

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‡See Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments", dated February 17, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. The Feb. 17 memorandum of transmittal is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "NSC Papers, 1953–1955"). For text of the Annex to the Second Progress Report on NSC 112, see p. 1103.]

c. The membership of the Disarmament Commission, consisting of the Members of the Security Council plus Canada, makes it almost inevitable that moves will be made by some nations on the Commission to bridge the gap between Soviet and United States positions under the stimulus of the recent apparent Soviet concessions to the Western position on disarmament. It may be recalled that the Representative of Pakistan confidentially submitted a draft proposal to the United States Representative on May 9, 1952, suggesting means of tying together general principles for a disarmament program, disclosure and verification, control of atomic energy, and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Representative of France twice confidentially submitted a draft disarmament treaty, seeking to accomplish these ends, and even after the United States twice informally detailed its objections to the treaty the Representative of France outlined these concepts in a public statement to the Disarmament Commission. As recently as April 8, 1953, the French Government again evinced interest in these proposals. In the recent General Assembly discussions, the French Representative suggested that the Commission work out a system for "dovetailing" the primary elements of a disarmament program. Lebanon, Colombia and Chile are other countries which might be tempted to introduce proposals seeking to bridge the gap between the East and the West.

6. Consequently, while following the policy that the United States should not initiate major substantive action in the Commission until such time as settlement of some of the major political issues between the USSR and the West is achieved, the United States should employ the following tactics:

a. Endeavor to induce other Commission Members to join the United States in pressing the USSR to explain and elaborate the apparent change in Soviet views.

b. Reiterate before the Commission the basic principles and concepts which must underlie any program for safeguarded disarmament and ascertain the degree to which the USSR is willing to accept as a basis for discussion proposals which have already been introduced in the Commission by the United States, individually or joined by the United Kingdom and France. In concrete proposals tabled before the Disarmament Commission, the United States has submitted or reaffirmed the broad outlines of a plan for the international control of atomic energy; a system of continuing safeguarded disclosure and verification; proposals for fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of all states, and proposals for practical procedures to limit armaments and work out the details of a disarmament program. In making these proposals, the United States had emphasized that they were not definitive in terms or exhaustive in details, but were made only to provide a basis for discussion and to open avenues to agreement and understanding. Nevertheless, all of these proposals have been thus far rejected by the Soviet Union. The frustrating history of these negotiations characterized by Soviet intransigence emphasizes the wisdom of concentrating continuing attention on broad principles, and avoiding immersion in details until agreement has been reached on the basic premises outlined in these proposals.

c. Recognize that certain affirmative action to avoid the appearance of intransigence and rigidity may be forced on the United States by the Soviet overtures in the disarmament field, by the probability these overtures will motivate other members of the Disarmament Commission to make proposals designed to bridge the gap between Soviet and U.S. positions, and by the possibility the Soviets may actually make concessions. Consequently, the United States Government should have ready for use, when deemed appropriate, working papers on the international control organ, limitation of strategic materials, and co-relationship issues. These papers should confine themselves insofar as possible to a brief and general discussion of these subjects and a detailed provision of the plans should be avoided. The purpose of such action would be to develop fully the U.S. position, thus retaining the tactical initiative, while at the same time presenting as small a target as possible for Soviet counter-action. With the submission of these papers, it should be made abundantly clear that the United States has no intention of submitting new proposals or additional details unless there is a marked change in the situation in the Commission. Such an approach would be in general consonance with the statement of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament in their report on "Armaments and American Policy", to the effect that "in the context of the existing world situation, the drafting of detailed blueprints for general arms regulation has seemed to us a dangerous and misleading exercise."

7. In the event that negotiations of other outstanding major political issues is progressing successfully and demonstrates the possibility of agreement, or if the Soviet Union indicates a willingness to make concrete concessions in the debates of the Disarmament Commission, so that a new situation is created, the United States

Delegation should be prepared in the Disarmament Commission to elaborate the disarmament program. The procedures for so doing should be determined by subsequent policy directives, but conceivably could include elaboration, in either the Disarmament Commission or in private Great Power conferences with possible adjournment of Commission deliberations, of a comprehensive, coordinated and safeguarded program for balanced reduction of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments and the international control of atomic energy, based on the United Nations plan or a no less effective plan. This program would be developed in accordance with existing policy directives or those directives may be modified as a result of certain pending long-range studies by the NSC. These studies include: a review of United States policy towards regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments established by NSC 112; exploration of the possibility of a new United States proposal on disarmament between now and the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1953 (NSC Action No. 717 of February 20 [*18*], 1953); and in conjunction with the two previous tasks an evaluation of the fourth recommendation of the Report of the Panel of Consultants concerning "Armaments and American Policy" which recommends a gradual disengagement from disarmament discussions in the United Nations.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 146th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 27, 1953* [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 146th meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of Commerce; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); Dr. Vannevar Bush (for Item 3); Dr. Robert Oppenheimer (for Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Secretary of the

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 30.

Navy (for Item 2); J. Ed Warren, Deputy Administrator for Petroleum Administration (for Item 2); W. Y. Elliott, ODM Planning Board Member (for Item 2); Earl W. Clark, Deputy Maritime Administrator (for Item 2); Robert B. Murray, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation (for Item 2); Charles J. Hedlund, Director, Program Division, Petroleum Administration (for Item 2); Robert L. Finley, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Item 2); W. G. Donley, Petroleum Administration for Defense (for Item 2); Brig. General A. H. Johnson, Chairman, Joint Petroleum Committee, Munitions Board (for Item 2); the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

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3. *Armaments and American Policy* (NSC 151; NSC Action No. 725; Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953) [2]

At the invitation of Mr. Cutler, Dr. Oppenheimer made a brief statement to the Council as to how the original panel of consultants, of which he, Dr. Bush and Mr. Allen Dulles had been members, had reached the conclusions which were now set forth in NSC 151. They had concluded in favor of the policy of candor to the American people regarding the atomic equation, in view of their feeling that the public must be made to understand the grim situation with which they were now faced. There was very little likelihood that the Soviets would change their spots, and not much hope that a really adequate defense against surprise atomic attack could be developed. It would be agreeable if we could discount these grim facts, continued Dr. Oppenheimer, but we simply could not. As in other areas, the Russians were behind us in the development of atomic weapons, but they will soon be pressing us hard. In 1945 the United States had made four atomic bombs. Today we could make a thousand. In 1945 these A-bombs were comparatively small, the equivalent of 20,000 tons of HE. Now they were enormously more powerful, and every year and a half or so the destructive power doubled. Dr. Oppenheimer professed to see no reason why the Soviets could not approach this achievement, although he admitted they would do so more slowly. Our only hope in facing this situation was an informed and steady public. Whatever steps we took to create a defense against this threat would still leave us vulnerable.

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[2] For text of NSC 151, May 8, see p. 1150. For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114. The memorandum of Feb. 4, transmitting the Report of the Panel of Consultants, is not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) For the text of the Report, see p. 1056.

The public does not realize the true facts of the situation, and it was crucially important to enlighten them. In addition, we ought to provide appropriate information to our allies, who are faced with an even more immediate danger. Finally, the policy of candor, which the report advocated, would have an important effect in securing support from the Congress and people for taking whatever practical steps we could to build a defense of the continent. Such a defense would never remove the atomic threat wholly, but it would at least palliate this threat. To explain to the people the nature of their dilemma it was necessary for the highest voice in the land to speak. Only a wise and informed people, concluded Dr. Oppenheimer, could be expected to act wisely.

The President replied to Dr. Oppenheimer's statement by indicating his great concern over the fact that the Russians were in so much more favorable a position in using atomic weapons. The Soviets would not hesitate to use them on the territories of our Western European allies, where, of course, we ourselves could not use the bomb. We were hamstrung, and could only bomb Soviet territory.

Asked for his views of the report, Dr. Bush said he had little to add to the statement of Dr. Oppenheimer. We were facing very grim times. If the American people were to go along with their Government, they must know the worst and what the Government can do about it. Otherwise the day might soon approach when, instead of being obliged to attack us with atomic weapons, the Russians would merely confront us with the necessity of agreeing to a vast Munich appeasement. To counteract this it was vital to create the best possible defensive system.

The President observed that he certainly agreed in principle with Dr. Oppenheimer's recommendation in favor of candor. He was concerned, however, about the security aspect of the release. What facts could safely be revealed to the public? Much too much classified information was already being dished up. How, inquired the President, can we distinguish the kind of information on this problem that it is safe and wise to release?

In response to this query Dr. Oppenheimer noted the suggestions in the report with respect to the type of information that could be released. It was obvious, he added, that we must avoid releasing any information as to know-how and technical construction of warheads, and the like. But a release on the general problem of the atomic race and the atomic equation, far from inciting the Russians, might even deter them by bringing home to them the fact of our enormous atomic power.

The President then said he had another thought on this subject which he wanted to try on Dr. Oppenheimer. If he was to go to talk to 160 million people on this tremendous subject, he thought it was unwise to make any distinction between fission and fusion weapons. Indeed, he thought we should suppress in all future official statements any reference to the term "thermonuclear". It was quite possible that omission of this term would add to Russian confusion and ignorance of the status of our program. Dr. Oppenheimer expressed agreement with the President's view.

Secretary Wilson stated that, as he had said previously, he feared that the proposal was more likely to frighten people than to reassure them, and Secretary Humphrey said that the same problem bothered him.

The President, however, stated his own conviction that instead of trying to raise vague hopes in the minds of the American people, it should be our job to attempt to inspire some really energetic action. In order to avoid the worst effects of bombing in great metropolitan areas, the first requisite was to assure firm discipline. Despite this truism, people merely laughed at all our efforts to emphasize discipline and control in our civilian defense exercises. As to the clamor for shelters, the President thought that they were far less significant than means to assure discipline. It was essential that more thought be given as to how to get this job done. It seemed apparent that civilian defense inspired no enthusiasm among most people.

At this point Mr. Cutler read to the Council Governor Peterson's written statement approving the recommendations in NSC 151. [3]

The President expressed his agreement with the ideas of Governor Peterson, but insisted that the Administration must do more to make people realize their own individual responsibility in facing up to this problem. The Government cannot simply do everything for them. People had been so used during the past twenty years to expecting the Government to settle all their difficulties, that it was going to be extremely hard to inspire a new sense of individual responsibility.

Dr. Bush, referring to the discussion of possible defense measures, expressed the view that it was plainly hopeless to expect any complete defense against atomic attack. Nevertheless, he insisted that it was possible to construct a defense sufficient to postpone and deter the evil day. We should have commenced this task several years ago. We have delayed almost too long the construction of a defense system for the North American Continent. Along with the facts of their grim situation, the American people must be told what the Government proposes to do to defend the continent.

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[3] The text of the statement has not been found.

Secretary Wilson observed that a trying part of the problem was that we would never be the first to use the atomic bomb, whereas the Russians obviously would use it when they were ready.

The President said he was not absolutely sure that Secretary Wilson was right. It seemed to him at least possible that some action would occur which would force the Government's hand and cause us to resort to atomic bombardment. He noted that popular pressure had forced the Government's hand in the Spanish-American War. Accordingly, though Secretary Wilson was generally correct, he should not be so certain in view of the temper of the American people.

Secretary Smith said that he was concerned, as he had said to the Council before, about the increasing feeling among Western European peoples that anything was better than atomic warfare. He wondered, therefore, whether, if the President agreed to speak to the American people along the lines recommended in this report, he would not in fact intensify this sentiment of so many Europeans and thus jeopardize the objectives of our foreign policy.

Dr. Oppenheimer replied that he did not think this a necessary corollary of a policy of candor if we stressed the deterrent power of the bomb and also pointed out to our allies that we too were vulnerable.

The President added that of course no one, he supposed, was suggesting that he go before the people with some kind of horror story. There were enough raw nerves in various parts of the world so that he did not wish to add to them. The emphasis should be on vigilance and sobriety, not on panic. The President went on to say that perhaps in this case, as in others, he was too pragmatic in his approach, but he was convinced that he must see the text of what he was expected to say to the American people before deciding to support the recommendation in favor of candor.

Secretary Humphrey reverted to his own anxiety as to the wisdom of telling the American people these grim facts before we were in a position to state concretely what steps the Government would take in building a defense against atomic attack.

The President said that that might be the case, but if free government were going to work, it was necessary to have an informed people.

Secretary Humphrey said he obviously could not deny this statement, but he was merely concerned with the matter of timing. In short, we should be ready to talk with the American people about the defense system at the same time that we informed them of their extreme vulnerability.

Secretary Wilson added that he was far from certain that this was the right moment to acquaint the American people with the facts.

Dr. Oppenheimer replied that the precise question of timing was beyond his knowledge, but he was sure that in general the policy of candor was several years overdue.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the question of timing the release of the information was discussed very carefully in NSC 151.

The President reiterated his desire to see a draft of the speech before he agreed to the policy, at which point Mr. Jackson suggested that he or someone else be directed to outline the draft of an opening-gun speech. The President thought this a sensible proposal, and further indicated that the subject of the atomic threat ought to be fitted into a speech which had a larger umbrella than the A-bomb and atomic warfare.

General Bradley commented that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored the policy of candor, they were uncertain of the wisdom of acting on this first of the four recommendations in the report of the panel of Consultants until we were ready to go ahead with the other three recommendations.

*The National Security Council:* [4]

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject in the light of oral remarks by Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Bush and a memorandum from the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

b. Noted the President's desire that reference in official statements to "thermonuclear" weapons be discontinued for security reasons, and that such weapons be included within the term "atomic" weapons.

c. Noted that the President directed Mr. C. D. Jackson to prepare a draft of a Presidential address which might initiate the recommended policy of candor toward the American people.

d. Directed the Psychological Strategy Board to prepare for Council consideration an outline plan of the specific steps, including speeches by Government officials, which should be taken to carry out the recommendations contained in NSC 151.

*Note:* The action in c above subsequently transmitted to Mr. C. D. Jackson for implementation. The action in d above subsequently transmitted to the Psychological Strategy Board for implementation.

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S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[4] Paragraphs a–d constitute NSC Action No. 799, May 27, 1953. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action")

330.13/6-453

### *The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1953.

DEAR CABOT: I understand you have inquired whether the resumption of discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission at this time would conflict with the priorities assigned to other US-USSR issues in testing the Soviet desire to reach a peaceful accommodation with the West.

We have reached the conclusion that extensive negotiations with the USSR on the subject of disarmament would at the moment be inappropriate to probe Soviet intentions and that bilateral or multilateral discussions with the Soviet Union could more profitably concentrate at the outset on other major international problems. Only after considerable progress towards adjusting these other problems has been achieved would there appear to be any likelihood of securing an agreed disarmament program which would safeguard our interests.

Despite this U.S. policy, it would be neither possible nor desirable to avoid United Nations discussion of disarmament. The recent General Assembly resolution on this subject, which we sponsored, requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work and requires the Commission to report by September 1, 1953 to the General Assembly and Security Council. [2] In view of this situation, and because of the pressure of international public and governmental opinion, the United States should use the Disarmament Commission primarily to explore the weakness of the Soviet disarmament position and to determine how far the USSR will go, at least in public utterances, toward support of a sound disarmament program. In other words, the United States should concentrate, so far as feasible, on pressing the USSR to explain in detail its concepts of an acceptable disarmament program, rather than bringing forward new United States positions. We should seek to avoid creating confusion between this type of operation and genuine progress toward disarmament, which could arise only as a result of a major change in Soviet attitude.

Therefore, the United States should consider the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission as in the nature of a "holding operation". A more precise definition of what is meant by this phrase is set forth in the paper approved by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC) on May 11, 1953 entitled "Policy

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer and Meyers of UNP.

[2] Regarding Resolution 704 (VII), Apr. 8, see the editorial note, p. 1140.

Guidance Governing United States Activities in the United Nations Disarmament Commission for the Period May through September, 1953." [3]

You will recall that the President, in his speech of April 16, 1953, placed major emphasis on disarmament, while at the same time making it clear that agreement on this important problem would come only as progress towards settlement of certain other political issues strengthens world trust. The "holding operation" in the Disarmament Commission, of the nature described in the RAC paper to which I referred, follows this approach.

I suggest, therefore, that you may wish to communicate with your friendly colleagues on the Disarmament Commission, explaining our views as generally outlined in the reference paper, and ascertaining their reaction to this line. I believe that it would be advisable to resume deliberations in the Disarmament Commission within the fairly near future, probably before the middle of June, and assure you that the Department will do everything possible to ensure you are provided with all the necessary support for this operation.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[3] For text, see Attachment B to the memorandum of May 26, p. 1162.

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330.13/6-553

## *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NEW YORK, June 5, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: This acknowledges yours of June 4 concerning the Disarmament Commission. [1]

Your letter is dated on the day that I had my conference with you, and the fact that you did not mention the subject to me at the time, led me to believe that you agreed with my telegram No. 757 of June 3. [2]

In this telegram I opposed taking the initiative in reconvening the Disarmament Commission at present, because of my belief that the Soviets could put us in an extremely embarrassing situation by challenging us to adopt the Baruch Plan for International Inspection of Atomic Facilities. This, of course, is something which would be totally unacceptable to the Senate, and which we probably would not even want to present to the Senate.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed. (310.2/6-353)

I thoroughly agree with what you say in your letter about it being "neither possible nor desirable to avoid U.N. discussion of Disarmament", and I would not want to do so. In fact, if any other nation raises the question I would of course want to take part in the most effective way.

But I do wonder about the political cleverness of taking the initiative on disarmament in order to "exploit the weakness of the Soviet disarmament position" when they can keep us on the end of the harpoon concerning our own willingness to accept inspection of atomic facilities.

For this reason, I am rather inclined to doubt the advisability of initiating discussions on this question with our friendly colleagues on the Disarmament Commission.

Sincerely yours,

CABOT L.

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Eisenhower Library, "Project Clean Up, AEC—General"

### *Thomas E. Murray, Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1953.

DEAR BOBBY: I didn't think it appropriate to join in the discussion of NSC 140/1 at the Council meeting on June 4th since the Commission was not represented on the Subcommittee which prepared the document.[1] However, I thought it might be useful if I passed on to you a few thoughts which struck me in going over the basic paper and listening to the Council discussion.

I think it is agreed that enemy attack capabilities are largely dependent on atomic energy considerations. So, it worries me to see the Administration apparently relying on analyses prepared without any responsible Atomic Energy Commission participation. Observer status or *ad hoc* participation by Atomic Energy Commissioners is a far cry from responsible sharing by technically competent Atomic Energy Commission people in the staff work leading to Presidential review and perhaps decision of matters which have direct atomic energy bearing. Present Atomic Energy Commission observation of the Planning Board sessions does not answer this problem, if for no other reason, because of the statutory prohibition against discussion of restricted data with non-Q cleared people.

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[1] For the text of NSC 140/1, May 18, see p. 328. For the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at the 148th meeting of the National Security Council, June 4, see p. 367.

A few instances of atomic energy items which bear on NSC 140/1 may highlight the point. The only reference to Russian thermonuclear capacity appearing in any papers which I saw in connection with the NSC discussion was the Subcommittee opinion that the Russians would not have a thermonuclear weapon delivery capability by mid 1955. It strikes me that the validity of the conclusions of the basic paper depend in no small degree upon the accuracy of this assumption. To my mind the assumption is not justified in fact. Less than three years ago we were being told that the United States might be able to develop a successful thermonuclear device in ten to fifteen years. Yet it was only a little more than a year after the conceptual development that the "Mike" device was successfully detonated at Eniwetok. The Russians have the materials necessary for a thermonuclear device and I think it would be very dangerous to assume anything but that they also have the information contained in the lost Joint Committee document. And it should be remembered that the Russian's idea of a delivery capability for thermonuclear weapons may differ entirely from our idea of a delivery capability.

On the score of vulnerability of atomic energy production installations to sabotage, not enough recognition seems to have been given to the fact that all U-235 is now processed through one part of the Oak Ridge complex which is most vulnerable to sabotage and this will be the case until the completion of the Portsmouth plant.

The basic paper refers to the time requirement for SAC to mount a retaliatory strike. It should be clearly understood that this delay is in no manner attributable to civilian custody of atomic weapons. On a number of occasions the Commission has pointed out to the Department of Defense the possibilities of improved readiness if further nuclear deployments to the military were effected.

I hope that these few examples provide some justification for concern about the relegation of the Atomic Energy Commission to a secondary role in the top Executive Branch decisional machinery. Beria's [2] assignment to manage the Russian program indicates their appreciation of the need for atomic energy representation at the highest level. Since the national security is so closely tied up with atomic energy considerations, it would seem to me only the part of prudence to bring men with atomic energy backgrounds and understanding directly into the work of the Security Council which under your good guidance has become such an important part of the Executive process.

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[2] Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

THOMAS E. MURRAY

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330.13/6-553

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1953.

DEAR CABOT: Thank you for your letter of June 5 [2] about disarmament.

I believe that we are in substantial agreement on the desirability of minimizing emphasis on the forthcoming Disarmament Commission discussions. When we speak of taking initiative in discussions with friendly delegations, we merely intend to assure that, before the Disarmament Commission convenes, we should make sure that we and our friends see eye to eye on the most important issues.

I suggest that it would be helpful for you to discuss this with Mr. Gordon Arneson, my Adviser on Atomic Energy matters, and an officer from UNA, either in Washington or New York at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNA and Secretary Dulles.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1176.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 151st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 25, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 151st meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Admiral Fechteler for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on June 26.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *Military Requirements for Atomic Weapons* (NSC Action No. 768–f) [2]

*The National Security Council:* [3]

Noted a report by the Secretary of Defense, as read by Mr. Cutler, that, pursuant to NSC Action No. 768–f, the Secretary of Defense:

a. Had concluded, after review with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the assumptions and calculations used in arriving at military requirements for atomic weapons are not significantly changed by the force requirements envisaged in the FY 1954 budget.

b. Intends to ask the new Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the entire program for military weapons, and presumes that the new Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission will likewise review the production and development of atomic weapons by the Commission.

c. Considers that these two actions should provide the guidelines for future determinations in this field and that it is not prudent to alter our military requirements pending the completion of these actions.

. . . . . . .

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[2] For NSC Action No. 768, see footnote 7, p. 300.

[3] The paragraphs below constitute NSC Action No. 820, June 25, 1953. (S/S-NSC files, "NSC Records of Action")

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711.5611/11-2053

## *Statement by the Under Secretary of State (Smith)* [1]

[WASHINGTON, June 25, 1953.]

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE CONCERNING LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO FOSTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC POWER JUNE 25, 1953

As a general proposition, the Department of State believes that atomic energy should, as rapidly as, and to the extent that, security considerations permit, become integrated into the national economy.

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[1] The unsigned source text constitutes the statement delivered by the Under Secretary before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy on June 25, *Continued*

Since legislation designed to promote the development of nuclear power in the United States concerns domestic matters primarily, the Department does not consider that it should comment on the details of such legislation. Legislation to this end, however, does have important implications for our relationships with other nations and I welcome the opportunity to comment on these implications.

It is of paramount importance to our international relationships generally that the United States maintain and improve its leadership in atomic energy development. It is important, therefore, that we press ahead with the development of nuclear power. There is every reason to believe we will be the first to have nuclear power if we are prepared to move with vigor in this direction. It would be very damaging to the position of the United States if another country were to be first in this field of endeavor. It would be especially damaging if the Soviet Union were to precede us in the development of atomic power. If this were to happen, the Soviet Union would cite their achievement as proof of their propaganda line that the United States is interested in atomic energy only for destructive purposes while the Soviets are interested in developing it for peaceful purposes.

On the positive side, by being first to develop nuclear power we will have further demonstrated to all the world that we are intensely interested in the peaceful aspects of atomic energy with all its implications for the future of mankind. This achievement would provide additional and positive evidence of the humanitarian policies of this Government, and its desire to further the economic well-being of the free world.

This Government has long and vigorously supported the United Nations plan or any other no less effective plan for the international control of atomic energy. President Eisenhower, in his speech of April 16, re-emphasized the willingness of the United States to enter, at an appropriate time, into solemn agreements in the field of disarmament providing for effective safeguards, including "the international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only, and to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons".

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1953, during exploratory hearings on problems of nuclear power development. It is accompanied in the files by a similar draft dated June 4. An additional expression of the views of Under Secretary Smith regarding the international implications of nuclear power development is contained in his letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Aug. 18, 1953; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 7, 1953, pp. 330–332.

The United Nations plan, as you know, has a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it would promote and foster the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. Efforts to hasten the day when atomic power will be economically feasible are consistent with this purpose.

On the other hand, in order to ensure against the misuse of atomic energy, the United Nations plan provides for safeguards which would effectively prohibit the manufacture, possession, or use of atomic weapons, by nations. In considering legislation designed to foster the development of nuclear power, it would be well to recall the nature of the principal safeguards against violations and evasions provided in the United Nations plan.

The United Nations plan provides for an international system of inspection designed primarily to prevent and detect clandestine operations in the field of atomic energy. This inspection system would guard against the possibility of an atomic energy program being developed outside the international control system.

The other major safeguards are designed to meet the danger of diversion of fissionable materials from known plants. This is a very real danger and a difficult problem to cope with because, starting with the mines, the processes and facilities involved in developing atomic energy for peaceful or for military uses are identical and similar up to a very advanced stage. To guard against the danger of diversion of materials from these facilities, the United Nations plan provides for the international ownership of source and fissionable materials, and international ownership, operation and management of facilities making or using these materials in dangerous quantities.

Because the technology of atomic energy is a changing art, dangerous facilities were not precisely defined in the United Nations plan, but were defined as those which, if misused, would be a threat to international security. In the United Nations plan, the international control agency would determine, in the light of the state of knowledge at the time, which facilities are dangerous and, accordingly, what kinds of controls are required.

The safeguards of the United Nations plan closely parallel those provided in our existing domestic legislation. To the extent that new legislation results in some relaxation or modification of domestic controls and safeguards, questions will arise as to whether we should modify our position on international control of atomic energy.

We are continually examining new developments in the field of atomic energy that might have a bearing on the problem of international control. If, in the course of developing a domestic program of nuclear power, we acquire experience which would call for modifications in our position on international control of atomic energy, we would not hesitate to modify our position accordingly. Such experience may well provide useful guidance if and when a system of effective international control can one day be negotiated.

Because of Soviet intransigence, present prospects for international control of atomic energy are dim. However, we must at all times be prepared to enter into an arrangement, no less effective than the United Nations plan, for the international control of atomic energy. Therefore, I would strongly urge that any legislation that is considered should take account of this Government's continuing interest in bringing about effective international control. Not to do so would, in our view, be a mistake.

It is well known that an important part of the uranium ore needed for the United States atomic energy program is derived from foreign sources. This ore has been made available to the United States as a part of the common defense effort. The growing need of the United States for uranium to supply and expand our atomic weapons program is well understood and appreciated.

There has always been a natural and understandable interest on the part of foreign governments supplying uranium ore to the United States to assure that they will be able to enjoy the peaceful uses of atomic energy when the state of world conditions and atomic technology permit.

Enactment by the United States Congress of legislation designed to promote the development of atomic power will tend to increase the natural interest of all foreign countries in participating in this development and in the many benefits which are hoped for from it. This will be especially true in the case of nations which produce uranium ore.

We believe that legislation designed to foster the development of atomic power in the United States should include provisions which—recognizing this natural aspiration of foreign countries—would enable the United States to make available, in appropriate cases and under suitable safeguards, information and material to assist them in making progress in this field.

In summary, the Department of State favors legislation which would hasten the day that atomic power can be made a reality. Such legislation would re-affirm our leadership in this field and our desire to develop this source of energy for the greater well-being of mankind. Development of atomic power is consistent with this Government's support for an effective system of international control which would prohibit atomic weapons by ensuring and promoting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 157th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 30, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 157th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding (except for the first part of Item 1, which was presided over by the Vice President); the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Assistant Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 5); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State (for Item 5); Walter S. Delany, Office of the Director for Mutual Security (for Item 1); Kenneth R. Hansen, Economic Defense Advisory Committee (for Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Col. Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

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6. *Armaments and American Policy* (NSC 151; NSC Action No. 799–c and –d; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 28, 1953) [2]

Mr. Cutler noted that at its 146th meeting the Council had directed the Psychological Strategy Board to prepare an outline of specific steps, including speeches by Government officials, to carry out the recommendations in NSC 151. The reference memorandum of July 28 was the response to this directive.

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[1] Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on July 31.

[2] For NSC 151, May 8, see p. 1150. For NSC Action No. 799, see footnote 4, p. 1174. The memorandum by Lay of July 28, not printed, transmitted to the NSC a memorandum dated July 23 from C. D. Jackson (acting in his capacity as Chairman of the PSB) which outlined a plan of specific steps, including speeches by the President, Secretary Dulles, and others, which would fulfill the recommendations concerning atomic "candor" contained in NSC 151. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC 151 Memos")

The President said that if the "Candor Project" were to be undertaken at all it should be undertaken soon. He added that the speeches listed in the enclosure to the reference memorandum were not exclusive; all speeches by Cabinet members should be related to "Project Candor".

Mr. C. D. Jackson felt that the opening speech by the President might be an atomic "candor" speech.

The President said that a variety of presentation was necessary. Members of the Administration gave the people guides as to policy every time they appeared in public. The Administration should take the public into its confidence where the public has to make decisions or form public opinion. However, we did not have to tell everything.

Admiral Strauss objected to the connotations of the word "candor". He felt that if you said, "Now we are going to be candid", this implied deception up to now.

The President said that we could say, "Now we are being completely frank." He agreed that we should not beat our breasts and say, "Look, we are candid." The President also suggested that the phrase "age of peril" should be deleted in connection with "Project Candor".

*The National Security Council:* [3]

a. Approved in principle the proposed program for informing the American people, contained in the reference memorandum, to include follow-up addresses by Government officials.

b. Directed the Psychological Strategy Board to coordinate the development and implementation of the program, reporting back to the Council on progress made.

*Note:* The above actions referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for implementation.

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MARION W. BOGGS

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[3] Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 869, July 30, 1953. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action")

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S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC 151 Memos"

## *The Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (Cole) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: No American of this generation has spoken more eloquently than you on the folly of hoping to maintain lasting peace solely through material might. Yet no American has been more insistent in calling for all the weapons required for the defense of freedom and liberty.

I am therefore sure you will be the first to agree that the test of a thermonuclear device by the Soviet government on August 12 [1] now imposes a twin obligation upon our nation—maintaining and increasing our existing lead in fission weapons and the development of hydrogen energy and, side by side with this, re-exploring old ways and searching out new ways of bringing about effective control of nuclear armaments and all other instruments of war.

This letter is written to assure you that the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy will lend their support to all measures intended to enlarge still further our present advantage in atomic and hydrogen developments, and to all proposals designed to bring real and lasting peace to the world.

After Hiroshima, it was the deepest desire of our Government and our people that the output of all weapons, including nuclear weapons, be regulated through workable international arrangements. This remains our deepest desire, even though our strivings for such a plan—strivings extending over the past eight years—have met only with rebuffs from the Kremlin.

As you know, President Truman's decision of January 31, 1950 to step-up the tempo of our thermonuclear program was made with heavy heart. He issued his directive only after the evidences of Soviet intransigence and hostility had become so overwhelming as to leave us no alternative but to proceed with the development of these dreadful armaments. This committee not only supported your predecessor's decision, but it independently made positive and vigorous representations in support of an enlarged hydrogen program. We have long been on record as urging that no effort be spared in developing hydrogen energy to the extent required for the defense of this and like-minded nations.

Because of the requirements for security, few Americans can know of the devotion, skill, and sheer hard work which the pioneer researchers in thermonuclear energy have brought to our program over the past three and a half years. Some day, I hope that the American people can come to appreciate more fully the immense contributions these men and women have made to our national security.

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[1] On Aug. 8, Soviet Premier Malenkov told the Supreme Soviet that the United States no longer possessed a monopoly on the hydrogen bomb. At his press conference of Aug. 12, Secretary of State Dulles indicated that there was no independent evidence to support Malenkov's contention. For the text of Dulles' press conference statement on the Malenkov speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1953, pp. 236-237. On Aug. 20, AEC Chairman Strauss issued the following statement:

"The Soviet Union conducted an atomic test on the morning of August 12. Certain information to this effect came into our hands that night. Subsequent information on the subject indicates that this test involved both fission and thermonuclear reactions.

"It will be recalled that more than 3 years ago the United States decided to accelerate work on all forms of atomic weapons. Both the 1951 and the 1952 Eniwetok test series included tests involving similar reactions." (*Ibid.*, p. 237)

Thanks to their work, we are now well ahead of the Soviets—both in fission weapons and in thermonuclear developments. Yet, in this dynamic and fast-evolving science, what is adequate today may be inadequate tomorrow. I therefore believe that our thermonuclear program should henceforth be characterized by even greater vigor, imagination, and boldness—toward the end of making hydrogen energy play, as rapidly and fully as possible, its appropriate role in the defense of the free world. Fundamentally, I believe this means that more men and more resources should be devoted to this phase of the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Yet no sensible person could imagine for an instant that accelerating the rate and scale of our hydrogen work, vital though this is, in itself represents a complete answer to the Soviet test of August 12.

I presume that this latest sign of Soviet atomic progress will be reflected in the plans you and your advisers are formulating for more effective defenses against nuclear attack from land or sea. I presume also that the Soviet test will have a bearing on our policy toward releasing more information on the effects of atomic weapons.

Above all, I earnestly hope we will not let feelings of hopelessness dissuade us from continuing to press for international control over nuclear and conventional armaments.

My own hope, in addition, is that we will seize every opportunity to assure the world that we stand ready to share the benefits of peacetime atomic energy with decent people everywhere. It is, I think, most urgent that we construct as quickly as possible a reactor turning out large amounts of useful power, and then aid our allies in the construction of similar machines—always subject, of course, to necessary security safeguards.

As Chairman of the Joint Committee, I am now framing for Committee consideration, proposals which aim at enabling us and our allies to pool our resources and talents more effectively in developing peacetime applications of the atom. I look forward to transmitting the Committee's considered recommendations on this subject for your study soon after the Congress reconvenes in January.

I cannot close without recalling your address of last April 16—which I deem to be one of the great state papers of our era—in which you declared that, if effective and worldwide disarmament could be achieved, you would ask our people to join with all other nations in devoting a substantial portion of the defense monies thereby saved to a fund for world reconstruction.

The goal of our people has been and ever will be a just and lasting peace for all men of good will. The members of this Committee stand behind you in your efforts to lead us toward that goal. [2]

Sincerely yours,

STERLING COLE

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[2] On Aug. 25, President Eisenhower sent the following reply to Representative Cole:

"Dear Mr. Chairman: My grateful thanks for your very thoughtful letter of the twenty-first. You will be interested to know that in recent days I have been working on a talk, to be delivered early this fall, on some of the subjects that you discuss in your letter. I find that our thoughts are almost identical on these vital matters.

"I am sending your letter on for study by the National Security Council and by the Head of the Atomic Energy Commission.

"With warm personal regard,

"Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

By memorandum of Sept. 8, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted Representative Cole's letter and the President's reply to the members of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC 151 Memos")

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761.5611/8-2453

## *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Knight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1953.

Subject: Effect on the French of Soviet possession of the H Bomb

In my judgment the public knowledge that the Soviets are in possession of the H-bomb does not (repeat not) add a new factor of any significance to either the state of mind of the French public and Government or to French policies.

I believe, in view of the horror of the atom bomb which the imagination of the average Frenchman portrays as absolute, that the additional horror represented in the H-bomb has no effectiveness.

Furthermore and most important, I am reasonably sure that the average Frenchman believes the Soviet bombs, be they A-bombs or H-bombs, are largely reserved for US targets and only very secondarily for target in Western Europe. He feels that the Soviets in their own interest would wish to avoid unnecessary destruction on the continent. Unfortunately, the average Frenchman is equally positive that the American A-bombs and H-bombs would be extensively dropped in Western Europe—perhaps in larger numbers than on the USSR. Being very unsure as to where the holding line in Western Europe may be, he rather expects that many of these American bombs would fall on French territory. Therefore, I very much fear and actually believe that the average Frenchman in his thinking and reaction is more concerned with American H-bombs than he is with Soviet H-bombs.

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[1] A marginal notation by Merchant on the source text indicates agreement with the substance of this memorandum.

I have checked the above opinion from the European point of view with the senior officers now on duty in WE and they generally concur.

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Chron File"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 1, 1953.]

### DISARMAMENT

The Secretary agreed the US should not introduce new substantive proposals in the Assembly but should co-sponsor a resolution reaffirming appropriate sections of the President's April 16, 1953 address concerned with disarmament. If the Soviets suggest 4-Power talks on disarmament, the US will point out that the Disarmament Commission exists to deal with this problem and such discussions are always possible within the Commission's framework. The Secretary also agreed that an important section of his opening speech in the General Assembly should be devoted to disarmament.

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[1] According to Secretary Dulles' appointment book, he met with Robert D. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and two aides at 4:30 p. m., Aug. 31. (Princeton University Library, Dulles papers, "Daily Appointments") This memorandum, drafted on Sept. 1 and bearing a handwritten date, 31 Aug. 1953, is presumably based on a portion of the discussion at that meeting.

Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "NSC Papers 1953-1955"

## *Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 1, 1953.
NSC 112/1

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON POSSIBILITY OF A NEW UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL IN THE EIGHTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

References:

A. NSC 112 [2]

B. NSC Action Nos. 717 and 725 [3]

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments", dated June 3, 1953 [4]

D. Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, "Armaments and American Policy", dated February 4, 1953 [5]

The enclosed draft report on the subject, adopted by the NSC Planning Board as a response to NSC Action No. 717-b, on the basis of a draft prepared by a working group of the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council of the Recommendations in paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof at the meeting on Wednesday, September 9, 1953.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed Recommendations, they be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State. [6]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[1] Copies were also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] For text of NSC 112, "Formulation of a United States Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments", July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

[3] For NSC Action No. 717, see footnote 6, p. 1108. For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114.

[4] This was a covering memorandum to the May 26 memo of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, p. 1160.

[5] This memorandum, not printed, transmitted the Report of the Panel of Consultants to the Senior Staff of the NSC. For the text of the Report, see p. 1056.

[6] At its 161st meeting, Sept. 9, the NSC adopted the recommendations contained in paragraphs 7-b and 8 of this report; for the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, see p. 1210.

[Enclosure]

## REPORT BY THE NSC PLANNING BOARD ON POSSIBILITY OF A NEW UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL IN THE EIGHTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

### THE PROBLEM

1. Pursuant to NSC Action No. 717 of February 18, 1953, to explore the possibility of new disarmament proposals by the United States in the Eighth General Assembly.

### CONCLUSIONS

2. Since past experience has indicated that efforts to achieve any limitation of armaments do little good unless they are closely integrated with the adjustment of other major international problems, we can expect little progress toward genuine disarmament until measurable progress is made toward the solution of other political questions, such as the German and Austrian problem and Korea.

3. Because of the complexity and nature of the problem, disarmament is peculiarly ill-suited to provide a real test of Soviet intentions to negotiate genuinely on political differences between the USSR and the free world. It is relatively easy for the USSR in the disarmament field to prolong negotiation by equivocal statement or involvement in details and by making illusory "concessions" which could confuse public opinion and create an unwarranted climate of hopefulness, with serious consequent damage.

4. Any serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on the subject of disarmament would probably take place in bilateral or multilateral discussions outside United Nations organs even though such discussions probably would have the previous approval of the United Nations and might be influenced by the United Nations discussions, both public and private.*

5. The working papers which the United States, either unilaterally, or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and France, has already submitted to the Disarmament Commission, taken together, represent a sufficiently comprehensive approach to make possible genuine negotiations leading to a safe-guarded disarmament program.

6. Despite the difficulties outlined above, it is advisable that the United States continue to demonstrate to the world its abiding

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*This paper does not deal with the problem of how to meet a Soviet proposal in the General Assembly for immediate Great Power discussions on disarmament, except to indicate that specific substantive proposals on disarmament in the General Assembly would not be the best method of dealing with the situation. [Footnote in the source text.]

desire for comprehensive and safe-guarded disarmament. The general desirability of such posture is heightened by the probability that the interest of our Allies in lessening international tensions and reducing armaments has been augmented by their hopes arising from the Soviet peace offensive and their fears derived from the announcement that the Soviets had exploded a hydrogen bomb or device on August 12, 1953. Such posture would also improve our ability to meet any Soviet moves in the General Assembly. Consequently, it is desirable for the United States to introduce in the General Assembly a proposal affirming the principles regarding world peace contained in the President's speech of April 16, 1953. [7]

### RECOMMENDATIONS

7. a. In the Eighth General Assembly, the United States should review the record of its efforts in the United Nations to achieve agreement on disarmament, and forcefully emphasize that the proposals which the United States has already submitted in the Disarmament Commission, either unilaterally or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and France, provide a comprehensive approach to genuine disarmament negotiations which treats all elements of the problem.

7. b. The United States should not initiate any new major substantive proposals on disarmament in the Eighth General Assembly, nor elaborate the existing substantive proposals already introduced in the United Nations by the United States, individually or joined by the United Kingdom and France.

8. To maintain United States initiative in the disarmament field, to demonstrate to the world our continued desire to achieve comprehensive and safe-guarded disarmament, and to anticipate Soviet proposals, the United States should introduce a proposal along the lines of paragraph 6 above, reaffirming the sections of the President's speech dealing with the problem of disarmament and, in particular, the statement in that speech that as progress in the settlement of certain other political problems "strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world."

### COMMENT

9. NSC Action No. 717 of February 18, 1953, calls for exploration prior to the Eighth General Assembly of the possibility of a new United States proposal in the field of disarmament.

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[7] See the editorial note, p. 1144.

10. In considering this question, the most important basic factor confronting us is that there is no anticipation that serious negotiations on disarmament will take place in a United Nations organ, at least in the foreseeable future, although the United Nations would doubtless approve the agreed framework for such discussions. This evaluation is based on two general lines of reasoning.

a. The President stated in his speech of April 16 that as progress in certain other areas of political differences "strengthens world trust we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world." This is part of the United States policy that a precondition for serious detailed negotiations on disarmament would logically be progress toward the settlement of such political questions as Korea, Austria, and Germany.

b. Any serious negotiations on the subject of disarmament would undoubtedly be more fruitful if they take place in bilateral or multilateral discussion outside United Nations organs, even though such discussions probably would have the previous approval of the United Nations and might even be influenced by United Nations discussions, both public and private.

In the light of this situation, United States policy in the field of disarmament now rests on the premise that in the Disarmament Commission, and presumably in the General Assembly, we should conduct a holding operation, as outlined in the RAC Policy Paper RAC (NS) D-5a.†

11. However, the above factor does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of certain types of new United States proposals to the Eighth General Assembly in the field of disarmament. Such proposals might become desirable because of the following considerations.

a. We may be faced with the necessity of fairly extensive disarmament talks, either inside or outside the United Nations, even though the record of the past years indicates there is no likelihood of genuine negotiations at present with the USSR because of proposals and pressures from the Soviet Union, from France, or from certain of the smaller states which are members of the Disarmament Commission. In this connection, it should be emphasized that under Articles 11 and 26 the United Nations is charged with the mandate of seeking to reduce armaments.

b. It must be recognized that, regardless of the nature of the particular proposal, the mere fact that the United States makes a proposal has an important effect upon world opinion, as exemplified by the reaction of Indian officials to our past disarmament efforts and the favorable world reaction to the President's April 16 speech placing disarmament in perspective to other problems.

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†Attachment B to Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject "Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," June 3, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. RAC (NS) D-5a is printed under the date of May 26, p. 1160.]

c. Proposals submitted to the United Nations by the United States could conceivably set the stage for subsequent Great Power negotiations.

12. When considered in the light of the many outstanding political questions dividing the Soviet Union and the United States, the past United States proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission, and the failure up to the present time of the Soviet Union to offer any suggestions of its own that might serve as the basis for serious negotiations, it would seem that any proposals we might submit to the General Assembly would have as their primary objectives either:

a. A serious attempt to break the present disarmament deadlock by presenting new and revised United States positions likely to be more acceptable to the Soviet Union; or

b. Proposals primarily calculated at least to maintain and possibly to advance our present advantageous political position in the disarmament field and to give support to the general effort to maintain free world initiative.

13. Any revision and elaboration of existing United States positions with the aim of breaking the present deadlock would necessarily be drastic. (e.g., it could conceivably be along the lines suggested in the Annex of "Armaments and American Policy", Report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament of the Department of State:‡—a disarmament scheme with a relatively simple system of inspection designed merely to prevent any major violations from going unnoticed and including a revision of the present United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy.) Aside from the question of the merits of any major revision of United States policy, there are basic reasons which weigh against any serious attempt to break the disarmament deadlock through proposals in the Eighth General Assembly. The extreme unlikelihood that serious negotiations on disarmament can take place in a United Nations organ would make it unwise to present any major revision in the General Assembly, particularly when such proposals would constitute unilateral disclosure of our minimum positions before agreement has been reached on any of the East-West political differences and before entering into serious disarmament negotiations.

14. The question thus arises as to what proposals we might make in the General Assembly to accomplish the other objective, namely, the maintenance and possibly the advancement of our political position in the disarmament field. It should be noted that to advance

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‡Transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff by memorandum from the Executive Secretary, subject "Armaments and American Policy," dated February 4, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. For text of the Report and its Annex, see p. 1056.]

a proposal solely for this reason is not equivalent to relegating our interest in disarmament purely to the field of propaganda. The United States had consistently taken the position that it must be ready to carry out any proposals which it makes in the field of disarmament. In other words, all such proposals must be basically sound and capable of development into a workable program in the event of a change in the international climate. Our past adherence to such a course of action has convinced most of the world of our sincerity and has therefore been the best possible form of propaganda. Such proposals have the additional advantage of creating a foundation which would facilitate genuine negotiations in the event of a lessening of international tension.

15. In the light of the above, it is clear that any proposals concerned solely with disarmament which we might make in the General Assembly must have three characteristics.

a. The proposals must be such that we could carry them out if they were accepted.

b. The proposals must be relatively understandable and capable of reduction to simple terms, in order to have the necessary popular appeal.

c. The proposals must be of such a nature that their discussion in the General Assembly will not raise unjustified hopes which might interfere with the essential program of developing sufficient strength among the Western Powers to resist Soviet imperialism.

Possible proposals concerned solely with disarmament are set forth in Annex A, together with their advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of these criteria. The general conclusion regarding these possible proposals is that the United States would probably not be justified in submitting any of them to the Eighth General Assembly. In connection with some of them, the disadvantages of their submission outweigh the advantages. Others lack sufficient popular appeal to justify their submission.

16. A general factor affecting any presentation in the General Assembly might be the status of US–USSR relations. Now that an armistice has been achieved in Korea, if Four-Power talks on disarmament seem imminent, it is doubtful that new substantive proposals on disarmament will be submitted to the General Assembly, and, in fact, will be considered by many states as inappropriate due to the expectation of discussion of this subject in Four-Power talks. It is possible, however, that the General Assembly might consider a resolution on the disarmament item urging the Great Powers to confer and seek to reach an agreement upon a program of safeguarded disarmament. In this event, it would be difficult and probably inadvisable to restrain the General Assembly from passing such a resolution.

17. Even if there is no prospect of Four-Power talks, it seems likely that the pressures in the General Assembly will be in the direction of securing Four-Power talks which would include the subject of disarmament. Under these circumstances, (despite the fact that the disadvantages appear to outweigh the advantages for the United States, in general, as indicated in paragraph 15 above) a disarmament proposal by the United States might serve the dual purpose of giving further assurance to the world that peace and a disarmed world are our ultimate goal and of lessening General Assembly pressures for Four-Power talks.

The chief advantages which might be derived from the submission of such a proposal might be obtained if the United States were to submit to the General Assembly an item dealing broadly with the entire problem of international peace and the courses of action necessary to secure that objective. The basis for that item could be the President's speech of April 16 which indicates in outline the general problem of relaxation of international tensions and of ensuring peace. Disarmament plays a large role in this program, the chief stress being on the relationship of disarmament to settlement of other outstanding political issues.

18. From the standpoint of the United Nations disarmament discussions, the chief advantage of focusing the attention of the General Assembly on the problem of relating disarmament to relaxation of international tensions is that it touches on the large gap in the work of the Disarmament Commission. The serious discussions of the Disarmament Commission—in accordance with its terms of reference—have been devoted almost exclusively to the comparatively technical side of securing safe-guarded disarmament rather than to the broad relationship of disarmament to other world problems.

Another advantage of such an approach is that it conforms to the objectives emphasized in NSC 112 of avoiding proposals which would immerse the United Nations in a mass of details prior to strong indications of a possibility of securing genuine progress in achieving the programs.

Another important advantage of this type of proposal is that it, like our other disarmament proposals, would result in a favorable reaction throughout the world to the United States, through showing our continued interest in disarmament.

19. It must be recognized that the decision as to whether the United States should present to the General Assembly an omnibus item of this nature dealing in broad general terms with the causes of international tension will depend upon political considerations extending considerably beyond the field of disarmament. It should be noted that the United States in the past has criticized the USSR

for introducing proposals of an omnibus type and has successfully contended that such proposals be placed at the bottom of the agenda after General Assembly consideration of the individual elements of the omnibus proposals. Also, it would be easy for other states to add their own ideas, possibly hostile to our position, to such omnibus proposals. For example, the Arab states might propose that a solution of the Palestine and North African problems in accordance with their ideas was essential to world peace. This process of political logrolling could result in General Assembly approval of a resolution completely objectionable to the United States.

Despite these and other dangers, it would be desirable for the United States to go ahead with an omnibus proposal, principally because our political position would suffer at this time by any indication that the United States lacks interest in disarmament or does not wish to take any initiative in this regard. The announcement that the USSR had exploded a hydrogen bomb or device on August 12, 1953 undoubtedly has stimulated our Allies' interest in this subject, already great. In the past, the clearly expressed United States desire to obtain agreement on a comprehensive disarmament program, plus the broad proposals which the United States has made on this subject and Allied participation in or support of these efforts, has been helpful in securing popular support for necessary rearmament efforts by demonstrating that Western desire for disarmament was rejected by the Soviets and left no alternative for the present but to maintain armed strength to insure security. Moreover, United States interest in disarmament has favorable impact on the so-called "neutralist" powers in counter-acting Soviet propaganda that the United States seeks war.

20. The proposal would, in effect, ask the General Assembly to endorse the principles contained in the President's speech. The sections of the President's speech most relevant to such an item in the General Assembly (and some or all of which might be utilized) are set forth in Annex B. We could not, of course, expect the General Assembly to accept a wording even closely akin to the text of a speech by the head of government of one of the Great Powers. However, to indicate through reference to the President's text the principles which might be developed in the General Assembly amply serves the limited purposes of this paper.

21. With regard to the question of preparations within the United States Government, it is probable that the United States could present in the General Assembly without extensive study a generalized proposal along the lines suggested in the previous paragraph. It would even be possible, without extensive studies, to elaborate somewhat on the various points of the disarmament sug-

gestions contained in the President's speech or to go forward with proposals along the lines dealt with in Annex A. It must be pointed out emphatically, however, that while such extensive studies would not be a prerequisite to proposals in the General Assembly they undoubtedly would be a prerequisite to the determination of United States positions in connection with Four-Power discussions. Considerable additional machinery would have to be set up within the United States Government on an urgent basis in order to carry out such studies.

## Annex A

## Possible Proposals Concerned Solely With Disarmament That Might Be Presented to the Eighth General Assembly

1. *Proposals or comments, following up the President's April 16 speech, concerning the devotion of a "substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction."*

This might take the form of one or a combination of the following:

(i) Illustrations of the type of program the United States would support, and some illustration of just what this would mean for the various countries now in need of such aid;

(ii) An indication of the probable or possible amounts that would be available and some illustration of just what this would mean for the various countries now in need of such aid;

(iii) A suggestion that a United Nations study committee be set up to survey the means and methods of establishing and carrying out such a program.

*Advantages*

a. Such action would enable the United States to further dramatize and elaborate on the President's suggestion regarding use of disarmament savings. General Assembly discussion of a United States proposal on this subject would have a powerful appeal to the peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The resulting increased pressure on the Soviet leaders, possibly even from some of the satellite officials, to take action to permit such a program to come into being would serve greatly the interest of the United States and would help forge another bond of common interest between the Western nations and the rest of the free world.

b. Some initiative on our part indicating a desire to develop further this aspect of the President's "peace program" would serve to counter the arguments advanced in some quarters that the "peace program" is just words for propaganda purposes and that the United States does not intend to press for its implementation.

*Disadvantages*

a. Increased attention in the General Assembly to the benefits that would accrue from disarmament, and particularly any General Assembly involvement in actual planning of a program to administer such benefits, might well divert attention from the present obstructionist position of the Soviet Union and might cause some governments to press for a rapid "compromise", unacceptable to us but economically and financially profitable to them, in order to initiate the program. In addition, such a result, through by-passing problems and concentrating attention on the benefits of disarmament, might hinder our present policy of encouraging the rearmament efforts of the free world until we secure genuinely safeguarded disarmament.

b. It is entirely possible that proposals on the utilization of disarmament savings at the Eighth General Assembly might lessen chances of Soviet agreement not only on disarmament but also on other political issues. In the first place, if the Soviets were to participate in such a program as a contributing nation, it would make it more difficult for them to utilize the savings resulting from disarmament to increase the standard of living for their own people. One of the most likely motivations for any sincere Soviet effort to achieve a political *modus vivendi* would be the desire of the new regime to strengthen its popular support by finally delivering the long promised increased standard of living. Thus the strength of the above motivation for agreement would be reduced to the degree that Soviet leaders felt they would be forced to divert savings to other countries. Furthermore, if the Soviets were convinced that the United States actually planned to carry out its share of such a program, either with or without Soviet participation, such conviction might weigh against chances for agreement on disarmament. United States participation would, in Soviet eyes, not only cushion the domestic and world-wide disruptive effects of a reduction of United States armament production but would also increase the likelihood that the economies of various countries which the Soviets would hope to see disrupted during a period of reduced tensions could instead be strengthened.

c. A proposal of this sort might cause pressures on the United States to accept inadequately safeguarded Soviet proposals which might unless we are alert lead to unilateral disarmament by the United States.

2. *New proposals for international control machinery.*

A working paper presently contemplated for possible future submission by the United States to the Disarmament Commission is one concerning the nature and functions of an international control organ which would supervise the carrying into effect and operation of a comprehensive disarmament program. (A preliminary draft paper on this subject has been prepared and circulated to the French and British for their comments, which have not yet been forthcoming.) If, however, it were deemed desirable, submission of a paper on this subject could be made to the Eighth General Assembly. In order to ensure the maximum propaganda appeal, a proposal on this subject submitted to the General Assembly as opposed to the Disarmament Commission should place greatest emphasis on the general concept of international control and fill in the details only to the extent necessary to impress the world with the fundamental importance of the concept.

*Advantages*

a. Such a paper would have considerable propaganda value, whether presented alone or in conjunction with other aspects of a disarmament program. A control organ proposal presents to the public, and even to some officials, an image that is simple and concrete in nature and thus more easily understood and remembered than proposals, however significant, on types of limitations, correlationships, modification of the United Nations atomic energy plan or modification of the disclosure and verification proposals. If it were decided to achieve the maximum propaganda effect for such a proposal, the General Assembly offers a much better platform for dramatizing it than the Disarmament Commission. Similarly, if it were decided to dramatize any general presentation to the General Assembly, a control organ proposal could be of great value.

b. The proposal would dramatize the strongest United States and the weakest USSR positions, i.e., the necessity of breaking through the Iron Curtain as one essential element in achieving international security.

c. The Soviet Representative on March 21, 1953 in the Political Committee of the General Assembly in effect invited the United States to introduce a paper concerning the nature and functions of an international control organ and we must expect to be under considerable pressure to respond with a paper on the subject. This situation not only enhances the propaganda value of a General Assembly proposal on this subject, but adds to the effect it would have on other governmental representatives.

*Disadvantages*

a. A proposal of this nature might launch the General Assembly into a fruitless discussion of minute details, thus obscuring the basic differences with the USSR.

b. Such a proposal could easily become a central target of anti-United Nations groups for attacking the United Nations as a "world government."

3. *Presentation of a Paper correlating the principal aspects of a comprehensive disarmament program.*

The problem of correlationship—the indication in broad general terms of the way in which the principal aspects of disarmament, such as disclosure and verification, international control of atomic energy, and regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments, would dovetail in a coordinate fashion in putting into effect a disarmament program—has been the subject which has most troubled the other non-Soviet members of the Disarmament Commission. At the present time, however, it is United States policy to introduce a paper on this subject into the Commission only if absolutely necessary to preserve the United States tactical position in the Disarmament Commission:—for example, if non-Soviet members of the Commission were about to secure strong support for proposals which would be damaging to our position. There is no possibility that such a paper will be introduced into the Disarmament Commission before the next General Assembly and therefore the presentation of a proposal on this subject can be considered as a possibility for the Eighth General Assembly.

*Advantages*

a. Such a proposal would add to whatever other action we might take in the General Assembly in strengthening our effort to convince the world that we are pressing forward in our efforts to achieve an effective disarmament program. This effort would have more effect on governments than on public opinion in general, for the subject is necessarily a complex one.

b. The pressures from such countries as France and Pakistan for a correlationship paper could be met partially by a proposal on this subject during the next General Assembly. It must be recognized, however, that any proposal we might submit—particularly our initial position—probably would not satisfy all the interested non-Soviet representatives and we would thus still face pressures in this regard. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union, during the Commission meetings or during the Eighth General Assembly, makes some gestures that convince others that they are making substantive concessions, the present pressures for a correlationship paper will be increased considerably and probably will necessitate some response on our part.

c. Until the position is clarified, the Soviet Union can claim that the unrevealed aspects of the United States position on the correlationship problem are the legitimate concern of Soviet policy makers, even though from the standpoint of negotiations, Soviet failure to present proposals that could serve as even a possible basis for negotiations relieves the United States of any obligation to indicate our positions on this subject. Therefore, if there are any forces within the Soviet Government that look with some favor on possible disarmament agreements, presentation of our views on correlationship might advance the possibility of substantive progress.

*Disadvantages*

a. There would be little if any mass appeal in any proposals we might make on the correlationship question for it is too involved and intangible a subject for such treatment.

b. Once our views on this subject had been presented, either as a United States or as a tripartite paper, there might well be considerable pressure from other countries, and possibly from such individuals within the French Government as Jules Moch, to press for further concessions by the West and thus divert attention from other aspects of the disarmament discussions.

c. Questions concerning correlationship are the type that should be saved for serious discussions, since there is considerable room for negotiation in this field. Furthermore, discussion of the basic points of conflict in the correlationship question would have an essentially ethereal quality unless accompanied by simultaneous discussion of the specifics of the political solutions, i.e., in Great Power talks.

4. *Modification of the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan.*

The question of a proposed major revision of the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan has already been alluded to and the subsequent consideration of this paper has been based on the premise that such a revision was not a possibility for the Eighth General Assembly. However, consideration might be given to the desirability of proposing in the Eighth General Assembly some revisions to the United Nations Plan. The two most probable such revisions would be:

(i) Some diminution of the areas connected with fissionable material which would be subject to international ownership, operation and management. An example of this would be a provision which would specifically permit private ownership and/or operational control of reactor plants in non-Socialist states and national ownership and/or operational control of such plants in socialist economies;

(ii) Modification of the present provisions of the United Nations Plan with respect to the veto and the application of sanctions.

*Advantages*

a. Modification proposals, even though minor in nature, would be useful in conveying the impression that the United States was continuing to review the United Nations Plan, which many non-Communists believe to be "dated", with a view to improving it and making it more acceptable to the Soviet Union. Thus to those individuals somewhat more familiar with the problem, modification proposals could be presented basically as an indication that we were willing to take a new look at the United Nations Plan, and to the foreign public in general they could be presented as yet another United States proposal made in the interest of promoting agreement.

b. Proposals for modification would help to meet Soviet charges that our insincerity regarding the United Nations Plan as a whole is revealed by our "turning atomic energy over to private individuals", which they may claim will make any form of international ownership and control more difficult if not impossible in the future.

c. Modification of the veto provisions would meet one of the criticisms of the United Nations Plan, a critcism which while it has not received too much attention lately is one which the Soviets are increasingly able to support with the writings of non-Communists.

*Disadvantages*

a. The suggestion for some diminution of the areas connected with fissionable materials which would be subject to international ownership, operation and management is not and could not be a "minor" modification. A major change at this time in the United States position toward the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan is precluded not only because of the general considerations set forth in paragraph 5 of the "Comment" but also because of a number of considerations related specially to the problem of the control of atomic energy, which may be briefly stated as follows:

(1) Any United States suggestions for modification would intensify pressures from governmental and private sources for further changes of a more significant type at a time when we have not established whether any concessions are possible or, if they are possible, the maximum limits of those concessions.

(2) The resulting pressures for further modifications of the United Nations Plan would tend to divert attention from Soviet obstructionism on atomic energy control to United States refusal to go further with modification.

(3) The USSR will contend that the United States suggestions for modification establish the fact that we have been wrong in continu-

ing to adhere to the United Nations Plan and, conversely, that the Soviets have been right in demanding a new approach.

(4) Any suggestion for a major change in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan, because of its importance in relation to the entire problem of negotiations with the Soviet Union, might well be reserved for bilateral or multilateral negotiations rather than for presentation in the United Nations.

It is entirely clear that this disadvantage of a proposal at this time to diminish the areas connected with fissionable material which would be subject to international ownership, operation and management is of such consequence that any such proposal must be eliminated as a possibility.

b. A modification of the veto provisions at this time would not be of sufficient consequence to permit us to secure the hypothetical advantages as set forth above of a modification of the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan.

c. Any suggestion for modification of the United Nations Plan might subject the United States Government to considerable criticism from Congressional and private sources for having made "concessions" without receiving any *quid pro quo* from the Soviets.

## Annex B

## SECTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL 16TH SPEECH RELATING TO A POSSIBLE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR THE EIGHTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

"*The Road Followed by the United States*"

The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs.

First: No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.

Second: No nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow-nations.

Third: Any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable.

Fourth: Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible.

And Fifth: A nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations.

In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war, toward true peace . . . [8]

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[8] Ellipses in this Annex are in the source text.

"*Working for Peace*"

This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations *can* find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive . . .

The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea.

It should mean, no less importantly, an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.

We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.

Out of this can grow a still wider task—the achieving of just political settlements for the other serious and specific issues between the free world and the Soviet Union.

None of these issues, great or small, is insoluble—given only the will to respect the rights of all nations . . .

We have already done all within our power to speed conclusion of a treaty with Austria, which will free that country from economic exploitation and from occupation by foreign troops.

We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but also, upon the foundation, to strive to foster a broader European community, conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas.

This community would include a free and united Germany, with a government based upon free and secret elections.

This free community and the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe.

"*Reduction of Armaments*"

As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements. These could properly include:

1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations.
2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes.

3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness.

5. The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.

The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the formula matters less than the faith—the good faith without which no formula can work justly and effectively.

*"A New Kind of War"*

The fruit of success in all these tasks would present the world with the greatest task, and the greatest opportunity, of all. It is this: the dedication of the energies, the resources, and the imaginations of all peaceful nations to a new kind of war. This would be a declared total war, not upon any human enemy but upon the brute forces of poverty and need . . .

This Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. The purposes of this great work would be to help other peoples to develop the undeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom . . ."

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330.13/9–453: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 4, 1953—6:12 p.m.

93. Re Disarmament.

I. Following position has been approved by Secretary and should be discussed now with friendly members Disarmament Commission in anticipation GA debates this subject. While contents draft resolution should be indicated text should not be transmitted.

1. US should not introduce any substantive proposals in GA, nor elaborate existing substantive proposals previously introduced in UN by US, individually or jointly with UK and France.

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNA. Repeated for information (by air) to Moscow, Paris, and London.

2. US will in debate:

(a) Point up US and Western allies unilateral disarmament after World War II and fact free-world rearmament program forced by aggressive Soviet efforts seeking world-domination;

(b) Review record its efforts in UN to achieve agreed disarmament and emphasize proposals US already submitted in Disarmament Commission, unilaterally or with UK and France, provide comprehensive approach to genuine disarmament negotiations treating all elements this problem;

(c) Emphasize deep and abiding interest US Government and people in achieving comprehensive, balanced and safeguarded disarmament, as evidenced by President's statements and Congressional expressions,[2] and point out USSR largely responsible for lack of progress attaining this goal;

(d) Note that, although substantial progress cannot be expected in UN on disarmament program until international tensions relaxed through settling some of the major political issues, we are prepared continue our efforts obtain from Soviets concrete indication they will sincerely cooperate in necessary exploratory work to establish technical bases of disarmament. This would facilitate final agreement when propitious international atmosphere achieved;

(e) Propose any specific disarmament proposals, if made in GA, be referred to Disarmament Commission.

3. US will co-sponsor resolution along general lines set forth below.

4. If Soviet bloc introduces resolution calling on Great Powers to confer and agree upon disarmament program, which Department estimates most likely Soviet gambit although they may make specific proposals similar to past efforts in GA, US should in addition to action outlined under paragraphs 2 and 3:

(a) Point out that because of complexity disarmament problem, it is much more difficult item than other USSR–free-world issues on which ascertain Soviet sincerity in allegedly seeking general peaceful settlements. Nevertheless, it would be helpful and useful continue explore technical bases disarmament program in anticipation being able both reach final agreement on and implement agreed disarmament program because of progress on settlement other issues. Parenthetically, should be noted that, while Foreign Ministers of Great Powers might conceivably agree on broad avenues of approach, development of comprehensive program would still have to be delegated to experts either in Disarmament Commission or in Great Powers conference;

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[2] On July 29, 1953, the Senate, in Resolution 150, had declared the continued purpose of the United States to be the pursuit of conditions for a durable peace including agreements by all nations for enforceable limitations on armaments through the medium of the United Nations in accordance with the principles set forth by President Eisenhower in his "Chance for Peace" address of Apr. 16, 1953. For text of Senate Resolution 150, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 387–388.

(b) Indicate that while US is ready at appropriate time to proceed with substantive disarmament discussions in Great Powers Talks, the work of Great Powers Representatives convened to deal with this problem can be more fruitful should progress be made toward solution outstanding political problems facing world;

(c) Point out that, meanwhile, Disarmament Commission should continue to deal with problem; that the Great Powers are represented on the Commission and it is always possible, within Commission's framework, to arrange for specific Great Power discussions of subject.

5. If Soviet bloc raises issue including Communist China among Great Powers, the US should:

(a) state that essential problems are whether Soviet Union sincerely desires negotiate on disarmament problem, and how agreed disarmament program can best be achieved.

(b) Question of Chinese participation in disarmament negotiations not fundamental these problems at this time. It is question which must be considered when there is evidence of progress in disarmament discussions, since obviously all states or authorities with major military strength must be included in agreed disarmament program. As is well-known, US recognizes National Government as Government of China. However, as pointed out in Disarmament Commission at time Tripartite Working Paper concerning numerical limitation of armed forces was introduced in May 1952, [3] agreed disarmament program would have apply to all armed forces everywhere, including all Chinese forces; the word "China" in proposals to limit armed forces indicated country and not government; and is premature consider what authorities which might have substantial military power must be consulted at later date in order bring them into effective disarmament system.

II. We anticipate Secretary will also devote section his statement in general debate to disarmament problems.

III. *Verbatim text of possible draft resolution*

*The General Assembly*

*Mindful* of the international tensions which grip the world, of which the burden of armaments is evidence, and believing that lasting peace can be firmly based only upon just relations and honest understanding between all nations,

*Reaffirming* its responsibility for considering the principles governing disarmament,

*Believing* that progress toward agreement on the principal issues which heighten international tension would facilitate achieving concurrent progress on an agreed disarmament program,

*Mindful* that the aim of a system of world wide disarmament is to prevent war and to release the world's human and economic resources for the purposes of peace.

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[3] Reference is to UN doc. DC/10, May 28, 1952; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 365-369.

1. *Takes note* of the Third Report of the Disarmament Commission of August 20, 1953 [4] and, particularly the Commission's hope that recent international events will create a more propitious atmosphere for the reconsideration of the disarmament question, whose capital importance in conjunction with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace is recognized by all.

2. *Declares* its belief that

> (a) All States should contribute to that rebirth of trust vital to the attainment of peace and disarmament, by seeking to achieve just settlements of their international disputes in accordance with the obligations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;
>
> (b) Concurrently with these attempts to settle existing international disputes, progress on which would materially strengthen that world trust essential to disarmament, all Member States and in particular the major Powers among them should intensify their efforts to agree on a comprehensive and coordinated program of disarmament with adequate safeguards;
>
> (c) Agreement on and implementation of such a disarmament program should enable all nations to devote a substantial percentage of the savings achieved through disarmament to joint and separate efforts to aid the underdeveloped areas of the world, stimulate mutually beneficial world trade, and help build a world in which all peoples will know the blessings of productive freedom.

3. *Reaffirms* General Assembly Resolution 704 (VII) of 8 April 1953, [5] and requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts to develop agreement on proposals for a comprehensive and coordinated system of disarmament, as defined in that resolution.

4. *Requests* the Commission to report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than September 1, 1954.

5. *Calls on* all Member states to cooperate in aiding the Disarmament Commission reach agreement on the problems with which it is concerned.

DULLES

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[4] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, p. 338. A copy of State Department position paper SD/A/C.1, "Report of the Disarmament Commission," Aug. 29, 1953, drafted in preparation for the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, is in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Disarmament-General".

[5] See the editorial note, p. 1140.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 161st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 9, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 161st Council meeting were the following: The Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Douglas MacArthur, II, Department of State; Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; Gerald D. Morgan and Bryce Harlow, White House Staff; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

3. *Possibility of a New United States Disarmament Proposal in the Eighth General Assembly* (NSC 112 and NSC 112/1; NSC Action No. 717) [2]

Mr. Cutler summarized the background on this problem, and read the conclusions and recommendations in the Planning Board's report to the Council. The substance of the present report, he added, was that the UN General Assembly was no place in which to seek a genuine disarmament. On the other hand, the United States did not want to lose the initiative which it had previously taken in the field of disarmament.

The Vice President inquired whether it would not be possible to dress up the proposed position of the United States on this subject so that it at least would look like a "new story". He pointed out that the President's April 16 speech had had very great impact, but many believed that our follow-up to this speech had been insufficient. What with recent developments in the sphere of fusion weapons, it might be desirable, thought the Vice President, to heighten the psychological repercussions of any position we took on disarmament in the forthcoming General Assembly.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Sept. 10.

[2] For NSC 112/1, Sept. 1, 1953, see p. 1190. For NSC Action No. 717, see footnote 6, p. 1108. For NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

Mr. Bowie replied that the feeling behind the present report was that the General Assembly was simply not a feasible forum in which to put forward disarmament plans with any expectation that they would be seriously treated. Moreover, Mr. Bowie expressed the view that the United States should not put forward any position on this important subject which we were not fully prepared to follow up on, even though we recognized the propaganda value of such moves. The thought behind the present paper was rather to reaffirm in the General Assembly the desire of the United States to proceed with disarmament, but to transfer consideration of the problem from the General Assembly to the UN Disarmament Commission, which would be a much more effective forum for getting ahead.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the proposal under consideration really constituted a reaffirmation of the past position of the United States on the disarmament problem, with the addition of certain thoughts taken from the President's April 16 speech. He also pointed out that the President might conceivably desire to change the position set forth in this report, but meanwhile, if the Council would approve the report, it would provide us with the necessary start.

Mr. Strauss then informed the Council that his consideration of the present report had given rise to a number of questions in his own mind. Does the United States have at present an effective disarmament plan? Is the so-called Baruch Plan still our only position, or do we have others in reserve? Does the Baruch Plan still make sense in the light of developments in the field of thermonuclear weapons? Inspection and verification, said Mr. Strauss, now seemed to him the only sensible criteria for achieving disarmament. The criteria of ownership and control of atomic materials have probably ceased to be important. Accordingly, was not a new look at our situation needed?

Mr. Bowie agreed with Mr. Strauss that this Government possessed no plan which took account of the developments Mr. Strauss mentioned, and very obviously needed one. The present paper, which dealt merely with a position to be taken by this Government in the UN General Assembly, was of course no substitute for an adequate and detailed disarmament plan to meet the new situation. Mr. Bowie thought that a group had been set up some time in August to study the situation and to come up with the desired new plan.

The members of the Council were unaware of the existence of any such group as that mentioned by Mr. Bowie. Accordingly, Mr.

Strauss suggested, and the Vice President agreed, that our disarmament position needed reexamination as a matter of urgency.

Thereafter, Mr. Cutler read to the members of the Council the bases on which our present disarmament plan had been established in NSC 112, noting that the problem had not been thoroughly studied since July 1951.

It was the view of several members of the Council, particularly Mr. Flemming, that Council action on the present paper should in no wise seem to reaffirm and reemphasize the Baruch Plan, in view of developments which cast doubt on its validity. It was accordingly agreed to make certain changes in the text of the report designed to avoid such an implication.

Thereafter, the Vice President expressed the view that the President should be requested to set up a new committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to work out a revision of our present disarmament plans in the light of what had occurred since July 1951.

*The National Security Council:* [3]

a. Adopted the recommendations contained in paragraphs 7–b and 8 of NSC 112/1.

b. Did not adopt paragraph 7–a of NSC 112/1; but agreed that action under paragraph 8 could include a review of U.S. efforts in the United Nations to achieve agreement on disarmament.

c. Agreed to recommend to the President that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission be appointed a special committee to review, as a matter of urgency, the current policy contained in NSC 112, with particular reference to the international control of atomic energy, and to report back to the Council their findings and recommendations.

*Note:* The above actions, as subsequently approved by the President, transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation.

. . . . . . .

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[3] Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 899, Sept. 9, 1953. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1953.

In discussing with the President this morning the action taken at the Council yesterday [2] relative to the review of NSC 112 (Policy on Limitations, Regulation, and Control of Armaments), the President suggested that you might consider the following proposal, which he did not think anyone had yet thought of.

Suppose the United States and the Soviets were each to turn over to the United Nations, for peaceful use, X kilograms of fissionable material.

The amount X could be fixed at a figure which we could handle from our stockpile, but which it would be difficult for the Soviets to match. [3]

ROBERT CUTLER

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[1] This memorandum was directed to Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President.

[2] See the memorandum of discussion at the 161st meeting of the National Security Council, Sept. 9, *supra*.

[3] In his memoirs, Admiral Strauss, after quoting this memorandum, comments as follows:

"This was the seed from which the Atoms for Peace program was to grow. Though sown upon the rocky soil of political querulousness and international suspicions, it did germinate and in the course of time struck root.

"On reading the President's suggestion, my imagination was slow to take fire, but the more I thought about it in the following days, the more promising it began to appear." (Lewis L. Strauss, *Men and Decisions* (London, Macmillan and Company, 1963), p. 357).

For a chronology of the development of the Atoms for Peace speech, see the memorandum for the files, dated Sept. 30, 1954, p. 1526.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1953.

I had a talk this morning with the President about various matters brought up at the Council Meeting yesterday. [2] His mind turned again, as it has very frequently, to the thermonuclear device explosion on August 12.

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[1] The source text bears the following handwritten notation: "Talked to Lewis Strauss Sept 11."

[2] For the memorandum of discussion, see p. 1210.

He said that he would like you to estimate in your opinion what this explosion might mean in the capability of the Soviets to produce such devices in the next two or three years, assuming that they have a capability as good as our best capability.

ROBERT CUTLER

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330.13/9–1453

*Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1953.

Subject: Urgent Interpretation of NSC Decision on NSC 112/1,[2] "Possibility of a New U.S. Disarmament Proposal in the 8th General Assembly."

*Discussion:*

1. The NSC on September 9, with the President and Mr. Dulles absent, approved the subject paper. This recommended that the U.S. introduce in this General Assembly a resolution generally reaffirming appropriate sections concerning disarmament from the President's April 16 speech, particularly the relationship between progress in political settlements and progress toward disarmament.

2. Believing that the UN atomic energy control plan needed review, the NSC objected to voicing public U.S. support for it. Consequently, the NSC deleted paragraph 7 (a) (See attached paper).[3] This issue was raised by AEC Chairman Strauss, who apparently was unaware his Agency is currently conducting a basic technical review of the UN plan at your request made in August.

3. The NSC action will prevent us from reaffirming past General Assembly resolutions referring to the UN atomic energy control plan as the basis for control in that field until a better or no less effective system is devised. This concept is in the UN Disarmament Commission's terms of reference, which the U.S. sponsored. Such omission will immediately be noted by the USSR and our allies, and we can expect public and private queries whether we have changed our support of this concept.

4. In such event, the U.S. Delegation can reply either that the U.S. adheres to the past position or that it has changed its views. The latter reply, indicated as correct by the NSC action, cannot be supported by any new U.S. views since the AEC has not completed its review.

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNA.

[2] Dated Sept. 1, p. 1190.

[3] A notation on the source text indicates that the attached paper was a copy of NSC 112/1.

*Recommendations:*

1. You should urgently see Mr. Strauss and explain the untenable position in which we are left by the NSC decision of September 9, as described above.

2. You should suggest Mr. Strauss may have misunderstood the past U.S. public position, namely:

> a. Any acceptable disarmament system must meet one test, that of effective safeguards to ensure the compliance of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions and violations.
>
> b. We continue to support our past proposals as sound and effective, but are not inflexible in believing they are necessarily the only ones that would meet these criteria.
>
> c. We are constantly reviewing the disarmament problem; hope others will do likewise; and will seriously examine any promising new proposals made by others or will put forward new ideas as we develop them.

3. You should explain we are recommending the Secretary include these concepts in his speech, and ask Mr. Strauss' concurrence.

4. If Mr. Strauss concurs in these concepts, you should also tell him we will inform the NSC of this language, and of the Department's belief it is consistent with the NSC action on September 9.

5. If Mr. Strauss does not agree, we should take the matter up urgently with the President at Denver, because of its importance and because the U.S. Delegation undoubtedly will be queried on this matter before the President's return. We would expect JCS support of our position.

*Concurrence:*

S/AE—Mr. Arneson
Defense—Adm. H. P. Smith

*Non-concurrence:*

S/P—Mr. Bowie believes that paragraph 2b should read: "Our past proposals have been designed to meet this test but we are not inflexible in believing they are necessarily the only ones that would meet these criteria." He also suggests the Department should state its interpretation to the NSC without first securing Mr. Strauss' agreement.

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## *Editorial Note*

On September 17, Secretary Dulles addressed the Eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on "Easing International Tensions: The Role of the UN". During the course of his remarks, the Secretary noted that "the United States has already put forward a series of" disarmament proposals at the United Nations "which have attracted widespread support" and he added: "We have faith that the time may come—it might come quickly and suddenly—when political leaders would be prepared to put into effect international agreements limiting armaments." In the interim, he believed that the United Nations should continue to make studies to lay the foundation for quick action once the general atmosphere made such action possible. "But", he added, "these studies need to be carried on to a still higher state of completion." Secretary Dulles' address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 28, 1953, pages 403–408.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 162d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, September 17, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 162nd meeting of the Council were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Attorney General (for Items 4 and 5); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 2, 3 and 6); the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (all for Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for Item 2); the Chief of Naval Operations (for Item 2); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (for Item 2); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Item 2); Capt. C. C. Kirkpatrick, USN, Col. D. O. Monteith, USAF, and Carroll Hinman, Foreign Operations Administration (all for Item 2); the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 4); the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member; and George Weber, NSC Special Staff Member (for Item 2).

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[1] Prepared by Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member, on Sept. 17.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

3. *Position of the United States on Disarmament in the Eighth General Assembly* (NSC 112 and NSC 112/1; NSC Action No. 899)[2]

Secretary Smith introduced this item, which had been scheduled on the agenda as an urgent matter in view of Secretary Dulles' speech at the UN the following day.[3] He referred to the Council action at its last meeting and said that the Department of State had assumed that the Council had not meant to repudiate our past positions while the new review was pending, even though the Council had not approved paragraph 7-a of NSC 112/1.

Mr. Cutler said his understanding was that the Council did not wish to reaffirm or push our previous disarmament proposals until the new review had been completed.

Vice President Nixon asked if Secretary Dulles wanted to reaffirm our position.

Secretary Smith then said that the Department of State was proposing that Secretary Dulles reaffirm the basic principle, that any disarmament system must meet the basic test of effective safeguards, but added that our past proposals were designed to meet this basic requirement and were not inflexible as the only proposals that could meet such a test. Secretary Smith felt that the Council could agree on language which would state that our past proposals had been designed to meet this test, but we are not inflexible in believing they are necessarily the only ones that would meet these criteria.

The Vice President, Secretary Wilson and Mr. Cutler all felt that the Council would support the latter language, but did not intend to reaffirm our past proposals.

Secretary Smith said there was a chance that Secretary Dulles might be asked categorically if we still stand by our former proposals. In this event, he felt the answer must be yes, subject to review.

At Mr. Stassen's suggestion, Mr. Strauss expressed his view, namely, that the language proposed, to the effect that our past proposals had been designed to meet this test but that we are not inflexible, was satisfactory. He remarked that the control aspects for fissionable material did not apply to fusionable material. The latter is much more plentiful, harder to inspect and easier to produce. Accordingly, Mr. Strauss said his understanding was that the NSC intended the whole disarmament problem to be reviewed in the light of new developments.

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[2] For NSC 112/1, Sept. 1, see p. 1190. For NSC Action No. 899, see footnote 3, p. 1212. For NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

[3] See the editorial note, *supra*.

Admiral Radford suggested that if Secretary Dulles were asked the direct question, he might say that technical developments had outmoded the details of our previous disarmament proposals.

Secretary Smith said that Secretary Dulles could not decline to answer where we stood on such a basic UN resolution, and suggested that Secretary Dulles could say that we supported our previous UN resolutions, subject, of course, to such review as new developments require.

*The National Security Council:* [4]

Agreed that the following U.S. position on disarmament at the eighth General Assembly, as proposed orally by the Acting Secretary of State, would be consistent with NSC Action No. 899:

a. Any acceptable disarmament system must meet one test, that of effective safeguards to ensure the compliance of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions and violations.

b. Our past proposals have been designed to meet this test, but we are not inflexible in believing that they are necessarily the only ones that would meet these criteria.

c. We are constantly reviewing the disarmament problem; hope others will do likewise; and will seriously examine any promising new proposals made by others or will put forward new ideas as we develop them.

d. If required during the course of the eighth General Assembly, we might take the position that we still support the basic principles of our past proposals, subject to review of the details of these proposals in the light of recent developments.

. . . . . . .

HUGH D. FARLEY

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[4] The paragraphs which follow constitute the operative portion of NSC Action No. 909. The action also includes a concluding note which reads as follows: "*Note:* The above action, as subsequently approved by the President, [was] transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation." (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions") On Sept. 17, General Cutler informed President Eisenhower, who was in Colorado, of the action taken by the Council at this meeting. (Message Capital 187, Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, Administration series, "Cutler")

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum for the President by the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 17 September 1953.

General Cutler has given me two memoranda embodying questions from you. [1] Here are my replies.

Respectfully, LEWIS L. STRAUSS

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[1] The two memoranda, both dated Sept. 10, are printed on p. 1213.

Question A: [2] "Suppose the United States and the Soviets were each to turn over to the United Nations, for peaceful use, X kilograms of fissionable material. The amount X could be fixed at a figure which we could handle from our stockpile, but which would be difficult for the Soviets to match." (This question was addressed to C. D. Jackson also and he concurs in the following:)

Reply: The proposal is novel and might have value for propaganda purposes. It has doubtful value as a practical move for the following reasons:

> (a) Our intelligence . . . is not sufficiently firm as to the difference in size between U.S. and Soviet stockpiles, and we are ignorant of their current production rates and the extent of their raw material development. Our own experience on the Colorado Plateau from which only a trickle of uranium was being received five years ago would sustain the supposition that the Russians have also located and developed important ore bodies.
>
> (b) One of our main advantages is our stockpile whereas, presumably, one of the Soviet main advantages is their apparent *rapid expansion*. Under this assumption, the proposal might operate in their interest rather than in ours.
>
> (c) With the advent of the thermonuclear development (i.e., when a small number of thermonuclear bombs can produce the equivalent damage area of a much larger number of conventional atomic bombs), the relative importance of a stockpile of *fissionable* material is reduced since it is only required as a primer while quite different substances, *not fissionable*, support the thermonuclear explosion.

Recommendation: The proposal ought to be carefully explored, nevertheless, by the group which the National Security Council has appointed with the approval of the President to study atomic disarmament [State, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission]. [3]

Question B: "The President said that he would like you to estimate in your opinion what this explosion might mean in the capability of the Soviets to produce such devices in the next two or three years, assuming that they have a capability as good as our best capability."

Reply: . . . .

(b) Even when considered at its upper limit of estimated TNT equivalent, the Soviet thermonuclear test appears to have had somewhat less than one-third the yield of the Mike shot. However, their shot may well have been to prove principle and there is no reason to think that they were necessarily trying for size. For that reason, I assume for the purpose of the following estimate that their weapons can be equal in magnitude to ours.

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[2] A handwritten marginal notation on the source text next to "Question A" reads as follows: "do it *annually* [President] interested. Passed this on to L[ewis] L. S[trauss]."

[3] Brackets in the source text.

(c) We have absolutely no intelligence as to whether their weapon is deliverable. Their test shot was in all likelihood not an air-drop to judge from sonic and seismic evidence. The following estimate assumes no engineering delays in designing a delivery-size weapon.

(d) The materials in their weapon are all relatively plentiful except for U–235 and Lithium 6, and the limiting factor in our opinion would be the supply of Lithium 6. Therefore, on the basis of the assumption in your question, we estimate a possible Soviet production capability of thermonuclear weapons of 10 weapons in 1954, 30 in 1955, and 119 in 1956.

*Note:* There have now been four shots in the current Soviet series. Only the first appears to have had any thermonuclear characteristics.

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PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments 1952–1953"

## *Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1953.

Subject: An "Eisenhower Plan" for the Atom?

The recent evidences of Russian nuclear advances confront us with the problems of atomic plenty in the foreseeable and fairly immediate future. They also, however, add a new element to the possibilities of our dealing with these problems by indicating a considerable degree of Russian knowledge and competence in many sectors of nuclear development and by thus decreasing the value of U.S. security controls in these sectors.

Assuming atomic plenty, the stark elements of the situation will be that both we and the Russians will have the power to destroy the other but not the power to destroy the other's retaliatory capacity so that both will encounter destruction in case of atomic war. This may quite possibly lead to what has been generally described as atomic stalemate, with neither side capable of the act of will to undertake an atomic attack because such an attack will lead to its own destruction.

The extent to which atomic stalemate will lead to an increase of Russian capabilities for atomic blackmail will depend on the confidence third countries have that the U.S. is willing to retaliate atomically in their behalf, and that this U.S. will is sufficiently evident to the Russians so as to deter attack. To build this confidence or to provide an equally valuable substitute for it is the primary problem of U.S. foreign policy in this field.

On the assumption that the requirements of U.S. security controls in the nuclear field are now considerably lessened, there would seem to be a potential substitute at hand. The U.S. can have confidence in its own will to use atomic weapons in case it is attacked by atomic weapons because it possesses the weapons. The U.S. thus controls the deterrent. The Allies of the U.S., or for that matter other third countries can have confidence in their own will to use atomic weapons in case they are attacked and thus have confidence in their control of the deterrent—if they have atomic capabilities. The substitute for confidence in the U.S. would be self-confidence, which would be contingent, however, on possession of atomic capabilities. The U.S., therefore, should seriously consider whether it is not now in the national interest to assist in the development of atomic capabilities in the other countries of the Free World. Certain questions arise immediately. All of them require the most careful examination.

In the first place is the assumption valid that the dangers of Russian gain through the inevitable leakages which would be involved in U.S. sharing of nuclear weapons, knowledge, and techniques has been materially lessened by Russian progress? Would Russian acquisition of substantial information on U.S. nuclear knowledge and techniques significantly increase Russian capabilities, or lead to danger of a Russian technological breakthrough which would pose even more drastic threats to U.S. security? The answers here are technological but there is perhaps enough basis for a layman to hazard that there are some grounds for the conclusion that U.S. security would not now be materially endangered by an increase of Russian possibilities of acquiring U.S. nuclear knowledge and know-how.

In the second place would it be the part of wisdom for the U.S. to assist in the development of atomic capabilities in the hands of Allies or third countries who, in the very nature of the history of sovereign states, must be assumed to be not completely reliable friends of the U.S. The offhand answer might be made that the capability of complete destruction of the U.S. will be in the hands of an implacable foe of the U.S. in any event; that the U.S. can only be destroyed once; and that the gamble of spreading among friends the capability, eventually, of complete destructiveness, is not materially greater than the gamble involved in having this capability already in the hands of our worst enemy. It can also be answered that in the nature of things sovereign states of the requisite industrial capacity will in any event arrive at atomic capabilities and a U.S. initiative would affect only the timing and not the end result of the inevitable decentralization of atomic capacities. But the question must be searchingly examined. Other questions must be equally exhaustively explored. Taking it as axiomatic that the U.S. must always possess a retaliatory capacity to inflict destruction on the U.S.S.R., or for that matter any other state which might be or turn hostile, at what point and when will the U.S. be in a position to share its weapons without undue sacrifice to its retaliatory capacity? What would be the order of magnitudes of the costs involved in sharing atomic weapons with other countries or in assisting the development of nuclear programs? What countries would have the capability for either using the weapons or developing full scale nuclear programs?

Should exploration of the numerous questions involved lead to the conclusion that a sharing of atomic capabilities with other countries of the Free World was in the interest of the United States, it would seem possible to devise a program which would not only remove the potential of Russian atomic blackmail, but might conceivably have real potency in increasing pressures on the Russians for accession to a system of international control of all types of armaments. The U.S. could announce that the atom, under present conditions is a menace to mankind. International control of atomic developments as well as conventional weapons is the only long term method of warding off this menace. But in the short term the possession of retaliatory capabilities is the only reasonably sure protection against the menace. Therefore to all nations who will guarantee accession to a system of international control, when by reason of the accession of all states such a system becomes possible, the United States will, in the interests of humanity, extend assistance in the development of atomic capabilities either in the form of weapons or in the form of technical assistance. The U.S. will not urge the development of atomic capabilities upon any other country, but stands ready to assist those who wish assistance and who will join in the agreement for eventual control. The impact of such a program on the Free World would be great. The political implications would be manifold. The possession by the U.S. of considerable temporary control over the rate of development of atomic capabilities in other countries would give it very considerable political leverage on such varied things as for example Franco-German relations, the nature of Swedish neutrality, Japanese rearmament, and ROK impatience for Korean unification. The self confidence of major partners of the U.S. might be revived and fortified. And the Soviets might be presented with a united front of countries with atomic capacities which at the least would give it pause in undertaking further aggressions and which might just conceivably eventually lead it to acceptance of reasonable limitations on the quantity and character of conventional and unconventional armaments.

I recommend that we give careful thought to the possibility of a program of spreading the responsibilities, burdens, and benefits of nuclear capabilities.

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600.0012/9-2553

## *The Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)* [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, September 25, 1953.

DEAR BEEDLE: During a discussion with the President on the Candor speech, an idea came up about which he asked me to write you.

The general concept of a speech by the President on atomic warfare and the atomic age has been, as you know, batting around for quite some time—as I recall it, since February or March. At that time all those involved—that is, the members of NSC and the high command of AEC—were very much in favor of such a speech being made, and at that time they had definite and fairly simple reasons for feeling as they did.

Now, quite a few months have passed, and an absolute rash of material on the subject has been in the press and on the radio.

The question is, has this taken the edge off the idea? In other words, are we for candor out of habit, or do we still really think it is a good idea?

The President wanted me to put the question to you personally, and ask you for an early reply which would be your personal views, uninfluenced by any indians.

If your reply is affirmative, then there are a few other questions the President would like to ask you on the same basis. They are:

1. Is it possible to make a "hydrogen bomb" speech without some kind of equally significant hopeful alternative? [2]
2. If such a counterbalance is essential, should both be in the same speech, or should we be thinking in terms of two speeches by the President fairly close together, one exclusively destruction and the other hope and reconstruction?

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[1] A copy of this letter in the C. D. Jackson papers at the Eisenhower Library indicates that the same communication was also sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson, Secretary of State Dulles, Admiral Strauss, Governor Stassen, and Admiral Radford.

[2] A handwritten notation to subparagraph 1 on the source text reads: "Answered by phone."

3. If you think that two speeches would be better, which should be the first one? And should the first one, whichever it is, include some reference to the second one?

Many thanks for your trouble.

Sincerely yours,

C D

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

*Memorandum to the President, by the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 2, 1953.

Subject: Briefing memo for Saturday's "Candor" breakfast. [2]

After last week's conversation with you on the "Candor" speech, I got in touch with Messrs. J. F. Dulles, Wilson, W. B. Smith, Strauss, Radford and Stassen [3] and asked them the questions you suggested. I also asked that they give me their own personal replies, and not something cooked up by their staffs.

The returns are now all in.

This memo does not attempt to represent the consensus or a compromise between different viewpoints. It does, however, represent my personal point of view, with which I believe the majority would concur, except on some matters of detail. I am sending it to you in that form in order to serve as a springboard for the Saturday's discussion.

The need for a frank speech on the atomic age and Continental Defense is, if anything, greater than ever. The speech should be televised, and the fact that you read it will add rather than detract from its importance and solemnity. Other personalities or the use of props would detract.

The speech should be given as soon as possible—certainly before Congress reconvenes, and preferably during October or not later than the first week in November.

As you said yourself, the speech must contain more than just "attack" and "retaliation", which is what a speech dealing only with The Bomb and Continental Defense would be. It must besides contain a tremendous lift for the world—for the hopes of men everywhere.

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[1] The handwritten notation by the President, "file/DE", appears on the source text.

[2] According to the President's appointment book, he held an off-the-record breakfast meeting at 8 a.m., Saturday, Oct. 3. The following were present: Secretary Dulles, C. D. Jackson, Admiral Strauss, Admiral Radford, Governor Stassen, Allen Dulles (Director of Central Intelligence), Emmet John Hughes (Administrative Assistant to the President), and Maj. John Eisenhower (the President's son). (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, "President—Daily Appointments")

[3] See the letter of Sept. 25, *supra*.

That lift has got to be something much more than what is at the end of the current draft, namely, the withdrawal of Russian and Allied forces from Germany. It has got to be a packaged concept which will fulfill the three requirements Foster Dulles has in mind:

1. It should contain new and fresh proposals which could be acceptable to the Russians if they possess a shred of co-existential reasonableness or desire.
2. If it is accepted in whole or in part by the Russians, the Western position must not be seriously impaired or jeopardized thereby.
3. It must be of such a nature that its rejection by the Russians, or even prolonged foot-dragging on their part, will make it clear to the people of the world, not just to the Governments, that we must all prepare for the worst, and that the moral blame for the armaments race, and possibly war, is clearly on the Russians.

Some of the group feel that you should do this in two bites, separated by not more than a week; the first bite taking care of the atomic aspects, the second bite, the lift. Personally, I feel it should be done all at once, otherwise it will lose impact, if for no other reason than that the audiences will not be the same each time, and therefore a lot of people will only hear first-hand part of the story.

The script which you now have covers The Bomb and Continental Defense pretty well, and those sections almost intact could be adapted to a new draft.

What is missing is the "package".

I suggest, if you can get broad policy agreement in Saturday's meeting, that Foster Dulles be given the responsibility for producing the contents of the package. He has already given this much thought. To Emmet Hughes would go the responsibility for the production of the whole speech.

I would also suggest that for the time being, conversation on the subject of this speech be restricted to the present group, correspondence likewise, on an "Eyes Only" basis, and that possible coordination with our allies be conducted through personal Presidential courier instead of by code through the Embassy machinery. When you have an acceptable, or nearly acceptable, draft it will be time enough for the staffs at State, Defense, and AEC to pick over it.

This can not only be the most important pronouncement ever made by any President of the United States, it could also save mankind. It therefore rates the concentrated attention of the Government's top brains.[4]

C. D. JACKSON

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[4] For a chronology of events in the drafting of the Atoms for Peace speech, see the memorandum for the files, dated Sept. 30, 1954, p. 1526. Certain preliminary drafts and other related documentation are contained in the Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jack son papers, "Atoms for Peace Evoulution".

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Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Atomic Weapons"

### *The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, October 9, 1953.
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

DEAR CHIP: It is possible that the President may be making a speech toward the end of this month which will point out the rising threat of atomic warfare and urge the importance of

(1) eliminating by reduction and controls the present destructive capacity of armament; and
(2) eliminating the immediate sore spots which could bring armaments into play.

With respect to (2) the speech might develop somewhat the lines of thought contained in my United Nations speech of September[1] with respect to Germany, Austria, satellites, Korea and Indochina.

With respect to (1) it might emphasize that while we cannot now end "distrust" between the two worlds, this does not preclude a downward movement in terms of weapons and armament, conventional and unconventional, so long as this does not appreciably alter the existing balance of power.

The speech as now forecast would be sober, non-provocative and not designed to be a "propagandish" speech. It will probably be made before the General Assembly.

I cannot, of course, guarantee, particularly after the speech writers have had their day, that it will not seem somewhat propagandish to the Russians but this is not the present intention.

This whole program is subject to modification in the light of ideas of Churchill and the French, which are not yet fully developed. We have not yet indicated to them in any way what the President has in mind. We would, however presumably do so before he speaks.

In order that the speech may have the best chance of producing a positive result from the Soviet Union I ask you to be prepared, upon receipt of a cable from me, (a) to call upon Mr. Molotov and advise him of the President's intention to make this address and (b) his purpose in doing so and (c) as much of the substance of (1) and (2) as I will indicate in my cable.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1215.

You will urge an affirmative reaction and indicate our willingness to proceed with diplomatic channel talks if they so desire either (x) alone or (y) with UK and France.

You may point out that a negative reaction or one which was affirmative only in words but without rapid follow-up would leave a state of tension even greater than that which exists today. The armament race might then mount.

You will please not communicate the contents of this letter to anyone. In cabling you I may refer to this letter as "Frank's" letter and refer to the numbered lines. [2] Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by an "eyes only" cable to me. [3]

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[2] Each line of this letter is numbered in the left margin of the source text.

[3] Not found.

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Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson papers

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the Planning Board of the National Security Council* [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1953.

### SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION OF STATE DRAFT OF PART TWO OF PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH [2]

The State draft for the second part of the Presidential speech was discussed by the Planning Board members and advisers as individuals, rather than as representatives of their agencies. The need for the utmost security was emphasized by General Cutler.

1. Mr. Bowie made the following points concerning the draft:

a. The draft was prepared on the assumption that a speech has to be made, and that there is a conceivable settlement which can be offered to the USSR without endangering U.S. security interests.

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[1] Drafting information and distribution are not indicated on the source text. For information on the origins of and the major decisions stemming from this discussion, as interpreted by Robert Cutler, see Cutler's memorandum to the Secretary of State, Oct. 19, *infra*.

[2] The specific draft under reference has not been identified. For information on the development of the Atoms for Peace speech, see the memorandum for the files, Sept. 30, 1954, p. 1526.

b. The draft is not primarily a propaganda speech. It is a serious proposal which the Russians might accept. It contains the maximum concessions consistent with U.S. security interests.

c. It is doubtful whether a speech is the proper way to initiate any serious negotiations with the USSR. The State Department would prefer not to have a speech and not to try to explore Soviet views [3] in public concerning a possible settlement. Its preference would be for quiet talks. The objectives of explaining our position to the public and testing Soviet intentions concerning a settlement may be so incompatible as to prevent their being achieved in a Presidential speech.

d. Assuming that a Presidential speech is necessary, then a discussion of the dangers of the H-bomb and of our intention to protect ourselves against H-bomb destruction must be combined with a statement of our desire to reach an agreement which would prevent general hostilities.

e. The President's April speech was acclaimed by the public, but it was not helpful as an indication to the Russians of those matters on which we would be prepared to negotiate. It is not possible to write a speech which states specifically what the United States is prepared to offer and expect to get any discussions with the Russians as a result. The speech is purposefully vague and does not put all our cards on the table, since it is not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The objective is to make it as a "come on" to the Russians, but not give away one's negotiating hand.

f. If the Russians refuse a serious offer which honestly tests their willingness to negotiate, then we must draw the appropriate conclusions.

g. The proposal in the draft seeks:

(1) Control of nuclear weapons.

(2) Reduction of conventional weapons in some equal way. This is admittedly difficult but will have to be done if any disarmament is undertaken.

(3) Clarification for the Russians of those points on which we are not prepared to make a deal, for example, EDC, since this is the best way to handle German rearmament.

(4) Assurance to the Soviets that Western power will not be used against them unless they initiate aggression.

h. The withdrawal of U.S. troops is linked to control of nuclear weapons, because we cannot withdraw our forces at the same time the Russians do without abandoning our bases. Obviously we cannot abandon forward bases until nuclear weapons are controlled.

i. The reference to Asia in the draft is intentionally fuzzy because this question contains so much Congressional political dynamite. It is believed that concessions on Asia would be accepted by Congress if they were part of an over-all settlement. However, if specific offers were made, and not tied into a "package", considerable domestic opposition might develop.

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[3] The rest of this sentence was corrected by hand in the source text. It formerly ended: "Soviet views concerning possible public settlement."

j. Distrust may not be dissipated by disarmament, but unless there is an attempt to seek a settlement of some kind involving disarmament, then it must be admitted that there is no prospect of any improvement in relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

k. Criticism of the draft on the grounds that it is not dramatically expressed is unimportant, since the purpose was to present the substance and, if agreement was reached on the content, the speech writers could write an appropriate speech.

l. Criticism of the content of this draft means in effect that no speech can be made which is not damaging to our security interests.

m. The draft does not seek effective abolition of nuclear bombs, but rather their reduction and control. No control is foolproof. Fewer nuclear weapons will decrease the possibility of their use.

n. The draft is aimed at the American people and would make clear to them why the budget cannot be balanced. It is also aimed at our Allies in an attempt to convince them of our serious intention of seeking a settlement.

o. The draft clearly explains the proposals and was understood by the President when Secretary Dulles read it to him. Attempts to make it clearer and easily understood by the uninformed citizen make it less useful as a device to test Soviet intentions.

2. Colonel Bonesteel stated that he, Mr. Nash and Admiral Page Smith were very concerned about the draft for the following reasons:

a. Disarmament does not reduce the risk of war, nor does the existence of nuclear weapons necessarily increase the likelihood of war.

b. The draft is unclear as to whether we are proposing proportional or quantitative disarmament.

c. The draft goes very far toward offering to withdraw our troops, but does not stress the mutuality of withdrawal.

d. Only secretly and through diplomatic channels can we test Soviet willingness to negotiate.

e. Everyone is concerned about how to work out a settlement with the USSR but an offer of disarmament is not the proper posture for the U.S. to take in seeking peace. This is proved by all of our knowledge of how the Russians operate.

f. There is an implication in the draft that Germany is the country to fear—that the U.S. and the USSR can work out a deal together to hold down the Germans. The effect of this position in Germany would be very serious.

g. The long range effect of an offer of a settlement to withdraw made in this form would be to blow up NATO.

h. The draft touches on the five points which have constituted for several years Vishinsky's position in the United Nations.

i. The effect on our Allies and the free world would be disastrous. An offer of this kind made as the second part of a speech describing the horrors of the H-bomb would be interpreted as evidence of basic fear and a desire to reach a settlement, rather than stand up to the increased Soviet military capability.

j. The position of the United States would be that of offering to disarm even though we agree there has been no basic change in Soviet intentions, but merely because they have the H-bomb. This is not the way to deal with a tyrant. Such an offer would make the Russians highly suspicious at the same time that it would confuse the free world.

3. General Gerhart asked what thought was behind this draft. He saw it as containing an offer of concessions of unknown magnitude in an attempt to get "peace". He cited the difficulties of proportional disarmament and pointed out that if the Planning Board members could not understand exactly what was involved, the Soviets could twist the offer to their own ends. He accepted the description of the proposal made by General Cutler in his memorandum. He foresaw serious consequences if the offer were misunderstood. In the United States he said it might slow down the whole productive effort if the average man concluded that we were beginning to disarm immediately. Abroad, he saw a very serious effect in those countries where we now have bases, if we offered now to negotiate with the Russians about whether we would leave these forward bases. He said that the proposal as now stated would be inimical to the national interest. This defect would continue until specific details of the proposal were stated without vagueness. He did not know how to answer the question as to whether the proposal would be acceptable if it were taken as a package by the Russians, because he did not understand what the package involved. He agreed with Colonel Bonesteel as to the undesirability of linking in the same offer to negotiate, a description of the potentiality of nuclear weapons.

4. Mr. Amory agreed with General Cutler's summary of the proposal. He said that the reduction of armaments maintaining the same balance of military power was not achievable, since balancing of armaments of military power could not be made precise. He doubted that "proportional" disarmament was possible. He said that a speech could be made, but it should not be this one which is too vague. He suggested that the speech contain specific illustrations as to how we disarm. He felt that if the speech contained no more than this draft it would be a "turkey" and the reaction would be that it was no more than a restatement of the same generalities.

5. General Porter [4] said he felt the draft was fuzzy on the question of how we achieve disarmament, and that the references to neutralized areas were unclear. He believed that the speech should not be based on disarmament and suggested that the draft say we

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[4] Brig. Gen. E. H. Porter, USAF, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

wanted to spend our money developing peaceful uses for atomic energy, but that we were prevented from doing so because of the Soviet threat to our security. He suggested that the speech be built around our efforts to arrive at a settlement which would permit us to use atomic energy to benefit mankind, rather than for destructive purposes. He urged that no attempt be made to deal with "relative" or "balanced" disarmament, which he felt was an impossible task.

6. Mr. Tuttle [5] pointed out that the draft would change existing policy by reopening a discussion of disarmament in the United Nations forum, which the Council had decided not to do, and by easing existing pressures on the USSR. He added that his reading of the speech led him to believe its purpose was to reassure the free world that the United States was not intransigent. He wondered whether we have not committed ourselves in the draft beyond the point where we could negotiate a settlement which would not be harmful. He feared that an attempt to state our position clearly would be harmful. He said that our Allies might be led to believe that we were determined to balance the budget at all costs, even to the extent of the compromises listed in the draft. He feared that the Allies would say we were making this proposal in an attempt to save money or to deal with a U.S. recession.

7. Mr. Finley [6] said he believed the draft could be understood completely by the average man. He indicated that his impression was that we were asking for a one-sided withdrawal of Soviet troops.

8. General Cutler read a memorandum stating his initial views, [7] and emphasized the vagueness of the proposals, especially the last paragraph, as well as the danger of the Soviets accepting the package and then attaching conditions which we could not accept. In the discussion he made clear that in his view the disarmament would be "proportional" and that we would get from the Russians a *quid pro quo* for our withdrawal from forward bases and positions. He pointed out that theoretically, acceptance of a package proposal would not harm the national interest, but that great difficulty arose in stating the package in such a way as to be understood by the average man and yet be foolproof as far as Russian attempts to misuse it for their own purposes. He said that the President's present thinking concerned a statement of our position, sufficiently clear but not damaging to U.S. security interests which would be accepted or turned down by the Russians. If turned down,

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[5] Presumably Elbert P. Tuttle, Treasury Representative on the Planning Board.

[6] Presumably Robert L. Finley, ODM Representative on the Planning Board.

[7] See the annex to the memorandum by Cutler, *infra*.

this offer would be our last hope and we would reconcile ourselves to life in an atomic world in which the Soviet threat would be ever present.

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600.0012/10-1953

### *Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 19, 1953.

1. Pursuant to your memorandum of October 13, 1953, [1] certain pages suggested for inclusion in a forthcoming Presidential speech on means for reducing the atomic threat: (1) were submitted to Planning Board members and advisers on October 14, (2) under special security precautions, limiting consideration to themselves as individuals without consultation with their Chiefs, (3) for an expression of views as to the consistency of the proposals set forth in the pages with U.S. security interests. The pages so distributed are being returned to the Council office for impounding.

2. The proposals in question apparently seek: (1) *a reduction in military strengths* by the Soviet bloc and by the free world, through control of atomic weapons and through limitation of conventional weapons, to be proportionally similar on each side and to be effectively safeguarded; (2) *a removal of the specific causes of instability* through mutual withdrawal of troops from key danger areas now occupied and by limitation by the U.S. of bases overseas.

3. It was the opinion of the Planning Board members and advisers that

a. (*preponderant view*) the proposals were not sufficiently clearly expressed to be fully understood by them on careful reading;

b. (*preponderant view*) if the proposals mean what is stated in par. 2 above and could be effectively implemented as a total and nonseparable program, which is highly theoretical—their carrying out would not prejudice U.S. security interests;

c. (*majority view*) serious doubt that the proposals could be stated with sufficient clarity in one form or another so as to be readily understood, without danger to the U.S. security;

d. (*strong minority*) the proposal of disarmament to a tyrant so soon after his having exploded a thermonuclear device would be widely interpreted as defeatism on part of U.S.; and making the package proposals at this time would not help our cause.

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[1] Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson papers, "Atoms for Peace Evolution")

4. For what it may be worth, I attach a memo of additional views of my own which I read to the Planning Board and as to which several expressed agreement.

ROBERT CUTLER

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[Annex]

## *Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 19, 1953.

### COMMENTS BY RC ON DRAFT, DATED OCT. 13/53, OF PAGES FOR PROPOSED SPEECH

1. The virtue of making the proposals lies not so much in the likelihood of their acceptability by the other side, but in the opportunity provided to the U.S.—once the proposals have been made and not accepted—to put into effect a new and better (for the long run) basic policy than that we now have.

2. Pursuit of our existing basic policy over a long period is likely to break down the free world's economy, dislocate its individual liberties and free institutions, and provoke it through frustration into armed conflict. The new proposals offer the opportunity for a new road more safely to travel over many years to come.

3. There are, however, serious difficulties in the statement of the proposals as written:

a. They are not sufficiently clearly expressed to be understood, even as a diplomatic message.

b. As a speech by the President, the audience of world peoples would be unable to grasp what he was talking about; and hence the speech would fail of its great purpose.

c. If this great proposal is to be made as a last best hope of the world, its message must be clear beyond a doubt to John Q. Citizen.

d. The proposals are not sufficiently expressed as an indivisible package, so that there is danger that the USSR might accept one part (e.g. the limitation of US bases overseas), to the prejudice of our security.

e. Specifically—

(1) the language in par. 7 ("restricting the military strength *equally* on both sides") is capable of a dangerous quantitative interpretation, not intended or acceptable.

(2) query if the last sentence of par. 9 is not so general that it might be accepted by the USSR—, but the USSR would then make unacceptable specifications which, when not accepted by the free world, would lead to charges of bad faith.

(3) the mutual withdrawal of forces (and reduction of overseas air bases) is so diffused and glancingly expressed in pars.

15–18 as to miss fire. In par. 19, the Asian proposal rests entirely on the earlier paragraphs so that if they are not clear the Asian proposal cannot be understood either.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum for the President by the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 23, 1953.

Subject: Atomic Speech

I

Talks at the London Conference, and with Hallstein (Germany) and Alphand (France) here, and the probable action on EDC in France by January, all lead me to the conclusion that we ought not seriously to seek discussions with the Soviets until decisions have been taken on EDC. [2] If U.S.-Soviet discussions were started or impending before then—

(1) Their pendency would almost surely arrest any positive action on EDC or possible alternatives.

(2) The Soviets would concentrate on breaking up Western defense arrangements rather than on trying to reach a constructive settlement.

I think there may be a fair chance of some settlement with the Russians if we have a firm foundation in Western Europe—but not before.

II

If this view is accepted, it means that we should not at this time make publicly or privately the far-reaching proposals which were envisaged by the State Department draft paper, but that these moves should be held back until after the first of the year.

Soviet propaganda at the present time is emphasizing and coupling the two subjects of atomic weapons and bases and we should avoid presently creating a situation where we might have to accept or refuse an invitation to discuss these two topics. Acceptance would have the paralyzing effect on Western European plans above referred to. Refusal might seriously hurt our standing and influence in friendly countries.

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[1] The source text bears the following handwritten notation: "C.D. is taking up with Sec. Dulles", and is initialed by the President. It is accompanied by a note from Ann Whitman, Presidential secretary, to Robert Cutler, dated Oct. 24, which reads: "General Cutler: C.D. Jackson asked me to send this to you. Will you please return for my files?"

[2] Regarding the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings at London, October–November 1953, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1709. For documentation on U.S. interest in the establishment of a European Defense Community, see *ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 571 ff. Walter Hallstein was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the German Federal Republic. Hervé Alphand was French Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

III

I submitted the State Department paper to the Planning Board, as you requested.[3] Their cogent comments compel me to conclude that it is probably a mistake to try to make serious proposals by means of a public speech. The specific and simple terms desirable for a speech are not a good basis for beginning negotiations. Either they seem to give away too much of our case or else they seem to be primarily propaganda, which would be likely to provoke only a propaganda response. I think, therefore, that when the time comes, the approaches should be primarily private.

IV

I can visualize as acceptable, and perhaps desirable, at this time a Presidential speech which would (1) describe the atomic danger; (2) make clear our determination, so long as this danger exists, to take the necessary steps to deter attack, through possession of retaliatory power and the development of continental defense; and (3) reemphasize in general terms our willingness to discuss limitation and control of armaments, both conventional and atomic, in the U.N. machinery, and the present sore spots such as Korea, Indochina, Germany, and Austria.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[3] See the summary of the Planning Board discussion, Oct. 19, p. 1227.

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PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments"

## *Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 30, 1953.

Subject: Conversation with Admiral Strauss

Admiral Strauss wishes to discuss with you the possibilities of a new approach to the international control of atomic energy. The attached memorandum briefly reviews:

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[1] The source text is accompanied by a typed, unsigned, and undated note, which reads: "Mr. Bowie says this just hits the 'high spots' but might be helpful before you see Admiral Strauss this morning. Admiral Strauss' proposal is at Page 6." According to the Secretary's appointment book, he met with Bowie and Strauss at 10:10 a.m., Oct. 31. (Princeton University Library, Dulles papers, "Daily Appointments")

a. The problem;
b. The plan endorsed by the U.S. for dealing with it;
c. The Russian position; and
d. A suggestion for a new approach which Admiral Strauss has privately put forward.

Robert R. Bowie

[Annex]

## Memorandum for the Secretary

### I. *The Problem*

A plan for the international control of atomic energy must deal with: nuclear raw materials, installations for producing nuclear fuels (i.e., the explosives themselves minus the bomb containers), nuclear fuels and installations for producing power. From the point of view of international security these materials and installations are all dangerous, though in varying degrees. The problem of dealing with them has five components:

1. How to achieve disclosure of materials and installations.
2. What system to devise for the control or disposal of the materials and installations disclosed by each nation so as to prevent their use in war and yet not defeat legitimate expectations for peacetime uses.
3. How to police the arrangements made for the control or disposition of disclosed materials and installations so as to ensure compliance while they are in effect.
4. How to ensure that activities in installations and with materials other than those disclosed by the nations are not carried on secretly.
5. How to protect the national interest against the event of open repudiation by the other side of the entire control agreement and resumption of the atomic armaments race.

### II. *The U.S. Plan*

The plan to which the U.S. adheres—that is, the Baruch plan as modified somewhat and overwhelmingly endorsed by the United Nations—proposes that existing materials and installations remain available for peaceful development. It proposes that a strategic balance be maintained in stockpiling fuels in Russia and in the United States. At the time it was under active consideration, its adoption would very likely have resulted in the distribution to the Soviet Union of some part of the U.S. stockpile. Further production of nuclear fuels—that is, further refining and separation of uranium and production of plutonium—would be restricted and might even be stopped completely if an international agency found that it was unnecessary for peaceful purposes. Should any new production go forward, it would be carried on by the international agency itself on the territories both of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union. All fuels and large installations everywhere in the world—that is, piles and plants other than small power plants, perhaps, and the small piles used for research and medical purposes—would be internationally owned and for all intents and purposes always in the possession of the international agency.

International ownership and management of all sizeable installations and international ownership and possession of all nuclear fuels ensure that no warlike use can be made of them without immediate notice to the world. But the striking fact is that any nation could at any time and with ease take possession of fuels and installations found within its territory. Such a nation could then convert the fuels into weapons and resume further weapons production. It is estimated that within three months to one year after seizure, stockpiles of weapons capable of doing serious damage could again be in existence. There is no safeguard against such an eventuality. But the strategic balance which is to be maintained in the management of peacetime operations is intended to ensure that neither the U.S. nor Soviet Russia could seize a preponderance of the world's fuels and facilities, placing the other country at a disadvantage; a disadvantage, however, as of the time of seizure, not necessarily in relation to the position held at the time the plan went into operation.

The U.N. plan thus attempts to ensure against surprise atomic attack; it makes no pretense of ensuring against eventual atomic warfare. At the time of breakdown of the plan through seizure, there would be a heavy premium upon the speed with which each nation could reconvert to war production. There would also be a heavy premium upon striking the first blow, if possible, simultaneously with seizure. Consequently, there is initially a premium on secretly withholding as much material and fuel as possible as well as any facilities that can be kept secret, and, while the plan is in operation, there is a premium on secretly manufacturing weapons and fuels. A nation which has kept back or secretly manufactured enough weapons for a fairly heavy initial blow and enough weapons containers to enable it to follow up the initial blow fairly promptly with seized fuels will be more likely to risk seizure. The efficacy of the plan's assurance against sudden atomic attack depends, therefore, in large measure on its provisions for early notice of clandestine activities outside known installations and on accurate verification of initial disclosures of fuels, materials and installations.

The problem of initial disclosure of Russian capabilities hardly existed at the time the U.N. plan was under active consideration. It is acute now, and, in the Disarmament Commission last year, we proposed disclosure by stages over a period of time. But the fact is that our means of verifying what the Russians have are not such that we can ever be certain that they haven't kept back sufficient fuel to make at least a small number of bombs and perhaps a thermonuclear weapon. Non-disclosure to this extent must therefore be assumed.

Clandestine activities are guarded against in the U.N. plan by regular inspections of danger spots on each nation's territory, by spot aerial surveys and by inspections for cause, on warrant from an international court.

### III. *The Russian Position*

The Russians, of course, have never accepted any part of the U.N. plan. They have proposed that everyone solemnly sign a convention agreeing never to produce another atomic weapon and never to use one. They have proposed further that existing weapons be destroyed. This however means merely destruction of weapon containers, which are quickly and easily produced. The Russians do not propose destroying nuclear fuels or the installations required for refining, separating and producing them, for they lay quite a bit of emphasis on peaceful development of atomic energy. They propose that each nation go on at will producing and stockpiling nuclear fuels, which are the explosive without the container, and that a system of inspection ensure that no finished weapons are manufactured. The inspection they would allow is such as will not interfere with what they term the internal affairs of a nation, and they propose to retain authority to exclude inspectors from their territory and from parts of their territory. This plan, of course, offers no security whatsoever.

### IV. *Admiral Strauss' Suggestion*

Admiral Strauss' suggestion is that existing fuels be delivered by each nation, at semi-annual periods, into the hands of an international agency for storage in a remote insular or mainland place. The fuels would be stored in liquid form so that their recovery would be time-consuming and cumbersome. A sea-going tanker of the largest present size could carry only the equivalent of less than one critical mass of fuel in solution. Production in each country—both refining and separation of uranium and production of plutonium—would cease.

This disposition of the fuels—when final delivery in escrow is made—solves the problem which arises under our existing plan when a nation seizes the fuels found within its borders. If we maintain adequate conventional forces, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Russians could effect a seizure and then move back to the homeland the gigantic fleet of tankers or tank cars necessary to transport large amounts of fuel. There is, however, the risk that if Russian seizure should succeed it would be seizure of the preponderance of fuels existing in the world rather than of a strategically balanced portion of them. Before it is fully operative, the Strauss suggestion would have the effect of continually reducing U.S. and Russian stockpiles, thus, at a given time, perhaps increasing the risk of local aggressions. It may do so ultimately as well, but so might atomic plenty and stalemate.

The Strauss proposal thus offers assurance that existing nuclear fuels will not be used against us in quantity either suddenly or, unless we lose a conventional war, at all. As under the U.N. plan, however, an inspection mechanism would be necessary to ensure that, having placed existing fuels in escrow, the Russians do not simply proceed to build up a new stockpile with which, when they are ready, they could deliver a surprise attack. But immediate notice of use of disclosed facilities for warlike purposes would as easily be forthcoming under the Strauss proposal as under the U.N. plan. For Admiral Strauss would stop all further production of nuclear fuels. Resuming production, once stopped, is not a simple matter and is easily noted. Inspection for activities carried on secretly in new or undisclosed installations presents the same problem as under the U.N. plan. But the fact that a surprise attack with secretly manufactured fuels could not be followed up or accompanied, as under the U.N. plan, by seizure and quick use of existing stockpiles would put less of a premium on carrying on secret activities.

Nuclear fuels needed for power production would be released from the place of deposit as and when needed. Existing supplies are amply sufficient to serve peaceful purposes for the foreseeable future. There is, of course, a danger that some fuels will be misused when released. Inspection to guard against diversion in small quantities would admittedly be more difficult than under our existing plan, which would keep the fuels nearly always in international hands. But the danger is largely one of diversion of small quantities of fuels for purposes of secret weapons manufacture. It has been pointed out that this is a considerably less profitable venture under the Strauss proposal than under the U.N. plan. So is a sizeable diversion of fuels, against which there are a number of other deterrents as well.

Facilities for the production of power are, at least at present, exceedingly costly (a single installation of 100,000 kw. capacity runs to about a hundred million dollars). The fuels used quickly become contaminated, requiring time to reconvert them into explosives, and the installations once in operation become, of course, an integral part of the economy, which would suffer some disruption if power production were stopped entirely. Also, sizeable diversion could not easily be carried out secretly, for the stoppage of power production in an area is noticeable.

In sum, unlike the U.N. plan, the Strauss proposal, once fully operative, offers fairly safe assurance that currently existing fuels will not be used in war, and it does so without preventing the peaceful development of atomic energy. It offers no more and no less assurance against surprise attack in relatively small force than does the U.N. plan. Some small secret diversion of fuels released for power production, some initial withholding of fuels and some clandestine manufacture are not definitely excluded by either plan. But the Strauss proposal does make all these operations less profitable by making it impossible for them to be followed up quickly with use of existing stockpiles.

ROBERT R. BOWIE

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Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary records, "NSC"

### *The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President*

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 30, 1953.

DEAR MR. JACKSON: Pursuant to NSC 151 [1] and in accordance with your request for assistance from various governmental departments and agencies in the preparation of a draft Presidential speech on atomic energy, the Department of Defense has participated in the efforts of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Armaments which were directed toward this end. Early in September, the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted to you what it considered its final substantive draft of such a speech reflecting the consensus of the views of the departments and agencies concerned.

At that time, I sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's draft for their formal consideration and comment. Having now had an opportunity to study their comments, I am passing them on to you with my concurrence for whatever use they may be in drafting any subsequent Presidential address on the subject of atomic energy. I suggest that you may wish to bring the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments to the attention of the President.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. WILSON

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[1] Dated May 8, p. 1150.

[Enclosure]

## *Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)*

SECRET WASHINGTON, 16 September 1953.

Subject: Draft Presidential Speech on Atomic Energy.

1. In response to the request contained in a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 3 September 1953, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments concerning the draft Presidential speech which accompanied that memorandum.[2] (For ready reference, the paragraphs in the draft Presidential speech and the draft Appendix thereto have been numbered.)

2. While it is recognized that the President's speech on this subject will be directed primarily to the American public, it is considered to be important, when analyzing the subject matter of the speech from the military point of view, to take into account the effect which the speech is likely to have upon our Allies and upon the government of the USSR.

3. The proposed Presidential address stems from the recommended policy of candor toward the American people, the basic objective of which is to apprise them of the realities of the atomic arms race. In light of this fact and the probability that the speech will be widely referred to in the press by its title, it would appear desirable to give the speech a title more directly associated with its main topic, such as "The Realities of the Atomic Arms Race" or, on a broader basis, "The Safety of the Republic" (see paragraphs 3 and 75).

4. NSC 151, which is as yet not approved but which is the genesis of NSC Action No. 799[3] leading to the preparation of this speech, states in paragraph 3b under Recommendations: "It should be recognized that the degree to which the objective of such a policy [of candor][4] will be achieved in the initial stages will be affected by the Government's ability to inform the public of its views on the programs required to deal with the dangers involved in the atomic equation." The proposed Presidential speech, as now drafted, forcefully describes the grave threat involved in the continued build-up of Soviet atomic capability, but does not adequately set forth the government's views as to the course along which we should proceed in seeking the ultimate reduction of that threat by peaceful means.

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[2] The memorandum of Sept. 3 and the attached draft have not been found.

[3] For NSC Action No. 799, see footnote 4, p. 1174.

[4] Brackets in the source text.

Thus the speech may leave the American public with a sense of endless burden, fear, and hopelessness. It is suggested that the speech should:

a. Stress more pointedly the fact that merely "keeping ahead of the Russians" in the atomic arms race is not regarded as an ultimate solution to the problem; and

b. Outline in broad terms the measures which are essential to safeguard the security of the nation in the face of the Soviet threat, and the means by which the ultimate reduction of that threat will be sought while keeping to a minimum the danger of a catastrophic resort to atomic weapons on both sides.

(See paragraphs 7, 8, 15, 16, and 35.)

5. In considering the probable effect of the speech upon our Allies, two points suggest themselves:

a. Our Allies may feel that the role of the United States is overstated, almost to the exclusion of credit to our Allies for their contribution to the over-all defense. It is suggested that the interdependence of all nations of the free world be given prominent recognition early in the speech, before turning to remarks intended primarily for the people of the United States (see paragraphs 12 and 46); and

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the proposed remarks concerning an exchange of atomic information with our Allies might be interpreted as an announcement of intent to liberalize United States policy in this matter. Were a relaxation of controls not to follow in the near future, a deep disappointment and resentment on the part of our Allies might well result. Since authorization for exchange of atomic information will require Congressional action, it is assumed that assurance of early and favorable Congressional action will be obtained before such a change in United States policy is publicly implied. In this connection, it is recommended that the statement concerning the TNT equivalent of bombs in our stockpile be cleared with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy prior to release, since this information may be regarded as Restricted Data (see paragraphs 61, 62, and 63).

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there are certain aspects of the draft speech which might leave an erroneous impression with the Soviets. While it is stated that the power of the United States to wreak destruction upon an enemy is greater than that of the USSR, the draft speech leaves the impression that the inevitable results to the United States and the USSR of war in the atomic age would be equally disastrous. There is the implication that the results of atomic war would be so catastrophic that the United States could not be provoked into a war in which atomic weapons might be used, or that the United States would not initiate the use of atomic weapons in the event of war. Any such impression in the minds of the Soviet leaders might lead them to be-

lieve that further local aggressions could be undertaken without risk of provoking atomic war. It is suggested that the draft speech be modified to eliminate the possibility of such an interpretation (see paragraphs 15, 16, 20, and 76).

7. In addition to the foregoing general comments, the following comments of a more specific nature are submitted:

a. The first sentence of paragraph 39 conveys the impression that our atomic delivery capability is limited to the Air Force. It is suggested that this sentence be amended to read "Our own atomic striking power . . .";

b. Regarding paragraph 48, the extensive early warning net now under development will serve to detect the approach of aggressor submarines as well as aircraft;

c. The use of the word "prohibitive" in paragraphs 49 and 77 carries the fallacious connotation that a continental defense can be had which will in itself dissuade the enemy from attempting an atomic attack against the United States; such a belief could result in pressure to allocate a disproportionate amount of the total available resources to a static continental defense; and

d. It is recommended that the paragraphs set forth in the draft paragraphs prepared by Admiral Parker[5] be adopted in lieu of paragraph 35, with the following modification to the first paragraph (changes indicated in the usual manner):

> "In our stockpile today are bombs which release energy equivalent to ~~that of 550,000~~ *more than 500,000* tons of TNT—which is *more than* 30 times the power of the [bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.]* ~~This larger bomb~~ *A bomb of this size,* if burst above a city such as Washington, would totally destroy an area of 2 square miles and heavily damage buildings within an area of 14 square miles. Lighter damage would extend the casualty area even further."
>
> *Reason:* To be less specific in revealing the power of bombs now in our atomic stockpile, and to remove the inference that the quoted equivalent TNT value represents the largest bomb in our stockpile. *Note:* This change was suggested by the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.

8. Subject to the foregoing comments and recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the draft Presidential speech is satisfactory for the purpose intended.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
*Chairman*

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[5] The draft paragraphs have not been identified.

*First atomic bombs exploded. (possible substitute) C.E.W. [Brackets and footnote added by hand in the source text by Charles E. Wilson.]

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum for the President, Prepared in the United States Atomic Energy Commission* [1]

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1953.

The atomic energy relationships between the United States and Canada, if they come up during your visit, [2] should be currently benefited as we will be informing the Canadians today of the arrangement for more extensive technical cooperation under the *Modus Vivendi.* [3] This will give them information on effects of atomic weapons to assist them in defense preparations.

. . . . . . .

*Suggested points that might be made if occasion arises:*

1. Express appreciation of the American people for the Canadian contribution to the common defense effort by the production and sale of uranium to the United States—stressing particularly the sympathetic and understanding cooperation of C.D. Howe.
2. Express hope that continued vigorous search for uranium will result in greater production.
3. State that you have directed the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to recommend amendments to the Atomic Energy Act at next session of Congress to provide for broader cooperation with Canada and friendly nations.

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[1] The source text is unsigned but was prepared on AEC stationery. It was initialed "D.E." by President Eisenhower.

[2] The President visited Canada Nov. 13–14. No record of discussions on atomic energy has been found.

[3] The *Modus Vivendi* is recorded in the minutes of the Combined Policy Committee, Jan. 7, 1948; for text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1948, vol. I, Part 2, p. 679.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 170th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 12, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 170th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President was out of the country and so did not attend this meeting. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 2, 4 and 5); the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 1); Robert Murray and Louis Rothschild of the Department of Commerce (for Item 1); Robert Finley, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Item 1); General Ridgway for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Nov. 13.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

4. *U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments* (NSC Actions Nos. 899 and 909; NSC 112 and NSC 112/1)[2]

Following a brief introduction by Mr. Cutler, Mr. Strauss stated that before making his report in response to NSC Action No. 899-c, there were one or two other points about which he wished to speak. He reminded the Council that at a recent meeting regret had been expressed that the terms of the existing atomic energy law so drastically limited the exchange of information on atomic energy with our British and Canadian allies. He was therefore glad to be able to inform the Council that ways and means had been found within the existing statute to effect an exchange of data with the governments of these two countries on the effects of atomic weapons. Accordingly, and if the President agreed, Mr. Strauss said that discussions would be arranged with the British and the Canadians which would prove especially helpful in the area of civilian defense.

Secretary Dulles commented that while he was uncertain as yet what precisely would be discussed at the forthcoming Bermuda Conference, there was a strong possibility that exchange of information between the British and U.S. Governments on atomic energy matters would be raised. Accordingly, he was anxious to know what the prospects were that the Congress would act favorably in amending the Act of 1946 to permit more latitude on the exchange of information.

Mr. Strauss replied that if nothing unforeseen occurred, he anticipated favorable action by the Congress. Congress had been on the point of doing this earlier, when the Fuchs case intervened to prevent further consideration. A prerequisite, however, to favorable Congressional action would be the completion by the British of improvements in their security system for safeguarding atomic energy information. This process had been started but was not yet complete. Canadian security in this field was as effective as our own.

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[2] For NSC 112/1, Sept. 1, see p. 1190. For NSC Action No. 899, see footnote 3, p. 1212. For Action No. 909, see footnote 4, p. 1218. For NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

Mr. Strauss then said he had one more matter before beginning to make his report. This was to tell the Council that the Atomic Energy Commission was announcing at twelve noon today that it would be unnecessary to build an additional facility in Illinois, with a consequent saving of $30 million in capital outlay and $3 million of annual expenditure for operations. Nearly everybody, thought Mr. Strauss, would be cheered by this news, although he was apprehensive of the reaction of Senators Dirksen and Douglas, [3] in whose jurisdiction the facility would have been built.

The President said he doubted if there would be much trouble from these two Senators.

Mr. Strauss then launched into a discussion of his disarmament plan. He noted that thus far the Departments of State and Defense have not sponsored this plan, although it was quite possible that they would do so shortly. The germ of the idea, continued Mr. Strauss, derived from a conversation with the President in which the latter had suggested the possibility of creating a stockpile, or "bank", containing fissionable material.

At this point the Secretary of State inquired whether it was necessary that Mr. Strauss' proposal be kept secret if it were to have any hope of adoption.

Mr. Strauss replied that secrecy was absolutely vital, and that if news of the proposal leaked out prior to its consideration in the UN, there would be no hope of success.

In that case, said Mr. Cutler, it might be better to postpone Mr. Strauss' briefing and Council discussion of the matter until the Secretaries of State and Defense had had an opportunity to study and concur in the proposal being presented by Mr. Strauss.

*The National Security Council:* [4]

a. Deferred discussion on the above subject pending study by the Secretaries of State and Defense of the tentative proposals by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

b. Noted an oral report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, that a method has been developed, within the terms of the

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[3] Everett McKinley Dirksen and Paul H. Douglas of Illinois.

[4] Paragraphs a-b constitute NSC Action No. 959, Nov. 12, 1953. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action")

Atomic Energy Act, for exchanging with the United Kingdom and Canada information on the effects of atomic weapons.

. . . . . . .

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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711.5611/11-2053

*Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1953.

Subject: Representative Cole's Inquiry Concerning the Possible Conflict Between the Administration's Position on the Private Ownership of Nuclear Power Facilities and Continued United States Support of the United Nations Plan for the International Control of Atomic Energy.

*Discussion*

Attached as Tab A is a letter dated November 17 from Chairman Cole of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy which requests your advice on any possible conflict between the Administration's recommendations for private ownership and continued support of the UN plan for international control of atomic energy.

Chairman Cole quotes a part of the NSC statement of policy on the development of nuclear power made public on June 25 which advocates private ownership of nuclear power facilities. [2] He then quotes a portion of General Smith's testimony given that same day before the Joint Committee (see Tab B) [3] which comments on the UN international control plan. Chairman Cole said that the NSC statement of policy clearly advocates private ownership of the nuclear power facilities which, according to General Smith, would be subject to international ownership, operation and movement under the UN plan. He asks for your comments as soon as possible in order to avoid "any extensive possible discussion of this conflict".

General Smith's secret testimony before the Committee on June 4 alluded to the question now raised by Mr. Cole. He stated that "To the extent that new legislation results in the relaxation of domestic controls and safeguards, impetus would be given to hasty and premature demands both at home and abroad to modify our position on international control of atomic energy." He continued however, "it seems probable that experience gained by this kind of domestic program may well provide useful guidance if a program of effective international control can one day be negotiated." A copy of the June 4 testimony is attached (Tab C).[4]

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[1] Transmitted through the Under Secretary.

[2] The NSC statement of policy is included in NSC 145, Mar. 6, p. 1121.

[3] For text, see p. 1180.

The preparation of a substantive reply to Mr. Cole is difficult, if not impossible, pending completion of the review and report called for by NSC Action 899 of September 9, 1953.[5] Under NSC Action 899, you, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission are to review current policy as contained in NSC 112 with particular reference to the international control of atomic energy.

I have received reports, which I am unable to verify, that Chairman Strauss believes the United States should announce withdrawal of support for any international control plan because of Soviet intransigence and, to demonstrate its interest in the peaceful application of atomic energy, should set up atomic power reactors in various countries as well as expand the export of radioactive isotopes. Should a report along the foregoing lines be made to the National Security Council, as envisaged by Action 899, and approved, an answer to Mr. Cole's inquiry would be of academic interest only.

However, without knowing what might be contained in the forthcoming report, it is not possible, at this juncture, to prepare a meaningful reply to Mr. Cole.

In a news account of Mr. Cole's speech of November 19 at a conference on industrial use of atomic energy at Buffalo, New York, he is reported to have said that "outright ownership of fissionable materials might not be desirable or necessary to a private program. A leasing arrangement might be more satisfactory. . . ."

The receipt of Mr. Cole's letter has been acknowledged (Tab D).[4]

*Recommendation*

That a substantive reply be deferred until such time as the report and recommendations envisaged by NSC Action 899 have been acted upon by the NSC.

R. GORDON ARNESON

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[Tab A]

### *The Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On June 25, the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Smith, in testimony before the Joint Committee indicated that the Secretary of State—as a member of the National Security Council—had approved the statement of policy on the development of nuclear power made public that same day by the Atomic Energy Commission. One part of that policy statement is as follows: [6]

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[4] Not printed.

[5] For NSC Action No. 899, see footnote 3, p. 1212.

> ". . . 4. We recognize the need for reasonable incentives to encourage wider participation in power reactor development and propose the following moves to attain this end:
>
> (a) Interim legislation to permit ownership and operation of nuclear power facilities by groups other than the Commission.
>
> (b) Interim legislation to permit lease or sale of fissionable material under safeguards adequate to assure national security. . . ."

This statement of policy clearly advocates private ownership of nuclear power facilities which Under Secretary Smith described earlier in his testimony as ". . . making or using these (fissionable) materials in dangerous quantities. . . ." The full quotation from which this excerpt is drawn reads thusly:

> ". . . To guard against the danger of diversion of materials from these facilities, the United Nations plan provides for the international ownership of source and fissionable materials, and international ownership, operation, and management of facilities making or using these materials in dangerous quantities. . . ."

The Joint Committee would undoubtedly find your personal advice on domestic nuclear power legislation helpful in resolution of any possible conflict between Administration recommendations for private ownership and continued support of the proposal to the United Nations calling for international ownership. It is now anticipated that the Joint Committee will hold hearings on specific legislation starting in next January. Your advices as long in advance of that time as possible would assist us in avoiding any extensive public discussion of this conflict in the event that it proves irreconcilable and should require a modification of position in either domestic or international proposals.

A copy of this letter is being sent to Chairman Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Thank you for your attention to this matter of such broad consequence.

Sincerely yours,

STERLING COLE

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[6] Ellipses in this document are in the source text.

## *Editorial Note*

The Disarmament Commission met on August 20, 1953 (for the first time since April), and adopted a report which merely expressed the expectation of continuing its work. For text of the report, UN doc. DC/32, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, page 388.

The report was considered by Committee I of the General Assembly November 6-18, 1953. The committee approved a resolution on the subject of disarmament which was passed in plenary session of the Assembly on November 28 by vote of 54-0-5 (the Soviet bloc abstaining) as Resolution 715 (VIII). The resolution requested the Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts and to consider establishing a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the powers principally concerned, which would meet privately to seek a solution. For text of Resolution 715 (VIII), see *ibid.*, pages 391-393.

For additional information on consideration of disarmament by the General Assembly at its Eighth Session, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1953, pages 262-269; *U.S. Participation in the UN 1953*, pages 56-60; *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, pages 389-407; and Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, pages 207-210. For additional unpublished material, see Department of State files 330.13 and 600.0012, and Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Chron File—Disarmament".

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Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Telephone Conversations"

## *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation* [1]

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1953.

The Secretary telephoned Mr. Bowie and said he thought the Candor Speech was likely to see the light of day, at least to the point of bringing it up as a proposal at Bermuda. [2] The President went over it last night and marked it up. He did quite a bit in the direction of cutting out some of the stuff that could be offensive to the Soviet Union, although he didn't believe he did a great deal of toning down in other respects. Bowie wanted to know how we would get our oar in and the Secretary said he would call the White House and ask for a copy of the draft as soon as it is retyped.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

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[1] The identity of the drafting officer is not indicated on the source text.

[2] Regarding the Bermuda Conference, Dec. 4-8, see the editorial note, p. 1285.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy"

## *Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Arneson)* [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1953.

### BACKGROUND INFORMATION RE UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY RELATIONS WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE SHARING OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION

1. The Quebec Agreement, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 19, 1943, which established the basis for wartime collaboration, provided, among other things, "that in view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of a wise division of war effort, the British Government recognize that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world." More specifically, as regards exchange of information, the Quebec Agreement also provided:

> "There shall be complete interchange of information and ideas on all sections of the project between members of the Policy Committee and their immediate technical advisers.
>
> "In the field of scientific research and development there shall be full and effective interchange of information and ideas between those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field.
>
> "In the field of design, construction, and operation of largescale plants, interchange of information and ideas shall be regulated by such *ad hoc* arrangements as may, in each section of the field, appear to be necessary or desirable if the project is to be brought to fruition at the earliest moment. Such *ad hoc* arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the Policy Committee."

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[1] A covering memorandum from Arneson to Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State, reads: "Herewith are two copies of 'Background Information re United States-United Kingdom Atomic Energy Relations with Particular Regard to the Sharing of Atomic Energy Information' which you asked me to prepare this morning." The covering memorandum indicates that copies were also sent to Bowie and Merchant. This paper was presumably prepared for the Bermuda Conference.

2. An *Aide-Mémoire* of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 19, 1944,[2] stated, among other things, "full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing tube alloys [atomic energy][3] for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement."

3. The successful use of the atomic bomb against the Japanese and the subsequent surrender in early September 1945 caused a new orientation in Anglo-American atomic relationships. The basic document—the Quebec Agreement—on which these relations rested had as its sole object the fruition of the atomic weapon project at the earliest possible moment as a measure of common safety during the war then being waged. The shift from a war to peace-time basis introduced a number of factors which had to be considered in the reorientation of Anglo-American atomic relationships. These were:

(1) The decision of the British to embark upon an atomic production program of their own in the United Kingdom for which they would need to obtain raw materials and industrial know-how.

(2) The realization of the impact of atomic weapon development on international relations and the urgent need to obtain security through international control of the destructive potentialities of the atom.

(3) Consideration of American legislation aimed at domestic control and development of atomic energy.

4. In the course of the Truman–Attlee–King conversations in November 1945, Sir John Anderson, who had accompanied the Prime Minister, met with Secretary of War Patterson and their respective assistants to discuss revision of existing agreements. From these discussions emerged a Memorandum of Intent which was signed by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King on November 16, 1945, stating:

"(1) The signatories desire there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada;

"(2) They agreed that CPC and CDT should continue in a suitable form; and

"(3) They requested CPC to consider and recommend to them appropriate arrangements for this purpose."*

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[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, pp. 492–493.

[3] Brackets in the source text.

*The Combined Policy Committee (CPC) was originally established under the Quebec Agreement to supervise the agreed arrangements for cooperation. The Combined Development Trust (CDT), a body subsidiary to the CPC, was established on June 13, 1944, as a combined ore procurement body. [Footnote in the source text.]

5. At subsequent meetings of the Combined Policy Committee efforts were made to work out a new agreement to supersede the Quebec Agreement and an exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister to the effect it was considered just and fair, and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world, that there should be no restrictions placed on the Government of the United Kingdom in the nature of development and use of atomic energy for industrial or commercial purposes. The American draft of the proposed new agreement provided that there should be full and effective cooperation between the three governments in regard to the exchange of information required for their respective programs of atomic development. As this draft was being considered by the CPC the American members raised the question of whether under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter it would be necessary to register the revised agreement with the United Nations Secretariat and also the effect the new arrangement, if made public, would have on United Nations negotiations for international control.

6. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom announced that it had decided to construct large-scale reactors for plutonium production in order to provide adequate supplies of fissionable material for use in research and for eventual industrial or military application. This development raised very sharply in the minds of the American representatives the question whether any new arrangement should permit the exchange of information which would facilitate the construction of plutonium producing reactors in a country as exposed as the United Kingdom would be in the event of future hostilities.

7. In order to bring the negotiations to an interim conclusion, the British proposed in April of 1946 that cooperation between the three governments, pending the outcome of the United Nations atomic discussions, should be based on conclusions recorded in the Minutes of the CPC.[4] The United States members of the Committee, supported by the Canadian member, stated that the United Kingdom proposal did not surmount the difficulty presented by Article 102 of the Charter, since its effect was to change the basis of cooperation established by the Quebec Agreement and, as such, would have to be reported. The United Kingdom members pointed out that this left the Memorandum of Intent, agreed upon by the President and the Prime Ministers on November 16, 1945, without effect. Cooperation was neither full nor effective, and, in particular, the United Kingdom was not receiving the information from

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[4] For documentation on discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic energy during 1946, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1197 ff.

the United States it required for the execution of its atomic energy program. The American rejoinder was that nothing should be done which would in any way compromise the success of the discussions within the United Nations. At this juncture negotiations in the CPC were terminated and the matter was referred back to the respective governments.

8. There ensued a lengthy exchange of telegrams between Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman. The Prime Minister took the view that the British, having voluntarily given up work on atomic energy projects in the British Isles during the war, were now entitled to information which would assist them in solving more expeditiously problems impeding the development of the program they had initiated following the conclusion of hostilities. He complained that the Americans appeared willing to cooperate in the raw materials field where substantial benefits accrued to the United States, but that they were far less willing to cooperate in fields where it was felt primarily benefits for the time being would flow from the United States to the United Kingdom. President Truman said he did not understand that the proposal set forth in the November 16 Memorandum of Intent that there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada was intended to mean that the United States was obligated to furnish to the United Kingdom in the post-war period the designs and assistance in construction and operation of plants necessary to building of a plutonium producing reactor. He said that no one had informed him that this was the intent and he had not signed the memorandum with this understanding. He stated that the words "full and effective cooperation" applied only to the field of basic scientific information and were not intended to require the giving of information as to construction and operation of plants whenever it was requested.

9. While the situation remained in this stalemate, the raw materials supply situation was becoming acute. An interim allocation arrangement arrived at in July of 1946 provided that all new ore as it became available for allocation should be split 50–50 between the United States and the United Kingdom, this allocation being made without prejudice to establishing a different basis for allocation in subsequent years. As a result of this, interim allocation stocks were accumulating in the United Kingdom far in excess of current needs, whereas the United States program requirements were not being fully met.

10. In November of 1947 it was decided, after full consultation with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom, the objectives being the following:

(1) Tidy up the war-time agreements.
(2) Secure a disposal of the stockpile in the United Kingdom.
(3) Secure a satisfactory share of Belgian Congo production.
(4) Restrict storage in Britain to the amount which could be used in current projects.
(5) Obtain British support in negotiations for uranium with South Africa.

11. The results of the negotiations are embodied in an agreed Minute of the Combined Policy Committee termed a *Modus Vivendi*, dated January 7, 1948. The *Modus Vivendi* has governed United States-United Kingdom-Canadian relations in the atomic energy field from that date to the present. Its principal provisions are:

(1) The Quebec Agreement was superseded.
(2) The Combined Policy Committee was continued as the body for dealing with atomic energy problems of common concern, its powers being as follows:

> (a) To allocate raw materials in accordance with such principles as may be determined from time to time by the Committee taking into account all supplies available to any of the three governments.
> (b) To consider general questions arising with respect to cooperation among the three governments.
> (c) To supervise the operations and policies of the Combined Development Agency (formerly known as the Combined Development Trust).

(3) It was recognized that there were areas of information and experience in which cooperation would be mutually beneficial to the three countries and it was therefore agreed that cooperation should continue in respect of such areas as may from time to time be agreed upon by the CPC and insofar as this is permitted by the laws of the respective countries.

12. Under the *Modus Vivendi* satisfactory allocations have been made from time to time under which the United States consistently obtains most of the uranium ore available for allocation. British stocks have been reduced to current operating needs and the combined efforts of the two countries in securing additional sources of supply have greatly increased the tonnages available to both the United States and the United Kingdom programs. With respect to exchange of information, 9 areas of cooperation were agreed upon in which exchange of information continues. In practice, the United States has been more restrictive in this exchange than the United Kingdom would like. The inhibiting factor, of course, as far as the United States is concerned is the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 151 Series

## *Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)* [1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 151/2

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1953.

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON DISCLOSURE OF ATOMIC INFORMATION TO ALLIED COUNTRIES [2]

References:

A. NSC 151 and 151/1 [3]

B. NSC Action Nos 725, 799, 869, 895, 912 and 974 [4]

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Armaments and American Policy," dated July 28, 1953 [5]

D. Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, "Armaments and American Policy," dated February 4, 1953 [6]

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator at the 173rd Council meeting on December 3, 1953 adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 151/1, subject to the changes which are set forth in NSC Action No. 974–a.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 151/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

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[1] Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

[2] For related documentation, see pp. 1 ff.

[3] NSC 151, May 8, is printed on p. 1150. NSC 151/1, Nov. 23, 1953, is not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 151 Series)

[4] For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114; for NSC Action No. 799, see footnote 4, p. 1174; for NSC Action No. 869, see footnote 3, p. 1185. NSC Action No. 895, Aug. 27, and Action No. 912, Sept. 17, 1953, neither printed, merely noted oral reports to the NSC by C. D. Jackson. NSC Action No. 974, taken at the 173d meeting of the NSC on Dec. 3, 1953, constituted adoption of NSC 151/1, with amendments, as NSC 151/2. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action")

[5] See footnote 2, p. 1184.

[6] This memorandum transmitted the Report of the Panel of Consultants, p. 1056.

Also enclosed for Council information is the Second Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Armaments and American Policy of the NSC Planning Board, as amended by the Planning Board.[7]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[Enclosure 1]

## STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON DISCLOSURE OF ATOMIC INFORMATION TO ALLIED COUNTRIES

1. Subject to appropriate revision of existing legislation, and to the extent consistent with security considerations, the United States should increase its disclosure to selected allied governments of information in the atomic energy field.

2. The objectives of greater disclosure to our allies are to:

a. Enable them to participate intelligently in military planning for their own defenses and in combined operations with the United States.

b. Inspire them to act with the United States in crises and thus give the United States greater freedom of action to use atomic weapons as required.

c. Enable them to provide more effective non-military defense, such as continuity of government and civil defense, and thus decrease the military and industrial burdens on the United States in the event of war.

d. Continue their cooperation in U.S. atomic energy programs, particularly uranium ore procurement.

e. Continue and if possible increase their nuclear research and development and their contribution to free world development vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

3. The information to be made available through appropriate U.S. governmental channels, to the extent required to achieve the above objectives, should include but not be limited to the following categories, provided disclosure is consonant in each case with considerations of security.

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[7] Regarding the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, see the memorandum by Lay, Mar. 12, p. 1134. The *Ad Hoc* Committee forwarded its Second Report to the NSC on Oct. 27, 1953 (memorandum by Lay to the NSC, Oct. 27, and enclosure). On Nov. 18, Lay transmitted to the NSC Planning Board a draft statement of policy on "Armaments and American Policy—Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries", which had been prepared by the Senior Staff on the basis of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's Second Report. This draft statement, along with the Second Report itself, were then transmitted by Lay to the NSC on Nov. 23, as NSC 151/1 and subsequently amended by NSC Action No. 974, as noted in footnote 4, above. Copies of the Lay memoranda of Oct. 27 and Nov. 18, with enclosures, are in S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Armament (NSC 151)".

a. *Weapons Effects.* Such information should no longer be limited to the unrealistic nominal weapon concept (the 20 KT bomb) but should reflect the existence of a family of weapons ranging from relatively small yields to the very large. It need not be directly related to existing stockpile weapons, but should clearly reflect a range of yields available to different delivery systems.

b. *Tactical and Strategic Use of Atomic Weapons.* NATO countries should be given an approximation of the kilotonnage and the numbers of weapons within various yield ranges which will be available for tactical support of NATO forces in the event of war; the tactical use to which the United States would put atomic weapons; the estimated military results from such use; and, in broad terms, those expected results from strategic atomic operations which should influence NATO planning.

c. *Soviet Atomic Capabilities Including Stockpile and Delivery.* Such information should include estimates of the total kilotonnage available to the Soviet Union as well as the concept of the wide range of yield of varying types of atomic weapons. These data should be as precise as intelligence considerations permit.

d. *Military and Non-Military Defense Techniques Related Specifically to Atomic Weapons.* Such information should include military defense practices, techniques and capabilities against atomic attack as well as complete interchange of information on civil defense.

e. *Scientific and Technical Atomic Energy Information.* Such information, materials and equipment should be made available on a classified basis to selected allied countries, particularly to facilitate the procurement of uranium ore. Unclassified information, materials and equipment should be made available to friendly countries to maintain Free World leadership in basic scientific research and development.

4. a. It must be assumed that the rate of leakage to the Soviet Union of atomic information disclosed to allied nations would be very high. This factor has an important bearing on the precise nature of the information to be made available under paragraph 3 above.

b. Because information on the tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons is of relatively high sensitivity, the appropriate U.S. governmental channel for making it available, referred to in paragraph 3 above, is specifically designated as the mechanisms established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and such information should be kept strictly in military channels. Once removed from the Restricted Data category, this information would appropriately become subject to the procedures, practices, and regulations of the State–Defense Military Information Control Committee.

5. Except as may subsequently be determined to be in the national interest, information in the following categories should not be made available to any foreign governments:

a. *Manufacture and Design of Atomic Weapons.* Detailed scientific and technical information concerning the manufacture and design of atomic weapons.

b. *Numbers of Atomic Weapons.* Figures relating to the existing or past U.S. stockpile of weapons.

c. *Total Atomic Capability.* Information in precise terms respecting the total capability of the United States.

d. *Deployment.* Details as to the deployment of atomic weapons, except as required to obtain the consent of a country to deployment within that country.

6. Appropriate legislation to carry this policy into effect should be sought.

[Enclosure 2]

## SECOND REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ARMAMENTS AND AMERICAN POLICY (AS AMENDED BY THE NSC PLANNING BOARD) ON DISCLOSURE OF ATOMIC INFORMATION TO ALLIED COUNTRIES

### *Present Practices*

1. In examining whether the United States should increasingly share atomic information with our allies it is necessary first to describe the nature and extent of such sharing at the present time. Five general categories of information can be identified and are discussed below.

a. *Consultation on the use of atomic weapons and on the use of allied bases for atomic operations.*

. . . . . . .

b. *Atomic weapons information.*

(1) Restricted Data information on atomic weapons is specifically excluded from the purview of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee (SD-MICC) which is the agency of this Government having cognizance over the disclosure of military security information to foreign countries. (The terms of reference and the operations of this Committee are set forth in Annex A, paras. 6-22, and in the Appendix thereto.) Steps have recently been taken to make available to NATO a modicum of information concerning atomic weapons. By authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the information cited below is released to allied commanders and certain key staff officers in SHAPE on a strictly need-to-know basis and under the security classification of Top Secret. Data as to numbers are defined as being purely planning assumptions and not as representing stockpile capabilities or actual United States planning allocations. The following types of information are furnished:

(a) As of———— there are———— atomic weapons available for tactical use in defense of Western Eurasia.

(b) All weapons are assumed to be air burst.

(c) Weapons will be retained in custody of U.S. commands.

(d) There is flexibility as to type of weapon (air-artillery) within the number allotted.

(e) The nominal weapon yield is 20 KT.

(f) Various means of delivery available to NATO during FY 1954 (Air Force-Navy-Army) giving specific numbers of each and type of delivery they can accomplish.

(g) Responsibility for determining military significance of target, target approval, and weapon expenditure rests with SACEUR.

(h) Type of tactical support which could be expected from SAC on call.

(i) Instruction in the defense against atomic weapons.

(2) There was recently instituted a NATO special weapons school for senior NATO officers at Oberammergau, Germany, the purpose of which was to give such officers a basic orientation on the principles of employment of atomic weapons in support of land operations. A summary of the subject matter contained in the course is attached as Annex B.

(3) None of the information mentioned above is deemed to include Restricted Data and, accordingly, the sharing of it with NATO allies has not required amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

c. *Scientific and technical atomic energy information.* The extent to which scientific and technical atomic energy information is shared with other countries at the present time is set forth in Annex A, paras. 46-75.

d. *Civil defense.* The extent of cooperation with other countries in the civil defense field where information concerning atomic weapons is involved is severely limited. A brief summary of the present situation is set forth in Annex C.

e. *Atomic energy intelligence cooperation. . . .*

### *Objectives To Be Sought in a Program of Greater Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries*

2. To the extent consistent with security considerations, to communicate to selected allied governments knowledge of atomic matters, excluding detailed scientific and technical information concerning the fabrication and design of atomic weapons, sufficient to:

a. Enable them to participate intelligently in the military planning required for their own defenses and in the conduct of combined operations in which those governments serve as active and important allies of the United States.

b. Inspire them to act in concert with the United States in the event of crises, thus tending to permit freedom of action for the United States to employ atomic weapons as the over-all situation may dictate.

c. Enable them to provide an effective program of non-military defensive measures, such as continuity of civil government and adequate civil defense to minimize the effects of enemy attacks on lives, property and industrial production, thus decreasing the military and industrial burdens on the United States in the event of war.

d. Continue their cooperation in programs relating to atomic energy, particularly uranium ore procurement.

e. Continue and if possible increase their nuclear research and development, and their contribution to aggregate free world development vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

*Categories of Information Relevant to These Objectives*

3. *Introduction.* The list which follows is not intended to be exhaustive but indicative of categories of classified information which it is thought necessary to make available to selected allied governments in order to carry out the objectives stated above.

a. *Additional information in connection with diplomatic consultations on the use of atomic weapons.* It is not believed that there are any specific categories of information which are required primarily to alleviate difficulties in this aspect of the problem. Information as may be disclosed in the atomic weapons field in connection with NATO planning could be drawn upon.

b. *Additional information in the military field.*

(1) *Weapons effects.* Information in this category should not be tied to the now unrealistic nominal weapon concept but should reflect the existence of a family of weapons ranging from the relatively small yields to the very large. Such information need not be directly related to existing stockpile weapons but should clearly reflect the weapons family concept, and a range of yields available to each delivery system.

(2) *Numbers of atomic weapons.* Apart from the fact that numbers per se are not very meaningful any longer in view of the diversity of size and yield of weapons now in the stockpile, there would seem to be no need for NATO members or other countries to be informed of the extent of our total atomic capability in precise terms. NATO countries should, however, be given an approximation of the kilotonnage and the numbers of weapons within various yield ranges which would be committed to support of NATO in the event of war for tactical use and the estimated military results to be expected from such tactical use, and also from strategic use.

(3) *Tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons.* In order to have an integrated picture of the full effect of planned NATO operations in the event of war, NATO countries should be given information concerning both the tactical use to which the United States would put atomic weapons and, in broad terms, the estimated results desired from strategic atomic operations.

(4) *Soviet atomic capabilities including stockpile and delivery.* Information in this category should include estimates of total kilotonnage available to the Soviet Union as well as the concept of the wide range of yield of varying types of atomic weapons. These data should be as precise as intelligence considerations will permit.

(5) *Military and non-military defense techniques related specifically to atomic weapons.* This category should include information on military defense practices, techniques, and capabilities against atomic attack as well as complete interchange of information on civil defense.

c. *Additional scientific and technical atomic energy information.* The United States should make scientific and technical information, material assistance, and equipment available on a classified basis to selected allied countries (particularly to facilitate uranium ore procurement). The United States should make similar unclassified items available to friendly countries to maintain Western leadership in basic scientific research and development.

d. *Additional atomic energy information for civil defense.* It is not believed that additional atomic information specifically designed for civil defense purposes is required provided the kinds of information listed in b and c are made available.

e. *Additional atomic energy information for intelligence purposes.* It is not believed necessary that additional atomic energy information be disclosed to other nations primarily for intelligence purposes provided the kinds of information listed in b and c above are made available.

*Security Problem*

4. A program of disclosure of the types of information outlined above gives rise immediately to a number of security problems.

a. *Should it be assumed that any and all of the foregoing information if disclosed to a number of friendly countries would in a relatively short period of time become known to the Soviet Union?*

(1) It must be assumed as a practical matter that the rate of leakage to the Soviet Union of atomic information disclosed to allied nations would be very high. If this is so, it seems clear that this factor has an important bearing on the precise nature of the information that should be permitted in the above listed categories.

b. *How sensitive is the information involved?*

(1) By excluding at the outset detailed scientific and technical information concerning the fabrication and design of atomic weapons, it would appear that the types of information indicated above in the military field would not constitute information of very high sensitivity. Information on tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons, however, is of relatively high sensitivity and should be handled under appropriate military security classifications and under security procedures consonant with such classification including a rigid application of the criterion of need-to-know.

(2) With regard to scientific and technical information in the general field of atomic energy, it is not likely that any of the types of information suggested above would carry a very high classification. As information concerning nuclear power reactors becomes

more widely disseminated, particularly to industry in this country, it is highly unlikely that it will be advisable to assign any great sensitivity to, or controls over, such information. Certain research reactor designs have already been declassified and are available to the public. A general trend toward more openness is clearly discernible in the nuclear power reactor field. As to sensitivity of materials and equipment which it is suggested should be made available to other countries for research reactors and reactors designed for power production, it would be necessary to insure that these materials and equipment were not transshipped behind the Iron Curtain. Control of material and equipment, however, are rather more readily devised and more dependable than controls over information and ideas.

c. *What channels of communication should be used in exchanging these various categories of information?*

(1) Information on tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons should be handled through mechanisms established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and kept strictly in military channels. Once removed from the Restricted Data category this information would appropriately become subject to the procedures, practices, and regulations of the State–Defense Military Information Control Committee which is the agency of this Government having cognizance over the control of military security information to foreign countries.

(2) Programs for technical cooperation with other countries in the atomic energy field generally should be handled by the Atomic Energy Commission.

(3) Civil defense interchange should be handled by the FCDA.

(4) Non-military information such as decrease of urban vulnerability, continuity of government, etc., should be handled by ODM.

(5) Intelligence cooperation would continue to be handled by the CIA.

(6) Weapons-effect information should be handled through the above channels as appropriate in each case.

(7) Diplomatic consultations with other governments concerning the use of atomic weapons and the use of bases for atomic operations should continue to be handled, as in the past, by the Department of State in consultation with the Department of Defense.

d. *What security standards should be required of recipient nations?* With respect to military information concerning atomic weapons, the security standards and practices applicable to other fields of classified military information should apply (SD–MICC). With respect to information involved in a program of cooperation in the general atomic energy field, the Atomic Energy Commission should establish security requirements consonant with the sensitivity of the information involved.

*Legal Obstacles to a Policy of Greater Disclosure*

5. With respect to non-atomic information, statutory protection of security information is provided by certain sections of the Espionage Act and the Internal Security Act. These statutes impose penalties on the wrongful disclosure of information to foreign countries. Except in the case of atomic energy information, administrative discretion is exercised by executive agencies with respect to the substance of communication with foreign countries and the procedures involved. With regard to atomic energy information, an additional barrier, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, exists. The effect of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is set forth in Annex A, paras 23–45 and 60–70.

6. It seems clear that some amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 will be necessary if the objectives set forth above are to be achieved.

*Recommendations*

7. It is recommended that:

a. To the extent consistent with security considerations, a policy of greater disclosure of information in the atomic energy field, excluding detailed scientific and technical information concerning the fabrication and design of atomic weapons, to selected allied governments be adopted which would achieve the following objectives:

> (1) Enable them to participate intelligently in the military planning required for their own defenses and in the conduct of combined operations in which those governments serve as active and important allies of the United States.
>
> (2) Inspire them to act in concert with the United States in the event of crises, thus tending to permit freedom of action for the United States to employ atomic weapons as the over-all situation may dictate.
>
> (3) Enable them to provide an effective program of non-military defensive measures, such as continuity of civil government and adequate civil defense to minimize the effects of enemy attacks on lives, property and industrial production, thus decreasing the military and industrial burdens on the United States in the event of war.
>
> (4) Continue their cooperation in programs relating to atomic energy, particularly uranium ore procurement.
>
> (5) Continue and if possible increase their nuclear research and development, and their contribution to aggregate free world development vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

b. The categories of information listed in 3 above be accepted as indicative of the types of information to be made available in order to carry out the policy and objectives stated in 7–a.

c. In proposing legislation in this field, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense should ensure that it is consistent with the policy and the objectives set forth in 7–a.

*Ad Hoc Committee:*
State—R. Gordon Arneson (Chairman), Edmund A. Gullion
Defense—Lt. Col. Edwin F. Black
AEC—Roy B. Snapp
CIA—Dr. Ralph Clark
PSB—Dr. Horace S. Craig
FCDA—John DeChant
Executive Secretary Carlton Savage (Acting)

## Annex A

### *Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy*

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

## EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

### SCOPE OF PAPER

1. *Purpose and Limits.* The purpose of this paper is to examine statutory provisions governing the communication of classified information by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense to foreign countries, current programs concerned with the communication of such information, and the relationships among present laws and programs respecting this matter. Special consideration will be given to barriers to further communication under present arrangements.

2. The desirability of modifying existing arrangements to permit increased communication with foreign countries will not be assessed in the present paper.

3. *Outline.* Arrangements in the field of military security information will be discussed first, then arrangements respecting restricted data atomic energy information. A summary comparison of both fields and their relationships will be presented at the conclusion of this paper.

### PERTINENT STATUTES

4. *Penalties and Restrictions.* Statutory protection of security information is provided by certain sections of the Espionage Act, the Internal Security Act, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. All of these statutes impose penalties on the wrongful disclosure of information to foreign countries. In addition, the Atomic Energy Act

raises special procedural barriers to communication with foreign countries in the atomic energy field and entirely excludes particular categories of information in that field from such communication.

5. Except in the case of atomic energy information respecting which statutory barriers have been imposed, full administrative discretion is exercised by executive agencies with respect to the substance of communication with foreign countries and the procedures involved. Existing arrangements for the exchange of military security information are outlined in the sections immediately following.

### STATE–DEFENSE MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL COMMITTEE

6. *Extent of Authority.* The State–Defense Military Information Control Committee (SD–MIC), established in 1948 as successor to a similar State-War-Navy Information Control Committee, is the agency of this Government having cognizance over the disclosure of military security information to foreign countries. In March 1951, the Secretaries of State and Defense established in Washington a permanent joint secretariat for the SD–MIC. This secretariat is the focal point in the United States for receiving and processing all requests from United States agencies and activities for authority to release military security information to NATO countries and other countries receiving United States military aid.

7. Under the policies established by SD–MIC, the JCS retain control of strategic planning and guidance information, and specified categories of information may be released through military attaché channels as authorized by the chief of intelligence of the service concerned.

8. *Functions.* The SD–MIC and its secretariat provide guidance to United States agencies and activities by the issuance or approval of directives which specify in detail what categories of information and what degree of classification within those categories may be released to each specific foreign country. Procedures, delegations of authority, channels for such releases, and the conditions under which releases may be made under existing agreements or treaties between the United States and the nation concerned are prescribed in detail.

9. Procedures and restrictions are designed to insure that no military security information is released to any country until it has been determined that the release conforms to existing authorizations approved by SD–MIC. These authorizations are established only after careful consideration by the various Government agencies concerned. Delegations of authority are limited to specified cat-

egories or areas of information and include provisions for referring doubtful questions to higher authority.

10. Restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act are excluded from all such releases by established regulations.

11. *Basic Principles.* The SD–MIC and the agencies concerned operate on the general principle that military security information will not be disclosed until a number of conditions have been met. Disclosure must be consistent with laws and policies of this Government with regard to atomic energy information and other information to which special restrictions or procedures apply. Military security of the United States must permit disclosure, and disclosure must be consistent with the foreign policy of this country toward the foreign country concerned. The foreign country involved must have a definite need-to-know the information requested, and the information disclosed must be limited to that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the release.

12. *Benefits for U.S.* It is also necessary that disclosure of the information result in benefit for the United States. Benefits may be in the nature of a specific *quid-pro-quo,* such as the disclosure to this country of information held by the foreign country. They may also be of a more general nature, such as the furthering of United States military policy for defense of the Western Hemisphere, the North Atlantic area, or other strategic areas, or such as the increase or maintenance of the military potential of the country receiving the information, where this is advantageous to the United States. (See Appendix for examples of permitted disclosures of military weapons information.)

### TEMPLER–BURNS AGREEMENT

13. *Basic Policy.* The Templer–Burns Agreement is an understanding reached in 1950 in meetings between a British delegation headed by General Templer and a United States group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and chairmanned by General Burns to the effect that the two countries should adopt substantially identical policies in regard to the exchange of classified military information between each other and disclosure of such information to other countries.

14. The following basic policy is stated in this agreement:

> "The United States and the United Kingdom are agreed that it is in the interests of both countries that there should be a full and frank interchange to the greatest practicable degree of all classified military information and intelligence, except in a limited number of already declared fields, it being understood that either Government may subsequently declare any newly-developed fields or

projects as excepted upon due notification to the other Government."

. . . . . . .

### SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS

18. *Security.* A security agreement between the United States and United Kingdom chiefs of staff provides that the chief of staff of each country will make every effort to maintain the military security classification established by the authorities of the other country with regard to military information originating in that country or established jointly by the two countries, and that such information will not be disclosed to a third country without mutual consent.

19. *Commonwealth Countries.* Agreed policy with respect to the release of military information to British Commonwealth countries relaxes provisions of the security agreement to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom with respect to such countries. Special arrangements are set up for a very free exchange of information among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, with the areas of information carefully indicated. Somewhat more restricted agreements are provided with regard to other Commonwealth countries, and drastic restrictions are imposed with respect to a few Commonwealth countries.

20. *Joint Board.* A United States, United Kingdom, Canadian Military Information Board has been established to resolve problems arising in connection with the disclosure to fourth countries and to NATO of "combined military information," which term is defined in the agreement establishing the Board. The agreement deals only with combined information and does not prevent any one of the three countries from releasing to NATO its own classified military information.

21. *Other Agreements.* There are in existence a number of other agreements and treaty arrangements involving the release or exchange of specific categories of classified military information with other countries. These include security agreements between the United States and Australian departments of defense, the United States and Canadian departments of defense, and among the parties to NATO. Restricted data atomic energy information are excluded from these arrangements.

22. *Relation to Atomic Energy Act.* Any proposed revision of the Atomic Energy Act to modify present provisions in regard to the classification and handling of atomic energy information should be examined in terms of the extent to which the atomic energy information involved could, or would have to, be released to foreign

countries under the agreements outlined above. Adjustment of these agreements might be necessary in some cases.

### PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

23. *Restricted Data.* The enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created a special category of security information—"Restricted Data"—to provide additional protection for information in the atomic field, which was thought to be especially sensitive and vital to the national security. Section 10(b) (1) defines this special category as follows:

> "The term 'restricted data'. . . . means all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power but shall not include any data which the Commission from time to time determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security."

24. In contrast with other laws concerned with the security of information, the Atomic Energy Act imposes special limitations on communication with foreign countries and specifies in detail procedures that must be followed in certain cases. Relevant provisions of the Act are quoted in the following paragraphs.

25. *Policy and Principles.* Provisions of the Act establishing the framework for communicating atomic energy information to foreign countries are as follows:

> "Sec. 10. (a) *Policy.*—It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the Commission shall be guided by the following principles:
>
> > "(1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes; and
> >
> > "(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress."

26. To the foregoing "principles," which were included in the Act as originally enacted, a third was added by amendment of the Act in October 1951:

> > "(3) Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the Commission, when in its unanimous judgment the common defense and security would be substantially promoted and would not be endangered, subject to the limitations hereinafter set out, from entering into specific arrangements involving the communica-

> tion to another nation of restricted data on refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source materials; reactor development; production of fissionable materials; and research and development relating to the foregoing: Provided:
>
> "(1) that no such arrangement shall involve the communication of restricted data on design and fabrication of atomic weapons;
> "(2) that no such arrangement shall be entered into with any nation threatening the security of the United States;
> "(3) that the restricted data involved shall be limited and circumscribed to the maximum degree consistent with the common defense and security objective in view, and that in the judgment of the Commission the recipient nation's security standards applicable to such data are adequate;
> "(4) that the President, after securing the written recommendation of the National Security Council, has determined in writing (incorporating the National Security Council recommendation) that the arrangement would substantially promote and would not endanger the common defense and security of the United States, giving specific consideration to the security sensitivity of the restricted data involved and the adequacy and sufficiency of the security safeguards undertaken to be maintained by the recipient nation; and
> "(5) that before the arrangement is consummated by the Commission the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been fully informed for a period of thirty days in which the Congress was in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days)."

27. *Unauthorized Disclosures.* The provisions of sections 10(b) (2), (3), and (4) prohibit and impose special penalties respecting espionage and sabotage involving restricted data and with respect to disclosure of restricted data "to any individual or person . . . . with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation." The term "person" is defined in sec. 18 (c) to include "any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, the United States or any agency thereof, any government other than the United States, any political subdivision or any such government, and any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing, or other entity but shall not include the Commission or officers or employees of the Commission in the exercise of duly authorized functions."

28. *Relation to Other Laws.* The relation of sec. 10 to the provisions of other laws is stated in sec. 10 (b) (6) as follows:

> "This section shall not exclude the applicable provisions of any other laws, except that no government agency shall take any

action under such other laws not consistent with the provisions of this section."

### COMMUNICATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

29. *Barriers.* It is apparent, from review of the pertinent provisions of the Act quoted above, that the Act in itself establishes formidable barriers to the exchange of atomic energy information with other countries. It can also be seen that there are provisions in the Act which make the administration of the intended controls over restricted data quite difficult in practice. These matters will be noted in succeeding sections.

30. *Basic Policy.* The basic policy and intent of the Act with regard to dissemination of atomic energy information are quite clear. Sec. 10(a) states that: "It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security." This policy is, in effect, a restatement with respect to control of restricted data of the "paramount objective" of the Act, which, as stated in sec. 1(a), is also that of "assuring the common defense and security."

31. *Principles.* Although the basic statement of policy is clear, the Act amplifies this policy statement with a number of overlapping principles having a bearing on exchange of information with foreign countries.

32. Section 10(a) (3) (1) expressly bars discussion with foreign countries of data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons; this appears to be the only absolute prohibition in the Act with respect to any area of information. Section 10(a) (1) prohibits exchanges on information relating to use of atomic energy for "industrial purposes," but such information may be included in exchanges made under the special procedure established in sec. 10(a) (3), which under specified conditions, permits exchanges involving data on "refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source materials; reactor development; production of fissionable materials; and research and development relating to the foregoing."

33. The dissemination of scientific and technical information, according to sec. 10(a) (2), should be "permitted and encouraged," but presumably not if it reveals information that is otherwise barred. Scientific and technical information may be transmitted to foreign countries under sec. 10(a) (3) procedure, but in the case of the United Kingdom and Canada, it may also be exchanged to some extent under an existing technical cooperation program consistent with provisions of the Act and established prior to the enactment of the Section 10(a) (3) amendment.

34. The Act is silent on the specific question of communicating data on the utilization of atomic weapons to foreign countries, but

as is the case with scientific and technical data, communication of weapons data appears to be limited to that information that does not reveal data, such as weapons design and fabrication data, otherwise prohibited.

35. *Declassification.* Although declassification procedure theoretically offers a means for communicating data to foreign countries, the Commission must be able to determine that the information removed from the restricted data category "may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security." While this determination does not necessarily mean that declassifed data will be published, it does means of course, that they are removed from statutory protection. Furthermore, declassification of data amounts to giving to allied countries no more preference than to unfriendly ones.

36. *Ambiguity of Principles.* Much of the difficulty in administering requirements of the Act respecting communication of information to other countries has arisen from the basic ambiguity and internal conflicts of the "principles" discussed above. This difficulty was explained by the Senate report on the Act, which stated:

> "The problems are especially difficult because vital objectives in a sense compete with or are in direct conflict with one another. The common defense and security require control over information which might help other nations to build atomic weapons or power plants (until effective international safeguards are established) and, at the same time, sufficient interchange between scientists to assure the Nation of continued scientific progress. Section 10 expressly states these policy considerations of opposite tendency and attempts to frame a program that will reconcile their apparent divergence."

37. Existing programs involving the exchange of scientific and technical data will be discussed in succeeding sections of this paper. The problem of communicating restricted data on atomic weapons to foreign countries will be discussed briefly at this point since such data are not included in existing programs either of the DOD or the Commission. The issues that arise in the case of weapons data are similar in a number of respects to those arising generally in communicating restricted data to foreign countries.

### ATOMIC WEAPONS DATA

38. *Interpretation of "restricted data."* The restricted data category established by the Act includes all data falling within the statutory definition regardless of whether the data be originated by the Commission, by other Government agencies, or even privately. The Act states that the term "restricted data" means "all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the produc-

tion of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power." Interpretation of this definition and its application in specific cases have been the source of continuing disagreement between the DOD and the Commission. The two agencies have attempted to draw a mutually satisfactory line of demarcation consistent with the Act between restricted data and military security information. However, disagreement persists in a few important areas, such as weapons effects information.

39. In general, the Commission has maintained that the definition is clearly a broad one and was intended to include all data concerning atomic weapons if such data have security significance. The DOD maintains that the phrase "manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons" was surely intended to protect information concerning design and fabrication of such weapons but was not necessarily intended to bring under the restricted data classification as much classified military information concerning the military use of atomic weapons in connection with military operations as the Commission believes is demanded by the statute.

40. *Lack of Flexibility.* Whatever the exact limits of the restricted data category, the Act places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission the control of the dissemination of some information in which the DOD, as the agency having basic responsibility for the national defense, has primary interest. This difficulty is intensified by the fact that the Act does not give the Commission any flexibility with respect to classification of restricted data other than to declassify them (and the Commission can declassify only those data that it determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security). The Commission may not transfer information from the restricted data category to any other category of security information. Furthermore, sec. 10(b) (6) is intended, in the words of the Senate report on the Act, to prohibit "any agency from placing information in a restricted category . . . once such information has been released from the category by official action of the . . . Commission." [8]

41. The interest of the DOD in the control of restricted data is reflected in sec. 2(c) of the Act, which requires the Commission to keep the Military Liaison Committee (with the DOD) fully informed concerning a number of matters including "the control of information relating to the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons." Furthermore, the Act specifically provides for appeal by the Secretary of Defense to the President in the event that "any action, proposed action, or failure to act of the Commission on such matters is adverse to the responsibilities of the Department of De-

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[8] Ellipses are in the source text.

fense." However, while providing some recognition of the responsibilities of the DOD, such an appeals procedure is clearly no remedy for problems arising from the Act itself.

42. *Barrier to Communication.* Although there is no provision in the Act which in so many words prohibits the communication to foreign countries of restricted data concerning the utilization of atomic weapons, it appears, as noted above, that communication of such data is barred to the extent that the data are revelatory of other information that may not be communicated. For example, since sec. 10(a) (3) (1) bars discussion of data on weapons design and fabrication, data on utilization of weapons that reveals information on their design and fabrication may presumably not be made available even to allied countries.

43. While there is possibly an area of restricted data concerning the utilization of atomic weapons that does not reveal information in prohibited areas and that might be communicated to allies under present provisions of the Act, it is likely that such an area would at best be limited, and certainly it would by no means approach the extensive collaboration with allied countries permissible in other areas of military information.

44. *Effects.* The inhibiting effects of the Act on communication of information to foreign countries extend into existing arrangements for the exchange of military information with the United Kingdom, Canada, and other allied countries. With considerable uncertainty existing as to the extent of authority to communicate data in the atomic weapons field, atomic energy restricted data have been excluded from existing arrangements for exchanges of military information with other countries. At the same time, the increasing impact of atomic weapons on military weapons systems and military operations is leading to a situation wherein atomic weapons activities and military operational activities are becoming practically inseparable.

45. Should it be considered desirable to seek revision of the Act to clarify authority respecting communication of atomic weapons data to foreign countries, any proposed amendment should be examined in terms of its relationships with other provisions of the Act to assure that such relationships would not prove to be continued barriers. For example, if the restricted data category were abandoned completely but there remained in the Act a bar to the communication to foreign countries of information on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons, such a prohibition might still operate as a barrier to communication on utilization of weapons.

## TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH U.K. AND CANADA

46. *Modus Vivendi.* The existing Technical Cooperation Program for exchanging scientific and technical information with the United Kingdom and Canada is based on the *modus vivendi* agreed to by those countries and the United States January 7, 1948. This agreement, which superseded wartime agreements, provided for the continuation of the tripartite Combined Policy Committee as the instrument of the three countries "for dealing with atomic energy problems of common concern"; laid the basis for continued collaboration in the raw materials field; and stated:

> "It is recognized that there are areas of information and experience in which cooperation would be mutually beneficial to the three countries. They will therefore cooperate in respect to such areas as may from time to time be agreed upon by the CPC insofar as this is permitted by the laws of the respective countries."

It was also agreed that classified information in the atomic energy field would not be disclosed "to other governments or authorities or persons in other countries without prior due consultation."

47. An annex to the *modus vivendi* recognized special arrangements for cooperation among the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in a limited number of areas of research and of raw materials development. Recognition of these areas of Commonwealth cooperation did not involve agreement to the release by the United Kingdom and Canada to other Commonwealth countries of information furnished by the United States under the *modus vivendi.*

48. *Base for Program.* The *modus vivendi* was entered into on the basis of agreement within the executive branch of this Government, and after consultation with the legislative branch, that the United States could properly enter into such an undertaking provided that this Government was satisfied that it would be in the interest of the national security to do so. The program of technical cooperation entered into under the *modus vivendi* was also based on the Governmental decision that such a program was justified by and consistent with the paramount objective of the Atomic Energy Act and the basic policy of the Act relating to control of information.

49. *Areas of Cooperation.* The Technical Cooperation Program has from the beginning been limited in its scope. When the *modus vivendi* was entered into by the three countries, they also agreed on the following nine areas in which it appeared at the time that cooperation would be mutually beneficial: (1) declassifiable subject matter; (2) health and safety; (3) isotopes; (4) nuclear and extra-nu-

clear properties of the elements; (5) detection of distant nuclear explosions; (6) reactor materials; (7) extraction chemistry; (8) design of power reactors; and (9) low-power reactors. General definitions were agreed to for these areas.

50. No new areas have been added since the original agreement, and at the present time, only six of the areas under the original arrangement are active.

51. *Active Areas.* The six active areas are health and safety, isotopes, detection of distant nuclear explosions, reactor materials, extraction chemistry, and low-power reactors. Area (1) has never been utilized since it pertains to information that has largely been declassified. The opening of area (4)—properties of the elements—has been a topic of almost continuous discussion over the last five years, but agreement has not been reached as to opening this area to active cooperation. Cooperation was initiated but has been abandoned in area (8), power reactors. Activity in area (5), detection of distant nuclear explosions, is very limited since little can be done without involving matters relating primarily to weapons.

52. *Topics Within Areas.* The nine areas of cooperation have been considered by this Government to be general areas, and acceptance of them was not considered to constitute a commitment to exchange any particular information within any of the areas. In the implementation of the program, the active general areas have been further defined to include specific topic for cooperation.

53. Particular proposals for exchange are reviewed to assure that they fall within these topics and that they conform to an administratively established criterion that has been stated as follows:

> "While recognizing that a distinction between atomic energy matters of military significance and of non-military significance cannot be clearly made, all exchanges under this program shall be governed by the general criterion that information directly and primarily related to weapons or to the design or operation of plants for the production of weapons materials or weapons parts is not subject for discussion."

Basic metallurgy of plutonium is also excluded from discussion.

54. Since the policy has been to exclude exchanges of information in the production field, exchanges have been confined to the fields of research and development.

55. *Activities Under Program.* The principal activities under the program fall into the following categories: visits by official scientific representatives of the cooperating countries for classified discussions with the scope of the active areas of the established program; irradiations of special materials and equipment in reactors; the transfer of classified research and development reports; and the making available of isotopes and instruments.

56. *Administration.* General supervision of the program is the responsibility of a subgroup of the CPC known as the Sub-group of Scientific Advisers on Technical Cooperation. United States membership on this body includes representatives of the AEC and the DOD. With respect to day-to-day activities under the program, the DOD has primary responsibility for cooperation under the area relating to detection of distant nuclear explosions, and the Commission has primary responsibility for the remainder of the program. In practice, both AEC and the DOD must agree as to the propriety of specific exchanges. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is kept fully informed on activities under the program.

57. *Limitations on Program.* In recommending amendment of the Atomic Energy Act to provide, in the section 10 amendment, a procedure for exchanging information with foreign countries under special circumstances, Joint Committee stated in its report:

> "The committee of course intends that the section 10 amendment have no retroactive but only prospective application . . . . In particular, the existing technical cooperation arrangement of the United States with Great Britain and Canada, which has its roots in the War-time partnership between the three countries, remains unaffected."

58. This statement provides clear Congressional endorsement for continuation of the Technical Cooperation Program at least in the limited areas covered by the existing agreement with the United Kingdom and Canada. However, there may be some disagreement as to whether specific activities should be undertaken under the Technical Cooperation Program or under the procedure established by the section 10 amendment.

59. Expansion of the program, should such be considered desirable, would not only raise a further question as to the relationship of the program to the sec. 10 amendment but would also involve a previous commitment to the Joint Committee. In 1949, when the program was under discussion by the three countries, the Secretary of State advised the Joint Committee that "continuation would not involve any expansion of the present nine areas of cooperation." In view of this statement, the addition of new areas to the program would require full prior consultation with the Joint Committee. As a practical matter, justification for such an expansion would probably have to be based on findings similar to those required by the sec. 10 amendment.

## SECTION 10 AMENDMENT

60. *Background.* In 1951 there arose the need to exchange information with the Canadians in the field of feed materials processing. This information could not be exchanged under the Technical

Cooperation Program, and in view of the prohibition of sec. 10(a) (1) of the Atomic Energy Act on exchange of information with respect to use of atomic energy for industrial purposes, there was doubt as to the authority of the Commission to enter into a new arrangement covering this matter. The Commission placed the problem before the Joint Committee, and a Committee-sponsored amendment was enacted in October 1951.

61. The section 10 amendment authorizes exchanges of information in all fields of the Commission's operations from the refining of feed materials through the production of fissionable materials but expressly prohibits exchanges of information on the design and fabrication of weapons. Information concerning the utilization of weapons is not mentioned in the amendment.

62. *Exchanges Under Amendment.* Two exchanges have been undertaken under the sec. 10 amendment, one with Canada and one with the United Kingdom. A third exchange is expected to be completed in the near future.

63. *Practical Difficulties.* While the amendment establishes a legal basis for exchanges of information with any country except, of course, one threatening the security of the United States, it interposes a number of obstacles in the way of such exchanges.

64. In the first place, the amendment establishes a cumbersome procedure involving review by the National Security Council, approval by the President, and submission to the Joint Committee for a 30-day waiting period. This procedure not only creates a considerable administrative burden but also makes the authority under the amendment unavailable for emergency use.

65. Secondly, the information to be exchanged must be "limited and circumscribed to the maximum degree consistent with the common defense and security objective in view." The meaning of this requirement will, of course, have to be ascertained in individual cases. However, in view of this requirement it is not clear that the sec. 10 amendment would be useful for establishing areas of continuing cooperation with other countries or that it would be useful for conducting exploratory discussions with other countries.

66. Thirdly, the Commission must be able to make the finding that the recipient nation's security standards applicable to the data communicated to that nation are adequate. While this finding can be made with respect to exchanges susceptible to narrow compartmentalization, it would probably be very difficult at the present time to make such a finding with respect to a foreign country's security standards over-all.

67. Comparability of security standards has been the subject of a series of conferences and exchanges of visits among the United

States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. This country has also undertaken to assist Belgium in security matters.

68. *Unresolved Problem.* An unresolved problem confronting the Commission having a bearing on the sec. 10 amendment is that raised by countries supplying source materials to the United States. The desire of such countries to participate in possible industrial benefits of atomic energy is reflected in contractual arrangements. For example, the agreement with Belgium states:

> "9. As regards the use of the above mentioned ores as a source of energy the following arrangements shall apply:
>
> > "(a) In the event of the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom deciding to utilize as a source of energy for commercial purpose ores obtained under this agreement the said Governments will admit the Belgian Government to participation in such utilization on equitable terms."

Whether communication of information necessary in connection with achieving "equitable participation" can be accomplished under present provisions of the Act is not yet resolved.

### DATA IN RAW MATERIALS FIELD

69. *Programs.* Cooperation in the raw materials field with the United Kingdom and Canada, which is carried on under the *modus vivendi* with those countries but not as part of the Technical Cooperation Program, includes exchange of certain information relating to exploration for and beneficiation of ore. In addition, in order to make possible explorations for source materials by other countries and to facilitate the extraction and processing of materials by countries involved in the supply program, the Commission communicates to such countries information in the raw materials field, such as geological and mineralogical data and information respecting the extraction, recovery, and beneficiation of materials. Furnishing such information is essential to assure an adequate raw materials supply. Restricted data are involved in certain of these exchanges.

70. *Protection of Information.* When security information is transmitted, it is with the understanding that the recipient country will accord it adequate protection. The Commission has helped certain countries develop appropriate personnel security, document security, and physical security arrangements. It should be noted that where information on processing is involved, the information exchanged relates only to that process suitable to the kind and grade of ore to be processed; general access to processing data is not permitted.

## JOINT DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAM

71. *Purpose.* Since 1947, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have cooperated in a program for controlling the declassification of commonly held information in the atomic energy field. The program was undertaken in order to assure comparability of treatment of such information by the three countries with a view to forestalling the declassification by one of the countries of information considered sensitive by another. This program does not serve as a medium for exchange of information among the countries.

72. *Conferences.* The joint declassification program has been implemented through a series of annual joint conferences, the last of which took place at Chalk River, Canada, in April 1953. United States representatives at the conferences generally include the Director and Deputy Director of Classification of the Commission and members of the Committee of Senior Responsible Reviewers.

73. As a result of these conferences, a Joint Declassification Guide has been established and is kept up-to-date. The conferences provide an opportunity for mutual consideration by the three countries regarding interpretations of the declassification guide and proposals for its revision.

74. *Limitations.* The standard terms of reference for the conferences state: "No classified information not already known to all parties concerned will be discussed." The commonly held information which can be discussed is largely that remaining from the period of wartime cooperation and that shared under the Technical Cooperation Program.

75. As the pool of joint wartime information diminishes and as advances are made in areas in which there is now no communication among the three countries, the usefulness of the joint declassification program is being seriously restricted, and the assurance of comparable treatment of information by the three countries is being reduced. Under these circumstances there is a real possibility that one nation may reveal information without fully realizing its significance.

## SUMMARY

76. Statutory protection of security information is provided by certain provisions of the Espionage Act, the Internal Security Act, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. In according special treatment to atomic energy information, the Atomic Energy Act created the restricted data category and imposed a number of barriers on communication with foreign countries. Except in the case of atomic energy information respecting which such barriers have been im-

posed, full administrative discretion is exercised by executive agencies both with respect to the substance of communication with foreign countries and the procedures involved. Information may not be transferred from the restricted data category to any other category of security information.

77. Consistent with the provisions of the Internal Security Act, an extensive system for exchange of military security information with other countries is in effect. The Departments of State and Defense, through the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee, exercise primary control over such exchanges. The degree of disclosure permitted respecting military security information under existing arrangements varies from almost unrestricted disclosures to the United Kingdom and Canada to practically no disclosure except as specifically authorized in the case of countries not allied to the United States by mutual defense or military assistance agreements.

78. Separated from other security information by the Atomic Energy Act, restricted data are defined by the Act to include "all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power." The Act establishes the basic policy that dissemination of restricted data shall be controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. The Commission may declassify restricted data the publication of which it determines would not adversely affect the common defense and security.

79. With respect to communication of restricted data to foreign countries, the Act completely excludes disclosure only in one area, design and fabrication of atomic weapons. However, this prohibition together with other provisions, which are to some extent ambiguous and conflicting, have the effect of greatly restricting communications in other areas as well.

80. The Commission and the DOD have attempted to draw a mutually satisfactory line of demarcation consistent with the Act between restricted data and military security information, but disagreement persists in a few areas as to what specific information falls into the restricted data category. As a result of uncertainty as to the extent to which the Act permits communication to foreign countries of such information as restricted data on utilization of atomic weapons, the inhibiting effects of the Act on interchange of information extend into agreement for exchange of military information with the United Kingdom, Canada, and other allies, and restricted data are excluded from the approved areas of exchange under such agreements.

81. The principal continuing program for exchange of classified scientific and technical data in the atomic energy field is the Technical Cooperation Program with the United Kingdom and Canada, which was established under the *modus vivendi* with those countries and which permits exchanges only within strictly delimited areas. Activities in this program are carried on under the general supervision of the Subgroup of Scientific Advisers (which includes representatives of the DOD and the Commission) of the tripartite Combined Policy Committee. Not as part of the Technical Cooperation Program but also under the *modus vivendi*, data in the raw materials field are exchanged with the United Kingdom and Canada. Under the Commission's raw materials program, specialized data in the raw materials field are also communicated from time to time to other countries involved in the supply program.

82. Other exchanges of information are permissible under the Act through a cumbersome procedure involving review by the National Security Council, the President, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, even after review and approval by these parties, exchanges under this procedure may be made only on a limited and circumscribed basis.

83. Examination of the need for communication of information to foreign countries, a matter not within the scope of this paper, is also important in identifying problems in this area. The statutory barriers and the programs discussed in this paper do, however, indicate the present limits within which such needs as may arise must be met.

### Appendix to Annex "A"

## MILITARY WEAPONS INFORMATION

1. *Disclosure to Foreign Nations.* Under the cognizance of SD-MIC permitted disclosures of military weapons information to foreign nations follow the general pattern shown in succeeding paragraphs. It must be remembered that these permitted disclosures are not automatic. Each disclosure must conform to all the policies, procedures, conditions and limitations established or approved by SD–MIC. Except for the routine disclosure of information of low sensitivity which clearly falls within the scope of delegated authority, each disclosure must be approved by SD–MIC after having been coordinated with and approved by interested agencies. Further limitations are indicated in the following paragraphs.

2. *United Kingdom and Canada.* Disclosure of military weapons information of all classifications through Top Secret including weapons research and development information is permitted.

*Note:* British Commonwealth Nations are considered as separate nations. United States information disclosed to either United Kingdom or Canada will not be passed on to other Commonwealth nations except as agreed by the United States pursuant to policies established by the Templer–Burns Agreement and the United States–United Kingdom and United States–Canada security agreements.

3. *NATO Nations.* Any disclosure made must be determined to be essential to the achievement of North Atlantic Treaty defense objectives. When determined to be essential to NATO defense objectives, disclosure of military weapons information of all classifications through top secret is permitted. Weapons research and development information is excluded except information pertaining to new equipment which has reached the engineering test (pilot model) stage of development.

*Note:* Military information in certain categories of higher sensitivity is not released to NATO nations but is made available to non-United States members of SHAPE and its major commands on a strict need-to-know, highly restrictive, and compartmentalized basis. Restricted data atomic energy information can be made available only to United States members of these headquarters.

4. *Australia and New Zealand.* United States disclosure of military weapons information classified no higher than secret is permitted. Weapons research and development information is excluded.

*Note:* Specific agreements with United Kingdom and Canada concerning United Kingdom or Canadian release of information of United States origin to Commonwealth nations permit release by United Kingdom or Canada to Commonwealth nations of certain United States research and development information. For example: The United Kingdom may release to Australia such United States research and development information on guided missiles as is necessary for the development of United Kingdom-Australian guided missile program.

5. *Other Allied Nations.* Disclosure of military weapons information to other nations allied to the United States through specific mutual defense, military assistance or Western Hemisphere defense arrangements is limited to information classified no higher than confidential which pertains to weapons already furnished or programmed to be furnished these nations individually and which is deemed necessary for the adequate use or production of the weapons.

6. *All Other Nations.* No disclosure of classified military information is permitted unless its release is approved by SD–MIC.

[Here follow Appendixes "B" and "C", a description of the Senior Officers' Course at the NATO Special Weapons School (Oberammergau, Germany), and a paper discussing "The Foreign Civil Defense Relations".]

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## Annex D

AUGUST 7, 1953.

## COLLABORATION WITH THE UK ON ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE

1. Close collaboration is maintained with the UK Atomic Energy Intelligence Organization on intelligence against the common enemy, i.e. the Soviet Bloc. Interchange in this field is reasonably complete for both raw intelligence information and finished intelligence reports, including a copy of the periodic JAEIC report, "Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program" with required security deletions (latest issue NSIE 1–B). In addition an extensive interchange of semi-finished intelligence (working papers and evaluation and interpretation of bits of evidence) is carried out through the medium of memoranda and personal contacts. The usual restrictions on source and operational information, of course, apply.

2. The legal restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 as amended are encountered only when the analysis or interpretation of the intelligence information is made in terms of U.S. practices. Section 10 of the Act was amended in October 1951 to allow the communication of certain categories of Restricted Data to foreign governments when the common defense and security would be promoted. Elaborate and cumbersome procedures were established for obtaining authorization for the transmission of this material. The law specifically forbids the communication of Restricted Data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons. When an urgent intelligence requirement has existed, the provisions of the law have been utilized to obtain the necessary authorization for the transmission of the Restricted Data.

3. Two points are most important in considering this matter.

a. Atomic Energy intelligence information on the Soviet Bloc is not Restricted Data. Only when U.S. practices are introduced in processing or interpreting the data does it become Restricted Data.

b. The requirement for the transmission of Restricted Data for atomic energy intelligence purposes must not be confused with the question of the technical interchange of atomic energy information between the U.S. and UK Atomic Energy Programs. The intelligence requirement for the communication of Restricted Data is relatively small and occurs mostly in the area of collaboration on scientific methods of intelligence collection.

4. While the full and free collaboration in atomic energy intelligence is handicapped to some extent by the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act, in most cases satisfactory collaboration could be obtained within its framework. . . .

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## *Editorial Note*

President Eisenhower met with French Premier Joseph Laniel and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Bermuda December 4–8, 1953, for high-level talks on a wide range of subjects including atomic energy. Churchill voiced his continuing concern at the limited degree of cooperation on atomic matters between the United States and the United Kingdom and argued forcefully for the return to the full-scale cooperation he said was envisaged in the wartime agreements.

At the first restricted tripartite meeting of the Heads of Government on the afternoon of December 4, President Eisenhower informed Laniel and Churchill that he had been invited to make a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations before it adjourned on approximately December 8. The President added that he would not address the United Nations "just for the sound and fury but would have a serious proposal to make." While this proposal "was still only a draft" the President proceeded to outline his ideas for a diminution of existing atomic stockpiles through donation to the United Nations. Laniel "said he approved entirely what the President had proposed." Churchill "said he would like to think this over before making an answer" and expressed a concern over the "great difficulty in drawing a line between atomic energy commercial information and atomic energy military information." After further discussion, Eisenhower "concluded by saying he would like to ask those present to consider this as very secret. He had not yet even made a definite decision as to whether the talk would be given."

For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see volume V, Part 2, pages 1710 ff.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower*

PRIVATE MID-OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, 6 December 1953.

MY DEAR IKE: I think it is a very fine speech [1] and tackles the terrible problems which confront us with your usual courage and candour. I think it will help towards the "easement" of which I have sometimes spoken and it may well be that the contacts which may develop will be useful. It is a great pronouncement and will resound through the anxious and bewildered world.

Naturally I do not like what appears on page 11. [2] History will, I am sure, make a different appraisement.

About page 7. [2] I hope we may have some further talk, for I know you understand the reservations I have to make in the light of our exposed position. Circumstances, proportion and the fate of friends and allies would never, I am sure, be absent from your mind.

I am sending you privately a short note about the proposed international Atomic Energy Administration which Cherwell prepared for my eye. [3]

Yours sincerely,

WINSTON S.C.

P.S. (longhand) It is nice to see you and talk freely, amid all our terrible problems. [4]

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[1] See the editorial note, *supra*.

[2] Reference is presumably to pagination in an unidentified draft.

[3] The attached memorandum by Cherwell, dated Dec. 6, commenting on the President's proposal, is not printed.

[4] The source text is a copy on which this postscript was typed.

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600.0012/12-653: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT BERMUDA, December 6, 1953.

Dulte 5. Eyes only Bohlen from Secretary. Supplemental to my 6 replying to your 663. [2]

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[1] Repeated to the Department of State as Dulte 5.

[2] In telegram 5 to Moscow niact, eyes only for Bohlen, Dec. 5 (repeated for information to the Department of State as Dulte 2), Dulles had informed the Ambassador that he was to "stand ready to advise Molotov orally in re Frank's letter confirming lines one and two December 8." The reference is to a letter which Dulles sent to Moscow on Oct. 9; see p. 1226. In telegram 663 from Moscow (niact, pass Bermuda eyes only for Secretary), Dec. 6, Bohlen asked for clarification as to the precise procedures for contacting Molotov. Dulles replied in telegram 6 from Bermuda, Dec. 6

*Continued*

1. President has accepted UN Secretary General invitation address General Assembly 1600 hours Tuesday New York time.

2. President's acceptance based on three points:

(a) He has been committed for some time to discuss publicly atomic warfare danger;
(b) He considers General Assembly excellent forum to make an address which will be neither boastful nor truculent in tone;
(c) He is anxious to use international forum as basis for suggesting serious private talks with Russians on whole atomic armaments problems.

3. His talk will analyze present atomic threat to civilization and will specifically state US willingness to talk privately with Russians and others interested. These talks can proceed under UN auspices or in regular diplomatic channels.

4. President will also propose a method of allocating from US and Soviet stockpiles atomic material for peacetime purposes and as means of starting total atomic disarming.

5. Stress to Molotov that purpose of speech is to initiate serious talks, if possible, and not merely to propagandize. You may urge him make positive response, if you think useful.

Dulles

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(niact, eyes only from Secretary to Bohlen, repeated to the Department as telegram Dulte 4), that Molotov was to be contacted immediately, and also clarified the language to be employed. The three telegrams are in file 600.0012/12-553 and 12-653.

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600.0012/12-753: Telegram

## *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT Moscow, December 7, 1953—6 p.m.

669. Eyes only Secretary; pass Bermuda if necessary. I saw Molotov 3 o'clock this afternoon and made following oral statement to him as instructed (reference 5, 6 and 9 from Bermuda). [2]

I opened by telling Molotov that perhaps he had heard President Eisenhower would be addressing UNGA tomorrow afternoon at invitation of Secretary General and that as had already been announced speech was to be devoted to dangers of atomic age. I said chief purpose of speech was specifically to state US willingness to talk privately on whole atomic armaments problem with Soviet

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[1] Relayed to the U.S. Delegation at Bermuda Dec. 7 at 12:45 p.m. as telegram Tedul 14.

[2] For information on Dulles' telegrams 5 and 6 to Moscow, see footnote 2, *supra*. Telegram 9 has not been found.

Government and others interested either through diplomatic channels or under UN auspices. This was an important offer to initiate serious talks and was not to make propaganda on this most serious subject. The purpose of my visit to him was to draw the attention of Soviet Government in advance to great importance which my government attached to this speech which would contain a sincere and serious offer by President and to express the hope that the suggestion would be received by Soviet Government in same spirit. If, as we hoped, Soviet reaction was affirmative the exact form of talks could be worked out subsequently. I concluded by saying there was no need to stress to him (Molotov) the immense importance of whole question of atomic weapons and repeated the hope that Soviet Government would receive this suggestion as seriously as it was made.

Molotov listened attentively and said of course he could not express any view on a speech or proposal which he had not yet seen. I told him that I did not have the text but if I should receive it or any parts thereof tomorrow I would send him a copy for his personal confidential information. Molotov said that Soviet Government attached greatest importance to question of atomic weapons and would await with great interest President's speech and suggestion on this subject. He asked me whether President would make a "new" proposal on question of atomic weapons to which I replied that I did not have text of President's speech and was unable to give him any details but according to information I had received I believed President's suggestion was designed to initiate serious discussions with Soviet Union and others interested on this subject rather than attempt in public speech to set forth detailed proposals on substance of the question.

I told Molotov that when he had had time to study the speech carefully, I hoped he would give me his government's reaction to President's suggestion. He promised me that he would do so. I did this deliberately in order (a) to underline seriousness of suggestion and (b) also as a possible additional inhibition to any premature propaganda response in Soviet press.

I told Molotov that I would not inform correspondents even of fact of my visit, but if it should become known I would say it was routine. He said that was entirely up to me. While speculations as to Soviet response risky, there is good possibility Molotov may pose number of questions re proposed talks—particularly, character of discussions, and especially what proposals, if any, US would have in mind on substance reduction and control atomic weapons.

In any event, I believe Soviet interest and curiosity has been definitely aroused.

Bohlen

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower*

TOP SECRET MID-OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, 7 December 1953.

We agreed, did we not, that Admiral Strauss and Lord Cherwell should compile a White Paper of the documents, and their linking together, which constitute the story of Anglo-American relations about the Atomic Bomb. You and I will then consider and discuss whether it will be helpful or not to publish. Personally I think it will be. We both desire a fuller interchange of intelligence [1] and the fact that secrecy is evaporating through growth of knowledge between us, and alas between both of us and Soviet Russia, makes it desirable that we two should make the best joint progress we can. Your speech will, I think, encourage the new atmosphere. Cherwell and Strauss, I understand, take it that they should prepare the White Paper.

W.C.

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[1] On the morning of Dec. 7, Churchill had handed to Eisenhower a memorandum by Lord Cherwell expressing the British desire to extend the interchange of intelligence regarding Soviet nuclear tests. The memorandum, which is attached to the source text, is not printed.

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600.0012/12-853: Circular telegram

## *The Acting Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Posts (Except Moscow)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 8, 1953—4:02 p. m.
NIACT

225. Address of President before UNGA, Dec. 8, 4:00 p. m. EST being transmitted by Wireless Bulletin [2] and cabled to missions not serviced by Bulletin. Should be made occasion exceptional effort to assure its importance recognized and intent correctly interpreted.

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[1] Drafted by Phillips and Huyler of P. The same message, with certain modifications, was sent simultaneously to Moscow as telegram 354. The first paragraph of telegram 354 reads: "Address of the President before UNGA, Dec. 8, 4 p.m. EST will be cabled immediately thereafter. In presenting to FonOff (and in discussion with your diplomatic colleagues friendly and unfriendly) you may wish to make following points as appropriate." A new paragraph 6 in telegram 354 reads: "Stress offer made in speech of 'private conversations' making clear to Foreign Minister that this is bona fide." Also, this telegram's paragraph dealing with USIS assistance is deleted in telegram 354. (600.0012/12-853)

[2] The Wireless Bulletin was a news roundup including texts of official statements, transmitted regularly by the Department of State to many U.S. posts abroad.

Therefore, in your discretion present copy of speech promptly as possible to Foreign Minister making following points as appropriate:

1. This is further to President's April 16 ASNE speech wherein he declared U.S. determination to seek peace and "international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure prohibition of atomic weapons;" and U.S. "firm faith that God created man to enjoy, not destroy, the fruits of the earth and of their own toil."
2. Supporting fully UN disarmament commission, and in line with General Assembly resolution on Disarmament of November 18, 1953, United States is instantly prepared to meet privately with other countries as may be "principally involved" to seek an acceptable solution to atomic armament race ("in order that this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great constructive force for the benefit of all mankind.")
3. Atomic sharing concept is product of maturing plans reflecting U.S. determination that mankind shall benefit from this knowledge and reflects U.S. view that such benefits can be shared in foreseeable future.

However, President's statement not to be construed as an immutable proposal, but rather as basis for consideration and development by interested Governments in private conversations.

4. President's suggestion is offer to take tangible first step towards international use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes which will strike massive blow against root causes of war and international tension.
5. In case any implication is made that speech largely intended as psychological warfare move, you should point out that text particularly in context April 16 speech makes amply clear U.S. seeking every practicable means toward peaceful settlement international differences and has sincerely invited USSR to join in private conversations as one of principal parties to discuss means of establishing joint pool of fissionable material and of technical skills for betterment of mankind.
6. Obviously, at present stage no reason to believe EDC less essential to defense and security free world. You should discourage any premature stimulation of false optimism regarding immediately realizable substantive disarmament.
7. President's suggestion does not imply abandonment of U.S. position supporting UN plan for international control of atomic energy unless a better or equally effective plan is developed, but is aimed at breaking international log-jam on disarmament proposals.

You are requested to assist USIS in assuring that speech and relay commentary along lines of foregoing are given widest possible dissemination. Appropriate follow-up should be planned and executed to assure continuing understanding and impact.

Report soonest summary reaction and follow with detailed despatch covering mission handling.

*Note:* London and Paris: In view of fact speech discussed at Bermuda with British and French doubt necessity special FonOff representation.

SMITH

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## *Editorial Note*

As indicated in circular telegram 225, *supra,* President Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" speech—as press accounts quickly named it—before the General Assembly of the United Nations late on the afternoon of December 8, 1953.

Work on the speech had proceeded nearly to the moment of delivery. A draft had been transmitted from the Bermuda Conference to Ambassador Lodge on the evening of December 7 in telegram Gadel 121 (600.0012/12-753), but according to Lewis L. Strauss, the President made major revisions in it on the Presidential airplane *Columbine* en route from Bermuda to New York. (Strauss, *Men and Decisions,* page 359) Eisenhower, without going into details, merely stated: "Finally, only minutes before delivery of the speech, the work was done." (Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* page 253) President Eisenhower's "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City, December 8, 1953," is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pages 813-822.

The President's speech generated a significant amount of comment and reaction. In telegram 2223 from Paris, December 9, Minister Achilles reported that he had sought to impress upon French officials, including Bidault, the "importance of France's quickly picking up President's initiative on atomic energy." French reaction was favorable, "Bidault mentioning that he had already commented favorably to press on getting off plane and that he still had time to get ahead of Churchill before latter's return. Bidault's comment to press, however, was largely lost among his other remarks on Bermuda." (600.0012/12-953) In telegram Delga 393 from New York, December 9, Lodge reported that Indian Ambassador V. K. Krishna Menon "called on me late last night urging desirability of a resolution following up President's speech. I sought to discourage him in view need for reflection by various powers concerned. Today before plenary meeting he informed me that he had asked Malik (USSR) whether latter had any objections. Malik said he had no objection but that his delegation was without instructions." (600.0012/12-953). In priority telegram 691 from Moscow, December 10, Bohlen reported, eyes only for the Secretary, that only a factual summary of the President's speech had so far appeared in the Soviet press. "It is possible that Molotov may send for me in next day or so to give privately Soviet reaction to President's speech. If there are any particular points you would like stressed in event adverse Soviet reaction, this might be good opportunity. I would appreciate your advice." (600.0012/12–1053) Dulles replied personally to Bohlen in priority telegram 362, December 10, that "if you have not gotten any official reaction from Molotov within 10 days' time, you should approach him and inquire further. We will send you further instructions at that time but would like your suggestions. In reference to your question as to what points you might stress, I believe that the principal point to underscore is that this is an entirely sincere and serious proposal which we should like to develop as soon as possible." (600.0012/12–1053) Bohlen acknowledged Dulles' comments with thanks in priority telegram 693 from Moscow, December 11, adding: "I would imagine Molotov will send for me before too long since failure to do so would in effect be equivalent to blanket rejection without attempt to justify such action. Soviet press this morning by selecting excerpts from foreign press, especially Communist, continues to reflect cool and skeptical attitude towards President's proposal." (600.0012/12–1153) The telegrams to the Department commenting upon foreign reaction to the President's "Atoms for Peace" proposal are in file 600.0012.

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## *Editorial Note*

On December 8, at the Bermuda Conference, Jean-Marc Boegner of the French Delegation transmitted to Douglas MacArthur II of the United States Delegation a memorandum in which the French Government expressed interest in cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the field of atomic energy, particularly with regard to the exchange of information. For a memorandum of the MacArthur–Boegner conversation of December 8, see volume V, Part 2, page 1845. A translation of the French memorandum is in file 600.0012/12–853.

OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "President's UN Speech"

## *Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to the Operations Coordinating Board* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1953.

Subject: Follow-up Exploitation of the President's U.N. Address

The main points of the President's U.N. address of December 8, 1953, particularly those dealing with the sharing of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy with the entire world, can be expected to raise the most searching domestic and international questions both as to conditions which will have to be met and as to the specific safeguards and procedures which remain to be established.

To ensure that the resultant statements and actions in the public opinion field will be in support of current U.S. national security policies, I believe that the OCB should undertake to coordinate the various follow-up activities which may be expected to take place.

It will be particularly important to impress upon world opinion the sincerity with which the United States seeks international security through the reduction of the arms burden, while at the same time avoiding any premature stimulation of false optimism regarding immediately realizable disarmament, which cannot be fulfilled under present conditions of international tensions.

Furthermore, since the President's proposals constitute a direct challenge to the Soviets near monopoly of "peace" propaganda, it will be of the utmost importance to develop an integrated national program designed to achieve a world climate of opinion in which the proposals set forth by the President can be accepted and adhered to.

Since exploitation of the initial delivery of the speech has already been planned and implemented by an informal working group composed of the Department of State, USIA, and OCB staff representatives, I recommend:

(a) that the Board direct its Executive Officer to establish an interdepartmental working group to be chaired by a member of the OCB staff, in which the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administration will be invited to participate;

(b) that the working group note the actions already taken or under way, including the carrying out of recommendations under NSC 151 [2] and, as a matter of urgency, develop for the Board's approval specific programs for follow-up exploitation of the President's U.N. speech in both the domestic and international public opinion fields.

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[1] Copies to Elmer Staats and George A. Morgan, Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer, respectively, of the Operations Coordinating Board. Source text is accompanied by a memorandum of transmittal "for action" from the Director of the Executive Secretariat Walter K. Scott to the Operations Coordinator Walter Radius, dated Dec. 10, 1953.

[2] Dated May 8, p. 1150.

C. D.

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600.0012/12-1153: Circular telegram

### *The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 11, 1953—5:39 p. m.

Usito 173. InfoGuide: President's UN Speech. This is joint State-Defense-USIA message. Further to Usito 164, December 8. [2]

In follow up exploitation of President's speech it should be kept in mind that definitive answers to detailed questions will only be reached through the private conversations which the speech invited. Consequently, speculation on such points is to be avoided.

Following is guidance on some general points which may be useful in follow-up of speech:

1. *Relations of President's Proposal to UN (Baruch) International Atomic Energy Control Plan:* [3]

President's proposal is major effort to break impasse on disarmament; a practical proposal which U.S. determined to explore through UN and elsewhere as appropriate. In no way is it to be construed as negating or replacing other plans or programs toward this end, but shld help give new life to UN Disarmament Commission's efforts, and serves to reaffirm U.S. determination to explore every possible solution of present impasse.

(FYI: As President's proposal is flexible and subject to development and modification during "private conversations" not to U.S. interests to develop, or comment on, comparisons with other plans at this time).

2. *Re USSR Participation in Plan:*

a. As one of states "principally involved", USSR must participate in "private conversations" re development of plans to expedite peaceful use of atomic energy if any real progress to be made in breaking log-jam on international control of atomic energy by concentrating on potentialities in peaceful uses fissionable material.

b. Whether or not USSR participation in the plan itself is also a prerequisite to plans further development and implementation will largely be resolved after "private conversations" with states "principally involved" have taken place.

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[1] Drafted by Phillips of P and Meyers of UNA; sent to 67 missions.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Documentation on the "Baruch Plan" is in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 757-1106 *passim*.

(FYI: The question of practicability of proceeding without the USSR in implementation of plan for peaceful use atomic energy cannot be decided by the U.S. alone, but will depend in part upon the result of discussions and attendant exchange of views with other governments. For present, U.S. position is open, hence, it is important to avoid use of material speculating whether or not implementation of President's conception is contingent upon Soviet participation in plan development.)

3. *Re USSR Acceptance or Rejection of Invitation to Participate in "Private Conversations":*

a. Recognize it may take considerable time for USSR to seriously consider and reply. This regard, follow White House statement December 9. [4]

b. It could be tempting to enter into polemics replying to current comment Soviet and satellite press and other similar semi-official or official comments. This not to our interests as it might give support to assertion that primary motivation President's offer is psychological warfare. Hence, this regard confine comment to official statement of U.S. or other friendly Governments.

c. In event USSR accepts invitation to discussions, U.S. will be pleased and is as Pres said prepared to meet instantly.

d. In event Soviets reject invitation, follow official statements, further guidance will be upcoming.

(FYI: Bohlen has made most serious representations to USSR indicating U.S. grave concern and steadfast hope that USSR can see why clear to join us in this major effort.)

SMITH

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[4] Reference is presumably to a White House press release of Dec. 10 containing a brief statement by Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty. On Dec. 9, a Moscow radio political commentator had said: "It is clear that the United States does not want to bring about an international *détente*. The warmongering speech of President Eisenhower and the attitude adopted in the United Nations by the United States delegation proves this sufficiently." In partial response to this comment, Hagerty stated: "We do not believe that immediate reactions to President Eisenhower's atomic proposal necessarily represent the considered decision of the Soviet Government. After all, the President always recognized that his suggestion would require thoughtful study. Therefore any 24-hour reactions by Soviet officials or by Soviet propaganda media cannot be accepted as anything more than stopgap interim statements. We are still very hopeful that the Soviet leaders will recognize the President's proposal for what it is—a serious and feasible first step toward atomic peace." Both the Hagerty statement and the Soviet comment are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 851.

S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Atomic Energy—Peaceful Uses"

## *Memorandum for the National Security Council, by the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 11, 1953.

Subject: Development of Nuclear Power

References:

A. NSC 149/2, paragraph 7 [2]

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 20, 1953 [3]

1. On April 29, 1953, the President approved NSC 149/2, which included as paragraph 7 the attached statement of policy on the "Development of Nuclear Power". (See Annex A) [4]

2. It is desirable that the Council at this time make clear that the attached statement of policy has not been superseded by the subsequent approval of the policy statements contained in NSC 153/1 and 162/2. [5]

3. The national security is affected by a policy looking toward the development of nuclear power for peaceful use in the following principal ways:

a. The extent to which U.S. military capabilities might be affected by the diversion of some fissionable material for peaceful purposes.

b. The security of the diverted fissionable material to prevent its military use by enemies.

c. The requirement that all fissionable material be available to the U.S. Government for military purposes in the event of war.

d. The impact which the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, rather than for war, may have upon the foreign policy and world leadership of the United States.

4. Programs for the development of nuclear power for peaceful use involve other policy issues, particularly of an economic nature, which are not the direct concern of the National Security Council.

5. On October 5, 1953, the Secretary of Commerce, by the attached letter (Annex B) [6] raised a question with respect to the attached policy for the development of nuclear power. He requested that the economic factors involved in the development of nuclear power by private industry be given additional study, prior to final

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[1] Copies to the Secretaries of Commerce and of the Treasury, to the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence, and to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2] For text of NSC 149/2, Apr. 29, see p. 305.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Annex A is not printed.

[5] Dated June 10 and Oct. 30, pp. 378 and 577, respectively.

[6] Annex B is not printed.

approval of the national policy, since he is of the opinion that the present tight control should be relaxed in limited steps.

6. A Special Committee composed of representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, was constituted to examine into the question raised by the Secretary of Commerce. Although the Planning Board has not had opportunity as yet to consider certain recommendations by this Committee, the urgency in connection with the 1954 Legislative Program makes it necessary for the Council to consider at its meeting on Tuesday, December 15, 1953, one aspect of this issue:

> Should the legislation to be proposed in conformity with the attached policy, which provides for sale or lease of fissionable material, be modified so as to provide solely for the lease of fissionable material? [7]

ROBERT CUTLER

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[7] Following discussion of this topic at its 175th meeting on Dec. 15, 1953, the National Security Council in NSC Action No. 985:

"a. Agreed that the statement of policy on the subject contained in paragraph 7 of NSC 149/2 (Annex A to the reference memorandum of December 11) has not been superseded by the subsequent approval of policy statements contained in NSC 153/1 and NSC 162/2.

"b. Agreed that the legislation to be proposed in conformity with this policy should provide for either the sale or lease of fissionable material.

"*Note:* The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for implementation." (S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Decision, 1953")

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600.0012/12-1653

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1953.

Subject: Implementing the President's December 8 Speech on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

Participants:

G—Mr. Murphy
S/P—Mr. Bowie
S/AE—Mr. Arneson
U/OC—Mr. Radius
UNA—Mr. Phillips
UNP—Mr. Wainhouse
UNP—Mr. Bechhoefer
UNP—Mr. Meyers
G—Mr. Goodyear
P—Mr. Huyler

Mr. Bowie explained that Under Secretary Smith had asked him to head the State Department's Working Group to implement the President's proposals. Mr. Bowie had discussed with Mr. Duncan of the AEC the problems which should be examined, and they had tentatively agreed on the following series of studies to be developed as foundations for specific U.S. proposals, if such proposals proved desirable:

(a) The structure, powers and functions of an International Atomic Energy Agency (to be developed by the State Department);
(b) Problems involved in the custody of the fissionable material (AEC responsibility);
(c) Problems raised in utilizing the fissionable material (AEC responsibility);
(d) Question of contributions to the IAE Agency (AEC responsibility);
(e) The effect on the United States, and in particular on U.S. security, of different levels of contributions to the IAE Agency (State-AEC responsibility; probably Defense participation as well);
(f) Problems involved in exchanging information, particularly concerning power reactors and research (AEC responsibility).

Mr. Duncan and Mr. Bowie had agreed to leave untouched for the present the problems of the interrelationship between these studies and other aspects of the U.S. position on disarmament. They further agreed that these studies must be carried out on an urgent basis.

Mr. Arneson raised the question of the forum in which these discussions would take place, after Mr. Bowie had remarked that the President's speech indicated U.S. willingness to engage in private conversations both in the Disarmament Commission subcommittee or elsewhere on a bilateral basis. He thought that if we engaged in the private talks in the Disarmament Commission framework, as called for by the General Assembly Resolution, [1] the Soviets might have better reason to insist that the subcommittee should concern itself with disarmament problems as well as the President's proposal for utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. If we desired to avoid at present discussing disarmament problems, it might be advisable to engage in these private conversations on a bilateral basis.

Mr. Wainhouse noted that the General Assembly Resolution by its terms did not exclude bilateral discussions. Mr. Murphy thought that the President's reference to this resolution supported Mr. Wainhouse's interpretation, since necessary bilateral conversations might well be carried out within the framework of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. Arneson believed it was useful to think of the topics tentatively agreed upon by Messrs. Bowie and Duncan in terms of (a) what we might do if the Soviets agreed to participate in the operations of the IAE Agency, (b) what we would do if they would not so cooperate and the U.S. should proceed with these plans in cooperation with other members of the free world. Mr. Bowie agreed with these remarks.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1250.

Mr. Bowie then turned to the question of the relationship between the President's December 8 proposals and other aspects of the United States position on the disarmament program. He suggested that the present U.S. policy of, in general, not initiating major new substantive disarmament proposals was modified by the President's proposals. He tentatively agreed with the UNP view that if the tactical situation in the Disarmament Commission warranted, the United States might introduce working papers on certain topics, including a control organ paper, proposals limiting the production of strategic materials devoted to military purposes, or a paper correlating the principal aspects of a comprehensive disarmament program. He also agreed that the review of basic disarmament policy established by NSC 112 should continue to be carried out, and the conclusions reached should be subject to revision if required by new views reached by the Special Committee set up by NSC Action 899 [2] to re-examine disarmament policy with particular attention to atomic energy control. In Mr. Bowie's opinion, the question of the relationship between the President's December 8 proposals and the other aspects of a disarmament program should be examined on a priority basis simultaneously with the studies required in order to implement the President's December 8 proposals.

Howard Meyers explained that the UNP views were based upon the practical consideration that there was not enough time or personnel to enable both jobs to be done simultaneously; that the first priority was to fill out the details of the President's December 8 proposals; and that we could rely meanwhile in the disarmament field on the rather extensive proposals which had been made in 1952 in the Disarmament Commission, concerning which the Soviets had not really expressed their views. It was this thinking which motivated the UNP suggestions.

Mr. Wainhouse and Mr. Arneson both agreed that the concerned officials in the United States Government would only be able to do a limited amount in the short period of time available before the Disarmament Commission would meet, probably in January 1954, so that it was most feasible to concentrate on developing the President's December 8 proposals. They believed it would be exceedingly difficult for the U.S. Government to make up its collective mind on the shape of any new disarmament proposals or a review of present disarmament positions within this period.

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[2] For NSC Action No. 899, see footnote 3, p. 1212.

The views expressed by Messrs. Meyers, Wainhouse and Arneson were accepted by the other participants in the meeting.

It was agreed also that Messrs. Bechhoefer and Meyers (UNP) and Meeker (L/UNA)[3] would form a team to develop a study on the problems involved in establishing an IAE Agency, its structure, powers and functions; that draft proposals might also be framed as part of this study. This study was to be completed by December 23, as the item of first priority.

Mr. Wainhouse returned to the question of the forum for these discussions with the Soviets, asking if it was advisable to use a subcommittee composed of the U.S., USSR, UK, France and possibly Canada (as proposed in a telegram sent to New York requesting the U.S. Delegation to the UN to discuss this suggestion with the British, French and Canadian delegations), or whether the same states should meet outside of the Disarmament Commission context. Mr. Bowie believed that we were really at the mercy of the Soviet Union on this, since the President indicated in his speech that the United States was prepared to carry out these private conversations in almost any way acceptable to the Soviets.

Mr. Murphy decided that it would be advisable to start these conversations in the Disarmament Commission subcommittee and see how the Soviet Union reacted.

Mr. Bechhoefer suggested that, in addition to the control organ paper, another study was needed regarding the broad question of presenting in the UN the United States views on the President's proposals in relation to the United States positions on disarmament. He proposed, and it was agreed, that he would develop a paper on the subject.

Mr. Arneson suggested, and it was agreed, that technically competent people should be available in New York to support the United States representative in these discussions, particularly from the Atomic Energy Commission and probably also from the State Department.

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[3] Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.

Presidential Correspondence files, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence"

### *Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 16, 1953.
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

I have to tell the House of Commons tomorrow about our meeting [2] and I send you a draft of what I have prepared on atomic affairs. I hope that you only need to send me an O.K. as time is so very short before I speak at 3:30 p. m. G. M. T. tomorrow Thursday.

I have included nothing of what I shall say about our talks and interchanges upon your U.N. speech as I am giving full support to your inspiring lead and trying to persuade the bear to stop growling. I shall make it clear that I no more write your speeches than you write mine and I expect to stave off questions about the untruthful press, rumours of which there have certainly been no lack.

I shall defend Foster for speaking frankly to the French in Paris about EDC. [3] Anthony and I both believe the secondary reaction may be favourable.

Kindest regards,

WINSTON

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[Enclosure]

### DRAFT OF PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH ON ATOMIC AFFAIRS

I discussed with the President a number of points affecting our two countries about the atomic problem. Lord Cherwell had already made some progress in the autumn when the Americans agreed to exchange some information with us about the effect on various targets of atomic explosions. As they have made . . . bomb tests as against our three, they have a great deal of knowledge on these matters, so that this agreement is of considerable value. At Bermuda it was clinched, and I hope it will soon be put into effect.

The other important matter we discussed was the exchange of information on intelligence matters. We hope to enlarge the area over which these exchanges can take place without in any way infringing the McMahon Act which has so often prevented cooperation between our two countries. It is this Act of course which sets limits to the exchange of technical information. But this is all getting into an easier atmosphere.

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[1] A covering "Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State" from Presidential Secretary Ann C. Whitman reads: "Attached is copy of a message the President just received from the Prime Minister."

[2] Prime Minister Churchill's remarks to the House of Commons on his meeting with President Eisenhower and Premier Laniel at Bermuda are printed in Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 522, pp. 578–586.

[3] Regarding Secretary Dulles' comments at Paris in December 1953 regarding an "agonizing reappraisal" of U.S. commitments to European defense should the EDC treaty not be ratified, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 1, p. 868.

We in Britain, thanks to the secret exertions of the leader of the Opposition in bygone years, already know almost as much as our American allies, and it is probably true that our Russian fellow mortals (because that is what they are) may well know almost as much as either of us. At any rate, I hope results will in due course become apparent which will bring Britain and the United States into closer, more agreeable and more fertile relationship upon atomic knowledge. Secondly, the President and I have asked Lord Cherwell and Admiral Strauss, who are very good friends, to prepare a record of the history of Anglo-American cooperation in the atomic field since the subject first cropped up during the war. When this compilation is complete the President and I will consult together about publication. [4]

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[4] Eisenhower replied in niact telegram 3214 to London, Dec. 16, 1953, "eyes only Chargé to be delivered to the Prime Minister," as follows: "Dear Sir Winston: Just this minute I received your cable and immediately consulted with Admiral Strauss. He points out that the last sentence of your first paragraph is somewhat in error because the agreement on this point was firmed and announced here several weeks before the Bermuda talks took place.

"Admiral Strauss also suggests that before you make your talk you consult again with Lord Cherwell about the final two sentences. He feels that Lord Cherwell might want you to be very general and indefinite in talking about a possible white paper. Having said all the above, I assure you that we have no objection to the paper. With warm regard, Ike". At the bottom of this telegram, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith had written: "Deliver immediately to Chargé or highest ranking political officer." (Disarmament files, lot 57 D 688, "Eisenhower Corr. with Churchill")

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600.0012/12-2153: Telegram

## *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT Moscow, December 21, 1953—7 p.m.

745. For the Secretary. Reference: Embtel 743. [2] Molotov said that he had asked me to call in relation to our conversation of De-

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text indicates this telegram was repeated unnumbered to Paris and London.

[2] In niact telegram 742, Dec. 21, Bohlen had reported that Molotov had "asked me to call at 6 p.m. Moscow time undoubtedly for purpose receiving Soviet reaction to President's proposal." (600.0012/12-2153) Telegram 743, niact from Moscow, Dec. 21, "for the Secretary" reads: "I have just heard that Foreign Ministry has called press

*Continued*

cember 7[3] concerning President's speech on atomic armaments and he then handed me an 11 page document. He also told me that this document was being released to press at 7 o'clock and would be on the Moscow radio this evening to be published in Soviet press tomorrow along with President's speech.[4]

Operating portions follow in immediately following telegram.[5]

In essence they constitute Soviet acceptance President's proposal for talks, expectation Soviet Government for further clarification substantive proposals, statement that during discussion Soviet Government will make proposal for commitment participants not to use atomic and other weapons mass destruction which could be first important step towards abolition atomic weapons with establishment strict international control.

In body of document, however, President's substantive proposal receives negative response on grounds that (1) only small portion of material would be turned over to proposed body; (2) does not limit use of atomic weapons and therefore will not halt atomic arms race.

BOHLEN

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conference for 7 p.m. Moscow time. In all probability it is to announce publicly Soviet reaction to President's proposal which I assume Molotov will give me at 6 (Embassy's telegram 742)." (600.0012/12-2153)

[3] See telegram 669 from Moscow, Dec. 7, p. 1287.

[4] The text of Soviet statement of Dec. 21, responding to President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 18, 1954, pp. 80-82, and also in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 401-407. Secretary Dulles publicly acknowledged the Soviet reply in press release 666, Dec. 21, in which he stated, *inter alia*, "It has long been evident, and the tone of the Soviet response makes it even clearer, that little can be achieved by the continuance of public debate. The United States will, through the new channels which the Soviet Union now accepts, explore every possibility of securing agreement and bringing President Eisenhower's historic proposal into the realm of creative action." (Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 9)

[5] Telegram 746, niact from Moscow, "for the Secretary", Dec. 21, not printed. (600.0012/12-2153)

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600.0012/12-2253: Telegram

## *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, December 22, 1953—1 p.m.

750. For the Secretary. Due to mechanical difficulty code machine immediately after dispatch Embtel 745,[1] could not complete detailed report interview with Molotov.

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[1] *Supra.*

Molotov had nothing to add orally to text he handed me[2] but drew my attention to concluding paragraphs, in particular Soviet willingness to take part in conversations suggested by President and announcement Soviet intention to propose in such conversations fact renunciation use atomic weapons (both paragraphs of which are carried in black type in Soviet press today). Although text was clear on this point I thought it prudent to inquire of Molotov if Soviet proposal for renunciation use atomic weapons was in any way a precondition for talks to which he replied it was not and Soviet Government was merely announcing that it intended to make this proposal during the talks and that it would be considered along with and at same time with proposal of United States or any other participating country. I endeavored to ascertain from Molotov whether Soviet Government had any views as to how these private conversations could take place . . . [3] whether through diplomatic channels or under aegis UN since President's speech had offered both alternatives. Molotov said he had nothing to add to text of statement but left impression that this was not considered a very important point. Text of statement, however, would indicate a preference for government-to-government conversations by reference to "the Soviet Government has always attached importance to direct conversations between governments." I believe, however, they are awaiting specific suggestions from us as to place and manner of conversations.

Document as whole obviously was most carefully drawn up by Soviet Government and as propaganda document is well-constructed with many points of appeal to world public opinion. While maintaining standard Soviet position concerning necessity abolition atomic weapons, etc., the declaration does, however, reflect a slight shift in Soviet proposal to this end. Previously they had insisted on abolition plus or followed by international inspection under SC veto whereas now, a step on that path, they propose Geneva-type renunciation of its use leaving governments still in possession of military stockpile atomic weapons. Declaration makes quite clear that Soviet Government will raise this proposal in conversations and will undoubtedly insist that it be discussed "simultaneously" along with President's or other substantive proposal on this subject.

Reaction towards substantive part President's proposal was to be anticipated in that in Soviet eyes it was probably regarded as means of maintaining superiority of US in military stockpile but arguments used against it are not unskillful from point of view of public opinion. In general statement is noticeably free from vituperation and makes serious response to President's proposal.

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[2] See footnote 4, *supra*.

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

Chief substantive element of Soviet position will be proposal for immediate conclusion agreement renunciation use atomic weapons without any safeguards such as inspection etc. I assume that this will be unacceptable to us. It would not appear to have much effect on global atomic war since any aggressor cold-bloodedly planning sneak attack would hardly be restrained by piece of paper. Its effect, however, would be extremely important on problem dealing with local aggression since inhibition on retaliation effect use of atomic weapon would remove what is clearly one of strongest deterrents to use of conventional arms in local situation such as Chinese intervention Indochina. Perhaps chief problem we face in talks will therefore be to counter unacceptable Soviet proposal on this point without adverse propaganda effect. On procedure, statement puts next move up to us as to proposals on form, composition and place of conversations which President proposed and Soviets have now accepted.

Incidentally, Soviet press does not carry full text President's speech but only those parts (2 from New York repeated Department 284) [4] which I transmitted to him on December 9.

BOHLEN

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[4] Not printed.

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600.0012/12-2253

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1953.

Participants: The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Merchant—EUR

As the British Ambassador was leaving the Secretary after a call on another subject, he raised the question of preparations for the impending talks with the Soviets on atomic matters arising from the President's December 8 speech before the United Nations General Assembly. The Ambassador said that he assumed, as did London, that these talks would be conducted in the United Nations Subcommittee.

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[1] Copies to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Minnich at the White House, S/S, G, C, S/P, UNA, and R. Gordon Arneson.

The Secretary pointed out the fact that the President gave alternatives and did not stipulate the forum for such discussions. He went on to say that he was inclined to consider the UN Subcommittee less suitable due to the fact that it had a wider membership than what might be described as the parties most directly concerned. He said he thought it might be wise to confine the talks to the British, the Soviets and ourselves although he recognized that Canada had a certain position in this regard. In any event the Secretary said that there was as yet no agreed US position in this matter.

The British Ambassador said that they would like to talk to us before the US puts in any papers on either substance or procedure and he asked whether Admiral Strauss were the proper individual to speak to in the US government on this subject. The Secretary replied that Admiral Strauss was the responsible official on matters relating to nonmilitary uses of atomic energy but that of course in the weapons field other Departments of the government had a direct interest. He added that he thought it would be desirable to set up within the US government a working party for the purpose of preparing for these talks, among whose members would be representatives of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Secretary went on to say that as he had stated in reply to a question that noon at the National Press Club,[2] the United States Government was prepared, in accordance with the terms of the President's December 8 speech, to accept a framework for the talks somewhat broader than mere discussion of the "World Bank" plan.

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[2] Secretary Dulles addressed the National Press Club on Dec. 22, on the North Atlantic Council meeting at Paris, Dec. 14–16. His address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 4, 1954, pp. 3–7.

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600.0012/12–2453

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs and the Acting Chief of Staff Operations (Gilman)*[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1953.

Subject: Procedures for Implementing the President's December 8 Proposals on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Participants:

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| The Secretary | S—Mr. Hanes |

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[1] Of the participants listed below, John W. Hanes, Jr., was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

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|---|---|
| G—Mr. Murphy | UNP—Mr. Bechhoefer |
| UNA—Mr. Key | UNP—Mr. Meyers |
| S/P—Mr. Bowie | |

The Secretary wondered whether the private conversations with other states, to develop the President's December 8 proposals, should take place in a United Nations framework or elsewhere. In this connection, he invited suggestions concerning the individuals with whom discussions should be initiated.

Mr. Murphy suggested the Secretary and Molotov should discuss these questions.

The Secretary agreed this was feasible if the Berlin meeting [2] actually were held on January 4 or thereabouts, but this arrangement might not be practical if the Berlin talks were held later. He asked what states should take part in the substantive discussions.

Mr. Bowie thought that, ideally, the conference should be limited to the United States and the USSR. Mr. Murphy believed that the UK could not be kept out of these discussions, and suggested it might be advisable for a discreet inquiry to be made of Vishinsky to see whether a private reaction could be obtained from him. Meanwhile, it would be perfectly possible to have a motion made in the United Nations Disarmament Commission to postpone the Commission's deliberations pending further developments in the private diplomatic talks, with assurances to the Commission that it would be kept advised of progress.

Mr. Bowie emphasized that the Secretary and Molotov could only discuss questions of procedure, since neither would have the time to deal with the substance of the issue. A full-time U.S. representative was needed, supported by an adequate staff.

At the Secretary's request, Mr. Bechhoefer explained the procedures which would be followed in the Disarmament Commission, which would probably meet some time in January under Ambassador Lodge's chairmanship, to study pursuant to the GA Resolution of November 28, 1953 [3] the advisability of establishing a subcommittee consisting of "representatives of the powers principally involved". Under the resolution, the Subcommittee, if established, would seek an acceptable solution and report back to the Commission as soon as possible, so that in turn the Commission could study and report on such solution to the General Assembly and Security Council not later than September 1, 1954. The Commission could establish such a subcommittee, presumably naming the states from among the members of the Commission (the 11 members of the Security Council plus Canada). Or, the Commission might merely take note of the fact that private diplomatic conversations were taking place between the U.S. and the USSR and any other combination of states, and decide that this procedure was adequate and that there was no necessity for establishing a specific subcommittee. Mr. Bechhoefer suggested that, whether the private conversations took place within a UN framework or elsewhere, it was desirable at least to have the blessing of the UN through a motion in the Commission which would refer to any diplomatic conversations as in the spirit of the November 28 Resolution, and which could note any assurance that the Commission would be kept apprised of developments.

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[2] See the editorial note, p. 1355.

[3] See the editorial note, p. 1250.

Mr. Murphy believed that bilateral talks with the Soviets on the substance would be more effective in ascertaining if there were any real possibility of making progress, since otherwise we might go through the usual propaganda routine of the Disarmament Commission with little progress.

The Secretary doubted the Soviets would take the responsibility for this decision, thus enabling the United States to tell the UK and other powers that it was the Soviet Union which had desired that diplomatic conversations be limited to bilateral talks between the U.S. and the USSR. He believed our contacting the USSR on these matters should await a Soviet answer whether or not they would accept January 4 or thereabouts for a meeting in Berlin in response to the Tripartite Notes.[4] If the Soviets agreed to this date, it would be best for the Secretary to ask Molotov the questions concerning the participants and the meeting place for these private discussions. If the date of the Berlin talks was postponed or there was no Soviet reply by the end of the month, the Secretary suggested it might be desirable for him to talk to Vishinsky in the latter's capacity as a Deputy Foreign Minister. It could doubtless be arranged for Vishinsky to come to Washington to see the Secretary and pay his respects. In any event, it would probably be necessary to have UN blessing on these talks because of UN interest in the subject. The United States could say that it would keep the Disarmament Commission informed from time to time of the progress of any private diplomatic talks. The Secretary was inclined to think the Disarmament Commission should not set up a subcommittee but should work through diplomatic channels, since he believed it would be better to have a small group in which the U.S. could keep the initiative on the procedures. He touched briefly on the problem of carrying the burden of the substantive talks, noting that this might well take the better part of a year, regardless of the nature and locale of the talks, and that it would be necessary to find an able man, devoting practically all his time to the work, who could be supported by an adequate staff.

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[4] Regarding notes exchanged by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers prior to the Berlin Conference, see documentation on preparations for that meeting, volume VII.

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Eisenhower Library, Whitman files, "Name Series, Hazlett"

### *The President to Captain E. E. Hazlett, Jr., U.S.N. (Ret.)* [1]

[Extract]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1953.

DEAR SWEDE:

. . . . . . .

I think I have digressed sufficiently far from Bermuda that I should come back there just long enough to say that I left the Islands one morning, flew to New York, and that afternoon made a talk to the UN.

That particular talk had been evolving in our minds and plans for many weeks. Quite a while ago I began to search around for any king of an idea that could bring the world to look at the atomic problem in a broad and intelligent way and still escape the impasse to action created by Russian intransigence in the matter of mutual or neutral inspection of resources. I wanted, additionally, to give our people and the world some faint idea of the size of the distance already travelled by this new science—but to do it in such a way as not to create new alarm.

One day I hit upon the idea of actual physical donations by Russia and the United States—with Britain also in the picture in a minor way—and to develop this thought in such a way as to provide at the very least a calm and reasonable atmosphere in which the whole matter could again be jointly studied. Once the decision was taken to propose such a plan in some form, the whole problem became one of treatment, choice of time, place and circumstance, and the niceties of language. I had, of course, a lot of excellent help—but I personally put on the text a tremendous amount of time.

Throughout the friendly world reactions have been good; our official messages have been much like the public statements you have seen in the press. The Soviets have now, at last, moved toward a meeting, though not without their customary grumbling, griping, and some sneering. We will see now what the next step brings forth! But all in all I believe that the effort up to this point has been well worth while, and has done something to create a somewhat better atmosphere both at home and abroad.

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[1] Hazlett was a personal friend of the President, with whom he corresponded frequently.

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600.0012/12-2653: Telegram

## *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL Moscow, December 26, 1953—midnight.

774. Lead article in today's *Pravda* entitled "New Proposal of Soviet Union." Begins by saying Soviet statement on Eisenhower speech "brought forth everywhere wide response and many commentaries of leading state and public figures and also the press."

Soviets, "unfailingly following their peace-loving policy" expressed readiness for "confidential diplomatic negotiations".

"On its side Soviet Government advanced new important proposal, directed to averting threat atomic war and lessening tension in international situation".

Quotes from statement proposal for participating nations pledge not use weapons mass destruction. Claims this sympathetically accepted by wide groups many countries, but that "in series of countries, primarily in United States, attempts made to conceal, be silent about proposal Soviet Government, or misinterpret it".

"Dulles, in clear contradiction to the facts", said proposal only set forth "previous position taken by Soviet Union". Quotes British statement that proposal only repetition previous Soviet stand, adds that after these statements "several other officials and also many bourgeois papers in United States and England are also giving such an incorrect interpretation".

This silence or misinterpretation not accidental, apparently.

Asks what was Soviet's "previous position"? Answers that Soviet "always considered and considers that most important and most urgent task is unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons as well as other types weapons mass destruction. Soviet Government repeatedly and unequivocally emphasized its desire establish strict and effective international control of this ban. Soviet Government expressed again in its statement its readiness henceforth as well to secure prohibition atomic, hydrogen and other weapons mass destruction. With such preciseness and clearness Soviet Government repeated its intention secure strict international control over prohibition" then claims Soviet Union not responsible for failure up to now to achieve agreement. "Instead of business-like consideration this basic and decisive question representatives United States in United Nations Disarmament Commission attempted to tie in their plans of "registration" or "census" of various types weapons of ordinary type. These plans had no connection either with the prohibition atomic weapons or reduction ordinary weapons".

Soviet Union "advances new proposal" . . .[1] "In attempt find way out of that impasse into which American diplomacy led problem atomic weapons".

Editorial then repeats argument in its statement on effectiveness Geneva protocol, and effect threat reprisals on Hitler. "This consideration applies fully also to atomic and hydrogen armament". Signed agreement would be restraining factor as was Geneva protocol in World War II.

"Of course, an agreement on prohibition atomic weapons and on establishment effective international control over observance this ban would have still more significance than Geneva protocol. But even an agreement on refusal of use atomic weapons would have immense significance at present stage". Proceeds repeat attacks on Eisenhower proposals: Provides for allocating only certain portions atomic materials to central control, no provision for limiting arms production, no guarantee not to use arms.

Aim of removing threat atomic war, use atomic energy for peaceful means "will be achieved faster as interested sides display more good will and desire to cooperate".

Editorial concludes with usual words about Soviet people supporting Soviet Government's action, and statement that "solution these questions will unquestionably contribute to strengthening peace and bettering international cooperation".

Yesterday's press continued carry long round-up International Press coverage Soviet proposals. United States comments given largest coverage, with introductory remark that deep world-wide interest in Soviet proposals forced United States press to abandon previous position silence. Includes quotes from Reston that "new American defense budget assigns greater place to atomic weapons than did last budget."

*Comment:* Extensive coverage Soviet press on foreign reactions to Soviet atomic energy statement is undoubtedly measure importance subject in Soviet eyes.

Today's *Pravda* editorial is noteworthy primarily for its plaintive tone and allegations Soviet proposal has been misunderstood abroad. It re-emphasizes that Soviet Government's proposal for agreement on renunication use nuclear weapons represents new element in Soviet position on atomic energy. However, editorial does not indicate whether there has been any change in Soviet Government's thinking on method implementation any renunciation or prohibition agreement, except perhaps in brief criticism of past American insistence on tie-in atomic controls with census conventional weapons.

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[1] Ellipsis in the source text.

BOHLEN

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PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments"

*Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1953.

## ATOMIC CONTROL PLAN

1. A complete control plan for atomic energy must provide for the control or supervision of three different aspects:

(a) The production of atomic material, including mining of ore and its refining and the method for producing fissionable materials.

(b) The storage and custody of atomic materials.

(c) The use of atomic materials for military or peacetime purposes.

2. With respect to production of atomic materials, the safeguards must provide for two different kinds of risks:

(a) The risk that such materials will be produced secretly and outside the known facilities. Safeguards against this require some means for discovering or detecting the fact that such secret activities are being carried on, and thus depend, in large part, on an effective system of inspection.

(b) The risk that facilities which are known and in operation may be seized and converted to national use, especially for wartime or warlike purposes. Here the risk is dependent mainly on the fact that facilities are in operation on the territory or of the member State or are within easy access to it for seizure. This risk would be removed by the stopping of production of all kinds or by any other method which eliminated the continuing output of atomic materials on the territory of the member States or accessible to them.

3. With respect to storage, the risks are essentially those which arise from the possibility of seizure of existing inventory, if it is held by some international agency or the risks from national control of such inventory if it is not under international control. Since an existing stockpile is one of the actual problems in the present

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[1] The source text is copy 1 of 2 copies. The recipient of the second copy is not indicated.

situation, this could best be removed as a risk by a series of measures which are related to one another:

(a) International control of substantially all of the stockpile. The difficulty here is in knowing whether or not the international agency has achieved exclusive control or whether the member States may have withheld some of their stockpile secretly.

(b) The reduction of the stockpile to some form which would not be readily convertible to military use and would require substantial further processing for this purpose. Ideally this processing would be of a sort which would require substantial time and extensive facilities of a unique type.

(c) The storing of the stockpile in some remote place which would be difficult of access by any person or state likely to try to seize the stockpile. Here again the objective should be to make it possible for other states to prevent the conversion to military uses by the offending nation before it could be a serious threat to other states.

4. With respect to use, the risks involved differ somewhat according to the use:

(a) Use for research is likely to involve such small quantities as not to constitute a serious military risk.

(b) Use for medical and similar purposes is likewise not likely to require such large amounts as to be a serious military threat.

(c) Use for power purposes will present somewhat greater danger. If power facilities became common, there would be substantial amounts of fissionable material spread around in many areas of the world. However, the cost of such facilities would be one factor limiting the total amount which could be made accessible. Also, the extent of risk would be somewhat dependent on the ease with which the material once inserted in the pile could be removed and converted into military uses. This would depend somewhat on the design of the piles and on the kinds of facilities which were available for cleansing and other operations to the State which was seeking to divert the material. Finally, the extent to which the economy of the State involved was dependent on the output of power from the atomic source would be a limiting factor in any large-scale diversion.

5. The relation of any plan for a peacetime atomic pool to the foregoing considerations is as follows:

(a) Such a pool need not affect in any way the production of atomic materials. In other words it would be entirely feasible to set up such a pool for peacetime purposes without stopping or inspecting the facilities for output in the various states. Of course, to this extent, the plan would not in any way reduce the continuing danger arising from known or secret output of atomic materials. In so far as it removed from national control some part of this output or earlier output, it would reduce the possible damage which could be done by any state through the use of such material. But this could well be only a very small part of the total amount of output and stockpile of the various states.

(b) The storage problem for such a pool would present similar problems to those under a full-scale control plan. There are major differences, however, so long as the amounts contributed to the pool would not be large compared to national stockpiles. In this situation no state would feel the same degree of dependence on the safeguards for the U.N. pool because it would have its own stockpile for use against any effort to seize the U.N. stockpile. On the other hand, a full-scale transfer or large-scale transfer to the U.N. stockpile would present much more serious issues for member states in insuring that the stockpile was secure from seizure. But if one assumed that power production will become an important factor in the future, then this question of security of the material in the hands of the U.N. agency could be a more serious problem, even if not arising in connection with full-scale control.

(c) With respect to use of atomic materials, the problems under a pool plan would be much like those under any form of control. That is, the same kinds of safeguards and the same kinds of dangers would arise under both systems. Again, however, if the pool plan represented only a small part of the total available stockpile of atomic material and if the member states retained a very large national stockpile they might feel that the dangers to them of any diversion from the power purposes would entail much smaller risks than under a full-scale control system.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *The Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to the President* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 29, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is an updater on your UN atomic proposal.

Although I knew that State, Defense, and AEC had set up a Working Group to iron out some of the practical details which we should have well in mind if we sat down with the Soviets on your proposal, [2] I had begun to worry because the last impression left in the minds of the public on both sides of the Atlantic was the Soviet reply. And since that reply deliberately attempted to fuzz up the issues, I thought that clarifying action was needed from us soon.

A meeting was arranged for Monday, December 28, for representatives of State, Defense, CIA, AEC, and OCB (working level), [3] at which I distributed the attached memorandum.

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[1] This letter was addressed to President Eisenhower at Augusta, Georgia.

[2] Summaries of working group meetings of Dec. 24 and 27 are in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Atomic Energy-Armaments."

[3] A memorandum for the record summarizing the meeting under reference is in Eisenhower Library, White House Central files, "Wheaties Exploitation".

There was immediate and unquestioned acceptance of the necessity of not allowing the Soviet note to crystallize in people's minds, and therefore of the necessity for prompt action on our part.

However, a major rhubarb developed between the State representative, Bob Bowie, and the Defense representative, Frank Nash, of which you should be aware not only because it will certainly be brought to your attention on your return, but also because it is rather basic.

Bowie took the position that the language of your speech, plus Foster Dulles' personal impression in the two speech meetings prior to Bermuda, indicate that the U.S. is prepared to sit down with the Soviets to work out atomic disarmament without reference to total disarmament, including conventional weapons.

Nash took the position that State's position is not only counter to the consistent U.S. policy over the past seven years, confirmed by various NSC papers, but would amount to defense suicide, since the net result of exclusively atomic disarmament would reduce the U.S. defense position to a definite inferiority ratio in conventional weapons and manpower. Furthermore, it would completely reverse practically all of the current defense planning and expenditure which is calculated gradually to phase us into the new defense posture of genuine reliance on atomic weapons, not only strategically but tactically.

Defense and State had apparently been at each other on this for days, and what I caught at the meeting was simply the almost angry summary of previously taken positions.

I tried to resolve the argument, at least for the immediate future—and the immediate future includes a press conference which Foster will be holding within a half hour [4]—by saying:

(a) It was never your intention to embark on exclusively atomic disarmament, to the exclusion of the overall arms situation.

(b) It was ridiculous to take a single phrase out of your speech and build a whole atomic disarmament thesis on it.

(c) The important thing to state *now,* and to keep hammering at, was to remind everyone that your proposal was to initiate the pooling of fissionable material for peaceful purposes, no matter how small the beginning. Soviet participation might indicate the beginning of a new spirit on their part on which future arrangements might be built.

The Soviets had taken your simple, understandable, and doable proposal, and had surrounded it with a lot of old disarmament spinach, all of which had been proven unworkable in the past, and we should not allow ourselves to be booby-trapped into allowing the two concepts to be merged.

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[4] The Secretary of State's remarks on this subject at his press conference of Dec. 29 were not issued as a Department of State press release.

However, our insistence upon "first things first" did not mean that we would be unwilling to sit down to explore any workable plan of disarmament as we had already done for many months over many years.

I added that it had never been your thought, no matter what conversations were undertaken with the Soviets, to interfere with the planned build-up of our military atomic situation to previously agreed-upon goals.

Everyone seemed to be willing to accept this for the immediate future, but the difference between State and Defense lies very deep, and I do not think it can be satisfactorily or conclusively resolved without your getting them together and personally presenting your point of view.

Meanwhile, several of the positive aspects outlined in the attached memo are moving ahead.

Happy New Year.

Sincerely,

C.D.

P.S. Last week when Roger Makins was seeing Foster on some matters, he brought up the matter of your atomic proposal, [5] and expressed the hope that if private conversations were to be held on the subject, they would really be private and not handled by the UN Disarmament Committee or Sub-Committee. The Secretary told him that your proposal had deliberately left that point vague, and that no decision had yet been made.

I personally think that Makins was quite right on this point, and that to have something as full of dynamite as this pawed over by several uninformed and emotionally opinionated "foreigners" would tend to confuse rather than clarify. This matter, without specific reference to the British Ambassador, also came up in our meeting, and everyone agreed that "private" should be "private".

C.D.J.

[Attachment]

## *Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1953.

### THE PRESIDENT'S ATOMIC PROPOSAL BEFORE THE UN

1. The Soviet reply has put the ball in our court—whence it should be returned at the earliest possible moment.

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[5] See the memorandum of conversation, by Merchant, Dec. 22, p. 1305.

2. Returning the ball does not necessarily mean a single smash over the Kremlin wall. It does mean a series of *actions* —repeat actions—on our part, each one of which may be small, but each one of which should be understandable by people as well as Governments everywhere.

3. I have heard quite a few people in our Government describe the Soviet note as "very clever"—"diabolically clever"—"dangerously smart"—etc. etc. Sure, the note is smart. Why shouldn't it be? However, its smartness was not revealed by the line they took, but rather by the way they took it. As a matter of fact, the line was exactly the line that we had anticipated weeks if not months ago when the proposal was first being worked on, and furthermore, was just about the only line they could possibly take short of admitting that they had been hopelessly trapped. So for once let us feel that we have led the Soviets along the line anticipated by us, and let us move on from there, instead of granting the Soviets another victory which in fact they did not score.

4. Shouldn't we concentrate our thinking and acting on not allowing the situation to crystallize in people's minds the way the Soviets want it to crystallize—namely, by making small potatoes out of the President's feasible offer and big potatoes out of their global disarmament plan which has already been proved unworkable several times. We must not allow the peaceful image they have attempted to superimpose on ours to become fixed in people's minds.

5. Following are a few possible courses of action as a starter:

(a) The appropriate American spokesman—maybe Chairman Strauss, maybe Secretary Dulles—should undertake a full-scale half-hour radio and television talk explaining in considerable detail what the President's proposal was *not*, what it *was*, and the sorry history of the Soviet suggestion, winding up with a quick, hard-hitting analysis and warning of the obvious Soviet tactic.

This might be a good place to remind the American people of what the American press has completely overlooked—namely, that the President actually made two proposals, the first being to sit down privately in accordance with the General Assembly's Resolution "to seek an acceptable solution to the atomic armaments race". The second proposal had to do with the pool of fissionable material, which was designed among other things as a device to give reality and substance to the first proposal.

This speech would be primarily for the American audience, but should be translated and redistributed abroad as widely as possible through the regular channels of State, USIA, etc.

(b) We must quickly find the appropriate United Nations diplomat—not American, and I have a hunch not British either—to take up the cudgels for us on this Soviet tactic of confusion. Speaking as a UN dignitary, he would express his heartfelt appreciation for what the President did before the UN, and he would go from there to an analysis of the Soviet tactic and urge all people to appreciate the American proposal for what it is and the Soviet proposal for what it is.

This speech would be directed primarily toward Western Europe, possibly Asia. If French Ambassador Hoppenot [6] would be willing to do this, it would be very valuable, and even more valuable if he were in France and the speech could originate there, and thereby guaranty much better Western European press coverage than if it had originated here.

(c) The Secretary of State should announce that Ambassador Bohlen has been instructed to resume conversations with Mr. Molotov and that his instructions are, "Never mind the ambiguities—let's get down to cases".

(d) The news that a special task force of State and AEC has been at work on the implementing details of the Eisenhower proposal should be leaked without giving away any of the real details.

(e) The appropriate U.S. legislator—for instance, Senator Hickenlooper—should state publicly that he is asking the Atomic Energy Commission to sit down with him to explore the possibility and advisability of unilateral U.S. action on the proposal. And in fact, such exploration, if it has not already begun, should be undertaken immediately.

(f) If the U.S. Government, private U.S. industry, and the Adenauer Government, could team up to furnish the funds for the installation of a power pile in Berlin at a very early date, the effect would be absolutely electrifying. We would be furnishing power for an area that if cut off by a new blockade, would be unable to get its fuel except via airlift. And we would be matching words with action.

(g) The appropriate British spokesman, and possibly Canadian spokesman, should at a very early date announce publicly that whether or not the Soviets are really prepared to take up this proposal—"and the tone of their note indicates that all they intend to do is stall and haggle over commas"—the British and the Canadians are prepared to join with the Americans to furnish the material and help finance a power pile in a needed area—again Berlin might be the appropriate site.

(h) The appropriate representatives of the Joint Legislative Committee should publicly restate their enthusiastic approval and pledge themselves to the enactment of the proper legislation to make this possible.

(i) All USIA Missions should keep at top pitch their efforts to have the right articles on this subject—and by "this subject" I mean the Soviet tactic against the American proposal—written up by the best available intellectual in the best available intellectual publication.

The above is all off the top of the head, and I am sure that much if not all of it has already occurred to all of you. However, I wanted to get it on paper in order to try to generate the next item of action, which is essential, and very quickly.

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[6] Henri Hoppenot, French Representative at the United Nations.

600.0012/12-2953: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 29, 1953—7:24 p.m.
PRIORITY

408. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Please call on Foreign Minister Molotov and orally tell him substance of following, unless you consider this action unwise:

"Secretary Dulles would welcome early exchange of views regarding time, place and manner of conducting talks in relation to President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8 and the response embodied in the statement which was delivered to Bohlen on December 21. Dulles had thought you and he might discuss these procedural matters early in January while both were at the Berlin meeting. Since Berlin meeting now postponed, Dulles will be glad explore these matters earlier at Washington through the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Soviet Ambassador, if Molotov desires. Otherwise, he will plan to discuss them with you at Berlin."

For your own information, we have in mind probable participation also of UK and possibly France and Canada. We are open-minded as between UN and diplomatic channels. We have suggested initial discussion, in which Secretary can personally participate, either Washington or Berlin, because there is great deal of background about this sensitive subject which we cannot convey to you adequately. However, obviously, if Molotov proffers to you any ideas of his own regarding time, place and manner, we would be glad to receive them in this way.

If your British and French colleagues know of and are curious about meeting, you should advise merely that you called at Secretary's instructions to ask Molotov in due course to indicate his views about procedure. [2]

DULLES

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[1] According to a handwritten notation on a draft of this telegram filed in the John Foster Dulles papers at the Eisenhower Library, these instructions were cleared by the President in Augusta via telephone on Dec. 29. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Atomic Weapons")

[2] In telegram 783 from Moscow, Dec. 30, Bohlen wrote that since it was impossible to send adequate background information by cable, it might be better if the Secretary handled the entire matter himself in Washington through the Soviet Ambassador. An alternative, suggested Bohlen, would be to provide him with sufficient information to deal with the initial problem of procedure. (600.0012/12-3053) Dulles responded in telegram 413 to Moscow, also Dec. 30, instructing Bohlen to proceed in accordance with telegram 408. (600.0012/12-3053) In telegram 793, Dec. 31, Bohlen reported that he had delivered the oral statement contained in telegram 408 to Molotov. Molotov had refused to give an immediate reply, but Bohlen imagined that his preference would be to await a personal meeting with Dulles at Berlin to discuss the subject. (600.0012/12-3153)

600.0012/12-3053

### *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1953.

Subject: International Atomic Agency

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
The Secretary
Mr. Robert Murphy

Ambassador Makins called at his request and said that the thinking in London regarding the international atomic agency to be set up under the proposal contained in the President's UN speech concerned three things: (1) procedure; (2) substance; and (3) relationship to disarmament.

Ambassador Makins said that as regards procedure there is obviously the question whether the matter should be treated within the framework of the UN or in private, diplomatic channels, and that London seemed to have no fixed notions on this score. About substance, he said that he had talked with Cockroft during his recent visit to England. The British apparently have been speculating on whether the international agency would actually stockpile atomic material or whether the agency would farm-out the actual custody to other agencies. British thinking also apparently contemplates that the agency would indulge in extensive research, laboratories, construction of reactors, etc. On the subject of disarmament, Makins said that it is the view of his Government that we should continue to retain the initiative and not allow the Soviet Union to take advantage of this opportunity to "run away with the ball." London has been giving considerable study to the question of how the President's proposal, which primarily relates to industrial power, should be linked to disarmament, and whether conventional and unconventional weapons should be treated jointly under the heading of disarmament with atomic energy. He inquired how far our thinking had got.

The Secretary said that of course we were awaiting the return of the President to Washington next week before proceeding in this matter. Obviously, there are many features of the subject to be worked out and he did not pretend to have the answers. He said that about procedure as between the UN approach, which would involve discussions with a considerable number of the representatives in the Disarmament Commission, he at this stage inclines to the view that it would be preferable to deal with the matter in private conversations. He said he had thought that if there were to be a Four-Power meeting in Berlin on January 4, that discussions, perhaps with Molotov in the margin of that meeting, would be the best approach. Now that that meeting has been postponed to January 25, he was not quite sure how to approach the matter.

The Secretary also said that on substance, while decisions had not been taken by us, on balance he would imagine that the agency would deal with the custody of the atomic material directly rather than farming out projects. He could not answer, he said, on the technical side as to what, if anything, would be developed regarding research.

The Secretary also said that we are giving very active study to the question of how to deal with the disarmament factor and its relationship to the President's speech and he hoped shortly that we would be in a position to discuss this more effectively.

Ambassador Makins said that he realized that we, like the British, are only in the first stage of our thinking on this subject but that he wanted to give London the drift of our present thoughts. He said that incident to his visit to London there was a discussion whether Ascension Island in the South Atlantic might conceivably be a suitable place for the storage of the material, but after consideration of the volcanic structure of the island it was thought not suitable.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum by the President to the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson)*

SECRET [AUGUSTA, GEORGIA,] December 31, 1953.

I can think of no reason that would prevent us from beginning the implementation of the things suggested in your memorandum dated December 28th. [1] I assume that Secretary Dulles and Chairman Strauss agree with the suggestions you have outlined. If they do, it would seem to me that something could be started instantly on the matter.

As for your letter to me dated December 29th, I cannot agree that the State-Defense quarrel makes much sense even though, as you say, it may be both bitter and deep.

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[1] See the attachment to C. D. Jackson's letter of Dec. 29 to the President, p. 1316.

The question of total, as opposed to atomic, disarmament is largely academic. Neither can be accomplished without the most rigid and complete system of inspection—this we feel perfectly certain the Soviets would never allow.

Moreover, I should like to discuss with all the so-called "military experts" just what would be the effect on us and our position if atomic weapons could be wholly eliminated from the world's armaments.

The mere argument that because we are ahead of the Russians in atomic weapons that this one phase of our armament activity should be pushed to the limit, must be taken into account.

Also we must consider the factor that atomic weapons strongly favor the side that attacks aggressively and *by surprise.* This the United States will never do; and let me point out that we never had any of this hysterical fear of *any nation* until atomic weapons appeared upon the scene and we knew that others had solved the secret.

Here I am not arguing either side of the particular question that you mention. I am merely pointing out that there needs to be a bit of intellectual analysis of these grave problems rather than screaming support of a position already taken.

At a reasonably convenient date, I hope you will arrange to have Secretary Dulles and Secretary Wilson, together with Chairman Strauss and yourself, meet with me to talk over this general matter. Each of the individuals just named can bring with him one assistant if he so desires.

DDE

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600.0012/1-554

## *Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 5, 1954.

Subject: Atomic Proposal of President, Dec. 8

The President agreed that we should be prepared to listen to talks going beyond the pool proposal and dealing with atomic weapons generally although he was skeptical as to the possibility of any grandiose proposal being acceptable because of mutual suspicions.

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[1] Directed to Bowie, Murphy, and Arneson. The following handwritten notation by Dulles appears on the source text: "These Presidential positions on substance agree [in general?] with Defense presentation." The annex (memorandum for the President), which is attached to the file copy, presumably provided the basis for the discussion between the Secretary of State and President Eisenhower.

He indicated that he did not think it necessary to link atomic-weapon discussions to conventional weapons although there would be no objection to our doing so as a technical or precautionary measure.

The President agreed that it would be in order to ask Howard Peterson to represent the State Department on a team to deal with this problem.

[Annex]

### *Memorandum for the President*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1954.

In preparation for possible talks with the Soviet Union on the atomic armaments race resulting from your speech of December 8, it will be necessary to settle the following points:

1. Does the United States prefer that the talks be held in the U.N. Disarmament Commission or in diplomatic channels?

2. What nations in addition to the U.S. and the USSR should participate in the talks?

3. Will the U.S. seek to confine the talks to the atomic pool proposal, or also be prepared to discuss seriously atomic disarmament?

4. Should the U.S. be prepared to accept a control plan limited to atomic weapons under suitable safeguards or should we insist on linking such control with the control of conventional weapons?

5. Whom might we designate to serve as our representative for conducting the negotiations?

(Possibly suggest Howard Peterson; about 42; with a large firm (Cravath (?)) before the war; in War Department during the war, finally as Assistant Secretary; now with one of the main Philadelphia banks; able, balanced judgment, good presence).

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600.0012/1-654: Telegram

## *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT Moscow, January 6, 1954—4 p.m.

816. Eyes only for Secretary. This afternoon at three o'clock Molotov read and handed to me following memorandum:

> "The Soviet Government has considered the proposal of Government of United States to exchange views on procedural questions connected with forthcoming conversations on question of atomic

energy [1]—namely, concerning the time, place and form of the conversations. The Soviet Government also considers it desirable to discuss the above-mentioned questions and agrees that discussion should be begun in Washington as was envisaged in proposal of Mr. Dulles. For its part Soviet Government is authorizing Ambassador Zarubin to take part in this discussion."

Although as previously reported in my 793 on 31st [2] Molotov indicated rather clearly his personal preference for discussion to be inaugurated in Berlin, it is probable that decision to authorize Zarubin to discuss these procedural questions with you is based upon desire to have in advance as much indication of our thinking on that point as possible before you meet in Berlin. Unless it is planned that Vishinsky would return to Moscow, there is some interest in selection of Zarubin rather than the Deputy Foreign Minister to conduct these talks.

BOHLEN

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[1] See telegram 408 to Moscow, Dec. 29, 1953, p. 1319.

[2] See footnote 2, *ibid.*

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PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Atomic Energy"

## *Memorandum of Conversation*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

SUMMARY OF MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 8TH SPEECH, 6 JANUARY 1954

Present:

*Department of State:*
Secretary Dulles
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Merchant
*Atomic Energy Commission:*
Mr. Strauss
Mr. Smyth
*Department of Defense:*
Secretary Wilson
Deputy Secretary Kyes
Mr. Nash
Mr. LeBaron

Secretary Dulles paraphrased Ambassador Bohlen's cable from Moscow relaying Molotov's suggestion that preliminary talks be held in Washington with Ambassador Zarubin in preparation for further discussions of the President's atomic proposals at the Berlin meeting. [1]

Secretary Dulles then summarized four basic questions which he said he discussed with the President on Tuesday, January 5th. [2]

1. Where should talks be held, in the UN Disarmament Commission or through diplomatic channels?
2. What other nations, if any, should participate?
3. Should the US ask to confine the talks to the questions of the President's "atomic pool" proposal or should we also be prepared to discuss atomic disarmament?
4. If we discuss atomic disarmament should these discussions be based on the principle that atomic weapons and conventional weapons must be linked together, or are we prepared to discuss atomic disarmament alone?

Secretary Dulles stated that the preparation for these talks was a full time job that required a high-level working group consisting of State, Defense and Atomic Energy Commission. State is thinking of designating Howard Peterson, former Assistant Secretary of the Army, as their representative.

Secretary Dulles said that in his discussion with the President he did not ask for any definite decisions on these four points, but only the President's preliminary views. The President thought that we should be *prepared* to talk atomic disarmament, if the USSR raised the matter. He said he felt he made this clear in his December 8th speech when he said "The US . . . is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved', to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race . . .". [3]

Secretary Dulles pointed out that in our recent press release we said that if the USSR wanted to make any atomic disarmament proposals we would be prepared to discuss them. Both the President and Secretary Dulles believed the Soviets would find it difficult to formulate acceptable proposals, but for our part we would be prepared to listen to anything they had to say. Secretary Dulles stated that the President feels if a way could be found which would eliminate atomic and similar weapons of mass destruction under a really reliable security system he would be prepared to accept it even if it left the USSR with a numerical predominance in ground forces. Secretary Dulles said the President indicated he would be willing to do this because he is convinced that the US industrial potential and capability for rapid mobilization would still constitute an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and that if such aggression should occur, the US industrial capability, when harnessed into a war effort, would ultimately defeat them. Secretary Dulles said that he was reporting this not as a decision but only as the President's initial reaction to the subject.

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[1] See telegram 816 from Moscow, Jan. 6, *supra*.

[2] See the memorandum of conversation, Jan. 5, p. 1322.

[3] Ellipses in the source text.

Admiral Strauss stated that the idea behind the President's speech was that even limited contributions from the several stockpiles would improve international relations, and if the USSR rejected the proposal, the US would have won a psychological victory.

Secretary Wilson observed that we should still approach this subject with an open mind even if our hope of success in subsequent negotiations may be slim. He commented that ultimately war is war, and that there must be a broader disarmament than merely atomic disarmament. He remarked that until the Iron Curtain was pierced or lifted we could not achieve any real security system. Secretary Wilson recognized that if we want to relieve tension we must be willing to talk and listen. However, he cautioned that we should not talk with "two mouths". We can not go on telling our people that our strength in deterring aggression rests in SAC and that we are making our military plans on this basis; i.e., the full use of atomic weapons,—and at the same time talk about eliminating atomic weapons without at the same time reducing the level of conventional armaments.

Secretary Dulles remarked that in our negotiations with the Russians we do not need to depart from our present governmental position of the inter-relation of atomic and conventional weapons in any disarmament discussions. Nothing in the President's speech itself need be taken to mean that we are prepared to discuss atomic disarmament separately.

Admiral Strauss commented that it would be illusory to suppose that we can get a binding agreement on the reduction of armaments out of the Russians. He said that in his speech the President put disarmament to one side and invited the Soviets to talk about peacetime uses of atomic energy.

Secretary Wilson commented that nevertheless the President did talk about atomic disarmaments in his speech.

Admiral Strauss was of the opinion that if we talk about disarmament we will be talking about something we know will not work at this particular time, and therefore he is convinced that the President intentionally pushed this idea aside, and went on to peacetime uses of atomic energy. The principal reason for making any mention of atomic disarmament discussions was the inclusion of the idea of "private" discussion.

Secretary Dulles then suggested that there was no point in getting too legalistic about the President's speech. He admitted it was subject to a lot of interpretations, but hoped that we would pick out the one that was best for the United States. We should go into these discussions with the goal of getting the President's atomic pool plan accepted. He considered that we will have to listen to a lot of the same old speeches from the Soviet representatives. After we had heard them, we should reply that the current international climate does not permit much progress in any form of disarmament since neither side trusts the other. However, the President's atomic pool plan is one which we could both at least try out. Secretary Dulles does not believe that the Soviets can make an acceptable proposal for atomic disarmament, but nevertheless we should listen to whatever they have to say.

Secretary Dulles indicated that he would prefer to have the discussions of this matter handled through diplomatic channels rather than through the UN Disarmament Commission as it would be very difficult in the latter forum to keep the discussions from bogging down.

As to who should participate in these discussions, Secretary Dulles said that there is considerable logic to limiting the discussions to countries who actually have atomic weapons; namely, the US, USSR, and UK. If, however, emphasis is to be placed on the establishment of a "bank of fissionable material", then perhaps the French, Canadians, and Belgians should also take part.

Admiral Strauss said that if these other countries had to come in, they could come in later. Secretary Dulles agreed with Admiral Strauss adding that otherwise the meeting may deteriorate into just another international conference.

Admiral Strauss, Secretary Wilson, and Secretary Dulles all agreed that we should try to keep the French out of the discussions, at least initially. Secretary Dulles added, however, that this may be very difficult as if the French are excluded this might bring about a revulsion in their thinking which would turn them toward the USSR. However, all of this is a question of tactics. Secretary Dulles recalled the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow in 1947 which resulted in the breaking-up of the previously close working relationship between the French and the USSR. Since then we have had the French fully on our side.

Mr. Nash suggested that the best way to handle it would be bilaterally between the US and USSR. Secretary Dulles agreed, but said that the British have been quite concerned that US made approaches to the USSR without consulting them. Secretary Dulles felt that the best idea would be for the US to carry the discussions alone for two or three months, and after Berlin perhaps to bring the British in, and the French if absolutely necessary. Secretary Wilson remarked that if the British do come in we should be prepared to admit the Canadians and Belgians. Admiral Strauss observed that he would hate to see the French brought in the discussions. As to the Belgians, Admiral Strauss remarked that "their nose has been out of joint" since Bermuda, but all in all he did not expect too much trouble from the Canadians and Belgians.

Admiral Strauss and Mr. LeBaron then entered into a discussion of the status of our current agreement with the Belgians for purchase of uranium ore, with particular emphasis on the fact that our contract expires next year. They also discussed the ramifications of the Lilienthal proposal which suggested Brussels as the center of an international atomic agency.

Secretary Dulles stated that he hoped the UK would agree not to insist on participation and in that way make it less embarrassing for us to leave the French out.

Mr. Murphy commented that that would be a safer approach to the problem. He noted, however, that the Malik–Churchill discussions might lead to UK initiative alone. Secretary Dulles pointed out that he would have to tell Ambassador Makins about his forthcoming talk with Zarubin. He noted that Churchill has complete contempt for the French, and therefore wouldn't take kindly to the idea of including them in any atomic discussions. (Mr. Merchant entered at this point.)

Mr. Merchant commented that although the French should be excluded, it would be difficult to get away with it. On balance he thought it was better to take the UK in from the start. This would be much better from the standpoint of world opinion.

Secretary Dulles conceded that Churchill will present an increasingly difficult problem. The UK is making an intensive effort to get into these discussions.

Mr. LeBaron observed that this is because the whole background of their thinking is directed towards realizing the peaceful application of atomic energy as soon as possible.

After some further discussion it was agreed that the US would conduct its initial negotiations on a bilateral basis through Ambassador Zarubin, in Washington. Later we may have to bring the UK in, but even then we would try to keep the French and Belgians out.

Secretary Dulles then discussed the question of whether to continue the discussions in the UN Disarmament Commission or bilaterally. He personally favored the bilateral approach as did Secretary Wilson and Admiral Strauss. Secretary Dulles said that he had never known a UN Committee that was held down to small size. It simply would not be possible to restrict it to the membership that we considered pertinent and discussions in that forum would automatically be turned into disarmament discussions.

Mr. Bowie raised again the question of whether we *would* be willing to talk about disarmament in the field of atomic weapons, and expressed the view that this is what the President meant in his speech.

Secretary Dulles said that the Russians would probably want to talk about atomic disarmament, but there is no practical plan that they would put up. In the first place we can not trust their word, and secondly, there is no practical plan of inspection. However, the principle which we should follow, and this is one to which the President agreed, is that if you could get a really workable scheme of atomic disarmament, coupled with adequate security safeguards, the US would be prepared to support it and the peace of the world would benefit thereby. However, Secretary Dulles stated he did not think that the President believes this is a presently attainable objective. The President believes that the only way to get there is by the path of peaceful uses of atomic energy. By making progress in this field we could develop mutual trust and cooperation, and eventually atomic disarmament could mushroom out from these small beginnings. However, this is not something we can expect to achieve by a stroke of the pen.

Admiral Strauss observed that if we get involved in disarmament discussions now we will get nowhere on our proposals for the peaceful application of atomic energy.

Mr. Bowie asked what would happen if the USSR were to say to us, "Write out your own ticket for atomic disarmament"? Is there none we could write out?

Secretary Dulles answered by saying that in his view there must be more than what you write down on paper, there must be a fundamental transformation of environment—there must be an opening-up of the present Iron Curtain. In his opinion nothing short of five years would bring about such a fundamental change in Soviet policies.

Mr. Bowie believed that it would be impossible to get a fool-proof plan for atomic disarmament as we are not living in a fool-proof world. It was Mr. Bowie's judgment that we should continue to search for a workable system of atomic disarmament which would make the world a better and safer place than it is today. We must remember that as the Russian atomic strength increases the risks to the security of the US five years hence may be greater than they are today. Mr. Bowie felt that if things continue the way they are now, they will work out better for the Russians than they will for us. Therefore, we must seek some workable system that will improve our over-all security position.

Admiral Strauss commented that even if we assumed such a system existed—and the odds were against it—the problem was still to find it and get it agreed to. Meanwhile, the odds of accomplishing this would be improved if something could be done to minimize the distrust and suspicion which exists between the two principals today.

Mr. Bowie said that he was not urging that we let the Soviets get us "smoke screened" out of our original idea of moving forward with the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but he questioned whether this would really get us anywhere in the reduction of stockpiles of atomic weapons.

Secretary Dulles concluded the meeting by summarizing the agreement reached on (1), conducting the discussions through diplomatic channels rather than in the UN Disarmament Commission, (2), restricting them at least initially to the US and the USSR, although recognizing the UK may insist on coming in late, and possibly also the French, and (3) concentrating on the President's "atomic pool" proposal although being willing to listen to anything the Soviets might advance on the side of disarmament.

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600.0012/1–754

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Merchant—EUR

During a call by the British Ambassador on the Secretary on a different subject, the Secretary raised the question of the forthcoming talks with the Soviets on atomic energy matters. He said that he was anxious to receive the ideas of the British Government. The Secretary then went on to say that a US group, including representatives from the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission had met with him yesterday on this subject. [1] He said there were several points of substance involved which he would like to raise since their solution would be helpful in deciding matters of procedure.

The first point, the Secretary said, related to the extent to which the talks developed into a discussion of atomic weapons as opposed to being confined to the narrower issue of the President's proposal for the establishment of a "bank" for peaceful purposes. He said we couldn't refuse to let the Russians talk on the bigger question as their reply suggests they desire to and indeed he himself in a press conference had agreed that the President's proposal did not confine any discussions to the narrower point of the "bank". The Secretary said, however, that all United States authorities were persuaded that no acceptable over-all scheme could be found for abolishing atomic weapons by some single step. We would not be justified in relying on the Soviets' unsupported word and it seemed impossible to devise any adequate system of inspection and control until the Soviet system itself was changed and the Iron Curtain disappeared. This led him to the conclusion that any discussion of abolition or control of atomic weapons at this time was visionary and probably had significance only in the propaganda field. Nevertheless it seemed to him that we should let the Russians talk but should ourselves try to get down to a discussion of the President's suggestion for a "bank".

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

By making a start at working together in this field the possibility existed that a relationship might develop which would lead to bigger things. The US, the Secretary said, doubts the utility of discussing lengthily the larger question of banning or abolishing atomic weapons at this time.

As his second point, the Secretary raised the question as to whether any discussion of atomic weapons should be linked directly with conventional weapons. He said that the general feeling on the US side was to continue to tie the two together. In this connection there were two points of apparent significance in the Kingsbury Smith interview with Malenkov. Malenkov appeared to revert to the earlier Russian position of placing a ban in sequence with control of atomic weapons rather than agreeing that the two acts or agreements be simultaneous. Malenkov also made the point that the abolition of atomic weapons must involve or be accompanied by conventional disarmament. In any event the Secretary said that it was our feeling that it would be unwise to disconnect conventional weapons and atomic weapons.

The Secretary said that his third point related to how these talks were handled. Should it be through a Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission or through diplomatic talks? He added that the US inclined to the latter. In answer to the Ambassador's query as to how he visualized diplomatic talks being conducted, the Secretary said he assumed we would meet here in the Department with the Russians. He went on to say that he was not rigid in his preference but that it appealed to him, first, because the atmosphere, tradition, and background of the United Nations Disarmament Commission would make it more difficult to focus on the President's specific proposal of a "bank" and, secondly because in diplomatic talks it would be easier to control the number of those participating. At the UN so many nations assert an interest in any subject that it is hard to keep numbers down. He emphasized that at the start it was essential that any talks with the Russians be kept small and private.

The fourth point which the Secretary said he wished to raise was the question of what countries would participate. He said that the US preference was to limit the talks to the Soviets, the British and ourselves. He noted that this raised problems, particularly with respect to the French. Others also have claims and such countries as Belgium and Canada should at a later stage participate. The British Ambassador noted that South Africa would soon displace the Belgian Congo as the largest supplier of fissionable material and he referred to an understanding with the Belgians regarding the provision of material for military as opposed to civilian use. The Secretary reverted to the serious problem which the exclusion of France would create, notwithstanding the fact that France had neither atomic weapons nor raw material. He expressed the fear, however, that exclusion could have serious effects on French attitudes which might be reflected in the Berlin Conference and in France's future action on EDC. He concluded by stating his tentative conclusion that the United States should alone carry on at this preliminary stage talks with the Soviet Union designed to find out when, where and with whom they wanted to meet. He said that the British would be kept currently informed and that time could thereby be consumed until the Berlin meeting opened at which he would have the opportunity to talk personally to Mr. Eden. The Secretary indicated that he would probably see Ambassador Zarubin in the next few days and expected that the Soviet Ambassador would be in a fishing or probing expedition.

The British Ambassador said that he could answer a few of the last questions raised by the Secretary on instructions which he had recently received from Mr. Eden. He said that the latter had no objection whatsoever to the United States discussing procedure alone with the Russians either before or at Berlin. Mr. Eden was anxious, however, that the atomic talks should not get mixed into the Berlin Conference itself. Moreover, he did want to participate in any talks on substance. The Ambassador went on to say that London had not indicated any preference as between the UN or diplomatic talks as the forum. His Government, however, felt that if the talks were held within the UN framework then there should be two Subcommittees of the Disarmament Commission established (possibly with identical membership), one of which would consider the President's "bank" proposal and the other would deal with disarmament, both conventional and atomic. Ambassador Makins went on to say that if diplomatic talks were decided upon as opposed to the UN, the

British Government suggested participation by the US, the UK, Canada and the USSR. The Ambassador indicated that he had been somewhat surprised himself at the exclusion of France.

In reply the Secretary reminded the Ambassador of the danger that France might move into the relationship with the Soviet Union which existed during the spring of 1947. He recalled that this relationship was only broken by the fact that tactically the Soviet Union found itself embarrassingly straddled between the French position and Germany with the result that the British and ourselves by throwing our full weight to France in such matters as the Saar succeeded in pulling her back. The Secretary said that he was sure that the Soviets at Berlin would try to re-establish some such relationship with France and that this was an important reason why he was anxious to avoid any appearance of public rebuff to France at this time on the matter of these atomic talks. He would prefer to stall and thereby avoid this possible difficulty. Ambassador Makins said that this line of reasoning seemed very sound. He mentioned that the British were anxious that the Canadians as well as themselves be kept currently informed and assumed that the Secretary had this in mind. The Secretary acquiesced.

The Secretary then pointed out the impossibility of proceeding with our defense plans if we had to treat atomic weapons as something separate from conventional weapons. It would create chaos in our defense planning, if we had to maintain such separation because of the threat of a banning of the use of atomic weapons. He noted that there could be no confidence in the Soviets abiding by any agreement to ban atomic weapons and he elaborated on the physical impossibility of establishing an adequate and acceptable inspection system over all of the Soviet Union, as indicated by the experience of the Swiss-Swedes in North Korea.

The Ambassador then asked if he were correct in understanding that the United States was contemplating no current move in the United Nations on this matter. The Secretary confirmed this understanding.

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600.0012/1-854:Telegram

### *The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT PARIS, January 8, 1954—3 p.m.

2542. Arneson from Robinson. [1] Charpentier [2] called me in this morning at Bidault's request to say it has been France's understanding it would be kept fully informed on any atomic negotiations with Russia and to raise question as to whether it was actually being so informed. I told Charpentier we had no information in Embassy other than what had appeared in this morning's press and as far as we knew discussions in Washington with Soviet Ambassador were purely procedural at moment.

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[1] Howard A. Robinson, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy in France.

[2] Pierre Charpentier, Director-General, Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

FYI. Unfortunately this morning's press carries article under London dateline referring Anglo-American-Canadian discussion atomic matters previous to Zarubin–Dulles meeting. French extremely sensitive their position this subject. Embassy suggests every reasonable effort be made keep France in picture.

Charpentier suggested sending French Ambassador see Secretary to present *démarche*. We suggested no action until Embassy could raise question Washington. Charpentier acquiesced holding Bonnet orders until Monday afternoon. [3] France willing receive information and participate in planning through any one three channels: (1) through French Ambassador directly in Washington; (2) sending De Rose or Goldschmidt Washington temporary mission; (3) channels already set up through this Embassy Paris. [4]

ACHILLES

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[3] Jan. 11.

[4] In telegram 2438 priority to Paris dated Jan. 8, Arneson replied as follows: "Secretary saw Bonnet last evening and told him that the talks scheduled in near future with Zarubin would be purely procedural. No substantive talks with Russians contemplated between now and Berlin meeting when Secretary will discuss the matter with Bidault. Arneson seeing Martin, French Embassy, tomorrow to reinforce this line. Urge you dissuade French pressing channels 2 and 3 set forth reference telegram." (600.0012/1–854)

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330.13/1–1154: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 11, 1954—4:41 p.m.

314. Disarmament Commission.

1. Dept's present thinking is that regardless of outcome of informal discussions with Soviet Union concerning procedures for dis-

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[1] Drafted by Dulles with the aid of Wainhouse and Bechhoefer of UNA.

cussing President's proposal, DC should meet at least once in January. [2]

2. Any US statement before DC could be confined to a factual report on approach of US to Soviet Union concerning time, place and manner of discussing President's proposals. After January 25 meeting with Molotov US might make further report to DC.

3. If this course followed USUN would confer with at least dels of the UK, France, Canada, China and USSR in advance of meeting in order to assure that meeting will be confined to factual report and that no one will prematurely raise questions of immediate appointment of a subcommittee or identity of States principally involved.

Dept would appreciate your views on foregoing. [3]

DULLES

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[2] This view had been conveyed to the Secretary of State in a memorandum of Jan. 8, by David Key of UNA. In his memorandum, Key wrote, *inter alia*, "Much of the beneficial results of the President's initiative in the General Assembly might be lost unless a factual report is made to the Disarmament Commission within a reasonable time, indicating that we are moving ahead with the President's proposals." (330.13/1-854)

[3] Deputy Representative to the United Nations James Wadsworth replied in telegram 334 from New York, Jan. 13, that the proposed meeting of the Disarmament Commission "seems to us undesirable" since other members of the Commission had not expressed any impatience and in any case could be informally kept abreast of developments and seemed to understand the importance of informal U.S.-USSR discussions whereas "Even a factual report on US approach to Soviet Union conceivably might have adverse effect on informal discussions and we are not certain that we could assure meeting would be confined to factual report." (330.13/1-1354)

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600.0012/1-1154

## *Draft Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)* [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, January 11, 1954.

Subject: Atomic Energy Proposals

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[1] A covering memorandum from Merchant to Dulles, dated Jan. 11, reads:

"I attach a draft of a memorandum of your conversation with the Soviet Ambassador this morning for your textual review. I believe you should also personally determine the distribution.

"I also attach a proposed telegram to Ambassador Bohlen reporting this conversation.

"I recommend that you call in today if possible Ambassador Makins and Ambassador Heeney separately and allow them to read your memorandum but not keep copies of it. At the same time you could give each of them a brief report of the Soviet Ambassadors reaction and the way matters were left at the conclusion of your conversation. If possible I believe you should see them today or at least arrange today for their appointments tomorrow.

*Continued*

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Georgi Zaroubin, Soviet Ambassador
Mr. Michail N. Smirnovsky, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Merchant—EUR
Mr. Logofet (Interpreter for the Secretary)

The Soviet Ambassador called at 10:30 this morning at the Secretary's request. The Ambassador was aware that the meeting was for the purpose of opening discussion on procedural points that arose from Mr. Molotov's suggestion to Ambassador Bohlen that these talks be conducted by Ambassador Zaroubin on behalf of his Government with the Secretary.

The Ambassador and Mr. Smirnovsky arrived promptly and, to the Secretary's opening reference to the snow outside, remarked genially that it was even colder in Moscow. The Secretary remarked that he hoped it would be warmer in Berlin, particularly if it developed that he and Mr. Molotov would have to meet in the street in the absence of agreement on the building in which the conference would be held. The Ambassador laughed and said he was sure that would not be necessary.

The Secretary then said that he appreciated the willingness of the Ambassador to meet with him on the subject which they were about to discuss. He said that he hoped it might mark the beginning of a relationship which could change the current of tension which has existed over the last few years. He then asked the Ambassador if his Government had any ideas as to the time, the place and the participants for conducting the proposed discussions.

The Soviet Ambassador replied that he fully shared the views expressed by the Secretary and similarly hoped that these talks would lead to a lessening of tension. He said that his Government welcomed their beginning and that he wished to assure the Secretary of the most sincere desire of the Soviet Union to cooperate. He added that his task in Washington was to seek ways to improve relations. As to the question of procedure, the Ambassador said he had received no views from his Government but that he would be grateful for any suggestions the Secretary might care to make.

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"With respect to the French Ambassador, I think it important that you personally ask him to come in as early as convenient and give him a brief oral summary of your conversation with Zaroubin but not show him a copy of the memorandum which you gave to the Soviet Ambassador."

The draft telegram to Bohlen mentioned above is not attached. However, telegram 456 to Moscow, Jan. 11, from the Secretary to Ambassador Bohlen (drafted by Merchant), summarizing the meeting, is in file 600.0012/1-1154.

Signatures at the bottom of the source text indicate that this memorandum was read by Key, MacArthur, Murphy, Arneson, Bowie, Armstrong, and, on Dec. 2, 1954, by Gerard Smith of S/AE.

The Secretary thereupon discussed seriatim the points contained in the attached memorandum. He said that one matter left open in preliminary exchanges has been whether the talks now beginning should be conducted through diplomatic channels or under the auspices of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. He said that if the Soviet Government has no preference to express at this time he would present the views of the United States Government which were that the conversations in the first instance should be held in the diplomatic channel and that as they progressed agreement be reached upon the proposal of either participant regarding the desirability of shifting the talks to the United Nations. (On this point the Ambassador sought precise confirmation of his understanding that the United States was not excluding the discussions at some point being conducted in the United Nations, which understanding the Secretary confirmed.)

The Ambassador then asked if the Secretary had any suggestions regarding the participants in these talks. The Secretary replied that in our view the initial talks regarding procedure should be on a bilateral basis between the US and the USSR. He went on to say that question of other participants should be decided by the US and the USSR since the subjects to be discussed and the order of their discussion would have a bearing on what governments would in fact be principally involved. For example, he said, the "governments principally involved" in any conversations relating to atomic weapons, as suggested by the Soviet Government as one topic for consideration, might be only those governments possessing atomic weapons. On the other hand, the Secretary said question of putting atomic material at some phase of its development into fissionable material into a "pool" or a "bank" might involve still other governments. (Zaroubin nodded vigorous agreement at the suggestion made by the Secretary that the initial talks on procedures be on a bilateral basis. He gave no facial or other reaction to the Secretary's suggestion that talks on atomic weapons be confined to governments possessing them. On the Secretary's second illustration of participation by subject matter he interrupted to confirm his understanding that the Secretary was referring to the use of atomic material "for peaceful pursuits.")

The Secretary then suggested that if it were the desire of our two governments to make a beginning of practical cooperation, the maximum results might be best achieved by a small number of participants and that the greater degree that views can be exchanged between the two governments as a preliminary, the better the hope of success. The Secretary added that this seemed true even though it were understood that such exchanges were informal and preliminary and that they might require later discussion with and ratification by other nations.

The Soviet Ambassador then asked if he might summarize the main points made by the Secretary as he understood them. He did so accurately, adding at the end however his understanding that at present the talks should be kept confidential. The Secretary confirmed his understanding and then gave him and his companion the original and a carbon of the attached memorandum which was read to him slowly in translation.

The Secretary said with a smile that of all the problems enumerated in the memorandum probably that last one relating to secrecy and the avoidance of propagandistic treatment of these exchanges of views would prove the most difficult problem of all. The Ambassador laughed and said he did not agree and when the Secretary reminded him that every newspaperman in Washington would be on the trail of both of them to find out what had been discussed, the Ambassador replied, "Do not doubt it—I can assure you that no one will learn from me."

The Soviet Ambassador then reverted to the third point of the attached memorandum and asked if he was correct in understanding that the participants in conversations on both the President's proposal and the Soviet proposal on atomic weapons would be decided by the US and the USSR in the course of their preliminary bilateral discussions. The Secretary replied that he hoped he and Molotov could decide at Berlin what countries would come in and at what stage they would come in. Zaroubin indicated agreement and said that he would report fully to Mr. Molotov with a view to greater precision being arrived at in Berlin.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Ambassador would be in a position to communicate to him prior to his departure for Berlin the Soviet Government's reaction to the suggestions which he had made this morning. He pointed out that this would permit him to be better prepared for his talk with Mr. Molotov in Berlin. The Ambassador assured the Secretary that he would do everything in his power to comply with his request and said that he would hope to see the Secretary again before he departs for the Berlin Conference.

The Secretary again referred to the question of privacy and handed the Ambassador the attached proposed statement by the Department for the press. The Ambassador said he had no objection to it.

The meeting ended at 11 o'clock with the Secretary saying to the Ambassador as he left that he felt they had made a good beginning and that he hoped they would also achieve a good final result.

[Attachment]

### *Memorandum for the Soviet Ambassador* [2]

1. The United States suggests that the conversation with reference to atomic energy should initially be conducted through diplomatic channels, reserving the right of any participant to propose shifting the deliberations to the United Nations pursuant to its resolution suggesting private discussions under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission.

2. It is suggested that the diplomatic discussions take place at Washington and wherever else it is convenient for the participants to meet. Presumably Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles would have a private discussion at Berlin.

3. It is suggested that procedural talks should in their initial stage be limited to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. with the participation of the other nations principally involved as determined in the light of the subject matter to be discussed.

4. The U.S. is prepared to consider any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

5. However, the U.S. believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope. That is why the United States urges an early discussion of the proposal made by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953. The U.S. is prepared to have concrete private discussions about this plan and its possible implementation.

6. The U.S. suggests that privacy will best serve practical results at this time and that these talks should not be used for propaganda purposes by either side.

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[2] A notation on the source text reads: "Note handed to Zaroubin 1/11/54".

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600.0012/1-1254

### *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1954.

Subject: Atomic Energy Proposals

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[1] A notation on a note accompanying the source text indicates that this memorandum was seen and approved by the Secretary of State.

In accordance with the Secretary's instructions I saw separately today Ambassadors Makins, Heeney and Bonnet to give each of them an oral, factual account of the Secretary's discussion yesterday with Ambassador Zaroubin regarding procedures for the atomic energy talks. All three of them were appreciative and each agreed to the importance of maintaining complete secrecy.

Ambassador Makins displayed a lively interest in every element of the discussion and asked me questions. He was specifically interested in discovering whether or not the Secretary had made any specific suggestions to the Russian Ambassador concerning the participants in any of the talks. I told him that at no time had the Secretary mentioned the name of any country (other than the US and the Soviet Union) but that he had suggested as illustrations the possibility that any talks on control of atomic weapons might be confined to the nations actually possessing them whereas in discussions of the peaceful use of atomic materials it might be considered that the nations principally involved would include countries possessing the raw materials. (Sir Roger questioned me concerning the status of the substantive preparation for these talks within the US Government and I replied that I was not familiar with this and suggested that he talk to the Secretary or Mr. Murphy.)

Ambassador Bonnet mentioned that the Secretary had told him that he would discuss this subject with Mr. Bidault in Berlin. He referred to the embarrassment felt in Paris over constantly inspired stories from London and elsewhere to the effect that the US Government was keeping the United Kingdom and Canada fully informed, with the implication that France was not so being informed. I agreed that at such point as we might make a statement we would attempt to find a formula which would not name those allies specifically who were being kept informed but which would be so worded as to avoid giving the impression that France was excluded. Ambassador Bonnet left the impression with me (understandably enough) that the French would prefer to see these talks held in the forum of a Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission composed of the US, the USSR, the UK, France and Canada.

By agreement with Mr. McCardle and Mr. Suydam [2] the calls of Ambassadors Makins and Heeney on me were not listed on the Press Room calendar. The French Ambassador's call was so registered and by agreement with him before he left my office he was to confine himself to answering any press queries as to its purpose by saying that he had called at his request to discuss certain matters related to Berlin (which subject we did briefly discuss).

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[2] Henry Suydam, Chief of the News Division, Department of State.

After completing the above talks I so reported to the Under Secretary, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Arneson.

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600.0012/1-1254

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 12, 1954.

Subject: Atomic Energy Proposals and Disarmament

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary

The British Ambassador called at his request, saying that he wanted to talk on a strictly informal basis about the atomic energy proposals and disarmament. He said that Mr. Merchant had filled him in on the Secretary's conversation yesterday with Ambassador Zarubin, [1] but that London keeps peppering him with questions emanating from several agencies of the Government. On the technical side, he said that these were being discussed with other echelons in the Department, but he wanted first of all to see whether our thinking regarding the handling of the disarmament feature corresponded with his. I told Mr. Makins of our initial thinking regarding an eventual meeting in January of the UN Disarmament Commission, saying that Ambassador Wadsworth would undoubtedly be talking to the UK Delegate in New York on this subject; that in essence we believe that a meeting of the Disarmament Commission should be held in January, as the US is Chairman this month; we hoped that there would be agreement that the meeting should be limited to a factual presentation of what has happened since the President's December 8 speech and that we would hope to avoid for the present action by the Commission in appointing a subcommittee pending possible progress in the US talks with the Russians here and, we hope, in Berlin. Ambassador Makins said he personally agreed with this line and believed that Jebb [2] would be in accord. Makins expressed the opinion that at one point there should be a connection between the question of disarmament in the field of conventional weapons and atomic weapons. He felt that any form of prohibition of atomic weapons is not realistic.

Ambassador Makins also inquired again, as he had some weeks ago of the Secretary, regarding US thinking about the scope of the international agency. He felt there were two lines of thought on the British side, as he believed there were on the US side; in Bermuda the President seemed to have given Mr. Churchill the impression of the possibility of the allocation of very large amounts of fissionable material and larger-scale activities of the agency. (He mentioned again laboratories and research.) On the other hand, he felt that Strauss had talked about a much more modest undertaking, and this corresponded to Cherwell's thinking. I said that I was not in a position to give him any more information than the indication given to him recently by the Secretary, but that I would guess that perhaps the trend was toward a modest rather than an ambitious undertaking. Naturally, everything would depend on the amount of interest the proposal would generate on the part of the Russians. This, he said, he fully appreciated, but that many people in London apparently had sharpened their pencils and were trying to figure out the proposals in detail.

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, *supra*.

[2] Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent British Representative at the United Nations.

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600.0012/1-1654

## *Summary of Meeting in the White House, January 16, 1954* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

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| Present: | President Eisenhower<br>Secretary of State Dulles<br>Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith<br>Admiral Strauss<br>Mr. C. D. Jackson<br>Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes<br>Vice Admiral Davis |

Mr. Jackson opened the meeting by saying that its purpose was to clear up one or two points regarding the interpretation of the President's December 8th speech. The President indicated he had been fully briefed on this matter. He stated that if it could be accomplished, he would be willing to cancel out atomic and hydrogen weapons from the armaments of both the US and the USSR. He would do this to protect the US economy and the US industrial base. He pointed out that in the final analysis it was the US industrial capacity which was the decisive factor in all major wars, from the Civil War on. Once the atomic and hydrogen threat to the US economy and industrial plant were removed, he believed the US could readily handle any other form of military attack on our country. However, he agreed that in the present state of world affairs, it is impossible that any effective agreement toward this end could be worked out which would provide the necessary safeguards.

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[1] Drafted by Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.

Secretary Dulles agreed with everything the President had said. He pointed out that the question of separate atomic disarmament discussions with the USSR was somewhat academic as it was almost certain that the Russians would bring the subject up whether we liked it or not. Although we are perfectly prepared to listen to anything they may have to say, we do not intend to let ourselves be drawn into separate negotiations with the Soviet on the elimination or control of nuclear weapons alone. For our part, we intend to discuss only the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles reiterated that we should try through these discussions to get across to friendly nations the idea that the disagreement over control of the atomic weapons was not a bilateral difference of opinion between the US and the USSR, but rather was a split between the USSR and the remainder of the free world.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that if the President's program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy could be put into operation at an early date perhaps it would pave the way for some future agreement on the control of nuclear weapons. However, everyone present was of the opinion that no effective agreement could be reached with the Soviets on the control of nuclear weapons at this time. Secretary Dulles reinforced this point by referring to General Hull's cable of 5 January (DA IN 31873)[2] in which he emphasized that on the basis of his experience with the Communists in Korea, "it is dangerous to hope that any system of inspection can be applied effectively behind the Iron Curtain".

In summary it was agreed at the meeting that, (a) although the US would listen to any proposals which the USSR cared to submit on the control or abolition of nuclear weapons, we would not be drawn into any negotiations on this subject, and (b) we would press for negotiations leading to the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the understanding that these discussions take place entirely separately from any discussions on control or abolition of nuclear weapons.

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[2] Not found.

600.0012/1-1854

## *The Canadian Ambassador (Heeney) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1954.

### THE PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE PROPOSALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEACETIME USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY MADE BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ON DECEMBER 8, 1953 BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY

The Canadian Government endorses the general idea of an international agency to facilitate the development of the peacetime uses of atomic energy, as suggested by President Eisenhower in his speech of December 8, 1953, to the United Nations General Assembly, and in doing so accepts the implicit obligation to make contributions to the agency on a basis to be negotiated when the requirements are known.

2. It would seem desirable for the proposed international agency to be associated with the United Nations, probably as a "specialized agency". It will be important, however, to insure that in determining its policies and programme, the views of the important contributing powers have appropriate weight. One way of accomplishing this would be to follow the precedent set when the International Monetary Fund was established and include some system of weighted voting. Another method might be to have an executive council composed of permanent members representing the important contributing nations, and elected members representing the other countries.

3. The following suggestions on the scope and nature of the proposed agency are submitted for the consideration of United States authorities:

(i) The agency should secure uranium and fissionable material from countries supporting and contributing to it; should itself hold only small stocks of such material, but be in a position to draw upon the stocks held by contributing nations up to the amounts pledged. Such stocks held for it by contributing countries would be segregated and subject to its inspection.

(ii) The agency should supply on a rental or sale basis, but subject to its continued inspection and control, uranium and fissionable materials for the establishment of power and research reactors by countries willing and able to establish and operate such reactors with the help of the agency.

(iii) The agency should be given the duty, in addition to furnishing of materials, of arranging for the provision of professional and technical services in the construction and initial operation of power and research reactors to those countries capable of making effective use of such services.

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that this note was handed to Bowie of S/P by Ambassador Heeney on Jan. 20.

(iv) The agency should, in due course, in co-operation with other agencies assisting in the development of under-developed countries, make available atomic materials and technical assistance for the building of atomic power plants in under-developed countries, when the technology of such plants has advanced to the stage where this is practical.

(v) The agency should be enabled to finance the sale on credit or rental of uranium and fissionable materials provided to recipient countries as described, but should not provide other capital required for the construction of reactors, leaving this role to the recipient nation itself or to other institutions, including the International Bank and any agencies engaged in assisting economic development of other types. Payment by recipient nations might be in materials of use to the Agency in lieu of money.

(vi) The Agency should not itself construct, own or operate atomic reactors, but might conceivably undertake certain key processing work if this contributed to the more effective control of fissionable materials furnished to recipient nations.

4. It is important for a clear understanding to be reached between those likely to be the principal contributing powers (other than Russia) before getting involved in discussions with other countries or in the Disarmament Commission; for this reason it would be desirable for informal discussions to commence forthwith between the countries represented on the Combined Policy Committee that deals with atomic energy matters (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom and Canada); in any event, Canada, as an important potential contributor, would wish to be consulted before any firm proposals were put forward to countries other than those represented on the Combined Policy Committee.

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600.0012/1-1954: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 19, 1954—8:03 p.m.

487. Eyes only Ambassador from the Secretary. Reference Deptel 456 January 11. [2] Soviet Ambassador called on me January 19 at his request. [3] He opened by stating he had received answers from

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[1] Drafted by Merchant.

[2] See footnote 1, p. 1335.

[3] According to a memorandum for the record, prepared by James C. H. Bonbright on Jan. 19, the Secretary of State suggested at his morning staff meeting that Bonbright call the Soviet Embassy to remind Ambassador Zarubin that a promised early Soviet reaction to the meeting of Jan. 11 had not been forthcoming and that *Continued*

Soviet Government which were embodied in memorandum then read in translation.[4]

In brief, Soviets accepted suggestions contained in numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 6, of memorandum I had given him January 11[5] and repeated verbatim to you in reference cable.

On numbered paragraph 3 Soviet Government expressed consent bearing in mind necessity at certain stage of negotiations of inviting all powers bearing main responsibility for maintenance world peace and international security. (Later in conversation I said that if this meant reaching present agreement to bring Chinese Communists at some point into discussions, I could not give any such agreement and that this should be made clear right away. Zarubin said it was very difficult for him to indicate now who those nations are and he made no effort to identify them.) On numbered paragraph 4 Soviet memorandum stated that it was necessary to recall Soviet Governments declaration of December 21 pointing out that in course of negotiations there should be simultaneously examined the matter of agreement unconditionally to ban the use of atomic or hydrogen or other weapons of mass destruction.

On numbered paragraph 5 the Soviet Government agreed to participate in discussion of President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8 but at same time believed agreement must be reached on plan of "rotation" under which Soviet proposal of December 21 would be discussed in alternating meetings with President's proposal.

I told Ambassador I felt general tenor of reply marked some advance but that I would want to study it more carefully before commenting. I asked whether there was any preference on the part of his government for channel of communication (i.e., through Soviet Embassy here or through you in Moscow) if I had any questions to put to Molotov before Berlin. Zarubin replied that either would do, whatever was most convenient. He then confirmed that he was leaving Washington tomorrow and in reply to my question as to whether his destination was Moscow or Berlin he said he was going directly to Berlin.

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the Secretary was leaving for the Berlin Conference in 2 days' time. Bonbright reached Counselor Vladykin who soon phoned back that the Ambassador did indeed wish to see the Secretary and a meeting was arranged for 5 p.m. that day. "In my conversation with Mr. Vladykin, I made it quite clear that the Secretary was not asking for the appointment and the initiative rested clearly with the Soviet Ambassador." (600.0012/1-1954)

[4] For the text in translation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 478-479. The memorandum was among the documents released as the result of Soviet-American agreement in September 1954, to make public the correspondence between the two governments concerning the question of an "atomic pool".

[5] *Ante*, p. 1339.

I asked him when Molotov would arrive in Berlin and when he replied on 23, I remarked it might be possible to talk to him before opening of conference on January 25.

In closing I thanked Ambassador for prompt reply of his government and we quickly agreed upon a brief statement to press which said that, in agreement with Molotov, I would continue these discussions in Berlin.

DULLES

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600.0012/1-2054

*Memorandum for the Record, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1954.

Subject: Next Step in Bilateral Procedural Discussions with the Soviets on Atomic Negotiations

At a meeting in his office, with General Smith, Mr. MacArthur and myself present, the Secretary suggested that as the next step in our atomic negotiations with the Soviets we attempt to have the US plan implementing the President's December 8 proposal set down succinctly in writing; that this paper then be discussed with the British, Canadians and French (also possibly the Belgians and South Africans) with a view to securing their concurrence in it; that it then be transmitted through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Government in a concurrent exchange, the Soviets having been asked similarly to prepare a memorandum outlining their proposal.

The Secretary's thought was that if the British and Canadians (and possibly French) concurred in this procedure he could make the suggestion to Molotov in Berlin. The time required to secure the concurrence of the other governments in our paper could be gained by the Secretary explaining to Molotov that, whereas preparatory work was going forward in Washington, this was a matter in which he would personally participate and hence it would be impossible for us to have our memorandum finally completed for transmission to the Soviet Government until after his (the Secretary's) return to Washington from Berlin. The Secretary said that this procedure would conform to the President's desire that the negotiations with the Russians on this subject be kept on a bilateral basis as long as possible in the belief that this held the most fruitful prospects for progress.

Those present agreed with the Secretary's plan and the Secretary then asked Admiral Strauss to come over to his office with a view to discussing it with him and ascertaining whether this constituted a practical method. The Secretary also said that he was lunching with Secretaries Wilson and Humphrey and would discuss it with them.[1]

Shortly thereafter Admiral Strauss arrived. General Smith and Mr. MacArthur had departed.

The Secretary informed Admiral Strauss in detail of his talk yesterday with Zarubin.[2] He then outlined his suggested plan and asked if the Admiral thought it would be feasible to prepare our paper and secure the agreement of the other governments concerned within a month. Admiral Strauss felt that there would be no difficulty in meeting the time limit in so far as the US preparation of its paper was concerned but expressed no definite opinion as to the length of time required to secure other government's agreement.

After some further discussion it was agreed that, subject to Secretary Wilson's approval, I should ask Ambassadors Makins and Heeney this afternoon when they called on me to receive a report of the Zarubin talk yesterday with the Secretary if the UK and Canada would be agreeable to proceeding on the foregoing line. It was also agreed that I would ask their views as to the desirability of similarly consulting the French but that in my conversation this afternoon with the French Chargé I would not raise this particular point.

In response to a question from Admiral Strauss as he was leaving, the Secretary said that General Smith would be the responsible officer in the Department on all conversations on this general subject during his absence in Berlin. The Secretary also said that Mr. Bonbright should assist General Smith in my stead during my absence.

After lunch the Secretary telephoned me to say that Secretary Wilson had given his approval to proceeding along the line proposed by the Secretary.

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[1] Dulles met with Secretary of Defense Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey at a Pentagon luncheon where "Secretary Wilson agreed on the desirability of this procedure which I told him had previously been agreed to by Admiral Strauss at a meeting held a few minutes earlier." (Memorandum by Dulles of conference with Secretary Wilson (Defense) and Secretary Humphrey (Treasury) at the Pentagon, Jan. 20, 1954, 600.0012/1-2054. A copy of this memorandum is also in the Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers.)

[2] See telegram 487 to Moscow, Jan. 19, *supra*.

600.0012/1-2054

## *Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1954.

The preliminary procedural exchanges of views between the United States and the U.S.S.R. have indicated the following:

(1) It is mutually agreeable that the discussions should continue through diplomatic channels subject to the possibility of transfer of the discussions to the UN, if this later seems desirable.

(2) That the diplomatic discussions should take place in Washington with the possibility of meetings elsewhere, if this seems suitable.

(3) That the next phase of the discussions should be a talk between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Molotov at Berlin.

(4) The participation of other countries after initial procedural matters have been dealt with has not been decided nor has there been any discussion by name of possible participants.

(5) The Soviets suggest a rotating (i.e. alternating meetings for the discussion of the President's proposal and the Soviet proposal of Dec. 21) consideration of their proposal and the Eisenhower proposal. The United States has not commented on this.

(6) It is agreed that confidential treatment would best serve for the time being, and that the negotiations should not be used for propaganda purposes by either side.

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[1] An attached note indicates that this memorandum was dictated by the Secretary of State to serve as a basis for discussion with the Belgians and the French. A copy initialed by Secretary Dulles is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Atomic Weapons".

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600.0012/1-2054

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 20, 1954.

Subject: Discussions with Soviets on President's Atomic Proposal

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Arnold Heeney, Canadian Ambassador
Mr. Merchant—EUR
Mr. Bonbright—EUR

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[1] According to a notation on the source text, copies of this memorandum were sent "eyes only" to Smith (U), Murphy (G), MacArthur (C), Bowie (S/P), Arneson (S/AE), and Key (UNA).

Sir Roger Makins and Mr. Heeney came in at 5 o'clock to be filled in on the latest developments on the above subject.

Mr. Merchant began by telling them of our telephone call to the Soviet Embassy yesterday which resulted in the Secretary's receiving Soviet Ambassador Zarubin at 5 p.m. at the latter's request. [2] Before showing the Ambassadors a translation of the paper left by Zarubin with the Secretary, [3] Mr. Merchant explained that at the previous meeting the Secretary had, for the sake of precision, set down in writing the points which he wished to make to the Soviet Ambassador. When the interpreter ran into difficulties the Secretary had given him the paper from which he had been reading to assist him in his translating. At the end of the conversation the Secretary had acquiesced in Zarubin's request that he keep a copy. This, Mr. Merchant explained, accounted for the references in the Soviet paper to "the U.S. *aide-mémoire.*"

Sir Roger and Mr. Heeney then read the Soviet paper and, with Mr. Merchant's permission, took notes on it.

There followed a brief discussion in which both Ambassadors expressed the view that the Soviet reply was encouraging. Sir Roger then left with Mr. Merchant an informal paper which set forth the views which he said Mr. Eden would express to the Secretary in Berlin (see separate memorandum). [4]

Both Ambassadors asked if there was any clarification on the Soviet reference to "all powers that bear the chief responsibility for maintaining peace and international security." Mr. Merchant explained that this had not been further defined by Zarubin. He said that the Secretary's tentative thinking was that these countries should include the United Kingdom and Canada, probably France and possibly others such as Belgium and South Africa. When Sir Roger inquired whether the Australians would be included Mr. Merchant said that the Secretary had not come to any firm conclusions as to what countries should be included. Both Ambassadors expressed the view (and this was one of the points in the paper left by Sir Roger) that for broad policy reasons the French should be completely cut in and at an early date.

Mr. Merchant then told them of the line which the Secretary was thinking of taking with Molotov at Berlin (see first two paragraphs of Mr. Merchant's memorandum of January 20). [5] In brief this was that the Secretary would suggest that we prepare a written paper for transmission to the Soviet Union showing the US plan for implementing the President's proposal of December 8. The

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[2] See footnote 3, p. 1345.

[3] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 478-479.

[4] *Infra.*

[5] *Ante*, p. 1347.

Secretary would also suggest that at the same time the Soviets would prepare and let us have a paper outlining their proposal. It was our thought that when we had prepared our paper we would seek to obtain agreement on it with the British and Canadians (and probably the French) prior to giving it to the Soviets. This would take a certain amount of time and probably would not be given to the Soviets until after the Berlin conference. The Secretary would explain the delay to Molotov as being due to his keen personal interest in the problem and his desire to study our paper on his return to Washington.

In conclusion, Mr. Merchant told the Ambassadors that he was about to have a talk with Mr. de Juniac of the French Embassy. However, he did not intend to show the Soviet paper to Mr. de Juniac but merely give him orally a summary of the points. Nor did he intend to tell the French representative of the Secretary's ideas for his discussion with Molotov in Berlin.

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600.0012/1-2054

## *The British Ambassador (Makins) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1954.

### POUR MÉMOIRE

*The President's Proposal on Atomic Energy*

1. Mr. Eden has been considering the question of procedure for dealing with this matter in the light of some talks which I have had with Mr. Dulles.

2. He feels that if progress is to be made with the President's proposal, its discussion will have to be kept separate from the discussion of the Soviet proposal to ban atomic weapons. He also feels that the right place to discuss this latter proposal is the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The present thought is, therefore, that the Soviet proposal should be discussed in the Disarmament

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[1] This communication was left with Merchant by Ambassador Makins at 5 p.m. on Jan. 20. The source text is accompanied by two brief covering memoranda. The first, dated Jan. 20, from Merchant to the Secretary of State, reads as follows: "The British Ambassador left with me the following informal memorandum concerning the next procedural steps on the atomic energy discussions. He emphasized that this was not a formal document but indicated the lines along which Mr. Eden expected to speak to you at Berlin. He also gave a copy of it in my presence to Ambassador Heeney." Merchant's memorandum and the attached "pour mémoire" were transmitted to the Secretary through his Special Assistant Roderic O'Connor by Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Jan. 20, who noted in his memorandum that "Livy would like the Secretary to see" the materials "this evening."

Commission of the United Nations and in the Sub-Committee to be established under the recent General Assembly resolution. He suggests that the discussion could take place concurrently with discussion of the President's plan.

3. As regards the latter, Mr. Eden feels that, though France is admittedly of small importance from the atomic energy standpoint, it would on general grounds of policy, be desirable to bring her in immediately to the procedural discussion of the proposal.

4. As far as the substance of the proposals is concerned, Mr. Eden feels that the arguments for pursuing the discussion in the first instance through diplomatic channels are perhaps not conclusive. Since the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations itself contains no more than twelve members, the Sub-Committee need not exceed five or six, and, if the French and Canadians are brought into the discussions, it would be easier to do this in the Disarmament Commission. Under this procedure, it would also be easier to meet the Soviet demand that the ban on atomic weapons should be considered on the same footing as the President's proposals.

5. Mr. Eden is therefore in favour of working towards the establishment of a second Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, whose mandate would be confined to the discussion of the President's proposals.

RM

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600.0012/1-2054

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 20, 1954.

Subject: Discussions with Soviets on President's Atomic Proposal

Participants: Mr. de Juniac, French Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
Mr. Merchant—EUR
Mr. Bonbright—EUR

Mr. de Juniac of the French Embassy came in at 5:30 p.m.

Mr. Merchant began by telling him of our telephone call to the Soviet Embassy yesterday which resulted in the Secretary's receiving Soviet Ambassador Zarubin at 5 p.m. at the latter's request. Mr. Merchant then outlined briefly and orally the points made by Mr. Zarubin. In the course of his explanation Mr. de Juniac inquired whether the Soviets had left a paper with us. When Mr. Merchant indicated that they had left an informal paper, Mr. de Juniac did not pursue the matter further.

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[1] According to a notation on the source text, copies of this memorandum were sent "eyes only" to Smith (U), Murphy (G), MacArthur (C), Bowie (S/P), Arneson (S/AE), and Key (UNA).

At the conclusion of Mr. Merchant's presentation Mr. de Juniac expressed interest in "all powers that bear the chief responsibility for maintaining peace and international security." He did not specifically ask if France had been mentioned but he did wish to know whether the Soviets envisaged bilateral conversations with the United States on questions of substance as well as on questions of procedure. It seemed to him from Mr. Merchant's summary of the Soviet position that the latter was at least open to this interpretation. Mr. Merchant agreed that this point was not entirely clear. While Mr. de Juniac did not press the matter further it was quite obvious that this would be a cardinal point with the French.

Mr. Merchant did not inform Mr. de Juniac of the Secretary's thoughts for his discussion with Molotov in Berlin. Mr. de Juniac did inquire whether we contemplated discussing the problem as an item for the agenda of the Four Power Conference. Mr. Merchant said that we did not contemplate doing this and that the Secretary planned to speak to Molotov separately about it.

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600.0012/1-2154

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1954.

Subject: President Eisenhower's December 8 Proposal

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary

Ambassador Makins called today at his request and left with me the attached *aide-mémoire* regarding the President's proposal on atomic energy. He said he had gone to the airport today to say goodbye to the Secretary, incident to the latter's departure for Berlin, and had given Mr. Merchant a copy of the attached *aide-mémoire* for the Secretary's information.

Ambassador Makins referred to the active attention which London is giving, he said, to the relationship between the President's proposals and disarmament, and the question whether and how the matter should come up in the UN Disarmament Commission. He said that London was actively trying to arrive at a position regarding the so-called "Baruch Plan" and wondered whether we still stood firmly on it. He said that he, of course, did not expect an answer to these questions now, but would hope to have the Department's comment on the *aide-mémoire* as soon as it might be convenient.

I told the Ambassador that the entire question is under active study now and mentioned that while we had expected pressures in New York for a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, perhaps as early as January 10, thus far this had not developed. There seemed to be a tendency to wait a little longer on the part of many delegations. Naturally, we were waiting the outcome of the Berlin conversations. Makins thought that the initial Russian reaction might be considered encouraging and said that Mr. Merchant had filled him in yesterday regarding the Secretary's conversation with Ambassador Zarubin.

[Annex]

### *The British Embassy to the Department of State*

SECRET
1240/1/33/54

#### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Her Majesty's Government have been considering President Eisenhower's proposals on atomic energy in relation to the United Nations Majority Plan for the international control of atomic energy and the United States paper of June 18, 1952, [1] about methods of implementing and enforcing the disarmament programme and establishing international control organs.

Her Majesty's Government have reached no definite conclusions as yet about their attitude toward the United Nations Majority Plan or the extent to which it needs revision. But their preliminary view is that the proposal on atomic development in the control organ paper need not conflict with the President's proposals and can be reconciled with the Majority Plan.

In order to carry their studies further they would like to know whether the United States Government—

(a) agree in principle that the Control Organ paper might provide a suitable initiative in the Disarmament Commission;

(b) consider that the section in it dealing with atomic development can broadly stand as it is so far as the Eisenhower Plan is concerned, and

(c) consider that the section on the functions of the Control Organ should still be based on the United Nations Majority Plan and if not what modifications in that Plan are they at present working on.

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[1] Not found in Department of State files.

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1954.

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## *Editorial Note*

Between January 25 and February 18, Secretary Dulles met with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Berlin to confer on European problems and to lay the groundwork for a subsequent conference on Far Eastern problems at Geneva. During the Berlin Conference, Dulles and Molotov conferred several times on the President's atomic proposals of December 8, 1953. For documentation on the Berlin Conference, see volume VII. For information on the atomic energy discussions at Berlin, see the study prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, April 23, page 1387.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Quebec Agreement"

## *The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Arneson) to the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Penfield)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1954.

DEAR JIM: I am sorry I have not had an opportunity before now to give you a fill in on the possibility of publishing the Quebec Agreement. [1] The matter has a rather long history which might be worth repeating. The story goes back several years.

When the Labor Government was in power and Churchill was busy writing his books he asked the Government to ask us whether we would be agreeable to publishing the Quebec Agreement. The British came to us with a strong implication they very much hoped we would turn down the request. This was easy to do at that time on the simple grounds that Churchill was not then a member of the Government and it would not be appropriate to honor his request. Moreover, it was fairly plain that his purpose in asking publication of the Quebec Agreement was partly at least to fill out his memoirs.

When Churchill came back to power the argument had to be shifted. At one stage I recall we had to say to him that while some purpose might be served by publication of the Quebec Agreement, that Agreement standing by itself would give a distorted picture of our atomic energy relationships over the years. The subsequent publication of Vandenberg's book [2] brought a good deal of the Quebec Agreement into public print. Churchill, however, did not come back at us as a result of this and the matter lay in limbo until Bermuda.

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[1] Reference is to the "Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy" approved by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec on Aug. 19, 1943; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 1117-1119.

At Bermuda Churchill raised with the President the question whether it might not be desirable to publish jointly a White Paper on our atomic energy relationships. [3] The President said he was agreeable in principle and directed Chairman Strauss to look into the matter. It was understood that no final decision would be taken, however, until the actual document had been reviewed by the two governments concerned. Both Eden and Cherwell made it plain to some of our people, as well as to Chairman Strauss, that they took a very dim view of the enterprise and would be glad if it never saw the light of day. Roger Makins has spoken in the same vein. His line is that there is no purpose to be served by dishing up ancient history, but that the thing to do is get on with the job of improving our relationships in this field unencumbered by any historical albatrosses. I certainly agree with this view myself.

Nevertheless the AEC staff has been engaged for several weeks in preparing a first draft of such a White Paper. After it has been reviewed by the Chairman it will be submitted to us and to the Department of Defense for review. What emerges from that process will presumably be sent to Cherwell for his comment. The Canadians have suggested, meanwhile, that they too should be consulted on the drafting of this document, and only today have gone further to suggest that its issuance—if and when—should be a tripartite affair. We have told them that—if and when—we would of course be pleased to have it issued on a tripartite basis.

That in brief, relatively, is the situation as it stands. I think that Churchill's reference to this matter in the House of Commons on December 17, [4] particularly as regards the necessity for further review by the two governments, was essentially correct.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

R. GORDON ARNESON

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[2] Reference is to Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., and Joe Alex Morris, eds., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952); see pp. 359–365.

[3] See the message from Churchill to Eisenhower, Dec. 7, 1953, p. 1289.

[4] See footnote 2, p. 1301.

600.0012/1-2754

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 27, 1954.

Subject: A Suggested Basis for a Plan to Carry out the President's Proposal, "Atomic Power for Peace"

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Atomic Energy Commission draft, subject as above, dated 13 January, 1954, [1] on the basis of the following broad criteria, which are considered to be of primary importance from the military viewpoint:

> "a. The provisions of the plan should not serve to increase directly the capabilities of any nation in the military application of atomic energy by virtue of its membership in or association with the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency;
>
> "b. Implementation of the plan should not result in any appreciable decrease in the atomic capability of the United States in the military field relative to that of the USSR;
>
> "c. In the proposed basis for establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency or in the treaty establishing such an agency, there should be no inference that the United States is prepared to accept international regulation of atomic armaments alone, thereby departing from its stated policy that 'International control of atomic energy is inseparably related to international regulation of armed forces and all other forms of armament' (see NSC 112); [2] and
>
> "d. Membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency should not preclude bilateral or multilateral arrangements in the atomic field outside the framework of the agency."

2. With the exception of the statement in paragraph 2, page 3, of the Atomic Energy Commission draft to the effect that the activities of the Agency "would begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles", which appears to be at variance with the actual facts as I understand them, the Atomic Energy Commission draft appears adequately to meet the foregoing criteria. I therefore concur with the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinion that this draft provides an acceptable initial basis for a plan to carry out the President's proposal, "Atomic Energy for Peace" and for the preliminary discussions which it is understood will take place during the Berlin Conference.

C. E. WILSON

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[1] Not found in Department of State files. Presumably it was an antecedent draft of the "Outline of International Atomic Energy Commission", Mar. 17, printed on p. 1372.

[2] For text of NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 447.

600.0012/2-254

### *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key)*

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] 2 February 1954.

DEAR DAVE: This letter is for you and, in the absence of Foster Dulles, for Bedell Smith and Bob Murphy as well.

I suspect, that at some highly inappropriate time in the near future, probably at some meeting of the Security Council, Vishinsky will echo the propaganda line now being put out by Molotov in Berlin—that we must agree not to use atomic weapons.

I would like to be in a position to give a quick answer which would be to the general effect that we would be glad to agree not to use atomic weapons except in self defense, and then, proceed to ask him why the Soviets did not cooperate with the President's plan of December eighth.

Will you give this a high priority and try to get it cleared quickly, so that I (and the U.S.) do not get caught flat-footed on this extremely crucial phase of the "cold war"?

Faithfully yours,

H. C. LODGE, JR.

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600.0012/2-854

### *The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 8, 1954.

DEAR CABOT: We appreciate the problem with which you may be confronted as a result of Molotov's disarmament proposals in Berlin. However, we would suggest that your rebuttal line be somewhat different from the one you recommend in your letter of February 2. [2]

The difficulty with a statement that we would agree not to use atomic weapons except in "self-defense" rests in the ambiguity of the term "self-defense". If, in the event of another Korea, we choose to retaliate directly against the source of aggression with atomic weapons, would that be "self-defense"? This is the type of situation we have to envisage in the light of Secretary Dulles' speech of January 12 [3] in which he said:

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[1] Drafted by Popper and Meyers of UNP.

[2] *Supra.*

> ". . . Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. . . .
>
> ". . . The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. . . ."

The Secretary's speech is, of course, based on recent decisions taken in the National Security Council.

We think the Soviet proposal to outlaw the use of atomic weapons can best be met in the following way. First, we should repeat our past assertion that we will not use atomic weapons or any other type of military force for aggression in violation of our Charter obligations.

Second, what the world wants is agreement on an effective disarmament program, not merely an agreement to give up the use of a particular weapon while continuing to stockpile it. This latter argument has been effective in the United Nations in defeating this type of Soviet proposal, particularly in connection with our own disarmament efforts.

For the time being at least, it would not be possible to ask Vyshinsky why the Soviets did not cooperate with the President's plan of December 8. The Soviets have not yet rejected that plan, and discussions on it are now going on in Berlin.

As soon as we know what if any decisions are taken on this problem at Berlin, we will, if you agree, elaborate the foregoing suggestions for use by you as appropriate. [4]

Sincerely,

DAVID MCK. KEY

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[3] For the full text of the speech by Secretary Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York, Jan. 12, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 107-110.

[4] On Feb. 9, Lodge responded as follows:

"Dear Dave: Thanks for yours of February 8. It is all very sensible. If Vyshinsky raises the question, I will plan an immediate rejoinder as briefly as possible, as follows:

" 'I am delighted to assure the Soviet Representative that, of course, we are glad to agree not to use atomic weapons for aggression or for any other violation of our Charter obligations for that matter, and I hope that he will indicate his willingness immediately to have his country join in a thorough-going international inspection system of all atomic facilities, whether in his country or in my country or in any other country where it is pertinent to do so. While we are glad to agree that we will not use the atomic weapon for aggression or in violation of our Charter obligations, I would point out to him that we wish to go further—that what we seek is an agreement on an effective disarmament program, not merely an agreement to give up the use of a particular weapon while continuing to stockpile it.' " (600.0012/2-954)

600.0012/2-954

## *The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1954.

DEAR CABOT: With regard to your letter of February 9[2] and the rejoinder to Vyshinsky on agreements not to use atomic weapons, I would like to suggest one slight technical change to emphasize an international control system rather than an "international inspection system". As you know, the concept of effective international control of atomic energy involves more than inspection, and I think it would be advisable to indicate this in your reply. Consequently, I would suggest that your rejoinder be somewhat as follows:

> "I am delighted to assure the Soviet Representative that, of course, we will not use atomic weapons or any other weapon for aggression or for any other violation of our Charter obligations for that matter. I hope that he will indicate his willingness immediately to have his country join in working out a disarmament program which will, among other things, eliminate atomic weapons as a result of an effective control system which would apply in his country or in my country or in any other country. While we are glad to agree that we will not use the atomic weapon or any other weapon for aggression or in violation of our Charter obligations, I would point out to him that we wish to go further—that what we seek is an agreement on an effective disarmament program, not merely an agreement to give up the use of a particular weapon while continuing to stockpile it."

Sincerely,

DAVID MCK. KEY

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP.

[2] See footnote 4, *supra*.

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## *Editorial Note*

On February 17 President Eisenhower submitted a "Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act" of 1946. During the course of his message, which covered both the foreign and domestic aspects of atomic energy, the President urged "that authority be provided to exchange with nations participating in defensive arrangements with the United States such tactical information as is essential to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel for atomic warfare. Amendments to the definition of 'restricted data' recommended later in this message will also contribute to needed administrative flexibility in the exchange of information with such nations concerning the use of atomic weapons." The President added that "In the development of peaceful uses for atomic energy, additional amendments are required for effective United States cooperation with friendly nations. Such cooperation requires the exchange of certain 'restricted data' on the industrial applications of atomic energy and also the release of fissionable materials in amounts adequate for industrial and research use. I therefore recommend that the Atomic Energy Act be amended to authorize such cooperation." In closing that section of his message dealing with international cooperation, the President stressed that "These recommendations are apart from my proposal to seek a new basis for international cooperation in the field of atomic energy as outlined in my address before the General Assembly of the United Nations last December." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954,* pages 260–269)

Documentation on the background of the President's message is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Central files, Confidential file, "Atomic Energy". Of particular interest is a letter from Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, to President Eisenhower, November 18, 1953, transmitting a statement on proposed changes in the Atomic Energy Act.

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600.0012/2-2454

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Merchant, EUR

The British Ambassador called on the Secretary this afternoon at his request in connection with President Eisenhower's atomic proposals. He first conveyed to the Secretary, Mr. Eden's thanks for the letter the Secretary had sent him during the closing days of the Berlin Conference. [2] He then handed the Secretary the attached *aide-mémoire*.

The Secretary said after a quick reading that on the whole the contents seemed sensible.

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[1] The initials of the Secretary of State appear on the source text; a handwritten notation indicates that the Secretary approved this memorandum.

[2] For text of the letter, dated Feb. 16, see volume VII.

The British Ambassador then raised two questions concerning the character of the participation of certain countries in the matter of the US memorandum which he understood was in the process of clearance within the US Government.[3] The Secretary indicated his regret at the delay which had occurred but he said that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would act on it within the next day or so. Sir Roger Makins then said that in the *aide-mémoire* given by Mr. Molotov to the Secretary in Berlin,[4] Canada had apparently been demoted from the original group which it was understood would be fully consulted in the preparation of the US memorandum. The Secretary referred to a letter which he had sent to Mr. Molotov in Berlin on this subject and pointed out that this apparent confusion in Mr. Molotov's mind had been clarified.[5] The Secretary confirmed that the US planned to secure the concurrence of the UK, Canada and France in the memorandum before it was submitted to the Soviets through Ambassador Zarubin in Washington.

Sir Roger Makins next raised a question concerning the role that Australia, South Africa and Belgium would play in the memorandum. He said that as he understood it they would be shown it but would not be allowed to comment. The Secretary referred to the fact that we are already behind our schedule but suggested that after the British Ambassador had actually seen the US memorandum he should let us have his further views on the matter of giving the three countries referred to above the right of submitting comments.

Sir Roger Makins then stated that we are agreed on the next step which was the exchange of memoranda. Thereafter, however, the British Government thinks that it should participate fully in any substantive discussions. In this connection he referred to the suggestion contained in the *aide-mémoire* that by transfer of the discussions to the UN Disarmament Commission a troublesome problem of Chinese and Czechoslovakian participation could be avoided.

The Secretary replied that he had an open mind on all of that but that he was most concerned that we should be resourceful and flexible. He said he was inclined to think that continuation of written exchanges with the Soviets might be best and added that this, of course, would enable complete substantive discussion with the

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[3] The memorandum entitled "Outline of an International Atomic Energy Agency", in its final form, was handed by Secretary Dulles to Ambassador Zarubin on Mar. 19; for text, see p. 1372. A draft of Feb. 22, which closely resembles the final version, is in file 600.0012/2-2254.

[4] For text of the reference *aide-mémoire*, Feb. 13, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 479.

[5] For the letter from Dulles to Molotov, Feb. 16, see *ibid.*, pp. 479–480.

British. He indicated that if for any reason this procedure proved inadequate, it might well be desirable to suggest to the Soviets referring the matter for further discussion to the UN Disarmament Commission. The British Ambassador appeared satisfied.

[Annex]

## *The British Embassy to the Department of State* [6]

SECRET

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. Her Majesty's Government have been examining the correspondence exchanged between Mr. Eden and Mr. Dulles in Berlin about President Eisenhower's atomic energy proposals.

2. Her Majesty's Government agree about the importance of conducting the forthcoming negotiations about these proposals with the maximum privacy and flexibility. They have no objection to pursuing the matter through diplomatic channels once the jointly agreed draft has been handed to Mr. Zarubin provided that there is full and direct participation of the United Kingdom in the ensuing discussions of substance.

3. At the same time, while Her Majesty's Government recognise that the course of future negotiations must depend to a large extent on the attitude of the Soviet Government, they hope that the possibility will not be excluded of using the United Nations Disarmament Commission for discussion of President Eisenhower's proposals if circumstances make it desirable. Not only could Chinese and Czechoslovakian participation thereby be prevented; but if the Soviet proposals about the banning of the use of atomic weapons are to be considered by the Disarmament Commission it might be tactically advantageous for the President's proposals to be afforded similar treatment.

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1954.

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[6] A handwritten notation by Merchant on the source text reads as follows: "Handed to the Secretary by Sir Roger Makins 5:30 p.m.—Feb. 25, 1954".

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 186th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, February 26, 1954* [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State; the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; Mr. Smith for the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the report and discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *Meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers* [2]

. . . . . . .

IV. *Atomic Energy Matters*

Secretary Dulles said that he had had two full talks plus a dinner talk with Molotov on the subject of the President's speech to the United Nations on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. [3] The next step will be the submission, through normal diplomatic channels, of a fairly elaborate statement of our plan to follow through on the President's proposal. Molotov had pointed out that if we were to have any conference on this subject, it would have to include Communist China. So, said Secretary Dulles, we can anticipate all the usual procedural hurdles before we ever get into a real negotiation with the Soviets on this subject. At every step the USSR invariably drags in Communist China, in order to convince the world that it is only our stubborness on this issue which blocks the solution of all the great problems that afflict the world.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Feb. 26.

[2] For the full record of Secretary Dulles' report on the Berlin Conference presented at this meeting, see volume VII.

[3] For accounts of the two full meetings, see telegrams Dulte 23, Jan. 31, and Dulte 71, Feb. 14, from Berlin, *ibid.*

The French, and especially the British, are very anxious to get into these talks on atomic energy more fully. We hope to have our own plan completed soon, a statement which Admiral Strauss confirmed. Secretary Dulles said that he had already agreed that the British and the Canadians should be brought into the talks when they had reached a certain level, since they were actually engaged in the production of atomic weapons. The French, the Belgians, and the South Africans, as suppliers of raw materials, would have to be brought in at a different level. But in any event, said Secretary Dulles, we must move ahead on this front very rapidly if we are to avoid embarrassment.

Ambassador Lodge confirmed Secretary Dulles' position by noting that he was under constant pressure to get this matter before the UN Disarmament Commission.

Secretary Dulles explained that the disarmament plan to which Ambassador Lodge was referring was quite a different issue from the President's proposal with regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He had made this distinction very clear in his discussions at Berlin, though the British had pointed out that if the two problems could be combined and submitted to the UN Disarmament Commission, the issue of Communist Chinese participation could be avoided. Secretary Dulles, however, doubted whether the Russians could ever be induced to agree to this procedure.

The President expressed some doubt as to whether the problem was as urgent as Secretary Dulles seemed to think. Secretary Dulles replied that he believed world opinion was very anxious to hear the follow-up on the President's proposal, and he very much hoped that our own U.S. position would be clear in no more than three weeks.

The President, pointing out that the problem was a vast one to deal with at one blow, inquired whether it could not go forward in a series of phases. Secretary Dulles said that this might be possible, but that the matter had already progressed so far that it was more desirable to rely on the present plan and to complete this plan as a matter of urgency.

. . . . . . .

S. EVERETT GLEASON

600.0012/2-2754

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 27, 1954.

Subject: Implementation of President's Proposals on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Participants: G—Mr. Murphy
EUR—Mr. Merchant
S/P—Mr. Bowie
S/AE—Mr. Arneson
UNA—Mr. Wainhouse
UNP—Mr. Meyers

It was agreed that copies of the memorandum outlining tentative U.S. views in amplification of the proposals for an International Atomic Energy Agency [1] would be handed to British and Canadian Embassy Representatives today. A copy would also be delivered to the French Ambassador on Monday, March 1. It will be stressed that this memorandum is an outline of U.S. views and not rigid; that the objective is to ascertain whether the memorandum provides a profitable basis for discussion with the USSR. Consequently, it will be suggested that the U.K., Canada and France give their general views on the memorandum, rather than direct their attention to the details. The memorandum will be transmitted at a later date to the Belgian, South African and Australian Embassies, for information rather than comment.

Mr. Merchant raised three questions concerning the memorandum.

First, what was the meaning of the provision that the USSR would be expected to make a donation toward the needs of the Agency equivalent to that of the U.S.? It was explained that this meant an equal donation on a comparative basis, permitting donation of different kinds of fissionable materials having the same value.

Second, did the reference to the Agency's authority to verify the status of allocated material inventories and to verify compliance with the terms of issuance imply rights of inspection? It was explained that this was correct.

Third, would the provisions for membership and for the governing body of the Agency, which referred to the fact that all signatory states would be members and suggested that in determining the Board of Governors prospective beneficiaries should be taken into consideration among other possibilities, mean that Communist China might be a member of the Agency or even on the Board of Governors? It was agreed that, while membership on the Board of Governors should be restricted to the present UN membership, States other than UN members might sign the treaty and that this conceivably could raise the question of Communist China participation. Mr. Murphy pointed out that it seemed clear from the present political climate in this country that it would be impossible for the US to accept Communist China as a member of the Agency.

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[1] See footnote 3, p. 1362.

The question of the appointment of the U.S. Representative to participate in these discussions with the Soviets was discussed. It was agreed that recommendation should be made for the speedy appointment of our representative. Mr. Arneson will prepare a memorandum to this effect.

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600.0012/3-554

## *The British Embassy to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden agreed in Berlin that study of the Soviet proposal for a ban on the use of atomic weapons and the preparation of any reply thereto should be undertaken jointly by United States, United Kingdom, French and Canadian Governments. No reply to the Soviet proposal need be made until the Soviet Union and its associates are in a position to reply to the *Aide Memoire* on President Eisenhower's proposals, which is still to be finally agreed, but thought should now be given as to what the reply should be.

2. It is Mr. Eden's view that the Western Powers could not without grave risk to their security agree to the Soviet proposal because

(I) Unless the Western Powers are free to strike with the weapons of which they have a preponderance, they will be placed at a serious disadvantage in war in view of the Soviet preponderance of conventional weapons.

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[1] This communication was delivered to Arneson by E. E. Tomkins, First Secretary, British Embassy. Arneson's memorandum of his conversation with Tomkins, dated Mar. 8, reads as follows: "In accepting the attached *Aide-Mémoire* from Mr. Tomkins, I said that, on the basis of a quick reading, the points made therein appear to be well taken; however we would not be in a position to comment usefully on the points made for some time. For the present our immediate objective was to see what sort of response we would get from the Soviets on the atomic pool proposal, a substantive paper which we hoped could be given to Ambassador Zaroubin fairly soon." (600.0012/3-554)

(II) Russian fears that the Western Powers might use atomic weapons against any aggression are the most powerful deterrent against such aggression.

(III) No ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction would be acceptable except as part of a disarmament treaty providing for a substantial balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments under an acceptable system of controls and safeguards.

3. On the assumption that these are also the views of the United States, Mr. Eden suggests that the reply to the Soviet proposal should take the line that the Western Powers are second to none in wishing to see weapons of mass destruction eliminated. They certainly agree that the disarmament system for which we are working should provide for the prohibition of the production, storing and use of atomic weapons. They have always maintained this and it has been provided for in every General Assembly resolution on disarmament. But the United Nations has also made it clear that world security can only come about through *balanced* disarmament and that security will not be achieved by singling out one aspect of disarmament for preferential treatment. Our desire is to prevent war of any kind, not any particular type of war and the Soviet Government cannot expect us to deprive ourselves of the weapons in which we have a preponderance unless they are also prepared to deprive themselves of the weapons in which they have a preponderance. We should be interested to know if the Soviet Union agrees that this question of the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction should be considered in connexion with reductions in conventional armaments. We still maintain that progress towards disarmament should be in the basis of the resolutions of the General Assembly, of which the most recent provides that the whole disarmament programme, including the elimination and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, should be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security were in danger.

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1954.

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600.0012/3-1054

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director in Charge of USSR Affairs (Stoessel)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1954.

Subject: Discussions with Soviet Union Regarding President Eisenhower's Atomic Energy Proposals

Participants: Ambassador Georgi Zaroubin
Mr. M. N. Smirnovsky, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., EE
Mr. Alexander Logofet, TC (translator)

Ambassador Zaroubin called at 12:00 noon today at his request. After reviewing the discussion at Berlin between the Secretary and Mr. Molotov regarding the question of which countries should participate at a later stage in the negotiations on the atomic energy proposals, Ambassador Zaroubin read a memorandum setting forth the views of Mr. Molotov in this connection. The Ambassador left with the Acting Secretary the Russian-language text of this memorandum, together with an unofficial translation thereof. A translation prepared in the Department is attached. [1]

The memorandum expresses the agreement of the Soviet Government to negotiate with the United States Government on a bilateral basis, leaving open the possibility of re-examination of the question of the participation of other countries. The memorandum notes that the opinion of the Soviet Government regarding the possible participation of Communist China in the negotiations was set forth in the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of February 13. [2]

The Acting Secretary thanked the Ambassador for this expression of the views of the Soviet Government. He said they would be conveyed to the Secretary upon his return to Washington [3] and that, in the light of the importance attached to this subject by the Secretary, he would probably wish to arrange another meeting between the Ambassador and himself in the next *near* future.

The Acting Secretary noted his personal view that it was advisable to keep the discussions on a bilateral basis for the present, since he had observed that whenever progress had been made in negotiations between the United States and the USSR it had usually been as a result of bilateral talks. The Ambassador agreed, saying that there would be no point in bringing five or six countries into the discussions if agreement had not first been reached between the United States and the USSR.

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[1] The attachment is not printed. For the translation of the Russian memorandum, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 480.

[2] For text, see *ibid.*, p. 479.

[3] Dulles was at Caracas to attend the Tenth Inter-American Conference, documentation on which is in vol. IV, pp. 264 ff.

600.0012/3-1654

### *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bechhoefer)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1954.

Subject: Paper Entitled "Outline of an International Atomic Energy Agency." [1]

Participants: Mr. Murphy, G
Mr. Arneson, S/AE
Mr. Bowie, S/P
Mr. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Wainhouse, UNA
Mr. Bechhoefer, UNP

Mr. Arneson referred to the comments received from the British and French and Canadians on the original draft of the paper. The French had no substantial comments.

After some discussion it was agreed that the following changes would be made in the paper to meet constructive suggestions made by the British and the Canadians:

1. In accordance with suggestions made by the British, the final phrase of the preamble in paragraph I should be changed to read as follows: "from those member countries *having* stocks of such materials, to be used for the following objectives".
2. In accordance with suggestions made by the Canadians, the following words would be added to paragraph I, a: "and to foster an exchange of information".
3. In accordance with a suggestion made by the British, paragraph II, F would be amended by striking the final phrase "such as at the seat of the United Nations or Geneva."
4. In order to meet the most important suggestion made by the British, paragraph II G would be redrafted to read as follows:

> "*Relationship to the United Nations and Other International Bodies*
>
> The Agency should report to the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly when requested by either of these organs. The Agency should also consult and cooperate with other UN bodies whose work may be related to that of the Agency."

It was agreed that it would not be advisable from the political standpoint at this time to accept the British suggestion that the Agency should accept contributions of uranium and thorium ores. This matter could be ironed out in later discussion.

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[1] For the text of the proposal as submitted to the Soviet Union on Mar. 19, see *infra*. A draft which closely resembles the final version is in file 600.0012/2-2254.

It was also agreed that it would be inadvisable to follow the Canadian suggestion for spelling out a more definite relationship of the proposed Agency to the United Nations on the theory that the Agency would be a Specialized Agency within the meaning of Chapter 9 and 10 of the Charter. While the Agency has some characteristics of a Specialized Agency, in other aspects it is quite different. The Canadian suggestion for spelling out more closely the relationship to the United Nations is the exact antithesis of the British suggestion which we have accepted for dealing with the matter less specifically than in the original draft.

It was agreed that we should suggest to the British that the proposed statement of the British Foreign Minister in Parliament set forth in the final paragraph of the British letter should not include the remark that it is merely for reasons of convenience that the United States will act as a "post-office" with the Russians. It was further agreed that we should inform the British that we *would communicate* these proposals in confidence to Portugal just before they are given to the Russians.

It was also agreed that at an appropriate time the proposals might be communicated to the North Atlantic Council. Mr. Arneson indicated that he *and Mr. Wainhouse* would talk to the British and Canadians about their suggestions and our reaction to them.

Mr. Bowie proposed to redraft the paper which could be transmitted to Ambassador Zarubin as soon as a clean copy was prepared.

Mr. Murphy suggested that the Secretary of Defense's Office should be informed of the results of this meeting and referred in that connection to the request of the Secretary of Defense in a letter to Mr. Murphy of March 5, [2] that the Department of Defense be included in all discussions and actions on this matter. Mr. Murphy indicated that an affirmative response should be made to this request and it was agreed that UNA carry out this responsibility through its regularly established channels.

Mr. Arneson suggested that the changes accepted in the meeting had the concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission.

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[2] Not printed. (600.0012/3-554)

600.0012/3–1754

## *Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1954.

Subject: U.S. Atomic Energy Proposal

1. Attached is a memorandum outlining a U.S. proposal in conformity with the President's speech to the U.N. of December 8.

2. This is now believed to be suitable for submission to the Soviet Union. [2] The draft proposal was prepared largely by the AEC after discussions with State and Defense. This was submitted for comment to the British, Canadians and French, and more informally to the Belgians, South Africans and Australians.

3. The British and Canadian comments were considered at a meeting with Messrs. Murphy, Merchant, Bowie, Arneson and Wainhouse. [3] The attached version of the proposal has been revised to include the changes suggested by the British and Canadians which were considered acceptable. These are not believed to change the substance of the original proposal.

4. The Department of Defense and the AEC have both indicated their approval of the proposal in the original form. The minor revisions referred to have been informally cleared with Defense and AEC.

[Attachment]

## *Memorandum Prepared in the United States Atomic Energy Commission*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1954.

### OUTLINE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The United States Government wishes to submit additional tentative views amplifying the proposals for an International Atomic Energy Agency as presented by the President of the United States to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953:

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[1] Cleared by Merchant, Wainhouse, and (in draft) by Arneson. Sent through Robert Murphy.

[2] A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the attached memorandum was "handed to Zaroubin on 3/19/54 by the Secy." See the memorandum of conversation, p. 1376.

[3] *Supra.*

I. *The Objectives of the U.S. Proposals*

The U.S. proposes that there should be established under the aegis of the United Nations an International Atomic Energy Agency to receive supplies of nuclear materials from those member nations having stocks of such materials to be used for the following objectives:

a. to encourage world-wide research and development of peaceful uses of atomic energy by assuring that engineers and scientists of the world have sufficient materials to conduct such activities and by fostering the interchange of information.

b. to furnish nuclear materials to meet the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities including the eventual production of power.

II. *The International Atomic Energy Agency*

A. The Agency would be created by and derive its authority under the terms of a treaty among the participating nations. To the greatest extent practicable, the treaty should define standards and principles which would govern the Agency in the discharge of its functions.

B. Membership—all signatory states would be members of the Agency.

C. Governing Body

1. The highest executive authority in the Agency should be exercised by a Board of Governors, of limited membership representing governments. In determining the composition of the Board of Governors, it might be desirable to take account of geographic distribution and membership by prospective beneficiaries. It is expected that the principal contributors would be on the Board of Governors.

2. It is suggested that decisions of the Board of Governors generally should be taken by some form of majority vote. Arrangements could be worked out to give the principal contributing countries special voting privileges on certain matters, such as allocations of fissionable material.

D. Staff—The Staff of the Agency should be headed by an administrative head or general manager, appointed for a fixed term by the Board of Governors and subject to its control, and, of course, include highly qualified scientific and technical personnel. Under the general supervision of the Board, the administrative head should be responsible for the appointment, organization and functioning of the Staff.

E. Financing

1. Funds for the central facilities and fixed plant of the Agency and its research projects should be provided through appropriation by the participating states in accordance with a scale of contributions to be agreed upon. It is suggested that it might be possible to

utilize the general principles governing the scale of contributions by individual members to the UN.

2. Funds for specific projects submitted by member nations to utilize the materials or services of the Agency should be provided by the recipient country concerned through specific arrangements in each case.

F. The administrative headquarters of the Agency could be located at a place mutually agreed upon.

G. Relationship to the United Nations and Other International Bodies—The Agency should submit reports to the UN Security Council and General Assembly when requested by either of these organs. The Agency should also consult and cooperate with other UN bodies whose work may be related to that of the Agency.

H. The facilities of the Agency would include:

1. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issuance of nuclear materials.

2. Physical safegaurds.

3. Control laboratories for analysis and verification of receipts and inventory control of nuclear materials.

4. Necessary housing for administrative and other activities of the Agency not included in the preceding categories.

5. Those facilities, as might in time be necessary, for such purposes as education and training, research and development, fuel fabrication and chemical processing.

III. *Functions of the Agency*

A. Receipt and Storage of Materials

1. All member nations possessing stocks of normal and enriched uranium, thorium metal, U-233, U-235, U-238, plutonium and alloys of the foregoing would be expected to make contributions of such material to the Agency.

2. The United States would be prepared to make as a donation, a substantial initial contribution of nuclear material towards the needs of the Agency. The USSR would make an equivalent donation towards these needs.

3. The Agency would specify the place, method of delivery, and, when appropriate, the form and composition of materials it will receive. The Agency would also verify stated quantities of materials received and would report to the members these amounts. The Agency would be responsible for storing and protecting materials in a way to minimize the likelihood of surprise seizure.

B. Allocation of Materials by the Agency

1. The Agency would review proposals submitted by participating members desiring to receive allocations of Agency stocks in the light of uniform and equitable criteria, including:

a. The use to which material would be put, including scientific and technical feasibility.

b. The adequacy of plans, funds, technical personnel, etc., to assure effective use of the material.

c. Adequacy of proposed health and safety measures for handling and storing materials and for operating facilities.

d. Equitable distribution of available materials.

2. Title to nuclear materials would initially remain with the Agency, which would determine fair payment to be made for use of materials.

3. In order to insure that adequate health and safety standards were being followed, and in order to assure that allocated fissionable material is being used for the purposes for which it was allocated, the Agency would have the continuing authority to prescribe certain design and operating conditions, health and safety regulations, require accountability and operating records, specify disposition of by-product fissionable materials and wastes, retain the right of monitoring and require progress reports. The Agency would also have authority to verify status of allocated material inventories and to verify compliance with the terms of issuance.

4. Information about all transactions entered into by the Agency would be available to all members.

C. Information and Service Activities of the Agency

1. All member nations possessing information relevant to the activities of the Agency would be expected to make contributions from that information to the Agency.

2. In addition to data developed as a result of its own activities, the Agency would have available:

a. Data developed by participating countries as a result of the utilization of the materials, information, services, and other assistance of the Agency.

b. Data already publicly available in some of the countries.

c. Data developed and previously held by principals or other members and voluntarily contributed to the Agency.

3. The Agency would encourage the exchange of scientific and technical information among nations, and be responsible for making wide dissemination of the data in its possession.

4. The Agency would serve as an intermediary securing the performance of services by one participating country for another. Among the specific activities the Agency might provide would be the following:

a. Training and education.

b. Services concerned with developing codes for public health and safety in connection with the utilization of fissionable materials.

c. Consultative technical services in connection with the establishment and carrying on of programs.

d. Processing of nuclear materials (i.e., chemical separation and purification, fabrication of fuel elements, etc.).

e. Supply of special materials, such as heavy water.

f. Design and supply of specialized equipment.

g. Special laboratory services such as conduct of experiments and tests.

h. Aid in making financial arrangements for the support of appropriate projects.

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600.0012/3-1854

## *Memorandum by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Wainhouse)*

[NEW YORK,] March 18, 1954.

1. You will recall that President Eisenhower in his speech to the General Assembly of December 8th said: ". . . I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps—*NOW* . . . . The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is *instantly* prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved.' . . . To *hasten* the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people, and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken *now.*"

2. I am being continually pressed by the Canadians and others as to when in the light of the President's statement we can expect some action on this matter.

3. When the President made this statement James Reston, the diplomatic expert of the *New York Times* said that for the first time since the end of World War II the U.S. has seized the initiative.

4. Why the delay? Cannot the rest of us in the Executive Branch keep faith with the true spirit of the President's great speech?

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600.0012/3-1954

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Zaroubin, Soviet Ambassador
Mr. Merchant—EUR
Mr. Smirnovsky, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Logofet—TC (interpreter)

At 12:30 this afternoon the Soviet Ambassador called on the Secretary at the latter's request.

The Secretary stated at the outset that he had told Mr. Molotov in Berlin that after further consultation within the United States Government it was planned to transmit to the Soviet Government through Ambassador Zaroubin a proposal outlining plans for the peaceful use and development of atomic energy. The Secretary thereupon handed the original and one carbon copy of the United States Government plan to the Ambassador.[1] He added that he hoped in due course to receive the comments of the Soviet Government on this document.

The Ambassador said that he would transmit this document immediately to his government and that he had no doubt that its comments would be forthcoming. He said that before he left Berlin he had spoken to Mr. Molotov on this subject and that the latter was awaiting our proposal with interest.

The Secretary then asked the Soviet Ambassador if his proposed press release on this conversation (copy attached)[2] was agreeable to the Ambassador. The latter said that it was and thereupon took his leave.

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[1] For text of the U.S. proposal, see p. 1372.

[2] For text of the press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 29, 1954, p. 465.

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600.0012/3-1854

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Wainhouse) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)*[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1954.

Subject: Progress in Implementing the President's December 8 Proposals

1. Your memorandum of March 18[2] asks when action may be expected to implement the President's proposals, particularly steps "to hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people . . .". Action on this matter is progressing along two lines: private discussions with the USSR on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and a U.S. governmental review of our basic policies on disarmament.

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer and Meyers.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1376.

2. The private discussions with the USSR on peaceful uses of atomic energy have progressed to the point where, as you know, the Secretary handed Soviet Ambassador Zarubin on March 19 a copy of our tentative views outlining the organization and functions of an International Atomic Energy Agency. [3] I enclose a copy of this outline for your own information. Prior to its transmittal to the USSR, the outline was discussed with UK, French and Canadian representatives and their general concurrence obtained to the document. The details of this outline have not been made public.

3. The review of basic disarmament policy is now taking place with the participation of the State Department, Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission and CIA. The most recent developments in connection with this matter are reflected in NSC Action #1035, dated February 11, 1954:

"*U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments* (NSC Action Nos. 899-c and 959-a; NSC 112) [4]

a. Noted an oral report by Mr. Cutler on the status of the work of the Special Committee appointed to review the current policy contained in NSC 112, with particular reference to the international control of atomic energy, pursuant to NSC Action No. 899-c.

b. Noted the President's desire that the above-mentioned Special Committee expedite the completion of its review of the policy contained in NSC 112 and report to the Council its findings and recommendations thereon."

4. We are informed that even with maximum expediting of this review, it will take several months before it can be completed. [5]

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[3] For text, see p. 1372.

[4] For NSC Action Nos. 899 and 959, see footnotes 3 and 4, pp. 1212 and 1246, respectively; for NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

[5] In a letter of Mar. 25, Lodge responded to Wainhouse as follows:

"Dear Dave: I received your top secret memorandum of March 20th.

"Frankly, it is not very enlightening and does not give me much that I can tell the Ambassadors here.

"I think this President's speech of December 8 made it perfectly clear that he was in a tremendous hurry to get this thing started. Nothing in your memorandum indicates any hurry or any intention to hurry.

"Unless I hear any news from you to the contrary, I must merely give evasive answers and stalls when I get questions here.

"In the light of the tremendous impression which the President's speech made on December 8 this is rather a pitiful anti-climax." (USUN files)

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Telephone Conversations"

### *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss), Monday, March 29, 1954, 10:30 a.m.* [1]

The Secretary called and mentioned the explosion. [2] S. said it was grossly exaggerated by those who wish we did not have such a weapon and don't care if Russia has it. Nothing was out of control. Nothing devastated. The Sec. said that was not correct from our point of view. Japan and England are upset. S. said the Japanese were inside the warning range; otherwise they would not have heard the explosion six minutes after seeing the flash. [3] The Sec. asked if another one were planned; confidentially, he said, one was held Friday. He said a large piece of the ocean is patrolled, but difficult to see ship even on radarscope. How the tuna was contaminated, he doesn't know. Many things suspicious. The Sec. said international law is involved—can we have an operation that destroys all living things in an 800-mile radius? S. said not a single person was destroyed. No effect on fish. Under the blast, the fish would be killed.

The Sec. said the effect was serious. S. asked what he wanted done. The Sec. said he didn't know but suggested bearing in mind the tremendous repercussions these things have. It should be kept under control. The general impression around the world is we are appropriating vast area of the ocean for our use and depriving other people of its use. There is panic re the fish being contaminated, etc. Some feel the British Isles could be wiped out, and so they better make a deal on the best terms possible with the Russians. S. described the islands around Bikini as being tiny. S. said the time has come for a careful explanation, and guesses he better do it this week. [4]

The Sec. referred to a message re Stassen and Aldrich having talked with Churchill. C. volunteered he was being pressed to request no more tests, but he said he would refuse to answer questions Tuesday. [5]

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[1] Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau of the Office of the Secretary.

[2] Reference is to the U.S. hydrogen bomb test which occurred in the Marshall Islands on Mar. 26. Regarding U.S. testing, see the editorial note, p. 881.

[3] The hydrogen bomb test of Mar. 26 resulted in the contamination of a Japanese fishing vessel and its crew. For documentation on the diplomatic repercussions of this occurrence, see volume XIV.

[4] Strauss read a prepared statement on the subject at the President's news conference of Mar. 31; for extracts, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 548–549, and *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1954, pp. 163–165.

[5] From March to May 1954, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill corresponded on several occasions regarding atomic energy questions. Their exchanges are documented in volume VI.

S. said there were 5,000 people within 30 miles on Friday and 5,000 within 40 miles. Nobody got any radiation. There were no special precautions.

The Sec. said it would be a good thing if something could be said to moderate wave of hysteria. It is driving our Allies away from us. They think we are getting ready for a war of this kind. We could survive but some of them would be obliterated in a few minutes. It could lead to a policy of neutrality or appeasement. They might go into the Soviet-proposed agreement that we will each agree not to use it. We can either go on as we did before not relying on their promises or if we stop, we know they will be going on. The Sec. wants him to say something that will bring this back to the realm of reason.

S. said as far as closing of a large area is concerned, it is done only during the period of tests. An area from Florida to the Bahamas and an area on the West Coast is closed permanently for rocket tests. No one said anything. The British and others who have military establishments do the same thing. But this brought the whole thing in for questioning.

S. asked if any progress had been made with Zarubin matter? No, except they are studying memo. The Sec. said he does not expect an answer for a month. S. said good. The Sec. said he thinks it will drag on and there will be a renewed effort to get discussions on their proposal. S. asked if he got anyone to do what he wanted McCloy to do? He said no, as he feels it will be a long while before the matter is very active. Probably, we will get some questions in a month, which we can answer easily. He is not sure it will reach the point of high-level negotiating. S. agreed on the Sec.'s thinking.

S. said in the next couple of days, he would like to come over and report more fully. The Sec. will call him.

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330.13/4-154

## *Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1954.

Subject: UK Proposal for Immediate Meeting of United Nations Disarmament Commission.

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNA.

*Discussion*

1. Minister R. H. Scott of the British Embassy spoke to me this morning [2] on instructions from London, to request U.S. assent to meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission commencing next week. [3] The UK has spoken similarly to the French. Mr. Eden must respond on Monday, April 5 to Parliamentary inquiries why discussions on disarmament have not been held, and believes it vital to explain that the Disarmament Commission is about to meet on these matters.

2. The British propose that the Commission should set up the subcommittee, suggested in the General Assembly resolution of November 28, 1953, to carry on private discussions on disarmament. [4] The subcommittee should probably be limited to the United States, United Kingdom, France and USSR, although their instructions are not firm on composition. This accords with the Four Power Agreement reached at Berlin on February 18, 1954 to exchange views on disarmament. [5] Discussion in the subcommittee should be concentrated on the basic principles of disarmament, with pressure on the Soviets to clarify their views on the general principles set out in the resolution establishing the Disarmament Commission. Any discussion on atomic energy matters should be excluded on the basis that these issues are to be discussed in the private U.S.-USSR talks on the President's December 8th proposals and the Soviet response.

3. This UK proposal coincides with certain views in the Department on the tactics which we should employ in this field. I have also spoken to Cabot Lodge, who agrees with this course of action; and is inclined to think we should join the UK in requesting the Commission meetings. He wants a top-flight adviser if these meetings are brief but believes he needs a full-time Deputy for this if the discussions are extensive.

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[2] A copy of the memorandum of conversation is in file 330.13/4-154.

[3] A notation in the source text at this point reads: "*Aide-Mémoire* attached." A copy of this *aide-mémoire* is in file 330.13/4-154.

[4] On Mar. 25 Meyers of UNA had drafted a memorandum of conversation concerning talks he had previously held with James George of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations during the Conference on World Disarmament and Development at New York, Mar. 25-26. At that time, George had said that, in Meyers' words: "The Canadians believe that the private US-USSR discussions do not constitute the 'subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution' according to operative paragraph 6 of the General Assembly's November 28, 1953 resolution. Consequently, they believe that, in the light of this resolution and the Four Power statement at Berlin agreeing to an exchange of views on disarmament in accord with paragraph 6 of the November 28 resolution, there should be a meeting of the Disarmament Commission to consider whether to establish this kind of subcommittee to carry out these stated functions." (330.13/3-2554.)

[5] See the editorial note, p. 1355.

4. I believe we should agree with this course of action, since it will help to provide time to carry out the basic review of disarmament policy now under way while concentrating fire on Soviet deficiencies. It will obviously be of great help to the British Government.

*Recommendations*

That we support this British proposal and inform the UK Embassy in time for Mr. Eden's Parliamentary statement on Monday that we will join them in this request for Disarmament Commission meetings. [6]

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[6] A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Approved April 2, 1954, JFD." Murphy had telephoned Lodge on Apr. 1 to tell him of the British request, to which the Ambassador had given his immediate assent, later telephoning Murphy that UN members and the "USUN saw no objection to" the Disarmament Commission meeting being held the following week. (Memorandum of conversation, by Murphy, Apr. 1, 1954, 330.13/4-154) Dulles informed the USUN in priority telegram 459, Apr. 2, that he had approved the British request for the meetings to commence the week of Apr. 5, and requested the USUN to coordinate its actions with the British and French Delegations. (330.13/4-254) Also on Apr. 2, Australian Counselor of Embassy F. J. Blakeney informed Raynor of BNA that Australian Minister for External Affairs R. G. Casey had made a statement on Mar. 31 calling for a UN Disarmament Commission meeting "on a stated and early date." (330.13/4-254) On the same day, Murphy telephoned Scott at the British Embassy to inform him that "the U.S. would go along with" the British proposal. Scott later requested approval of the British inclination for a tripartite rather than a bilateral proposal. Lodge reported to the Department in telegram 599, Apr. 8, that British Ambassador to the United Nations Sir Pierson Dixon had explained to Vyshinsky that it was the British view "that the business of the Disarmament Committee" on the following day should be "limited to setting up a subcommittee" to "consist of the four powers and Canada", to which Vyshinsky replied that it would be "difficult to deal with disarmament without China." Dixon added that he intended to introduce a short resolution establishing a subcommittee to meet hopefully by Apr. 14. (330.13/4-854) On Apr. 9, in telegram 605 to the Department, Lodge proposed a brief statement of three paragraphs to be used if the proposal was to include the People's Republic of China, asserting that the United States was opposed to the inclusion of that country in the subcommittee for the same reasons it was opposed to its admission to the United Nations. (330.13/4-954) In telegram 606 of the same date, Lodge sent the Secretary the text of a draft resolution establishing the subcommittee, which Dixon had agreed to that afternoon and referred on to London. (330.13/4-954) Meanwhile Wainhouse contacted British Embassy First Secretary Barbara Salt and informed her that Dulles "would take up with Mr. Eden," when he saw him, "the question of where the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission should meet". She agreed that "this was a very desirable method of solving the problem." (Memorandum of conversation, by Wainhouse, Apr. 9, 330.13/4-954) Dulles and Eden met in London, Apr. 12. (Memorandum of conversation, by Merchant, Apr. 12, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287)

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## *Editorial Note*

On April 5, 1954, the House of Commons adopted an opposition resolution recognizing the threat to civilization posed by the hydrogen bomb and urging that the heads of government of the United

States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union meet to reconsider the question of regulation of armaments. During the course of the debate on the motion, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill disclosed the provisions of the Quebec Agreement of 1943. For documentation on this episode, see volume VI. For the record of the debate in the House of Commons, see *H. C. Deb.* 5th series, volume 526, cols. 36 ff. For text of the Quebec Agreement, see *Foreign Relations,* The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pages 1117–1119.

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330.13/4-1254: Telegram

### *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State*

SECRET NEW YORK, April 12, 1954—2 p.m.

611. Re Disarmament. Introduction in the Disarmament Commission by India of Nehru's parliamentary statement makes it essential that we take an immediate position on the question of moratorium of all future tests of nuclear weapons. Unquestionably we would reap great political benefits if we could announce our willingness to forego further tests of nuclear weapons, provided the USSR agrees to the same thing. Would it be possible, without losing any of the political benefits, to limit the moratorium on the tests to nuclear weapons of megaton magnitude on the ground that only in connection with tests of this magnitude do we have "built-in" safeguards through our ability to detect explosions? While I am, of course, not in a position to judge whether such a moratorium would be consistent with US security interests, I have been told that a proposal of this kind would have certain strategic benefits for US and deficits for the Soviet Union.

We urgently request a US position on this matter as soon as possible.

LODGE

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600.0012/4-1254

### *The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1954.

DEAR FOSTER: I am writing to you relative to the lack of progress made to date by the Special Committee created by NSC Action No.

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[1] Copy to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

899c [2] in developing recommendations as to possible new United States courses of action in the field of disarmament in general and the control of atomic energy in particular. Apart from our responsibilities to the National Security Council, recently re-emphasized by NSC Action No. 1035, [3] world-wide public sentiment resulting from the recent hydrogen bomb experiments has focused attention more sharply than ever before on the problem of disarmament. I have no doubt that we will now be subject to a variety of pressures in the forthcoming meetings of the Disarmament Commission toward the adoption of a disarmament plan relating to atomic energy alone and lacking proper safeguards.

In view of the foregoing, it is my view that if the United States position of a comprehensive disarmament plan with proper safeguards is to be effectively maintained and expanded, we should have the benefit of a complete review of the problem by all interested agencies. I am sure that you will agree with me that such a study as is required by these circumstances and which the President has had in mind for some time can be most effectively accomplished by utilizing the combined resources of the three interested agencies. Accordingly, in order that the Department of Defense may be in a position to contribute effectively to this task, I have directed the establishment of a special working group headed by Major General Herbert B. Loper, USA (Ret.), formerly Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and currently a consultant to my office, to develop the aspects of this problem of primary concern to this Department. I propose that General Loper meet at the earliest opportunity with appropriate representatives of the Department of State and of the Atomic Energy Commission in order that this study may be initiated with a minimum of delay.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. WILSON

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[2] For NSC Action No. 899, see footnote 3, p. 1212.

[3] For text, see the memorandum by Wainhouse to Lodge, Mar. 20, p. 1377.

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330.13/4–1354: Telegram

## *The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 13, 1954—4:02 p.m.

483. Verbatim text. Limited distribution. Following is portion of Telegram 4523 of April 13 from London, dealing with discussions between Secretary and Eden on UN Disarmament Commission:

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer.

"UN Disarmament Commission. Eden raised possibility of Disarmament Commission meeting in London about May 7. UK regards this as cold war exercise designed to put Soviets on spot and believes USSR vulnerable since they have always insisted that any sanctions be subject to veto in SC. Eden thought it important to have disarmament discussions on comprehensive plan in London so that it would not get intermingled with debates in SC on Arab-Israel and other matters. I told Eden that if it would help UK to have discussions in London I would go along. I also told him that I thought Disarmament Commission talks should be separate from discussions on President's December 8 proposal re atomic energy which was a different aspect of atomic problem and should be carried on through diplomatic channels, at least for coming period. Eden agreed. Re report that suggestion might be made for Disarmament Commission to meet in Paris rather than London, Eden and I both agreed that meeting in Paris would be most unwise. Eden commented that meeting in London would get Jules Moch out of Paris which would be helpful for EDC".

SMITH

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600.0012/4-1454

## *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NEW YORK, April 14, 1954.

DEAR FOSTER: We seem to be losing a good part of the advantage which the President gained for us in the cold war on December 8 because there is no publicity whatever on the follow-up. The fact that you and Zarubin are having talks makes no impact on the public mind. The thing that is making an impact on the public mind are the pleas from the Communist world to abandon future tests of the hydrogen bomb. Is there no possibility in the near future of getting the President's December 8 proposals into the Disarmament Commission where we can develop some good publicity?

Faithfully yours,

CABOT L.

600.0012/4-1254

### *The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In Secretary Dulles' absence I am writing to answer your letter of April 12 [2] regarding the urgent necessity of a complete review of the problems of disarmament, in accordance with NSC Actions 899c and 1035 (SecDefContNo.TS–1160). I thoroughly agree with your view that a comprehensive review of this problem is required immediately, and that it can be most effectively accomplished by utilizing the resources of the Departments of Defense and State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

In line with your suggestions for expediting this effort, representatives of the AEC and of the Department of State met April 14 with your representative, General Loper, and members of his working group in order to initiate this study. I expect that the review will progress rapidly and, indeed, it is necessary that this be done to meet the exigencies with which we are now faced.

I assure you that the Department of State shares your concern that the United States maintain effectively its position that any disarmament program must meet the fundamental test of effective safeguards to ensure the compliance of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions or violations. I am confident that the combined effort of our respective Departments and the Commission will enable us to achieve this goal.

Sincerely,

[File copy not signed]

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[1] Drafted by Meyers on Apr. 15; a copy was sent to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1383.

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### *Editorial Note*

At its 35th meeting, April 19, 1954, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted a resolution establishing a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and Canada. For text of the resolution, UN doc. DC/49, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I, page 413. The subcommittee, instructed to submit a report to the Commission by July 15, 1954, held its first meeting in New York on April 23 and decided to meet again in London on May 13.

On May 4, President Eisenhower nominated Moorehead Patterson, a New York business executive, to be Deputy United States Representative on the UNDC and head of the United States Delegation to the meetings of the Subcommittee of Five at London. (Department of State Press Release No. 229, May 4, 1954, 330.13/5-454)

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600.0012/4-1454

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY [WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1954.

DEAR CABOT: I have your letter of April 14. In some matters, it is necessary to choose between publicity and the possibility of really getting results. I think we may get some results on the President's proposal if we work privately. I am sure we shall get none if we work publicly. Therefore, I think we should stick to the private exchanges for the time being—at least unless the possibility of progress vanishes.

I have for some time been talking to the President and others about a moratorium on H-Bomb experiments. I also discussed it with Eden in London. I think this is an area where we have a chance to get a big propaganda advantage—and perhaps results.

Faithfully yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Exchange of Notes with USSR"

## *Study Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1954.

### REPLY TO RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

#### I BACKGROUND

On December 8, 1953 before the United Nations General Assembly, the President, having dwelt on the potential horror of atomic warfare, stated that the United States is prepared "to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race" in private or diplomatic talks and to carry into these talks "a new conception". The President then set out what has become known as his Atom-Bank proposal. Among the objectives of this proposal he listed, "First—

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[1] Drafted by Alexander Bickel of S/P.

encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material . . . ," and "Second—begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles."

The first Russian reaction to the President's speech was public and proposed that the United States join with the U.S.S.R. in an agreement outlawing use of nuclear weapons. [2]

In the course of discussions among the interested departments of our own Government subsequent to the President's speech, the decision was formed that, despite possible contrary constructions, we would regard the speech as having made a new proposal for peaceful development of atomic energy which is essentially unrelated to the problem of control or abolition of nuclear weapons. At a meeting with the President on January 16, [3] it was agreed that while the U.S. would press for entirely separate negotiations on the President's proposal as thus narrowly conceived and would not be drawn into negotiations on the subject of control or abolition of nuclear weapons, we would listen to any proposals which the USSR cared to submit on that subject. Our readiness to listen was made known to the USSR. On January 19, 1954, in the course of private procedural conversations, Ambassador Zaroubin, referring back to the first public Soviet reaction to the President's proposal, reiterated to the Secretary of State that the Soviet Government would wish its own proposal for outlawing use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction to be considered in the course of negotiations. [4]

In Berlin, on January 30, Mr. Molotov handed the Secretary of State a formal version of the Russian outlawry proposal. [5] This was in the form of a draft declaration of the Governments of the United States, England and France, Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union. These governments would declare that they are determined to deliver humanity from the threat of destructive war with use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction; that they are desirous of promoting peaceful utilization of atomic energy; that they consider unconditional renunciation of the use of the weapons above mentioned to be in conformance with the purposes of the United Nations and to be a step toward elimination of such weapons from national armaments and toward the establishment of strict international control guaranteeing that they will not be used; and that they solemnly undertake the unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary told Molotov that he would examine the Soviet proposal and that he for his part would hand Zaroubin in Washington an amplification of the President's proposal.

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[2] See telegram 745 from Moscow, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 1302.

[3] For a summary of the meeting, see p. 1342.

[4] The conversation is described in telegram 487 to Moscow, Jan. 19, p. 1345.

[5] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 479.

In Washington on March 19 the Secretary handed Zaroubin a paper elaborating on the President's proposal as narrowly conceived within our government. [6] A press release issued on the same date stated in its last paragraph: "The Soviet Government has also transmitted to the United States Government certain proposals in connection with the general subject of atomic matters. These proposals are under study."

## II THE PROBLEM

The United States stands committed in general terms to consider any Soviet proposal privately made on the subject of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the U.S. stands committed to register some reaction to the Soviet outlawry proposal made to us once by Zaroubin and the second time more formally by Molotov. An answer to be conveyed to the Russians at an appropriate time must therefore be formulated.

## III DISCUSSION

The practical effect—if any—of the unenforceable paper on outlawry now proposed by the Russians would be slight.

In the past the Russians were accustomed regularly to propose outlawing possession as well as use of nuclear weapons. The present proposal would have us foreswear only use. The Russians speak of it as a step toward eliminating atomic weapons from military establishments. They, therefore, clearly do not contemplate that their proposal would in itself do so. The reason for this change in the Russian position is doubtless that the Russian military establishment itself now assigns a substantial role to atomic armaments and that the Russians propose to continue to do so. That means, inescapably, that they propose to retain the freedom to use their atomic weapons when they deem such use to be in their interest, solemn declarations to the contrary notwithstanding.

In so far as any sanction is concerned we, like the Soviets, would retain complete freedom of action following signature of the proposed Russian declaration. There would arise from that declaration a certain moral obligation to which in the nature of things our Government and our people would be more sensitive than would the Communists. Yet it is open to question to what extent that moral obligation would as a practical matter have an inhibiting tendency on our freedom of action over and above that which exists anyway.

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[6] For text, see p. 1372.

The decision whether or not to employ atomic weapons is, by statute, for the President. We recognize it as an important one, upon which considerations other than strictly military ones have a bearing. In making it, the President will doubtless have regard for its effect on the governments and peoples of our allies and indeed on public opinion throughout the non-Communist world. It is exceedingly doubtful that the President would decide to use atomic weapons unless the act of aggression to which he was responding had so alarmed and outraged the free world that world public opinion could be expected to support his action. Under such circumstances, it is exceedingly doubtful that the fact of our adherence to a declaration such as the Russians are now proposing would make a substantial difference. It would have been known that under the declaration both the Russians and we have retained atomic weapons, and the implications of that fact bearing on Russian intentions and *bona fides* would not have been lost upon a world disenchanted by a decade of cold war.

All that having been said, it remains true nevertheless that in the event we should be the ones to make first use of atomic weapons, the proposed declaration could be a propaganda weapon in Russian hands; a weapon perhaps not of much use with enlightened opinion in the free world, but a weapon just the same; after all, even the germ warfare charges had some effect. Secondly, if we sign a declaration such as this, even though the atomic weapon would retain the same place in our military establishment which it now holds, there being no compulsion growing out of the declaration to assign another and more minor role to it, we would have to refrain from making any public statements concerning its use. Thus, even though the declaration might impose no inhibition which does not now exist upon strategic planning or military action on our part, it might impose a new inhibition on our diplomatic freedom of action, so far as diplomacy consists of making clear, where appropriate for deterrent purposes, what one is prepared to do in case of trouble. (It should be mentioned, however, that the fact of our preparedness is really the more important element in a deterrent than the spoken word.)

The upshot of this analysis is that, everything else being equal, it would be inconvenient for the United States to adhere to such a declaration as the Russians are proposing, but that the question presented for us by the declaration is one to which the answer lies in a balancing of conveniences and not, as was the case with the proposal to outlaw possession of nuclear weapons, in critical security considerations. It follows therefore that our position may vary with the time at which the question is put to us.

Three major factors not heretofore mentioned could weigh in the balancing of conveniences, or change the question into one critically affecting our security. These three factors are:

1. A governmental decision, which we have not yet made but are in process of reaching, determining whether or not it would be in the national interest of the U.S. to limit or eliminate atomic armaments, and whether or not, given an affirmative answer to the first question, a reasonably secure plan achieving such limitation or elimination can be found;
2. Russian seriousness in pursuing negotiations for the limitation or elimination of atomic armaments, and Russian receptiveness to proposals looking to that end; and
3. World public opinion jitters at the prospect of atomic devastation as opposed to the feeling that our possession of the atomic weapon, being a potent deterrent, is a factor making for peace.

These three factors will bear some analysis.

If we should decide that atomic disarmament is not in our interest or not feasible, we will have no interest in influencing the Soviet government toward a favorable position looking to such disarmament and no interest in convincing them of our own seriousness in the matter. We will not care about their private feelings, but deal with them only with an eye to world public opinion. Should our decision, however, as is quite possible, go the other way, it will be in the national interest that we take every step to convince the Soviets of our serious desire for disarmament and to ease the position within the Soviet Government of those officials who from the Soviet point of view also favor disarmament. But should it become clear that the Soviets have reached a firm position against disarmament and are not seriously negotiating about it, we would once more be free to deal with them with an eye only to public opinion. Finally, opinion in the free world ever since Hiroshima has vacillated between a sense of horror at the thought of atomic war which it is difficult to think of as exaggerated, and the Churchillian view that the atomic weapon has bought us what peace we have had since V-J Day. A recent outburst of the first current of opinion, particularly in Britain, has forced us to renewed meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, which are also inconvenient for us. It is not inconceivable that world public opinion may in the future, for a time at least, generate a great deal of feeling along the same lines. It could well get to the point where substantial groups of people feel that any sort of peace, with or without honor, is preferable to devastation with hydrogen bombs. At such a time, it may not be a misstatement of the choice open to us to say that we would be forced either to make a gesture such as adherence to the Russian resolution now before us or risk a very serious threat of neutralism in strategic places.

At present the situation with respect to the three factors just discussed would appear to be as follows: We ourselves don't know whether or not we seriously want disarmament. The Russians have given every appearance of seriousness, but only in the limited area circumscribed by the President's proposal as narrowly construed. Neither of the first two factors mentioned is therefore really in play as yet. So far as world opinion is concerned, it is clear that the governments of our two principal allies, that is Britain and France, do not at first blush consider the Russian proposal a serious matter. The British seem inclined, for example, in the Disarmament Commission, to pursue aspects of the old U.N. plan. Moreover the Russian proposal was made to us in strict secrecy and on the basis of Russian performance in these negotiations so far there seems to be some ground for expecting that our answer will be kept secret as well. World public opinion is, therefore, also not yet in play.

It would thus seem we can for the present afford to reject the Russian proposal. But our rejection should be couched in reasoned and calm tones, and should not fail to leave us with a possible, though not explicitly indicated, line of retreat which we might wish to take in the future in light of different circumstances.

## IV RECOMMENDATION

The attached reply [7] in the form of an *aide-mémoire* to the Russian proposal should be adopted as a U.S. position. The Secretary of State should be authorized to communicate this reply to the Soviet Government, in its present form or in any other form he may deem appropriate, orally or in writing, at such time as in his tactical judgment may be suitable.

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[7] The draft reply was not with the source text and has not been found in Department of State files.

330.13/4-2154

## *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1954.

Subject: Reply to UK *Aide-Mémoire* on tactics in the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee.

*Discussion*

1. Miss Salt of the British Embassy on April 21 handed the attached *Aide-Mémoire* (Tab B) to Mr. Wainhouse, requesting an urgent response. This *Aide-Mémoire* makes three principal points:

(a) Discussion in the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee should be directed toward the general principles which must govern any disarmament program. We agree with this.

(b) The basic position of the Western powers should be that prohibition of all mass destruction weapons is acceptable, under certain conditions set forth in the *Aide-Mémoire*. We do not support this formulation, since it can be interpreted to permit agreement to prohibition of atomic weapons prior to establishing an effective international control system. We suggest any formulation of our position can be developed by a Four-Power working group.

(c) Suggested tactics if the U.S.S.R. does not appear at the subcommittee on April 23. We have already dealt with this in a telegram to USUN, and the Mission has contacted the UK Delegation.

2. A suggested *Aide-Mémoire* in reply (Tab A) is attached, incorporating our attitude reflected above.

*Recommendation*

That, if you agree, Mr. Wainhouse or I will hand our own *Aide-Mémoire* to a UK Embassy representative. [2]

[Tab A]

## *The Department of State to the British Embassy* [3]

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State refers to the United Kingdom *Aide-Mémoire* of April 21, 1954 [4] concerning the line to be taken by the

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP.

[2] Murphy's initialed "OK" appears on the source text.

[3] A working copy of this *aide-mémoire*, also in the 330.13 file, indicates that it was drafted by Bechhoefer on Apr. 23. There is no indication when this *aide-mémoire* was handed to British officials.

[4] Tab B, below.

United Kingdom, France, Canada and the United States at the forthcoming meetings of the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Department of State is in agreement with the suggestion that the discussions initially should be directed toward the general principles which must govern any disarmament program and that, starting from this position, the Four Governments should be able to press the Soviet representative for clarification of his Government's attitude on the basic principles of disarmament and to show that the Soviet Union is responsible for the lack of progress.

The Department of State, however, does not agree with the formulation contained in the United Kingdom *Aide-Mémoire* concerning the circumstances under which the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would be acceptable, since under this formulation the agreement to prohibit weapons of mass destruction could precede the establishment of effective international controls to ensure the observance of the prohibition.

The Department of State heartily supports the view of Her Majesty's Government that a Four-Power Working Party should meet in London three or four days before the date chosen for the first substantive meeting of the subcommittee to work out a finally agreed course of action, depending on whether or not there actually are subcommittee meetings in the event of a Soviet boycott. This meeting could, among other matters, devise an initial formula to indicate our acceptance of the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as a part of a comprehensive disarmament program. The general United States position on this subject is set forth in the proposal of the United States to the Disarmament Commission on April 24, 1952 entitled "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program". [5] This meeting would also consider the type of questions which should be put to the Soviet representative, which we agree should be generally along the lines suggested in the United Kingdom *Aide-Mémoire*.

It would be extremely helpful to the United States Government if the meetings of the subcommittee in London could be postponed until May 13 or thereabouts. The Four-Power Working Party would then commence its discussions in London approximately on May 9. The Department of State believes that this postponement could readily be justified because of the unanticipated delays in setting up the subcommittee, delays which have been occasioned by the attitudes and positions of the Soviet Union.

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[5] See the editorial note, p. 895.

The Department of State has communicated with the United States Mission to the United Nations concerning the tactics if the Soviet Union boycotts the subcommittee and the Mission is in communication with the British Delegation on this matter.

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[Tab B]

## *The British Embassy to the Department of State*

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

### DISARMAMENT

Now that the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission has been set up the Foreign Office have been considering what line should be taken at meetings by the United States, France, Canada and the United Kingdom.

On the assumption that the Russians attend, it is essential that the Allied Powers should agree on the policy to be adopted. The Foreign Office therefore propose that, as suggested in paragraph 6(b) of the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of April 1 (ref. 1199/44/54),[6] discussion should be directed towards the general principles which must govern any disarmament programme. This course would be in accordance with the Resolution tabled by the French in Berlin which was supported by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden.

Her Majesty's Government accordingly propose that the Western Powers should take as their basic position the proposition that the prohibition of all atomic and hydrogen weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction is acceptable provided:

(a) that it is accompanied by simultaneous and major reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces to agreed levels and carried out to an agreed timetable, and

(b) that there must be agreement on the machinery for enforcing the prohibition and reductions. Such machinery must be in existence from the beginning of the prohibition and reductions. Provision will have to be made to enable the United Nations to reach positive decisions in respect of violations, i.e. the enforcement measures must not be subject to the veto.

Starting from this position the Allies should then be able to press the Soviet Representative for clarification of his Government's attitude to the basic principles of disarmament and to show that the Soviet Union is responsible for the lack of progress. The type of question which the Foreign Office consider should be put to the Soviet Representative is:

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[6] See footnote 3, p. 1381.

(i) whether there is agreement that Disarmament should cover both conventional and novel types of weapons;
(ii) whether it is agreed that there should be agreed measures of disclosure and verification of existing levels of armaments and armed forces on which the reductions can be based;
(iii) whether it is agreed that the object of Disarmament should be not only to abolish the more obnoxious forms of warfare, but war itself by removing the disparity between the armaments and armed forces of the major world powers by means of a programme of balanced reduction;
(iv) whether there is agreement that States must be prepared to give facilities to the Control Organ sufficient to enable it to guarantee that evasions shall be detected, even if this entails some derogation from the normal concept of State sovereignty;
(v) whether there is any agreement on the enforcement procedure, e.g. whether this can be devised so as to avoid the use of the veto.

Mr. Eden considers that the above proposals would enable the Western Powers to retain the initiative and, when publicity is given to the Subcommittee's conclusions, to make it clear to public opinion that they are ready to deal constructively with all aspects of disarmament, including atomic and hydrogen weapons. Further, the Allies would retain freedom of manoeuvre and would not become involved at an early stage in a detailed discussion of any one aspect of disarmament before agreement had been sought on the basic principles.

If the Soviet Government decide to boycott the Subcommittee Mr. Eden still thinks that it would be to our advantage for the remaining members to meet and to draw up a report for the Disarmament Commission. Such a report might elaborate the main principles enumerated in para. 3 above, and present them as the basis for a thorough debate in the Disarmament Commission in which the Soviet Government which had refused to participate in the work of the Subcommittee would be placed at a serious disadvantage. A decision by the Western Powers to proceed with the work of the Subcommittee despite the Soviet Union's refusal to participate would underline the hollowness of the Soviet Government's claim to be one of the leading advocates of world disarmament. There would also be advantage in showing that the Soviet Union has not got the power to prevent discussion in the United Nations on matters of vital concern to the whole world. The whole practice of the United Nations is that committees and subcommittees can proceed with their work in the absence of one of their members. There seems to be no reason why this practice should not be followed in the case of the Disarmament Subcommittee. A seat should, however, always be left vacant for the Soviet Representative and the Subcommittee's records should be made available to the Soviet Government on request.

If the other Allied Governments are in agreement with the foregoing suggestion, the British Representative will, if the Soviet Representative does not attend the meeting of the Subcommittee on April 23, move an adjournment of the meeting until April 26. In so doing he would express regret that the Soviet Representative had decided not to be present and the hope that the Soviet Government had not reached a final decision not to cooperate in the work of the Subcommittee. He would explain that his motion for adjournment was made in order to give the Soviet Government a final opportunity to reconsider their attitude.

At the meeting on April 26 Mr. Eden hopes that the Subcommittee would decide to meet in London on May 6, as has already been provisionally agreed between the Four Western Powers.

It is further suggested that if agreement is reached to establish the Subcommittee in London, a Four-Power Working Party should meet in London three or four days before the date chosen for the first substantive meeting of the Subcommittee to work out a finally agreed course of action.

It would be appreciated if the above proposals could be studied urgently in the Department of State with a view to communicating the preliminary reactions of the United States Government to the Foreign Office as soon as possible.

Similar representations are being made to the Canadian and French Governments.

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1954.

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330.13/4-2354: Telegram

## *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, April 23, 1954—6 p.m.

658. For the Acting Secretary.[1] Re: Disarmament. In disarmament subcommittee meeting this morning which lasted from 11 to 3 o'clock without a break, Vyshinsky reserved his right to raise

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[1] Dulles was at Paris addressing the North Atlantic Council on the new conventional role which the United States planned to assign to nuclear weapons in strategic planning. For the text of Dulles' statement at the closed Ministerial session, Apr. 23, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 509.

again at future meetings of the subcommitee question of including Communist China, Czechoslovakia and India. [2]

Vyshinsky also reserved his position on question of subcommittee meeting in capitals other than London.

On both of these points I made it clear, both in this morning's meeting and to press afterwards, that I did not agree with Vyshinsky's ideas.

My estimate of the Russian play is that they may well try to get subcommittee to meet in Moscow. They would then make a move to have Chinese Communists invited to come to subcommittee and express their views on hydrogen bomb, etc.

These developments would be very disadvantageous to us and I know you would agree that the people who represent us in London should be very alert to prevent this happening.

LODGE

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[2] Vyshinsky subsequently incorporated his objections to the exclusion of the People's Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, and India from subcommittee membership in a letter to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, which Lodge transmitted to the Department in telegram 661, Apr. 23. (330.13)

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396.1 GE/4-2854: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT GENEVA, April 28, 1954—11 p.m.

Dulte 19. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President and eyes only Wilson and Strauss from Secretary. The memorandum which Molotov handed me yesterday in answer to our memorandum of March 19 [2] takes position that Soviet will not consider President's proposal for peaceful use of atomic energy until there is first agreement between Soviet Union and United States renouncing the use of atomic weapons, and the memorandum concludes that in regard to the questions mentioned in United States memorandum of March 19, "the insufficiencies and one-sidedness of which is obvious", they might be made the subject of additional studies upon reaching agreement on fundamental questions.

I have advised Eden and Bidault in general terms, and Eden has asked for copy of Soviet memorandum.

The Soviet memorandum of April 27 is expressed to serve propaganda ends. Consideration should be given as a matter of urgency to handling of publicity. I shall probably be seeing Molotov before I leave, and should probably arrange with him for some simultaneous communiqué.

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[1] The Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina was held from Apr. 26 to July 21. Secretary Dulles attended the opening sessions, returning to Washington on May 4. The principal documentation on the conference is presented in volume XVI.

[2] For text of the U.S. memorandum, see p. 1372.

Unofficial translation full text being transmitted Dulte 18. [3]

DULLES

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[3] Telegram Dulte 18 from Geneva, Apr. 28, is not printed. (600.0012/4-2854) For text of the Soviet memorandum of Apr. 27, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 482–484.

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330.13/4-2854

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs*

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 28, 1954.

Subject: United States Position on Scope of Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee Meetings and on Atomic Energy Control Plan.

Participants: Miss Barbara Salt, 1st Secretary, British Embassy
James McCardle, 2nd Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Jean de la Grandville, Counselor, French Embassy (4/29)
Ward P. Allen EUR
Howard Meyers UNP

Miss Salt, Mr. McCardle and Mr. de la Grandville came in separately on request, in accord with a previous commitment to keep their embassies informed regarding U.S. attitudes towards various aspects of the impending London meetings of the UN Disarmament Commission's subcommittee of five. We explained that we expected the views set forth below would be reviewed at the working party meetings in London commencing May 10.

We stated that the United-States believes that the subcommittee deliberations should include consideration of the atomic energy control problem, because of the US desire to be able to concentrate discussion in the US-Soviet bilaterals insofar as possible on the President's December 8 proposals, the need to maintain a proper relationship between the atomic and non-atomic aspects of disarmament in the subcommittee meetings, and the adverse reaction of world opinion should we attempt to exclude the atomic energy control question from the subcommittee's deliberations. We explained that the US has for some time been reviewing general policy toward disarmament; hoped to conclude this review in the near future; and would not wish to imply that the fact of the review necessarily would bring about any changes in past US positions. Prior to this time, we had to be prepared to express our views on atomic energy control in the Disarmament Commission subcommittee, if asked, and the attached position, which was handed them, was governmentally approved.

We added that these views were being presented now in order to give the British, Canadian and French governments advance indication of the US attitude on these matters before the working party meetings in London.

None of the embassy representatives had any notable comments to make and expressed appreciation for this information.

[Annex]

## *Position Paper*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

### POSITION ON UN CONTROL PLAN [1]

We think it is obvious that any acceptable disarmament system must maintain the necessary inherent relationship between the international control of atomic energy and international regulation of armed forces and other forms of armaments. Further, we believe that such disarmament program, both as regards its atomic and non-atomic elements, must meet one fundamental test: that of effective safeguards to ensure compliance of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions or violations. (See Secretary's September 17, 1953, statement to GA.) [2] The proposals which US has introduced in UN in past, whether individually or in conjunction with UK and French Governments, have all been designed to meet those tests. We have said before and emphasize again that beyond insistence on these principles, US is not inflexible in its attitude nor do we believe that our proposals are necessarily the only ones which meet these criteria. In fact, we are constantly reviewing our disarmament positions to examine present validity of our past proposals in light of recent developments. We hope that other states will do likewise. We assure the members of subcommittee that we will seriously examine any new proposals made by others and that we will put forward any ideas as we develop them.

This position conforms in substance to GA resolution of January 11, 1952, [3] which established DC, and which in para. 3 directed

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[1] This position was also communicated to USUN in telegram 527 to New York, Apr. 28. (330.13/4-2854)

[2] See the editorial note, p. 1215.

[3] See the editorial note, p. 845.

Commission to be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Commission was further directed that "Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the UN plan for the international control of AE and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."

In particular, we require from USSR a clear and detailed explanation of its attitude on those elements basic to a system which will ensure that nuclear weapons will be effectively prohibited as part of a general disarmament program. Furthermore, we believe it is incumbent on Soviet Union to explain its views on question of effective safeguards for all elements of a comprehensive disarmament plan, since this problem has been principal point at issue in past between USSR and other members of this subcommittee.

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396.1 GE/4-2954: Telegram

### *The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY GENEVA, April 29, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 24. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. I received from Eden on April 28 the following note: [1]

"My Dear Foster: I was much interested in your statement at the restricted meeting of NATO about the thinking of the United States Government on the use of nuclear weapons. [2]

As you then said, many considerations besides purely military ones must be taken into account in deciding in any given case whether or not there is a balance of advantage in using them, and, if so, where.

We had some talk about this at Bermuda and I hope that we may soon be able to resume those talks. But meanwhile, you know our strongly held views on the need for consultation before any decision is taken.

In addition I think that it should be useful if we had some further word while we are in Geneva on what we talked about in London. I shall also be grateful if you will let me have a copy here of Molotov's note of yesterday, which I understood you to say concerned the President's proposals for peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Yours ever, Anthony."

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[1] The original copy of Eden's note is in the Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, "Atomic Weapons". The original contains the following handwritten notation in addition: "This was dictated before I had the pleasure of lunching with you today. Yours ever, Anthony."

[2] See footnote 1, p. 1397.

On April 29, I handed Eden the following answer:

"Dear Anthony: I have your note of April 28. I share your hope that we can carry on in Geneva our talk in London.

I enclose herewith a copy of our unofficial translation of Molotov's note of April 27. It is rather disheartening.

Sincerely Yours, Foster."

DULLES

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum by Alexander Bickel of the Policy Planning Staff to the Consultant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1954.

RUSSIAN NOTE OF APRIL 27

It seems to me that from the point of view of public reaction, the most damaging point made by the Russian note is this: The Russians say in substance that we talked big in public before the U.N., emphasized the perils of the atomic age and suggested that we desired to meet them and were prepared to come forward with a new approach to them, but, when it came to private talks, we revealed our real position which is quite different. Our real position is that we want to continue the atomic armaments race. All our vaunted new approach turned out to be was a piddling proposal for an insignificant international pool. This shows our bad faith.

The line of attack I have just outlined is, unfortunately, supportable by reference to some of the more eloquent passages in the President's speech of December 8, compared with which the paper we actually handed the Russians looks sick.

The fact that we are open to this damaging line of attack argues that we ought to do everything we can to preserve secrecy about these bilateral dealings. Should we, however, fail, it is imperative that we attempt to make an answer to this point. Our answer might be as follows:

The President's speech correctly stated this country's position. We realize the dangers of the atomic period and would like to mitigate them, if this can be done without prejudice to our security. But, experience has taught us the difficulties. We tried to negotiate disarmament before. So we thought perhaps a gradual approach might ease matters. That was the central idea of the President's speech. We have acted on that idea, and presented the rudiments of a plan to get started. We have no panaceas, no total immediate solution, and the President promised none. We hoped that if the Russians would in good faith join with us in the small beginning we have proposed, greater things might follow. That requires the Russians to negotiate in good faith. We stand ready to listen. But the Russians are not answering us on the merits.

Our statement should next proceed to answer the Russian proposal on outlawing use of atomic weapons. This should follow the lines of the *aide-mémoire* we agreed on.

A. M. BICKEL

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OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "President's UN Speech"

## *Progress Report of the Working Group of the Operations Coordinating Board* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 30, 1954.

### PROGRESS REPORT OF WORKING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S UN SPEECH, DECEMBER 9, 1953 TO MARCH 10, 1954

#### I. SUMMARY

On December 9, 1953, the Operations Coordinating Board established an interdepartmental committee to follow up on the President's UNGA speech of the day before. Chaired by Mr. C. D. Jackson, the new group sought to insure that resultant statements and action in the public information field would support national security policies.

The group worked with non-OCB-member agencies as required, maintained appropriate private and congressional contacts, and kept in touch with Government machinery for substantive atomic policy.

Domestic activities included cooperation with UN information officers on quick, priority media coverage, including commercial channels, and specific plans, projects and action assignments for the participating agencies. The working committee also prepared recommendations for the domestic release of the Ivy film, [2] and developed a program to counter Soviet propaganda against the film, for Board action. The group also contributed to exploitation of relevant portions of the President's messages on the State of the Union and on modernizing the Atomic Energy Act.

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[1] A covering memorandum by Elmer Staats, Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board, to the OCB, dated May 7, reads as follows: "Attached is the subject report which was noted by the Board Assistants on behalf of their principals at their meeting on April 30, 1954. The previous draft of this report dated April 23 and the draft Summary dated April 27 are obsolete and may be destroyed in accordance with the security regulations of your agency." No copies of the reference report and summary have been found. Ellipses in this document are in the source text.

[2] The paper, approved by the Operations Coordinating Board Assistants, Mar. 26 is not printed. (P/PG files, lot 60 D 661, "Ivy")

The committee also coordinated the overseas exploitation of the speech, handled primarily through a U.S. Information Agency program of the first magnitude, which included exhibits, films, collections of books and other materials, and other media activities in a long-range and continuing program.

In an effort to maintain the initial successes of the speech and its exploitation, the Board on March 10 approved "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's Speech . . .". This paper, which was produced by the working group, brought the initial planning effort near to a close. [3]

## II. THE PROGRAM: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

At the request of the OCB in its meeting of December 9, Mr. C. D. Jackson agreed to ". . . assume chairmanship of a high-level Board committee to steer the follow-up activities in connection with the President's speech before the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953." The agreed membership included State, USIA, CIA, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. The immediate exploitation of the speech had been handled thus far by an informal working group, which this action superseded.

The Board acted after receiving Mr. Jackson's December 9 memorandum [4] which anticipated important questions which the speech would raise, particularly on sharing the peaceful benefits of atomic energy with the world. The memorandum proposed the OCB coordination of follow-up activities to ensure that "the resultant statements and actions in the public opinion field will be in support of current U.S. national security policies."

The OCB continued at subsequent meetings to give attention to the problems of the new group, both administrative and substantive, including action on December 22 to ensure adequate coordination between the working group and the independent interdepartmental committee on substantive atomic policy. [5]

Appropriate non-OCB-member agencies were asked to participate in the domestic phase of exploitation, in a letter from Mr. Jackson of January 19, [6] which enclosed a check list of suggested agency actions. The proposal recognized both existing government coordination efforts under State and the AEC and the need for new coordinating machinery for the future. It resulted in the establishment of periodic meetings of the appropriate OCB staff representative with press officers of interested Executive agencies on problems of exploiting the speech domestically, so that appropriate newsbreaks could be generated for USIA to report overseas.

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[3] The reference paper is not printed. A copy is in P/PG files, lot 60 D 661, "President's UNGA Atomic Speech, IV" together with earlier drafts and comments prepared by the Working Group for Exploitation of the President's UN speech.

[4] *Ante*, p. 1293.

[5] A copy of the minutes of the OCB meeting of Dec. 22, 1953 is in OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "OCB Meetings, I".

[6] Not found.

For specific projects and problems, liaison has been developed by the working group or participating agencies, with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and with private institutions, organizations and individuals in the United States and abroad. The exploitation program has included certain unattributable activities.

At its meeting of March 10, [7] the OCB approved a major working group paper entitled, "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank proposals in the President's UN Speech of December 8, 1953." This action authorized the development of a program to provide ". . . guidance for effective coordination of the domestic and overseas information follow-up . . . so as to insure that public statements and resultant actions are in support of current U.S. national security policies," and brought an initial planning phase near to completion.

At the March 3 and 10 meetings, [8] the Board also considered the future approach of the Government to atomic information problems in a broader context, and "directed the Assistants to submit recommendations with regard to over-all coordination of public statement, information and timing of projects relating to the question of atomic energy . . ." The purpose of the directive was ". . . to produce recommendations by the Assistants as to the extent of OCB responsibility in these important fields and as to what if any additional responsibilities the Board or other agencies might be charged with by the National Security Council." A memorandum to the Board on this subject was under development as this report closed.

### III. REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES TO MARCH 10

A. *Domestic*

The principal working group began at its first meeting to act on domestic problems of exploiting the President's speech, including policy decisions, administrative arrangements and specific action projects. Members of the initial exploitation team in Washington advised and assisted UN information officers to develop top priority foreign and domestic coverage on short notice, through the UN and commercial channels serviced by the UN. For example, five American TV networks and four radio chains carried the entire speech live, all network shows presented excerpts, and additional releases were made on kinescopes and recorded radio broadcasts. The UN Film Division provided a complete color film for FCDA, and 16 commercial newsreels covered the entire speech (overseas and domestically). Edward R. Murrow used a part of the speech on "See It Now".

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[7] A copy of the minutes of this meeting is in OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "OCB Meetings, I".

[8] Copies of the minutes of these meetings are in OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "OCB Meetings, I".

Subsequent to Mr. Jackson's letter of January 19, the domestic aspects were handled primarily by "Group No. 2", the press and information officers' working group described in II above, working on the basis of check lists of actions keyed to a running calendar of events. The basic program paper, which was approved by the Board on March 10, contained plans, projects and action assignments to agencies in the domestic field which were accomplished as follows:

*The Department of State:* Distributed by mailing list some 4,700 copies of the speech, captioned "Atomic Power for Peace," to local and national organizations; publications, key individuals, radio and TV outlets and display libraries; sent out 1,000 copies of the speech in response to requests; made reference to the President's proposals on atomic power in New York address by Secretary Dulles before the Council of Foreign Relations; developed liaison with magazine and feature press through personal contacts and furnishing of information on economic implications of nuclear power; began plans to send the speech to 10,000 non-metropolitan editors; made initial distribution of "Questions and Answers on The Atom for Progress and Peace" in 10,000 copies and released the speech in a new format.

*Atomic Energy Commission:* The burden of supplying the "raw material" on peacetime applications of atomic energy and of reviewing for security, accuracy and policy consistent with AEC domestic operations has fallen on the AEC.

The AEC on December 15, designated two members of its public Information Staff to coordinate this supply and review service. Since that date, practically every AEC operating division and installation has been involved in supplying the material needed by other agencies, principally USIA.

About 40 USIA, State and CIA staff attended a specially arranged seminar at AEC early in January. Before the FCDA had prints available, the Official Use Only version of the Ivy Film was shown to principal staff members of the interested agencies.

Chairman Lewis L. Strauss has emphasized the importance of the President's program in his public addresses, beginning with his speech to the Washington Conference of Mayors on December 14. Other Commissioners also have highlighted the proposal in public appearances.

Film, still pictures, reprints of pertinent articles, AEC reports and bulletins have been supplied in quantity to USIA. Policy guidance on spot news stories is given, especially to the Voice of America. AEC representatives have participated regularly in various OCB group and staff meetings and taken part in the evaluation of the various proposed promotion ideas.

*The Department of Defense*, while relatively conservative in its domestic treatment, made considerable progress in starting a long-range program to reach all components of the Department, and plans to give it continuing and concentrated attention. Defense's activities included: circulation of the speech to key personnel through an Air Force Information Series Letter and development of an Armed Forces Talk, "Atomic Energy in your Future," based on the President's address. This is the most thorough current Defense effort. It will be distributed down to platoon level in the Army and Air Force for use in weekly discussions with all personnel, plus another 160,000 copies for other Services and outlets, and several additional thousands for local project officers on Armed Forces Day, May 15, and for private institutions and schools.

Defense is also publishing 20,000 copies of a speakers' guide for Armed Forces Day, keeping alert for additional opportunities to increase understanding of the project through its regular contacts with hundreds of organized groups, and continuing to explore all profitable avenues of public understanding within the military establishment.

*The Foreign Operations Administration* has distributed copies of the speech to all key employees. Governor Stassen has stressed the significance of the December 8 proposals in repeated staff conferences, and referred to their world implications in all of his addresses since December 8. The speech is included in FOA briefing kits for visiting organizations, and FOA speakers are instructed to use the President's main points wherever possible. FOA has also enclosed copies of the speech with FOA materials requested by mail, and briefed its entire staff on the guidance points highlighted by Mr. C. D. Jackson at the regular White House meeting of the information operators on December 11.

*The Department of Agriculture* will be prepared at appropriate times to include references to atomic energy and its application to agriculture in speeches of the Secretary and top officers, and may find occasion to do a special speech or more, largely on that subject. It will be ready when appropriate to stimulate newspapermen to treat the same topic. It is also preparing a television film short on the use of atomic energy in agricultural research, for distribution to 80 stations carrying farm program material from the Department. The film uses scenes from the President's speech delivery and some AEC footage.

*The Department of Labor* has mailed hundreds of copies of the State Department's Question and Answer fact sheet to its specialized list of publications (Labor Press Service, Negro Press, etc.), with explanatory notes, and is considering a program to distribute 10,000 copies of the State-printed pamphlet "The Atom for Progress and Peace" to its own employees, union and labor press officers and groups, and Departmental field officers.

*The Department of Justice* has distributed the speech to its key personnel and emphasized the need for discussing it in their public appearances.

*The Department of Health, Education and Welfare* has ordered 5,500 copies of the speech for distribution to key officials, and arranged to reprint it in the Office of Education's *School Life* (10,000 circulation), and to carry excerpts in Public Health Service's *Public Health Reports* (12,000 circulation). The subject will be mentioned in speeches by Department speakers whenever appropriate, and additional future actions are to be considered.

*The Office of Defense Mobilization* distributed this speech to key employees, and undertook continuing use of the theme in addresses by ODM officials. It distributed copies, plus State's "Questions and Answers" to members of the Health and Resources Committee, which represents U.S. medical and health professions, and will distribute them where appropriate to business and labor leaders, scientists and educators through various ODM committees. Selections from the speech will be referred to in the next ODM Report, which has wide distribution.

*The Treasury Department* distributed the speech with an explanatory memorandum to its key officials, gave copies of the State "Questions and Answers" pamphlet to Washington and field officers, and provided them with guidance on points to be emphasized in official speeches. Secretary Humphrey has mentioned the speech on several public occasions and is expected to use excerpts from it in a recording for nation-wide use by Junior Chamber of Commerce groups.

*The Federal Civil Defense Administration* has made three distributions of the complete text. The first was in its *Daily News Digest* of December 9, 1953, which was mailed to 3,500 State Governors, Congressional leaders, agency heads, key organizations, and Federal, State and local civil defense officials.

The second was an appendix to the printed report of the White House Conference of Mayors on National Security to mayors of all U.S. cities over 5,000 population and other selected circulation totaling 10,000. An accompanying "FYI" pointed up the close link between the President's words and civil defense, and urged frequent reference to the address in civil defense articles and speeches.

In addition, a public booklet containing the full text of the UN address, with marginal notes, and a foreword by FCDA Administrator Val Peterson, was produced and given a select distribution of 5,000.

Both the Administrator and Deputy Administrator in their speeches, as well as FCDA booklets and releases, have continued to quote pertinent parts of the UN address.

*General*

*The Ivy Film:*

After extensive preliminary consideration by the principal OCB working group and the Board Assistants, the Board took action at its meeting of March 10 on the unclassified public version of the motion picture film "Operation Ivy," produced in classified form under the auspices of Joint Task Force 132. It illustrates the effect of exploding a thermo-nuclear device in the fall of 1952. It was produced for AEC and Defense and made available to FCDA by AEC last September. The OCB agreed to a recommendation for release of this film by the FCDA to all media for U.S. audiences at 6:00 p.m., EST, on April 7, under specified conditions, and approved transmittal of a memorandum to NSC advising that this release date would be acceptable from the standpoint of foreign climate of opinion which may affect the security interests of the United States. The memorandum also included the view of the Board that insofar as feasible, overseas public display of the film should be avoided. The Board also directed the preparation of a program to counter Soviet propaganda exploitation of this film as evidence of U.S. warmongering and to gather support for the Soviet proposal to outlaw atomic weapons. This program had been prepared by the working group for approval of the Board Assistants as this report closed.

*Legislative Liaison*

The important relevance of atomic energy legislation to the project was recognized early. Arrangements were made for OCB staff to be informed by the Bureau of the Budget on the progress of coordination of substantive legislation to be proposed by the President. Mr. C. D. Jackson advised on portions of the President's State of the Union Message and his special message to Congress on modernizing the Atomic Energy Act, and the working group developed information and guidances on appropriate portions of these messages. In addition, OCB staff representation arranged for brief references to the project in the President's Economic Report.

B. *Foreign*

The overseas operational exploitation of the speech has been handled primarily by USIA, under the policy guidance of the Department of State and with the assistance of other agencies represented on the OCB working group or concerned with the substantive aspects of the speech and other atomic energy problems. All the resources of USIA have been committed to a massive program to spread the President's message that "the United States pledges its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life".

Four exhibits on the peaceful use of atomic energy—and the great strides already made in that direction—are now in production. A special motion picture has been produced. The overseas Information Centers are building up special collections of books and materials on the subject. The Press Service daily carries news of the latest peacetime atomic developments to the free world. The Voice of America is also factually reporting these vital developments to the captive peoples behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

USIA's program is a long-range and continuing one. Some of its more significant projects to date include: (1) the immediate transmittal of the full speech to 55 major foreign posts, followed by a suggested leaflet and more than 7,000 photos, plates and negatives; (2) distribution of the "Atomic Power for Peace" kit to PAO's at all posts, including 45 separate items for publicity and speech use, picture stories and displays, pamphlets and reprints, and background information; (3) inclusion in the daily wireless file of six or more follow-up stories each week (total selective distribution of printed materials is expected to top 16,800,000); (4) emphasis in daily treatments on the great progress already made in the peaceful applications of atomic energy.

*Exhibits*

Overseas exhibits in preparation include a U.S. exhibition for Sao Paulo's 400th Birthday Celebration, opening in July, three large mobile exhibits for transport through Europe by truck and smaller exhibits for all 217 USIS ports.

*Information Centers*

USIA libraries are building special shelves on peaceful atomic uses, over 24 current documents and pamphlets have been sent to information centers, and over 12 others have been recommended for addition to the libraries. Many "Atom for Peace" exhibits have been established, and books on peaceful use recommended for translation and publication by foreign publishers.

*Voice of America*

The President's speech was carried live from the UN by all domestic and foreign-based Voice transmitters, and within a half an hour it was on the air in over 30 foreign languages. A complete kinescope was flown overseas immediately for the 35 countries with TV. Follow-up news and features were broadcast daily through December and consistently since then.

*Motion Pictures*

The speech was given immediate world-wide newsreel coverage. A one-reel documentary is receiving wide foreign distribution by Universal Pictures and USIS, and a new documentary supporting the President's atomic pool proposal is in preparation.

*Private Enterprise Cooperation*

Over 266 U.S. companies highlighted the speech in their regular foreign correspondence, an Atomic Industries Forum was arranged for 300 foreign journalists, international service organizations are spreading the President's message, and USIA has also been consulted by private sponsors of exhibits, films and international advertising.

*United Nations*

The initial Washington group cooperated with the UN and commercial channels serviced by the UN on a short-notice major exploitation program which included live Canadian television, British and Danish kinescopes, and Australian, Canadian and Latin American radio broadcasts or rebroadcasts and translations. Complete films or newsreels were carried on various UN Services, making it the largest UN motion picture coverage of a UN speech in recent years.

*Task Force 7 Guidance*

The working group assisted in preparations for initial motion picture guidance for Task Force 7 (future nuclear explosions).

### IV. EVALUATION OF INITIAL IMPACT

The President's speech, supported by all-out global exploitation and follow-up, initially put the USSR on the defensive by focusing attention on the prospects for peaceful development of atomic energy. It was a bold positive act, which appealed to common people and intellectuals alike. It aimed straight at a goal cherished by the "neutrals" as well as our friends. It gave the Kremlin the choice of responding favorably or standing condemned by their own past "peace" propaganda. The Russians' early impulse to say "No" gave the lie to that propaganda and earned them severe propaganda reverses.

However, U.S. successes to date have only been partial and unless the program is followed up vigorously, U.S. gains will be short-lived. The initial effect of the President's speech while gratifying has shown that the significance of the proposals is not fully understood. Specifically, there is a great deal of confusion concerning the social improvement which can be expected from the peaceful application of nuclear energy and of the actions which the various countries must take in order to benefit from this program.

Judging from past activities, the Soviets can be expected to continue their attacks against any U.S. proposals and counter with such lines of action as a revised USSR Disarmament Plan, possibly calling for an atomic weapons ban and/or possible limited concessions to past U.S. views; other actions designed to exploit the fear which mankind has of the destructive power of the atom and its ignorance of the constructive potential of atomic energy; and discrediting the U.S. proposal and subsequent steps as not possessing any serious merit but as cover for "espionage, infiltration," etc.

### V. FUTURE PLANS

At its March 10 meeting, the OCB laid the foundation for continuing future activities when it approved "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the President's UN Speech of December 8, 1953, in the Domestic and International Public Opinion Fields." The program's objective is to develop as part of a long-range domestic and international informational and educational effort, a widespread understanding of the speech, particularly in terms of the proposal to make nuclear energy available for peaceful purposes on an international scale. This program paper contains in addition to a concise exposition of the problem, widespread implementing action proposals with agency assignments and a checklist of suggested agency actions.

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600.0012/4-3054

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

TOP SECRET [GENEVA, undated.]

Participants: Mr. Pearson, Secretary of External Affairs of Canada
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, US Delegation

Time: 1 p. m., April 30, 1954

Place: Mr. Pearson's Suite at Hotel de la Paix, Geneva

During the course of a talk with Mr. Pearson on another subject, I asked him if the Secretary had yet had a chance to speak to him concerning the contents of the Soviet reply to our note of March 19 on the President's atomic energy proposals. Mr. Pearson answered in the negative, but said that Sir Harold Caccia of the British Delegation had let him read the informal translation which we had given the British. I told Mr. Pearson that the translation had been done very hastily and that we had sent it back to Washington for checking. I also said that their people in Washington would be brought into this matter as usual through the normal channel there. I said that the copy we had given the British of the rough translation had been due to their request. Mr. Pearson did not indicate in any way that he had been miffed but merely said that the reply was just about what he had expected.

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Exchange of Notes with USSR"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

TOP SECRET [GENEVA,] May 1, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Zarubin
Mr. Troyanovsky

Place: Mr. Molotov's villa

Subject: Atomic Energy

The Secretary met with Mr. Molotov at 11 a.m. this morning at the former's request. After a brief exchange of trivialities, the Secretary said that he would read some notes which he had jotted down for the sake of accuracy, but that they did not constitute a formal note. He thereupon handed Mr. Troyanovsky a carbon copy of his statement, which copy was left with the Soviets.

The Secretary then read the attached statement. [1]

Mr. Molotov listened attentively and replied that he would have to study our statement and that thereafter, the Soviet Government could give its reply. At the same time, Mr. Molotov said he desired to draw the Secretary's attention to the fact that the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 27 [2] pointed out that the establishment of an international agency, as proposed by the United States, would not limit the production of hydrogen bombs. Not only would the agency be no obstacle to their use, but it might lead to an increase in the amount of material and bombs. Mr. Molotov went on to say that in the reply of the Soviets of December 21 [3] to the President's proposal contained in his speech of December 8, 1953, the Soviet Government had expressed its willingness to discuss the President's proposal, and it had also suggested that its own proposal be discussed. Since then, Mr. Molotov said, the Soviet Government had three times repeated its proposal concerning unconditional ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons by the Soviet Union, the United States and other governments. This Soviet proposal was advanced on December 21, was referred to in the Soviet declaration of January 30, [4] and again in the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 27, but the Soviet Union still had no reply by the United States regarding the subject. Mr. Molotov continued that were the United States to give a favorable reply to the suggestion of a ban on nuclear weapons, then of course, the United States proposal for an international agency for the development of atomic energy would have a definite significance, which without the ban, it now lacks. Mr. Molotov concluded by asking when he could hope to have a reply to the Soviet proposal.

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[1] The statement does not accompany the source text. For text, see telegram Dulte 36, *infra*.

[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 482–484.

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1954, pp. 80–82.

[4] For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1954, p. 479.

The Secretary answered by referring to the statement in his original remarks to the effect that we intended shortly to submit a reply on the Soviet proposal. He went on to say that our failure to respond earlier was not due to lack of interest or discourtesy, but for reasons which he would be glad to mention.

Mr. Molotov nodded interested assent.

The Secretary said that there does not now exist, unhappily, between our two governments a degree of confidence which enables the United States to look on a mere proposal to agree not to use atomic weapons as being in itself fully reliable. It had been the hope of the United States that if we could find an area regarding atomic energy, however small, within which we could cooperate, then there might be created a greater degree of confidence, which in turn, would make it easier to deal with these larger matters. That is the reason, explained the Secretary, why we were anxious to find out whether or not it was possible for our two governments to work together in some phase of the atomic energy field before dealing with the larger aspect contained in the Soviet proposal. The Secretary concluded by saying we will, as desired by the Soviet Government, give our reply to its last note, which reply will of course have to take into account that element of the Soviet note which expressed unwillingness to consider the establishment of an international agency for peaceful use, until after the matter of the ban had been dealt with.

Mr. Molotov said that he believed that not only the Soviet Government, but the United States and others are interested in having the problem of the atomic bomb considered, and thereby contribute to reduce the danger of an atomic and hydrogen war. He then said something to the effect that this danger remains or might even increase as a result of certain proposals.

The Secretary interjected that he did not clearly understand Mr. Molotov's last words.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had said that the danger of atomic or hydrogen warfare remains and might even increase as a result of measures proposed for the peaceful use of atomic energy and that this would increase apprehension of atomic warfare. If, on the other hand, agreement could be reached not to use these weapons, then of course the proposal for an international agency for peaceful development would have significance which it now lacks. The Secretary said that he was at a loss to understand the suggestion contained in the Soviet memorandum of April 27, which Mr. Molotov had just repeated, to the effect that the establishment of the agency would not in any way increase the amount of atomic material available for military purposes or increase the likelihood of atomic war. In fact, the Secretary said the proposal would decrease the amount of material slightly (depending on agreements on the extent of contributions made to the agency), but that from the standpoint of working relations between the two countries and restoring mutual confidence, it might make a great contribution and that this was what we had in mind. We cannot, said the Secretary, deal in these matters involving the life and death of nations without greater confidence than exists today.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet proposal for a commitment not to employ atomic weapons was intended to create such a degree of confidence as the first stage, and thus permit cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. As to deeply technical and scientific questions regarding the use of atomic energy, Mr. Molotov said he was not competent to speak, but that he clearly understood that parallel with the peaceful use of atomic materials, as in power plants, it was possible concurrently to increase the production of material needed to produce atomic bombs. These, he said, are the scientific facts into which he would not go deeper, but concerning which he knew that experts in the United States would be able to give confirmation.

The Secretary asked Mr. Merchant if this made any sense, to which the latter replied that it didn't to him and that it was an angle which he had never heard of. Simultaneously, Mr. Molotov and Ambassador Zarubin had a brief exchange in Russian. Mr. Molotov replied carefully that he believed men of science have the necessary data to substantiate this angle.

The Secretary then drew on a piece of paper two boxes for the purpose of explaining the nature of the plan we had in mind. These boxes, he said, could be considered the stockpiles of the United States, the U.S.S.R., with possibly a smaller additional stockpile in the United Kingdom. Under the United States plan, each would take some small part now available for military purposes, and put it into an agency internationally supervised and that, as a result, each of our stockpiles would be reduced, not increased. The Secretary said he could not understand how this would represent an increase in the amount available for military purposes. Perhaps, he said, the point was of such scientific character that he was incapable of understanding it.

Mr. Molotov smiled and replied that he believed it would be difficult for the two of them to go into details, and that he was unable to speak in a scientific language, but that experts have the data to substantiate his point.

The Secretary said that he would seek out a scientist to educate him more fully.

Mr. Molotov again reiterated that there are such scientists.

The Secretary expressed skepticism as to his ability to understand the point and then passed for Mr. Molotov's reading a proposed innocuous communiqué to be issued after the meeting. Mr. Molotov approved it. [5]

The Secretary then, as he made a move to go, remarked that he was leaving Monday morning. [6] Mr. Molotov said that there were differing interpretations in the press as to the reasons for his departure, and inquired if the Secretary was returning. The Secretary replied that he had no plans to return, but this was not excluding his return, if the occasion required it. He reminded Mr. Molotov that he had told him in Berlin that it would be impossible for him to remain very long in Geneva. The Secretary added that the fact of his going was not related to happenings at the Conference, but due to a prior decision connected with the necessity of his returning for consultations and exchanges of views with the Congress, before the adjournment, which might come early in June.

Mr. Molotov, who had given the impression of thinking deeply, from the moment that the Secretary indicated he was about to take his leave, then remarked that the Geneva Conference was called to consider two questions, and the Secretary would have participated only in the consideration of the first.

The Secretary replied that he was being replaced by General Bedell Smith, whom Mr. Molotov knew and who could deal with matters with very considerable authority. The United States would continue to be responsibly represented. The Secretary said that he would like to participate personally in the Indo-China discussions and to learn Mr. Molotov's thinking with regard to it, but he was afraid that time would not permit this. He concluded by saying that he had not disguised to Mr. Molotov his concern over the situation and his fear that unless both parties—indeed all parties directly involved—exercise mutual restraints, the situation could serve to increase rather than diminish international tensions.

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[5] The draft communiqué prepared for Dulles and transmitted to him by Bowie on May 1 reads as follows: "Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles today held another in the series of meetings dealing with atomic energy. They discussed the reply of the Soviet Government on April 27 to the United States note of March 19, 1954. This reply will be further considered by the United States in Washington." (600.0012/5-154)

[6] May 3.

Mr. Molotov, after a moment's thought, produced only the statement that, of course, we should all seek to find a way to peace in Indo-China at Geneva, that all should participate in that effort, and that it was important that attention should be paid to the interests of the two parties.

The Secretary then rose, and as he said goodbye to Mr. Molotov, expressed the hope that his sore throat was better.

Mr. Molotov said it was nearly well.

The Secretary said jocularly it would indeed be a world calamity if Mr. Molotov were to lose his voice, to which Mr. Molotov rejoined he did not have the occasion to speak as frequently as Mr. Dulles, but no foreign minister should ever lose his voice.

The Secretary left at 11:55 a. m.

Mr. Molotov looked somewhat better than he had at the time of his other private talk with the Secretary earlier in the week. His color was still gray, however, and he left the impression of a lowered level of energy.

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110.11-DU/5-154: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET GENEVA, May 1, 1954—2 p.m.

Dulte 36. Limit distribution. Moscow information eyes only Ambassador. Following is text of informal talking paper which I read to Molotov this morning, leaving copy with his translator.

*Begin verbatim text.*

1. I have now read the *aide-mémoire* of the Soviet Union of April 27 [2] re the proposal for "an international atomic energy agency" submitted to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on March 19. [3] This *aide-mémoire* criticizes the proposal on the grounds that it would not substantially reduce atomic material stockpiles, or control the making or use of atomic weapons or remove the threat of atomic war.

2. These criticisms misconstrue the purpose of the US proposal of March 19. By its terms this proposal was not intended as a measure for the control of atomic weapons or for solving itself the various other problems mentioned in the Soviet note. Its purpose was the more limited one of initiating international cooperation in the field of atomic energy on a basis which would avoid many of the obstacles which have heretofore blocked any agreement. In this

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[1] Repeated for information to Moscow.

[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 482–484.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1372.

way the proposal could contribute to improving relations among the cooperating nations and thereby to facilitating solution of the more difficult problem of effective control of atomic energy for military purposes.

3. Accordingly, the US cannot concur in the view of the Soviet Union that creation of an international agency to foster the use of atomic materials for peaceful purposes would not be useful in itself. On the contrary, it believes that such an agency could have valuable results both in encouraging closer cooperation among the participating nations and in expediting more extensive use of atomic energy for purposes beneficial to mankind. The US therefore regrets that the Soviet Union is not willing to explore this matter further at this time.

4. In view of the lack of interest now of the Soviet Union in pursuing this proposal, the US will feel free to examine the creation of such an agency with other nations which might be interested. If the Soviet Union should later decide that it wishes to take part in any such discussions, the US will, of course, welcome its participation.

5. The US proposal of March 19 was, of course, not intended as a substitute for an effective system of control of atomic energy for military purposes. The US will continue, as heretofore, to seek means of achieving such control under reliable and adequate safeguards. It is prepared to continue exchanges of views with the Soviet Union for that purpose, and will shortly submit to the Soviet Union comments on its proposal referred to in its *aide-mémoire* of April 27.

*End verbatim text.*

DULLES

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396.1–GE/5–254: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET GENEVA, May 2, 1954—10 p. m.

Dulte 43. Eyes only Acting Secretary. Eyes only Secretary Wilson and Admiral Strauss. I met briefly with Eden yesterday afternoon at his request. General Smith was with me. Caccia and Merchant were also present. This was in continuation of the discussion I had had two weeks ago with Eden concerning the possible feasibility of a moratorium on further hydrogen experiments.[1] Eden told me that he had had their scientists look into matter and that they could now say that they considered it feasible. With an upper allowable limit set at 50,000 tons TNT equivalent they felt one observatory was sufficient to detect an explosion of this magnitude and that with two observatories it would be possible to locate site of explosion. For this purpose one in Scandinavia and one in Switzerland would probably suffice, but there would be advantages in having one in Europe and one on North American continent.

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[1] The memorandum of conversation, Apr. 12, is not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287)

Eden said that if Russians accepted, there would be a disadvantage directly to UK and that he hoped under such circumstances we would be "as kind to UK as possible within US laws". Eden added that Makins was informed on this subject and available for further discussion in Washington.

Dulles

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600.0012/5-554

## *Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

Washington, May 5, 1954.

Subject: NSC Consideration of Proposed Suspension of Tests of Atomic Weapons.

1. Foreign Secretary Eden has raised with you the question of discontinuing or suspending tests of atomic weapons and has reported that this proposal and its policing is considered "feasible" by the UK.[1] Fifty thousand tons of TNT equivalent would be the upper allowable limit, and "observatories for monitoring" would be placed in Scandinavia, Switzerland and on the North American continent. If the Russians accepted, according to Eden, the UK would be disadvantaged and might look to us to be "as kind to the UK as possible within US laws" in supplying them with information of which they would be deprived by the moratorium on tests.

2. There has been strong world-wide reaction to the test programs and numerous official suggestions that they be halted. The most important are the following:

a) Nehru's proposal for suspension,[2] which has been submitted to the Disarmament Commission and which will probably be considered in the course of the Disarmament Commission talks in London.

b) Both houses of the Japanese Parliament have passed resolutions critical of tests and calling for effective control of atomic energy (April 5). These resolutions have been officially submitted to us.[3]

c) The inhabitants of the Marshall Islands have submitted a petition to the UN which has been referred to the Trusteeship Council and which calls for the cessation of tests and, if this is not feasible, a series of measures to circumscribe the effects on territories and populations in the Pacific.

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[1] See telegram Dulte 43, May 2, *supra*.

[2] See telegram 611 from New York, Apr. 12, p. 1383.

[3] See footnote 3, p. 1379.

d) The Japanese Red Cross has submitted to us a petition it intends to present to an international Red Cross Conference in Norway at the end of May, calling for a suspension of tests and emphasizing the increased need for effective control of atomic energy.

3. At the request of the United States Representative to the United Nations, the US Government has begun to consider the moratorium proposal and it is being studied by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense. It is understood it would have these disadvantages, *inter alia:*

a) increased uncertainty with respect to the relative position of the United States and the USSR weapons programs;

b) suspension would be difficult to monitor;

c) the integration of atomic components into our weapons systems would be more difficult;

d) the central problem of control of atomic weapons would remain and concentration on the fringe aspect might distract attention from effective control.

On the other hand:

a) The suspension would increase goodwill for the United States in Asia and in Europe.

b) It would alleviate the "jitters" now affecting populations within range of Soviet weapons and which is having a deleterious effect on our alliances.

c) If agreement with the USSR were possible, this would contribute to the reduction of tensions and perhaps open the way to more fruitful discussions of atomic matters.

d) Presumably, the USSR would be more disadvantaged by the suspension of tests than the Western world because of the relative arrears in their atomic programs.

*Recommendation*

That the [National] Security Council direct Defense, State and AEC to coordinate their studies of the advantages and disadvantages and to submit a report at an early date to be used as the basis for reply to the United Kingdom and possibly for devising a program for suspension of tests if the study so recommends.

Robert Bowie

600.0012/3-554

## *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1954.

Subject: Response to Mr. Eden's Views on Position Opposing Soviet Proposal to Ban the Use of Atomic Weapons.

*Discussion*

1. A British *Aide-Mémoire* of March 5 (Tab B) [2] contained Mr. Eden's views on the reply which the Western Powers should make to the Soviet proposal for a ban on the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons. At the time this *Aide-Mémoire* was handed to Mr. Arneson, he explained that we would not be in a position to comment on this for sometime. In the last two weeks, we have had a number of pressing inquiries from the British Ambassador requesting our views on this matter.

2. It will be necessary to have an agreed Western position on this subject, since we can expect the USSR to raise the issue in the forthcoming meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission subcommittee. The line proposed for our own *Aide-Mémoire* (Tab A) generally agrees with Mr. Eden's views, with some slight modifications. This position would be that we cannot agree to this Soviet proposal without grave risk to our security, since a mere declaration foregoing the use of these weapons is not supported by effective safeguards to ensure that the agreement will be honored. Nor would such an agreement prevent the accumulation of weapons-stockpiles sufficient to destroy our major cities and industries if the agreement should be broken. Mass destruction weapons should be eliminated as part of a general disarmament program which would also include substantial balanced reduction of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments under effective safeguards. We are prepared to renew our solemn assurances that we will not use any weapon except to repel aggression, nor in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the attached *Aide-Mémoire* for transmittal to the British Embassy.

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1367.

[Tab A]

## *The Department of State to the British Embassy* [3]

SECRET

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State refers to the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of March 5, 1954, containing Mr. Eden's views on the reply which might be made to the Soviet proposals for a ban on the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons. This problem has been under consideration for sometime within the United States Government, which is of course constantly reviewing its disarmament positions to determine their continuing validity.

The Department of State agrees with Mr. Eden's view that the Western Powers could not agree to this Soviet proposal without grave risks to their security. A mere declaration abjuring the use of these weapons cannot be accepted, since it is not supported by effective safeguards to ensure that the agreement will be observed. Furthermore, such an agreement would not prevent the accumulation of stockpiles of weapons sufficient to destroy our major cities and industries and even to damage gravely western civilization as we now know it, should this unsafeguarded agreement be broken.

As Mr. Eden has pointed out, mass destruction weapons should be eliminated as part of a general agreement on disarmament which would also include a substantial balanced reduction of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments, under an effective system of controls and safeguards which would assure that no state should have cause to fear that its security was in danger.

While concurring in the general line suggested by Mr. Eden for reply to the Soviet proposal, we suggest that this might be modified slightly so that it would read somewhat as follows:

"The Western Powers are second to none in wishing to achieve elimination of major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. They certainly agree that the disarmament system for which we are working should provide for the prohibition of the production, storing and use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, but believe that this can only be accomplished as a result of an effective system of safeguards which will ensure that agreements of this nature will be observed. They have always maintained this, and it has been provided for in every General Assembly resolution on disarmament.

"The Western Powers believe that a mere declaration abjuring the use of these weapons and which lacks adequate safeguards against violations or evasions does not lessen the danger of war nor the destructiveness of war if it should come. The Soviet proposal would do nothing to prevent the accumulation of stocks of materials for major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, sufficient to destroy major areas of the world if not to wound mortally our civilization, as Mr. Malenkov has pointed out.

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[3] Drafted by Meyers on May 5. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Handed to Miss Salt, British Embassy, at 12:30 p. m., May 12, 1954. H. Meyers".

"The United Nations has also made it clear that world security can only come about through balanced disarmament, applied to armed forces and to all manner of armaments in such a manner that the security of all States will be assured. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the United Nations has recognized that it is aggression which is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security, rather than the use of any particular weapon. Our ultimate objective is to prevent war of any kind. Our immediate objective is to eliminate the possibility of any successful aggression by such a substantial balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces, including the elimination of atomic weapons, that the possibility of an aggression achieving its goal will be virtually removed.

"We still maintain that progress toward disarmament should be on the basis of the resolutions of the General assembly, of which the most recent provides that the whole disarmament program, including the elimination and prohibition of atomic weapons and major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, should be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no state would have cause to fear that its security was in danger.

"For their part, the Western Powers are individually prepared to renew their solemn assurances that they will not use either weapons of mass destruction or any other weapons except to repel aggression. Nor will they threaten to employ these weapons or use them in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

The Department of State suggests that it would be advisable to work out an agreed statement of the above general nature at the forthcoming meeting in London of the staffs of the United Kingdom, Canadian and French and United States Delegations, in preparation for the Disarmament Commission subcommittee's meetings.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 6, 1954* [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 195th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 8. The meeting was largely devoted to a report by Secretary Dulles on the Geneva Conference and the

*Continued*

Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; General Ridgway for the Secretary of the Army; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Cutler then reminded Secretary Dulles that he wished to discuss with the Council the subject of the recent series of H-bomb tests at the Pacific proving grounds. Secretary Dulles replied that he indeed wanted to bring the Council up to date on these developments. He said that he had made a statement to a restricted group at the recent NATO meeting which was designed to clarify the position of the United States with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. [2] He said he wished a copy of this statement to be placed in the records of the National Security Council since this statement officially put our allies on notice regarding our views on the use of these weapons.

Secretary Dulles said that, subsequent to the delivery of this statement at the NATO meeting, he had received a letter from Anthony Eden discussing the statement. Secretary Dulles read portions of the Eden letter and pointed out that Mr. Eden was holding strongly to the idea of consultation between the United States and the United Kingdom prior to any decision to use atomic weapons. In effect, said Secretary Dulles, this was indication of the British desire to get themselves into a position to veto the use of atomic weapons by the United States; whereas, in fact, Secretary Dulles had intended his NATO statement on the subject to constitute the "consultation with our allies" which was called for.

Secretary Dulles then referred to a conversation he had had at Geneva with Molotov regarding further steps to carry out the President's plan for the developing of peaceful uses of atomic

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Indochina situation and related discussion. For the portion of the memorandum recording consideration of those matters, see vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 1481.

[2] For text, see vol. V, Part 1, p. 509.

energy.[3] Molotov had called on him, and had stated in effect that until a ban on the use of atomic weapons was agreed upon, there was no use in having further conversations regarding peaceful uses of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles then read his reply to Molotov's statement, in which he suggested that continuing the conversations looking to the creation of an agency for exploring peaceful uses might pave the way for the solution of the more difficult problem. However, in view of Molotov's attitude, the United States would now feel free to go ahead and discuss peaceful uses without the Soviet Union.

Secretary Dulles pointed out his belief that it would have been a mistake to let the American public know that the Soviet Union had thus virtually rejected the President's proposal. Popular reaction in this country would have been pretty violent.

Secretary Dulles said that the other major issue which he wanted to discuss was that of an international moratorium on further atomic and thermonuclear tests. This subject had first come up in a talk with Eden in London on April 13 [*12* ?], and there had been further discussion of the subject with Eden at Geneva.[4] The UK strongly favored a moratorium on further tests. As far as he could see, said Secretary Dulles, the present series of U.S. tests put us a lap ahead of the USSR. If this was so, and we could secure a moratorium which could really be policed, it would place us in a much better position from the point of view of propaganda and our posture vis-à-vis the free world. It would certainly help us to meet the vicious attacks on us as warmongers by Soviet propaganda. Of course, continued Secretary Dulles, he was in no position to make any judgment as to the technical issues involved in accepting a moratorium, but it would certainly be advantageous to do so from an international point of view.

Admiral Strauss then spoke to this issue. He said he had hoped to be able to inform the Council that the last test in the current series had been completed, but weather conditions had made this impossible, and a few more days would be required. With respect to a cessation of further tests, he pointed out that the current series had been of the utmost importance and had advanced our knowledge of nuclear weapons in a great variety of ways. It isn't necessary to have further tests in order to increase the potential destructiveness of our stockpile of atomic weapons, but to discontinue the tests would certainly deny us the prospect of advances in knowledge which would significantly increase the number of weapons available to us in terms of available raw materials. Also, commented Admiral Strauss, while a team of international scientists might be able to detect a Soviet violation of an agreement to cease further tests, there was no infallible means of assuring such detection.

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[3] See the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, May 1, p. 1413.

[4] See telegram Dulte 43 from Geneva, May 2, p. 1418.

The President said to Admiral Strauss, "You mean that if the Russians went ahead despite agreement not to, the effect would be to put us behind them in the procession." In answer to the President, Admiral Strauss merely commented on what might have happened to us if we had agreed earlier, say in 1950, to a cessation of tests.

Secretary Wilson expressed great skepticism regarding the moratorium, and said there was nothing we could do about it if the Russians did violate their agreement.

The President said he had a rather different view. The Soviets were always talking big about outlawing atomic weapons, though of course they did nothing whatever about it. Accordingly, we could put them on the spot if we accepted a moratorium. If they violated their agreement we would go ahead promptly and conduct new tests ourselves. The President did express with great emphasis the necessity we were under to gain some significant psychological advantage in the world. Everybody seems to think that we're skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers. We ought not to miss any chance to make clear our peaceful objectives.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that if the Soviets broke the moratorium agreement and this was certified by the team of neutral scientists, the Soviets might, of course, gain a technical advantage, but they would lose enormously in terms of world condemnation of their violation.

Secretary Wilson then inquired whether the moratorium envisaged would be complete, or would extend only to large weapons. Secretary Dulles replied that that would be something that we would have to decide upon. Secretary Wilson pointed out that if atomic weapons of a certain range of magnitude were subject to the moratorium, there would be serious repercussions on the development of our thermonuclear capability. Admiral Strauss confirmed this by stating that such a prohibition would prevent any further thermonuclear experiments. The President said he realized this, but that after all, the Soviets had exploded only one thermonuclear weapon and the United States was ahead of them in this field.

Admiral Strauss went on to point out how unfortunate it would be if the United States appeared to be stopping these tests because of pressure. Moreover, he asked that before the United States agrees to the terms of any moratorium, time should be provided to permit full evaluation of the results of the current series of tests, which would conclude this week. It might be that our people would agree after this evaluation that no additional tests would be necessary for perhaps a year's time. This decision was in any event of the utmost importance and should not be hastily made.

Admiral Radford commented that a great many high officials in the United States Government had no idea what tremendous progress we have made in the field of nuclear weapons in the last six weeks. No hasty decision regarding a moratorium should be made. This should await the preparation of a detailed study upon which the Council could base a decision.

The President agreed that of course no hasty decision should be taken, but if we have actually reached the limits of efficiency in our atomic weapons, it might give us a tremendous psychological advantage over the enemy if we could propose a moratorium on future tests.

Secretary Wilson again pointed out to the President that the issue of further tests related not to the efficiency and size of our atomic weapons, but to the actual numbers.

Mr. Cutler then inquired of Admiral Strauss how long it would take to evaluate fully the results of the current series of tests. Admiral Strauss replied that the process would take not less than thirty days.

The Vice President expressed himself as in agreement on this problem with the point of view of the Secretary of State. The Council should bear in mind that the United States was at the moment taking a "hell of a licking" on the propaganda front. An offer of this sort would certainly help. The Vice President believed that the Soviets needed to continue their tests more than we needed to continue ours. This being the case, and we make the offer, they will presumably turn it down. We would gain a net advantage. If, on the other hand, they did accept the offer, we would be obliged to deduce that their program is further advanced than we had previously believed. This in itself would constitute very valuable intelligence information. Furthermore, the Vice President said, he assumed that even though we entered into a moratorium, we would continue to develop our research in the field of nuclear weapons even though the tests themselves were stopped. In any event, we must all bear in mind the fact that the potentialities of the hydrogen bomb are so terrible that every effort must be made to avoid another world war. Conceivably the proposed moratorium might help to avoid such a war.

Secretary Wilson replied by pointing out to the Vice President that, unhappily, you couldn't go very far in your research program without resorting to tests.

To these and other objections to the proposal by Secretary Wilson, the President again summarized his belief that the United

States required to put itself in a better posture before the world. If the Russians agreed to accept a moratorium and then welshed on it, our position in Britain, for instance, would be tremendously improved. Secretary Dulles added that the basic cause for the British weakness with regard to Southeast Asia was their obsession over the H-bomb and its potential effect on the British Isles. We are losing ground every day in England and in other allied nations because they are all insisting we are so militaristic. Comparisons are now being made between ours and Hitler's military machine. Speaking with great conviction, Secretary Dulles insisted that we could not sit here in Washington and develop bigger bombs without any regard for the impact of these developments on world opinion. In the long run it isn't only bombs that win wars, but having public opinion on your side. In sum, the net advantage to us of a moratorium would be very great indeed.

Admiral Strauss said that he must remind the Council that we had made similar proposals to the Russians in 1946, and they had kicked us in the teeth. Why don't we, therefore, keep stressing this failure to respond? Haven't the Russians supplied the world with sufficient evidence of breaches of faith? The list of these was almost endless.

The President agreed with much that Admiral Strauss had said, but pointed out that there was one thing missing from his analysis. The world is much more terrified now than it was in 1946. The long list of Russian violations of agreements wasn't as physically terrifying to people as was the prospect now of atomic warfare.

Mr. Cutler then suggested that the whole problem of the moratorium be studied as a matter of urgency by the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency. As soon as the study was complete it should be brought to the attention of the Council.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Secretary Dulles asked if he might have a look at the statement which Defense and AEC proposed to issue at the conclusion of the current series of atomic tests. Admiral Strauss had a copy of the proposed statement and handed it to Secretary Dulles, who then read it aloud to the Council. The President suggested limiting the statement simply to say that the safety zones which had been established for the conduct of the tests were no longer in force and had been lifted.

*The National Security Council:* [5]

. . . . . . .

f. Noted that the Secretary of State had presented to the recent NATO meeting in Paris a statement on the United States position regarding nuclear weapons, a copy of which was made available for the Council files.

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[5] The paragraphs which follow constitute NSC Action No. 1106. Paragraphs a–e deal with the Geneva Conference and Indochina.

g. Noted, as read at the meeting, the statement which the Secretary of State had made to the Soviet Foreign Minister at Geneva in response to the latter's reply to the President's proposals for peaceful uses of atomic energy.

h. Requested the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, to report to the Council as soon as possible and not later than June 3, 1954 on the desirability of an international moratorium on further tests of nuclear weapons.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense. The action in e above subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board. The action in h above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

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S. EVERETT GLEASON

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330.13/5-754

## *The Secretary of State to the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission at London (Patterson)*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1954.

SIR: 1. The following instructions are presented for your guidance as Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, meetings of a Subcommittee of which are to be convened at London on May 13, 1954. I shall appreciate your communicating these instructions to your Advisers.

2. Since the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission, The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, does not plan to attend these Meetings of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, you will act as United States Representative at these Meetings. In the interests of expeditious exchanges of views between you and the Department of State the most feasible method of communication will be directly from you to the Department of State and from the Department to you. The Department of State will ensure, however, that all copies of communications in either

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[1] Drafted by Thomas J. Cogan of UNA/IC on May 6. Concurrences given by Meyers and Bechhoefer for Lodge.

direction will be transmitted to the United States Mission to the United Nations.

3. The general terms of reference for these Meetings are attached as Annex A. In connection with your responsibilities as Deputy United States Representative, you should be guided by the briefing previously given by officers of the Department of State. While no position papers are attached, you should keep in mind the general position of the United States Government towards disarmament as outlined in the National Security Council Document and subordinate papers. [2]

4. It will be noted that basic documents in connection with these Meetings are classified. There will remain much in these documents that should not be revealed, even after the substance of the United States position has been made known at the Meeting. For this reason, these documents will retain their classification after the United States position has been made public.

5. The matter of tactics in connection with the issues of this Meeting, including the timing and emphasis which should be taken on any point, is left to your discretion within the framework of policy decisions. In this connection, it is urged that you utilize fully the experience of your Advisers. If any matters should arise which are outside the scope of these instructions and which are not consistent with our national policy in this field, you are requested to make an appropriate reservation of your position, insist that discussion be limited to the subjects within the frame of reference as you understand it to be, and communicate with the Department immediately for instructions in these matters, reporting any information which may be relevant and, where possible, recommending a course of action.

6. Since this is an official governmental conference, the views expressed by the respective representatives are likely to be considered as official views of their governments, even though advanced as tentative suggestions. Accordingly, your Advisers must act as a unit and present a solid front. The views expressed on issues before the Meeting must be those of the Government of the United States, rather than the views of individual Advisers or of organizations or groups with which they may be affiliated. Any divergent views among your Advisers should be resolved by you in private meetings in order that embarrassing differences of opinion may not possibly appear in open discussion. In the event of diverse views among

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[2] The documents under reference cannot be further identified. Possibly the "National Security Council Document" refers to NSC 112/1, "Possibility of a New U.S. Disarmament Proposal in the Eighth General Assembly", Sept. 1, 1953, printed on p. 1189.

your Advisers, your decision shall be final and binding on the Delegation.

7. Your Advisers will constantly keep in mind their official capacities as representatives of the Government of the United States accredited to this Meeting. In such official capacity, the demeanor and statements of your Advisers are subject to close scrutiny by representatives and advisers of the other participating governments, the secretariat, the press and the public. When an opinion is solicited or given on programs or proposals not germane to this Meeting, your Advisers should be especially mindful to be cautious in their remarks and to identify them as personal. Your Advisers should also be consistently alert to the possibility that the sessions of this Meeting may be utilized by certain representatives as a forum for political attacks on the United States or as vehicles for the dissemination of propaganda. You should, therefore, impress upon all your Advisers the importance of exercising discretion and tact while on this official mission. Should any difficulties arise in the foregoing connection, you should seek the advice and assistance of the American Ambassador at London.

8. All relations with the press should, in principle, be conducted by you through your press and public relations officer, Mr. John Z. Williams. The advice of the American Ambassador at London, The Honorable Winthrop W. Aldrich, or if considered necessary, of the Department, should be sought before the issuance of any statement which might involve policies not covered by your instructions. You should caution your Advisers not to give information or opinions to the press in respect to official work of the Meeting, except as you deem otherwise advisable.

9. You are authorized to delegate to one of your Advisers from the Department of State all authority held by you in the event of your absence or inability to attend sessions of this Meeting and in any other instances in which you are unable to exercise the functions of your position.

10. You are authorized to sign joint communiqués with representatives of some or all of the other governments, reached as a result of the labors of the Meeting, provided they are within the terms of your instructions and that they take the form of resolutions or recommendations, and not the form of a treaty or other binding international agreement.

11. In the event that representatives of other governments seek to have the Meeting moved from London to another site, you should oppose such a move and urge that the work of the Subcommittee be completed at London. In the event that the majority of the representatives believe that the site of the Meeting should be

transferred to another city, you should seek instructions from the Department, prior to any action being taken on this matter.

12. Immediately upon your arrival at London, it is suggested that you communicate with the American Ambassador, The Honorable Winthrop W. Aldrich. He is in a position to provide advice and assistance on conference organizational, procedural and administrative matters. He will advise you with regard to the local situation and problems, especially those which may apply to the Meeting, and facilitate generally the work, social obligations and accommodations of you and your Advisers. Specifically the American Embassy may assist you in your relations with the press in the event that you deem such assistance necessary.

13. It is expected that you will keep the Department fully informed by regular cables and despatches of the progress of the deliberations, and that you will see that such documents of the meeting as you deem necessary to keep the policy officers in Washington fully informed are dispatched regularly.

14. Should you find it necessary to seek telegraphic advice from the Department in connection with the Meeting, you will, of course, utilize the facilities of the American Embassy at London as the sole channel of communication with the United States Government. While a special designator series has not been established for this Meeting, this may be done at your request. Any telegraphic communications from the Department affecting your instructions shall become a part thereof and shall supersede any position found to be in conflict.

15. At the close of the Meeting, you are requested to submit an official report covering the work of you and your Advisers and the action taken by the Subcommittee. Enclosed for your convenience is a suggested outline for the report which will serve as a convenient check-list of items to be covered. [3] Its use will serve to assure a degree of uniformity with reports of other official delegations, all of which will be summarized in the Department's annual conference volume. The official report may be supplemented by a confidential report containing any other items which, in your opinion, should be a matter of record. The reports should be addressed to the Secretary of State and marked for the attention of the Office of International Conferences which will ensure their proper distribution within the Department and the Government.

16. The United States Government appreciates your willingness to represent your country at this important Meeting. May I express the Administration's and my own deep gratitude to you personally for the great service which you are rendering. I have every confi-

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[3] Not printed.

dence in the individual ability of you and of your Advisers and that your able leadership will reflect credit on the United States in this important undertaking.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
DAVID MCK. KEY
*Assistant Secretary*

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[Annex A]

### *Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (Bechhoefer)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1954.

## TERMS OF REFERENCE OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

1. Under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is responsible for "formulating . . . plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments". Under Article 11 the General Assembly "may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the members or to the Security Council or to both."

2. On January 11, 1952 the General Assembly by a resolution established "under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission" and indicated its functions and certain general principles to guide the Disarmament Commission. [4]

3. On November 28, 1953 the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts to reach agreement on the problems with which it is concerned and suggested (Paragraph 6) "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a Subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission in order that the Commission may study and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954". The General Assembly further suggested that the Subcommittee "hold its pri-

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[4] Regarding the resolution of Jan. 11, 1952, see the editorial note, p. 845.

vate meetings as appropriate in the different countries most concerned with the problem".[5]

4. Pursuant to these provisions of the General Assembly resolution the Disarmament Commission on April 19 adopted a resolution establishing a Subcommittee consisting of representatives of Canada, France, USSR, UK and USA, and recommending that the Committee present a report on the results of its work to the Disarmament Commission not later than July 15. At the first meeting of the Subcommittee on April 23 the Subcommittee decided to hold its next meeting in London on or about May 13.[6]

5. As stated in Paragraph 3 of this memorandum, the objective of the Subcommittee as set forth in the General Assembly resolution of November 28 is to "seek in private an acceptable solution". The problems which must be solved are those within the jurisdiction of the Disarmament Commission. While there have been several formulations of these problems, the most recent and one which secured the affirmative votes of all states including the Soviet Union, is set forth in the first preambular paragraph of the General Assembly resolution of November 28, reading as follows:

> "*Reaffirming* the responsibility of the United Nations for considering the problem of disarmament and affirming the need of providing for:
>
> (a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,
> (b) The elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction,
> (c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,
>
> the whole programme to be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered."

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[5] Regarding the resolution of Nov. 28, 1953, see the editorial note, p. 1250.

[6] Regarding the Disarmament Commission resolution of Apr. 19, see the editorial note, p. 1386.

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## *Editorial Note*

The Subcommittee of Five of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, consisting of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, met in 19 sessions at Lancaster House, London, May 13–June 22, 1954. The Subcommittee Report and its nine annexes, consisting of proposals and working papers submitted by the various delegations, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* August 2, 1954, pages 177–183. Unpublished documentation on the London Subcommittee meetings is in Department of State files 330.13, 600.0012, and Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "Telegrams–1954".

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Exchange of Notes with USSR"

## *Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)* [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1954.

Subject: NSC Study Concerning Whether and Where to Proceed with the President's December 8 Proposals in the Light of the Soviet Note of April 27. [2]

You might wish to consider the following points in preparing the NSC study on this subject:

1. We should proceed with the President's A-Bank proposals in spite of the Soviet refusal in their note of April 27 to discuss this proposal barring agreement on the Soviet call for a ban on the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

(a) It is doubtful that the USSR's response of April 27 was actually a rejection of the proposals. It is framed in terms of a refusal to discuss the proposals until agreement is reached on the Soviet call for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, but is not a rejection per se as was confirmed by USSR Representative Malik in the London meetings of the Disarmament Commission subcommittee (London's 5141, May 15). [3] Moreover it must be read in the light of the fact that the U.S. has not officially responded to the Soviet proposal in their *Aide-Mémoire* of January 19 [4] that the President's Proposals and the Soviet proposals be discussed in rotation. Consequently, the Soviet move might have been designed to force some indication on our part of the way in which the conversations would be carried on. Prior to the April 27 *Aide-Mémoire,* I had wondered whether the USSR would in fact reply to the outline amplifying the President's Proposals since in the meanwhile the Disarmament Commission had been reconvened on Western initiative and the way in which atomic energy control would be handled obviously would be a point susceptible of discussions in the Disarmament Commission subcommittee meetings and thus would affect the Soviet approach toward the A-Bank proposals.

(b) Even if the USSR in fact intends at some point to reject the President's proposals, it would not be advisable to base our approach to the problem on this assumption, while of course taking this possibility into account. It might be worthwhile recalling, in regard to the USSR attitude on this whole subject, that it is generally agreed the Soviets made a tremendous diplomatic mistake in their rejection of the Marshall Plan and that the present leaders of the USSR may very well have decided that it was better not to reject the President's Proposals outright, because of their initial favorable impact on world opinion and the unfavorable impact of an outright Soviet rejection. To base our approach solely on the assumption the USSR had or would reject the A-Bank proposals would limit our maneuverability when the USSR is behaving in a more sophisticated fashion which enables them to deny that they had rejected the proposal and to point up the fact that the proposal does not deal with the basic issues of atomic disarmament.

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[1] Drafted by Meyers; copies to Murphy, Bowie, and Gullion.

[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin,* Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 482–484.

[3] Not printed, but see the editorial note, *supra.*

[4] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin,* Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 478–479.

(c) If, as the President said, one of the principal purposes of his proposal was to reach agreement with the USSR in an area more susceptible to agreement because of its limited scope, as a step in opening up "a new channel for peaceful discussions . . . to make positive progress toward peace", then it would seem advisable to proceed to develop and implement the President's Proposals in the hope that the USSR would at some stage join in the operation.

(d) Another major reason for proceeding with the President's Proposals is the unfavorable effect on world public opinion should the U.S. cease this effort, and the beneficial impact on world opinion resulting from our going ahead even under adverse circumstances in this effort to help the world realize the beneficial aspects of atomic energy instead of fearing atomic development. Furthermore, this course is valuable to help provide balance to the various statements on "massive retaliation", the effect on world opinion of the thermo-nuclear tests' "fall-out" in the Pacific, and the uncertainty of the Indochina situation. In brief, I think the U.S. badly needs to demonstrate its interest in helping the world realize the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in order to counterbalance fears that we are set on a course of unloosing atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. It certainly should help our relations with our allies, as well as stimulating a more favorable attitude on the part of the neutral nations, thus enhancing our basic security interests.

2. The President's Proposals should be developed within the UN framework rather than elsewhere.

(a) I believe that the A-Bank proposals should be developed and implemented within the UN framework. Certainly, this was their initial concept, as demonstrated by the fact the President made the proposals at the General Assembly; that he stated "we would expect that such an Agency (the IAEA) would be set up under the aegis of the UN"; and that this is the course proposed in the outline amplifying our views, transmitted to the USSR on March 17. [5] It would be difficult to reverse this trend and proceed outside a UN framework, although it would not be impossible. It can be predicted that there would also be a rather unfavorable reaction by many

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[5] For text of the outline of Mar. 17, transmitted to the Soviet Ambassador on Mar. 19, see p. 1372.

United Nations members to our proceeding outside the UN. These countries would hope to receive the benefits of such an Agency's operations and would think that they would have a better chance to realize these benefits if the operation was carried out within a UN framework, rather than on a bilateral or limited multilateral basis in which the U.S. would be able far more easily to obtain specific benefits favoring the U.S. at the expense of what other states might believe was their own national interest. Conversely, it can be said that the U.S. would gain definite international prestige by demonstrating its willingness to go ahead with the creation of an international organization with apparently less control over the operations than it would have if it were a bilateral agreement, thus demonstrating an apparently unselfish desire to help the world attain benefits from the peaceful uses of atomic energy within an international framework. In fact, as is clear in the present organizational framework of the IAEA, the U.S. and its principal allies would have the controlling voice in the Agency's operations, so that there is no difficulty for us with the international agency approach.

(b) Moreover, the presently suggested amendments to the McMahon Act for the domestic control of atomic energy would enable the U.S. to satisfy the needs and desires of certain friendly nations, such as Belgium, who would prefer bilateral arrangements with the U.S. to an international arrangement of the sort presently envisaged for the IAEA. This would seem to provide added reason for proceeding with the President's proposals within the framework of the United Nations.

(c) It will certainly be all the more difficult for the USSR to explain any refusal to discuss the President's Proposals or to join in the operations of the Agency should it be set up, if the Agency is established within the framework of the United Nations. The international nature of the organization renders it much less susceptible to Communist attack than would be the case if we proceed on a bilateral or on a more limited multilateral basis.

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711.5611/5-1754

## *The Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 17, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: By Action No. 1106-h, [1] the National Security Council requested that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, report to the Council on the desirability of an international moratorium on future testing of nuclear weapons.

In order to assist in the preparation of the report directed by referenced NSC Action, there is attached herewith a copy of a memorandum dated 30 April 1954 which contains the views of the Joint

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[1] For the pertinent portion of NSC Action No. 1106, see footnote 5, p. 1428.

Chiefs of Staff on this question. These views had been requested before you raised the subject during the NSC meeting of 6 May, [2] and were received coincidentally with the meeting. I concur in the views and recommendations expressed therein and consider them to be a sound basis for United States Policy.

I am sending copies of this letter and attachment to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, for their information. I am also sending a copy to Mr. Cutler asking that he show it to the President. [3]

Sincerely yours,

R.B. ANDERSON

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[Annex]

### *Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 30 April 1954.

Subject: A Proposal for a Moratorium on Future Testing of Nuclear Weapons

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated 16 April 1954 [4] regarding a proposal for a moratorium on future testing of nuclear weapons.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined this proposal in the light of the factors discussed below, which they consider should be governing in arriving at a United States position on this subject.

3. United States policy with respect to the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments (NSC 112) states, in part, as follows:

> a. "In the light of the present world situation the security interests of the United States demand that the first step in the field of regulation of armaments and armed forces be achievement of international agreement on at least the general principles involved."
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> b. "International control of atomic energy is inseparably related to international regulation of armed forces and all other forms of armaments."
>
> c. "The international control of atomic energy must be based on the United Nations Plan or some no less effective plan."

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[2] For pertinent extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the meeting, see p. 1423.

[3] The JCS memorandum was also circulated through NSC channels by Executive Secretary Lay on May 17. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112)

[4] Not printed.

A basic requirement in the United Nations Plan and in the United States position is that there be established a competent international authority for the control and administration of adequate safeguards.

4. A moratorium, either complete or limited, on the testing of nuclear weapons would constitute a step in the international control of atomic energy. If this proposal were to be adopted, the initial concrete action toward such control would have been taken without the benefit of prior international agreement on the general principles involved, without relation to any international regulation of armed forces and all other forms of armaments, and without there having been established a suitable international control body. Were the United States to depart from its position, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider to be sound, it could be expected that soon thereafter pressures would be brought to bear for further and progressive limitation on the military application of atomic energy, without the universal acceptance of a comprehensive disarmament system which would provide effective safeguards to insure compliance by all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions and violations.

5. There is no reason to expect that the Soviet Union would adhere in good faith to an agreement to suspend future tests. On the contrary, based on the entire pattern of past performance, it is certain that the Soviets would evade and circumvent such an agreement, and that they would violate or abrogate the agreement at any time they considered it would be to their advantage to do so. Moreover, any charges of Soviet violations, even though substantiated with scientific data, would most certainly be categorically denied by them.

6. It is believed that the United States has, at present, an indeterminate advantage over the USSR with respect to the technical status of thermonuclear weapons development. While a moratorium on tests of such weapons might, at first thought, appear to maintain this advantage, a moratorium would not prevent the Soviets from advancing their theoretical studies so as to approach the present stage of development in the United States. The advantage which the United States is believed now to hold might then readily be neutralized should the USSR elect to violate or abrogate the moratorium agreement and conduct proof tests of their theoretical studies.

7. While it is recognized that certain political advantages might accrue to the United States in making or accepting a proposal for a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, it is believed that any political advantages would be transitory in nature, whereas

the military disadvantages probably would be far-reaching and permanent.

8. In the light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it would not be to the net advantage of the United States to propose or to enter into an agreement on a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. It is recommended that the United States adhere to the position that it will not enter into any agreement providing for the limitation of atomic armaments outside of a comprehensive program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, conforming in general to the principles set forth in NSC 112.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
*Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

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330.13/5-2154

### *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 21, 1954.

Subject: Agreement Not to Use Nuclear Weapons Except Against Aggression, Prior to Establishing Disarmament Control Machinery.

*Discussion*

1. Jules Moch, French representative on the Disarmament Commission subcommittee now meeting in London, [2] in a closed meeting of the four Western Powers on May 17, apparently tentatively agreed with the United States that a convention describing control machinery to supervise compliance with a disarmament agreement should stipulate that the agreed reductions and prohibitions would not become effective until the control machinery was established and operational, say, one year following ratification of the disarmament treaty. If prohibition is to be physically effective, control machinery must be set up and actually operating. Mr. Moch then made the further proposal that all states should agree not to use nuclear weapons "except in retaliation for armed invasion of any kind". Our delegation has urgently requested instructions on the Moch proposal prior to May 24, stating they are inclined to oppose any proposition that prohibitions on weapons be accepted before the control machinery is in operation (London's 5184, May 18). [3]

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[1] Drafted by Meyers.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 1434.

[3] Not printed. (330.13/5-1854)

2. In an *Aide-Mémoire* handed to the British Embassy on May 12, 1954,[4] there occurs the most recent statement of the U.S. position: "For their part, the Western Powers are individually prepared to renew their solemn assurance that they will not use either weapons of mass destruction or any other weapons except to repel aggression. Nor will they threaten to employ these weapons or use them in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

3. This projected undertaking not to use these weapons "except to repel aggression" is less restrictive than Moch's proposal to prohibit their use "except in retaliation for *armed invasion* of any kind". "Aggression" can be both direct and indirect, as the General Assembly has already recognized in a previous resolution. If the Moch concept were accepted and if the United States should have to intervene in a situation like, for example, Indochina, it might be precluded from using atomic weapons (assuming this was practical) against an aggression which is not less dangerous and reprehensible because it lacks some of the components of "armed invasion". Therefore, for maximum flexibility it is advisable to maintain the present United States position as stated in the May 12 *Aide-Mémoire.*

4. The Delegation's instructions direct it to concentrate on establishing the real Soviet intentions with respect to disarmament and to identify general principles on which agreement might be reached before negotiating on the concrete aspects of a disarmament program. It remains of great importance to establish whether the Soviet Union is any more ready than heretofore to accept and apply in good faith those safeguards which must attend disarmament before raising a proposal of the nature Moch suggests and in the context he proposes. At the least, the discussions in London and the opportunity this affords to diagnose Soviet intentions should proceed a while longer before such a proposal is made.

*Recommendations*

Moch should be told that the United States would be willing to agree that all states should not use nuclear weapons except to repel aggression, within this period of one year following ratification of an agreed disarmament treaty, but believes it would be better to make the kind of declaration described in our May 12 *Aide-Mémoire* to the United Kingdom. The Delegation should suggest it would be advisable to follow the present tactics outlined in paragraph four above. A telegram stating these views is attached for your signature (Tab A), having been cleared with Defense and AEC.[5]

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[4] Printed as Tab A to the memorandum by Key, May 5, p. 1422.

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[5] Not found; presumably it is telegram 6496 to London, June 2. (330.13/5–2954)

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Atomic Energy Files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

### *Memorandum by Gerard C. Smith[1] to the Secretary of State*

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954.

Subject: The Bearing of the Proposed Atomic Energy Legislation on the President's UN Atomic Energy Proposal.

The President's message of February 17[2] asking for atomic energy amendments stated that legislation to cover the President's international pool proposal would be requested at a later date.

When Deputy Under Secretary Murphy testified before the Joint Committee on May 7, he pointed out this fact and stated that until the negotiations looking to the consummation of the President's plan were further along, the Department of State was not in a position to recommend legislation.

I was advised on May 20 by a representative of the Joint Committee that it would be helpful if in his public statement Secretary Dulles did not make the point that we were not asking for legislation to implement the President's proposal at this time.

On May 21, Mr. Morton and I discussed this matter with Senator Hickenlooper and Mr. Cole. It was pointed out to them that legislation to implement the President's proposal at this time might prejudge any Executive Branch decision as to whether or not to go ahead with the President's proposal in the event that the Russians rejected it finally. Legislative authorization now to participate in such a pool might also set up pressures by other nations for the United States to establish such an agency even without Russian participation.

Mr. Cole felt that the chances of passage of the bill would be increased if it permitted implementation of the President's proposal, but only if it did not bear a UN label. It should be noted that the President's December 8 speech called for an agency to be set up under the "aegis" of the UN. Senator Hickenlooper was silent on this score.

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[1] Consultant to the Secretary of State for atomic energy affairs.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 1360.

Senator Hickenlooper and Mr. Cole agreed to eliminate the language permitting the implementation of the President's plan pending a decision in the Executive Branch as to the desirability of its inclusion in the proposed legislation.

This raises the question of whether a decision can or should be made now as to whether or not to proceed with the international pool idea regardless of the ultimate Russian position. If such a decision were to be affirmative the needed authority should be included in the bill unless it is decided that the UN label might at this time hurt the chances of the other atomic energy amendments. To aid in the solution of this question, the following statement of advantages and disadvantages is submitted:

*Advantages*

The propaganda advantage. Such a course of action would indicate to the world an unselfish American position in this vital matter of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It would indicate an American intention to internationalize the constructive uses of atomic energy, even though such a course was not directly tied into the lessening of cold war tensions or to disarmament. Such a move would, to some extent, counteract the bad effects of the fall-out accident in the Pacific last March. Such a course would, to some extent, counter-balance the communist plea for outlawing the use of nuclear weapons. It would put Russia in a bad light if it had refused to participate in such an important international activity. It would avoid the great disappointment which a decision not to proceed would entail. It probably would be a very popular move politically in the United States. It might be a valuable integrating element to counteract the centrifugal forces appearing in the Western alliance.

*Disadvantages*

The President's proposal had two main aims: (1) to lessen the tensions of the cold war as a first step toward real disarmament negotiations; (2) to syphon off weapon level material from the stockpile of the competitors in the arms race. Without Russian participation, these two purposes of the President's proposal could not be met. In fact, the opposite result might obtain. Cold war tensions might increase as a result of a propaganda coup by the United States. Diversion of United States weapons grade material to an international agency without a corresponding contribution by the Russians would not be a step toward disarmament. To the extent that the security of United States classified information turned over to the proposed international agency was less than when it had been in the sole possession of the United States, the Soviet espionage function would be made easier. To the extent that such information was declassified to permit international use, the Soviet espionage function would be made unnecessary. If we proceed without the Russians it would leave them the option at all times to join the pool or not, which ever suited their interest best.

By proceeding without the Russians, we would lose the leverage of being able to say that Russian rejection of the President's proposal has prevented the nations of the world from having access to the peacetime advantages of atomic energy.

We would make our off-shore raw material procurement job more difficult in that technology and fissionable material would be available to foreign nations from the international agency which otherwise they could only get from the United States in return for their raw material. This seems the most significant disadvantage.

Time has not permitted clearance of this matter with other offices in the Department. This will be done on Monday, May 24.

### *Conclusion*

Unless, after further study, the political and psychological advantages are considered paramount, it is recommended that, in the event of ultimate Soviet refusal to participate in the President's plan, such an international atomic energy agency not be established at this time. As a practical matter, the development and construction of nuclear power reactors will require the skills, know-how, and capital of nations with advanced industrial systems. It is doubted that the existence of an international agency such as the President contemplated would result in the construction of power reactors throughout the world faster than if such an agency did not come into existence. In the absence of Russian participation with resultant improvement in the outlook for peace, it is believed to be more advantageous for America to directly assist in meeting the nuclear power aspirations of the various countries of the world in return for their allegiance and material support—especially in a matter of uranium and thorium supplies. Although such a course would result in an immediate loss of a propaganda opportunity, in the long run it is thought to be more to our advantage to keep the pressure on the Soviets by continually urging that their refusal to participate in an international agency is preventing the world from having the benefits of nuclear power. It is suggested that our information services should be able to demonstrate to the world that the disappointment of the great expectations raised by the President's speech is directly due to the Soviet rejection rather than to any American failure to act. United States information services should be able to convince large portions of the world that an international atomic agency without Russian participation would not be a step toward international control of atomic energy and would not lead to a lessening of cold war tensions.

If such a recommendation were accepted, it would seem well not to have any legislative authorization included in the atomic energy amendments of 1954. If such authority was legislated now, it might make such a negative decision more unpopular and subject it to pressures for reversal.

GERARD C. SMITH

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S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112

## *Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 25, 1954.

Subject: Indian Proposal for a World-Wide Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Tests [2]

The following estimate of the Director of Central Intelligence is forwarded in response to NSC Action No. 1106-h of May 6. [3] No attempt has been made to estimate the effect of the proposed moratorium upon the U.S. nuclear program or upon the relative military capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR.

### I. *The Reactions of the Non-Communist World*

1. The immediate reaction of the great majority of the governments and peoples of the non-Communist world would be one of approval and support for any world-wide moratorium on nuclear tests. The governments of most of our NATO allies would favor the proposal and would privately urge the U.S. to accept it. A summary refusal by either the U.S. or the USSR would be strongly criticized. There would also be serious criticism of any country that carried out nuclear tests during discussion of the proposed moratorium.

2. If the U.S. accepted such a proposal, the governments and peoples of the non-Communist world would consider it strong evidence against Communist charges that the U.S. seeks to terrorize and dominate the world. This reaction would be even more favorable if the USSR staged nuclear tests after the proposal had been made.

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[1] By memorandum of May 25, Lay circulated this paper to the members of the NSC, with copies sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairmen of the AEC and the JCS.

[2] See telegram 611 from New York, Apr. 12, p. 1383.

[3] For NSC Action No. 1106-h, see footnote 5, p. 1428.

3. As discussion developed about the proposal, there would almost certainly be a growing feeling throughout the non-Communist world that the moratorium would have little value unless it constituted the first step toward a worldwide agreement restricting or prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Communist and fellow-travelling organizations in the non-Communist world would claim that a U.S. acceptance of the offer represented a victory for "popular resentment" against the U.S. "war-mongers," and would hail this "victory" as but a step toward banning nuclear weapons. Non-Communist left-wing groups would independently take the same line. Thus, the U.S. would be under strong popular pressure to "ban the bomb."

4. The Indian Government would probably consider that a U.S. acceptance of their proposal was an admission of the correctness of Indian criticism of the March tests. At any international conference called to discuss the proposal, India would probably seek to expand the moratorium into an agreement banning the production and use of nuclear weapons. Such an Indian initiative to expand the moratorium would be supported by some non-Communist governments.

II. *The Communist Reaction*

5. The Communist leaders would probably signify their general approval of the objectives of the Indian proposal as being in line with their "desire" to ban nuclear weapons but would not commit themselves to its acceptance or rejection. If the U.S. rejected the proposal, they would claim that this was proof of U.S. aggressive intentions. If the U.S. accepted the proposal, they probably would consider the following factors before making their official reply:

a. *U.S. motives in supporting the proposal.* Communist leaders would probably estimate:

> (1) That the U.S. hoped to obtain a positive political ahd propaganda advantage and at the same time to deflate the Communist "peace" campaign.
>
> (2) That the U.S. hoped that a moratorium would cripple or at least hamper Soviet weapons development, at a time when U.S. research and development had achieved certain established goals.
>
> (3) That the U.S., disturbed by the protests over the March nuclear weapons tests, the growing strength of the campaign to prohibit nuclear weapons, and strains upon the alliance, had felt forced to accept the proposal.

b. *The Monitoring and Policing Problem.* Though the Kremlin is probably well aware that the U.S. has substantial capabilities for detecting Soviet nuclear tests, it might believe that strict adherence to the moratorium would be unnecessary. It probably believes that U.S. surveillance involves the use of information and techniques which the U.S. would not wish to disclose, and that the evidence or proof of tests derived through these techniques might not be convincing to all non-Communist governments.

c. *Effects of a Moratorium on Communist and Western Military Capabilities.* The Kremlin almost certainly estimates that it will need to stage a few weapons tests reasonably soon in order to incorporate recent research work into more advanced and efficient weapons. However, the Kremlin probably believes that, in general, numerous weapons tests are more important for the U.S. nuclear program than they are for the Soviet program. It almost certainly believes that nuclear weapons, especially those for strategic use, play a more important role in Western military strategy than they do in present Communist military strategy. Therefore, provided the USSR completes its next series of tests, which may well occur this summer, the Kremlin would probably estimate that a moratorium on weapons tests would not for the time being impair Soviet capabilities more than it would those of the U.S.

d. *Political Effects of a Moratorium.* The Kremlin would probably estimate that it could incorporate the Indian proposal into its "peace" campaign and (with left-wing and neutralist support) could convert it into the standard Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons. The Kremlin would estimate that many peoples and some governments would approve such a ban, and that, if the U.S. should oppose the ban, the U.S. would lose the advantage gained from supporting the original Indian proposal.

6. *Probable Communist Courses of Action*

a. Behind a screen of propaganda, the Kremlin would probably seek to delay formal international discussion of the proposal until any tests which it may have scheduled had been completed. The Kremlin would then probably agree to attend a conference on the proposal.

b. In the end, the Kremlin probably would either (1) accept a brief moratorium, on condition that the conference discuss plans for banning nuclear weapons or (2) put forth a counter-proposal of its own, reiterating its proposals for the abolition of nuclear weapons and for an international agreement controlling the production of nuclear materials.

c. Having completed its 1954 tests, the Kremlin would have no reason to violate a moratorium until such time as the Soviet research program had progressed to the point where new tests would be desirable—approximately one year. Its decision then would depend upon the political situation throughout the world and upon its estimate of the advantages it would gain from violating or denouncing the moratorium. In any case, the Kremlin would continue research in and production of all types and sizes of weapons.

d. In general, the reaction of the Kremlin would be conditioned by the nature of the U.S. reaction to the Indian proposal and it would maneuver in the endeavor to force the U.S. to show its hand first.

ALLEN W. DULLES

700.5611/5-2554

## *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1954.

During the course of a call by Sir Roger on the Secretary on another subject, the question of a possible moratorium on H-bomb experiments apparently came up. I came in at the tail end of the conversation and consequently do not know its entire purport. You may wish to ask the Secretary concerning its content. What I learned was that the Secretary was now dubious as to the wisdom of a moratorium on the grounds that it might handicap us in the missile field, that it might further impair the spirit of enterprise on the part of our scientists by placing artificial limits on their experimentation, and, in addition, might boomerang from a propaganda point of view. Sir Roger said that London was now aware of the possibility of a propaganda boomerang.

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## *Editorial Note*

On May 25, 1954, the United States submitted a working paper to the Subcommittee of Five of the Disarmament Commission. This document, circulated as UN doc. DC/SC.1/5, is entitled "Methods of Implementation and Enforcing Disarmament Programs—The Establishment of International Control Organs With Appropriate Rights, Powers, and Functions". For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* volume I, pages 414–422.

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600.0012/5-2654

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson), the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss), and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1954.

With a view to enabling our Committee to make a recommendation to the President as directed by the NSC, I have dictated four questions to which I think we should seek the answers and on the basis of the replies then I think a policy could be arrived at.

I suggest that you consider these questions and give me your views in relation to those matters which are distinctively within your several jurisdictions. If you prefer, we can have a meeting.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[Annex] [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1954.

1. Assuming that there could be an effective arrangement to limit future experimentation to explosions of under X [2] tons, would this be to the technical advantage of the United States?

2. If this would be to the technical disadvantage of the United States, would that disadvantage be overcome by a propaganda advantage and by betterment of allied relations?

3. Is it possible technically to set up arrangements which would dependably expose any violation of an agreement to limit the magnitude of explosions?

4. If questions 2 and 3 may be answered in the affirmative, can we assume that it would be possible to negotiate an arrangement with the Soviets which would permit explosions up to an agreed maximum without the Soviet getting an advantage from constantly urging a lower limit than what we could accept down to the agreed abolition which they seek? Is there a logical or public relations stopping point between no top limit and to all abolition?

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[1] The source text offers no explanation for the discrepancy in the dates of the covering memorandum and the annex.

[2] "X," rather than a number, appears in the source text.

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Eisenhower Library, "Project 'Clean Up', AEC-Nuclear Testing"

### *Memorandum by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (Peterson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 26, 1954.

Subject: NSC Action No. 1106-h [2]

The question of an international moratorium on future tests of nuclear weapons will obviously be decided on the basis of considerations other than those of primary importance to civil defense. I do feel, however, that the Council, in formulating its recommendations to the President, should have before it all relevant information. In my opinion, the importance of the continental tests to the development of civil defense, in both technical and non-technical ways, is a pertinent consideration.

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[1] By memorandum of May 26 Lay circulated this paper to the members of the NSC with copies sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence and the Chairmen of the AEC and the JCS.

[2] For NSC Action No. 1106-h, see footnote 5, p. 1428.

The necessity for FCDA participation in continental test series for research purposes, and the great benefits of such participation to the national civil defense public education and training programs, are well established. As a consequence, FCDA has planned what so far is its broadest and most elaborate participation for the next continental test series.

The need for research on the effects of nuclear weapons on typical civilian items, structures and installations is a continuing one. FCDA is a comparative newcomer in the test field, and our effects testing program is only now approaching our minimum requirements. The effects test program is closely coordinated with the Department of Defense, and a major criterion is that there shall be no duplication. FCDA also acts as a focal point for the test interests of other civilian agencies, and is currently providing coordination with the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission and otherwise assisting several agencies in planning tests for the next continental series. These agencies include the Food and Drug Administration, the Public Buildings Service, various offices of the Department of Agriculture with interests in foodstuffs, the Forest Service, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, and the Federal Housing Administration. Effects testing is so important to the civil defense program that the Congress has given it almost sole recognition in appropriating funds for FCDA research.

Another factor of importance is the participation of private industry in civil defense effects tests. In the Spring (1953) continental test series there was participation by the entire automotive industry through such groups as the Automobile Manufacturers' Association, the National Automobile Dealers' Association and the Society of Automotive Engineers. In addition, there was participation by major oil companies, the National Retail Dry Goods Association, the American Institute of Architects, and a number of individual concerns. The objectives of industry participation in atomic testing are: (a) to allow FCDA to increase the scope of its test programs by supplementing its own limited funds with industry sponsorship, (b) to provide, within industry, a nucleus of technical personnel with firsthand experience in nuclear weapons effects, and (c) to stimulate interest in the civil defense program within an industry through that industry's direct participation in test programs.

The program for the next continental series includes plans for industry participation. The food industry, represented by the National Canners' Association and its members, the Meat Institute and the Grocery Manufacturers' Association, is now planning with FCDA and the Food and Drug Administration a comprehensive program for the testing of canned and packaged foodstuffs. The trailer manufacturer and dealer associations are forming a technical committee to develop an empirical test of house trailers. The aluminum industry has organized an informal technical committee to work with FCDA on the development of tests of aluminum structures and products. The Housing and Home Finance Agency is working with the National Association of Home Builders on behalf of FCDA to develop a comprehensive and definitive program of residence testing. These are just a few of the expressions of interest from industry.

By integrating an observer and press program with the continental tests, FCDA has shown that the level of public interest in the civil defense program, and the level of public knowledge on nuclear weapons effects, can be significantly increased. The University of Michigan Survey Research Center, under contract with FCDA, conducted a survey of public knowledge and opinion in February and March of this year. In spite of the fact a whole year had elapsed between the public test of March 17th, 1953, called Operation Doorstep, and the survey, preliminary analysis of results indicates the following:

1. Seventy percent of the nation's population saw, heard or read about Operation Doorstep.
2. Of those who remembered the test, 61 percent saw it on television or read about it. Another 26 percent heard about it in ways other than through public information media.
3. Nearly half of the population (46 percent) felt they had learned something from the test.
4. At least one-fifth of the nation saw better chances of survival as a result of something they learned.
5. One-third still desire information.

In addition, FCDA has proposed to the Atomic Energy Commission a program of indoctrination for Civil Defense key workers from the States and cities. This program would be similar to the military's Desert Rock exercises, although on a smaller scale, with the objectives of (a) providing psychological conditioning for typical civil defense leaders; (b) providing a measure of prestige for the civil defense volunteer by demonstrating that the Government feels actual atomic attack training is as important for the volunteer as for his military opposite, and (c) emphasizing the national aspect of civil defense by getting several hundred civil defense workers together as representatives of the various States and cities.

These plans for technical tests, public participation, and civil defense participation in the next suitable continental series are already well underway, and the plans are being coordinated at each step with both the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

I feel that the test program now under development and similar programs in the future are definitely in the public interest. They will give impetus to civil defense and increase public knowledge and awareness to an extent that cannot be readily duplicated by any other means.

One further item of information may have a bearing on the central question. It is clear to me that much opinion, both here and abroad, with respect to thermonuclear weapons, is based on gross misinformation on effects, as a result of journalistic exaggeration. As one example, I might cite the action of the local authorities in Coventry in abandoning their civil defense organization.

More recently, at a meeting of the NATO Civil Defense Committee, the Deputy Administrator of FCDA arranged a showing of the film "Operation Ivy". She was both taken aback and encouraged by the reactions expressed after the showing. The representatives of both Belgium and Denmark expressed themselves as "reassured"! They saw a weapon of horrible power, but not one which would, as they had previously believed, erase their small countries in an instant. This feeling was shared by the others, who joined in a committee resolution expressing their joint conviction that civil defense is more important than ever.

I suggest that we may need to consider the extent to which support abroad for the moratorium under consideration may also be based on misinformation.

VAL PETERSON

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 199th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 27, 1954* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 199th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 through 6); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 5 and 8); Assistants Attorney General Barnes and Rankin; Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Department of State (for Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; The Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 28.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

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8. *Proposal for an International Moratorium on Future Tests of Nuclear Weapons* (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 17, 25 and 26, 1954; NSC Action No. 1106-h; NSC 112) [2]

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that the Secretary of State, as chairman of a committee, would report on the question of United States agreement to a moratorium on further tests of nuclear weapons. He pointed out that the Council had before it three reports on the subject; one from the Department of Defense opposing U.S. agreement to the moratorium, one from CIA, and one from the Federal Civil Defense Administration. No written report had come from the Department of State, but Secretary Dulles had some remarks to make on the subject.

Secretary Dulles said that he and his committee had been studying this problem intensively over the last two weeks. He had talked as recently as yesterday with Admiral Strauss, and as a result of these conversations, three or four significant questions had been posed. The subject needed further study before the committee could present its recommendations to the National Security Council. One of the problems which had particularly concerned him, said Secretary Dulles, is how the United States could secure the propaganda advantage it sought from accepting a moratorium without at the same time setting the lower limit to the moratorium at weapons of 100 KT yield. He said that hitherto we had assumed that we would continue to be free to test weapons of this or lower yield, but if we propose the 100 KT as the lower limit, the Soviets might well come back with a proposal to ban tests of all weapons yielding more than 50 KT. In the process of bargaining they might even try to get an absolute ban, since there was no clear criterion which we could invoke. Accordingly, the more he studied the problem the more clearly he perceived that the propaganda ball might well be stolen from the U.S. by the USSR.

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[2] Regarding the memoranda of May 17, 25, and 26, to the NSC, see respectively footnote 3, p. 1438; footnote 1, p. 1445; and footnote 1, *supra*. For NSC Action No. 1106-h, see footnote 5, p. 1428. For NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477. A briefing memorandum on the question of a test moratorium, prepared for Secretary Dulles by Gerard Smith, May 26, in preparation for Council discussion of this agenda item, is in file 700.5611/5-2654.

The second important question stemmed from the fact that we do not have very accurate methods of measuring the size of nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union. This would make it extremely difficult to police a moratorium and to assure ourselves that the Soviets were not evading their commitments. Nevertheless, the proposal for a moratorium was now before the UN, and while we have asked that the subject be deferred, we will presently have to decide whether to reject this proposal flatly or to offer some sort of counter-proposal. Secretary Dulles concluded his statement with a promise to put the varying opinions together and to present a comprehensive report at next week's Council meeting.

Turning to Admiral Strauss, the President inquired as to the degree of accuracy on the size of Soviet explosions which the AEC obtained after it had put together all the results of its investigations. Admiral Strauss replied that there was always a considerable difference of opinion and of debate after the Russians had tested one of their nuclear weapons. It sometimes took as long as a year to achieve final agreement as to the yield of the weapon.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether it wasn't a fact that the estimate of the yield of a weapon consisted of a composite of a number of estimates which varied greatly among themselves. Admiral Strauss replied that the divergence was not quite as wide as Secretary Dulles suggested, but there were certainly differences as great as 10% in the initial stages of an appraisal of the magnitude of any given explosion.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out in this connection that Lord Cherwell had stated that the British initially estimated the yield of the first Soviet thermonuclear explosion at approximately 50% more than the United States had estimated the yield. He understood that since then the British estimate had been revised downward.

The President expressed the desirability of thorough study by the United States of the British calculations as to the character of each Soviet weapon test. Admiral Strauss said he thought that the British were very much less thorough than we were in efforts to appraise these tests. He was not inclined to place high value on the British calculations.

The President then inquired what would be the largest size weapon the Soviets could set off without our knowing about it. Admiral Strauss replied that we would know of any explosion which yielded more than 10 KT equivalent, unless the Soviets took the most extraordinary precautions to prevent us from learning about a test. He pointed out, however, that the Soviets were due for a new series of weapons tests this summer. Accordingly, it behooved us to reach a decision soon if we proposed to gain any advantage from agreeing to a moratorium on further tests.

The President reiterated the view he had expressed at previous meetings of the Council, that he could perceive no final answer to the problem of nuclear warfare if both sides simply went ahead making bigger and better nuclear weapons. While, of course, he did not want the Soviets to gain a lead on us in this field, it was nevertheless a matter of despair to look ahead to a future which contained nothing but more and more bombs. He therefore believed it wrong for the United States merely to take a negative view of this terrible problem. We must try to find some positive answer, and to do so would require more imaginative thinking than was going on at present in this Government. Soon, said the President, even little countries will have a stockpile of these bombs, and then we *will* be in a mess.

Admiral Strauss observed that it would be quite a long time before the little countries were in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Secretary Humphrey stated that he simply couldn't see how this country could jeopardize the one great advantage that it now possesses over the Soviet Union. To him it was unthinkable that we should take any measures to retard our progress in this field. We must keep all the edge we now have.

The President said he could understand Secretary Humphrey's view, but what was the long-run answer to this problem? Secretary Humphrey then asked the President whether he really believed that the Soviets would honor a promise to stop conducting weapons tests. The President replied that the minute we learned that the Soviets had not stopped testing these weapons, we would ourselves start our own tests again.

Admiral Radford pointed out that, unhappily, we were in the awkward position of being unable to explain to our friends and allies why we felt it necessary to go on testing these weapons.

Admiral Strauss then turned to the President and expressed the hope that he would let him show the President charts indicating the results of prior tests of nuclear weapons, before the President made a decision to accept a moratorium.

The President said that of course he had no intention of making any impulsive decision on so grave a matter, but he did insist that we were now pursuing a course which had no future for us. All we are doing now is to make more certain our capability to destroy.

The Attorney General expressed serious concern as to the effect on our own people of accepting a cessation of nuclear tests. This country had taken the development of atomic weapons more calmly than the peoples of other nations, and Americans would react adversely, he believed, to any decision to discontinue tests of nuclear weapons.

Dr. Flemming said he felt, with the President, that somehow or other we must develop something that would give hope to our people. Otherwise, we would produce an atmosphere of despair, and people would feel that there was no use in trying to defend themselves against atomic warfare. Such despair would have very bad effects on the whole mobilization program and on the program for civil defense.

Governor Stassen suggested that the answer to this problem might lie in an approach consisting of alternatives which the United States could offer to the Soviet Union. Force was obviously one of these alternatives. But if the Soviets could be induced to move toward peaceful courses of action, we had other alternatives—for example, increased trade—with which to respond. If, however, the Soviets got to feel that the United States was weakening in its determination to maintain the alternative of force, Governor Stassen warned that they would surely take advantage of this evidence of weakness.

*The National Security Council:* [3]

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of oral remarks of the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

b. Deferred action on the subject until the next meeting of the Council, at which time the report called for by NSC Action No. 1106-h will be presented and will be considered together with the reference memoranda. [4]

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S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[3] Paragraphs a-b constitute NSC Action No. 1140, May 27. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

[4] The subject of a moratorium on nuclear testing was next discussed by the Council at its 203d meeting, June 23; for the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, see p. 1467.

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## *Editorial Note*

On June 3, Secretary of State Dulles appeared before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to support amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Dulles' statement before the Joint Committee was subsequently made public in Department of State Press Release No. 205, June 3, 1954, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 14, 1954, pages 926–928.

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711.5611/6-454

*The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Replying to your letter of May 26 [1] posing certain questions concerning the possible technical and propaganda advantages of a limited moratorium on future tests of nuclear weapons, I advise you that the Department of Defense feels that there is no compelling reason which would require this Department to modify its position previously expressed to you in my letter of May 17. [2]

With regard to the specific questions in your most recent letter, I advise you as follows:

1. It is our judgment that limitation by effective agreement of future experimental explosions to a fixed upper yield would not be to the technical advantage of the United States. This view is based upon the best scientific advice available to us, which would indicate that until an acceptable formula for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armaments of all nations can be devised and implemented, the security of the United States will depend in a large measure upon continued and intensive application of our scientific engineering and industrial capacity in this field without being circumscribed as proposed.

We realize that the proposed limitation might be acceptable if such a limitation agreement held promise, either through a propaganda advantage or otherwise, of such an overriding and advantageous nature as to justify some diminution of scientific development that would follow the proposed limitation. It is our judgment that the proposed moratorium does not hold such promise.

2. We do not believe that the technical disadvantage of a limited moratorium would be overcome by any propaganda advantage. As I have stated above, we believe that such a propaganda advantage should be very clear and of sizeable proportions in order to justify a moratorium that would impede to some extent our own progress. On the contrary, we believe that the USSR would likely seize and expound upon any agreement by us as being motivated by a desire to limit Russian progress. The USSR could also charge us with violations and produce faked evidence in proof which we could not

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[1] Reference is to Dulles' memorandum, p. 1448.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1437.

refute without revealing vital information. It is my understanding that with the experience of the recent tests behind us our scientists believe that we can so govern the magnitude and nature of future experimental explosions as to avoid the risk of seriously harmful effects on others.

3. It is not possible technically to set up arrangements which would dependably expose any violation of an agreement to limit the magnitude of explosions without the full cooperation of the agency actually conducting the tests. With respect to the reliability of remote detection methods the best estimates by our own scientists are at wide variance. Some believe we can estimate the yield of a Soviet explosion within 30 per cent; others feel that we cannot expect to do better than a factor of 2 to 3. Should the USSR elect to detonate a high yield device at some remote location outside the USSR, such as in the Antarctic, our ability to detect the occurrence of the explosion as well as to determine the yield would be greatly depreciated.

4. Inasmuch as it is not possible to answer questions 2 and 3 in the affirmative, I see no logical or public relations stopping-point between "no top limit" and "total abolition". Assuming, however, that these questions could be answered affirmatively and that the USSR should see an advantage in accepting a limited moratorium, there appears no way of avoiding continued pressure for lower limits down to abolition by agreement only. Clearly, a limited moratorium could be the first step in the direction the USSR is attempting to lead the world.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. WILSON

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600.0012/6-954

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 9, 1954.

Subject: Proposed Reply to Soviet Note of April 27.[1]

Participants: Mr. E. E. Tomkins, British Embassy
Mr. Gerard Smith, S/AE

Mr. Smith delivered to Mr. Tomkins two copies of the proposed reply to the Soviet note of April 27. Mr. Tomkins asked whether the reply would commit the United States to setting up an international agency without Russian participation. Mr. Smith stated that it would not. Mr. Tomkins stated that his personal estimate of the U.K. position on an international agency without Soviet participation was that if the United States Government felt very strongly in favor of such an agency, the United Kingdom would go along with it. However, in view of the relatively small size of the British atomic energy program, he felt that the U.K. would not have much to contribute to such an agency if it first had carried out its obligations to other members of the British Commonwealth.

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[1] For text of the Soviet note of Apr. 27, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 482–484. The proposed reply under reference here, dated June 8, is not printed. (600.0012/6–854) The text corresponds in large part to that of the reply actually transmitted to Soviet Ambassador Zarubin on July 9, p. 1473.

Mr. Tomkins expressed the hope that any information flow which might result from the existence of an international agency would not prevent continuance of technical information exchange between the United States and the United Kingdom and Canada.

Mr. Tomkins stated that he believed a committee was presently studying in London the question of an international atomic energy agency without Russian participation.

Mr. Tomkins asked if the United Kingdom, after submitting its views on the reply to the Soviet note of April 27, would see a copy of the final document before it was sent to the Russians. Mr. Smith advised him that such a copy would certainly be made available to the United Kingdom. Mr. Smith advised Mr. Tomkins that the United States proposed to submit this document for comment to the French and Canadian Governments, and transmit a copy of the final document to the South Africans, Australians, Belgians and Portuguese for information purposes only.

Mr. Smith pointed out the importance of getting a reply to the Soviets as quickly as possible. [2]

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[2] On June 9, Smith also transmitted copies of the proposed reply to Jacques Martin, First Secretary of the French Embassy, and George Glazebrook, Canadian Minister. Smith's brief memoranda of the two conversations are in file 600.0012/6-954.

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330.13/6-954

### *Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1954.

Subject: "Moratorium on Tests"

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[1] Copy to Strauss

As a counter to appearing to oppose any "moratorium", and to avoid the appearance of continuing in a negative position, why not intensify present planning, with a view to starting discussions shortly on the atomic-pool suggestion, excluding the USSR? The President instructed Admiral Strauss, in testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy relative to the Administration's legislative program, to take the position that the U.S. did not intend to be deterred from going ahead by itself with the atomic-pool suggestion just because the USSR appeared to be unwilling to take any part.

I don't know what is the present status of the program for the atomic-pool, excluding the USSR. If the U.S. position is to announce the infeasibility of a "moratorium," would there not be a benefit in simultaneously announcing the opening of negotiations with powers other than the USSR, on the peaceful use of atomic energy?

Bobby

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S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Atomic Energy—Cooperation"

### *The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler)* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 11, 1954.

DEAR GENERAL CUTLER: Your letter of April 7, 1954, [2] requested the views of the Commission concerning the development of a policy dealing with the construction of reactors abroad. We have had prepared a staff memorandum, which is attached, discussing some of the principal considerations involved in the development of such a policy. [3]

We now have the technical capability of constructing power, research, and medical reactors, though it should be noted that power reactors are at present development machines directed toward the goal of economic nuclear power. The Commission recognizes that construction of reactors abroad might be of great significance in attaining foreign policy and other national security objectives. Construction of reactors abroad would, from the Commission's point of view, benefit the reactor development program and, in the case of certain countries, assist the ore procurement program.

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[1] Copies of this letter were transmitted to the members of the NSC Planning Board by NSC Executive Secretary Lay by memorandum of June 15.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] The staff study is not printed.

The obligations incurred by this country in connection with procurement of uranium from the Belgian Congo have made it desirable that the first power reactor built abroad with United States assistance should be located in Belgium. As you are aware, the President has requested amendment of the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate such assistance. In considering a further program of construction of reactors abroad, difficult questions of law and security, referred to in the attached staff memorandum, would be confronted. As in the case of Belgium, a satisfactory foreign program would depend on amendment of the present law.

Additional problems are identified in the attached memorandum. None of these problems appears insoluble should it be found that construction of reactors abroad would be in the national interest. We will be happy to discuss further with you the technical and other questions which arise in seeking to establish national policy in this field.

Sincerely yours,

LEWIS STRAUSS

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711.5611/6-1754

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler)* [1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1954.

Subject: Moratorium on Tests

In reply to your memorandum of June 9 [2] —as you know we are now clearing our reply to the Soviet note of April 27 with the other governments concerned and this reply should go forward to the Soviets later in the month. Our purpose is to try to get a clarification from the USSR of their ultimate position on the President's proposal. Our thinking has been to defer any decision about establishing an international pool without Russian participation until we had obtained such clarification.

I agree that we should be stepping up our planning for machinery to permit foreign access to some fissionable material and data and technology bearing on the constructive aspects of atomic energy. I suggest that a working group be set up under the Planning Board composed of representatives of the Atomic Commission, the Department of Defense and the Department of State to make recommendations as to the best means to implement the President's proposal if the USSR does not participate. At the same time, the views of the United Kingdom, France, and Canada could be solicited.

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[1] Drafted by Gerard Smith.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1459.

Since all agree that we should vigorously pursue a program to develop the constructive uses of atomic energy throughout the world, this Planning Board study could be limited to considering whether this aim will best be reached by an agency under the aegis of the UN as originally contemplated or by "Agreements of Cooperation" under the atomic energy amendments now being considered by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. As for using an announcement of such a program to cancel out the bad effects of a possible United States turndown of the test moratorium proposal—I would be inclined to make no announcement of such turndown if this proves to be our decision. However, until we can see more clearly the likely upshot of the moratorium matter, I would like to hold off any further comment about linking those two questions.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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600.0012/6-254

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1954.

DEAR CABOT: I have read with interest your telegram of June 2 [2] regarding the President's December 8 proposal. The President and I both share your desire for the implementation of this proposal with or without the cooperation of the Soviet Union, and it is our intention at the appropriate time to consult with the free nations principally involved, in the hope of making progress.

It is quite true, as the President indicated in his press conference on June 2, that the Soviet Union seems to have closed the door on the President's proposal. [3] The latest *Aide-Mémoire* from the Soviet Government, dated April 27, [4] says that the USSR will not discuss this matter until we agree to a ban on the use of atomic weapons. However, I am not entirely sure that this represents a final rejection and believe we should try to ascertain whether the USSR definitely considers the question closed. To this end, I intend to send another note to the Soviet Government. When we receive a reply, we will be in a better position to make final decisions on how to proceed on the President's proposal.

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[1] Drafted by Paul W. Jones, Jr. of UNP.

[2] Reference is to telegram 792 from New York (from Lodge for Dulles), June 2, which reads in part as follows: "Since it now seems clear Russians have closed door to President's proposal of last December 8 (President's press conference this morning), I believe it would be desirable for us at this stage to recapture initiative seized by President on December 8 by going ahead with other countries. There may be practical reasons why it would be difficult to achieve constructive results without Russians. However, an indication of our determination to go ahead even if the Russians are not willing to join in at this time, would seem to me to offer great encouragement to free world and be very advantageous to us." (600.0012/6-254)

[3] For the pertinent passage, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, p. 528.

[4] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 482–484.

Enclosed, for your information, is a copy of our proposed note to the Soviet Union, which has been cleared with all the other Departments or Agencies concerned. [5]

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[5] The enclosure is not printed. For the reply actually transmitted to the Soviet Union on July 9, see p. 1473.

A letter from Lodge to Dulles of June 21 reads as follows: "In reply to your Top Secret communication of June 18th, I do not believe we are going to get anywhere with the Soviet Union by writing more notes. The only possible way of getting any progress is by forcing events and it is for this reason that I advocate bringing up the President's December 8 proposal in the Disarmament Commission, agitating it there and 'worrying it' like a dog with a bone. It is impossible for me to see what we could lose by such a procedure and it is just conceivable that we could gain a great deal." (330.13/6-2154)

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Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "NSC Papers, 1953-1955"

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1954.

Subject: Department of State Views on the Proposed Moratorium on Tests

The following views are submitted in response to NSC Action No. 1106-h of May 6. [1]

### I. *The Proposal*

On April 2 Prime Minister Nehru proposed in the Indian Parliament a "Standstill Agreement" covering at least the test explosions then being conducted in the Pacific. The Nehru proposal was referred to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. The matter, however, has not been raised in the London meetings.

The United Kingdom has shown solid interest in a "hydrogen bomb" moratorium. Churchill will probably raise this question during his visit to Washington.

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[1] See footnote 5, p. 1428.

II. *Technical Effects of a Moratorium*

A. *On the United States Program.*

The Atomic Energy Commission has concluded that "a temporary limitation or moratorium on megaton weapons would, under certain conditions, not damage our program." These conditions are:

1. That testing be permitted up to 100 kilotons.
2. That the moratorium end in January 1956 in the absence of clear and substantial progress in disarmament negotiations.
3. That in the meantime preparations for large-scale testing be continued and such fact be publicly known.
4. That monitoring be accomplished by on-the-spot surveillance conducted by properly equipped observers located as close as safety permits to the site of the test shots.*
5. That precise shot time and altitude be given in advance to such observers.

Chairman Strauss believes that such a moratorium would be advantageous only if covered by a dependable agreement which cannot be expected from the present Soviet government. If an affirmative decision for propaganda purposes is made, he points out the conditions which should be attached.

Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray submitted supplementary views expressing the opinion that long-range detection methods would be adequate to police a moratorium guarded by points 1 and 2 above.

Such an agreement would depend in no way on Soviet good faith, and the conclusion that the United States weapons program would not be disadvantaged is *not* contingent on the USSR's maintenance of such agreement.

The Department of Defense has concluded that any test moratorium would be to the technical disadvantage of the United States because until an acceptable formula for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armaments of all nations can be devised and implemented, the security of the United States will depend in a large measure upon continued and intensive application of our scientific engineering and industrial capacity in this field.†

*B. Technical Effects on the USSR.*

The Soviets have conducted a total of seven tests in three series as compared with 47 tests by the United States. Three of the Soviet 1953 tests utilized thermonuclear reactions. The yield of one shot is estimated at 1 megaton by CIA.

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*Since this presumably would involve disclosure of Restricted Data, Congressional approval would be required. [Footnote in the source text.]

† In view of the Atomic Energy Commission's subsequent conclusion that under certain conditions a moratorium agreement would not prejudice the United States weapons development program, the Department of Defense may want to submit further views on this point. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Soviets appear to have a family of weapons ranging from small (5 kilotons) through standard (50 to 80 kilotons) to 1 megaton.

If the Soviets desire to produce and stockpile higher yield weapons, for example 10 megaton, further tests would almost certainly be required. It is expected that such further tests will be conducted during the coming summer. If completed successfully, the USSR could forego tests for a substantial period of time without seriously affecting its total nuclear capability.

III. *Monitoring and Policing*

Two systems of monitoring any test moratorium have been suggested: (1) long-range detection by scientific techniques and (2) on-the-spot surveillance by qualified and properly equipped observers.

1. *Long-range Detection by Scientific Techniques.*

A. *Certainty of Detection.*

Any nuclear explosion in the USSR larger than 100 kilotons would be detected by long-range methods. If the USSR detonated a high yield device at a remote spot, such as in the Antarctic, there is less assurance that it would be detected.

B. *Capability to Estimate the Yield of a Test Shot.*

It is agreed that long-range detection is insufficient to give a precise measurement of the size of any explosion. The margin of error of yield measurement spreads over several hundred percent. In the mid-range (20 to 100 kilotons) a reasonable measure of precision is a range of plus-100 percent and minus-50 percent. In the megaton range, the margin widens substantially.

2. *On-the-spot Surveillance.*

Properly equipped observers stationed as close as compatible with safety and having advance knowledge of the exact time and altitude of the burst could clearly establish any substantial violation of a permissible testing ceiling.

IV. *Psychological/Political Effects*

*A. Advantages.*

An American offer to agree on a test moratorium or an American acceptance of such a proposal made by another nation would constitute a major propaganda stroke. It would be received with approval and supported by the great majority of the governments and peoples of the non-communist world. A summary refusal by the USSR to agree to such a proposal would meet sharp criticism. The Russians would also be criticized if they carried out large-scale tests during an international discussion of a test moratorium.

American support for such a moratorium would be strong evidence against communist charges that the United States seeks to terrorize and dominate the world. If the Soviets conducted large-scale tests after such an American move had been made, their aggressive intent would become clearer.

Specifically, American initiative on this score should substantially improve relations with the United Kingdom. It would measurably improve relations with India and Japan. It would be greeted with a great sense of relief by people all over the world who abhor the idea of atomic war and out of ignorance fear that continuing larger and larger thermonuclear testing may result in some global catastrophe.

*B. Disadvantages.*

American initiative at this time looking to a test moratorium might imply some admission of fault or some recognition that large-scale testing is illegitimate.

Although opinions differ as to whether or not the Soviets would accept any testing moratorium proposal, it is agreed that the USSR would seek to exploit such a change in United States policy to support their repeated call for a ban on the use of all nuclear weapons.

As first reactions wore off, and popular and governmental discussions of the proposal developed, there would be a growing feeling, even in the non-communist world, that the moratorium would have little value unless it constituted the first step toward a world-wide agreement restricting or prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

The hopes of avoiding nuclear war which the American move would have raised would be sufficiently widespread so that if the United States refused to take the "next step" and agree to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it might find itself in an international political position more difficult than that existing before the moratorium was proposed. This points up that a massive U.S. propaganda effort is an essential concomitant to any American move looking toward a test moratorium. A keynote for such a propaganda drive would be to appropriate for the United States the word "disarmament" as the Soviets have appropriated the words "peace" and "democracy". A strong American propaganda drive will be required in any event to counter the expected Soviet Stockholm Appeal type of propaganda drive urging outlawing the use of atomic weapons.

*Conclusion*

On the assumption

1. that the United States continues to oppose a total abolition of atomic weapons except as part of an effective general disarmament program and

2. that it would be contrary to the military interests of the United States to have a moratorium on tests unless its duration were limited to January 1956; unless explosions under 100 kilotons were tolerated; and unless there were "on the spot" controls; it is concluded that it would be a mistake for the United States to agree to such a moratorium.

The reasons for this conclusion are:

A. The proposal implies, or would be generally taken to imply, acceptance of the thesis that there is something morally wrong in explosions in excess of a certain power. It would be difficult effectively to answer a Soviet counter-proposal that the maximum be greatly reduced, or that *all* atomic explosions be banned.

B. The terms of the temporary moratorium, not only as to its tolerable limit and inspection, but notably as to its duration, i.e., to January 1956, are "hand tailored" to fit the present stage of United States technical development and, presumably, to embarrass the Soviet Union. This could readily be made apparent, and if there were counterproposals for a moratorium of longer or indefinite duration, we would find it awkward to explain our position.

C. In the unlikely event that a temporary moratorium were accepted, as proposed, the result would create a "climate", such that in fact no resumption could occur without then accepting a propaganda disadvantage which would more than offset the initial propaganda advantage.

*Recommendation*

It is recommended:

A. That the United States not agree to a testing moratorium.

B. That Churchill be advised of this position and the reasons therefor.[2]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[2] Churchill was so advised at a meeting on June 25. (Memorandum of a meeting; 700.5611/6-2754)

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 203d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, June 23, 1954* [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 203rd meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House

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[1] Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on June 23.

Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *Proposal for an International Moratorium on Future Tests of Atomic Weapons* (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 17, 25 and 26, 1954; NSC Actions Nos. 899-c and 1106-h; NSC 112)[2]

Mr. Cutler reviewed prior Council action on this item and noted the reference memoranda on the subject, including the latest one by the Secretary of State, which was distributed to the members of the Council by Mr. Lay.[3] Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Dulles to make his report.

Secretary Dulles said that he had attempted to present a unanimous report and he may indeed actually have succeeded, although there had not been sufficient time to obtain the formal concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, AEC. He believed, however, that both these other members of the committee did concur in the conclusions reached by the Secretary of State's report, which was negative with respect to the proposed moratorium. Secretary Dulles went on to state that these conclusions illustrated the power of reason against the power of will, since all members of the committee had desired to reach a different conclusion but could not succeed in so doing. Secretary Dulles also noted that the conclusion was predicated on two basic assumptions. If these assumptions were ever to be reconsidered, different conclusions could result. The first of these assumptions was that the United States continued to oppose total abolition of atomic weapons save as a part of an effective general disarmament program. The committee felt, said Secretary Dulles, that as long as the United States continued to oppose special treatment for the category of atomic weapons, it would virtually be forced to avoid taking any position which would in effect set these weapons apart from other weapons as morally bad.

The second assumption was that while a moratorium lasting until January 1956 would be advantageous to the United States from a technical point of view, it would be disadvantageous if it was to last any longer. The technical reasons for this, said Secretary Dulles, he would leave for Admiral Strauss to explain. But he pointed out that the Soviets would probably conduct nuclear tests this summer, and a moratorium in the short term would put them at a disadvantage. On the other hand, if the United States were to set the duration of the moratorium for the period up to but not beyond January 1956, and if the United States were also to insist that explosions under 100 kilotons were exempted from the moratorium, the Soviets would quickly grasp the fact that the United States was advocating a position which had been tailored to its own advantage. This would put us in an awkward propaganda position. Accordingly, to sum up, Secretary Dulles said that the committee had virtually been forced to the negative conclusions.

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[2] For NSC Action No. 899-c, see footnote 3, p. 1212. For NSC Action No. 1106-h, see footnote 5, p. 1428. Regarding the memoranda of May 17, 25, and 26 to the NSC, see respectively footnote 3, p. 1438, footnote 1, p. 1445, and the second footnote 1, p. 1449. For NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

[3] *Supra.*

The President stated with great emphasis that he thoroughly agreed with the conclusions reached by the committee, but that he would strongly challenge the first of the two assumptions on which the conclusions had been reached—namely, that the United States continues to oppose abolition of atomic weapons except as part of a general disarmament program. The President said that if he knew any way to abolish atomic weapons which would ensure the certainty that they would be abolished, he would be the very first to endorse it, regardless of any general disarmament. He explained that he was certain that with its great resources the United States would surely be able to whip the Soviet Union in any kind of war that had been fought in the past or any other kind of war than an atomic war. Unfortunately, the President said, he could see no way at present to secure an agreement which would really abolish atomic weapons. Thanks to the element of surprise in the enemy's hands, the United States, for the first time in its history, was frightened at the prospect of an atomic war.

Secretary Dulles reminded the President of the point he had made earlier, that if we were to reconsider these assumptions we might well come out with changed conclusions. But, said the President, he wanted to emphasize that he would go along a hundred percent with the present conclusions until someone invented a really foolproof system to ensure the abolition of atomic weapons. Let no one make the mistake, however, of imagining that if such a system were devised the President would not go along with it. The matter of the morality of the use of these weapons was of no significance. The real thing was that the advantage of surprise almost seemed the decisive factor in an atomic war, and we should do anything we could to remove this factor.

Secretary Dulles said that the President's comments were profoundly important and had a great bearing on our national strategy and subsidiary decisions in the light of that strategy. Secretary Dulles said that he did not entirely rule out the possibility of achieving the effective abolition of atomic weapons. He thought that the USSR might agree to cease activity in the nuclear area, where they know the United States now has superiority, and go back to an area of conventional armaments where they have superiority. The President interjected that the Secretary meant where they have *initial* superiority. Secretary Dulles agreed with the correction, and went on to point out how much the abolition of atomic weapons would help us in our problems with our allies and in the United Nations. Secretary Dulles stated his agreement that there ought to be a reappraisal of the basic situation with respect to disarmament. On the other hand, unless and until new conclusions had been reached on this basic situation, we could not agree to the abolition of atomic weapons alone.

The President agreed, but restated his position that there was no way in which the United States could be licked by any enemy in a protracted war of exhaustion unless we were the victims of surprise atomic attack.

Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Strauss if he would comment on the technical considerations which had moved the committee to reach its conclusions.

At the outset, Admiral Strauss expressed his agreement with the conclusions. He pointed out that the best advice available indicated that it seemed possible to conceal tests of weapons of a size up to fifty thousand tons of TNT equivalent, so that even if the Soviets agreed to a moratorium they could continue to stage tests of weapons of fifty thousand tons or less. Admiral Strauss also pointed out the large margin of error involved in the long-range detection process. He then indicated the reasons why it was of such importance that the United States again conduct atomic tests after January 1956. We required a small megaton weapon for defense against hostile aircraft. Work on such a weapon was still in a primitive stage and would not be ready for a test until 1956. But, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testing such a weapon and adding it to our present family of weapons was almost indispensable. This accounts for our unwillingness to extend the moratorium beyond January 1956.

Speaking personally, continued Admiral Strauss, he believed that there was something essentially illusory in offering to the peoples of the world a moratorium on atomic tests when at the same time both the United States and the Soviet Union would go on manufacturing nuclear weapons. The real fallacy in this whole business, however, was the unenforceability of any agreement on the subject with the Russians. These views, said Admiral Strauss, he had forwarded to Secretary Dulles (copy in the minutes of the meeting).[4]

At the conclusion of Admiral Strauss' statement, the President inquired of Admiral Radford whether attacking Soviet aircraft would fly in formation in an atomic attack on the U.S. or whether they would send single planes to attack each target. Admiral Radford replied that they would probably come over with a number of planes over each target in order to confuse the defenders.

The President said that if and when we succeeded in getting the small megaton weapon against aircraft, to which Admiral Strauss had just alluded, how high would such a weapon have to be exploded in order to destroy the hostile aircraft but not the city beneath? Admiral Strauss said that if the defensive weapon were exploded at a distance of ten miles or more above the city, the city would not be seriously damaged, even by the fall-out from the explosion.

The President then said that in any event we were not going to stop conducting tests of atomic weapons, and that there was no reason to do so until some new alternative was in sight.

Mr. Cutler then called on Mr. Allen Dulles for his views.

Mr. Dulles said that the CIA was inclined to be a little more optimistic than Admiral Strauss on the possibilities of detecting Soviet violations of a moratorium. With respect to the propaganda issue, Mr. Dulles said he would very much like to see the United States take a position which was somewhat more affirmative than the negative conclusions reached by the committee. He had, however, nothing specific to propose, except to suggest the insertion of the words "at this time" in the recommendation that the United States would not agree to a testing moratorium. He thought that the negative character of our position might also be softened a little if we added a third recommendation to indicate that we were continuing to review our policies with respect to disarmament.

Mr. Dulles then noted that the proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946[5] would, if passed, greatly facilitate the exchange of intelligence information in the atomic field with our allies. This would meet some of the British complaints on this score. The President replied that he had a great deal of sympathy with the British position, and that their complaints were legitimate. The 1946 law ought to be modified, and he was willing to do all that he could to obtain the modification.

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[4] The minutes under reference have not been further identified.

[5] See the editorial note, p. 1505.

Admiral Strauss commented that there seemed to be very little opposition in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to the proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.

*The National Security Council:* [6]

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference memoranda and a memorandum by the Secretary of State, presented at the meeting, the conclusions of which were concurred in by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

b. Adopted the position that the United States should not agree at this time to a testing moratorium.

c. Agreed that the review of the current policy with respect to the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments (NSC 112) should be continued and expedited by the Special Committee created pursuant to NSC Action No. 899–c.

*Note:* The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[6] Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1162, June 23, 1954. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95 "NSC Actions")

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## *Editorial Note*

On June 29 the United States Atomic Energy Commission announced that it had decided by a vote of four to one not to restore the security clearance of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director of the Institute of Advanced Study and frequent consultant to the government on atomic energy, disarmament, and various other subjects relating to science and national defense. Oppenheimer had been Chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 to 1952. His security clearance had been suspended on December 23, 1954, on the basis of charges of disloyalty relating to allegations that he had maintained contacts with subversive individuals and had made false statements to security officers.

At Dr. Oppenheimer's request, hearings on his case were held before a Personnel Security Board of the Atomic Energy Commission April 12–May 6, 1954. A majority of the Board recommended against the reinstatement of Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance, as did the General Manager of the AEC (Kenneth D. Nichols), who reviewed the findings. The Atomic Energy Commission subsequently issued two publications containing documentation on the Oppenheimer case: *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearings before Personnel Security Board, Washington, D.C., April*

*12, 1954–May 6, 1954* (Government Printing Office, 1954), and *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Texts of Principal Documents and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General Manager, Commissioners, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1954 through June 29, 1954* (Government Printing Office, 1954). Extensive additional information on this subject is contained in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, volume 10 (1954).

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600.0012/7-954

## *The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union* [1]

TOP SECRET

### MEMORANDUM

The United States has further considered the draft declaration of January 30 and *Aide-Mémoire* of April 27 delivered by the Soviet Union to the United States. [2] The United States wishes to make the following comments:

I.

1. The President's speech of December 8, 1953 to the United Nations General Assembly pointed out the dangers of the atomic armaments race and stressed the desire of the United States to remove these dangers by any effective method which includes adequate safeguards against violations and evasions. The United States would welcome any system of disarmament which would serve to protect the peoples of the world from the threat of war and relieve them of the heavy burden of military defense in a manner consistent with their security.

2. The United States is also aware of the difficulties which have been experienced since 1946 in trying to negotiate a disarmament plan. From that date until the present, the United States has persistently sought, alone and in concert with other nations, to find

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[1] Drafted by Bowie and Gerard Smith. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "Handed to Amb. Zarubin by Mr. Merchant on July 9, 1954." On July 2, Bowie had forwarded the draft text to Secretary Dulles for approval. The memorandum of transmittal indicated that the draft reply "is based on the draft you approved earlier, together with further revisions to take account of the comments from France, the U.K. and Canada as well as Defense and AEC. It has the concurrence of Mr. Merchant, Mr. Smith and myself. If you approve the draft, it will be retyped for delivery to the Soviets." Dulles initialed an "OK, JFD" on the memorandum of transmittal. (600.0012/7-254) On July 8, Gerard Smith presented advance copies of the reply to representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Belgium; memoranda of his separate conversations with these representatives are in file 600.0012/7-854.

[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 479 and 482–484.

ways of easing the burden of armaments and of lessening the threat of war. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 through 1948, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments from 1947 through 1950, in the special meetings of the Six Permanent Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1949 and 1950, and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission since 1951, the overwhelming majority of nations was able to reach agreement—the Soviet Union alone prevented progress.

3. Despite this discouraging record, the President, in his address on December 8, stated that the United States, heeding the resolution of November 28, 1953 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, was "prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved' to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the very life of the world."

II.

4. In his address, the President also stated that the United States would carry into these talks a new proposal for an international atomic energy agency to expedite the use of atomic energy to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. In its memorandum of March 19, [3] the United States explained in more detail its views on the method for converting this conception into a practical reality. The *Aide-Mémoire* of April 27 of the Soviet Union appears to misconstrue completely the purpose of this specific proposal.

5. This proposal was intended to make a beginning toward bringing to the peoples of the world the peaceful benefits of atomic energy. This offer by the United States to join with other nations having atomic facilities to furnish fissionable material and atomic energy technology for the common benefit, would provide a new opportunity for international cooperation. Successful cooperation in the implementation of the President's proposal would surely result in an improved atmosphere, which, in turn, could significantly improve the prospects for genuine, safeguarded international disarmament. The proposal itself was not put forward as a disarmament plan.

6. The Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* of April 27 states in effect that the USSR will not cooperate in steps to achieve peaceful benefits of atomic power for the world until the United States agrees to a ban on the use of atomic weapons. The primary reason given for this position is that under the President's United Nations proposal, stockpiles of weapon grade material could continue to increase

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[3] See the memorandum of conversation, Mar. 19, p. 1376.

after the international agency had been established. Yet the Soviet proposal for a ban on weapons' use would not in any way prevent such increases in stockpiles. Accordingly, the United States cannot agree that the Soviet position provides a valid objection to proceeding at this time with steps for promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

7. The Soviet Union also appears to assume that any form of peaceful utilization of atomic energy must necessarily increase stocks of materials available for military purposes. In reality, however, ways can be devised to safeguard against diversion of materials from power producing reactors. And there are forms of peaceful utilization in which no question of weapon grade material arises.

8. The United States believes that the nations most advanced in knowledge regarding the constructive uses of atomic energy have an obligation to make it available, under appropriate conditions, for promoting the welfare of peoples generally. At the present stage of nuclear technology, the United States believes that it is now possible to make a beginning in this direction. Accordingly, the United States will feel free to go ahead with its proposal with other interested nations, even though the Soviet Union does not wish to pursue it at this time. If at a later time the Soviet Union should decide to take part in any such discussions, the United States will continue to welcome such participation.

## III.

9. The Soviet Union refers to its proposal of January 30 for an international agreement calling for unconditional renunciation of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. The United States has thoroughly and earnestly considered this proposal in accordance with its oft-declared policy to examine with an open mind all suggested approaches to the problem of disarmament.

10. In the opinion of the United States, any effective plan for disarmament must provide satisfactory answers to two fundamental questions:

a. First, will the plan result in an actual reduction or elimination of national armaments in a manner consistent with the security of each nation? A paper promise not to use weapons will not enable the nations safely to reduce their armaments. The very existence of any weapon poses the possibility of its use, despite promises not to do so, which can be broken without notice.

b. Second, will the plan materially reduce or eliminate the danger of aggression and warfare? If any plan would, in fact, tend to increase the danger of resort to war by a potential aggressor, it would not accomplish the basic purpose of disarmament.

11. The Soviet Union's proposal of January 30 fails to meet either of these basic tests, or to offer any hope for beneficial results in the disarmament field:

a. It would leave unimpaired existing armaments and continued armament production. This is clear from the terms of the Soviet proposal itself. There would be only an exchange of promises not to make use of weapons which are still retained. There could be no certainty that these assurances would be observed. The maintenance of stocks of weapons and the continued manufacture of weapons would bear ominous witness to the danger that the assurances might be disregarded.

b. The danger of aggression and war would not be lessened if the Soviet proposal were put in effect. Indeed, it could be increased, since the deterrent effect upon a potential aggressor of the existence of nuclear weapons would doubtless be lessened if his possible victims had undertaken an obligation not to use them. Such an aggressor might be tempted to initiate an attack in the hope that the ban would prevent or delay the use of such weapons in the defense of his victims. Yet, the aggressor with nuclear weapons would be in a position to repudiate his past assurances and employ nuclear weapons whenever it suited his interests. Thus, such a plan might merely serve to induce aggression and weaken its victims.

12. Not only does the Soviet proposal fail to meet the necessary tests of any effective plan to prevent atomic warfare, but it would in fact harm the chances of adoption of any such effective plan. For surely the Soviet proposal, if it were accepted, would tend to create the deceptive impression that the danger of atomic warfare had somehow been limited and weaken the vigilance of the people regarding a threat which had, if anything, increased. This false sense of security could discourage further efforts to achieve genuine disarmament under effective safeguards, which would actually enhance the security of all, reduce the danger of war, and lighten the heavy burden of armaments.

## IV.

13. The United States reaffirms, as it did in the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 17, 1950, that, whatever the method used, aggression itself is the gravest of all dangers. Only if there is aggression will the world be exposed to the horrors of modern war.

14. The signatories of the United Nations Charter have undertaken solemn assurances not to commit aggression. In conformity with its historic traditions, the United States will never violate that pledge. But, as indicated, the United States is convinced that the only truly effective way to ensure that aggression will not take place and that nuclear weapons will not be used in war is to adopt a safeguarded, balanced system of disarmament. Such a system

could materially reduce the chance of successful aggression, and thereby minimize the risk of any aggression at all.

15. The United States continues to believe that a solution of the armaments problem is essential. Despite its inability to accept the Soviet proposal, the United States is ready at all times to discuss acceptable measures for effective disarmament under proper safeguards. It is prepared to do so either in the continuation of private exchanges or in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In view of the urgency of disarmament, the United States will welcome such a continuation if the Soviet Union considers it a useful means for seeking a common approach to this problem.

16. The United States also hopes that, in the light of the foregoing, the Soviet Union will wish to comment further on the concrete proposal submitted by the United States on March 19, 1954. In any event the United States is prepared to renew with the Soviet Union at any time the talks on the President's proposal.

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1954.

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Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers

## *Memorandum by Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Consultant for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1954.

On July 12 the President spoke to the Secretary and said that we should get busy on his (the President) December 8 plan without waiting for Russia.

The Secretary later called Admiral Strauss to report this. Strauss said that he was glad to hear that. The bill would be reported out Wednesday, July 14, and Strauss said he thought it would pass in 3-4 days.[1] When this happened, Strauss said he would work out some conferences—the first would be with Belgium. The Secretary stated that he was in favor of this. Admiral Strauss said that he would let the President know the above information. He said there may be a public announcement as soon as he, Strauss, gets the legislative authority.

RODERIC L. O'CONNOR

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[1] The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was not approved by Congress until Aug. 16. See the editorial note, p. 1505.

330.13/7-1954: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 19, 1954—8:11 p.m.

44. Re US Position on Indian Proposal for a Moratorium on Nuclear Tests.

1. Would be contrary to security interests of US agree at this time to moratorium on tests of nuclear weapons either in form proposed by India or in any other form. Therefore US must reject Indian proposal if it is considered in DC.

2. If matter considered statement of US Representative should be along following lines: "After the most sympathetic and extensive consideration, the US has concluded that an agreement for a moratorium or a standstill on tests of nuclear weapons would not benefit the free world and in fact would be harmful. A moratorium would be largely a limitation on scientific experimentation. The experiments have been fundamental to the development of the weapons necessary to protect the free world.

"Furthermore, a moratorium on nuclear experimentation has nothing to do with disarmament. The real problem is to eliminate the weapons through a general disarmament program with safeguards which would assure the whole world that nuclear materials would be utilized only for peaceful purposes. A mere promise to forego tests on nuclear weapons would give the illusion that we were making some progress toward disarmament when in fact this would not be the case. Only through a program of disarmament can the world be relieved of its fears that nuclear weapons will be used in war".

3. We realize that United States opposition to Indian proposal would have adverse political repercussions. To minimize and if possible eliminate such adverse repercussions you may wish to follow some or all of following possible courses of action.

a) We should avoid encouraging India or any member of DC to initiate discussion of Indian proposals.
b) We should seek to maneuver USSR into position where it rejects Indian proposal before we do. Soviet media of communication seem to foreshadow such rejection. Would be advantageous to couple with our rejection of Indian proposal a criticism of Soviet Union position on atomic energy control in general.

Essential however we should not be led into situation of agreeing to Indian proposal on condition that Soviet Union also agrees.

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[1] Drafted by Bechhoefer of UNP.

4. If issue is raised you should in your discretion determine best time for making statement in order to minimize adverse results.

DULLES

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330.13/8-1054

## *Department of State Press Release No. 434*

[WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1954.

### ATOMIC POOL PLAN

In view of the fact that the President, at his last news conference referred questions concerning the atomic pool plan to Mr. Dulles, [1] the Secretary, at his news conference today, was asked if he would elaborate on the status of the negotiations with the USSR on this plan. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:

I think the broad history of this is pretty well known although not the details because we agreed, in the beginning that we would try to handle this particular matter in terms of an exchange of diplomatic notes and private talks. Some people had felt that it would be possible to make better progress with the Russians if instead of having public diplomacy we tried to negotiate quietly and privately with them. So it was agreed with them and, in fact, suggested by the President's message of December 8 to the United Nations Assembly that we would have private talks on this matter.

I am sorry to say that the private talk method does not seem to work any better than the public talk method. I am afraid that the difficulties in dealing with the Soviets are so fundamental that the getting of positive cooperative action involves something more than a change of method.

I had several talks with Mr. Molotov at Berlin and at Geneva and we gave him various notes which had been prepared in concert with some of our Allies who are principally concerned, which elaborated the President's program.

I still do not feel at liberty to disclose the texts of what was said or describe these talks in detail because, as I said, we had agreed on the private exchange of note method. I can say that the last note which we had on this matter was wholly negative, or perhaps I should say, 99 per cent negative. We have in substance asked the Soviet whether they wish it to be treated as 100 per cent negative.

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[1] For the remarks on the subject made by the President at his news conference of Aug. 4, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, p. 683.

In the meanwhile we are making plans on the assumption that we will have to treat it as 100 per cent negative. In that event we hope to go ahead with the program in association with other countries. There are several in a position to contribute material to the program and many which would like to benefit from the program in terms of exploring and developing the possibilities of atomic energy for peacetime, life-giving purposes. That phase of the matter is being actively considered while we await what may be the final answer from the Soviet.

Asked whether this consideration was in consultation with the other countries concerned, Mr. Dulles replied:

The concrete plan which was proposed to the Soviet Union was considered actively, before it was submitted, with some of the Allies who are most interested in the problem from the standpoint of being able to contribute fissionable material.

Now, the adaptation of that program to one which would eliminate the hope for cooperation of the Soviet Union, that program, in the first instance, is still being considered by the United States Government and we have not yet gotten in detail into talks with our associates about that phase of the problem. But that would presumably come at an early stage.

Asked whether the exchange of notes between this country and the Soviet Union would be released when that position was reached, Mr. Dulles replied:

That would require an agreement on both sides and I cannot say whether or not the Soviet Union would care to have the exchange of notes made public.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA—Policy"

## *Memorandum of a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State, Wednesday, August 11, 1954, 3 p.m.* [1]

TOP SECRET

| | |
|---|---|
| Present: | The Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles |
| | The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Charles E. Wilson |
| | The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Lewis L. Strauss |
| | The Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Allen Dulles |
| | Mr. James S. Lay |
| | General Robert Cutler |
| | Mr. Robert Bowie |

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[1] Drafted by Smith of S/AE.

General Herbert B. Loper
Mr. Roy B. Snapp
Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/AE

The meeting was called to consider NSC 5431 dated August 6, 1954.[2]

Admiral Strauss discussed the background of this matter and pointed out the problems that will be raised in connection with fissionable material produced by any reactors which were constructed abroad.

He urged that arrangements for construction of such reactors provide for US chemical processing of spent fuel elements.

Mr. Wilson said that such a condition would be more realistic if the U.S. leased fissionable material than if the material was sold to foreign nations. Mr. Smith pointed out that conditions which might be agreeable in bilateral arrangements might not be agreeable in multilateral arrangements through an international agency and that the draft legislation had been specifically amended to permit transfer of title to fissionable material to another nation.

There was discussion of the nature of the fissionable material which would be provided for the research reactor program.

The Secretary of State raised the question of what relationship the international agency would have to the United Nations and pointed out that any agency related to the UN in any way would provoke a good deal of criticism from the anti-UN people in this country. The Secretary of State pointed out how far the proposed plan fell short of the President's proposal of last December 8. Admiral Strauss stated, however, that he thought the proposed plan would be very acceptable to public opinion throughout the Free World.

There was discussion as to when the plan would be announced and it seemed generally agreed that the President would be asked to make the announcement at the ground-breaking ceremonies of the PWR reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania.

Mr. Wilson pointed out the need for a US offer to supply modern technology rather than our second or third best designs.

Mr. Bowie raised the point that U.S. initiative now in the reactor field abroad would imply a commitment to continue to supply fissionable material in the future to foreign nations.

General Cutler pointed out that in his judgment the proposed program did not differ so sharply from the President's December 8 program as to be anticlimactical.

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[2] NSC 5431 is not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5431 Series) NSC 5431 as revised and approved was issued as NSC 5431/1, Aug. 13; for text, see p. 1488.

It was agreed that the blank space on page 4 in paragraph 10 referred to the number 50, and that this quantity of U–235 would be earmarked for a small-scale reactor program if the overall program was approved by the Council and the President.

Nothing was said about the international conference.

There was some discussion as to whether the fissionable material would be given or lent or sold. The discussion was inconclusive on this.

The consensus of the meeting was that the paper would be recommended for approval by the Council and the President.

Mr. Smith pointed out that he had discussed in general terms the proposed program with representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada.

It was agreed that implementation of the proposed program would, in the first instance, be the responsibility of the Working Group which had been set up by the Planning Board to draw up the proposal. [3]

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[3] The working group designated to prepare the report, consisting of representatives of State, Defense, AEC (Chairman), and CIA, had been established by the NSC Planning Board on July 7. Announcement of the creation of the group and its terms of reference were contained in a memorandum of July 8 by NSC Executive Secretary Lay to Snapp (AEC), Bowie (State), Bonesteel (Defense), and Amory (CIA). (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Atomic Energy—Cooperation with Other Nations")

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 210th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 12, 1954* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 4); the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 5 and 6); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Vice Admiral Gardner for the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Pate for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 5 and 6); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Marshall Smith, Department of Commerce (for Item 1); Walter S. Delany, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

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[1] Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator of the National Security Council Board of Assistants, on Aug. 13.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

4. *Cooperation With Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* (NSC 5431; Memo for NSC from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, subject: "Development of Nuclear Power", dated December 11, 1953) [2]

Mr. Cutler noted that NSC 5431 had been prepared by a committee established by the NSC Planning Board consisting of representatives of AEC (chairman), the Departments of State and Defense, and CIA. He said the paper dealt with two problems—developing a policy for the peaceful uses of atomic energy abroad, and developing the principles of the President's proposal of December 8, 1953, to the UN for the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency. Mr. Cutler felt that NSC 5431 lacked the inspiration of the President's great speech, possibly because the USSR thus far had refused to participate in carrying out the President's proposal. Mr. Cutler noted that Admiral Strauss was desirous that discussion of this problem be kept very secret, in order not to complicate Congressional action on amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. Mr. Cutler then read the general considerations and courses of action contained in NSC 5431.

Admiral Strauss said that the two great objectives of the President's December 8 proposal had been to extend the peaceful uses of atomic energy throughout the world and to reduce the weapon potential of fissionable material by contributions to a pool. NSC 5431 had been prepared to implement the first of these objectives. Admiral Strauss called particular attention to paragraph 14, relating to negotiations with Belgium. He said that regardless of the over-all scheme, negotiations with Belgium were essential because of the importance of the fissionable material obtained from the Belgian Congo. We had contracted to help Belgium build a power reactor. He felt that the amount of U-235 which we would release for use abroad was not excessive and, indeed, as CIA had pointed out [memo for DCI, dated August 9, informally distributed to the Planning Board], [3] might be regarded by some countries as too small. Admiral Strauss, however, felt that this amount was not altogether insignificant as a beginning.

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[2] NSC 5431, Aug. 6, 1954, is not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5431 Series) For the revised and approved version, NSC 5431/1, Aug. 13, see *infra*. For the memorandum of Dec. 11, 1953, see p. 1296.

Admiral Strauss then said he felt it would be essential to add a "recovery" or "recapture" paragraph to NSC 5431. He explained that after fuel elements have been in the pile for some time, fission byproducts ("clinkers") accumulate in sufficient quantity to stop the reaction unless they are taken out and reprocessed. Such reprocessing produces plutonium, an important weapon material. Therefore, he felt that the U.S. must stipulate that these by-products be returned to the U.S. for reprocessing and that we would retain the plutonium. He admitted that this would be a vulnerable stipulation in the sense that it could be alleged by the Russians that we were merely farming out uranium in order to get more plutonium produced. However, the legislation now in Congress would provide for Government recovery of fissionable material released to U.S. industry, and he felt that foreign countries would have to be treated on the same basis.

The President agreed that we should, in our negotiations with other countries, provide for regaining fission by-products. He thought we need not mention plutonium specifically; but we should plan to keep it when we got the by-products back in this country. He asked Secretary Dulles why we had to publish the terms of atomic energy agreements with other countries.

Mr. Cutler said that Agreements For Cooperation would be public documents because the proposed revisions of the Atomic Energy Act provide that proposed agreements must lay before the Joint Committee of the Congress for a period of 30 days while Congress is in session.

The President said that we didn't have to put everything we wanted to do in the agreement. We could simply provide that when the fissionable material wears out the foreign government can turn it in and get a new batch.

Secretary Wilson thought we should not emphasize plutonium but provide for recovery of all the by-products.

Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with the President's remarks. He felt that the policy in NSC 5431 was an important step forward, even though it lacked some of the luster of the President's December 8 proposal. Referring to paragraph 9, Secretary Dulles proposed that the President should make the initial announcement of U.S. plans for an International Atomic Energy Agency at the time of breaking ground for a new reactor and prior to the convening of the UN General Assembly on September 21. Secretary Dulles said he could follow this up with another statement. He felt that another Presidential speech before the UN would not be desirable at this time.

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[3] Not found in Department of State files. Brackets in the source text.

Secretary Dulles then asked how much emphasis should be placed on affiliation of this program with the UN. He felt that some connection was indispensable, but that too close a tie would result in criticism, especially in Congress, which would say that the USSR was getting all the benefits indirectly through its membership in the UN. He felt the International Atomic Energy Agency should be under the control of officials not chosen by the UN, but should perhaps make periodic reports to the UN. The connection between the Agency and the UN might be similar to the connection between the World Bank and the UN.

Secretary Dulles then called attention to paragraph 8, which provides that maximum psychological advantage should be taken from U.S. actions in the atomic energy field. Secretary Dulles thought it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of U.S. appearance before the world as a peaceful state. Propaganda picturing us as warmongers on account of our atomic capabilities has done incalculable harm.

The President wondered whether any association of the Agency with the UN was necessary. Could not the Agency be a separate organization merely reporting its accomplishments to the UN? Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative, and added that such reports would not contain technical atomic energy information.

Governor Stassen said he assumed the President's December 8 proposal still stood. He thought we could not go too slow in carrying forward the policy for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, or we might wake up some day and find that the Soviets had offered to build a power reactor in Italy or India. The President pointed out that power reactors produced weapon-grade material. Secretary Wilson said it was possible to use in a power reactor either a rich material which had weapon significance or a lower grade material which did not have such significance. Mr. Cutler pointed out that the policy in NSC 5431 did not propose the use abroad of U.S. weapon-grade material.

The President referred to the blank space in paragraph 10, and said that no figure should be inserted therein. Secretary Dulles asked whether the figure would appear in the Presidential statement. The President said by no means. Mr. Cutler noted that 50 kilograms of U-235 of less than weapon quality was to be earmarked for use abroad. We thought the figure might be mentioned only in the NSC minutes copy [4] of the paper. The President said that paragraph 10 should say that we would earmark a reasonable amount of U-235 for use abroad. There was no need for the figure to be in any copy. Secretary Dulles proposed that paragraph 10 should begin "Earmark initially".

Secretary Wilson asked what would be the dollar value of one kilogram of the material referred to in paragraph 10. Admiral Strauss said about $50,000.

Mr. Cutler said that the amount of U-235 to be earmarked could be understood and recorded only in the original records of the NSC. The President agreed, and added that he didn't want the Alsops publishing the figure.

Mr. Cutler called attention to the alternatives in paragraph 13 as to sponsorship of the International Scientific Conference. Admiral Strauss felt this matter should be left to the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles noted that the Conference, while it should still be held, had lost some of its original purpose.

Mr. Cutler then read a proposed new paragraph 15, designed to incorporate the "recovery" provision proposed by Admiral Strauss. The President said that the main point was to get used fissionable material back in our possession. Governor Stassen hoped that it was understood that recovery by the U.S. would be "for peaceful purposes". Admiral Strauss said that it was necessary to include in the proposed new paragraph a clause indicating that one of the reasons for recovery of fission by-products would be to obviate the need for reprocessing facilities in other countries.

As a sidelight on the "recovery" paragraph, Secretary Dulles noted that Molotov had argued that our atomic energy plan would increase the amount of fissionable material available for war.

Mr. Cutler noted that a committee consisting of representatives of State, Defense, AEC and CIA would prepare the statement of policy called for in new paragraph 15. The President wondered whether it would be necessary for the committee to report back to the Council until it felt that we were ready to take the next step.

*The National Security Council:* [5]

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject in the light of oral views expressed by the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5431, subject to the following changes:

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[4] Minutes not identified.

[5] Paragraphs a-b constitute NSC Action No. 1202, Aug. 12, 1954. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Actions")

(1) *Paragraph 4:* In the second sentence, substitute for the words "would be associated" the words "might be loosely affiliated".

(2) *Paragraph 9:* Revise to read as follows:

"9-a. Arrange for the President or the Secretary of State to make a statement, at an appropriate time, not later than the convening of the UN General Assembly on September 21, relative to U.S. plans for the organization of the International Atomic Energy Agency, described in b.

"b. Take necessary steps to proceed with the organization of an International Atomic Energy Agency, which may be affiliated with or report its accomplishments to the United Nations."

(3) *Paragraph 10:* Revise the beginning of this paragraph to read: "Earmark initially a reasonable amount of U-235 of less than weapon quality. . . ."

(*Note:* The approximate amount agreed upon at the meeting is recorded only in the original records of the National Security Council.) [6]

(4) *Paragraph 11:* Add at the end of this paragraph the words "which do not involve U.S. funds for such construction."

(5) *Insert a new paragraph 15,* renumbering the present paragraph as 16; the new paragraph to read as follows:

"15. In every case where the U.S. provides to another country fissionable material for research or power reactors, whether by gift, lease, or sale, the U.S. should seek to reserve the right to regain such fissionable material after usage in such other country's reactor, in order to reprocess such material and obtain all the by-products therefrom for peaceful purposes, and in order to obviate the necessity of creating reprocessing facilities in such other country."

(6) *Subparagraph 13-a:* Revise to read as follows:

"a. The Agency should be an international organization, which may be affiliated with or reports accomplishments to the United Nations."

*Note:* NSC 5431, as amended, approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5431/1; and referred to the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for appropriate implementation, advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to ensure that proposed actions in this field result in maximum psychological advantage to the U.S. pursuant to paragraph 8 of NSC 5431/1. The action in paragraph 16 of NSC 5431/1 transmitted to the Planning Board to prepare the statement of policy referred to, utilizing the special committee representing State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and CIA which prepared NSC 5431.

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[6] The "original records" have not been identified.

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MARION W. BOGGS

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S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5431 Series

## *National Security Council Report* [1]

SECRET
NSC 5431/1

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1954.

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

References:

A. NSC 5431 [2]

B. Memo for NSC from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, subject, "Development of Nuclear Power," dated December 11, 1953 [3]

C. NSC Action Nos. 985 and 1202 [4]

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 210th Council meeting on August 12, 1954, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5431, subject to the amendments therein which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1202-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 5431, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith and directs its implementation by the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to ensure that proposed actions in the field result in maximum psychological advantage to the United States pursuant to paragraph 8 of the enclosure.

Also enclosed are a financial appendix and an NSC staff study, as amended by the Council.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[1] Copies sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2] Not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5431 Series)

[3] *Ante*, p. 1296.

[4] For text of NSC Action No. 985, see footnote 7, p. 1297. For NSC Action No. 1202, see footnote 5, *supra*.

[Enclosure]

## Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on Cooperation With Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

### ASSUMPTIONS

1. This paper is based on the following assumptions: (a) that the USSR will not at this time participate in carrying out the President's proposal of December 8, 1953; (b) that the Atomic Energy Act will be amended generally as proposed in HR 9757 to permit bilateral cooperation with other nations in the atomic energy field; [5] and (c) that by treaty multilateral cooperation with other nations can be effected.

### GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The ability of the U.S. to construct reactors and to make available moderate quantities of fissionable material for peacetime reactors should be used in a program of cooperation with other nations to advance our national policy objectives. Power reactors, while technically feasible, are not yet economically competitive. Small-scale reactors are available which are useful for research, training, medical, and related purposes, and require only small amounts of fissionable material (not of weapons quality). Such reactors and the supporting training and information programs are a natural step in the development of any nation's capability to utilize nuclear power when it becomes economically attractive.

3. U.S. cooperation with other countries in advancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be both *multilateral* through an International Atomic Energy Agency as proposed by the President on December 8, and *bilateral* under Agreements for Cooperation under Section 123 of proposed revision of the Atomic Energy Act.

4. Negotiations for a treaty should be commenced promptly, leading to establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency. This International Agency might be loosely affiliated with the U.N. and would be open to all countries (including the USSR) which accept certain common objectives and obligations stated in the treaty. The Agency would exercise an important function in encouraging cooperation in research, in assisting nations to acquire facilities such as small-scale reactors, in supporting training and exchange of technical information and services, and in aiding other nations in developing a capability to use nuclear power.

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[5] See the editorial note, p. 1505.

5. During the interim period of a year or longer while the treaty is being negotiated and the consent of the Senate sought for an International Agency, the U.S. should proceed vigorously with direct actions to demonstrate its resolve to assist other nations and maintain its world leadership in peaceful uses of atomic energy. These activities, which in due course might be taken over by the International Agency, should include:

a. Sponsorship of international scientific conferences.
b. Aid in construction of small-scale reactors, including provision of fissionable material in the requisite small amounts under bilateral Agreements for Cooperation.
c. Training programs, provision of technical information, and consulting services to aid other countries in building up their capability to use atomic energy.
d. Promotion of medical and other humanitarian uses of atomic energy.

6. Cooperation with other countries in areas of importance to the U.S. atomic energy program and to the security interests of the U.S. will be undertaken on a bilateral basis with requisite security safeguards, an agreement with Belgium being the first.

7. Requirements for fissionable material (not of weapons quality) for this program are, and will be, in harmony with military requirements. Specifically U.S. participation will not cause any significant diversion of fissionable material or trained personnel from the nuclear weapons programs.

8. Maximum psychological and educational advantage should continue to be taken from the substantial actions of the U.S. in this field.

### COURSES OF ACTION

9. a. Arrange for the President or the Secretary of State to make a statement, at an appropriate time, not later than the convening of the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, relative to U.S. plans for the organization of the International Atomic Energy Agency, described in b.

b. Take necessary steps to proceed with the organization of an International Atomic Energy Agency, which may be affiliated with or report its accomplishments to the United Nations.

10. Earmark initially a reasonable amount of U-235 of less than weapon quality of U.S. material, for use in small-scale reactors and for other research purposes abroad.

11. Initiate a program of aid in construction of small-scale reactors in selected countries, under Agreements for Cooperation which do not involve U.S. funds for such construction.

12. Initiate, as rapidly as plans can be developed, activities such as reactor training courses for foreign scientists.

13. Determine, as soon as possible, whether the International Scientific Conference, now tentatively scheduled for January 1955, will be sponsored by the U.S. alone, by the U.S., U.K., and Canada jointly, or by the United Nations.[6]

14. Resume negotiations with Belgium, as soon as the revisions of the Atomic Energy Act have been passed, leading toward an Agreement for Cooperation covering, among other matters, technical aid in the construction of a power reactor in Belgium.

15. In every case where the U.S. provides to another country fissionable material for research or power reactors, whether by gift, lease, or sale, the U.S. should seek to reserve the right to regain such fissionable material after usage in such other country's reactor, in order to reprocess such material and obtain all the by-products therefrom for peaceful purposes, and in order to obviate the necessity of creating reprocessing facilities in such other country.

16. Prepare a statement of policy for Council consideration regarding the construction of power reactors abroad.

## Financial Appendix

Cost estimates in the Financial Appendix indicate order of magnitude.

Approval of the policy statement does not indicate approval of cost estimates in the Financial Appendix.

Appropriations and expenditures to finance the policy will be subject to determination in the regular budgetary process.

### NOTES

1. Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency would be expected to bear their share of operating costs. Recipients of direct services or of equipment (including small-scale reactors) would in general be required to pay for them. The U.S. may conclude that for control or other reasons, it will be to our advantage to furnish the fissionable material content of small-scale reactors without charge. The fissionable material cost, while substantial, will be less than the cost of the reactor itself. In recognition of the special U.S. interest in seeing that an active program of assistance to other countries is gotten under way, funds should be available to permit U.S. financial aid where considerations of prestige or other gains to the security of this country would justify such aid.

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[6] Documentation on the International Scientific Conference is in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Strauss Conference".

2. Under these assumptions, U.S. financial commitments under the programs outlined in this paper would not be more than $2,000,000 during the first 18 months and would rise perhaps to $5,000,000 annually by FY 1957 or 1958. These estimates include funds for constructing a number of small-scale reactors abroad should financial aid to this end prove in our national interests, but are exclusive of any program for construction of power reactors abroad.

*Program Cost Estimate*

| | |
|---|---|
| FY 1955 | None* |
| FY 1956 | $2,000,000 |
| FY 1957 | $5,000,000 |
| FY 1958 | $5,000,000 |

*Would be absorbed in present AEC appropriations. [Footnote in the source text.]

## NSC Staff Study on Cooperation With Other Countries in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

### *Problem*

1. To determine action to be taken in carrying out the President's proposal of December 8, 1953, to the UN for the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency; and to determine other action to employ the U.S. capability in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to attain foreign policy and other national security objectives.

### *Assumptions*

2. This paper is based on the following assumptions: (a) that the USSR will not at this time participate in carrying out the President's proposal of December 8, 1953; (b) that the Atomic Energy Act will be amended generally as proposed in HR 9757, to permit bilateral cooperation with other nations in the atomic energy field; and (c) that by treaty multilateral cooperation with other nations can be effected.

### *New Provisions of Atomic Energy Act*

3. *Cooperation with Another Nation.* The proposed revisions of the Atomic Energy Act permit furnishing classified information and material to another country under conditions which are, in summary: (a) That the Commission has approved an agreement for cooperation, including detailed terms, a guarantee by the other nation to maintain agreed security standards, a guarantee against diversion of fissionable material to military purposes, and a guarantee respecting the use of Restricted Data; (b) the President has

approved the execution of the agreement and has made a written determination that the performance of the agreement will promote the defense and security of the U.S.; and (c) the proposed agreement has been submitted to the Joint Committee for a period of 30 days while Congress is in session. This means that at least a month after Congress reconvenes in 1955 will be the earliest date that a bilateral agreement can become effective.

4. *Multilateral Arrangements.* The bill states in Section 124 that "the President is authorized to enter into an international agreement with a group of nations providing for international cooperation in the non-military applications of atomic energy." The act further defines "international arrangement" as a treaty (approved by the Senate) or an "international agreement" (approved by Congress). Thus, if the President's atomic pool proposal of December 8, 1953, is implemented by an agreement with a group of nations it must be submitted, as a first step, to the Senate as a treaty or to the Congress for approval as an international arrangement. The bill further provides, as a second step, that after the Senate or Congress acts, any agreement must meet the conditions set out in paragraph 3. While technically it might be possible to meet all the requirements of the bill during the first session of the 84th Congress a more realistic estimate is that at the very earliest it would be some time during the second session of the 84th Congress, beginning in January 1956, before an arrangement with a group of nations could become effective.

5. *Section 121.* Independent of the provisions of Section 124 of the proposed bill regarding multilateral cooperation, it appears that another course for establishing such cooperation is open. Section 121 provides that any provision of the Act which "conflicts with the provisions of any international arrangement made after the date of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be of no force or effect." As this section recognizes, any multilateral cooperation in accordance with a treaty duly approved by the Senate would have full effect regardless of the provisions of the Act. Negotiation and ratification of a treaty would require more than a year, but may provide the simplest basis for multilateral cooperation in establishing an International Agency.

### *Decision to Proceed with International Atomic Energy Agency Without the USSR*

6. U.S. cooperation with other countries in advancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy should proceed on a multilateral basis under the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency and also on a bilateral basis under agreements for cooperation negotiated under Section 123 of the Revised Atomic Energy Act. There is

precedent for this dual approach in this nation's program of technical assistance which proceeds both through the U.N. and on a nation-to-nation basis.

7. The principal objectives stated by the President in his December 8, 1953 speech to the United Nations were: (a) to reduce tensions between the East and West; (b) to siphon off fissionable material simultaneously from the military stocks of the U.S. and the USSR; (c) to assure that scientists throughout the world have fissionable material to conduct necessary studies; and (d) to advance the peacetime uses of atomic energy generally. These objectives were proposed in the common interest of all nations.

8. The U.S., in addition, had special foreign policy objectives in advancing the proposal. These were (a) to seize the initiative for the U.S. and maintain our free world leadership; (b) to demonstrate again the devotion of the U.S. to peace; and (c) to counter such expected USSR moves as the subsequent announcement of a 5000 KW power reactor or an expected new Stockholm-type peace petition. These foreign policy objectives remain valid.

9. The assumed decision of the USSR not to participate in an international agency has a regrettable but not unforeseen effect upon the scope of such an agency and upon the interest of the U.S. and other nations in participating in it. In particular, the first two of the above objectives of the President's proposal may not be attained, but other U.S. foreign policy objectives could be attained.

10. By going ahead with the proposed International Agency, we would gain the following advantages:

(a) Focus on cooperative peaceful uses of atomic energy helps place the military aspects of the atom in proper perspective;

(b) An integrating force will be exerted at a time when the cohesion of the free world is threatened;

(c) The favorable world reaction to the President's proposal will be retained and the contrast with the USSR rejection will be emphasized;

(d) Criticism that the U.S. made the proposal on December 8 only because it knew that the USSR would not accept it will be met; and

(e) Direct rebuttal will be given to Soviet propaganda that the U.S. attempts to keep a monopoly of atomic energy.

These advantages though not pertaining exclusively to an international agency as such, might be forfeited in whole or in part should our cooperation with other nations be limited to bilateral arrangements.

11. In proceeding with an International Agency, certain possible disadvantages must be recognized:

(a) The U.S. will lose some bargaining power with its raw materials suppliers;

(b) The U.S. will be required to make available some information, personnel, and eventually, nuclear materials with less control and less tangible returns than under bilateral arrangements;

(c) In the absence of USSR and satellites, the agency may appear to neutrals to be widening rather than closing the East-West split; and

(d) The USSR will retain the choice of entering the agency at a later time or of holding aloof and taking propaganda advantage of any failures or controversies attendant on the agency's activities.

Such disadvantages can, in most part, be overcome by proper organization of the agency and by complementary bilateral cooperation with nations with special relations with the U.S.: e.g., raw materials suppliers.

12. Public announcement of the U.S. intention to press ahead with positive measures for organization of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be made as soon as possible, perhaps in a speech by the President or by the Secretary of State. In view of the fact that the President's proposal was originally made before the U.N. General Assembly, there would be advantage to making the first announcement before that body. Private consultations should be held with interested friendly nations to inform them of U.S. intentions with regard to the international agency and our contemplated program of bilateral cooperation.

*Organization and Functions of the Proposed International Agency*

13. The International Atomic Energy Agency should be organized in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The Agency should be an international organization which may be affiliated with or report its accomplishments to the U.N.;

(b) Membership in the Agency, in accordance with the spirit of the President's proposal, should be open to all countries, including the USSR, who adhere to the objectives of the agency as described by the President. The charter of the organization will be drafted to include affirmative safeguards to prevent the USSR or any other nation from being able to defeat the objectives of the Agency or of the U.S. should the USSR subsequently decide to participate, and to prevent nations not recognized by the U.S. from being able to accept the treaty conditions;

(c) Initially the primary function of the Agency should be to serve as a clearing house and organ of cooperation in training, exchange of information, and provision of technical services;

(d) To maintain the effectiveness of the Agency, as well as to carry out the President's proposal, fissionable material in moderate quantities and appropriately safeguarded should be available to the Agency for projects which it has reviewed and approved as to the effectiveness and safety of the proposed use of the materials. The U.S., in proposing proceeding with the Agency, should reaffirm its intent to make fissionable materials available and should state this intent in concrete terms, such as the earmarking of enough fissionable material for a limited number of small-scale reactors for research and related purposes;

(e) The operating expenses of the Agency should be financed by contributions from all members, perhaps in accordance with the formula for contributions for operating expenses of the U.N. itself.

*International Scientific Conference*

14. On April 19, 1954, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission announced the President's intention to convene within the year an international scientific conference to explore "the benign and peaceful uses of atomic energy." A decision concerning proceeding with an International Agency in the absence of USSR participation is necessary for planning for the international scientific conference. While the question of sponsorship (e.g. U.S. alone or U.S., U.K. and Canada jointly) remains open at the present, the U.N. alternatively could be asked to sponsor the conference, now tentatively scheduled for January 1955 and the conference could discuss the status of nuclear science and technology relating to peaceful uses of atomic energy and consider ways in which the international agency might best knit together and supplement national efforts in this field.

*Actions Pending Establishment of International Agency*

15. *Introduction.* As a practical matter, at least two years may be required to negotiate a treaty establishing an International Agency and obtain Senate ratification. In view of U.S. statements of intent and the active progress of programs in the USSR and other countries, positive action to assist other nations should be taken in advance of establishment of the International Agency, in order to maintain the U.S. position of leadership and to accelerate the benign uses of atomic energy. Action on such programs as aid in the construction of small-scale reactors, training in reactor technology or in the use of isotopes, the distribution of unclassified publications, and sponsoring of international conferences can be initiated by the U.S. without precluding subsequent activities in the same areas by the International Agency when it has been organized.

16. *Small-scale Reactors for Research and Other Related Purposes.* Small-scale reactors appear for the present to be essential elements in any nation's atomic energy program and a necessary stage in the development of a nation's capacity to employ nuclear power reactors. A small-scale research reactor might have the following general characteristics:

(a) Fissionable material requirements: 2 to 6 kg of U-235 not of weapons quality.

(b) Construction cost of complete reactor—approximately $250,000- $750,000 depending on type and location.

(c) Sensitivity of information required—unclassified or of low sensitivity.

(d) Fissionable material produced by reactor—insignificant.

(e) Danger of diversion of fissionable material—assuming safe insertion in reactor and operation of reactor through "break-in" period, U-235 becomes so contaminated that it must be reprocessed in special facilities such as exist at Arco. U-235 of the quality contemplated will further have to be run through separation equipment such as exists at Oak Ridge. The U.S., U.K., and USSR are the only countries likely to have reprocessing and separation equipment for U-235 available during the next several years.

Such a reactor is, however, probably the most useful instrument that could be made available at this juncture to other countries. By use of enriched material rather than natural uranium, a more compact, inexpensive, convenient, and much more useful reactor can be built. In general, the higher the neutron flux possible, the more versatile is the reactor for research experimentation. The neutron flux of a reactor ($10^{12}$ to $10^{14}$) of this type is considerably higher than the flux of the French or the Norway-Netherlands natural uranium reactors ($10^{10}$ to $10^{12}$), which require tons of natural uranium and can produce plutonium.

17. U.S. commitment of fissionable material for construction of small-scale reactors and other peaceful uses abroad must, of course, be harmonized with prospective military needs. Limited diversion of source and fissionable materials in the interests of peaceful reactor uses can now be accepted. As the war reserve of weapons increases and power reactors become economical, it may be possible to allocate increasing amounts of fissionable material to power production in the U.S. and abroad. Some———kilograms of U-235, of less than weapons quality may be earmarked for reactor and other peaceful purposes abroad. In order to make material available to another country, an Agreement for Cooperation under the revised Atomic Energy Act would of course have to be negotiated and go to the President and the Joint Committee. The material would not be likely to be needed before FY 1956, and will remain available to the U.S. stockpile.

18. A program of aid to selected nations in construction of small-scale reactors will be gotten underway upon approval of this course of action and after the Atomic Energy Act has been amended. Study of possible locations for small-scale reactors, and of political and other pertinent considerations, is now underway. The cost of construction will be borne by the country in which a reactor is lo-

cated. The U.S. may well conclude that for control and other reasons, it will be to our advantage to furnish the fissionable material content of small-scale reactors without charge. The fissionable material cost, while substantial, will be less than the cost of the reactor itself.

19. *Training and Information Activities.* The possibility should be explored of establishing a training course in reactor technology to be given by the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies or by the Brookhaven National Laboratory for foreign scientists and engineers. A course might be offered to accommodate 50 students a year designated by foreign countries. Although tuition fees might cover operating costs, there would be required modest U.S. contributions for capital investment and overhead. Activities of this type and others such as isotope training courses and unclassified publication exchange centers will be put into operation to the extent they prove feasible.

20. *Capability of U.S. Private Industry.* Some private U.S. firms and consultants, subject to AEC authorization and passage of pending legislation, are now able to undertake construction, design, or consulting services for foreign countries in the construction of research and power reactors.

### *Power Reactors Abroad*

21. *Introduction.* Nuclear power, though demonstrated to be technically feasible, is not yet economically competitive. It would be unfortunate to encourage the hopes of the world for cheap power by premature negotiations with a number of countries for power reactors. We must discourage the belief abroad that the research reactor stage may be omitted in an immediate power program and make clear the essential relationship of training programs and the experience in operation of small-scale reactors to the goal of nuclear power and other peaceful uses of atomic energy.

22. *Development of Policy on Power Reactors Abroad.* When the Belgian negotiations have been concluded, or earlier if appropriate, a policy on the construction of power reactors abroad will be recommended to the National Security Council. The Belgian precedent should prove valuable background for formulating U.S. policy in respect to other nations. Many political factors will, of course, have to be examined in determining where and how many reactors should be constructed in addition to the first one in Belgium. Other ore suppliers such as South Africa and Australia obviously have substantial bargaining power. Countries with critical fuel shortages and high power consumption, such as Japan and Sweden, clearly merit consideration in any power reactor program. It is also obvious that any power reactor program must be limited in scope in

the early years and that difficult selections will have to be made. Careful consideration must be given to the adverse reaction of countries not included in this country's initial foreign nuclear power program and to the security considerations created by the construction of power reactors with their inherent ability to produce large quantities of plutonium and U-233. Friendly countries should also know that power reactors erected now would be early models and that rapid improvement in the art can be anticipated.

23. *Commitment to Belgium.* The 1944 U.S.-U.K. agreement with Belgium for procurement of uranium, which terminates in the early part of 1956, commits the U.S. and the U.K. to share with the Belgian Government on an equitable basis, power reactor technology when atomic power becomes feasible. In addition to the existing commitment to assist the Belgian atomic energy program which has recently been reaffirmed, any extension of the 1944 agreement will require satisfactory arrangements for the provision of reactor technology and material. As soon as revisions of the Atomic Energy Act permit U.S. aid in construction of a power reactor abroad negotiations will proceed promptly leading *inter alia* to the construction of a power reactor in Belgium. This is essential in order to provide assurance that there will be a continued flow of Belgian uranium to the U.S.

24. Belgium has the characteristics of a good location for a power reactor. Conventional power costs are high, general technology is well advanced, the Government is stable and friendly and the information and materials security situation is relatively good. Nevertheless, there are complex problems to be met. The U.S. statutory requirements will be stringent and many questions are still to be resolved. For example, the amount of fissionable material to be provided the Belgians, the disposition of whatever fissionable material is produced in the Belgian power reactor, the fabrication of new fuel elements and the reprocessing of the old, and the important policy problem of whether or not information which has not been made available to American industry generally can be provided the Belgians.

25. Fortunately, it is general knowledge throughout the world that the Belgians have a claim on the United States for aid in the construction of a power reactor and a minimum of criticism may be expected when priority is given to Belgium. The Belgians are now developing a capability in the reactor field by constructing a research reactor.

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "OCB General, 1953-58"

## *Minutes of the Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, August 18, 1954* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

Present:

- Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Director of Foreign Operations Administration, Acting Chairman
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Alternate for General Walter B. Smith, Under Secretary of State
- Mr. William H. Godel, Alternate for Mr. Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Lt. General C.P. Cabell, Alternate for Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence
- Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Mr. Theodore Streibert, Director, U.S. Information Agency
- Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.
- Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board and their Assistants.

The Board took the following actions:

. . . . . . .

*Report Item 5. Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs*

(a) Noted report by General Cutler that the President is planning a Labor Day speech in connection with the start of construction of the first nuclear power reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. The speech will stress peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Noted availability of an OCB working group draft of such a speech. Also noted State report that Secretary Dulles will address the UNGA on U.S. plan for the international nuclear energy pool.

(b) Noted that three major activities will be proceeding simultaneously in the near future: (1) The implementation of NSC 5431/1 [2] by the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, (2) The NSC Planning Board's development of a detailed policy with respect to the construction of power reactors overseas and (3) The OCB working group's activities under its approved terms of reference.

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[1] Signed by Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Harold E. Stassen as Acting Chairman.

[2] *Supra.*

(c) Instructed the OCB working group to develop a contingency plan for the detailed implementation of the U.S. policy for the construction of power reactors abroad on the assumption that the forthcoming NSC policy will provide for U.S. assistance in establishing power reactors abroad and that an implementation plan will be needed that takes into consideration the interests of the various governmental agencies involved.

(d) Agreed that the working group's terms of reference should be reviewed for appropriate adjustment after the NSC policy paper is approved.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA—Policy"

## *Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1954.

### MEMORANDUM ON PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The United States has considered the situation arising out of the refusal of the Soviet Government to participate in the International Atomic Energy Agency proposed by the President in his speech of December 8, 1953, before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The United States believes that, even in the absence of Soviet participation, an International Atomic Energy Agency can usefully be formed by the nations willing to support its activities. The program for organizing such an Agency should not delay present plans for bilateral cooperation, under the provisions of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act as revised.

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[1] The unsigned source text is accompanied by an Aug. 18 memorandum for the file by Gerard Smith of S/AE which reads:

"Mr. Murphy said it was all right to go ahead with the proposed action on the 'Memorandum on Proposed International Atomic Energy Agency' dated August 18, 1954 (giving same representatives of Canada, United Kingdom, South Africa, France, Portugal, Belgium and Australia today).

"I left word with the Secretary's office (Mr. O'Connor) of this proposed action and requested him to call me if the Secretary at the 2:30 meeting saw any objection.

"I had previously cleared this procedure with Mr. Merchant, Mr. Bowie and John Hall of the Atomic Energy Commission."

This is therefore presumably the statement of the U.S. position transmitted to the representatives of the abovementioned seven nations on Aug. 19; see memorandum for the file by Smith, *infra*.

Early announcement of plans for proceeding with the International Agency and with other international cooperative activities is considered desirable.

The International Atomic Energy Agency as it is now conceived would be established by treaty among interested nations. It would be loosely affiliated with the United Nations, the exact nature of the relationship to be subsequently agreed upon. It is expected that the Agency will be open to all countries (including the USSR) which accept the objectives and obligations stated in the treaty. Initially, the primary functions of the Agency would be to support training and exchange of technical information and services, to encourage cooperation in research, to assist nations wishing to acquire facilities such as small-scale reactors, and in general to aid nations in developing their capability to achieve the peacetime benefits of atomic energy and in particular nuclear power. Nations in a position to do so would make available source or fissionable material for projects approved by the Agency, but it is not expected that at the start the Agency would hold stocks of fissionable material. The United States is prepared at the outset to hold a reasonable amount of fissionable material at the call of the Agency. The operating expenses of the Agency would be allocated on an equitable basis to participating countries and costs of projects such as construction of reactors would be borne by the nations in which they are constructed.

The United States foresees that some considerable time may elapse before a treaty can be negotiated and the necessary ratifications obtained. During this period it is planned that the United States will initiate activities of the sort which the Agency might, in due course, appropriately take over. Activities of this sort now under study include a training course in reactor engineering, and bilateral assistance in the construction of small-scale reactors abroad (including provision of necessary modest amounts of fissionable material).

The United States requests that the other nations principally involved indicate at an early date if they agree in principle with this general outline for establishing an International Agency at this time.

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum for the File, by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1954.

On Wednesday, August 19, I delivered to the following two copies of an informal prospectus outlining U.S. thinking on implementing the President's pool idea—a copy of which is attached: [1]

Mr. Glazebrook—Canada
Miss Salt—United Kingdom
Mr. Fischer—South Africa [2]
Mr. Martin—France
Mr. Potier—Portugal [3]
Mr. Carlier—Belgium [4]
Mr. Lawrey—Australia [5]

I sounded out Mr. Glazebrook very informally on whether or not Canada would be interested in having the International Agency located there—perhaps in Toronto. Mr. Glazebrook indicated that he thought this would be quite welcome.

Miss Salt of the British Embassy, after reading the paper, felt that it would fit in with her Government's thinking.

Mr. Fischer of the South African Embassy indicated that it would be difficult to meet the suggested deadline (an answer next week) because so many of the members of his Government were away from the Capital. He inquired as to the relation of this Agency to the UN. I emphasized that the relationship would be tenuous. He wanted to know if bilaterals would be permitted and was advised in the affirmative.

Mr. Martin of the French Embassy asked if any further word had been received from the Russians since the April 27 note. I stated "no."

Mr. Potier of Portugal asked if it would be necessary to send this through the NATO pouch, and I told him in view of the urgency of the matter I thought that the Portuguese diplomatic pouch would be a safe means of transmission. He agreed to try to get his Government's answer next week.

Mr. Carlier stated that it might be difficult to get an answer by next week, but that he would try to get Robiliart's reaction expressed to the American Embassy in Brussels at the earliest possible date.

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[1] The attachment does not accompany the source text. Presumably, the document in question is the statement of the U.S. position, *supra*.

[2] D.A.V. Fischer, Second Secretary, South African Embassy.

[3] Augusto Potier, Counselor, Portuguese Embassy.

[4] Georges Carlier, Counselor, Belgian Embassy.

[5] L.J. Lawrey, First Secretary, Australian Embassy.

Mr. Lawrey of the Australian Embassy stated that his Government was looking forward to cooperating bilaterally with the United States Government, but indicated no objection to the proposed implementation of the pool idea.

I told each of these people that we were working on a draft treaty which would be delivered to their Governments at an early date. The reason for the urgency here is that it is expected that the President would make an announcement of this general plan at an early date, and we would like to be able to say that the countries principally involved had concurred in principle.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 668, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 24, 1954.

Subject: AEC briefing of Mr. Cole on Planning for the Implementation of the President's Pool Proposal

Participants: Sterling Cole, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
John Hall, Atomic Energy Commission
Ned Trapnell, Atomic Energy Commission
Walter Hamilton, JCAE Staff
Wayne Brobeck, JCAE Staff
Gerard C. Smith, S/AE, Department of State

Mr. Hall had asked Mr. Smith to go along with him when he briefed Mr. Cole on planning for the implementation of the President's pool proposal. Mr. Hall had originally asked if Mr. Smith was going to brief Mr. Cole. Mr. Smith advised him that he thought the Joint Committee should be briefed by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. Hall outlined the present planning to set up an international agency with the other nations principally involved in atomic energy matters: to set up a reactor training school, perhaps at Brookhaven; to declassify a certain amount of reactor information; and to renew power reactor negotiations with the Belgians.

Mr. Smith pointed out to Mr. Cole that it was not intended at this time that the international agency would hold any fissionable material but that it would act, at least in the early stages, primarily as an information exchange mechanism. However, we hope that its charter would be broad enough to permit it to evolve into an operating agency and perhaps in time into an international control mechanism.

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[1] Of the participants listed below, Edward R. Trapnell was Special Assistant to the General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. Cole was interested in the relationship of this agency to the United Nations and urged that it have only a tenuous relationship. Mr. Smith pointed out that this question of relationship to the UN as under study now. Mr. Cole suggested that the problems of Congressional ratification of United States participation in any international agency would be easiest if done under section 124 of the Atomic Energy Act since Congress, by passing this provision, had shown a preference for this procedure. Mr. Cole stated that the reason section 124 had been put in was so that the Congress would know in advance who the members of the international agency would be. He felt that the United States should also be able to control who subsequently joined the international agency. Mr. Smith pointed out the difficulties that such a veto power would raise and pointed out that a power to withdraw from the agency might be a sufficient protection. Mr. Cole stated that he was glad that we were getting on with planning for the international agency and said that he thought Congressional ratification would not be very time consuming.

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### *Editorial Note*

On August 30, President Eisenhower signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, an "Act To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946". For documentation on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, see U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 1st sess., *Atoms For Peace Manual; A Compilation of Official Materials on International Cooperation for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, December, 1953–July, 1955,* Document No. 55 (Government Printing Office, 1955). That publication also includes the President's February 17 message to Congress (see the editorial note, page 1360); the Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, House of Representatives Report No. 2181, "Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946", July 12, 1954; the Conference Report, House of Representatives Report No. 2666, "Atomic Energy Act of 1954", August 16, 1954; and Public Law 703, 83d Cong., 2d sess., "Atomic Energy Act of 1954", August 30, 1954.

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Atomic Weapons"

## *Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1954.

With reference to the atomic energy matter and having in mind the President's desire to speak only briefly on Labor Day, and also the desirability of getting as much credit as possible out of our past and prospective proposals, I would recommend:

1. That the President use something like the short form of announcement indicated in the alternative draft of August 27 (I have not gone over this draft in detail). [2]
2. That in my opening address at the UN General Assembly I should develop the plan further.
3. We should include an agenda item on this subject and Ambassador Lodge, or whoever else is designated, should develop fully in committee the original proposal of the President of December 8, the Soviet rejection, the alternative proposals now in mind and authorized by US legislation.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] Copies to Under Secretary Smith and Gerard Smith of S/AE.

[2] Draft not identified.

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Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1954.

Subject: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Participants: The Secretary
IO—Mr. Key
S/P—Mr. Bowie
P—Mr. McIlvaine
S/AE—Mr. Gerard Smith
IO—Mr. Wainhouse

With respect to the memorandum of August 30 which the Secretary sent to me regarding the item of peaceful uses of atomic energy, [1] the Secretary stated that what he had in mind is an agenda item in the United Nations General Assembly which would be introduced following his speech in the General Debate. He stated that he could not devote more than perhaps seven minutes of what might be a twenty minute speech on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and that what he wants therefore is an agenda item along the following lines: "Report by the United States on the Program of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." This item, the Secretary said, could be discussed in greater detail in Committee by Ambassador Lodge. The Secretary preferred no resolution, just simply a report. If, however, some friendly delegation should introduce a resolution which would give approval to or commend the U.S. initiative so much to the good. However, we ourselves should not introduce a resolution seeking approval.

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[1] *Supra.*

In reply to the Secretary's query, Mr. Wainhouse indicated that we are, of course, taking the risk that the USSR will seek to come in on this program. The Secretary replied that this is exactly what we want since from the outset we have been seeking USSR participation in this program.

With respect to the possibility that the report might be placed under the existing disarmament item instead of submitting a separate item, the Secretary stated that he would be opposed to any such move since the concept of the President's proposal could not truly be regarded as a disarmament proposal. It was primarily humanitarian in character.

The Secretary also went on to say that we ought to continue to exploit in the United Nations the propaganda advantages inherent in this program.

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Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, "AEC"

## *The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the President*

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 3, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The purpose of this letter is to request your authorization, in accordance with Section 144a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,[1] to continue to cooperate with Canada and the United Kingdom in the exchange of Restricted Data in certain areas pursuant to agreements existing on the effective date of the Act.

Attached is a statement concerning the statutory basis for the requested authorization and a description of the type of information exchanged under existing programs.

In summary, authorization is requested for the continuance of the following programs of cooperation:

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1505.

1. The program of Technical Cooperation (excluding the area entitled "Detection of Distant Nuclear Explosions") and the program of Raw Materials Cooperation among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. This cooperation is pursuant to a *Modus Vivendi* dated January 7, 1948, adopted by the three governments. [2]
2. Cooperation with Canada on uranium refining processes and technology, pursuant to an arrangement approved by the President on January 17, 1952, [3] in accordance with Section 10(a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended.
3. Cooperation with the United Kingdom in connection with the exchange of certain intelligence information, pursuant to an arrangement approved by the President on June 26, 1952, [4] in accordance with Section 10(a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended.
4. Cooperation with Canada in a joint program for the development of reactor fuel elements, pursuant to an arrangement approved by the President on July 13, 1953, in accordance with Section 10(a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended.

Your authorization of the continuance of the foregoing programs of cooperation is recommended. [5]

Respectfully yours,

[LEWIS L. STRAUSS]

[Enclosure]

### REPORT ON PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION WITH CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM PURSUANT TO AGREEMENTS EXISTING ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

With the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the continuation of existing programs of cooperation with Canada and the United Kingdom involving the communication of Restricted Data requires Presidential authorization in accordance with Section 144a of the Act. Section 144a reads as follows:

"a. The President may authorize the Commission to cooperate with another nation and to communicate to that nation Restricted Data on—

> "(1) refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source material;
> "(2) reactor development;
> "(3) production of special nuclear material;
> "(4) health and safety;

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[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, p. 683.

[3] Reference is to NSC 120/2, Jan. 16, 1952; for text, see p. 848.

[4] See footnote 4, p. 988.

[5] The source text bears no indication of approval or disapproval by the President.

"(5) industrial and other applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; and

"(6) research and development relating to the foregoing.

Provided, however, that no such cooperation shall involve the communication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons: And provided further, That the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 123, *or is undertaken pursuant to an agreement existing on the effective date of this Act.*" (Underscoring added.)[6]

Thus, it is contemplated that the President may authorize the Commission to cooperate with another nation and communicate to that nation Restricted Data in the six areas specified when such cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement existing on the effective date of the Act. It is further provided, however, that no such cooperation shall involve the communication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons.

The foregoing statutory provision permits Presidential authorization of each of the programs of cooperation as indicated below:

1. The existing program of Technical Cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada involves the communication of Restricted Data in the following areas:

a. Health and Safety
b. Research Uses of Radio-isotopes and Stable Isotopes
c. Fundamental properties of Reactor Materials
d. Extraction Chemistry
e. General Research Experience with certain Low Power Reactors

All the information exchanged in the foregoing areas falls within the specified categories of Section 144a, quoted above. None of the information relates to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons. The cooperation is pursuant to the *Modus Vivendi* dated January 7, 1948.

In addition to the Technical Cooperation in the foregoing areas, there has been in effect exchange of information in another area entitled "Detection of Distant Nuclear Explosions". Information relating to detection of distant nuclear explosions is not specified in Section 144a of the Act, and hence Presidential authorization for the continuance of exchange in this area is not requested. It is proposed that cooperation in this area should continue in conjunction with the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is believed that removal from the Restricted Data category of that information relating to detection of distant nuclear explosions which may properly be removed under Section 142e of the Act will enable cooperation in this area to continue, although perhaps to a somewhat limited extent. Section 142e provides as follows:

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[6] Parenthetical note in the source text. Underscoring printed here as italics.

> "e. The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such information concerning the atomic energy programs of other nations as the Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence jointly determine to be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and can be adequately safeguarded as defense information."

Cooperation in the raw materials field within the Combined Development Agency does not for the most part involve the communication of Restricted Data. The information in this field of cooperation pertains principally to exploration and assaying techniques, geological information, and research and procedures for the processing of ores, which is normally not Restricted Data. From time to time, however, some information in the raw materials field may fall within the category of Restricted Data, particularly that information relating to quantities of source material available from important foreign sources; accordingly, authorization for the continuance of this cooperation is specifically requested. Such Restricted Data as is involved in this cooperation is within the specified categories of Section 144a, quoted above, and does not relate to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons. The cooperation is pursuant to the *Modus Vivendi* dated January 7, 1948.

2. The existing program of cooperation with Canada on uranium refining processes and technology involves the communication to Canada by the United States of such Restricted Data as may be necessary to enable the Canadians to design, construct, and operate a uranium ore refinery incorporating the most recent United States technology and which would be capable of processing Canadian ore concentrates to a product meeting specifications as a feed to the metal production chain. This cooperation also includes the assistance of a United States private company as authorized by the Commission. The details of the arrangement are contained in a letter from the Commission to the President dated December 18 [*19*], 1951.[7] The arrangement was approved by the President on January 17, 1952, in accordance with Section 10(a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended. The Restricted Data involved falls within the specified categories of Section 144a, quoted above, and does not involve the communication of Restricted Data relating to

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[7] For text, see NSC 120, Dec. 21, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 794.

the design or fabrication of atomic weapons. The cooperation is pursuant to an agreement existing on the effective date of the Act.

3. The existing program of cooperation with the United Kingdom in connection with intelligence information includes the communication by the United States of Restricted Data relating to the production of certain materials in the United States as described in a Top Secret letter from the Commission to the President dated May 26, 1952. The arrangement was approved by the President on June 26, 1952, in accordance with Section 10(a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended. The Restricted Data involved is within the specified categories of Section 144a of the Act, quoted above, and does not relate to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons. The cooperation is pursuant to an agreement existing on the effective date of the Act.

4. The cooperation with Canada in a joint program for the development of reactor fuel elements involves the disclosure by the United States of Restricted Data relating to the development, fabrication, sheathing, testing, and assembly of experimental stable uranium plates into processed tubes and the irradiation and examination of such plates and assemblies in the United States and Canadian reactor facilities.

This program was described in detail in a letter from the Commission to the President dated June 15, 1953. [8] The arrangement was approved by the President on July 13, 1953. The information involved falls within the permitted areas of Section 144a of the Act, quoted above, and does not relate to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons. The cooperation is pursuant to an agreement existing on the effective date of the Act.

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[8] Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, Administration series, AEC)

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## *Editorial Note*

On Labor Day, September 6, groundbreaking ceremonies were held at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, for the first commercial atomic power plant designed to produce electricity for 100,000 persons. The ceremonies were marked by a brief address from the President at Denver, Colorado, and by longer remarks by Chairman Strauss of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and Representative W. Sterling Cole of New York, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The addresses were concerned with the international ramifications of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and all three speakers addressed themselves to the subject of the recent international agreement to proceed with the formation of an "international agency which will foster the growth and spread of the new atomic technology for peaceful use." The speeches cited above are all printed in U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 1st sess., *Atoms for Peace Manual,* pages 253–257. The President's remarks are also printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954,* pages 840–841.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip J. Farley of the Office of the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs*

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 7, 1954.

Subject: Planning for the International Atomic Energy Agency

Participants: Mr. John A. Hall, AEC
Mr. A.A. Wells, AEC
Mr. L.C. Meeker, L/UNA
Mr. Bechhoefer, UNP
Mr. Meyers, UNP
Mr. Gerard Smith, S/AE
Mr. P.J. Farley, S/AE

At a meeting in Mr. Smith's office at 11 a.m. on September 7, plans for organizing the International Atomic Energy Agency were discussed. The attached schedule [1] was accepted as an initial basis for proceeding. Conclusions reached regarding the principal problems in proceeding with formation of the Agency are summarized herein.

### *Approach to the UN*

The Secretary of State has decided that, in his initial speech before the UN General Assembly, he will report US plans for proceeding with formation of an International Atomic Energy Agency. The US position will be reported and discussed more fully by Ambassador Lodge in the General Assembly and perhaps in Committee One.

Drafting of the remarks by the Secretary and of guidance for Ambassador Lodge has been undertaken by UNP with assistance from S/AE.

It was hoped that the remarks by the Secretary and Ambassador Lodge will clear up some of the misapprehensions concerning US plans for the Agency, and in particular concerning the relationship of the Agency to the UN, which have been apparent since the President's Labor Day speech. [2] No earlier public announcement was considered desirable to clarify points raised in the press concerning the President's speech, but it will be publicly indicated that the US plans to report further concerning the Agency to the UN General Assembly.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See the editorial note, *supra.*

*International Scientific Conference*

Dr. Rabi has now returned to this country from his visit to Europe to discuss plans for the proposed international scientific conference with Sir John Cockcroft and other British and Canadian representatives, and with representatives of the French atomic energy project. As soon as Dr. Rabi can come to Washington to report on his trip, decisions will be made regarding sponsorship of the conference and regarding date, location, invitations, and agenda for the conference. In view of the Secretary of State's decision not to seek UN sponsorship for the formation of the agency, the previous plan for UN sponsorship of the conference needs to be reviewed. (UN sponsorship of the conference appears less desirable than sponsorship by the US or a group of nations.)

It was tentatively agreed that, if the UN does not sponsor the conference, an attempt would be made to reach agreement on the agenda, date, location, and invitations for the conference before October 1. S/AE and AEC will get in touch with Dr. Rabi and prepare recommendations on these points.

*Composition of Working Group*

It was recalled that the French Embassy has suggested that a working group consisting of the UK, Canada, France, and the US be set up to prepare plans for the formation of the Agency.

After discussion, it was concluded that, initially, consultation on plans for the Agency should be quite informal and should be limited to the US, the UK, and Canada. These three nations are associated in atomic energy matters through the Combined Policy Committee and have common interests in materials procurement and in control of classified information. There will be many problems requiring the attention of the three countries as the result of the recent amendment of the Atomic Energy Act and it will be advantageous to confine initial discussions of the Agency and its problems to this small group.

Subsequently, as plans for the Agency are tentatively agreed on by the CPC countries, a larger international working group might be constituted. The seven countries consulted on August 18 regarding the decision to proceed with an Agency in the absence of Soviet participation might appropriately be represented on the working group. Other countries might be added in order to avoid the appearance of exclusiveness and also to broaden such a group, now including the principal colonial powers plus a non-UN member and another state (South Africa) not popular with many Asian and African countries. It was recognized that it would be difficult to select additional members of the working group from the many interested countries, whereas the initial seven can be justified by their status as raw materials producers or consumers.

*Procedures*

It was agreed that representatives of the UK and Canada would be invited to discuss plans for the Agency immediately. A preliminary draft outline of the organization and functions of the Agency will be furnished the UK and Canada, in order that the ideas of the UK and Canada might be obtained at the outset. The US plans for an approach to the UN will be described in order to solicit the comments and support of the UK and Canada. Planning and problems related to the formation of the Agency and to the scientific conference will be described and discussed, as well as the proposed schedule and the US feeling of urgency. US plans for an interim assistance program will also be described to the UK and Canada and discussed with them at an appropriate time.

It was expected that, before the Secretary's speech to the UN General Assembly and after agreement with the UK and Canada, the other five countries who were consulted on August 18 would be notified of the US position to be taken in the UN.

By about October 1, after agreement has been reached by the CPC countries and the US has reported initially to the UN, a working group might be constituted. Agreement by this working group on an outline of the organization and functions of the Agency would be sought by about November 15. Such an outline would serve as a basis for the drafting of a treaty or convention to be open to signature by interested nations in addition to those represented on the working group.

By about October 1 it might prove possible to transmit a note on the plans for the Agency (derived from the August 18 memorandum, the President's Labor Day speech, and the remarks of the Secretary of State before the General Assembly) to the Embassies of all potential member nations. Such a note would advise other nations of planning for the Agency and indicate to them that their ideas on the role of the Agency would be welcome. Criticism from nations not on the working group might thus be forestalled, and other nations given a sense of participation.

When a treaty or convention has been drafted, it might be possible to convene a conference to formalize ratification (subject of course to Congressional action) in January 1955, or perhaps later in the year at the time of the international scientific conference.

Atomic Energy files, Lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip J. Farley of the Office of the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs*

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1954.

Subject: Planning for International Atomic Energy Agency

Participants: Mr. George P. de T. Glazebrook, Canadian Embassy
Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/AE
Mr. P.J. Farley, S/AE

Mr. Smith said that he had asked Mr. Glazebrook and Miss Salt to come in to discuss informally plans for the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In view of the close relationship of the UK, Canada, and the US both during the war and after the war through the mechanism of the Combined Policy Committee, and in view of the consultations which had taken place among the three countries prior to despatch of the March 19 note on the proposed Agency to the USSR, [1] it seemed desirable for the three nations to consider informally the plans for the Agency as they affect the continuing special relationship among them. Mr. Glazebrook and Miss Salt indicated that such informal consultations appeared desirable, recognizing of course that no formal group would be established for the purpose and no agreed position would necessarily be reached.

Mr. Smith gave Mr. Glazebrook and Miss Salt copies of a preliminary outline of the proposed Agency.* He explained that the outline was a draft prepared by S/AE on the basis of the March 19 outline given the USSR, and had no official status as representing the views either of the State Department of AEC. It was hoped that the comments and suggestions of the UK and Canada might be obtained at an early date and before any US position became final, and that an interchange of ideas could be facilitated by such a preliminary unofficial outline. Mr. Smith said that the schedule envisaged by the US called for discussion of the outline of the Agency among the US, UK, and Canada during September; by about October 1, it might be desirable to discuss the outline, still in draft, with other countries principally involved, looking toward agreement on an outline by about November 15; a conference for formal signature of a convention or other suitable instrument might perhaps be held in mid-January 1955.

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation, p. 1376.

*(Copy attached.) [Footnote in the source text. The attachment has not been found.]

The possibility of constituting a working group to consider plans for the Agency was discussed. Mr. Glazebrook pointed out that it might prove easier to discuss an outline or a draft convention in a group at some point rather than by correspondence among eight or more nations. It was recognized that the selection of the countries to be represented on any working group would be difficult once membership was extended beyond the eight nations† hitherto involved in consultations. It was agreed that other nations should be brought into the planning as early as possible and ways of notifying or otherwise bringing in a large number of nations were discussed. It was agreed that the question of establishment of a working group would be considered further during subsequent discussion of plans for the Agency.

Mr. Smith said that the US planned to report further on the Agency during the opening speech of the Secretary of State before the UN General Assembly, and to introduce an agenda item at that time calling for a report by the US on negotiations subsequent to the President's proposals of December 8, 1953. Discussion of such an agenda item, both in the General Assembly and in committee, would offer a further opportunity to bring out the position of the US and its associates. Miss Salt said that she did not know at this time what position the Foreign Office might take regarding the introduction of such an agenda item; her personal view was that discussion of the I.A. in the Secretary's speech and on other general occasions would be desirable but that an agenda item was of doubtful value. It would focus attention on the subject and perhaps lead to opposition and to hostile resolutions which might make the formation of the Agency more difficult. It was recognized that some of these difficulties might be expected to arise whether or not an agenda item was introduced. Mr. Smith asked that, if there were strong objections on the part of the UK or Canada concerning introduction of an agenda item, the State Department should be advised as soon as possible since present US plans included introduction of such an agenda item. He mentioned that the Secretary General of the UN had been advised prior to the President's Labor Day speech that the US would report further on the subject at the General Assembly meeting.

Mr. Smith said that, as a result of progress in planning for the Agency and of Dr. Rabi's recent trip to England and France, it was hoped that early decisions could be reached on the location, date, invitations, and agenda for the international scientific conference. If possible, some details of this sort might be announced in the Secretary's speech before the General Assembly. The most pressing question related to sponsorship of the conference. It has been considered desirable heretofore, in part for reasons of housekeeping, to request UN sponsorship of the conference. Since the UN is not to be asked to sponsor the Agency, however, it appears consistent to have the conference also sponsored by a small group of nations rather than by the UN. Mr. Smith asked that the views of the UK and Canada on this question of sponsorship be provided as a matter of urgency.

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† U.K., Canada, France, Belgium, Portugal, Australia, South Africa and U.S. [Footnote in the source text.]

Mr. Smith said that, of the seven countries consulted concerning the plan to proceed with the Agency, agreement in principle had been received from all but Belgium. Agreement from Portugal had been received on September 7.

Mr. Smith said that the US was drawing up plans for programs of interim assistance referred to by the President on Labor Day, and that it was hoped that these could be discussed with the UK and Canada at an early date.

Mr. Glazebrook said that the stories emanating from Ottawa following the President's Labor Day speech, which indicated that Canada had been surprised at the announcement, did not represent the thinking of the Canadian Government and he expressed regret for them. Miss Salt said that the UK had issued a press guidance at the time of the speech which was based on the August 18 memorandum [2] and thus might differ in some details, although she had not yet seen a copy. The Foreign Office was planning, if asked, to say that the arrangement with Belgium was a tripartite one in which the UK was a participant and that the UK also was assisting Belgium with its reactor program.

There was discussion of the question of whether further information should be given the press at this time. Mr. Smith expressed the US feeling that facts should not be wasted but should be saved for the UN debate or other occasions where they would have maximum effect. Accordingly, the US was saying nothing further at this time except that there would be further reports and discussion at the UN General Assembly session. He suggested that the UK and Canada might take the same line, which had the advantages of providing a terminal date to satisfy the curiosity of the press and of keeping some UN flavor about the plan.

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[2] *Ante*, p. 1501.

600.0012/9-2254: Telegram

### *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State* [1]

TOP SECRET Moscow, September 22, 1954—1 p.m.
NIACT [Received 8:52 a.m.]

418. Eyes only Secretary or Under Secretary. Gromyko asked me to call this morning and at 11:45 handed me nine-page memorandum on atomic energy discussions in answer to US memorandum of July 9 (full text in immediately following telegram). [2]

Bulk of memorandum merely reviews standard Soviet position on question including opposition to President's proposal for atomic pool; necessity of working towards total abolition atomic weapons with first step renunciation of use; and clear indication that any form of international organ for peaceful use of atomic energy in Soviet view must be under Security Council.

Following is translation last two paragraphs of memorandum:

> "Soviet government taking in consideration declaration government of USA concerning willingness at any time to renew the negotiations connected with peaceful use of atomic energy for its part declares its willingness to continue these negotiations for the examination of proposals of Soviet government as well as proposals of government USA.
>
> In conclusion, Soviet government would like to know opinion of US government as to whether it is not desirable that all documents which have been mutually exchanged between governments of USSR and USA during course of conversations which have taken place on atomic problem should be published in press of Soviet Union as well as press of USA respectively in order that public opinion might be informed concerning contents of these negotiations. In this connection Soviet government takes into consideration fact that in course of the conversations which have taken place between Soviet Union and USA, communications have appeared in the press which imprecisely elucidate certain questions concerning position of the parties".

In view of subject of Soviet memorandum, and particularly last paragraph, I will of course say nothing whatsoever to press here including fact of call on Gromyko. Since I do not have available here text of memorandum of July 9, I cannot judge to what extent Soviet reply is responsive to our proposal.

Soviet memorandum, however, appears to do little more than repeat standard Soviet positions on this question and seems designed primarily (1) to indicate Soviet willingness to continue discussions, probably in hope of throwing onus on US for any breakdown; and (2) for same reason, to publicize for propaganda purposes Soviet position during course these discussions.

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[1] Relayed to the Secretary of State who was in New York for the opening session of the UN General Assembly.

[2] Telegram 419 from Moscow, Sept. 22, is not printed. (600.0012/9-2254) However, for the text of the Soviet *aide-mémoire*, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 486–489. For text of the U.S. memorandum of July 9, see p. 1473.

I would appreciate being informed whether Department proposes to publicize (without indication of content) receipt of this memorandum so that I might simultaneously inform press here. [3]

**BOHLEN**

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[3] Telegram 198 to Moscow, Sept. 23, 12:14 p.m., reads as follows: "Eyes only for Ambassador. Advise Gromyko urgently that United States willing to publish all documents exchanged between United States and USSR on President's pool proposal.

"FYI. Urgency owing to fact Secretary will state in UN speech 4 p.m. today that United States is willing to publish such documents." (600.0012/9-2354)

The Department added the following in telegram 199 of 2:55 p.m.: "Further to Deptel 198, advise Gromyko urgently that although United States willing to publish subject documents would regret termination of this private channel. If USSR nevertheless desires publish, obtain if possible details re timing, content and manner of publication." (600.0012/9-2354)

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## *Editorial Note*

On September 23, Secretary of State Dulles addressed the United Nations General Assembly on the theme "Partnership for Peace". During his remarks, Secretary Dulles reviewed what he characterized as the frustrating negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning implementation of President Eisenhower's proposals of December 8, 1953.

The Secretary then continued: "The United States remains ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union. But we shall no longer suspend our efforts to establish an international atomic agency." The Secretary expressed firm determination that the President's proposals not die but be "nurtured and developed." He then stated: "The United States is proposing an agenda item which will enable us to report on our efforts to explore and develop the vast possibilities for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. These efforts have been and will be directed primarily toward the following ends:

> "(1) The creation of an international agency, whose initial membership will include nations from all regions of the world. It is hoped that such an agency will start its work as early as next year. (2) The calling of an international scientific conference to consider this whole vast subject, to meet in the spring of 1955, under the auspices of the United Nations. (3) The opening early next year, in the United States, of a reactor training school where students from abroad may learn the working principles of atomic energy with specific regard to its peacetime uses. (4) The invitation to a substantial number of medical and surgical experts from abroad to participate in the work of our cancer hospitals—in which atomic

energy techniques are among the most hopeful approaches to controlling this menace to mankind."

In conclusion, Dulles stressed that "our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture."

Following the Secretary's address, Representative Lodge requested the Secretary-General to place "an item entitled 'International co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy: report of the United States of America' " on the agenda of the General Assembly "as an important and urgent question". Lodge delivered a statement on the subject before the General Committee on September 24.

The texts of the Secretary of State's "Partnership for Peace" address, the United States request to the Secretary-General (UN doc. A/2734, September 23), and Ambassador Lodge's statement of September 24 are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 4, 1954, pages 471–477.

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600.0012/9–2354: Telegram

## *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET Moscow, September 23, 1954—10 p.m.
NIACT [Received 8:49 p.m.]

428. I sent following first person communication to Gromyko at 10 p.m. Moscow time (1900 GMT) September 23 in accordance with instructions Department's 198: [1]

"Dear Mr. Gromyko: I have the honor to refer to the *aide-mémoire* which you handed to me on September 22 and to inform you that the United States Government is willing to publish all documents exchanged between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding the proposal advanced by the President of the United States of America on December 8, 1953 with respect to the international use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
Sincerely yours,"

Since Department's 198 not received until after Foreign Office closed and appointment uncertain I thought it safer to send personal letter to Gromyko. I assume that publication will be at mutually agreed time, but since no such indication in reference telegram did not include in letter. Would appreciate urgent confirmation so that I can so inform Gromyko tomorrow morning in order to forestall Soviets jumping the gun.

BOHLEN

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[1] For text, see footnote 3, p. 1519.

600.0012/9-2454: Telegram

### *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, September 24, 1954—1 p.m.
[Received 8:36 a.m.]

430. Eyes only for Secretary. I saw Gromyko at 11 o'clock this morning. I told him with reference to my letter of yesterday evening[1] which he said he had received that my government wished to make following additional comments:

1. That, as indicated in letter, we were prepared to agree to Soviet desire to publish documents which had been exchanged between United States and Soviet Governments on atomic question;
2. That United States Government and Secretary personally desire, however, to ensure that publication of these documents would not prejudice in future the possibility of private exchanges between United States and USSR on this or other subjects and that in the future similar exchanges would be kept confidential except by mutual consent;
3. That we would appreciate being informed of details re timing, content, and manner of publication of the documents in question in order that this might be done at mutually agreeable time.

Gromyko said he could answer the third question first, by stating that Soviet Government had in mind publishing all documents which had been exchanged confidentially between United States and Soviet Governments on this subject; that this would involve publication in Soviet press of both its memoranda and those received from United States Government and he assumed the same would be done in our press.

As to timing, he said he had no concrete suggestion to make and asked if I had any. I told him that since it was on Soviet initiative that this question had been raised, I would welcome any indication of Soviet view as to timing. Gromyko said he had no specific date to suggest but that any date provided it was not too long delayed which was agreeable to United States would be acceptable to them. I repeated since it was a Soviet suggestion I would like to know what they had in mind as to timing but Gromyko merely repeated any date within near future would be acceptable to his government and he had no date to suggest. I did not think it worthwhile to press Gromyko further on this point since it might be to our advantage to be able to select the particular date we prefer. Publication of Soviet memorandum of September 22 will make entirely [garble] to public opinion on whose initiative publication took place.

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[1] For text, see telegram 428 from Moscow, Sept. 23, *supra*.

In regard to safeguarding future confidential exchanges, Gromyko said at that moment he could only take note of views of United States Government but would let me know later on when we further discussed the timing of release. He stated, however, that while he could give no definite answer on behalf his government he was sure there would be "no difficulty" on this point since it was obviously desirable to be able to have a confidential channel of communication by mutual agreement.

He did not mention your speech at UN [2] and I made only brief reference to fact that you had stated willingness of United States Government to publish the documents exchanged with Soviet Government.

From Gromyko's personal remarks it would appear that Soviet Government will recognize desirability of ensuring confidential exchanges. However, given degree of Soviet suspicion and general unwillingness to commit themselves in advance, we may not get firm blanket commitment on this point but, rather, indication that each case will be decided as it arises.

As to timing and any other technical matters, I would suggest that we should select date most convenient to us within next few days and I should be authorized so to inform Gromyko. For our purposes date might be sufficient without attempt to fix exact hour of release, but that is matter for Department to decide. [3]

BOHLEN

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[2] See the editorial note, p. 1519.

[3] In telegram 209 to Moscow, Sept. 24, the Department of State advised Ambassador Bohlen that the 12 documents exchanged between Jan. 11 and Sept. 22 would be released on Sunday afternoon, Sept. 26. (600.0012/9-2454) The documents were published in Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 478–489.

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600.0012/9-2454: Telegram

## *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, September 24, 1954—8 p.m.
PRIORITY [Received 9:03 p.m.]

Delga 12. For the Secretary. Re atomic energy item. Vishinsky today, while climbing on the bandwagon and agreeing that our new item should be added to the political committee's agenda claimed that the US was misrepresenting the Soviets attitude on going ahead with the discussions to set up the international atomic agency. He said the Soviets were more than willing to publish the exchange of notes between the US and the USSR, and that the record would show the accuracy of these remarks.

Since Vishinsky will speak in the general debate on Monday afternoon,[1] I believe it is vital that we publish the exchange of notes up here and circulate them as a UN document, if possible no later than Saturday. This will enable us to get the best press coverage in advance of Vishinsky's Monday speech, for otherwise the press coverage given Vishinsky's speeches may well blanket our issuing the exchange of notes. I think it is imperative that we take the initiative in this matter and hope you will agree with me. If possible, notes should be teletyped to us immediately so that we can make the necessary preparations up here with the UN secretariat.[2]

LODGE

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[1] Sept. 27.

[2] The source text bears the following handwritten notation: "Mr. Key discussed this with USUN—by phone Sat Sept. 24." (Saturday was Sept. 25.)

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip J. Farley of the Office of the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1954.

Subject: Planning for International Atomic Energy Agency

Participants: Representative Sterling Cole, Chairman, JCAE
Mr. Morehead Patterson
Gerard Smith, S/AE
Philip Farley, S/AE
Edward Trapnell, AEC

Mr. Smith introduced Mr. Patterson as the individual who would head negotiations for establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Mr. Patterson reviewed briefly his experience as an industrialist and as U.S. Representative for recent Disarmament Commission meetings at London.

At Representative Cole's request, Mr. Patterson and Mr. Smith discussed the status of planning and negotiations related to the Agency. It was pointed out that the negotiations were in an early stage and that many of the details of the organization and structure of the agency were as yet unresolved.

In the course of discussion of the contemplated arrangements for projects sponsored by the Agency, Mr. Smith referred to the tentative requirement that preparation of fuel elements and chemical processing of irradiated elements should be performed in this country. Mr. Cole recognized the security considerations supporting this objective, but expressed some doubt that it would be feasible or politically acceptable to other countries. Mr. Smith said that the importance of not imposing any restrictions on foreign projects which might appear to indicate a U.S. desire to dominate the programs of other countries would be borne in mind in planning for the Agency.

Mr. Patterson expressed the view that, unless information now held under the restricted data category could be made available, the expectations of other nations would be disappointed. Mr. Trapnell said that this problem might be handled by declassification. Mr. Cole referred to the provision of Section 124 of the Revised Atomic Energy Act, that cooperation with the new Agency should be undertaken pursuant to agreements for cooperation under Section 123; he pointed out that Section 123 made provision for appropriate security safeguards and standards, and that declassification might not be the only alternative.

There was discussion of procedures to be followed in negotiating and ratifying the international arrangement establishing the Agency. Mr. Cole said that he would, of course, reserve his right to question any procedure or agreement when submitted. It appeared to him, however, that a procedure which might be consistent with the Act would be for the executive branch to negotiate an arrangement with other countries, discuss the draft arrangement with the Joint Committee, present it to the Congress for ratification, and then proceed to negotiate agreements for cooperation under Section 123 as a basis for actual implementation.

At the conclusion of the general discussion, Mr. Cole said that he personally viewed the proposed Agency as of great promise and importance, and that he hoped Mr. Patterson would come to the Joint Committee for assistance on problems that would arise. Mr. Patterson said that he appreciated this offer and would like to have an opportunity from time to time to discuss informally with Mr. Cole the progress of negotiations.

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600.0012/9-2754

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Acting Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1954.

Subject: Soviet Motivations in Publishing Atomic Pool Correspondence

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[1] Drafted by Walter J. Stoessel of EUR/EE.

It appears most likely that the Soviets were motivated by the following considerations in taking the initiative in publishing the atomic pool correspondence:

1. *To show a willingness to negotiate:* The USSR now claims there is no problem which cannot be solved by negotiation. To counter US charges that the USSR was entirely negative on the atomic pool proposals, the Soviets probably felt that, through publication of the lengthy correspondence (which most people would not read in detail) the impression could be given that the USSR had, in fact, been willing to negotiate the atomic pool question and continues to stand ready to negotiate.

2. *To gain public support for the Soviet proposal for "banning the bomb":* The Soviet documents (which give every indication of having been prepared originally with an eye to publication) are full of statements regarding the horrors of nuclear warfare, and they reiterate the Soviet proposal for banning the use of nuclear weapons. Through publication of the documents the Soviets could hope to gain public support for their stand, especially in neutralist and uncommitted areas. Publication would also lay the groundwork for further emphasis on the Soviet plan to "ban the bomb".

3. *To bring talks on the atomic pool under the aegis of the UN:* It is to Soviet advantage to bring the whole atomic pool question under the aegis of the UN, where opportunities for obstruction are greater. Publication of the documents in conjunction with UN debate on the subject would help to open the matter to UN involvement.

4. *To point up weapon development potential of pool:* The Soviet memoranda claim that the use of atomic energy under the US plan would also result in production of materials useful for weapon development. While we contest this, there is some technical basis for the Soviet claim, and they may hope to capitalize on this point in future propaganda.

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## *Editorial Note*

On September 30, Soviet Representative at the United Nations Andrei Y. Vyshinsky transmitted to the President of the General Assembly a "Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the General Assembly: Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction." (UN doc. A/2742 and Corr. 1) The Soviet draft resolution called for a two-stage total reduction in armed forces, armaments, and budgetary appropriations over a period of one to two years, along with the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction. Supervision was to be undertaken by a temporary international control commission established under the Security Council. (*Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, pages 431-433)

Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov handed a copy of this draft resolution to French Ambassador to the Soviet Union Louis Joxe on September 29. It was subsequently sent from Paris to the Department of State as telegram 1340 of September 30, repeated to London for Secretary Dulles. (600.0012/9-3054)

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Eisenhower Library, C.D. Jackson papers

## *Memorandum for the Files* [1]

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1954.

### CHRONOLOGY—"ATOMS FOR PEACE" PROJECT

1. Early April, 1953, discussion of "Candor". Official NSC and Presidential instruction late May. Purpose—fuller disclosure.

2. Many drafts of Candor through September—none satisfactory because they either told too much or too little and were uniformly dull. [2] During this time mounting columnist hue and cry, led by Alsops, [3] referring to Candor (9/9) and disclosing much draft material.

3. Moratorium pending new idea.

4. Mid-September 1953, new draft, largely inspired by Radford—including tremendous recital U.S. atomic might—"one atomic bomb equal to all bombs dropped by all allies on Germany during the war" kind of stuff.

(Last days of Sept., much discussion on whether to continue—Jackson polled high officials with letter 9/25, and key inner group breakfasted with President at the White House 10/3, for which Jackson had written briefing.) [4]

5. New draft, including Russian potential for injuring the U.S. This was closer to what was wanted, but it had the basic defect that all it really contained was mortal Soviet attack followed by

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[1] Presumably drafted by or for C.D. Jackson, who resigned as Special Assistant to the President effective Mar. 31, 1954, but served on the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly, which convened in September.

[2] Various drafts and background materials relating to the "Atoms for Peace" speech are located in the Eisenhower Library, particularly in the C.D. Jackson papers and in the Whitman file, "Atoms for Peace".

[3] Joseph and Stewart Alsop, syndicated columnists.

[4] For the letter of Sept. 25, 1953, see p. 1223; for the briefing paper, see p. 1224.

mortal U.S. counterattack—in other words, bang-bang, no hope, no way out at the end.

6. Summer 1953, vacationing in Denver, President had vague and general germ of the atomic "pool" idea—on which he sent a message to Strauss from Denver via Bobby Cutler. [5]

7. Strauss-Jackson discussed ideas on ways in which this might be done, and Jackson put in rough speech draft in very general terms.

8. Strauss and Jackson came to New York August 19th to have breakfast with the President when he returned from Denver for the Baruch Anniversary. He read the draft, and discussed amplification of the idea, with Strauss supplying details on how it might be done. [6]

9. Highest level, top secret discussions. First draft of "Atoms for Peace" speech as such dated November 1. Meanwhile, Strauss was working on details, and as result of his talks with Pres. and other preparations, prepared memo dated November 6th, which included all basics including safe method. (*Note:* method still classified)

10. Gradual crescendo involving more and more people, including White House meetings, while this speech shaping up—by which time it had become a Strauss-Jackson act, Strauss supplying more and more atomic pool ideas and Jackson putting into words.

11. Approval all around immediately prior to Bermuda, and decision by the President that Strauss and Jackson should go to Bermuda.

12. Several long discussions between Strauss and Cherwell on validity and feasibility of plan, leading to Cherwell's advising Churchill to raise no British objections.

13. Work on plane on final draft, between the President, Strauss, Foster Dulles, and Jackson.

Delivery of speech at UN—December 8, 1953. [7]

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[5] Regarding the message to Strauss, see the memorandum by Cutler, Sept. 10, 1953, p. 1213.

[6] The President's appointment book confirms that the President had a breakfast meeting with Strauss and Jackson in New York at 7:30 a.m., Aug. 19, 1953. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, "President—Daily Appointments")

[7] See the editorial note, p. 1291.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip A. Farley of the Office of the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs*

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1954.

Subject: International Atomic Energy Agency

Participants: Mr. E.E. Tomkins, British Embassy
Mr. George P. de T. Glazebrook, Canadian Embassy
Mr. P.J. Farley, S/AE

Mr. Tomkins said that he had called to present a note stating preliminary U.K. views as to participation of the USSR in negotiations concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency (see attached copy of note).

Mr. Farley asked whether the U.K. note reflected preference on the part of the U.K. for the original outline of the Agency as transmitted to the USSR on March 19. [1] Mr. Tomkins said that he understood the preference of the U.K. to be for the revised outline, setting forth a more modest scope for the Agency's work. Mr. Glazebrook said that the Canadian preference was also for the outline presently under discussion rather than the March 19 outline.

Mr. Farley said that the problem of replying to the Soviet note of September 22, [2] together with related question of USSR participation in the negotiations relating to the Agency, was now under consideration in the Department of State. He indicated his understanding, on the basis of the U.K. note, that it was the U.K. view that further discussions and a better understanding should be sought with the other five countries who have agreed in principle to proceed with organization of an Agency prior to any move to bring the USSR into the discussion. Mr. Tomkins said that this was indeed the U.K. intent.

Mr. Tomkins pointed out that the U.K., as indicated in the note, agreed that the preliminary outline of an International Atomic Energy Agency prepared by the US was acceptable as a basis for discussions with the other countries principally involved.

[Attachment]

### *The British Embassy to the Department of State*

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

We should ourselves prefer the revised outline not to be communicated to the Russians at this stage. If the Russians later participate, it may then be thought better to revert to something on the lines of the March outline, i.e. with definite provision for storage of nuclear material when the Agency comes into existence, rather than "at a later date". Meanwhile we agree that the eight should proceed on the basis of the revised outline.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1372.

[2] For text of the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of Sept. 22, 1954, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 486–489.

In our view, therefore, the U.S. Note should aim at obtaining a positive reply as to whether or not the Russians are prepared to collaborate in the work of the Agency, whose objectives, functions and general organization they already know, but should not commit us to the revised outline.

When the revised outline is handed to the other five sponsoring powers they could be told that discrepancies between this and the March outline are due to Soviet withdrawal from the project. One of the main objectives of the President's proposal was to establish a pool of nuclear material to which the U.S.A. and Russia as two of the main producers would contribute. When one of the two main contributors withdrew, the plan was modified since there appeared no longer to be sufficient justification for the complicated storage and security provisions which the pool would require. If the Russians later convinced us of their willingness to join, we might wish to revert to something nearer to the President's original conception of the Agency. Meanwhile work could continue on the modified plan, of which the Russians should not be informed.

If the Russians should later learn of the revised outline and refer to it in debate, the discrepancies between this and the outline handed to them in March could be explained on the lines of para. 3 above.

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## *Editorial Note*

On October 12, James J. Wadsworth, United States Representative on the First Committee (Political and Security) of the United Nations General Assembly, spoke at length before the Committee on the subject of disarmament. For the text of his remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1954, pages 620–625.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum for the File, by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1954.

Subject: Conversation with Adm. Strauss on October 13, 1954

I showed him Delga 91 from New York [1] to point up the problem that we are going to have to keep Senator Lodge within bounds and told Strauss that we had replied in the negative. [2]

I pointed out the dilemma which proceeding under sections 124 and 123 would pose for United States participation in the International Agency. I suggested that the alternative treaty route should be considered which would permit United States cooperation with members of the Agency even though they could not qualify for a section 123 bilateral. Strauss said he took a pragmatic point of view which indicated that we should cooperate with friendly nations first. For example, he said that he thought the Pakistanis would be properly disgruntled if we cooperated with India before cooperating with them. I gathered that Strauss felt it would not be too difficult for us in the International Agency to work with our friends only, at least in the early years, in the matter of enriched material research reactors.

I then discussed the idea of dedicating a reactor experiment or a reactor to the International Agency or for work in this country by friendly foreign nationals. Strauss said that he had been thinking about putting up a reactor in Puerto Rico. He said he thought that if we build any reactors we should tie them into generating systems. He seemed to think well of the idea.

I told him I thought we were losing ground in the disarmament negotiations in New York and that the United States should make some dramatic gesture to point up clearly the sham nature of the new Soviet proposals. I suggested that this effect would be obtained by the United States proposing that the Soviets now permit United States representatives to visit Soviet atomic energy installations simultaneously with Soviet representatives visiting American atomic energy installations on an unclassified basis. Strauss seemed to think well of the idea but pointed out the domestic political liabilities of making such an offer in the pre-election period.

I discussed with him what reply we should make to the Soviet note of September 22. He asked me to send over this exchange of notes. I pointed out that our aim should be to offer to continue negotiating with the Soviets on the March 19 plan but at the same time preventing them from jeopardizing our efforts with the other seven countries. I suggested that we offer to examine with Soviet experts the "seepage" problem. He thought well of this idea and suggested that Moscow be the site. On this score of "seepage" he stated that the solution was simple. Merely require all chemical processing of fuel elements in power reactors to be done under UN auspices.

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[1] Telegram Delga 91 from New York, Oct. 12, not printed, contained a suggestion from Ambassador Lodge that, after the treaty creating an International Atomic Energy Agency had been negotiated, it be submitted to the UN General Assembly for approval before being sent to the national legislatures for ratification. (600.0012/10-1254)

[2] The response was actually transmitted in telegram Gadel 47 to New York, Oct. 15. (600.0012/10-1254)

Strauss, in conclusion, asked me if I would write him informally on the above matters.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

### *Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith) to the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1954.

As you suggested today,[1] I am setting down for what they may be worth certain ideas bearing on the foreign policy aspects of atomic energy.

In order to point up sharply the probably sham nature of the recent Soviet disarmament proposals it is suggested that the United States propose to the Soviets that United States representatives be permitted to visit Soviet atomic energy installations now in return for which Soviet representatives would be permitted to visit United States atomic energy installations. It is my understanding that such a visit could be arranged on an unclassified basis without loss of any United States security. If, as expected, the Soviets reject the proposal, it would, I think, point up the real nature of their current maneuvering in the UN. If, by some chance, they accepted the offer, gain for United States intelligence would be substantial. I understand that there would be certain domestic political considerations which would have to be kept in mind.

I also suggest that we could gain substantial net advantage by offering to build in the United States a power reactor experiment to which members of the International Agency would have access and in the construction of which they would participate.

This suggestion is made in anticipation of some disillusionment in the world upon the publication of United States technical plans for participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, we will continue to be faced with proposals for construction of power reactors abroad. The construction of such a power reactor experiment would tend to prove our claim that nuclear power is not at the present time economical. It would also be in earnest of United States intentions not to withhold power reactor technology from nations which have a greater need for nuclear power now than the United States.

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[1] See the memorandum for the file, *supra*.

Such a move would orient foreign reactor programs toward the United States—at a time when the trend seems to be somewhat away from United States leadership in this field. Such a reactor experiment would be entirely within the physical control of the United States. It is suggested that the possible gains from such a move may well justify that degree of declassification or access to Restricted Data by foreign nationals which would be required. Much as this net gain would also be derived from your thought that a power producing reactor be constructed outside of the United States but at a location in which it has some degree of control—such as Puerto Rico. I think that the reaction from Latin America would be tremendously favorable if such a move were to be made with the understanding that one purpose of the reactor would be to aid Latin American countries in the development of power reactor programs of their own. To gain this end I think foreign participation in the construction phase would be important.

GERARD C. SMITH

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600.0012/10-1554: Telegram

## *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, October 15, 1954—1 p.m.

Delga 108. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re: Peaceful uses of atomic energy.

1. As has previously been reported there is continuing and widespread interest in our plans for establishing an Atomic Energy Agency with a more than nominal relationship to the UN. Extent of enthusiasm for our program as presented in forthcoming debate may well depend on how far we are able to go with respect to UN relationship. Secretary's memo of Sept 24 [1] indicated importance working out this relationship and suggested that a "specialized" agency might be the answer. However, it seems clear that the Agency will not be set up before GA debate and therefore no relationship will be worked out during this session of GA.

2. For this reason I suggest consideration be given to the advantages of recommending to the GA the establishment of a UN comite comprising some or all of govts with whom we are now negotiating as prospective members of IAEA. Comite wld be asked to continue present negotiations for establishment of agency. GA

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[1] Not further identified.

might establish such a comite without, in my opinion, any real interference in the actual negotiations and this wld, from the start, provide adequate semblance of UN tie-up. Comite cld report to GA upon creation of agency and might, if it then seemed desirable, submit treaty creating agency to GA before ratification by national legislatures (see Delga 91 Oct 12).[2]

3. Seriously doubt whether the calling of a so-called "scientific" conf in and of itself adequately meets the positive and affirmative leadership requirements inherent in the program announced by the President last Dec. 3 [*8*]. At some stage in the development of this program such a conf might prove to be a useful thing, but it is vital that it be properly organized and managed. As so far envisaged, however, I think it wld be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to maintain our leadership and control. Unwieldly and theoretical nature of debate carried on by large body of scientists not responsible to govts wld do more harm than good at this stage. Giving the opportunity of a world forum such as this to "scientists" such as Joliot-Curie[3] and a miscellaneous crew from Russia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would scarcely advance the President's program. Similarly, a conference of scientists could produce a situation conflicting with plans of govts negotiating for creation of agency.

4. Therefore, in the first instance, it might be desirable to have UN comite as suggested above undertake arrangements for the conf, leaving to this comite the question of timing and terms of reference. This comite wld provide desirable and necessary link between Agency as we develop it and conf.

5. In addition to the foregoing, while I do not think we should make rash promises of miracles to be accomplished overnight, nevertheless I feel that we shld offer some very definite and tangible inducement, particularly to the smaller, underdeveloped countries. This might be accomplished by authorizing the UN comite to receive and respond to comments, requests for information and requests for assistance from UN member govts.

6. I also have considerable doubt whether it is wise to give as much power as seems to be contempiated in our present draft resolution to UNSYG. I think that all of these arrangements should be within effective control of USG and the govts most closely associated with US.

LODGE

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[2] See footnote 1, p. 1530.

[3] Dr. Frédéric Joliot-Curie, French scientist; High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, 1946–1950; and a Communist.

330.13/10-654: Telegram

## *The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 16, 1954—2:01 p.m.
PRIORITY

1418. Re disarmament (Gadel 32, rptd Paris 1299, London 2000, Oct 7; Gadels [*Delgas*] 63 and 64, rptd Paris 1295, London 1996, Oct 7). [2]

1. Request Embassy urgently see appropriate high-ranking official French Government conveying following:

a) Dept seriously concerned by extent Jules Moch's free-wheeling tactics on disarmament item at GA. While UK, US, Canadian delegations acting in concert, now appears Moch has been seeing Vyshinsky without informing other Dels. USDel had wondered why Vyshinsky appeared aware many matters discussed at meetings four Western delegations. Oct 14 Moch inadvertently disclosed he had been shown USSR amendments to Western-supported disarmament resolution prior to Canada, which had introduced this resolution. Moch has consistently sought accept Soviet amendments to Western resolution, mostly without revision, and threatened speak in their support despite US, UK, Canadian attitude, with consequent damaging effect on substantive positions previously held by four Western allies. While US, UK, Canadian, French dels. previously agreed USSR should be invited cosponsor Canadian resolution only on assurance no amendments would be accepted, Moch now declares not aware this understanding.

b) Above facts make Dept view apprehensively future disarmament discussions, since Moch's attitude indicates may be divergences between Western allies caused not by merits disarmament issues but by other factors.

c) USG deeply desires explore whether new Soviet proposal involves advance toward agreement or is only clever propaganda gambit. This requires careful, extended discussions. It also needs closest cooperation Western participants these discussions. Such cooperation seems strained now by Moch's attitude and may become worse if he continues on present course. Dept. would hope French Govt could advise French GA Del concert and cooperate with UK, Canadian, US Delegations on disarmament item.

2. FYI. We do not know whether Moch acting for self or on instructions and this might be good opportunity probe this important question.

HOOVER

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP. Repeated for information to New York as telegram Gadel 48 and to London as telegram 2181.

[2] None printed. (330.13/10-654)

330.13/10-1854: Telegram

## *The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 18, 1954—7 p.m.

1634. Repeated information USUN 10 London 453. Reference: Deptel 1418, October 16.[1]

Department's concern as indicated reference telegram conveyed frankly to Parodi[2] today. He replied immediately Moch was acting on his own as usual and was difficult to control. He said Mendes[3] had yesterday been irritated with Moch over an article in *London Observer* (which we have not been able to identify) and had sent him a sharp telegram last night. In response to our inquiry as to what might be done to control Moch, Parodi said he did not know but would consult Mendes. He also suggested that I take it up directly with latter which I will do at first opportunity.

DILLON

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[3] Pierre Mendès-France, Premier of France.

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330.13/10-1654

## *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1954.

Subject: Disarmament

1. Because of the French attitude toward the role of disarmament in its effect on rearming Western Germany, the following background may be useful to you in your forthcoming meetings on implementing the London Act.[2]

2. The Disarmament item at this General Assembly assumed more importance than previously anticipated, when the USSR introduced a draft resolution which proposed that the UN Disarmament Commission prepare a draft Disarmament treaty on the basis of the UK-French proposal of 11 June 54,[3] as modified in certain

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP.

[2] For documentation on the Nine-Power, the Four-Power, and the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings at Paris, Oct. 20-23, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1404 ff.

[3] For text of the Anglo-French memorandum submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee on June 11, 1954, UN doc. DC/SC.1/10, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 423-424, or Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2 1954, pp. 182-183.

respects by the USSR. The UK-French memorandum only dealt with the last of the various elements necessary in a disarmament proposal, i.e., the phasing or "dove-tailing" of the various reductions and limitations of the different types of armed forces and armaments. Consequently, the Soviet proposal was designed to give the appearance of a substantial measure of accommodation on their part, without in fact committing them to any fundamental changes of position.[4]

3. As the debate in the Political Committee has progressed, it now appears that the Soviets have not actually given up their previous call for a one-third across-the-board reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces by the great powers, their often-rejected conception of a control organ to oversee the disarmament program which would have only very limited powers and would be subject to Security Council veto, and their general views on atomic energy control. On the other hand, by accepting in part the Anglo-French memorandum, the Soviets have apparently now expressed willingness to delay the actual prohibition of nuclear weapons until the completion of one-half the agreed reduction of non-nuclear weapons and armed forces. While the USSR proposal on its face abandons previous Soviet insistence that initial prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is a prerequisite to a disarmament program, at the same time Vishinsky attacked the President's proposal on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy on just this basis, and it seems probable that the Soviets will at the appropriate moment raise this issue again.

4. By careful probing, our delegation has tried to minimize the Soviet effort to delude the Assembly into thinking there is very little difference now between USSR and Western views. However, it seems probable that the Disarmament Commission's subcommittee of Five, which we have proposed be reactivated, will have one or two preparatory meetings before the end of this Assembly. This rapid pace is being forced not only by the desire of many General Assembly members to see whether Soviet and Western views can be reconciled, but in large measure by the actions of the French representative, Jules Moch. We have been alarmed by Moch's free-wheeling technique, and the fact he apparently has been consulting Vishinsky without keeping his Western colleagues advised of the nature of these consultations. Consequently, we requested Embassy Paris on October 16 to convey to the French Government our apprehensions and our hope that the French delegation could be advised to concert and cooperate wholeheartedly with the UK, Canadian, and US delegations on the disarmament item. We also in-

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[4] Regarding the Soviet proposal of Sept. 30, see the editorial note, p. 1525.

formed the Embassy that we did not know whether Moch was acting for himself or on instructions from his Government, and thought this might provide a good opportunity to probe this important question.

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S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112

## *Summary of Discussion in the NSC Planning Board Meeting of October 18, 1954* [1]

TOP SECRET

### REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

General Cutler recalled the history of the NSC project for a review of NSC 112. [2] He thought the Planning Board might center its discussion on (1) U.S. policy (2) recent Soviet initiatives (3) what proposals the U.S. might advance as a result of Soviet moves.

Mr. Bowie felt the discussion should begin with a look at the basic issues. He said he admired the logical coherence of a study on the subject* prepared by General Loper (Defense), but was unable to agree with its conclusions. As he understood it, the Defense study concluded that, short of world government, it was not in the interest of the U.S. to seek disarmament, primarily because the effectiveness of a disarmament agreement depends on the good faith of the parties and the U.S. cannot rely on the good faith of the USSR.

Although he had not formulated any final conclusions, Mr. Bowie wished to try a somewhat different approach. At the outset, the following factors must be taken into account:

(1) As the Soviet production of nuclear material increases, a substantial range of error develops as to the amount of such material produced by the USSR in the past, even if a disarmament system permits access to current and future production.

(2) If thermonuclear weapons were eliminated, the free world would be at a serious disadvantage in the absence of complicated controls over other armaments.

(3) It is not clear whether an adequate system of inspection and control can be devised for conventional weapons.

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[1] Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator of the NSC Planning Board Assistants.

[2] For text of NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

* "A Review of the United States Policy on the Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," August 27, 1954. [Footnote in the source text. A copy of the subject paper, 148 pages, is in S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Armed Forces and Armaments", as an enclosure to a memorandum of Dec. 1 from NSC Executive Secretary Lay to the Planning Board, which bears the handwritten designation "Loper Report".]

However, there are certain counter-balancing factors:

(1) In determining whether any disarmament system is in the U.S. interest, we must ask: What is the alternative? The alternative is a growing capability by the U.S. and USSR for mutual annihilation. While this condition would tend to deter war it would also produce tensions which might eventually increase the risk of war. Disarmament proposals must be measured against this risk, rather than against an ideal standard.

(2) Since nuclear stocks in the U.S. and USSR are adequate for decades of peacetime use, production of such stocks could be discontinued without losing the advantages of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

(3) We must examine not merely the possibility of concealing fissionable material under a disarmament scheme, but also the possibility of using such concealed material in a war. Use in war is a function of deliverability as well as availability, so that disarmament would have to include control of means of delivery (e.g., long-range bombers).

(4) Even if it is assumed that outlawing of all nuclear weapons is not possible, progress toward a balanced reduction of all armaments (including nuclear) might be made. State has been working on this line of exploration, which appears promising, but is not yet ready to submit concrete suggestions.

Mr. Bowie concluded that on the basis of past history and developing capabilities, the prospects for humanity are grim. Each side will get more jumpy as it increasingly comes to feel it is living with a gun at its head. Faced with this prospect we must not accept the conclusion that disarmament does not serve U.S. interests.

General Loper said that in reviewing existing policy as stated in NSC 112, Defense had examined the technical effectiveness of the UN disarmament plan. He estimated that 5 years would be required to put any such plan into effect. By the end of that period the amount of nuclear weapon material produced and concealed by the USSR would be so great and pose such a risk as to make disarmament ineffective and unacceptable to the U.S. Even if this were not true (i.e. even if the risks of Soviet concealed nuclear material were acceptable) disarmament would still not be in U.S. interest because it is impossible adequately to balance the factors of war potential (morale, productive capacity, etc.). Even if weapons are controllable, political shifts in alliances are not. Moreover, no country can be expected to agree to have its whole way of life changed, as would be necessary under a complete inspection system.

However, General Loper thought a rejection of disarmament would be difficult to "sell" to U.S. allies and to public opinion. Accordingly we will have to continue to deal with disarmament; but in doing so we should seek to guide the discussions toward the type of disarmament which best conforms to our interests. In conclusion

General Loper noted that the Defense study had not examined the approach mentioned by Mr. Bowie (balanced reduction of all armaments, including nuclear).

Mr. Bowie felt that as long as nuclear weapons are such an important component of total armaments, a great premium is placed on forces in being. Historically, however, we have depended on forces formed after the outbreak of a war. If the importance of the nuclear component could be reduced, the importance of war potential would be restored, and this would favor the democracies, which find it difficult to maintain great forces in being but which have great productive capacity.

General Loper said that any plan which we agree to must be enforceable and such enforceability must be guaranteed in advance.

Mr. Snapp said he had great sympathy for the thesis that disarmament is not a satisfactory vehicle for resolving the cold war; and he was troubled by the idea of continuing disarmament negotiations if we are not really aiming at disarmament.

General Bonesteel feared the U.S. would be forced into a disarmament scheme contrary to its interests and would end up with resources inadequate to fight a war. He thought the technical difficulties should have been emphasized earlier in talks with allies. Now it was important to choose between catering to allies and taking a position in conformance with U.S. interests.

Mr. Amory said he feared a Soviet gambit on disarmament more than he feared peripheral aggression. He asked whether an agreement to abandon production of nuclear weapons would be in U.S. interests if it could be obtained in a year.

General Loper said this hypothesis was too far fetched. It would take a year merely to obtain Senate consent to an agreement.

Mr. Bowie said he would prefer a less secure plan which could be put into effect quickly to a perfect plan which involved delay. He asked whether it was not possible that the Soviets had changed their position and were now seeking a disarmament agreement.

General Bonesteel said to assume this we must further assume (1) the Soviets have given up hope of expansion or (2) they think they can maneuver to catch us off guard.

Mr. Bowie said alternatively we might assume (1) they are prepared to make concessions to reduce the risk to themselves or (2) they are willing to await "the inevitable decay of capitalism" predicted in communist doctrine.

General Cutler asked whether the USSR would use nuclear weapons. If not, it might be to Soviet advantage to eliminate nuclear weapons.

General Bonesteel said the crucial point was that the Soviets would never give up the potentialities which now exist in a combination of guided missiles and nuclear warheads. They would continue to be suspicious of free world disarmament proposals.

Mr. Amory believed a disarmament agreement might be accepted in a relatively short time. He also believed the free world would gain more than the USSR (e.g. in intelligence) from an inspection-disarmament plan which ultimately had to be abandoned.

Mr. Arneson then reviewed the UK-French-London memorandum on disarmament and the recent Soviet moves, which amount to a declaration of intention to propose a resolution in the UN along the lines of the UK-French-London memo. [3]

After a discussion of procedure, the Planning Board agreed to consider the subject again on November 29 on the basis of a report showing areas of agreement and disagreement to be prepared by the State-Defense-AEC working group, which would be convened by Mr. Bowie. [4]

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[3] Regarding the Anglo-French memorandum submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee on June 11, 1954, UN doc. DC/SC.1/10, see footnote 3, *supra*. Regarding the Soviet position, see the editorial note, p. 1525, and the memorandum by Key, *supra*.

[4] By memorandum of Oct. 19, NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitted two background studies to the Planning Board. These papers, "Summary of the Current United States and USSR Positions on Disarmament and of Significant Developments Since NSC 112" and "The Technical Feasibility of International Control of Atomic Energy", had been generally concurred in by a State-Defense-AEC working group. (S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112)

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600.0012/10-1554: Telegram

## *The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 20, 1954—7:32 p.m.

Gadel 56. For Ambassador Lodge. Re: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Delga 108, October 15.): [2]

1. Thank you for suggestions contained reftel. Points you raise have previously, for most part, been considered. For example, a suggestion similar to your idea of setting up UN Committee composed of all or some of states now negotiating on international agency and having GA ask them continue negotiations was rejected by Secretary because it would bring UN too closely into picture in establishing agency and thus would be contrary to position taken by NSC. Our apprehension re active GA role in creation international agency was previously voiced Gadel 47, October 15. [3]

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[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1532.

[3] Not printed. (600.0012/10-1254)

2. Re international scientific conference, our position is dictated by logic of situation. Secretary did not wish GA interfere in any way with our efforts establish international agency, nor did he believe there should be any action on our part other than reporting history of negotiations. He realized this would not be sufficient stem tide of GA desire "do something" about peaceful uses atomic energy. Since US had previously, on President's authority, declared we would call international scientific conference, most logical step appeared be conference called under UN auspices thus enabling take concrete action demonstrating desire advance peaceful uses of atom. This conference will deal with technical matters, not with negotiations for agency or other political matters, and was not intended in and of itself to fulfill President's proposals of December 8. Questions involving this conference, its scope and participants were discussed at length in Europe this past summer by Dr. Rabi, Chairman General Advisory Cmte to AEC, with leading British, Canadian, and French scientists, who also happen to be ranking Government officials concerned with atomic energy programs. On the basis these discussions, scientific conference would not be unwieldly or theoretical, and scientists would be responsible to governments since all but very few would be Government representatives. As for representatives from Iron Curtain countries, way in which we are proposing conference be organized should enable us substantially minimize wrecking activities you think this group may seek carry out. On other hand, truly international conference should include representatives from behind Iron Curtain, and fact we are proposing this should demonstrate our sincere desire that peaceful benefits of atomic energy be available to all, thus indicating positive and affirmative leadership inherent in President's universal approach to peaceful uses. This particularly true since scientific conference is only one element of our program, other parts being creation international agency and interim activities made possible by recent changes in US Atomic Energy Act. As for role of UNSYG in conference, we believe arrangements will be effectively controlled by us or governments most closely associated with us, since SYG can only act upon advice of advisory committee of nations suggested in draft resolution attached to position paper.

3. So far as offering tangible inducements to smaller undeveloped countries is concerned, it is believed course presently contemplated, including interim assistance activities, is adequate meet this issue since we will state in our presentation that views of other states will be solicited at earliest opportunity after greater crystallization ideas of states presently negotiating on agency. However, we recognize force your argument and suggest it might be possible in your

speech to say that US and we are sure other states now negotiating would welcome comments, expressions of views, etc.

HOOVER

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741.5611/10–2754

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1954.

Subject: Atomic Energy Matters

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
The Secretary
Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

While calling on other matters this afternoon Sir Roger Makins said that he wanted to inform the Secretary not for the purpose of his taking any action but for general information that he, together with Sir Edward Plowden, the new head of the atomic energy matters in the U.K. have started conversations under the new Atomic Energy Act which should make further collaboration possible with the Atomic Energy Commission on the civil aspects and with Defense on the military aspects. He said he hoped that these conversations would result in new bilateral agreements in each field. He said in the past and presently in the military talks legal obstacles had often cropped up to make progress difficult.

He said that talks had also been held with respect to the question of creating an atomic energy agency in line with the President's proposal and with respect to the convening next spring of the conference of atomic scientists. He said in these two fields he thought there was full agreement between ourselves and the U.K.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Draft Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1954.

The question has arisen as to whether the pooling concept of the document handed on March 19 to the Russians should be a *sine qua non* of Russian participation in any International Atomic Energy Agency.

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[1] Addressee(s) not indicated on the source text, but see footnote 3 below.

After the Lodge presentation next month in the UN it is possible that the Russians may take a position that an Agency without the pooling concept such as Lodge will outline is much more to their taste, that they would immediately like to join in the 8-power negotiations. The United Kingdom and Canada have indicated informally that in this event they would be opposed to a firm requirement that the negotiations go back to the March 19 pooling concept.

This position seems to conform to the position taken by the National Security Council on August 12. [2] The policy then taken was to set up an Agency which would not have a pooling function but the charter of which could be so drawn as to permit Soviet participation under proper safeguards.

Therefore, if the Soviets seek to participate in the formation of an Agency which does not have a pooling function, it is recommended that the United States should then probe the Soviet intentions in the matter of contributions of information and amounts of material which they would earmark (rather than transfer to) the Agency. This probing operation could probably be conducted in parallel with negotiations with the other seven powers to actually set up the Agency. Then after the Agency had been established, if the Soviets had indicated a real interest in participating seriously they might be taken into the Agency.

However, the Soviets, after the Lodge presentation, may take the position that the proposed Agency is entirely different from that originally suggested by President Eisenhower and seek to make propaganda capital out of this allegation. In this event it is recommended that the United States take the position that in the absence of Soviet participation we were proceeding with a slightly different type of Agency. But at any time that the Soviets indicated a serious intent to participate and expressed their wish to enter into a pooling arrangement, the United States was agreeable to such a move. [3]

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[2] See the memorandum of discussion at the 210th meeting of the National Security Council, Aug. 12, p. 1482.

[3] On Oct. 28, Gerard Smith drafted a memorandum for the file which reads as follows:

"Admiral Strauss called to say that he agreed with the October 27 memorandum with the exception that he thought it was naive to expect that the Soviets would honor any commitment merely to earmark material for an agency. I pointed out that we would require assurances even to the extent of physical inspection, but this was not good enough for him. He did say, however, that this was a matter for us to decide and not for him.

"I then put to him Phil Farley's suggestion that if the Soviets wanted to negotiate on the October 6 type of Agency, we should agree if it was understood that material earmarked for specific projects of the Agency would be ponied up by all countries having fissionable material and physically held by the Agency. Strauss said 'that's bully' and seemed to see no objection in the proposal. I should discuss this matter in

*Continued*

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 29, 1954.

Subject: Meeting with the Secretary

Participants: The Secretary
IO—Mr. Key
S/AE—Gerard C. Smith

This meeting with the Secretary had been arranged after Mr. Wainhouse expressed to me his concern about the way things were going in New York on the "peaceful uses" item. It had been my understanding that Mr. Key would make the argument. However, when we started with the Secretary, Mr. Key asked me to discuss the matter. I pointed out to the Secretary my concern about the free wheeling in New York—that there was evidence of planning for hoopla in the form of movies and some form of atomic energy kit. I expressed concern about our ability to control what Mr. Lodge would say in Committee I. I did not mention the story about the Peabody Associates. I suggested that Mr. Dulles call Lodge and express the hope that Lodge will stick to the script as given to him by the Department. Dulles showed little inclination to do this, saying merely "I wish you had told me that yesterday, as I saw Lodge in New York last night."

I pointed out the Canadian and U.K. concern about Lodge's remarks and that we had given them and Lewis Strauss a commitment that they would be seen by them in advance. Key reiterated an earlier statement that we would certainly see Mr. Lodge's remarks in advance. The Secretary asked why I did not go to New York. I told him I would be glad to. The Secretary agreed that I had little chance of keeping a rein on the combination of Lodge and C.D. Jackson. The Secretary asked if any atomic energy experts would be there. I said the AEC was having difficulty finding any available. I pointed out that apparently Lodge was now trying to get the Secretary to reverse himself on the question of U.S. sponsorship of a resolution on the Agency.

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the morning with Bowie, Patterson, the United Kingdom, and Canada." (Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies")

The Oct. 6 document under reference is "Preliminary Outline of an International Atomic Energy Agency", a paper used by the United States as a basis for discussion with friendly nations in Washington. A copy of this eight-page paper is in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 88, "IAEA-1954".

Key then brought up this matter and approved of the idea. I disagreed, saying that such a resolution would attract sponsorship by other nations who would then want to get into the negotiations for the Agency. The Secretary said the matter would require further consideration. He suggested a half hour on Monday morning. [1]

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[1] According to his appointment book, the Secretary did meet with Key and Smith on Monday morning, Nov. 1. (Princeton University Library, Dulles papers, "Daily Appointments") No other record of the meeting has been found.

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600.0012/10-2954: Telegram

## *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, October 29, 1954—11 a.m.

Delga 158. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. I consider it essential to proper presentation of US position on above matter that I announce in my opening statement that the US is prepared to set aside 100 kilograms of fissionable material, enough to activate 40-50 experimental reactors, which would be at the disposal of the international agency for distribution to other countries. This is essential follow-up of President's statement of Dec 8 that govts principally involved should "begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency."

LODGE

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 1, 1954.

Subject: Proposed Reply to the Soviet Atomic Energy Note of September 22 [1] and Further Negotiations with the Soviet Government on the President's International Atomic Energy Agency Proposal

*Discussion:*

The President's December 8 proposal and the March 19 outline [2] given to the USSR called for "pooling" of fissionable materials by nations possessing them. After the USSR had indicated a lack of interest in this proposal, we shelved the "pooling" concept. It is now contemplated that projects sponsored by the Agency will call upon "earmarked" fissionable material in national stockpiles.

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[1] The Soviet note is described in telegram 418 from Moscow, Sept. 22, p. 1518.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1372.

When this modification of the original plan is announced next week by Cabot Lodge, the USSR may state an interest in participating in the work of such an "earmarking" Agency as opposed to a "pooling" Agency. On the other hand, the Soviets may attempt to exploit, for propaganda purposes, our shelving of the pooling concept.

The proposed reply (Tab A)[3] to the latest Soviet atomic energy note dated September 22 has been prepared with both these contingencies in mind. It would "keep the ball in play" with the aim of permitting the U.S. to get on with the establishment of the Agency with the other nations principally involved. It attempts to probe Soviet intentions as to real participation in a cooperative effort to foster peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Informal consultation with the United Kingdom and Canada indicates their agreement that additional safeguards will be needed in the event of Soviet participation in the Agency as outlined in the October 6 document (the "earmarking" Agency).[4] It seems likely that actual contributions of fissionable material will be required rather than mere reliance on a promise to earmark. (This would not be a reversion to the original "pooling" plan, which contemplated syphoning off of relatively large amounts from the weapons stockpiles from the USSR and the U.S.) The U.S. then would also have to "pony up" the amounts which we now have or may in the future agree to "earmark" for the Agency. The organization and authority of the Agency will be such as to permit its holding fissionable material in the event that this becomes necessary because of Soviet participation.

*Recommendations:*

1. That the draft reply (Tab A) be delivered to the Soviet Union immediately before the Lodge UN presentation next week so as to permit a statement by Lodge that the United States is continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union as requested by it on September 22.

2. If the Soviets seek to participate in the formation of the Agency, it is recommended the United States attempt to probe their intentions in the matter of contributions of information and fissionable material to the Agency—while proceeding to form the Agency with the other nations principally involved.

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[3] Tab A does not accompany the source text, but for the reply transmitted by Secretary Dulles to Soviet Ambassador Zarubin on Nov. 3, see *infra*.

[4] See footnote 3, p. 1543.

3. If the Soviets seek to make propaganda capital out of the change in U.S. plans for the Agency, it is recommended that we point out that the sole reason for the change was the Soviet rejection of the President's proposal and that we stand ready to negotiate with them and the other nations principally involved on a true pooling arrangement as contemplated in the President's December 8 proposal.[5]

GERARD C. SMITH

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[5] A notation on the source text states that the proposed reply to the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of Sept. 22 received the concurrence of John Hall and Paul Foster of the AEC and of General Loper and Colonel Carson of the Department of Defense.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Status 1954-1955"

## *The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*[1]

SECRET

The Government of the United States has considered the *aide-mémoire* of September 22 delivered by the Soviet Government and wishes to make the following comments:

1. The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that the Soviet Government is now willing to continue the negotiations concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy which followed upon President Eisenhower's proposal of last December 8.

2. The Government of the United States has taken note of the "important principles" which the Soviet Government states must not be over-looked in considering this question of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Government of the United States is prepared to discuss these principles and their application to an agreement between nations to establish an agency to foster the peaceful uses of atomic energy as well as their application to the operations of such an agency.

3. In its *aide-mémoire* of September 22, the Soviet Government states that it wishes not only to continue the negotiations on the President's plan for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, but also to continue examination of its proposal of a preliminary ban on the

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[1] President Eisenhower opened his news conference on Nov. 3 by reading a statement indicating that "Today the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, is delivering to Mr. Zarubin, the Soviet Ambassador, our reply to the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of September 22." The President declined to stipulate the specifics of the U.S. reply, stating in response to a subsequent question that "obviously, I wouldn't give anything out until the Soviets have had it and studied it. So I think it will have to be confidential for a moment." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 1009–1010, 1013) The Soviet *Aide-mémoire* of Sept. 22 is summarized in telegram 418 from Moscow of the same date, p. 1518.

use of atomic weapons. However, since the delivery of this *aide-mémoire* of September 22, the Soviet Government has appeared to recede from its former position in the United Nations disarmament negotiations that such a ban must precede any useful planning for an international weapons control system. Under these circumstances the Government of the United States assumes that the Soviet Government has modified its earlier position that agreement on a ban on the use of atomic weapons is a necessary condition precedent to useful discussion and agreement in the matter of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

4. As the Government of the United States has stressed throughout these negotiations, the President's proposal of last December 8 was not a disarmament plan. It was a definite step in international cooperation to bring the benefits of atomic energy to the peoples of the world. It was also an expression of America's sincere desire for a new international climate in which the problems of disarmament might find a readier solution. It is hoped that participation by the Soviet Government in implementing the President's proposal will, by the same token, be a demonstration of its real interest in changing the present atmosphere of mutual distrust.

The Government of the United States believes that the cause of international harmony can be substantially advanced by cooperative efforts to foster the peaceful uses of atomic energy, such efforts to parallel the continuing negotiations looking to the establishment of a general and safeguarded disarmament program. The cause of humanity can only be prejudiced by deferring the international development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy until the immensely difficult problems of disarmament are solved.

5. The Government of the United States notes that the Soviet Government's *aide-mémoire* refers to the question of the possibility of diversion of fissionable material from power-producing atomic installations. The Government of the United States suggests that a good starting point at this stage of the United States-Soviet negotiations would be a mutual study of this problem and suggests that it be examined by experts from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. It would be agreeable to the Government of the United States for such discussions to take place at an early date either in the United States or in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or in some third country. If this is acceptable to the Soviet Government, the time and place of such a meeting could be arranged at short notice.

6. It is noted that the Soviet Government is ready to examine with the Government of the United States the opinion of the Government of the United States that there are forms of peaceful utilization of atomic energy in which there is no need for weapons-

grade material. Such applications of atomic energy will be considered by the international conference which the Government of the United States has proposed that the United Nations convene next year. It is suggested that participation by leading Soviet atomic scientists and engineers in the work of this conference will make clear the basis for the belief of the Government of the United States that applications of atomic energy which do not require weapons-grade material can be of great benefit to mankind.

7. The Soviet Government refers to proposals by it regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Government of the United States will be glad to learn the details of the proposals of the Soviet Government and the extent to which it is prepared to cooperate with other nations in fostering the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

8. The Government of the United States proposes that this note and further negotiations between the Government of the United States and the Soviet Government on this matter of implementing the President's proposal should proceed in private since confidential negotiations offer the best prospect of a fruitful exchange of views at this time.

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1954.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Policies"

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 3, 1954.

Subject: IAEA—Discussion at Luncheon Meeting

Participants: Secretary Dulles
Ambassador Lodge
Morehead Patterson
Mr. Key—IO
Mr. Wainhouse—IO
Mr. Strauss—AEC
Mr. Barco
Mr. Smith—S/AE

Mr. Dulles opened the discussion by saying that he had brought us together since there had been some evidence of need for coordinating the various groups working on different facets of the International Agency problem.

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[1] A separate record of this meeting prepared by Wainhouse of IO is in Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199.

Of the participants listed below, James W. Barco was Senior Adviser for Political Affairs, U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

The question was raised as to whether or not Mr. Lodge could state in his speech that the United States will hold available "x" kilograms of enriched material for projects sponsored by the Agency. [2] Mr. Strauss pointed out the difficulty was that Presidential approval was necessary—it had not yet been obtained—and in addition he would like to consult with the Joint Committee on this matter in advance of their hearing about it in a public speech. Mr. Strauss indicated that he thought the necessary clearance would be obtained, and it was agreed that Mr. Lodge might make the reference in a subsequent speech.

Mr. Smith pointed out that this still left the question of whether Mr. Lodge could say that the United States would hold this material for disposal by the Agency or for disposal by the United States Government. This depends upon whether we should seek United States participation in the work of the Agency by a treaty and rely on section 121 of the Act, or by an international arrangement and rely on section 124 and 123 of the Act. Mr. Smith pointed out the restrictions which would obtain if the latter course was pursued. There was discussion as to whether or not the necessity for a finding under section 123 that any specific cooperation by the United States must promote its defense, would prevent effective cooperation with neutral nations, for example. Mr. Strauss pointed out his belief that the Congress would be very anxious about the security aspects of any international plan and it would be well to make a very cautious start. If the limitations of section 123 prove too burdensome, the new legislative authority could then be sought. Mr. Smith suggested that proceeding under section 124 and 123 might be tantamount to a United States position that it would only cooperate in the International Agency with nations friendly to it. He pointed out that section 123 was a very restrictive channel and had been made so in the light of its possible use for transmitting military information to foreign countries and regional defense associations. He pointed out that NSC 5431 had directed the Department of State and the AEC to proceed along two lines: (1) bilateral cooperation, and (2) multilateral cooperation, and that apparently we were losing sight of the second direction. [3]

Mr. Strauss pointed out that even in the case of research reactors there was a physical danger since they had produced quantities of isotopes which, if improperly handled, could constitute an international hazard. Mr. Strauss pointed out that in his judgment true multilateral cooperation was contingent on substantial Russian participation in the Agency. Absent that, he felt that at least in the beginning we should keep close control.

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[2] See telegram Delga 158 from New York, Oct. 29, p. 1545.

[3] Reference is to NSC 5431/1, Aug. 13; for text, see p. 1488.

On the matter of the conference, Mr. Strauss pointed out how it had been proposed by him in a speech last April after he had obtained the approval of the President. If it was to be UN sponsored, the world would lose sight of its original Eisenhower sponsorship and we would lose a measure of credit to which the United States was entitled. It seemed generally agreed that this decision was beyond recall.

Mr. Smith pointed out that a resolution concerning the conference, if joined to a resolution concerning the Agency, would tend to confuse the fact that the Agency was to be separate from the United Nations as opposed to the conference which is to be a creature of the United Nations. [The Agency (although planned to be a specialized agency of the UN) was to be separate from the UN as opposed to the conference which was to be a creature of the UN.] [4] Ambassador Lodge agreed and suggested that there only be a reference to the negotiations looking to the Agency in the resolution on the conference and that the UN not sponsor a resolution concerning the Agency.

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[4] Brackets in the source text.

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## *Editorial Note*

On November 4, the General Assembly unanimously approved Resolution 808 (IX): Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and All Armaments; Report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. Under the provisions of the resolution, the Disarmament Commission was instructed to continue its deliberations, reconvene its subcommittee, and report to the Security Council and the General Assembly as soon as sufficient progress had been made. For text of Resolution 808 (IX), see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* volume I, pages 444–446.

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## *Editorial Note*

On November 5, United States Representative at the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge delivered a major address to Committee I (Political and Security) of the United Nations. Lodge first reviewed the efforts of his government to advance the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the 11 months since President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address. He then turned to the specific activities contemplated for an international atomic energy agency, stating:

> "We believe that the agency should encourage worldwide research in and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy; it should arrange for nuclear materials to meet the needs of research, development, and practical application to all manner of peaceful activities, including the eventual production of power. We believe the agency should foster the interchange of information on peaceful uses."

Lodge added that the agency "should be created by a treaty which in our opinion should define the standards and principles governing the organization in the discharge of its functions. All states which originally ratified the agreement should become members of the agency, and there should be a provision for accepting additional members. We believe that members should accept an obligation to supply materials and information for the work of the agency, financial support, facilities for open discussion and contacts among scientists engaged in peaceful research activities."

But such an agency, Lodge continued, could not encompass all international atomic activities. The United States, therefore, was prepared "to start discussion with other countries for the conclusion of bilateral agreements which will make it possible, under our laws, to furnish technical information, technical assistance, and necessary amounts of fissionable material for the construction and operation of research reactors to be located abroad." Moreover, the United States was prepared to establish a reactor training school early in 1955 to begin training "between 30 to 50 scientists and engineers from overseas" in the area of "practical reactor engineering."

Lodge concluded his presentation by calling for a United Nations-sponsored international conference to determine the fields in which peaceful atomic progress was technically feasible and to develop procedures through which various nations could make known their requirements. The conference would be organized by an advisory committee to the United Nations Secretary-General composed of representatives of states possessing knowledge of atomic energy development.

On November 6, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States sponsored a draft resolution to the First Committee (UN doc. A/C.1/L.105) which reflected the position enunciated by Ambassador Lodge. Lodge's address of November 5 to Committee I and the seven-nation draft resolution on the atomic energy plan are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 15, 1954, pages 742–750. For text of the revised draft approved by the General Assembly on December 4, see the editorial note, page 1578.

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Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, Administration series—Lodge

### *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President* [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, November 9, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are rapidly reaching a climax with respect to our item on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It will either be clean cut and world resounding, or it will be just a "pretty good", argumentative climax.

Using your December 8, 1953 speech as a springboard, the Secretary of State spoke at the General Assembly opening.

Last week, I added the following:

an offer of a large amount of informational and educational material;

an offer of facilities for the training of a large number of medical, scientific, agricultural, industrial, and electric power scientists, engineers, and technicians;

and a reaffirmation of our willingness to implement your original proposal, "under the aegis of the United Nations".

But the thing that will make all of this come alive is missing. That is a statement by the United States that it is setting aside a *specified quantity* of fissionable material to get this program off the ground. The figure suggested a few weeks ago was 100 kilograms—enough to activate 30 to 40 experimental reactors.

I was advised yesterday that Lewis Strauss will place this matter before you on Thursday, [2] and if he obtains your approval, will then get the blessing of his Joint Committee.

If Atoms-For-Peace, which you so dramatically, yet convincingly launched last December is to have the kind of U.S. identification, validity, and vitality that it deserves, it should have this "shot in the arm"—a definite quantity of fissionable material, say 100 kilograms.

I know of your keen personal interest in this project, which is why I take the liberty of writing to you about it now. It really is important to move fast. I have already discussed this whole matter with Secretary Dulles and am telling him about this letter.[3]

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[1] The source text bears the following handwritten notation by the President: "15 November—approved this a.m."

[2] According to the President's appointment book, his next meeting with Admiral Strauss was a minute off-the-record session on Monday morning, Nov. 15. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, "President—Daily Appointments")

Faithfully yours,

CABOT L.

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[3] Ambassador Lodge transmitted a copy of this communication to Secretary Dulles by letter of Nov. 9. (600.0012/8-954)

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600.0012/11-1054 Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 10, 1954—4 p.m.

Delga 209. Subject: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Menon spoke to me before the opening of Committee One debate today to record his government's unofficial disapproval at India's not being consulted regarding negotiations on establishment International Atomic Energy Agency. He said India possessed tremendous resources in this field, referring as example to recent sale of 200 tons thorium nitrate to US (a sale which he described as contrary to Indian neutrality policy). As further example he pointed to fact that leading individual in research on use of isotopes for cancer was Indian. Menon did not wish exaggerate his protest and was not instructed to present these views in writing. He did, however, wish to register them in this way.

Menon then took up question of current GA debate on peaceful uses.[1] He said he planned to file no formal amendments to resolution we have co-sponsored but urged our earnest consideration of certain suggestions to which he attached importance. Menon expressed strong view that conference of governments should be held to consider draft treaty creating agency for peaceful uses after treaty negotiated out by eight countries now engaged in this process. He referred to conference as one which would be held just prior to ratification of the treaty and he spoke of conference function as being to endorse draft treaty brought in by 8 negotiating powers.

Menon did not specifically state that treaty should be signed at close of conference by all conference participants who wished to sign. However, he expressly drew the analogy of the Japanese

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[1] Reference is to the ongoing discussion in Committee I, generated by the seven-nation "Draft Resolution on Atomic Energy Plan", and submitted to the General Assembly on Nov. 6 (see the second editorial note, p. 1551). Lodge reported on these discussions in detail in various Delga telegrams found in files 310.5 and 600.0012.

Peace Conference at San Francisco. Menon did not make it clear whether he favored either:

a) A treaty to be signed at the end of conference by large number of countries; or

b) A treaty endorsed by conference and then signed and ratified by small number of countries with treaty immediately open to accession by others.

Menon, upon my pressing him, agreed that conference he had in mind should not take longer than seven days.

I told Menon that, speaking personally and entirely without instructions, a conference such as his and with such a worthy purpose would be worth considering if it were not a negotiating conference and would involve no delay either in the actual creation of the agency or in the beginning of the agency's actual operations. I expressed appreciation for Menon's statement that he did not plan to introduce any amendments in the First Committee, and agreed with him that he should feel free to talk to the UK and US about the peaceful uses item at any time.

Hope you will study feasibility of short inter-governmental conference like San Francisco Conference on Japanese Peace Treaty without producing any material delay in creation and actual functioning of agency. Conference would meet desires of many countries for increased sense of participation in planning for and establishing new Atomic Energy Agency. At same time it must be clear that US and small number of other principal contributing countries now engaged in negotiations would, as practical matter, completely control contents of treaty creating agency.

LODGE

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Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

## *Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Office of the Under Secretary of State, Friday, November 12, 1954, 11:10 a.m.*

SECRET

Present:
  For Belgium—
    Foreign Minister Spaak [1]
    Governor Ryckmans
    Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
    Mr. Rothschild, Aide to the Prime Minister
    Mr. Julien Goens, Belgium Scientific Attaché

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[1] Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak was in the United States to represent Belgium at the Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

For the United Kingdom—
  Sir Robert Scott, British Minister
  Mr. E. E. Tomkins, First Secretary, British Embassy

For the United States—
  Under Secretary Hoover
  Chairman Strauss, AEC
  Mr. John A. Hall, AEC
  Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/AE

Admiral Strauss opened up by referring to the superb cooperation which the Belgians had given to the United States in connection with the raw materials for our weapons program. He then analyzed the paper entitled "Principles to be Incorporated in a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Belgian Government," a copy of which was left with Mr. Spaak.[2]

Sir Robert Scott then associated his Government with the tribute paid by Admiral Strauss to Belgian cooperation. He in turn submitted an informal paper to Mr. Spaak, stating that the United Kingdom agreed in principle with the basic points in the United States memorandum.

Mr. Spaak asked if it was contemplated that there would be two agreements, a Belgian-United States agreement and a Belgian-United Kingdom agreement. Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative, adding "even if the agreements were identical."

Governor Ryckmans asked if it was contemplated that the agreements would be given publicity. Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative, pointing out that an exception should be made for such parts of the agreements which might be sensitive from the point of view of United States or United Kingdom security, or Belgian internal considerations.

Governor Ryckmans then pointed out the difficulty of keeping production figures secret in view of taxation and budgetary tie-ins which perforce have to be public. Admiral Strauss stated that he recognized this difficulty, but thought our policy should be to make it as difficult as possible for the Russians to obtain an evaluation of Belgian Congo production.

Governor Ryckmans then asked how the United States proposed to treat the question of Belgium's future needs in the event that the uranium was not needed any longer for free world strategic defense.

Mr. Hall answered that it was proposed that the United States, for the term of the new contract (ten years), sell Belgium its requirements for uranium metal and enriched material. Mr. Strauss then explained, for Mr. Spaak's benefit, what constituted enriched material. It was pointed out that this offer to sell enriched materials was a sharp change from past United States policy and was a very valuable right which Belgium would have for ten years, regardless of whether or not Shinkolobwe production continued.

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[2] No copy has been found in Department of State files.

Mr. Speak pointed out the Belgian internal political situation requiring that the Belgian negotiators provide for the contingency that the day might come when Belgian uranium was not needed for strategic purposes and Belgium had stripped itself of its uranium by sales to the United States and the United Kingdom.

Governor Ryckmans pointed out that while recognizing the importance of the United States offer to sell enriched material, it only covered annual requirements of Belgium for actual power reactors and research reactors, and that what Belgium wanted was reemption rights for larger quantities to stockpile against the day that its mine would bottom-out. He argued that Belgium had two choices, (1) to retain a part of current production for Belgian stockpiling, or (2) to permit that part to be stockpiled, in the United States, in weapons form, subject to a right of reemption in Belgium.

Mr. Spaak asked if this matter could not be covered by a clause in the contract to the effect that Belgium's obligation to supply uranium under the contract would cease in the event of a disarmament treaty.

Governor Ryckmans pointed out that unlike normal armaments, uranium in weapons form also constituted a great investment for peacetime uses.

Admiral Strauss pointed out that it should be kept in mind that not only was Belgium getting current payment for its uranium sales, but also was getting the security which American weapons strength offered.

Sir Robert Scott pointed out the significance of the access to United States and United Kingdom technology which this contract would offer the Belgians, even if Shinkolobwe bottomed-out during the life of the contract.

Mr. Spaak indicated that he felt two provisions would be desirable: (1) a provision permitting the Belgians to buy back some percentage of production under the contract in the event that it was no longer needed for strategic purposes, and (2) a provision that a disarmament treaty would justify a renegotiation of the contract.

Governor Ryckmans pointed out the possibility that Belgium's right to buy enriched material for its needs should be greater in the event that no reemption right for stockpiling purposes was agreed upon.

Sir Robert Scott pointed out that the provision for annual review of Belgian requirements seemed to protect Belgium against the contingency which was giving it concern.

Governor Ryckmans pointed out that in a few years state central banks may be buying uranium as they now buy gold, and he pointed out how awkward it would be if Belgium, a prime producer of uranium, did not have at such time a right to buy back some of its uranium.

Mr. Hoover pointed out that Belgium should consider the value of the saving in investment accruing to Belgium by the United States offer to enrich Belgian uranium and supply the enriched material to meet Belgian needs.

Admiral Strauss again emphasized the value of a continuing call which Belgium would have under the proposed contract on United States enriched material. He mentioned that no other nation was in such a preferred position.

Mr. Spaak asked if the United States and the United Kingdom could now sell uranium.

Admiral Strauss answered in the affirmative, but pointed out that as a matter of practice, requests from abroad for uranium had been referred to Belgium, citing the recent sale to the Swiss. Mr. Spaak said that he had heard of a recent Norway case which was handled differently. Mr. Strauss stated flatly that the United States was not selling uranium to anybody, adding that the present statutory authority to export uranium was drawn to permit United States participation in the President's pool.

Mr. Smith suggested that possibly the Belgian concern might be met by a provision giving them the first refusal on any uranium which the United States might sell abroad in the future.

Mr. Spaak suggested that his Government study carefully the two memoranda and meet with the United States and the United Kingdom in the very near future.

Mr. Strauss suggested that members of the staff of the three countries involved see if something could be worked out to meet the Belgian point about stockpiling for its "future needs." [3]

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[3] The source text is accompanied by an additional memorandum of conversation, prepared by Gerard Smith and dated Nov. 12, which reads:

"After the meeting with Foreign Minister Spaak, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Strauss, Mr. Hall, and Mr. Smith remained in Mr. Hoover's office. Mr. Strauss suggested that Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith attempt to draft a provision for the proposed contract which would provide for a complete review of the contract in the event that a disarmament program was adopted.

"*Note*:

"Mr. Smith was later advised that, at a luncheon on November 12, Adm. Strauss again spoke to Mr. Spaak about this matter and suggested the following provision:

*Continued*

600.0012/11–1254: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 12, 1954—5:51 p.m.
PRIORITY

Gadel 93. Further to Secretary's telecon with Lodge re Menon's proposal conference of governments be held to consider draft treaty creating international agency after treaty negotiated out by present eight powers (Delga 209, November 10).[2]

While appreciating probability there would be some benefits in indicating publicly now our general approval this kind of conference, we doubt advisability so doing. It will require some period of time reach agreement with other seven negotiating states on details before establishing agency, and circumstances prevailing at that time would have major bearing on desirability such procedure as Menon suggests. Moreover, as Acting Secretary indicated previously in Gadel 47, October 15,[3] there are considerable dangers in giving opportunity to such large group of states in a conference to express disapproval treaty aspects not completely satisfactory to them. Contrariwise, these states may be more restrained when individually deciding whether ratify treaty and obtain benefits membership in international agency on terms which we and other seven negotiating powers should largely be able determine.

Consequently, we believe you should, after advising UK, Canadian and French delegations of intended course, inform Menon as follows:

1. Dept appreciates India's views and will continue keep them in mind;
2. However, US would not wish to commit itself now to future course of action, particularly when we are still in process of negotiations on details involving creation international agency;
3. Initial US reaction is negative to Menon's suggestion, since we believe would be preferable consult individually with states other than present negotiating group, in order ascertain their views and

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Should the circumstances of world utilization of atomic energy be substantially altered during the life of the Agreement, the three governments will undertake to reexamine the bases of this arrangement. Mr. Spaak is reported to have expressed the belief that such a provision would solve his parliamentary difficulties at home." (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199)

[1] Drafted by Meyers of UNP.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1554.

[3] Not printed. (600.0012/10–1254)

eventually secure their agreement and ratification of treaty establishing agency;

4. India will, of course, be one of the countries whose views on agency will be solicited as soon as ideas negotiating powers have further crystallized.

Above views discussed November 11 with Morehead Patterson,[4] who agrees with general line.

DULLES

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[4] U.S. Representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, for IAEA negotiations, since Nov. 4.

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## Editorial Note

United States Representative Lodge addressed Committee I of the United Nations General Assembly on November 15 on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. At the close of his lengthy remarks, Lodge stated that he had just received authorization from the President "to state to you that the Atomic Energy Commission has allocated 100 kilograms of fissionable material to serve as fuel in the experimental atomic reactors to which the Secretary of State and I have previously referred and which are to be situated in various places abroad." Lodge's address is printed in U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., *Atoms For Peace Manual, December, 1953–July, 1955* (Government Printing Office, 1955), pages 304–309.

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600.0012/11-1654: Telegram

## *The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT NEW YORK, November 16, 1954—noon.

Delga 238. Verbatim text. Re meeting with Vyshinsky on peaceful uses atomic energy.

1. At meeting yesterday afternoon co-sponsors draft res reached agreement on treatment Soviet amendments (see Delga 236)[1] and authorized me present group's views to Vyshinsky. I saw Vyshinsky at 8 p.m. accompanied by McSweeney and De Palma. We were joined in his office by Zarubin, Sobolev and interpreter.

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[1] Delga 236 from New York, Nov. 15, transmitting an account of the meeting that day of representatives of the cosponsors, is not printed. (310.5/11-1554)

2. Re Soviet amendments (see Delga 230)[2] I explained co-sponsors had unanimously decided first Soviet amendment unacceptable because such words as "by all means" and "only" were obviously intended to encompass questions which should be dealt with in disarmament framework and not confused with peaceful uses. I then reported that cosponsors had proposed as substitute for this amendment the following, to be inserted as second para in preamble: "*Desiring* to promote the use of atomic energy to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind and to ameliorate their living conditions".

3. Concerning second Soviet amendment I reported co-sponsors found it unacceptable because they understood "the corresponding states" to mean only US–USSR, leaving out 8–power negotiations. I said that if USSR really meant to refer to both sets of negotiations, this already covered by last preambular para our res which begins "*Noting* that negotiations are in progress, etc."

4. On third substantive Soviet amendment, making agency responsible to GA and SC, I said co-sponsors agreed with USSR that we should not employ language tending prejudge relationship agency to UN, but they felt that Soviet amendment prejudged relationship by specifying agency should be *responsible* to GA and SC. It was therefore unacceptable. I added that in effort meet Soviet point, co-sponsors were willing delete from para A–1 of our res words "similar to those of the specialized agencies".

5. Re last Soviet amendment, which would invite all other states desiring to participate, I reported co-sponsors found it unacceptable because raised question of invitations to several "ineligible" states and also question as to meaning of "states".

6. I also told Vyshinsky that co-sponsors had decided to add as last preambular paragraph of our res "recognizing the desirability that the agency, under the aegis of the UN, make the fullest possible contribution towards the principles and purposes of the UN".

7. In course of 50 minute discussion Vyshinsky asked why we could not agree to words "by all means" in his first amendment, explaining that all he was trying to say by this language was that we should promote *energetically* the peaceful uses of atomic energy and *not* that this should be done by all *methods*. He said he was not trying to put anything over on us and was not referring to a prior ban on atomic weapons.

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[2] Delga 230 from New York, Nov. 12, containing the text of Soviet suggested amendments to the seven-power draft resolution, is not printed. (600.0012/11-1254) The Soviet amendments were subsequently circulated as UN doc. A/C.1/L.106 and Rev. 1.

I pointed out that our substitute paragraph had same effect. Vyshinsky implied that his point might be met by inserting some word like "energetically" in our substitute paragraph.

8. Speaking of his second amendment, Vyshinsky said he was willing delete word "corresponding" and merely refer to fact that ". . . the states should continue their negotiations . . .". I said it was still ambiguous because not clear whether reference was to US-USSR negotiations or those of 8-powers. Vyshinsky said he was referring to both sets of negotiations.

I then suggested his point could be met by modifying last preambular paragraph our original resolution to read "noting that negotiations are in progress *and should continue* for the establishment, etc." Vyshinsky said he could accept this if we further modified paragraph to read "*and should continue with the aim of reaching an agreement for the establishment,* etc." I pointed out his extra words were unnecessary since to continue the negotiations for the establishment of the agency obviously implied that agreement had to be reached. He said he would think this over.

9. Most interesting point emerged from Vyshinsky's explanation his next amendment, making agency responsible to GA and SC. Both Vyshinsky and Sobolev insisted they not trying prejudge agency's relationship to UN, but merely seeking assure that agency would operate in framework SC in respect to matters which under charter are responsibility of SC. He said he was willing modify this amendment to read about as follows "*Recommends* that the agency should be established as an agency responsible to the GA and, *when cases arise concerning the security of any state,* to the SC." He said this language was taken from the Soviet note of September 22, 1954.

When I pointed out that this still specified that agency would be *responsible* to SC and GA and was therefore unacceptable, he admitted this was his intent and stressed that USSR concerned over danger arising from possible "leakages" or illegal diversion of fissionable materials produced in connection with peaceful applications.

I replied that his remarks had given me a much clearer understanding of his intentions. I pointed out, however, that I had said in my statement that there would undoubtedly be some relationship with the SC since SC would have to consider any abuses of peaceful applications atomic energy affecting security any state. I said I thought we had met his point by deletion reference specialized agencies our first operative paragraph, but he said this only met him about "one-fourth of the way."

10. We then got into a discussion of the veto with Vyshinsky asserting US clearly intended use it to protect its vital interests,

which is only reason USSR had used it. I asked him what vital Soviet interest had been protected by veto in Guatemala case. He merely laughed.

11. In explanation his last amendment Vyshinsky did not seem particularly concerned with Communist China, but with number of states ruled out by our formula. Vyshinsky asked how we justified exclusion certain states when in preamble our resolution we said ". . . that all nations should cooperate in promoting the dissemination of knowledge, etc."

I repeated we regarded such "states" as Communist China, East Germany and Outer Mongolia as ineligible. Then I asked if by his amendment he meant to invite certain individuals in their personal capacity. He replied that possibility might be considered, but did not clarify point.

12. Soviet group was affable and relaxed throughout and kept up running commentary in Russian, trying find alternative or more acceptable language. From their preliminary reactions I was impressed by apparent strong Soviet desire climb aboard this bandwagon.

At end of meeting Vyshinsky said he was acting under instructions his government to speak honestly and frankly to US representatives even if not always possible reach agreement. I said I always had believed in speaking frankly. Friendly atmosphere prevailed to end when Vyshinsky personally ran elevator down to lobby and saw me to door.

LODGE

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600.0012/11-1754

### *Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1954.

Subject: Revision of NSC 112, Basic Disarmament Policy

Participants:

*Department of State:*
Messrs. Bowie, Arneson and Stelle, S/P
Messrs. Smith and Farley, S/AE
Howard Meyers, UNP

*Department of Defense:*
Major General Loper
Major Wriedt

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[1] Drafting information on the source text indicates that this memorandum was prepared on Nov. 22.

*AEC:*

Messrs. Hall and Trevithick
Drs. English, Thornton and Fine

Mr. Bowie outlined the points of agreement and of disagreement, as he saw them, between Defense and State views on basic disarmament policy. State and Defense agree:

1. A continuation of present trends in the scale of Soviet and U.S. military power, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons and means of delivering them, may well tip the military balance in favor of the Soviets in the near future. This also increases the dangers of peripheral aggression.
2. The U.S. must take a public position favoring disarmament.
3. It is not possible technically to account fully for past production of nuclear material.
4. It would be feasible to close down fissionable material production facilities for a considerable period of time, provided this is done within the next few years, and thereby substantially minimize the danger that the Soviet Union could destroy the United States, while maintaining effective U.S. nuclear superiority over the USSR.
5. There must be effective and far-reaching inspection in a disarmament program.
6. The control agency must be in position and ready to exercise its functions prior to the commencement of agreed reductions and limitations.
7. There should be stages in carrying out an agreed disarmament program.
8. A disarmament program should include both the nuclear and the conventional aspects.
9. The U.S. should be free to act in its own interest if there are violations of an agreed disarmament program.

State and Defense disagree on the following:

1. State believes the UN plan for international control of atomic energy is no longer feasible; that nuclear weapons can no longer be completely eliminated from national armaments; that the U.S. should support a plan for control of atomic energy which will provide for reduction of nuclear weapons rather than their elimination, and for the retention of a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to guard against the probable error in accounting for past fissionable production by other countries; that this disarmament plan should not assume good faith but provide means to detect breaches in the agreement. Defense, while agreeing that the UN plan can no longer eliminate nuclear weapons, continues to support the UN plan but is only prepared to implement this plan when the Soviet Union can concretely demonstrate this good faith by other means.
2. State believes that it is necessary in the interests of U.S. security to seek a disarmament plan of the nature described above, rather than allow the present military threat to continue. Defense believes that no disarmament plan is of any value in the absence of prior demonstrated good faith by the Soviet Union.

3. State believes that past United States efforts to achieve disarmament have helped strengthen the support of our allies for general U.S. policy objectives. Defense considers that our past support for disarmament has been detrimental to building free world strength, as negotiations on disarmament have weakened the support of our allies for necessary rearmament programs.

General Loper, while agreeing that Mr. Bowie had in substance fairly stated the issues of agreement and disagreement, emphasized that the basic problem for Defense was that it believed any disarmament plan would be disadvantageous to the U.S. since the free world would reduce its armaments or fail to support its existing military strength adequately in the period between the signing of a disarmament agreement and the time when there would be real evidence that the Soviet Union intended to live up to the scheme. He explained that when Defense talked about "good-faith" it meant that a nation must be willing to accept a detailed disarmament agreement which would at the very outset, infringe on its sovereign rights, in the sense of permitting extensive international inspections and control. He divided this problem into three stages: the initial stage of disclosure and verification, the supervisory stage of reductions and limitations, and the control stage at which the agreed levels were maintained. He opposed drafting a disarmament program which would be couched only in broad language, since it was necessary to provide a detailed disarmament plan as a test of that good faith which Defense believes essential. Otherwise, the Soviet Union would agree on the general principles without any commitment to those infringements on sovereignty which Defense believed fundamental. It was his conclusion that it was not in the interest of the United States to reach agreement on disarmament, whereas it was advisable to continue negotiations in this field because of the strong public pressure for such a demonstration of continued support for disarmament.

Mr. Bowie remarked that it would be perfectly consistent with clever bad faith for the Soviet Union or any other state to accept a disarmament program which in one sense or another infringed on its so-called sovereign rights by permitting international inspections. The difficulty lay in defining either "good faith" or "sovereignty". In State's view, the test was the degree of risk which the United States could accept in a disarmament program, and whether this risk could be accepted as better than continuation of present military trends. It was quite possible that a more practical approach would be to go step-by-step rather than spelling out all details of a disarmament program, and thus benefit at the end of each stage from the experience gathered during the course of this stage, so far as working out details for the next stage. Perhaps it would be better if the NSC could examine this problem from the standpoint of the basic elements of a disarmament program, along the lines contained in State's draft paper of November 9, 1954,[2] rather than get into details.

General Loper disagreed, and emphasized the Defense view that the disarmament plan should be in greater detail.

The AEC representatives commented on the State paper of November 9, making two principal points:

1. Real problems were raised by State's proposal that nuclear fuel removed from national arsenals each year should be turned over to the International Agency and converted into a form unsuitable for weapons use but suitable for reactor use. A distinction must be made between U-235 and plutonium, and the State proposal was certainly practicable for U-235 but it was quite difficult to do this for plutonium.
2. The sections of the State plan which related to reducing the risk of nuclear war are generally too optimistic in tone, in large measure because of the difficulties of accounting adequately for past production of fissionable material. Nevertheless, the AEC representatives agreed that the UN plan was not feasible and that a plan generally along the lines proposed by State would be a feasible approach, provided that it was recognized at all times that a considerable risk was involved. They agreed that risks for the U.S. had increased measurably since 1946 and that a continuation of the present impasse on disarmament does not improve the relative situation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Summing up, Mr. Bowie proposed that the NSC should first decide whether or not it was in the basic interests of the U.S. to reach agreement on disarmament, to meet the basic issue posed by the Defense attitude, and then should direct the formulation of the kind of disarmament plan which would result from this decision.

General Loper suggested that it was better for the NSC to consider both aspects of the problem at one time; that State and Defense should each present their papers, together with an analysis of points of agreement and disagreement. Mr. Hall supported this approach. Mr. Bowie said he would consider this matter and communicate subsequently with General Loper.

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[2] Not found in Department of State files. A report by a State working group, "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments", 31 pages, Nov. 29, 1954, is in S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112.

600.0012/11-2954

## *The Soviet Foreign Ministry to the United States Embassy in the Soviet Union* [1]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, November 29, 1954.

The Soviet Government, having considered the memorandum of the United States Government of November 3 which is in answer to the *aide-mémoire* of the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of September 22 of this year, considers it necessary to state the following:

In the *aide-mémoire* of the Soviet Government of September 22 of this year it was pointed out that agreement of positions between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on a number of substantive questions regarding use of atomic energy has important significance for achievement of international agreement on the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time the Soviet Government drew the attention of the Government of the United States of America to certain important principles which must be taken into account in considering the question of international cooperation in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

In this connection it was pointed out that an important prerequisite of international agreement under reference is the recognition that such agreement must not place any country or group of countries in a privileged position whereby this country or group of countries could enforce its will on other states.

In its *aide-mémoire* the Soviet Government drew the attention of the Government of the United States of America also to the fact that an international organ which can be created on the basis of an appropriate agreement between states will only successfully discharge its functions if this organ is not used to the detriment of the security of some or other states. At the same time the Soviet Government stated that it shares the opinion of the Government of the United States of America, expressed in its memorandum of March 19 of this year, to the effect that appropriate international organ

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[1] The source text is a Department of State memorandum entitled "Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* of November 29, 1954". The translated text of the Soviet note of Nov. 29 was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 847 of Nov. 29 from Moscow. (600.0012/11-2954) In telegram 842 from Moscow of the same day, Chargé Walter Walmsley had reported: "Molotov handed me at 1300 today Moscow time three and one-half page note on peaceful uses of atomic energy in reply to our memorandum of November 3. In delivering note he said (1) that Soviet Government agrees with US suggestion that further negotiations on this subject be kept confidential and (2) in this connection Soviet Government is treating our memorandum as confidential and hopes that US Government treat Soviet note as confidential. Translation in preparation for later cable transmittal today." (600.0012/11-2954)

"should present reports to the UN Security Council and General Assembly".

In its memorandum of November 3 of this year, the Government of the United States stated that it is ready to discuss important principles under reference which were advanced by the Soviet Government in its *aide-mémoire* of September 22 and the application of these principles to the agreement regarding the creation of an international organ on peaceful use of atomic energy as well as their application to the activity of such organ.

It must, however, be noted that the proposal introduced by the United States jointly with six other states at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is in contradiction with the above-mentioned principles inasmuch as it contemplates the formation of an international organ not as an organ of the UN responsible to the General Assembly and in appropriate instances to the Security Council but as a specialized institution not obliged to report to the UN. In view of this, the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics assumes that the Government of the United States of America will take steps to eliminate the above-mentioned contradiction in the position of the United States.

In its memorandum the Government of the United States of America expressed the opinion asserting that the Soviet Government had changed its previous position on the question concerning the prohibition of use of atomic weapons since it did not bring up the question that agreement concerning prohibition of atomic weapons should precede agreement on the question of international cooperation in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

In connection with this the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that, as before, it proceeds from the premise that only conclusion of international agreement on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons is capable of ensuring wide international cooperation in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic energy and of elimination of threat of atomic war.

As an important step on the path toward the full elimination of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction from armaments of states together with the establishment of strict international control, the Soviet Government has proposed and proposes that states participating in the agreement assume a solemn and unconditional pledge not to use atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

In the course of the discussion in the United Nations of the question concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons and also in the course of negotiations which have taken place between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the atomic problem, it has become clear that the principal obstacle to the achievement of the above-mentioned agreement is the position of the United States of America which refuses to accept the above-mentioned proposal of the Soviet Government.

Taking this circumstance into account and striving to facilitate the achievement of this agreement on international cooperation in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy, the Soviet Government expressed agreement with the proposal that negotiations on above-mentioned international cooperation should not have as a precondition prior achievement of an agreement regarding unconditional renunciation by states of the use of atomic and other types of weapons of mass destruction. In this the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that both the question of prohibiting atomic weapons and the question of reducing armaments of the conventional type are being considered in the United Nations. The position of the Soviet Government on this question is expressed in its proposals introduced for the consideration of the General Assembly on September 30 of this year.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to remind the Government of the United States that in its *aide-mémoires* of April 27 and September 22 of this year it drew the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that the very utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is connected with the possibility of increasing the quantity of fissionable materials which serve as the basis for the production of atomic weapons which inevitably leads to increase in the scale of production of atomic weapons and to increase in stocks of them.

The Government of the United States of America, in its memorandum of November 3, proposed that the above-mentioned problem should be jointly studied by experts of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

The Soviet Government does not object to the joint study of this problem by experts of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. As regards the place and time of the conference of experts, it is the opinion of the Soviet Government that this question will not meet with difficulties once agreement on the program of work of the experts has been reached.

The Soviet Government expresses agreement with the proposal of the Government of the United States of America that further negotiations on the question of international cooperation in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy be confidential.

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "IAEA Status, 1954-1955"

## *Memorandum by the United States Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations (Patterson)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1954.

Subject: Proposed Course of Action for United States to Implement the President's Proposal.

The attached memorandum suggests that the Soviet Union will seek to prevent or delay the establishment of an effective international atomic energy agency. I recommend that the U.S. pursue the following main courses of action in order to achieve maximum progress despite Soviet delays:

1. The U.S. should prepare as rapidly as possible a Charter or draft statute of the international agency and seek to secure agreement thereon. Presumably the draft of the statute would not be forwarded to the Soviet Union without substantial preliminary agreement at least among the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Canada.
2. The U.S. should conduct negotiations in such a manner as to make it clear that the onus for any delay lies on the USSR.
3. The U.S. should simultaneously with the multilateral negotiations commence negotiations with a few countries, several of which should be countries other than those negotiating the international agency, with the objective of making available to these countries, under appropriate arrangements, technical training, technical libraries, and, in some instances, research reactors. Whenever it appears that the Soviet Union is seeking to delay or prevent the formation of the international agency, the U.S. should be in a position to announce from time to time the successful conclusion of a bilateral negotiation, pointing out that this arrangement was necessary because of the failure of the Soviet Union to agree upon the establishment of an international agency.
4. The U.S. should consult informally with all states expressing an interest in this program in order to fulfill the assurances given by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Lodge to the General Assembly that we will consult with all governments indicating an interest and take their views into consideration. We should seek to prevent these consultations from interfering with the expeditious creation of an international agency.
5. The U.S. should bear in mind that it will be advisable to submit a progress report to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September, 1955.

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[1] This memorandum was directed to Smith of S/AE, Key of IO, and Bowie of S/P. It was drafted by Bechhoefer, now an assistant to Patterson in S/IAE. For an account of IAEA negotiations, see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, "Negotiating the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency", *International Organizations*, vol. XIII, No. 1, Winter 1959.

I am anxious to have your comments on these suggested courses of action. S/AE would presumably make appropriate arrangements with the AEC on the respective roles of State Department and AEC in performing the specific tasks envisioned in this program.

I am stating my personnel requirements on the basis of the assumptions contained in this memorandum.

[Annex]

## MEMORANDUM

Subject: Peaceful Uses of the Atom

A. *Soviet Tactics during General Assembly discussions.*

1. Ambassador Lodge, after his first meeting with Mr. Vishinsky, stated his firm conviction that the Soviet Union would vote for practically any resolution which we put forward. He therefore saw no need for any bargaining—except possibly to satisfy the co-sponsors of our resolution—because we held all the trump cards. The entire negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the vote in the First Committee, proved the complete accuracy of Ambassador Lodge's diagnosis. [2]

2. The Soviet viewpoint as contained in the statements of Mr. Vishinsky, and Mr. Sobolev after Vishinsky's death, [3] give a strong indication as to probable Soviet tactics in connection with future negotiations after General Assembly action has been completed. The balance of this memorandum deals with these probable tactics and an explanation of possible motives for such tactics.

B. *Probable Soviet tactics in connection with negotiations for an International Agency.*

1. The Soviet representatives in their statements in the First Committee in connection with the item on peaceful uses of the atom, stressed three objections to present plans of the United States. It is suggested that all three objections foreshadow a general Soviet tactic of seeking to delay the establishment of the agency. Ambassador Lodge, in his opening statement, [4] described in one simple sentence the underlying objective of the United States: "The

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[2] On Nov. 23, Committee I unanimously approved the joint resolution (A/C.1/L.105 and Rev. 1), having rejected the Soviet amendments (A/C.1/L.106 and Rev. 1). For the report of the First Committee, see *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pp. 310–315. On Dec. 4, the General Assembly also approved the joint resolution; see the editorial note, p. 1578.

[3] Vyshinsky died on Nov. 22 and was succeeded as head of the Soviet Delegation by A.A. Sobolev.

[4] See the second editorial note, p. 1551.

thought that has governed all our suggestions is that what we propose to do is *feasible*—is *do-able.*" The Soviet Union apparently wants to make certain that this objective will not be realized.

2. The first fundamental Soviet objection to the suggestions of the United States was that incorporated in the first Soviet amendment to the Joint Resolution—an amendment that received affirmative votes only from the Soviet bloc. It provided that the international agency, when created, should be responsible to the General Assembly and "in cases provided for by the Charter of the United Nations" to the Security Council. While this amendment would not necessarily have required the negotiating states to secure the consent of either the General Assembly or of the Security Council to the Charter of the agency prior to its taking effect, nevertheless Mr. Vishinsky made it plain that he interpreted this paragraph to have such an effect. He cited the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946, creating the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, as a UN decision that should govern the relationship of the new Agency to the United Nations. In practice, this would mean that the negotiating parties would make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the report would be considered by those agencies. The Soviet Union could veto the approval of the report by the Security Council. Even if the approval of the Security Council were unnecessary—and the specific wording of the Soviet amendment might be so construed—General Assembly approval of an agency which, in effect, was controlled by the Great Powers might not be possible, and in any event would result in great delays. It is even possible that the Soviet representatives foresaw a situation where to avoid delay we would accede to Soviet wishes and thus secure immediate approval by the Security Council. We need not consider whether the Soviet thinking actually went into as great detail as indicated here. (From observation of Soviet staff operations on this subject, we believe that Soviet planning was more precise and more subtle than indicated above.) In any event, however, it is clear that the chief effect of this tactic would be delay.

3. The second Soviet tactic was to object to the small number of states participating in the negotiations by describing them as a small and exclusive club and advocating participation by all states in the negotiations. The Soviet Union never incorporated this objection into a specific amendment, for the probable reason that the first choice of the Soviet Union would not be to expand the number of negotiators but to reduce them from nine to two—the Soviet Union and the United States. Failing in that objective, the Soviet Union doubtless found propaganda advantages in urging the expansion of the number of negotiators. While the primary motive of the

Soviet Union in taking this tactic was doubtless purely one of propaganda, nevertheless the effect of the Soviet suggestions once more would be to delay the negotiations.

4. The third Soviet tactic, which probably received the greatest stress, was to seek to create an impression that the United States was narrowing down and limiting the scope of the President's proposals. In Mr. Vishinsky's initial statement he asked the question: "Can you tell us why it is that the present United States proposal for the organization of international cooperation in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy *narrows down* the volume, scope, and form, of such cooperation as compared to previous proposals, and especially in relation to the technical and economic assistance to be offered underdeveloped countries?" A careful reading of Mr. Vishinsky's second intervention shows clearly that the Soviet Union recognizes as well as the United States, that we are a long distance from abundant electric power utilizing atomic fuel. Why then would the Soviets seek to focus the entire debate on the phase of peaceful uses of atomic energy that was most remote in point of time? One, although not the only reason, for this Soviet position again seems to be delay—the desire to avoid at all costs a situation where the agency will actually have achievements to its credit in 1955. This could be assured if the agency concentrated on projects which at present are not scientifically or economically feasible.

C. *Soviet motivation.*

1. As set forth above, the primary Soviet tactics seem fairly clear:—support the General Assembly action, thus giving an appearance of Soviet participation in international cooperation;—see to it that the international cooperative effort has no tangible results in the immediate future. The motivation for the tactic of jumping on the bandwagon is clear enough. It is part of the "new" Soviet line of co-existence. The other part of the Soviet plan requires considerably more analysis.

2. The most obvious motivation for Soviet efforts to delay and sabotage the implementation of the President's proposals relate to world propaganda. Any success in international cooperation in this field would inevitably be linked to the initiative of the United States and would redound to the credit of the United States. In and of itself this would be sufficient to explain the dual Soviet technique of jumping on the bandwagon and then preventing the bandwagon from going forward.

3. A second motivation closely allied to the first may stem from the Soviet reaction to the decision, several times reiterated by the President, to "proceed with like-minded states in establishing an international agency" regardless of the Soviet attitude. The Soviet

tactics, if successful, might entangle the negotiations to such an extent that the United States would not be in a position to proceed expeditiously with like-minded states.

4. A third and more subtle motivation, however, may exist in the relationship between peaceful uses of the atom and the question of disarmament. Mr. Vishinsky and Mr. Sobolev both go to great lengths in claiming that there was no feasible method to prevent power reactors from producing "weapon-grade" materials. This was a part of the larger point which they constantly stressed, that it was not possible to divorce peaceful development of the atom from the general subject of disarmament.

A careful study of the Soviet statements in the disarmament item in the UN indicates the distinct possibility that the Soviet Union may be moving toward a proposal for the complete cessation of the production of any fissionable materials for any purpose. If this is the Soviet disarmament line, its corollary would be that as few countries as possible should possess fissionable materials.

While this possible motivation cannot be excluded, its relation to the immediate Soviet tactics seems a trifle remote. It is suggested that the primary Soviet purpose is to create the appearance of a desire to cooperate but in fact prevent any tangible accomplishments which would redound to the credit of the United States.

D. *Suggested U.S. counter tactics.*

1. From the above analysis of the Soviet tactics and motivations it seems essential that the United States move forward as rapidly as possible to secure tangible achievements during 1955 in the direction of carrying out the President's proposals.

2. The first move, of course, would be to secure agreement on a Charter or statute of the international organization. It will be necessary to include the Soviet Union among the states negotiating this Charter. This makes practically certain endless exchanges of notes with little or no progress.

3. We must, therefore, look toward other means of progress. The progress which we anticipate in 1955 was set forth in considerable detail in the statements of Ambassador Lodge. It included (a) providing technical training for nationals of other countries; (b) distribution of technical libraries and information; and (c) making research reactors and certain classified material available to other countries.

If the international agency were in existence it would have some role in connection with all these programs. Since it probably will not be in existence, the United States must carry out these programs under agreements with beneficiary states. From the standpoint of public relations it is essential that the announcement of these achievements must be correlated with the announcements of Soviet intransigence in negotiations to establish the agency. World public opinion must realize that the international agency would have played a considerable role in connection with each of these tangible achievements if the Soviet Union had not obstructed the establishment of the international agency.

We must be in a position to report to the Tenth General Assembly (a) tangible achievements either by the international agency, the United States, or both, along the lines set forth above; (b) the establishment of an efficiently functioning agency which is assuming responsibility for parts of the functions set forth above or, in the alternative, impressive efforts on our part to establish the agency—efforts which were frustrated by the Soviet Union.

4. The achievement of a program of this nature in 1955 will require a tremendous effort on the part of the United States. This will include (a) multilateral negotiations, including the Soviet Union, to establish an international agency; (b) bilateral negotiations with a number of countries in order that research reactors may be placed in these countries. This type of bilateral negotiation must be sharply differentiated from negotiations with countries which are large suppliers of uranium and other materials associated with atomic fission; (c) "consultations" with any state that has ideas in connection with the formation of the agency.

The Secretary of State, in his opening address to the General Assembly on September 23, 1954, said: "I would like to make perfectly clear that our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As our proposals take shape, all nations interested in participation and willing to take on the responsibilities will be welcome to join with us in the planning and execution of this program." Ambassador Lodge, on November 15,[5] under departmental instructions, reaffirmed this position and stated: "The governments engaged in the current negotiations intend to consult those governments which indicate an interest in participating in the agency before the agreement establishing the agency is submitted for ratification. Views expressed by the governments so consulted will, of course, be seriously taken into account." While the volume of "consultations" in Washington can be reduced through appropriate instructions to our Missions abroad, nevertheless whenever technical problems are raised it will be necessary for our missions to communicate with the Department of State and for the Department of State to be in touch with the Atomic Energy Commission. We may thus envisage a large number of "consultations". The United States' objective in these consultations will be to assure interested states that their ideas—regardless of their merit--are receiving our attention.

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[5] See the editorial note, p. 1560.

(d) The arrangements for the International Conference must be worked out in such a manner as to conform to this program.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

*Memorandum by the Staff Secretary to the President (Goodpaster)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

## NOTES ON MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

0900 1 DECEMBER 1954

Others present:
  Secretary Wilson
  Admiral Strauss
  Admiral Radford
  General Loper
  Colonel Goodpaster

Admiral Strauss, Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford discussed with the President the proposals relating to deployment and custody of atomic weapons contained in the attached letters from Admiral Strauss and Secretary Wilson respectively. [1]

The President indicated that he viewed the problem in distinct parts: actions within the United States, where security should be possible to maintain; action in those foreign areas in which we already have necessary permission; and action in additional foreign areas where new permission must be sought. The latter would be the most difficult. Admiral Strauss indicated that deployment to a considerable number of sites in the United States is envisaged. He thought the Joint Committee should be advised.

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[1] The letter from Admiral Strauss is not printed. Secretary of Defense Wilson's letter of Dec. 1 reads in part as follows:

"Dear Mr. President: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended and I have approved, as essential to an improved position of military readiness, the deployment of additional numbers of atomic weapons to our overseas bases and the dispersal of atomic weapons to certain operational bases in the United States. The purpose of increased overseas deployment is to make possible the integration of atomic weapons into the operations of our deployed forces without imposing the logistic effort, delays and transportation hazards involved in shipments from central storage in the United States. The purpose of on-base storage in the United States is to permit our combat forces to react instantly to attack or warning of attack without the serious delays incident to the trans-shipment of weapons and other complex arrangements necessitated by reliance upon central storage. In addition to enhancing our position of readiness, further overseas deployment and dispersal within the United States will greatly decrease the over-all vulnerability of the stockpile to enemy attack." (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

The President thought the plan of dispersal was acceptable. He thought the Joint Committee could be informed without undue risk of loss of secrecy.

The President indicated that dispersal arrangements should not be limited to fission weapons. He examined a copy of the letter to him from Secretary Wilson which indicated the numbers of weapons involved, and stated that he found the proposal satisfactory.

The President indicated that before transferring custody of weapons, AEC and Department of Defense must agree that the Defense Department is technically ready to handle them. He also stated that before additional weapons are deployed in foreign areas, the approval of the Secretary of State must be obtained (as envisaged in Mr. Wilson's letter to him).

He instructed Admiral Strauss to prepare for his signature letters giving effect to his decisions. Toward the end of the morning, Admiral Strauss provided these letters which the President signed at about 12:30. The signed originals were handed to a representative of Admiral Strauss by the undersigned.

Copies are attached.[2]

A. J. GOODPASTER
*Colonel, CE, US Army*

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[2] The copies of the letters from President Eisenhower to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Strauss, dated Dec. 1, are not printed.

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Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, "Exchange of Notes With USSR"

## *Memorandum for the File, by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1954.

Subject: Soviet note[1]—Meeting with Secretary, Murphy, Bowie, Merchant and Bohlen.

The Secretary read the excerpt from the November 3[2] note about the diversion problem and asked me how we proposed to reply to the Soviet offer. I told him that I had put it up to the AEC to prepare an agenda and that after a decent interval I thought we should forward it to the Soviets.

I pointed out that the Soviet note of November 29 showed no real interest in the President's proposal but was merely a method of "keeping the ball in play." I said that this seemed to be in our interest in that we could go ahead and form the Agency without Russian sponsorship and then go into the question of whether the Russians would participate in the Agency as formed.

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[1] Dated Nov. 29, p. 1567.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1547.

There was some discussion of the diversion question and Mr. Dulles recalled how he had been completely puzzled by Molotov's reference to it during the Geneva conversations. [3] The Secretary asked Bohlen to consider the matter further and get in touch with me.

I asked if a copy could be sent to Mr. Lodge with a covering letter from the Secretary stating that it was eyes only. The Secretary directed me to prepare such a letter.

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[3] See the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, May 1, p. 1413.

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## *Editorial Note*

At its 503d plenary meeting, December 4, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously approved Resolution 810 (IX) on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The resolution had also been adopted unanimously by Committee I on November 23. For statements in support of the resolution by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States Representative, November 18, 19, and 23, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, pages 918 and 920–925. For the report of the First Committee endorsing the resolution, November 26, see U.S. Senate, *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pages 310–315. For the pertinent portion of the record of the 503d Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, pages 316–335. For additional information on the evolution and passage of Resolution 810 (IX), see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1954 (New York, United Nations Publications, 1955), pages 1–10, and *U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954* (Government Printing Office, 1955), pages 16–24.

Resolution 810 (IX) reads as follows:

"*The General Assembly,*

*Believing* that the benefits arising from the momentous discovery of atomic energy should be placed at the service of mankind,

*Desiring* to promote energetically the use of atomic energy to the end that it will serve only the peaceful pursuits of mankind and ameliorate their living conditions,

*Recognizing* the importance and urgency of international cooperation in developing and expanding the peaceful uses of atomic energy to assist in lifting the burdens of hunger, poverty and disease,

*Believing* also that all nations should co-operate in promoting the dissemination of knowledge in the realm of nuclear technology for peaceful ends,

## A

### *Concerning an International Atomic Energy Agency*

*Recalling* the initiative of the President of the United States, embodied in his address of 8 December 1953,

*Noting* that negotiations are in progress, and the intention that they should continue, for the establishment as quickly as possible of an International Atomic Energy Agency to facilitate the use by the entire world of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and to encourage international co-operation in the further development and practical application of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind,

1. *Expresses* the hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be established without delay;
2. *Suggests* that, once the Agency is established, it negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations;
3. *Transmits* to the States participating in the creation of the Agency, for their careful consideration, the record of the discussion of this item at the present session of the General Assembly;
4. *Suggests* that Members of the United Nations be informed as progress is achieved in the establishment of the Agency and that the views of Members which have manifested their interest be fully considered;

## B

### *Concerning the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*

1. *Declares* the interest and concern of the General Assembly in helping in every feasible way to promote the peaceful application of atomic energy;
2. *Decides* that an international technical conference of Governments should be held, under the auspices of the United Nations, to explore means of developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy through international co-operation and, in particular, to study the development of atomic power and to consider other technical areas—such as biology, medicine, radiation protection; and fundamental science—in which international co-operation might most effectively be accomplished;
3. *Invites* all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to participate in the conference and to include among their representatives individual experts competent in the atomic energy field;
4. *Suggests* that the international conference should be held no later than August 1955 at a place to be determined by the Secretary-General and by the Advisory Committee provided for in paragraph 5 below;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, acting upon the advice of a small committee composed of representatives of Brazil, Canada, France, India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, to issue invitations to this conference, to pre-

pare and circulate to all invitees a detailed agenda, and to provide the necessary staff and services;

6. *Suggests* to the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee that, in making plans for the international conference, they consult with competent specialized agencies, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization;

7. *Invites* the interested specialized agencies to designate persons to represent them at the conference;

8. *Requests* that the Secretary-General circulate for information a report on the conference to all Members of the United Nations, and to other Governments and specialized agencies participating in the conference." (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, page 919)

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S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112

## *Memorandum by the Chairman of the NSC Planning Board (Cutler) to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 10, 1954.

Subject: U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

1. This memorandum is addressed to you as members of a Special Committee constituted under NSC Action No. 899 (September 9, 1953) to review the policy contained in NSC 112 (July 6, 1951). [2]

2. The Planning Board has received from the members of the Special Committee's Working Group:

a. A statement by the Defense Member, with four annexes (August 27, 1954). [3]

b. A synopsis of the Defense Member's position (November 24, 1954). [4]

c. A statement by the State Member (November 29, 1954). [5]

d. A statement by the AEC Member (December 2, 1954). [6] Each member of the Working Group made clear that these statements constituted only working drafts which had not received agency clearance.

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[1] By memorandum of Dec. 10, NSC Acting Executive Secretary Gleason transmitted copies of this memorandum to the members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] See the memorandum of discussion at the 161st meeting of the NSC, Sept. 9, 1953, p. 1210.

[3] Not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Armed Forces and Armaments")

[4] Not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112)

[5] Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112)

[6] Not found in Department of State files.

3. The Planning Board has discussed these papers. The Board has not attempted to prepare a summary description or an evaluation of the plans proposed by the State and Defense Members. Instead, the Board has sought to identify the principal issues underlying the two plans and to express succinctly (in the attachment) the positions asserted by the State Member and the Defense Member on these principal issues. The Board feels that this brief indication of opposing views should assist the Special Committee in trying to resolve the principal issues before consideration by the National Security Council on January 6, 1955.

ROBERT CUTLER

[Annex]

## *Memorandum by the NSC Planning Board*

### U.S. POLICY ON CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS: AGREEMENTS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POSITIONS ASSERTED BY STATE AND DEFENSE WORKING GROUP MEMBERS ON PRINCIPAL ISSUES

#### AGREEMENTS

1. *State and Defense* agree that:

a. No disarmament plan should be based on good faith on the part of the USSR.

b. Continued support of the UN Plan involves unacceptable risk to the U.S. and will be construed as hypocritical by our major allies.

#### DIFFERENCES

2. a. *State:* The possibility should be tested that the USSR might consider the elimination or reduction of the threat of nuclear warfare to be in its interests.

b. *Defense:* There is no possibility of USSR agreement to a disarmament plan acceptable to U.S. security, failing the abandonment of Soviet ambitions. An effort to test this possibility through step by step negotiation and partial implementation will place the U.S. under pressure to accept a disarmament plan inimical to U.S. security.

3. a. *State:* The State phased plan would entail less risk to U.S. security than the continuation of current armaments trends.

b. *Defense:* The risk to U.S. survival is *less* under the U.S. continuing to depend on its safeguarded retaliatory capacity to deter Soviet nuclear attack than under *any* disarmament plan, unless there is abandonment of Soviet ambitions or in the absence of world government.

4. a. *State:* Proceed by safeguarded phases, each beneficial to U.S. security, to a system which might become progressively more reliable and extensive (learning by experience and with the ability to discontinue if necessary, without having impaired U.S. security).

b. *Defense:* As an essential pre-condition, have a comprehensive and enforcible system before any disarmament action is taken.

5. a. *State:* The State plan will reduce the likelihood of total nuclear war as compared to reliance on current armament trends.

b. *Defense:* There is *less* likelihood of total nuclear war in reliance on current armament trends than in reliance on any feasible disarmament plan, unless there is abandonment of Soviet ambitions or in the absence of world government.

6. a. *State:* It is feasible to phase proportionate reduction of atomic stockpiles so that the U.S. will always have more atomic material than the USSR, even allowing for some Soviet secretion and diversion.

b. *Defense:* It is unrealistic to presume that the Soviets will agree to any plan which continues the U.S. in a position of atomic superiority.

7. a. *State:* Stoppage in production of atomic material and a partial reduction in atomic stockpiles under State's phased plan would be better, or no worse, than a continuation of current armament trends.

b. *Defense:* Stoppage in production of atomic material and initiation of partial reduction in atomic stockpiles will put the U.S. at a greater disadvantage in conventional power relations than a continuation of current armament trends and, among other things, will lead to pressure from allies and uncommitted countries for further reductions unacceptable to U.S. security.

8. a. *State:* Agreement and execution of control and reduction of conventional weapons will be aggressively sought, but will not be a precondition to agreement and execution of control and reduction of nuclear weapons in the initial phases.

b. *Defense:* Agreement on control and reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons must be the first step; subsequently, the execution of control and reduction of both types of weapons would proceed in concurrent stages to be defined in the plan.

9. a. *Defense:* The State plan is technically inadequate to accomplish the purposes for which designed.

b. *State:* According to the Defense report, any plan, including the State and Defense plans, is technically infeasible.

600.0012/12-1154

## *The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 11, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As a result of National Security Council Action Number 899 on September 9, 1953, representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and of the Atomic Energy Commission have been working on a review of NSC 112, the United States Policy on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. [1] A draft study which represented tentative Department of Defense views on this subject was transmitted to representatives of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission on July 7, 1954, and a slightly revised edition was transmitted on August 27, 1954. [2] The Department of Defense working group has given careful consideration to the State Department's staff studies of November 9, 1954, and November 29, 1954. Comments on the State Department studies have been furnished to the State working group. [3]

On the basis of the studies and conferences of the working groups thus far, it has become apparent that there is a major and probably irreconcilable divergence in basic concepts and principles and in the application of principles between the State and Defense working groups. The Atomic Energy Commission staff has submitted to the working groups in both Departments its views on the technical aspects of the problem of international control of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Commission staff study and its conclusions have received substantially divergent application in the respective studies of the two Departments' working groups.

In the meantime a formal Department of Defense paper consistent with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been prepared. The paper is also consistent with the thinking of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). I recognize the importance of this matter and the difficulties of achieving complete agreement since it involves both military and political points of view and decisions. In the interest of saving time, I am inclosing herewith this paper. [4] I am also referring it to the Secretaries of

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[1] See the memorandum of discussion at the 161st meeting of the NSC, Sept. 9, 1953, p. 1210.

[2] The 148-page study of Aug. 27 is not printed. (S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Armed Forces and Armaments") The draft of July 7 has not been found.

[3] The Department of State study of Nov. 29 is in S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112. The Nov. 9 study has not been found. However, comments on it by Loper of Defense (Nov. 22) and Hall of AEC (Nov. 26) are in file 330.13/11-2254 and 330.13/11-2654.

[4] The enclosure is not with the source text. A copy of this letter in the Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, "NSC Papers 1953-1955" is accompanied by a note indicat-

*Continued*

the Military Departments for their careful personal review and recommendations, and will be prepared shortly to express what might be called a formal Department of Defense position in regard to this important matter. I believe that the principals of the Special Committee appointed by the National Security Council to review NSC 112 should meet as soon as practicable to consider this problem. It is my hope that a single, agreed position could be arrived at prior to the National Security Council meeting now tentatively scheduled for 6 January 1955, but in the event this could not be done, I suggest that each principal should submit to the National Security Council either a unilateral report or such comments as he may wish to make on any report submitted by one of the other principals.[5]

I am sending an identical letter to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. WILSON

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ing that the formal Defense paper referred to here was being further reviewed in Defense prior to the establishment of a fully cleared Defense position.

[5] On Dec. 30 Dulles wrote Secretary of Defense Wilson as follows:

"My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have your letter of December 11 regarding the report to the National Security Council on disarmament.

"I suggest that members of the Special Committee meet in my office on January 4 at 3:00 p.m., in order to consider how to present this matter to the Council at its meeting on January 5th." (600.0012/12-1154)

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Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1954.

### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. THOMAS MURRAY
### MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1954—3:55 P.M.

The conversation lasted only for 5 minutes because there was confusion about the appointment, and I had another engagement. Mr. Murray said that he thought there could be a moratorium on all thermonuclear, as distinct from atomic, explosions and that this would be in the interests of the US. He said that it was possible to distinguish between atomic and thermonuclear explosions so that this would not involve fixing a magnitude limit which might interfere with atomic experimentation. Also, it would be easily susceptible of independent verification. I thanked Mr. Murray for his ideas.

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[1] The original of this memorandum was transmitted to Admiral Strauss on Dec. 14.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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600.0012/12-2954

### *Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1954.

Subject: Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments

Participants:

| | |
|---|---|
| The Secretary | Mr. Bowie, S/P |
| Mr. Murphy, G | Mr. Stelle, S/P |
| Mr. MacArthur, C | Mr. Gerard Smith, S/AE |
| Mr. Merchant, EUR | Howard Meyers, UNP |
| Mr. Barbour, EUR | |
| Mr. Key, IO | |

The Secretary suggested that the key question in considering this subject was whether it was possible to have elimination of nuclear weapons without a corresponding reduction in the conventional armaments field. He thought it might be possible to work out effective controls in the nuclear field, but that it was not really feasible to control conventional weapons because this involved so many complicated items and because there was such great opportunity for evasion of agreements in the conventional field. The practical effect of insisting that there could be no limitations in the nuclear field without limitations in the conventional field meant that there might well not be disarmament, unless there should be a mutual *de facto* disarmament by both sides individually cutting down their armaments and armed forces. Thus far, the United States retained superiority in the nuclear field. Although there was a danger of under-rating the Soviets, the Secretary believed that the U.S. should be able to maintain this superiority even in the future. Thus, if the U.S. should agree to eliminate nuclear weapons alone, we would be depriving ourself of those weapons in which the U.S. was ahead and would not be taking action in the area of Soviet superiority, the conventional armaments field. This created an obvious danger to the United States. On the other hand, it could be argued that atomic weapons are the only ones by which the U.S. can be virtually destroyed through a sudden attack, and if this danger of destruction should be removed by eliminating nuclear weapons this would help the U.S. by enabling retention intact of our industrial power which has acted both as a deterrent against total war and as a principal means of winning a war.

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[1] Drafting information on the source text indicates that this memorandum was prepared on Jan. 3, 1955.

Mr. Bowie said that the Department of Defense position on this review of basic disarmament policy [2] had raised a question which preceded the key question noted by the Secretary. This was that Defense believed any form of disarmament was contrary to U.S. security interests, principally because we could not trust the Soviets, who would violate any agreement.

The Secretary observed that in the conventional field, at least, there were so many areas to be covered that no plan could insure against all violations, and that in large measure the protection against violations of an international agreement involved the existence of such trust between nations that in fact there would be no need for a disarmament agreement. He thought that there was little difference between his views and those of the Defense Department, since he believed it would be impossible to insure absolutely that a disarmament program would be in our security interest. However, this came down to a question of the kind of risks we were willing to assume, and he believed that the real issue was how to maintain intact our industrial potential.

Mr. Bowie believed that the basic problem is how to remove the atomic threat to U.S. security, which had approached the point where failure to get disarmament now constituted a threat to U.S. security. He would be happy if an agreement could be reached which would cut down conventional armaments as well as nuclear, but this appeared to be too complicated a problem. The approach which seemed to offer the most promise was to take a little segment of the disarmament problem (cessation of nuclear fuel production) and see whether agreement could be reached with the Soviets on this objective, which would require simpler and more easily enforceable safeguards.

Mr. Murphy observed that it was not easy to separate the nuclear and conventional aspects of disarmament, because of the intermingling of both nuclear and conventional weapons systems and the fact that the means for delivering nuclear weapons involved conventional armaments, such as aircraft, artillery, etc.

The Secretary, in this connection, referred to the benefits given us by the existence of bases surrounding the Soviet Union, which enable us to deliver nuclear attack over such a wide area that it would be difficult for the Soviets to prevent an attack from being delivered on target. On the other hand, the Soviets could only hit the continental U.S. from one area, the North, which should make it easier for us to stop a good portion of a Soviet nuclear attack.

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[2] See the letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Dec. 11, p. 1583.

Mr. Bowie said that this did not take account of the fact that the Soviets within a fairly short time should be able to use submarine attacks against the American continent through firing guided missiles with nuclear warheads, and that before too many years the Soviets would probably have intercontinental ballistic missiles which could press home such attacks and would be fired from Soviet territory.

Mr. Meyers noted that one factor which had not been brought out in the discussion was that it was generally agreed that it was not possible to account fully for past production of nuclear materials, involving militarily significant amounts. This meant that it would be impossible to eliminate nuclear weapons, since we could not be sure that the Soviets would not hold out a sufficient amount of nuclear material (which could not be accounted for) so that they might launch a surprise attack. If we had agreed to eliminate all nuclear weapons we could not retaliate against such surprise attack, nor could we deter this attack by a nuclear capability in readiness. This factor seemed to indicate that an acceptable disarmament program had to link conventional and nuclear reduction. In part, this was required because we could not afford to reduce our nuclear stockpiles unless the Soviets reduced the conventional armaments in which they had superiority. In part, this linkage seemed required because, as Mr. Murphy had previously pointed out, the means of delivering nuclear weapons involved conventional armaments, and it certainly would be necessary to cut down delivery capabilities if we were to cut down our nuclear capabilities.

Mr. Bowie agreed that the impossibility of assuring the elimination of nuclear weapons at least led to the need to reduce the means of delivering these weapons. He emphasized the necessity for the U.S. to carry out a strenuous effort toward disarmament in all sincerity. The proposal which he had advanced was based on: (a) the fact that the effectiveness of an inspection system depends on experience gained in the operation of such system, since this is such an unexplored area; (b) the fact that increasing nuclear inventories increased the difficulty of inspection to verify what had happened to this nuclear material. This led him to believe that much could be said for minimizing this problem by stopping the production of all nuclear fuels, if this can be done without danger to our security.

Mr. Murphy referred to a suggestion previously made by Mr. Smith (S/AE) that the United States should conduct a trial run of an inspection system to see what were the difficulties.

The Secretary remarked on the great difficulty of securing competent personnel to check on the enforcement of any disarmament program. This was the reason why the Baruch Plan had proposed that the international control organ should run all nuclear plants, so that policing would follow automatically from the management operation.

Mr. Meyers explained that there was general agreement in the Department that cessation of nuclear fuel production within the next few years would be in U.S. security interests if protected by adequate safeguards. Disagreement with Mr. Bowie's views arose from the question of how to put forward such a proposal, since no other area in the Department concerned with this problem believed it would be politically advisable to make this suggestion except as part of proposals for reductions of nuclear and conventional armaments. There were two reasons for this view: (a) stopping nuclear fuel production at this time obviously favored the U.S. by freezing our nuclear superiority so that the Soviets would be bound to propose reductions in stockpiles or an unconditional ban on the use of all nuclear weapons, and this in turn would lead us to insist on reductions in the conventional field in which the Soviets had superiority; (b) it was doubtful that a proposal limited as Mr. Bowie suggested would be acceptable to certain of our principal allies, notably the United Kingdom, because they would not have adequate nuclear stockpiles for military or peaceful purposes. There was also considerable disagreement with Mr. Bowie's plan because of the safeguards he proposed and the stages he suggested for reaching this goal.

The Secretary believed that this was the kind of a problem which fundamentally could not be solved by controls or by limiting weapons. Once weapons of great power had been discovered, it seemed most doubtful that they could be eliminated. In fact, there would seem to be more chance of success if one could eliminate war.

Mr. Murphy directed the Secretary's attention to the memorandum which he had just laid before the Secretary, and which was agreed to by all the interested areas in the Department. This proposed that the Secretary should ask the National Security Council to recommend that it is important for the United States to continue efforts to achieve safeguarded disarmament, as politically necessary and in U.S. security interests; that the review of basic disarmament policy should be continued and that the President should promptly appoint an outstanding person to direct this review and perhaps to represent the United States in the London disarmament discussions, which would commence in February.

The Secretary agreed that it would be advisable to bring in a man of outstanding qualifications, as suggested in the memorandum, to head up this review. He believed that this required a decision by the Government, and not just by the State Department, and indicated that he would consider this matter further.

# DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA REGARDING THE DANGER OF GENERAL WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USE OF UNITED STATES BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR; ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY USE OF U.S. STRATEGIC BASES IN FOREIGN AREAS [1]

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[1] Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume VI.

# THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM [1]

A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "United States International Information Agency"

*Department of State Departmental Announcement No. 4* [2]

[WASHINGTON,] January 16, 1952.

## ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (IIA)

### *1. Purpose*

The purpose of this announcement is to establish the United States International Information Administration (IIA) for the conduct of the Department's international information and educational exchange programs, to describe the functions assigned to this organization and to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and the functions with respect to IIA programs assigned to other areas of the Department, and to maintain and further strengthen integration of the United States international information and educational exchange programs with the conduct of foreign relations generally.

### *2. Establishment of United States International Information Administration*

There is hereby established within the Department of State the United States International Information Administration. This organization shall be headed by an Administrator who shall be directly accountable to the Secretary and the Under Secretary for the planning and execution of the Department's programs under the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Congress) and related legislation and other foreign information activities for the administration of which the Secretary is responsible.

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 902 ff. See also documentation on national security policy, pp. 1 ff.; and the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953, p. 1795.

[2] On Jan. 18, 1952, the Department of State publicly announced the establishment of the International Information Administration in Press Release 43 which included a two-page biographical sketch of Dr. Wilson M. Compton, Administrator-designate of the IIA and former president of Washington State College at Pullman, Washington. The press release is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 151, and a copy is in A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "United States International Information Agency".

*3. Administrator of the United States International Information Administration*

a. Serves as Chairman of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee and discharges the responsibility of the Secretary of State for international information and educational exchange programs in the interdepartmental field.

b. Directs the development of international information and educational exchange (IIA) policies designed to implement and strengthen the foreign policies of the United States, with the advice of the regional bureaus and other areas of the Department as appropriate and with the aid of guidance from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

c. Directs the planning of IIA programs, with the advice of the regional bureaus.

d. Directs the execution of all IIA programs at home and abroad, submitting field communications for the *advice* or *review* of those areas of the Department having specific advice or review authority with respect to the matters dealt with in such communications.

e. Determines the selection and assignment of personnel to the IIA program, at home and abroad, under the personnel policies and procedures applicable to the IIA program, securing the review of the regional bureaus as to the selection of the chief public affairs officers at posts abroad and their advice as to their principal subordinates.

*4. Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*

a. Participates in the formulation of policy of the Department from the standpoint of public opinion factors and advises the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and other top staff of the Department on public opinion factors, domestic and foreign, involved in the formulation of departmental policy.

b. Develops policies on public information and directs the execution of programs designed to keep the United States public informed on international affairs and to maintain contact between the Department and the United States public.

c. Provides guidance to the development of international information and educational exchange policies and serves as the staff officer to the Secretary responsible for the approval of major IIA policy guidances.

d. Develops policies for and supervises the conduct of a program of research on American policy, historically considered, for use of the Department and the public, in consultation with other areas of the Department.

e. Develops policies on substantive matters relating to United States participation in UNESCO, subject to review by the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, plans and implements UNESCO's programs in this country, serves as the channel of communication between the Department and UNESCO and between the National Commission and UNESCO, and reviews determinations of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs pertaining to UNESCO.

f. Advises the Bureau of United Nations Affairs of obstacles to freedom of information encountered in operations of public affairs programs; assures the maintenance of liaison with American mass communications industries to interpret and to secure advice and support for United States policies and actions related to freedom of information.

*5. Regional Bureaus*

The responsibility and authority of the regional bureaus with respect to information policy for their areas are not changed. The regional bureaus shall have the following functions with respect to programs of the United States International Information Administration:

*a. State the foreign policies applicable to the region as a basis for the development of international information and exchange policies.

*b. Advise IIA on the development of international information and educational exchange policies applicable to their regions and the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs on policy guidance to IIA.

c. Consider and advise IIA on program plans applicable to their areas, with the right of appeal in the event of differences.

d. As requested by IIA, or upon own initiative, advises IIA on the area suitability of IIA materials and activities.

e. Advise IIA on the total IIA complement to be stationed at each post.

f. Review the IIA selection of the chief public affairs officer for each post and advise on the selection of his principal subordinates.

g. Advise IIA on budgetary provision to be made for administrative support of IIA staff and operations at posts abroad.

*6. Departmental Support of IIA Operations*

6.1 Adequate services will be provided to IIA by strengthening the central facilities of the Department where required or by establishing special facilities within IIA. It is intended to assure the provision of services in such a manner that the requirements of IIA will be met and the responsibility of the Administrator for the IIA program will not be impaired, at the same time maintaining the necessary uniformity of policy and practice, and retaining centralized facilities where important economies can be effected without impairing service for IIA.

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*The other substantive areas of the Department also discharge these responsibilities with respect to areas of foreign policy for which they are responsible. [Footnote in the source text.]

6.2 The basic lines to be followed in providing administrative support for IIA in the immediate future are set forth below. Continuous study shall be given to all phases of administrative support operations and further modifications shall be made where experience proves that they are necessary to provide adequate support for the IIA program.

6.3 Departmental services in the fields of communication, security, building operations and like services will be utilized by IIA.

6.4 Personnel operations will be conducted by the central facilities of the Department, but modifications in existing policies on appointment, promotion, salary, transfer, etc., and special procedural arrangements will be made wherever such adaptations are necessary in the interests of effective operation of the IIA program. In order to assure that full attention is given to the needs and problems of the IIA program, a special IIA unit will be organized within the Office of Personnel.

6.5 IIA will prepare, present and justify its own budget and manage its own financial affairs, subject to such review by the Deputy Under Secretary for administration as is necessary to assure compliance with general departmental budget and fiscal policies.

6.6 A special IIA unit within the Division of Central Services will handle IIA procurement.

### *7. Administration of IIA Programs at Posts Abroad*

7.1 The United States diplomatic mission chief shall continue to be fully responsible for the conduct of IIA programs at his post. The public affairs officer serves as a principal member of his staff with the status of chief of a major section of the mission. Mission chiefs are encouraged to delegate to public affairs officers authority to communicate with the Department in the name of the mission chief on as broad a range of IIA matters as practicable.

7.2 The mission chief will be responsible for assuring that the IIA program works cooperatively with the other operating United States programs within his country and provides information support to such programs.

7.3 The mission chief shall be responsible for seeing that adequate administrative support is provided for IIA programs in accordance with their requirements. Administrative support will normally be provided by the administrative officer of the mission. Other organizational arrangements may, with the approval of the mission chief, be made whenever required to assure efficient support of IIA operations. The name "United States Information Service" will continue to be used to identify the program abroad.

*8. Installation of Reorganization*

The Deputy Under Secretary for administration shall be responsible for providing leadership in the installation of the new plan of organization set forth in this announcement and in facilitating the transfers of personnel, funds, records and equipment.

*9. Personnel Designation*

United States International Information Administration
Administrator—Wilson Compton

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "United States International Information Agency"

## *Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Humelsine) to the Regional Bureau Executive Directors*[1]

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1952.

Subject: Strengthening U.S. International Information Program

Several background papers were prepared to point up the significant issues which led to the issuance of Departmental Announcement No. 4 "Establishment of the United States International Information Administration (IIA)" on January 16, 1952.[2] These papers included:

1. A summary statement of the Department of State program for strengthening U.S. international information.
2. A detailed staff paper regarding the U.S. International Information and Educational Exchange Program.

These papers describe the nature and purpose of the steps which are being taken to provide more effective administration of the international information program. The Secretary approved the changes being made in the information program on the basis of the analysis contained in these papers.

Copies of these documents are attached for your information and use as background material during the period of transition to the new form of organization. They should be helpful in providing general guidance regarding the new organization and in amplifying the Departmental Announcement, which remains the authoritative statement on this subject. These papers do not, of course, provide precise blueprints of all operating relationships. The details will be worked out gradually within the framework of these basic papers.

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[1] Copies of this memorandum were sent to: S/S, S/P, G, H, L, UNA, IIA, P, FBO, REP, OBF, OOF, CON, PER, A/FS, and FI.

[2] See Departmental Announcement No. 4, *supra*.

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE

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[Attachment A]

## *Summary Statement Prepared in the Department of State*

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

### PROGRAM FOR STRENGTHENING U.S. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION

### SUMMARY

*I. Purposes*

1. To improve the USIE program by a greater centralization of responsibility for its planning and execution in the Administrator of a U.S. International Information Administration (IIA) to be established as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State.

2. To maintain and to further strengthen the integration of the U.S. international information and educational exchange activities with the conduct of U.S. foreign relations generally.

3. To make available to the Secretary and top officers of the Department expert advice on information problems and information considerations in the development of foreign policy on a sounder basis by freeing the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs of any responsibility for the planning and execution of the USIE program. (This will also assist in the accomplishment of No. 2 above.)

*II. Background*

Present arrangements within the Department for the conduct of information activities have the following limitations:

1. Responsibility for the USIE program is too broadly diffused within the Department of State.
2. Responsibility for country program planning is discharged by the Regional Bureaus, which are not accountable to the top management of the program.
3. Responsibility for the supervision of field operations is located in the Regional Bureaus, separated from the top management of the program and from the media facilities.
4. The General Manager has to rely entirely upon the central management and service facilities of the Department of State, which are not subject to his control.
5. The USIE organization is not upon an adequate footing in terms either of its status within the Department and some of the missions abroad or its internal structure.

6. The present organization places an impossible burden on the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs who, in addition to his responsibilities as policy adviser to the Secretary and as head of the Domestic Public Affairs program, must act as head of the USIE program in many matters affecting Congress, the public, and other departments of the government.

### *III. Proposals*

#### 1. *Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs*

The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs will continue to serve as the officer responsible for advising the Secretary on opinion and attitude factors in the development of foreign policy, for bringing information factors to bear on top policy discussions and decisions, for providing to the foreign information program guidance based upon policy decisions at the highest levels in the Department, and for directing programs designed to keep the U.S. public informed on international problems and programs of the Department of State including the international information program. However, he will be relieved of responsibility for supervising the USIE program and will delegate responsibility for domestic information operations.

#### 2. *USIIA Administrator*

The International Information Administration will be established within the Department of State. It will be so designed as to strengthen the administration of the program, provide greater flexibility of operations and make it possible to hold the head of the program accountable for its operations.

The IIA Administrator will be given general authority to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary of State in the field of international information and educational exchange.

His responsibilities for the USIE program will include those now discharged by the USIE General Manager, plus certain others now placed elsewhere in the Department. He will also assume the present USIE responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs except for an over-all role in the field of information policy described above.

#### 3. *Foreign Information Policy*

Arrangements for the development of foreign information policy guidance will be such as to assure that the present integration of such policy with U.S. foreign policy in other fields is maintained and strengthened.

The Regional Bureaus and the other substantive areas of the Department will continue to state the approved foreign policies and to advise on the development of information policy applicable to their areas exactly as is now the case.

The Administrator of IIA will be responsible for: (1) developing information policies in support of approved foreign policies; and (2) assuring that IIA programs follow approved policy guidances. In developing information policies, IIA will be provided with broad guidance by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, who will act as the Secretary's representative in (1) assuring that information of approved foreign policies is promptly, fully and currently available to IIA in the formulation of its information policy guidance and (2) approving, or seeking the approval of the Secretary of major IIA policy guidances.

Although the size of the Public Affairs staffs in the Regional Bureaus will be reduced in line with the reduction in the total Regional Bureau information functions, staffs will be maintained for performance of the continuing Bureau functions with respect to information policy and programs, including advice to Bureau officers upon foreign public attitude considerations in the development of foreign policy.

4. *Program Planning*

Responsibility for planning country information programs will be transferred from the Regional Bureaus to IIA.

Responsibility for planning the information program for each country, under the general world-wide plan developed by the USIE General Manager, is now vested in the Regional Bureaus, an arrangement which restricts the General Manager seriously in the discharge of his responsibility for the program as a whole. This arrangement was dictated by the basic principles upon which the Department was reorganized in 1949 [3] and in fact might be adequate for a smaller and more stable program. In the situation which has now developed, however, the greater flexibility of centralized program planning for all areas of the world is required. Country program plans will be submitted for the advice and consideration of the Regional Bureaus, which in the event of differences shall have the right of appeal.

"Centralized" program planning should be understood to refer to the planning functions which must be discharged within the Department; full reliance will be placed upon the mission in developing the program within each country.

5. *Supervision of Field Operations*

Responsibility for the supervision of field operations will be transferred from the Regional Bureaus to the IIA.

Under the present arrangement responsibility for program operations is divided between IE for the media facilities and the Regional Bureaus for field activities. Unified direction of an integrated program and speed and flexibility in the supervision and support of field programs can best be produced by bringing together under the Administrator the media facilities, control of funds and personnel and responsibility for supervision of information planning and operations in the field.

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[3] For documentation on the 1949 reorganization of the Department of State, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

6. *Administrative Support and Services*

Adequate services will be provided to IIA by strengthening the central facilities of the Department where required or by establishing special facilities within IIA.

Departmental services provided to the IIA program have been reviewed in order to determine the action which should be taken in each field. It is intended to assure the provision of services in such a manner that the specialized requirements of IIA will be met promptly and the responsibility of the Administrator for the operations of the program will not be impaired, at the same time maintaining uniformity of policy and practice where such uniformity is essential to the most effective conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States, and retaining centralized facilities where important economies can be effected without impairing service for IIA.

Departmental services in the field of personnel, communications, security, building operations, language, and other services will be utilized by IIA.

Personnel operations will be conducted by the central facilities of the Department, but modifications in existing *policies* on appointment, promotion, salary, transfer, etc., and special *procedural* arrangements will be made wherever such adaptations are necessary in the interests of effective operation of the IIA program. In order to assure that full attention is given to the special needs and problems of the IIA program, a special IIA personnel unit will be established within the Departmental personnel office.

The Regional Bureaus will review the IIA selection of the chief Public Affairs Officer at each post and will advise on the selection of his principal subordinates.

IIA will prepare, present and justify its own budget and manage its own financial affairs, subject to such review by the Deputy Under Secretary for administration as is necessary to assure compliance with general departmental budgetary and fiscal policies and that adequate financial arrangements affecting other areas of the Department have been made.

A special IIA unit within CS will handle IIA procurement requirements.

7. *Conduct of USIIA Programs at Post Level*

Integration of the information program within the total conduct of foreign relations at the country level will be assured by maintaining the authority of the U.S. Mission Chief over the program, with the Public Affairs Officer serving as the chief of one of his major sections. The Mission Chief will be responsible for assuring that the IIA program works cooperatively with the other operating U.S. programs within his country and provides information support to such programs.

Administrative support will be provided to IIA by the Administrative Office of the mission, although, with the approval of the chief of mission, special arrangements may be made to meet requirements at particular posts.

8. *Salary Legislation*

The Department will propose, for early submission to Congress, legislation authorizing more appropriate salaries for the key IIA positions.

9. *A Single U.S. International Information Program*

The IIA has been so designed as to provide a framework for the inclusion of all U.S. international information and educational exchange activities in a unified program, although the establishment of IIA is being undertaken without respect to whether it is possible to effect the consolidation of any such activities at the present time.

[Attachment B]

## *Staff Paper Prepared in the Department of State*

[Washington, undated.]

### Program for Strengthening U.S. International Information

[Here follow a table of contents and a list of tabs.]

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The present international situation demands the development of an adequate program of international information in support of U.S. national objectives. The existing means for the planning and execution of such a program should be strengthened. This paper and the attachments hereto set forth measures which are being undertaken by the Department of State to this end.

#### II. BACKGROUND OF PRESENT INFORMATION PROGRAMS

During World War II, the United States executed large programs of propaganda and psychological warfare. Although we were lacking in experience and made many mistakes in the early days, we developed considerable skill and effectiveness in these areas in the course of the war.

After the end of the war, the propaganda program of the Office of War Information was transferred to the Department of State and very largely liquidated. A greatly reduced program undertook the task of presenting "a full and fair picture of the United States" to the rest of the world. When it became apparent that Russia intended to conduct the grossest kind of world-wide propaganda against the United States, Congress enacted the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Congress, 1948) in order to provide the machinery for the United States to counteract and overcome the effect of this campaign.

The program authorized under Public Law 402 was maintained on a very limited scale until the President directed the Secretary of State in the spring of 1950 to prepare a vigorous "Campaign of Truth" as a U.S. offensive in the psychological field. Funds appropriated in the fall of 1950 afforded a basis for rapid expansion of the program; policy-wise it had already moved far from the "full and fair picture" basis.

The USIE program, which at its lowest point in 1948 employed fewer than 1,500 persons throughout the world and was operating at a level of less than $20,000,000 per year, has now been built up to a program which calls for a staff of 8,900 and a level of operations of approximately $100,000,000 to be reached during the current fiscal year. Even the larger program of today is below the level required for a full fledged U.S. propaganda program on an all-out "cold war" basis.

After 1948 upon Congressional initiative, ECA developed in Western Europe an information program designed to meet the Congressional requirement that the U.S. should receive full credit for its contributions to the European economy. With the intensification of the cold war, however, and the transition of economic assistance programs into programs of military alliance and military assistance, the informational objectives logically to be associated with these programs have become increasingly identified with the objectives of the USIE program under the "Campaign of Truth."

## III. CRITIQUE OF PRESENT USIE ORGANIZATION

The present position of the U.S. in the field of propaganda has been greatly strengthened in the last two years. Arrangements for over-all mobilization and coordination in the psychological field have been improved by establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board; the USIE program has been rapidly expanded and its operational and propaganda methods radically adjusted to meet present requirements; the policy guidance process within the Department of State and interdepartmentally has been much improved; within the Department of State and elsewhere there is a more acute realization that "action is the best propaganda"; the work of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee has done much to develop a common understanding among agencies concerned with propaganda problems and has stimulated extensive joint action by these agencies; the ECA information program has been strengthened and has been adjusted in the direction of the propaganda methods now employed in the USIE program; close coordination of the USIE and ECA information programs in the field has been achieved.

There remain, however, areas of weakness in our international information programs which require attention. With respect to the USIE program, the principal problems are as follows:

*1. Responsibility for the USIE program is too broadly diffused within the Department of State.*

The present plan of organization makes it impossible to hold any one officer fully responsible for the success of the program. This condition results from applying to this program in too literal a fashion the principles underlying the reorganization of the Department carried out in 1949. The arrangements developed at that time may have been adequate for a smaller and more stable program, but they fail to provide the centralized authority and accountability and the flexibility of operations required for the period ahead.

The major aspects of this diffusion of responsibility are described as separate items below.

*2. Responsibility for country program planning is discharged by the Regional Bureaus, which are not accountable to the top management of the program.*

Although the General Manager of the USIE program is responsible for developing a world-wide program framework, the Regional Bureaus plan the specific country programs. This arrangement limits the authority and accountability of the General Manager, greatly restricting the flexibility with which he can apply his total resources to the total world-wide problem; it also necessitates an unwieldly process of coordinating country planning with media planning.

*3. Responsibility for the supervision of field operations is located in the Regional Bureaus, separated from the top management of the program and from the media facilities.*

This arrangement is unsatisfactory for much the same reasons as those set forth under "2" above.

*4. The General Manager has to rely upon the central management and service facilities of the Department of State, which are not subject to his control.*

For certain functions, this arrangement is entirely satisfactory. For example, there would be no advantage, and very serious disadvantages, in establishing separate facilities for communications, security and intelligence. Furthermore, the relationship of the USIE program management to the other areas of the Department in the field of foreign and information policy development has been greatly improved in recent years and should not be substantially modified.

In certain other fields, such as the procurement of specialized program equipment and the construction of broadcasting facilities, USIE requirements are entirely different from those of other areas of the Department and require special treatment.

In the fields of budget and personnel greater authority and flexibility within the program structure are required, although uniformity of policy and practice throughout the Department in certain respects must be maintained.

*5. The USIE organization is not upon an adequate footing in terms either of its status within the Department, its internal structure, or in some of the missions abroad.*

Location of the General Manager under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs tends to layer the program within the Departmental structure. This factor, plus the internal USIE organization pattern and the authorized salary scale, have made it impossible to attract outstanding men to key positions in adequate numbers. The General Manager is the only officer concerned exclusively with the USIE program whose position is classified above GS-15.

*6. The relationship between U.S. international information programs and other U.S. programs operating abroad is not sufficiently clear and constructive.*

Establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board is an important step in the direction of assuring adequate coordination among psychological programs and with U.S. programs in the economic, military and political fields. There remains, however, the need for improving the working relationships between U.S. international information and educational exchange programs and programs in the other fields operating abroad, such as the economic, military and technical assistance programs under the Mutual Security Act.[4] While improvements in headquarters' (Washington) relationships are important, the problem is most concretely evident at the country level, where it is necessary to arrive at one strong information organization and then to assure that it operates in coordination with other psychological programs and in full support of and collaboration with other major U.S. programs.

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[4] For documentation on the Mutual Security Program, see vol. I, Part 1, pp. 460 ff.

### IV. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In order to meet the problems set forth in the preceding section of this paper, the Department of State is establishing a U.S. International Information Administration (IIA), the Administrator of which will report directly to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary. The authority to be vested in the Administrator, the role of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and the relationship of the U.S. International Information Administration (IIA) to other areas of the Department are set forth below.

1. *The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs will continue to serve as the officer responsible for advising the Secretary on opinion and attitude factors in the development of foreign policy, for bringing information factors to bear on top policy discussions and decisions for providing to the international information program guidance based upon policy decisions at the highest levels in the Department, and for directing programs designed to keep the U.S. public informed on international problems. He shall serve as the senior officer of the Department on all information policy matters, but IIA may propose or initiate, through the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the consideration of any international information policy matter arising in connection with its activities. However, he will be relieved of responsibility for supervising the USIE program and he will delegate his operational responsibilities in the domestic field.*

The present organization, in addition to reducing the level of the operating USIE organization by locating the General Manager under an Assistant Secretary, places an impossible burden upon the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. In addition to his responsibilities as policy adviser to the Secretary and as head of the domestic public affairs program, he must act as the head of the USIE program in many matters affecting Congress, the public and other departments of the Government.

Under the new arrangement, he will have no supervisory authority over the USIE program. He will continue, in matters of policy determination, to serve as the link between the USIE program and the top policy councils of the Department. Although the IIA Administrator is expected to be available for such considerations when necessary. In developing information policies, IIA will be provided with broad guidance by the Assistant Secretary, who will act as the Secretary's representative in (1) assuring that information of approved foreign policies is promptly, fully and currently available to IIA in the formulation of information policy guidances and (2) approving, or seeking the approval of the Secretary, of major IIA policy guidances. He will not be responsible for developing and providing to the foreign information operators policy guidances on the full range of problems involved in the foreign information program. This responsibility (of the kind now discharged by the Foreign Information Policy Staff) will be discharged within the IIA as described below. The Administrator's principal policy officer will work for this purpose in close cooperation with the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

The UNESCO Relations Staff will remain under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Consideration has been given to the transfer of this unit to the United Nations Affairs Area, but it is believed that present arrangement should be maintained for the immediate future.

2. *The U.S. International Information Administration will be established within the Department of State so designed as to strengthen the administration of the program, provide greater flexibility of operations and make it possible to hold the head of the program accountable for its operations.*

The IIA Administrator will be given general authority to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary of State in the field of international information and educational exchange.

His responsibilities for the USIE program will include those now discharged by the USIE General Manager, plus certain others now placed elsewhere in the Department. He will also assume the present USIE responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs except for an over-all role in the field of information policy described above.

The principal features of this arrangement are set forth as separate items below.

An outline of the organization to be provided within the Department for domestic and foreign information is attached as Tab A.

3. *Arrangements for the development of foreign information policy guidance will be such as to assure that the present integration of such policy with U.S. foreign policy in other fields is maintained and strengthened.*

The Regional Bureaus and other substantive areas of the Department will continue to state the approved foreign policies and to advise on the development of information policy applicable to their areas. The Administrator of IIA will be responsible for developing information policies in support of approved foreign policies and for assuring that U.S. programs follow approved policy guidances. In developing international information and educational exchange policies, IIA and the other areas of the Department will be provided with broad guidance by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs as set forth under IV, 1 above. Specifically, he will approve, or seek the approval of the Secretary of major IIA policy guidances. The rationale for these arrangements is set forth as Tab B to this paper.

Although the size of the Public Affairs staffs in the Regional Bureaus will be reduced in line with the reduction in the total Regional Bureau information functions, staffs will be maintained for performance of the continuing Bureau functions with respect to information policy and programs, including advice to Bureau officers upon foreign public attitude considerations in the development of foreign policy.

*4. Responsibility for planning country information programs will be transferred from the Regional Bureaus to IIA.*

Responsibility for planning the information program for each country, under the general world-wide plan developed by the USIE General Manager, is now vested in the Regional Bureaus, an arrangement which restricts the General Manager very seriously in the discharge of his responsibility for the program as a whole. This arrangement was dictated by the basic principles upon which the Department was reorganized in 1949 and in fact might be adequate for a smaller and more stable program. In the situation which has now developed, however, the greater flexibility of centralized direction of program planning for all areas of the world is required. With the establishment of IIA, the Administrator will deal directly with the missions in carrying out this responsibility. Country program plans will be submitted for advice and consideration of the Regional Bureaus, which in the event of differences shall have the right of appeal.

It should be understood that it is intended to "centralize within IIA only those program planning functions which must be performed as a headquarters function; full reliance will be placed upon the missions in developing the local program within over-all policies, plans and fund availabilities."

*5. Responsibility for the supervision of field operations will be transferred from the Regional Bureaus to IIA.*

Under the present arrangement responsibility for program operations is divided between USIE for the media facilities and the Regional Bureaus for field activities. Unified direction of an integrated program and speed and flexibility in the supervision and support of field programs, can best be produced by bringing together under the Administrator the media facilities, control of funds and personnel and responsibility for supervision of information planning and operations in the field.

*6. Adequate services will be provided to IIA by strengthening the central facilities of the Department where required or by establishing special facilities within IIA.*

Departmental services provided to the USIE program have been reviewed in order to determine the action which should be taken in each field. It is intended to assure the provision of services in such a manner that the specialized requirements of IIA will be met promptly and the responsibility of the Administrator for the operations of the program will not be impaired, at the same time maintaining uniformity of policy and practice where such uniformity is essential to the most effective conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States and retaining centralized facilities where important economies can be effected without impairing services for IIA. Arrangements with respect to IIA use of Departmental services will be kept under continuous review and further modifications will be made when required to meet the needs of the program and, in the absence of agreement with the Administrative area on IIA proposals, the Administrator may appeal. In summary, the arrangements to be made initially are as follows:

a. *Communications*

The IIA will use the present communication system of the Department in the same manner as any other area of the Department.

This arrangement will place at the disposal of IIA a highly developed world-wide system embracing wire and wireless facilities, courier service and the most modern security methods and devices. Duplication of this entire system would be highly uneconomic as well as creating dangers to security.

Not only will IIA use the Department's facilities for the transmission of messages, but the distribution of information as well as action copies of messages to IIA will maintain intact the present flow of information on foreign policy and operations generally to the information staff.

Attention has been given to the matter of "direct communication" between the Public Affairs Officers in the field and IIA, Washington. All messages to the field are transmitted in the name of the Secretary of State, but approval of such messages is the responsibility of the officer having action responsibility for a given matter. This means that with respect to the great majority of information matters, IIA officers will have full responsibility for approving messages to the field. Advice or review of other areas of the Department will be secured when the contents of the message requires such treatment. Within the mission abroad, freedom for the Public Affairs Officer to communicate in the name of the Mission Chief on his own authority is for the determination of the Mission Chief as the responsible head of the entire mission. Such delegations should be encouraged.

b. *Security*

No real purpose would be served by changing the present application of the Department's security program to the information program as a regular part of the Department.

In the field of physical security, the necessity for one security operation is readily apparent, since IIA will share a common communications system and other physical facilities in Washington and in the field.

In the field of personnel security also there appear to be no important advantages and many disadvantages in any separation. The extraordinary efforts which have been made by the officers of the Department responsible for the security program to speed up all personnel security processes for the information program, including FBI investigations, will be continued.

c. *Budget and Finance*

The problem in respect to IIA budget and fiscal administration is to provide the IIA Administrator that degree of latitude and flexibility in the use and control of funds which is necessary for effective program management, while at the same time assuring through the budget and fiscal process that IIA programs and activities are in harmony with and reinforce total Departmental objectives and reflect over-all Department decisions as to priorities and emphasis in foreign operations. For this purpose the following arrangements are proposed:

(1) The Deputy Under Secretary for administration will remain responsible for the Department's budget, including the budget of the IIA and the information program generally. Budget estimates, apportionment requests and other fiscal proposals affecting the IIA program will be submitted to the Budget Bureau and the Congress through the Deputy Under Secretary for administration.

(1) [*2*] The Deputy Under Secretary for administration will normally look to the IIA to prepare, present and justify its own budget and manage its own financial affairs, subject to such review by the Deputy Under Secretary for administration as is necessary to assure compliance with general departmental budget and fiscal policies.

(3) IIA will be responsible for maintaining accounts and preparing fiscal reports on the IIA program, with the advice and assistance of the Office of Budget and Finance. Payrolling, auditing and

disbursing functions will be retained by the Office of Budget and Finance.

(4) Estimates for support and services to IIA by other units of the Department, including field administrative support, will be worked out jointly by IIA and the Departmental units concerned and will be developed and submitted as part of the total budget presentation and financial plan for the IIA program. So far as practicable, IIA shall make its funds for administrative support, in the United States and in the field, available for specifically designated services, organization units and posts and they shall be accounted for in that manner. Each departmental unit or field mission will be informed of the funds available to it for IIA administrative support.

(5) The Deputy Under Secretary for administration will call upon the Director of OBF and, as appropriate, other officers of the Department for staff advice and other assistance concerning budget and fiscal matters affecting IIA.

d. *Personnel*

IIA will place basic reliance on the central personnel facilities and procedures of the Department, but modifications in existing *policies* as to appointment, promotion, salary, transfer, etc., and special *procedural* arrangements will be made whenever such adaptations appear necessary in the interests of effective operation of the IIA program. This arrangement is the one which has been decided upon for the Point 4 Program. It appears to be the solution which best reconciles the need for personnel flexibility in an operating program with the efficiency and economy of central operations and the desirability of assuring as great a measure of consistency in conditions of employment in the United States and abroad as is feasible in view of the difference between the several activities to be carried on abroad.

In order to assure that full attention is given to the special needs and problems of the IIA program, a special IIA personnel unit will be established within the Office of Personnel to assure prompt service and full attention to special IIA problems.

The Regional Bureaus will, within reasonable time limits, review the IIA selection of the Chief Public Affairs Officer at each post and will advise on the selection of his principal subordinates.

IIA will have action responsibility for the selection and assignment of field personnel, subject to the review of PER within the applicable standards.

Specifically, IIA will assume those responsibilities relative to the selection, assignment, transfer and promotion of field personnel now vested in the Regional Bureaus.

e. *Procurement*

(1) While the procurement of supplies and equipment for IIA administrative and program needs is in many respects similar to

other administrative and program procurement done in the Department, special IIA requirements and problems must be met. The Department's procurement regulations, organization, and procedures should be applied to IIA procurement, except that the regulations, organization, and procedures should be modified as necessary in accordance with the exigencies of the IIA program.

(2) In recognition of the need to give IIA procurement requirements adequate and prompt consideration, CS will establish an IIA procurement staff. This staff will maintain close liaison with IIA and become thoroughly conversant with its programs and objectives, so that it can interpret and represent procurement needs of IIA for both common service items procured elsewhere in CS and special program items procured by this section.

(3) IIA should develop two aspects of procurement planning to the maximum extent, so as to meet the demands of a dynamic program:

a. prescribing standard specifications for items and developing guides for the purchase of new or the replacement of existing items.

b. stockpiling standard items so as to expedite the filling of IIA mission requisitions.

f. *Buildings Operations*

IIA space requirements will be met by the central facilities of the Department and the Foreign Service. IIA will provide the Division of Foreign Buildings Operations with requirements for various types of space and will review FBO plans for the provision of space for such specialized purposes as motion picture theaters and libraries.

g. *Language Services*

IIA will utilize as far as practicable the Department's facilities for translation and interpretation, but with the advice of the Division of Language Services may establish additional facilities if warranted by volume or other special circumstances.

h. *Other Services*

The various services not described above, such as space management, domestic communications, graphic presentation and reproduction shall continue to be supplied by the Office of Operating Facilities. Adjustments in the manner of rendering such services shall be made where necessary to meet the requirements of IIA operations, and IIA may establish separate facilities when experience indicates that they are required in order to provide adequate support.

i. *Administrative Support for New York IIA Operation*

Arrangements for administrative support for IIA operations in New York will be developed in agreement with the basic arrangements set forth above. Some of the present functions of the New York Administrative Office will be assigned to an IIA administrative office; such functions with respect to IIA as are retained by the Administrative area of the Department, and must be performed in New York, will be the responsibility of a Department administrative office in New York which will continue the present NAO functions of providing support to non-IIA offices in New York and discharging certain responsibilities in support of the overseas operations of the Department.

*7. Administration of Program at Posts Abroad.*

Integration of the information program with the total conduct of foreign relations at the country level will be assured by maintaining the authority of the U.S. Mission Chief over the program, with the Public Affairs Officer serving as the chief of one of his major sections. Primary reliance in the development of program plans will be placed upon the judgment of the Public Affairs Officer and the Mission Chief as to the situation within the area and the type of IIA program required, continuing a practice which has been emphasized in the development of recent program plans.

The chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission will be responsible for assuring that the IIA program works cooperatively with the other operating U.S. programs within his country and provides information support to such programs.

Administrative support normally will be provided to IIA by the administrative officer of the mission, but other organizational arrangements may be made with the approval of the Mission Chief in order to assure efficient support of IIA operations whenever required.

A more detailed statement of the relationships to be established for carrying out the information program at U.S. posts abroad is set forth as Tab C to this paper.

*8. Salaries for Key IIA Positions.*

The Department of State will propose for submission to Congress early in the new session legislation authorizing more appropriate salaries for key positions in the IIA organization.

Under the existing organization and salary structure it has been almost impossible to persuade a sufficient number of outstanding men from private life to come into the program. The plan of organization for IIA will be helpful in this matter, with responsibility more clearly placed upon the head of the program, with his status within the Department improved, and with a more "horizontal" type of organization designed to emphasize the importance of the key media and functional positions. These factors, plus improvement in executive salaries, should make service in this program far more attractive to the kind of men the program requires.

*9. A Single U.S. Information Program.*

It is clearly desirable that there should be a single U.S. program in the field of international information. The IIA has been designed so as to provide a framework for the inclusion of all U.S. activities in this field in a unified program, and the further development and installation of the IIA structure will be made in the light of this eventual requirement and objective. Relationships between the IIA and other departments of the Government and the role of the Mission Chief and the chief Public Affairs Officer in each country will be developed with a view to providing an adequate instrumentality for meeting the requirements of the U.S. Government as a whole in the field of international information.

### Tab A

### *Paper Prepared in the Department of State*

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

## U.S. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

1. The attached chart is largely self-explanatory but some clarification of several of the elements depicted is necessary to avoid misunderstanding.

2. *Field Representatives.* It is intended that these officers be stationed overseas as direct representatives of the Administrator. It is not intended that they become channels of communications or field supervisors. They will act in an advisory and consultative capacity to the missions chiefs, the Public Affairs Officers and the Department in the development of IIA country programs, will maintain liaison among IIA programs in their areas, and will carry out specific assignments for the Administrator.

3. *Field Programs.* This Assistant Administrator will have responsibilities as follows: (1) the global program planning function now carried on by PRS, (2) assuring that the country missions prepare adequate country program, now carried on by the Regional Bureaus, and (3) expediting the interest of the country missions in personnel, budgetary and related matters.

4. *Management.* This will include a Management Staff, and personnel budget and finance, and administrative facilities and serv-

ices activities. Provision is also made for Secretariats to provide for advisory commission secretariats and for certain activities similar to those performed by the Departmental Secretariat. These include the development and conduct of briefings, the development of displays, the preparation of executive reports and reports to Congress, and the issuance of the *USIE Newsletter. The New York Administrative Office* will serve IIA activities located in New York. The responsibility of the Assistant Administrator for this activity is directly related to the degree of responsibility delegated to IIA in the field of administration, especially in personnel, budget, finance, and administrative facilities and service fields.

5. *Private Enterprise Cooperation.* This is set up under an Assistant Administrator since it is not a staff function but an operating activity of a special kind and because in this activity prestige is of utmost importance, probably more so than in any other activity undertaken by IIA.

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## Tab B

### *Paper Prepared in the Department of State*

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

### RATIONALE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FOREIGN INFORMATION POLICY PROVIDED IN CONNECTION WITH ESTABLISHING THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (IIA)

During World War II our propaganda was not always designed to support approved national objectives and major actions in the military economic and political fields, although the fault was by no means exclusively that of the propaganda agency. One of the important reasons for transferring the OWI program to the Department of State in 1945 was the need for a more immediate association between the foreign information program and the development of foreign policy. There are three primary considerations involved: (1) The need for assuring that information experts are given an opportunity to influence the development of foreign policy. (2) The need for assuring that information programs and output support approved foreign policy. (3) The need for providing a free flow of classified information concerning both policy and operational matters from all parts of the State Department to the operators in the information field. This transfer, however, effected no immediate remedy. It was necessary for officers in other areas of the Department at all levels to realize the nature and importance of international information and for all concerned to realize that there is "information policy" in addition to, but in agreement with, foreign policy. It was necessary for substantive and information officers to learn the process of working together in the development of policy in the field of information which would best meet the sometimes conflicting requirements of long-range, as opposed to short-range, objectives and the needs of our policy in one region of the world as opposed to other regions. Many lessons had to be learned in the attempt to bring to the process of developing foreign policy adequate consideration of foreign attitude factors. Procedures and methods for the development and transmission of information policy guidance required much attention.

Not all of these things were accomplished overnight, and much remained to be done at the time of the reorganization of the Department in 1949. Rapid improvement in the policy process has taken place since that time. The Department is now in a far stronger position than ever before to develop and apply sound information policy and to take into account in all of its activities the sound maxim that "action is the best propaganda."

### *Present Policy Arrangements*

The Public Affairs Staffs in the Regional Bureaus (which were established by the reorganization of 1949) and the relationship of these staffs to the Public Affairs Area of the Department are the heart of the present policy mechanism.

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Tab C

## *Paper Prepared in the Department of State*

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAM AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

### *Role of the Ambassador*

The Ambassador or Chief of Diplomatic Mission is the principal United States representative in the country which he is accredited. He has direct responsibility for all activities carried on within the Embassy organization, and has responsibility for providing leadership, and assuring coordination of other programs and activities of the U.S. Government. With respect to the information program, the Chief of Mission has direct authority over the program. His continued interest and support are necessary for its success. The level of interest and degree of personal participation in the direction of the program will vary with the importance of the program in the total U.S. effort in the country concerned, but will generally be concerned with the following matters:

(1) Assuring that the information program is planned and executed consistently with U.S. policy objectives, local conditions within the country and the over-all conduct of U.S. relations with the country.

(2) Assuring that the information program is conducted in close working relations with other operating U.S. programs within the country and with due attention to the information problems of such programs.

(3) Exercising direction of any official [words missing in the source text] local government.

(4) Keeping informed of programs and specific activities with significant political importance or implications.

### *Role of the Public Affairs Officer*

The status of the Public Affairs Officer should be that of the chief of a major section of the mission. He serves the Ambassador in two distinct ways. First, he has an important policy advisory function on the information activities of the U.S. Government, and on the information aspects of other Embassy and program operations, and on public opinion factors generally in the conduct of relations with the local government. In this capacity he serves as a staff adviser to assist the Ambassador in the surveillance of all U.S. activities within the country. Secondly, the Public Affairs Officer is responsible to the Ambassador for the planning and execution of the information program within the country. In this capacity he will be responsible for the direct supervision of program operations, for proper working level coordination of the program with Embassy activities and other U.S. programs, and for keeping the Ambassador informed of matters requiring his attention.

It should be emphasized that IIA Washington will place principal reliance upon the mission for determining, within approved policies, plans and funds, the information activities to be conducted locally.

No inflexible pattern of relationships below the mission level should be prescribed. In general, however, the Public Affairs Officer at a consulate will bear the same relationship to the Principal Officer as the mission Public Affairs Officer has to the Ambassador. In some cases, the information program will be the principal activity of a post, and a Public Affairs Officer may be assigned as the Principal Officer.

### *Administrative Support*

In the interest of efficiency and economy of operations, administrative support functions for IIA normally will be performed by the administrative section of the mission. The Chief of Mission will be responsible for seeing that support is provided in accordance with the relative needs of the various functions under his direction and the purposes for which funds are allocated. He must assure that estimates for IIA program activities and administrative support are properly related to each other so that it is possible to provide adequate support within the financial plan. He will also see to it that the character of the services provided to IIA is based upon the actual requirements of the program rather than the application of blanket standards and practices to all mission activities.

Other organizational arrangements may, with the approval of the Chief of Mission, be made wherever required to assure efficient support of IIA operations.

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511.00/2-1552: Circular

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 15, 1952.

No. 21

Subject: Quarterly Propaganda Emphases

1. *Purpose*

This circular describes the quarterly propaganda emphases approach planned for 1952 in general, and specifically as it relates to the second phase. Reference is made to the circular airgram on this subject, dated November 17, 1951, [2] 11:05 a.m.

2. *General Quarterly Propaganda Emphasis Approach*

2.1 *Plan for the Quarterly Approach*

2.11 In order to afford posts an opportunity to give maximum impact to various carefully planned and coordinated approaches to the major continuing objectives of United States foreign policy, the Department has developed and proposes to continue to develop materials which will have four discernible thematic emphases, corresponding to the four quarters of 1952. The selection of these emphases is dictated by the psychological task of building unity and confidence in support of efforts to achieve peace with freedom. The broad basic theme for all four quarters of 1952 is *Progress Through Strength Towards Peace With Freedom.*

2.12 It should be understood that no departures from established United States policy are contemplated. The four major propaganda campaigns here outlined involve themes and aims which are being sustained and will continue to be sustained for the foreseeable future. The Department's purpose in dividing them into four three-month phases is two-fold: first, to enable IIA's operating media to plan far enough in advance to take advantage of useful dates and occasions, and to synchronize the fastest media products with the slowest; and second, to enable the posts to arrange well in advance for adaptations, translations, printing (locally or through the Regional Production Centers in London and Manila), and distribution facilities, and for such related local activities as appear to be indicated in each instance.

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[1] This Foreign Service Information and Educational Exchange Circular was drafted by Charles P. Miller of OII and cleared by Orville C. Anderson of PRS. Sent to all USIE posts and to HICOG Bonn, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, Salisbury, and Camaguey. Sent "Air Mail Urgent".

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 961.

2.2 *Operation of the Quarterly Approach*

2.21 Certain operational points may be noted in connection with press and publications campaign output:

a. Campaign materials will *not* be forwarded all together in a kit, but each item will be sent as soon as completed as a component part of the steady routing flow of press, photo and publications material.

b. Leaflets will be sent in the usual 10 English language pilot models to each post, with separate attribution instructions for each.

2.22 Officers should give the most serious consideration to the plan as it is presented, and should approach it as a technique for maximizing our propaganda potential in terms of specific areas. Posts, of course, are urged to continue to exercise their discretion and judgment on the use or adaptation of given items or themes. Field comments are welcome, and should include constructive suggestions on projects outlined in this and succeeding communications and/or new approaches which more closely fit area requirements.

2.23 Officers should bear in mind that campaign themes and materials are applicable to most phases of cultural programs, as well as to media operations. Servicing of campaign materials will be carried on in the same manner as in the past.

3. *Development of Phase One*

3.1 *Major Emphasis for Phase One*

The major emphasis for Phase One (January, February, and March) is on *Peace With Freedom*, with three concurrent subheadings: (1) "The Peace We Believe In"; (2) "Peace Through Deeds"; (3) "The Kremlin—Disturber of the Peace". Phase One was planned as an intensification of the effort to capture for the United States and its co-partners of the Free World the idea of peace which has been perverted and exploited so successfully heretofore by Soviet propagandists. It seeks to give the word "peace" a broader and richer content more reflective of basic human needs and aspirations, and sequester the idea against further misuse by the Kremlin by linking it indissolubly with the ideas of freedom and justice.

3.2 *Materials for Phase One*

Shipment of long-range materials for use in Phase One virtually has been completed. The Wireless Bulletin and other fast media will continue to supply appropriate items on the first theme until the close of the first quarter. This applies particularly to informational materials for use in specific regions and countries.

3.3 *Transition to Phase Two*

Effort is being made to shift from one major emphasis to the other without a noticeable break in the psychological task undertaken in this coordinated approach to furtherance of continuing major U.S. foreign policy objectives. One phase is expected to pass imperceptibly into the next. The elements of each phase are expected to prove useful in succeeding phases, either through mere persistence of their psychological effect or through actual re-employment to complement the new themes. To a very large extent, the precise nature of themes for Phases Three and Four will be determined by events and by the experience of field officers in the utilization of campaign materials. It is the Department's desire that this whole concept be regarded as a flexible frame of reference for the posts.

4. *Development of Phase Two*

4.1 *Major Emphasis of Phase Two*

4.11 In further developing the broad basic theme for 1952, Progress Through Strength Towards Peace With Freedom, special emphasis will be placed on the theme *Strength for Peace With Freedom* in materials prepared for use during the second quarter (April, May and June). Elements of the first phase, *Peace With Freedom,* should prove useful in the Phase Two.

4.12 The major emphasis for Phase Two, *Strength For Peace With Freedom,* has three concurrent subheadings: (1) "Aggression Has Been Stopped"; (2) "The Free World is Invincible"; (3) "The Slave System is Doomed".

4.2 *Materials for Use in Phase Two*

4.21 Phase Two material is intended to show that the Free World has the material strength and the spiritual will to: (1) resist aggression; (2) attain a peace based on freedom and justice through mutual cooperation; and (3) build up its industrial potential not only to attain and preserve peace, but also for the general advancement of mankind. It also will show that strength in the hands of the Free World threatens the freedom of no one, in contrast to the misuse of force by the Communist imperialists; that the great strength of the Free World is in its human resources, particularly its workers and its youth, and that the price of freedom is high, requiring sacrifices on the part of those who would remain free.

4.22 So far as the program for the second quarter relates to motion pictures provided to the field by the Assistant Administrator for Motion Picture Services (IMS) and to leaflets, photo displays, posters, picture stories and press features produced by the Assistant Administrator for Press Services (IPS), the items which have been shipped or are in preparation are listed in an enclosure to this circular. This is by no means a complete list of the materials to be supplied for use in Phase Two. It does show the scope of the preparation made for the second quarterly emphasis.

4.23 Many of the press, photographic and publications items supplied for Phase Two will be marked, either through the use of a rubber stamp, or by a special transmittal sheet. Press material, generally, will be unmarked due to the technical difficulties involved. The presence of the subthemes listed in paragraph 4.12 above should be easily discernible in press materials designed for this campaign.

4.24 Voice of America feature and commentary materials will be developed in accordance with the general themes and subthemes cited for IPS materials.

4.25 The Assistant Administrator for Information Center Services will follow this circular with a communication listing materials on hand at centers abroad which are applicable to the themes and subthemes on Phase Two and materials which it plans to send to the field in support of the quarterly program.

4.26 The Department recognizes that USIS officers already are in possession of a large body of materials—press items, films, radio transcriptions and scripts, books, pamphlets, photos, et cetera—which may be used for exploiting the theme Phase Two. Some of the previously shipped material might be usefully employed to complement the materials especially prepared by IPS for use in the second quarter propaganda emphasis.

5. *Subsequent Instructions*

5.1 The themes and subthemes for the third and fourth quarters will be elaborated in subsequent instructions. USIS officers will also be advised of materials prepared for use in the campaign during the third and fourth quarters of 1952.

5.2 The Department will in a series of communications, issue further guidance on the execution of the plan, as well as set forth what is being done by the IIA operating media to implement the plan.

5.3 Attention of USIS officers is again called to the fact that the whole concept of the four thematic emphases, corresponding to the four quarters of 1952, should be regarded as a broad frame of reference with the greatest flexibility indicated.

## Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

### MATERIAL SHIPPED OR IN PREPARATION BY IPS AND IMS RELATING TO PHASE TWO

#### A. LEAFLETS, PHOTO DISPLAYS, POSTERS, PICTURE STORIES, AND PRESS FEATURES

*1. Aggression Has Been Stopped*

Pamphlets and Leaflets:

a) *Communism is Losing.* Eight-page leaflet showing the decline of Communist strength in trade union memberships, elections, party memberships, etc.

Shipping date: Feb. 20

b) *United Action in Korea.* 24-page photo pamphlet proving that collective security, as exemplified by U.N. action in halting Communist aggression in Korea, is a working reality. This publication is a reprint of a United Nations pamphlet. It was previously shipped to the field and will be reissued.

Shipping date: Feb. 15

c) *Aggression Can Be Stopped.* Four-page leaflet which itemizes postwar Communist aggression and how it was stopped by courage and concerted effort.

Shipping date: Feb. 28

Picture Stories:

a) *Strength of United Action.* Strength of free world as shown through NATO and SHAPE.

Shipping date: March 15

b) *Strength Through Sacrifice.* Sacrifices of U.N. forces in Korea to preserve peace.

Shipping date: March 5

Posters:

a) *NATO.* A Power for Peace. Emphasis not only on U.S. contribution but on contributions of other members.

Press Features:

a) *How Communist Imperialism Has Been Checked.* Series of byliners, columns, press features, magazine reprints, and commentaries on how the Free World has succeeded in blocking the Kremlin's grab for world control.

b) Collective Security Seen as Block to Soviet Imperialism. Prepared especially for Middle East.

c) Free World Agriculture Helps Stop Communist Aggression.

d) Free World Scientists Help Check Communist Aggression.

*2. The Free World is Invincible*

Pamphlets and Leaflets:

a) *The People are Winning.* Illustrated leaflet recounting the achievements won by free peoples in the fields of labor, economics, politics, etc. To be written in three versions for Europe, Southeast Asia, and Middle East.

Shipping date: March 1

b) *American Labor Unions.* 48-page illustrated pamphlet which tells the story of the American labor movement, how arbitration and collective bargaining operate, and the role of the ICFTU. This publication was previously sent to the field and is being reissued in conjunction with the campaign.

Shipping date: March 10

c) *Working Together, the Role of Cooperatives.* 48-page pamphlet illustrated by photos and drawings. Tells the story of cooperatives all over the world, what they are, the problems they face. Examples taken from Nova Scotia, India, Israel, Denmark, Egypt, U.S. Previously shipped to field; being reissued.

Shipping date: March 20

d) *Consumer Capitalism in Action.* 24-page pamphlet with photos. A simplified account of how capitalism works in the U.S., how labor and management negotiate, etc. Previously sent to field; to be reissued.

Shipping date: March 1

e) *Why We March.* Four-page leaflet. Comparison of May Day in free and Communist worlds; comparison of the workers; life in a free society and a Communist world. Primarily aimed at Germany, Italy, France, but adaptable for other audiences.

Shipping date: Feb. 15

f) *NATO For Peace.* Eight-page leaflet. Because aggressors respect strength only, the best insurance for peace and security is NATO.

Shipping date: March 15

Photo Displays:

a) *Aid to Other Nations.* Accomplishments of ECA, TCA, etc.

Shipping date: Jan. 30

b) *Practicing Brotherhood of Man in the U.S.* Red Cross, Community Chest, etc.

Shipping date: March 28

c) *NATO.* Activities of Allied nations for preserving world peace.

Shipping date: April 15

d) *Western Metropolis.* Where Many People Live in Peace and Security—San Francisco melting pot.

e) *NATO.* A Power for Peace. Emphasis as in feature poster—but with different pictures, and at least one picture for each member, Greece and Turkey included.

f) *Religion.* A Power for Peace. Emphasis on part that religion plays in daily lives of Americans and on religion as a power for peace.

g) *Washington.* At Work for Peace. Emphasis on those features of a great capital which directly or indirectly stand for peace of freedom and defense of that peace.

Picture Stories:

a) *Strength Through Knowledge.* Foreign students exchange program.

Shipping date: Feb. 26

b) *Invincibility in the Free World.* U.S. military power.

Shipping date: Feb. 15

c) *Power of Youth to Obtain Peace Objectives.* PAL, [3] Boys Town, etc.

Shipping date: Feb. 19

d) *Progress of Point Four in Various Countries.*

Shipping date: March

e) *The Only Goals We Seek.* U.S. and free world efforts to eliminate poverty, disease, illiteracy, etc.

Shipping date: Feb. 26

f) *NATO.* A Power for Peace. Similar in emphasis to feature poster and photo display of same title but with different pictures.

g) *Religion.* A Power for Peace. Emphasis as in photo display, but pictures telling a story of a spiritual pilgrimage and retreat in a monastery in Kentucky, (for discretionary area use).

h) *Ideas.* A Power for Peace. Similar in emphasis to World Photo Review Poster with different pictures. Pictures will cover all major areas.

Posters:

a) *They Work For Peace.* World Photo Review No. 35.

Shipping date: Dec. 10

b) *World Leaders Meet to Promote Peace.* World Photo Poster No. 36.

Shipping date: Jan. 12

c) *Borders Without Bayonets.* World Photo Review Poster No. 37.

Shipping date: Jan. 25

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[3] Police Athletic League.

d) *International Exchange of Ideas.* Feature Poster No. 38.

Shipping date: Feb. 8

e) *Atomic Energy for Peacetime Uses.* Newspaper Insert No. 5.

Shipping date: Jan. 25

f) *Point Four in Action.* Educational Poster No. 1.

Shipping date: Jan. 18

g) *International Understanding Through Youth Groups.* Education Poster No. 2.

Shipping date: March 18

h) *Harmonious Labor-Management Relationships.* Educational Poster No. 3.

Shipping date: May 18

i) *Museums of Science and Industry.* (Cultural) Feature Poster No. 37.

Shipping date: Jan. 26

j) *Ideas.* A Power for Peace, World Photo Review Poster. Emphasis on exchange of ideas through international exchange of students. Pictures will cover all major areas.

Press Features:

a) *Free World's Growing Strength to Defend Itself.* Series of byliners, columns, press features, magazine reprints, and commentaries on the material and spiritual strength of the Free World.

b) *Strength of Free World Is In Cooperation.* Series of Special Press Features to be sent out by Mission Service European Unit.

c) *Asia's Growing Power to Defend Itself.* Prepared especially for Far East.

d) *Organization of American States Knits Hemisphere into Strong Force for Peace.*

e) *Americas Share Military Know-How to Strengthen Peace Power.*

*3. The Slave System is Doomed*

Pamphlets and Leaflets:

a) *Where Are They Now?* 24 pages. Names, pictures, and biographies of old-time Bolsheviks, formerly Stalin's cronies, who were purged.

Shipping date: Feb. 25

b) *Slave Labor in the Soviet World.* 32 pages. Documenting [words missing from the source text.]

Shipping date: Feb. 12

c) *The Deadly Parallel.* 16-page comparison of the similarity between Nazism and Communism.

Shipping date: April 15

d) *Blood Money for Mao.* 8-page leaflet describing the Chinese Communist extortion racket, mainly for Far and Middle East.

Shipping date: Feb. 15

e) *Buddhism Under the Soviet Yoke.* 4-page leaflet. Reports of plight of Buddhism in Communist countries, with a statement by a "Living Buddha".

Shipping date: Jan. 31

Picture Stories:

a) *Pattern for Slavery.* Comparing Nazism and Soviet Communism.

b) *Development of a Soviet Satellite.*

Posters:

a) *Vishinsky Laughed.* Emphasis of pictures on various scenes of war-caused misery, on U.N. efforts towards peace, and on Vishinsky's celebrated U.N. scoffing.

Shipping date: Jan. 8

b) *Stalin's Slave Empire.* Emphasis on "Gulag" may [*name*?] of Russian slave labor camps. Feature poster No. 36.

Shipping date: Jan. 11

Press Features:

a) *Unrest Behind the Iron Curtain.* Series of byliners, columns, press features, magazine reprints, and commentaries citing the growing weakness of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

b) *Purges Behind the Iron Curtain.*

c) *The Iron Curtain—Symbol of Soviet Decadence, Fear, and Weakness.*

d) *Failures of Soviet Economic Institutions to Reach Objectives.*

e) *Falsification of Soviet Statistics to Cover Failures.*

### B. FILMS

*1. Films Previously Distributed*

a) In Defense of Peace

b) One Year in Korea

c) UN Aids Korea

*2. Films in Current Distribution*

a) Plan for Peace. Animation depicting plan for international control of atomic energy as presented at the UN General Assembly, Paris. Released for distribution by Republic Pictures.

b) Japan Joins the Free Nations. Pegged on signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco.

c) Soldiers of Freedom. Filmed at Fort Benning, Ga., and showing the training of military personnel from NATO and other nations.

*3. Films to be Distributed*

a) Workers For Peace. Embrace the 9 living winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, highlighting most recent recipient, Ralph Bunche.

b) Foreign Language Press and Radio in the U.S. Stressing the freedom of the press and radio throughout the U.S. to disseminate information in various foreign languages for the benefit of those who do not understand English.

c) Operation Mascot. Demonstrating humanitarian efforts to rehabilitate the children of Korea for useful lives in a peaceful world.

d) Peace Worth Having (The first two films of the "Peace With Freedom" Series. The third and

e) Keeping the Peace final film will be "Defending the Peace" and will be released toward the end of the year.)

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Secretary's Daily Meetings, lot 58 D 609, 1952

## *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams)* [1]

[Extract]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 5, 1952.

Subject: Summary of Meeting with the Secretary

| Participants: | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mr. Acheson | Mr. Jessup |
| | Mr. Bruce | Mr. Nitze |
| | Mr. Matthews | Mr. McWilliams |
| | Mr. Humelsine | Mr. Battle |
| | Mr. Armstrong | |

. . . . . . .

Item 4. *American Motion Pictures Shown Abroad*

Mr. Cowen [2] brought up the subject of American motion pictures shown abroad and the damage to our standing by certain types of pictures. He mentioned particularly pictures on subjects of racial discrimination and also pictures of the gangster type. He urged that either the Secretary or Mr. Bruce talk to Eric Johnston [3] to see what could be done about this. The suggestion was also made that a list of pictures considered harmful be compiled and also our Ambassadors be asked their views of damage done by specifically what pictures. (I have talked to Mr. Phillips about these points and he will see what can be done about them.)

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[1] Copies to Matthews and Battle.

[2] Presumably Myron M. Cowen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs.

[3] President of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.

. . . . . . .

W. J. McWilliams

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511.00/6-1752: Circular airgram

*The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Offices* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 17, 1952—7:35 p.m.

EXPOSING OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

The purpose of this communication is to obtain the Missions' consideration and recommendations for further use among intellectuals of certain materials exposing Communist propaganda techniques.

A number of recent books and other publications deal with Communist techniques for warping mental attitudes. Two outstanding treatments of the subject are "Brain Washing in Red China" by Edward Hunter and "The Reds Take A City" by John W. Riley and Wilber Schramm. Distribution copies of the former book were shipped to Missions on October 30, 1951, and of the latter on December 19, 1951. Every Mission received at least one copy.

The Department believes that those portions of these books which reveal the purposeful and brutally efficient manner in which Communist officialdom sets out to change the basic mental attitudes and thought patterns of people living in areas under Communist control should be brought to the attention of intellectuals. It is felt that those portions of the books emphasizing disruption of family loyalties, betrayal of traditional social and economic patterns, abnegation to Communist ideology and the stifling of initiative, can be effectively used to wean intellectuals of Asia and the Middle East away from Communism. To a more limited, but nonetheless important extent, they may be useful in other areas of the world as well. It is recognized that in many countries the impact of this material might be more effective without passages emphasizing "the hate America" campaign.

A report is requested on the use of the two titles and of other similar materials.

A current IBS series entitled "Forbidden Literature" reports one facet of "operation brain washing." Reprints of articles entitled

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[1] Drafted by G. Huntington Damon of IIA on May 29. Cleared by IFI, IPS, and ICS.

"What You Can Read in Russia" and "The Great Liquidation: Satellite Culture" are in process for field use.

The Department will from time to time transmit further materials on this subject and summaries or popularized adaptations of such materials suitable for newspaper, magazine, or indigenous pamphlet use.

The use of such materials should be planned in terms of a long term program directed at intellectuals. This program should not be blatant. It should be adapted to the psychological situation and conditions in each country. One phase of it should consist of a steady and consistent reiteration of methods used by Communists to attain control of thought processes.

Would the Missions be interested in cartoon or other pictorial treatment of the subject?

The Missions are requested to evaluate with particular care and to report to the Department on the extent to which this effort should and can be successfully conducted by indigenous sources, with the open activities of USIS or any other U.S. source held either to a minimum or kept entirely in the background.

The Administrator of the International Information Administration of the Department has recommended that every key officer in the International Information Administration read "Brain Washing in Red China." It is hoped that the Public Affairs Officers, if they are not already familiar with the book, will give it their careful attention at the earliest opportunity. Other appropriate officers of the USIS should also do so. [2]

ACHESON

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[2] The only reply to this airgram found in Department of State files is despatch 33 from Prague, July 28. It stressed the difficulties of carrying out Acheson's requests from a post in Eastern Europe. (511.00/7-2852)

## *Editorial Note*

On June 30 the Senate adopted a resolution creating a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee charged with examining the overseas information programs of the United States. The subcommittee was composed of Senators Fulbright (chairman), Gillette, Benton, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Mundt. The subcommittee submitted an interim report (83d Congress, Senate Report No. 30) on January 30, 1953, urging that United States overseas information services and programs as well as those of private agencies be strengthened.

110.4/7-2952

### *Memorandum by the Administrator of the International Information Administration (Compton) to the Secretary of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 29, 1952.

It is six months since I have been on this "job". The order by which you established the U.S. International Information Administration included a number of other matters with which officially I am not concerned. In the attached report, therefore, I am referring only to the matters related to either the International Information Administration itself, or to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee of which, during the past four months, I have been acting as chairman.

As you know, I have tried deliberately to administer my responsibilities and authorities without encroaching on your time or on the time of your own office. Some of the matters still in suspense may require action by you. If so, the indicated action will, I believe, be apparent.

I have suggested to your office that the most expeditious way of handling these matters would be that you have an opportunity to examine this report and thereafter, at your early convenience, that I have an opportunity to discuss it with you personally. This, if convenient for you, may be before you leave for Honolulu [2] or shortly after your return. Certain important decisions for 1953 should be determined not later than August 15.

IIA still has more problems than answers, a condition I notice which seems to apply quite generally nowadays in the Department. But the ratio of answers to problems is, I believe, in every respect more favorable than when you established this consolidated activity last January.

I warmly appreciate the prompt action which you have taken on the few occasions on which it appeared appropriate to ask you for affirmative action.

Yours sincerely,

WILSON COMPTON

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Sec Saw".

[2] Acheson attended the first meeting of the ANZUS Council at Honolulu from Aug. 4-8, 1952. For documentation on this meeting, see vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 172 ff.

[Attachment]

## *Report by the Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Compton) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

### U.S. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (IIA) *

*1. Establishment*

The U.S. International Information Administration was officially established on January 16, 1952 (Departmental Announcement No. 4).[3] I became its Administrator on January 20. The necessary consolidations and reorganization of the "International Information and Educational Exchange Program" were initiated at once with the cooperation of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. They have been pressed as rapidly as the facilities available and the interests of the Department would permit. The reorganization is now far advanced but not yet completed.

*2. Scope of IIA*

Your order provided that under IIA jurisdiction were to be included the "foreign information activities for the administration of which the Secretary is responsible". With the execution on March 27, 1952 of an appropriate agreement with TCA; the transfer to IIA by the Army following April 28, 1952 of the Japan program; and the transfer to IIA as of July 1, 1952 (Departmental Announcement No. 84) of the information programs in Germany and Austria, the consolidation of administration in IIA, of all the foreign information activities for which you are responsible is on the way to completion.

*3. Funds for Operations*

For these activities (except the German and Austrian programs which are separately financed) the appropriations for 1952 were $86,575,000. For 1953 the funds requested, funds recommended, and funds appropriated were as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Requested for 1953 | $133,272,914. |
| Recommended by House Com. | 111,066,000. |
| Voted by House | 86,575,000. |
| Recommended by Senate Com. | 86,575,000. |
| Voted by Senate | 88,556,516. |

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*A six-months' report to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1952. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] *Ante*, p. 1591.

| | |
|---|---|
| Appropriated in 1952 for 1953 | 87,325,000. |
| (Appropriation in 1951, for 1952 | 85,000,000.) |

In addition to these are a number of miscellaneous special earmarked funds. By amendment to the MSA Act IIA, with respect to its exchange of persons activities, has now been put in the position of an authorized general claimant for counterpart funds. This should be useful. No additional appropriation was made for the Japan program.

*4. Capital Funds*

For 1952 no additional capital funds were appropriated. For 1953 IIA requested $36,727,086 for additional radio facilities overseas and in the United States (Ring Plan). The House Committee recommended $20,500,000. No funds were appropriated by either House.

*5. Financial Status of Program (1953)*

The cost of continuing, through 1953, of the 1952 year-end scale of program (including Japan; also including provision for operating new radio facilities; but not including Germany and Austria) is estimated at approximately $100,000,000 or about $12,500,000 more than the 1953 funds appropriated. Some economies and savings have been made. Others are underway. Still others are under investigation, with the help of inside and outside management surveys.

Some curtailments of scope of program nevertheless are necessary. These after consultation with the divisions concerned are being made selectively, based on (1) priorities, (2) evaluations, (3) consultation with overseas missions, (4) advice of regional bureaus. The funds allocated to broadcasting and overseas mission activities will be increased in 1953 over 1952; to the other media reduced. 1953 will be a period of consolidation and selection, not expansion.

*6. Relations with Appropriations Committees*

The House Committee in February made a penetrating investigation of IIA 1953 proposed budgets, and recommended support of practically all of the proposed activities, except most of the so-called "special projects". The House hearings were promptly and skillfully conducted. They were merciless. But they were fair and in constructive spirit. The Senate Committee hearings were reached in May. They were less extensive than the House hearings, well attended by Committee members. The Senate hearings were fairly and firmly conducted in a friendly atmosphere. The Committee recommended the figure previously voted by the House

($85,575,000) expressing the opinion that a "good" program can be conducted with this amount and that "expansion" should wait.

Notwithstanding the sharp criticism of individual items or proposals or of proposed scope of activities, no hostility to the program itself was manifested in either Committee. I am told by colleagues, with respect to "atmospheric conditions", that these hearings in both Houses were more of a *contrast* than a *comparison* with similar hearings in recent past years.

### 7. *Supplemental Appropriations 1953*

Tentatively we plan to propose a supplemental budget, 1953, for further improved radio facilities (and a few other items, not including operations funds). Reason: Our progress in radio *programming* has already outstripped our progress in facilities for *delivering a satisfactory radio signal* overseas. In radio we are "out of balance". While some curtailment in some radio programs is justified, the more constructive answer to the present unbalanced situation is to expedite the authorization and completion of additional units of the "Ring Plan", including additional mobile broadcasting units (Vagabond type). The initial ship-mounted mobile unit (The "Courier") has already demonstrated an electronic performance considerably beyond expectations and much in excess of specifications requirements. The feasibility of mobile land units (car- or truck-mounted) is being investigated.

### 8. *Organization of IIA*

Consistent with the objectives of IIA as defined in your original order of establishment, many consolidations and other organization changes have been made or are underway. These are summarized in the attached chart of January 30, 1952. Among the more important arrangements are these:

(a) The overseas operations are now under a single Deputy Administrator for Field Programs. These are the heart of the program. The overseas operations "come first". This is to put the horse before the cart.

(b) The media divisions (with the partial exception of the radio broadcasting services) are being reoriented essentially as service agencies to assist and implement the overseas operations.

(c) An Office of "Policy and Plans" has been established under an Assistant Administrator for *guidance* to all operating units.

(d) The Evaluation (and related research) Staff reports to the Office of the Administrator, rather than to the media divisions. Evaluation should be kept separate from operations.

(e) The Advisory Commissions are attached to the Administrator's Office rather than to the media divisions.

(f) A *Management* Division under a single experienced Assistant Administrator reports to the Administrator. It is expected to develop all opportunities for improvement in business management.

(g) Additional facilities have been provided to encourage and facilitate private cooperation and private participation in the program.

The first IIA Organization Manual was published within the Department on June 12. Additional installments to include all units of IIA are scheduled to be completed during calendar year 1952.

*9. Media Divisions*

The present status of the media divisions in general terms is as follows:

a. Press—satisfactory
b. Information centers—satisfactory
c. Exchange of persons—fair
d. Motion pictures—fair
e. Radio—unsatisfactory

Most of the media have made substantial progress during the past six months toward better organization, administration and management.

*10. "Unfinished Business" of Organization*

IIA is still operating under important handicaps. Most of these are beyond the direct control of the Department of State. Some, however, are within its competence.

Among the factors largely beyond the control of the Department are these:

a. *Space*

Space accommodations for IIA in general are mediocre. Widely scattered and inadequate space has been a hardship especially to the crucial Office of Policy and Plans (Connors); the Division of Field Operations (Johnstone);[4] and the Information Center Service (Lacy).[5] These conditions are gradually being improved. Had there been ordinary cooperation on the part of other Federal Agencies (notably the Federal Power Commission) many of these handicaps would have been relieved long ago.

b. *Amendments to P.L. 402*

The most important part of the amendments to P.L. 402 proposed by the Department relates to "super-grades" for IIA (asked by the Department, 20; approved by the Bureau of the Budget, 12). The bill, when it finally reached the Capitol, was buried in Committee. In fact it apparently had no consideration in either House or Senate except a decision by the House Committee to postpone consideration to the next Congress.

*Explanation*

These provisions are important if IIA is to *secure and hold superior top personnel*, and in the long run it will not have superior *bottom* personnel unless also it has superior *top personnel*. At present IIA includes one-half of the total personnel of the Department and has considerably more than 40 per cent of its total funds. The Department of State, in positions subordinate to the Secretary and the Under Secretary has 65 statutory or Civil Service super-grades. Of these 65 super-grade positions 1 (a grade GS–17) is now assigned to IIA. The only other access of IIA to "super-grades" or equivalent is by temporary assignment of top-ranking Foreign Service Officers. There are few such assignments. In fact the number of Foreign Service Officers in IIA has evidently dwindled during the past three years by more than one-half notwithstanding that the total personnel of IIA during the same period has been more than doubled.

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[4] William C. Johnstone.

[5] Dan T. Lacy.

This conspicuous unbalanced personnel situation of IIA is perhaps its greatest basic weakness. IIA employment is not "popular" in the Department. Experienced career men do not ordinarily encourage younger men to seek a "career" by the route of the Information Service. Some discourage it. As long as the top positions in IIA are so conspicuously below the top positions in other services of the Department the Information Service evidently will be *judged and rated accordingly*. Six months ago I thought this matter was comparatively unimportant. I still think that it should not be important. But by the prevailing standards within the Government with respect to rank, rate, and position, it is important. I have reluctantly concluded that it is not feasible to achieve one of your basic objectives in establishing IIA, i.e. to "lift" the status of this program within the Department of State, until this unbalanced personnel situation is substantially improved.

Among the factors within the Department's competence are these:

a. *Personnel*

This, as you know, has been a difficult matter from the outset, and as important to IIA as it is difficult. Your original order establishing IIA in January includes the specification that the Administrator:

> "determines the selection and assignment of personnel to the IIA program, at home and abroad, under the personnel policies applicable to the IIA program."

This evidently was a new procedure, a new precedent, within the Department. It was quietly resisted down the line. For a time it appeared that it was somewhere being "sabotaged". For several months IIA did not succeed in securing a reasonable chance even to "start to commence to get ready to begin" the establishment of the special IIA unit within the Office of Personnel as provided in Departmental Announcement No. 4. This neglect was finally appealed in June to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. With the cooperation of the Director of the Office of Personnel affirmative actions were taken. I hope they will work.

b. *Foreign Service Reserve Positions*

Early in July it was evident that action by Congress to provide a few "super-grade" positions for IIA would not be taken until next year. IIA then asked the assignment to it, as a partial temporary substitute, of a few top-grade foreign service reserve positions (substantially equivalent to super-grade positions). This request was rejected by A on the grounds of Department policy. This rejection may have been warranted. But it may be noted that similar foreign service reserve appointments have been recently provided for departmental service in other areas of the Department.

c. *"Administrative Support"*

This blanket category represents about one-sixth of the total dollar expenditures of IIA. Months ago after consultation with the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration IIA asked a thorough review of the manner of determining these "administrative support" charges. There has been no disagreement in principle. But the review is tedious.

IIA, of course, should pay its proportionate share of the cost of all of these common services of the Department. All that IIA was objecting to was the "pig-in-a-poke" method of determining the amounts to be assessed against its funds. This method had little if any visible relation to the services actually rendered or actually used. There is little room for doubt, especially in overseas missions, that administrative support funds actually provided by IIA were being used regularly to support other services of the missions. We have asked that IIA funds for administrative support be so identified, and that the charges against these funds be hereafter determined on the basis of services actually rendered. In the review for these purposes, now underway, IIA is represented through its Management Division (Kimball).

### *11. Relations of IIA to Other Areas of the Department of State*

The principal contacts of the Administrator's office during the six months period have naturally been with U, A, P, H and TCA. These contacts have been uniformly constructive, friendly and helpful to IIA. Continuous staff contacts have been maintained with the Regional Bureaus. These contacts on the whole have been satisfactory. The IIA conception was a new idea in the Department. As you know, from the outset, there has been some skepticism about the idea; also some resistance. There still is.

But the dragging of feet has been dwindling. As a fair generalization, at the end of six months, overt resistance to the IIA idea may be said to have subsided. The residue of "talking it down", describing it as "temporary", or referring to it as having no "future" to the careerist, and the like, is of consequence I think only insofar as it discourages promising young people from accepting IIA employment. The Office of Personnel is alert to it and is taking steps which I think will be substantially effective in neutralizing this sort of inside "propaganda". For these constructive results at the end of a difficult six months period the earnest cooperation of the Under Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration and his Staff is largely accountable.

*12. Congressional Relations*

On the whole I think the Congressional relations of IIA are reasonably good. At least they are much better than evidently they were. This applies to both parties. We have succeeded I believe in maintaining the non-partisan position of IIA. There is little hostility,—at least little vocal hostility,—to the program in either party; and from time to time there have been strong public commendations, in which partisan terms if they exist are at least indistinguishable. IIA so far has had little direct attention from the Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs and the exigencies of the coming elections presage possibilities of important changes in these Committees as well as in the Appropriations Committees.

The recent approval of the Benton–Wiley Resolution (S. Res. 74) [6] and the formation of the new Fulbright [7] Committee to make the study authorized by it, may provide a chance to lift the whole level of the overseas information and educational exchange program to a higher stature in the affairs of Government. As of this date the Committee has not been formally appointed. But the Committee on Foreign Relations has appointed Senators Fulbright (Chairman), Hickenlooper, [8] Wiley and Gillette. [9] It is understood that the Vice-President contemplates appointing Senator Benton and possibly Senator Morse [10] or Senator Mundt. [11] The Committee itself does not anticipate any Committee (as distinguished from Staff) activity until September 15. Evidently there will be short public hearings and overseas committee investigations both eastward and westward this fall. The resolution requires the Committee to report to the Senate by January 31, 1953.

IIA has provided the Foreign Relations Committee staff with desired information and will assist the Committee and the Staff in whatever ways are available. The Committee study is expected to include (1) appraisal of the needs and opportunities for overseas information (2) evaluation of present U.S. program (3) estimate of various information techniques (4) consideration of relation of U.S. programs to programs of other countries and (5) exploration of the question of the location of the information service (i.e. in the Department of State or outside).

13. Thurman L. Barnard has completed his six-months' commission from you to look into the status and conduct of the overseas

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[6] See the editorial note, p. 1627. Senator William Benton (D., Conn.), 1949–1953.

[7] Senator William Fulbright (D., Ark.).

[8] Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Iowa).

[9] Senator Guy M. Gillette (D., Iowa).

[10] Senator Wayne Morse (R., Ore.).

[11] Senator Karl Mundt (R., S.D.).

activities of this program in the Far East, Middle East and Europe. He has given me a copy of his report to you.[12] He has shared with me his impressions, such as these:

> The "general high calibre of American personnel".
>
> Information program is "pretty good", with "great unevenness" in its operations.
>
> In "too many missions we are trying to do too many things".
>
> "Essential that we get three more Hultens (regional representative in Europe) in the field" for "cross-fertilization, to raise the level of the poorer ones to the level of the better ones."
>
> We are still operating in the field "too much on the basis of hunch"; or "flying blind".
>
> Washington is still trying to "mastermind" the field operations. "Too much material is still going to the field that is dreamed up back home."
>
> We need "more authority and more responsibility in the field."
>
> "Our radio problem is a long way from being solved."

In these views generally I concur. We have made much progress in identifying our *problems*; and we have made substantial progress toward finding the answers.

*14. General Comments on IIA Program*

(1) Good progress has been made toward integrating the information operations of IIA and MSA in Europe; and steps toward similar integration in other MSA countries are underway. TCA and IIA have an overseas information agreement which is satisfactory to IIA and, so far as I have reason to believe, satisfactory to TCA.

(2) IIA can provide a reasonable minimum information service in Japan in 1953 only by scaling down the IIA program elsewhere. This is being done.

(3) The German-Austrian program, relatively, is amply financed.

(4) About 35 per cent of the complete proposed "Ring Plan" of improved world-wide radio facilities was authorized and appropriated for in 1950, 51. This includes seven out of twenty proposed major units. The specifications, estimating and contracting of these units have not been well handled by our International Broadcasting Service.

(5) You have had a recent report elsewhere on the organization and business management of the radio services of IIA, the urgent need for improvements, and the contemplated action.

(6) The recent two-way suspension of the "Amerika" Magazine in the Soviet Union and USSR publications in the United States seems to have had general, but not universal, public approval.

(7) To reduce the hazards of promiscuous criticism at home IIA is following a policy of avoiding the employment of "borderline"

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[12] This report cannot be further identified.

persons; use of "borderline" authors; selection of "borderline" writings or other products. This policy is hard to define and harder to administer. But it seems to have reduced the extent of domestic "issues" and it does not appear to have impaired the service.

(8) IIA is seeking gradually (a) to improve the quality of its American staff overseas; (b) to place more responsibility upon, and give wider discretion to, the overseas staff in each country; (c) to increase the proportionate use of local nationals, to select them more carefully and to pay them better.

(9) In attempting, where it has seemed appropriate for the Administrator to do so, to influence the spirit and direction of our work overseas and in the United States, I have been relying more upon giving our key staff members a "*point of view*" (rather than explicit instructions), and a sense of "mission". This approach I believe is proving itself. I am planning during next November and December, in company with the Deputy Administrator for Field Programs to meet in convenient groups our principal Public Affairs Officers in the Far East, Southeast Asia, Middle East and Europe. Meantime I am regularly meeting each month, here or in New York, the staff officers of each of our media divisions.

(10) We are seeking in the IIA program, more effectively to mobilize the element of religious interest as the most important single common denominator of universal appeal.

(11) In recent months (largely traceable I think to world-wide propaganda over the germ warfare and Korean prisoner allegations) there have been increasing pressures on IIA to "take a leaf out of the book of the Big Lie." These have been rejected and they will be. We have said that the "Voice of America" will not be the voice of Americans unless it is the voice of truth; and if we were to seek to model after the international communists, that we would lose even if we won.

(12) Like you I have been uneasy over the continuing charges—some nebulous and some less nebulous—of disloyalty to the United States within IIA. That such charges are leveled mostly at the International Broadcasting Service may be due to the fact that the "Voice of America" is the most conspicuous feature of IIA. But where there continues to be as much "smoke" there may be some "fire". The Assistant Administrator in charge of IBS is himself confident of the loyalty of its Staff and its loyalty must be protected from encroachment from either outside or inside. I have often said that this program is no place for "half-hearted" Americans. It may be that our problem is not so much one of "disloyalty" in its technical sense as of faintheartedness in carrying out a mission. Within the past fortnight I have had further assertions from within IIA of "disloyalty". I have, of course, at once transmitted this information

to SY for FBI investigation. FBI may be counted upon to deal with problems of loyalty and security. It cannot help us to deal with the problem of unsuitability of persons who are engaged in a "mission" but have no sense of mission. That I regard as an important part of the "unfinished business" of IIA.

*15. Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee*

The chairmanship of POC is a second function which you asked me to undertake. Recent changes in the POC set-up and staff plan have evidently had satisfactory results. The staff work of this interdepartmental cooperation is now centered under the direction of the IIA Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans. Under this plan the work of the interdepartmental staff (State, Defense, CIA and MSA) seems to "count for more". Apparently the present plan and operations of POC are satisfactory to the participating agencies (also to the Psychological Strategy Board). The daily reports and guidances of its "Watch Committee" seem to have been useful to the Far East Command, the United Nations Command and the Eighth Army.

15a. In all these matters during the past six months I have done what I could.

WILSON COMPTON

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CON files, lot 53 D 233, "Investigations, 1952"

*Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Scott) to the Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Compton)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY [WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1952.

Subject: Investigation at Voice of America, New York City

Our Security people have reported the results obtained so far by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and SY [2] on certain charges and allegations made by employees of IBS. [3]

Since the IBS employees against whom allegations have been made were originally investigated by the FBI, the FBI was called in to make the appropriate inquiry. The FBI has reported on the basis of an *initial* investigation that most of the allegations concern administrative practices, with fewer charges bordering on disloyalty or suitability. The charges concerning disloyalty are, in most part, allegations of deliberate tone-down and sabotage of Voice program content. Deliberate, skillful countering of U.S. objectives by choice of material and emphasis is alleged.

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[1] Drafted by John W. Ford, Assistant Chief of the Division of Security, Bureau of Administration.

[2] Division of Security, Bureau of Administration.

[3] International Broadcasting Service, U.S. International Information Administration.

The FBI representative at New York stated that since their initial inquiry had indicated the greater percentage of the information was primarily State's responsibility to investigate, it was the FBI's desire that SY develop all information possessed by informants, and refer to the FBI only such data as would form the basis for an FBI investigation on loyalty.

As a result of Mr. Ford's recent visit to New York, and from the results of SY's inquiry to-date, it does appear that the greater percentage of the charges will concern administrative practices. However, there are a considerable number of allegations pertaining to moral deviation, security or loyalty. Some of the allegations on moral deviation have been proved true and the individuals involved have been dismissed. Other moral deviation allegations are currently under investigation.

For the purpose of conducting an investigation into the situation, four SY Agents have been assigned to New York to carry out the required interviews. The Agents are obtaining insofar as possible full signed statements from the persons interviewed. Information developed by SY during the investigation will be segregated into the following categories:

(a) loyalty information to be furnished FBI for investigation.

(b) information requiring further SY inquiry on security or suitability grounds.

(c) information requiring administrative inquiry on policy or program questions.

I suggest you may wish to approach the investigation of these allegations of an administrative or policy nature by undertaking a thorough review of the content of questioned broadcast material, checking the selection of material, emphasis, et cetera. A study of this sort would have to cover a sufficient number of broadcasts to establish a clear case, which I realize would impose a considerable burden.

I suggest, therefore, that you designate Mr. Art Kimball to consult immediately with Mr. Ford concerning the findings of an administrative or policy nature which have been obtained so far, in order that Mr. Ford and Mr. Kimball may jointly recommend action to be taken in light of the investigation now in progress.

PSB files, lot 62 D 333, PSB D–34, "Miscellaneous Correspondence"

## *Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Phillips) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 11, 1952.

Subject: Propaganda Implications of the Slansky Trial and the Rosenberg Case. [2]

Recent reports from European posts suggest a revival of interest in the Rosenberg case on the part of the Communist press and various left-wing and front organizations. This may be partly explained by the standard Communist policy of distorting and exploiting U.S. legal judgments against Communists and members of racial minorities, but it is probably related more directly to the intense European reaction to the Slansky trial and its anti-Semitic implications, which have resulted in a decisive propaganda setback for the Communists, save possibly in the Arab States.

Judging from the limited reports available at the present time, it can be assumed that current agitation on behalf of the Rosenbergs is largely the work of front organizations and probably does not represent any significant doubt on the part of the non-Communist public regarding the integrity of U.S. action in the case. The positive effect, if any, of the Rosenberg campaign has been within Communist circles and secondarily, upon groups or individuals who do not believe in capital punishment.

So far, according to the best reports available, some two thousand protests have been received to date, principally by our missions in London and Paris, principally from recognizable Communist sources regarding the Rosenberg case, an insignificant number compared to, say the Willie McGee case.

With regard to the Rosenberg case, full documentation and editorial comment has been carried by our media. More recently (November 1952), it was felt desirable to supply affected posts with rebuttal material in the form of a review, including legal documentation and comment, in USIS Special Feature 130 of November 17, and the Wireless Bulletin 274 of November 18. In response to the recent renewal of Communist propaganda on the Rosenbergs, the findings of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and of the American Civil Liberties Union, were provided to missions as source material for effective local handling. Such material has also been the basis for Voice of America output, as well as informal briefing, both here and abroad, of responsible representatives of the foreign press.

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[1] Drafted by Coulter D. Huyler of P.

[2] For documentation on the trial of Rudolph Slansky in Czechoslovakia, see volume VIII. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had been convicted of atomic espionage in January 1951 and had been incarcerated while the verdict was being appealed.

With regard to the Slansky case, our own media output and guidances stressed, where appropriate, the anti-Zionist angle, and gave full play to the Communist trial technique as contrasted with the democratic processes of law. No attempt was made to defend those on trial, but full emphasis was given to the fact that they were being tried on trumped-up charges. The Slansky trial has been the subject of some forty VOA scripts tailored for regional consumption. International press coverage of the Slansky trial, basically in support of our views, has been exceptionally good.

There is little doubt that present Communist agitation of the Rosenberg case is a deliberate diversionary tactic whose principal aim is to divert attention from the Slansky trial. It is safe to say that this attempt has been unsuccessful and has little effect save within Communist circles.

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "IIA—Miscellaneous Reports"

## *Extract From a "Report on International Information Administration—1952" to the Secretary of State from the Administrator of IIA (Compton) December 31, 1952* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

Under date of August 8, 1952 at the end of the first six months of operation of the International Information Administration, I made an informal written report to you. [2] In that report I mentioned my intention, during November and December, to meet overseas with our principal Public Affairs Officers in the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Within the last few days this extensive schedule of conferences has been completed. Finally these have included more than 50 countries and have involved over 21,000 miles of travel. I have, so to speak, looked into the "nooks and crannies" of the United States Information Service around the world.

As reported to you, the International Information Administration is in the midst of a formidable transition. Historically the Information and Educational Exchange Program has been developed largely as five *media* programs (press and publications, radio, motion pictures, information centers, and exchange of persons) with initiative and responsibility centered in New York and Washington and with country outlets overseas. The program has had the elements of strength, and the greater elements of weakness, of a "mass" approach to the differing political, economic, cultural and ideological situations and opportunities in the 87 countries covered by this enterprise. We are now gradually converting it into a world-wide program consisting of individual country programs, each adapted to its appropriate objectives, each directed at selected population groups, each using the media best suited to these purposes.

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "For personal use of A—Mr. Humelsine." A complete copy of this report has not been found.

[2] Reference is presumably to the attachment to Wilson Compton's memorandum of July 29, p. 1629.

*Transition to Country Programs*

Under present budget regulations the completion of this transition evidently will take at least 12 months and perhaps 18. If we continue information activities in all 87 countries—and this matter is itself under review—the total *operating program* of the International Information Administration will eventually consist of 87 country programs and nothing else; its *operating budget* will consist essentially of 87 country budgets; the media will be service agencies to implement the approved country programs; and the media budgets will be derived from the country budgets. In the vernacular this transition means exchanging the "shot-gun" for the "rifle".

This plan has inspired the general enthusiasm of our missions overseas. It is approved—and now even insisted upon—by the Bureau of the Budget. It has long been encouraged by Committees of both Houses of the Congress and has been endorsed in principle by our Advisory Commissions on Information and on Educational Exchange. Eventually it will multiply the effectiveness of our overseas information program on whatever scale it may be undertaken. It is a further long step toward enabling us to take the "offensive" in the war of ideas.

This transition means a heavy increase in the extent of responsibility, authority and discretion lodged with our Public Affairs Officers and missions overseas. It means important problems here of personnel selection, information policy guidance, basic program planning and media support as well as of management. With the improvements in organization and management already made or well under way, we now have, or will soon have, the means of dealing effectively with these problems of program mechanics.

*Impressions of Overseas Information Services*

Our Public Affairs Officers in conference groups in Tokyo, Rangoon, Bonn and Brussels or individually elsewhere have made many useful and practical suggestions for improving the effectiveness of our overseas information program. These suggestions are being analyzed by the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Field

Programs. They are in considerable detail. They are not included here. But they are readily available to you if you wish. Meantime may I mention some general impressions of our staff, organization and performance here and overseas; and certain steps which if taken will strengthen and improve our overseas information service:

1. Our overseas information program generally is "much improved". That is my own impression. It seems also to be the general verdict of observers and investigators. There are many weak spots, especially in radio and in press and publications. These are having attention. We are still doing a better job of reaching the people who *think* the most than the people who, by their numbers, *count* for the most. We are making good progress in working with and through indigenous groups and indigenous sponsorship.

2. Among our Public Affairs Officers overseas about 60 per cent are highly qualified; about 15 per cent are fairly qualified but need more training or experience. Between 10 and 15 per cent, with good general qualifications, have insufficient aptitude for their particular present posts and should be reassigned. About an equal number are "misfits" and should be dropped.

3. In Southeast Asia and the Middle East we have our most acute problems of qualified American personnel. Generally in these important areas living is difficult for Americans. The customary two-year service term is not working well. We will do better with fewer Americans each with living experience and language background in the country and available for a longer term of service than two years.

4. In total we have in this program too many Americans overseas. In a few countries we do not have enough. In more countries we have too many. We should use qualified Americans for program policy and planning, major supervision, public representation on high levels, and security maintenance. We should make more use of qualified local nationals for other purposes; and we should pay them better.

5. "Departmental" information officers should be encouraged by personnel and promotion policies to undertake more frequent and more substantial overseas assignments; and we should provide more adequate prior training for overseas information service.

6. In many countries we are scattering our activities over too wide a range. We should seek greater concentration on limited selected objectives or ideas which we would like to have associated, in the minds of other peoples, with the policies and purposes of the United States.

7. We should use primarily our so-called "fast media" (e.g., Voice of America, Daily Wireless Bulletin and Press Service) for *current defensive* propaganda. So far as feasible we should use our longer range media (e.g., books, book translations, motion pictures, exhibits, information centers, exchanges of persons and educational services) as well as radio and press for *longer range affirmative* objectives such as:

a. Progress (productivity, health, education, higher living standards, etc.);
b. Independence—political (freedom from aggression, maintenance of national or racial integrity, religious entity, self-determination, etc.);
c. Freedom—individual (opportunity, right to choose, "human rights", etc.);
d. Peace;
e. "Good neighbor" motive ("Golden Rule", tolerance, helpfulness, etc.);
f. Mutual security (common interest, voluntary association, etc.);
g. Truth.

In our information policy and program guidances we should continuously seek to encourage world-wide recognition of the United States as a *symbol* and an *advocate* of such affirmative objectives as these. We are dealing in hope. The international communists are dealing in fear.

8. We should aim a greater concert of effort at ideas which may be expected to promote disunity and eventually political disintegration behind the Iron Curtain, especially in the Satellite Countries.

9. We should "speak" overseas more through the voice of indigenous groups; and where feasible through the voice of mutual interest groups, e.g., NATO, possibly ANZUS.

10. We should provide the basic framework and nucleus of a world-wide information organization which may be conveniently expanded whenever National policy and public support of it favor the gradual conversion of a "war of armaments" into a "war of ideas". That time is not here. But it will come.

*Information Service as Part of Program of National Security*

The extent to which further practical steps in these directions can be taken now or soon is, of course, dependent in part upon the verdict of the Bureau of the Budget, the incoming Administration and the Congress with respect to funds. The "Campaign of Truth" initiated in 1950 had, as you know, an authorized five-year annual operating-funds objective of over $250,000,000 by 1956. Last year the President's Budget included for operations of the Information Program $133,000,000 (not including foreign currencies for the Fulbright Educational Exchange Program). This year, for 1954, the President's Budget will ask $115,000,000 (including $9,000,000 of foreign currencies for the Exchange Program). For the first time since 1950 the sights of the Bureau of the Budget for this program are lower, not higher.

But in large part the effectiveness of America's voice is dependent less on what it says overseas than on what it does overseas—or on what together with other nations it is *prepared* to do overseas. This involves, I dare say, some of the most formidable policy questions which have faced you and will face your successor. I do not think that our people generally take the "cold war" seriously as a potential means of averting a "hot war". By "hot war" I mean war not up to our knees but up to our necks. My personal view, as a reasonably well-informed citizen with some knowledge of history, is that, if we keep on doing what we are now doing and do nothing more than we are now doing to forestall it, we will land in another hot war.

*"Cold War"*

As a nation we are not really trying to win the "cold war". We are relying on armaments and armies to win a "hot war" if a "hot war" comes. But winning a hot war which leaves a cold war unwon will not win very much for very long. Our present facilities for the "war of ideas" should enable us to retard the advance of international communism, dull the edge of its propaganda and help to give the free world a breathing space. This itself is important. But these facilities will not enable us to win the "cold war". Nor perhaps will even larger facilities enable us to win it, until as a nation, or mutually with other nations, we can couple what we are able to *say* overseas more effectively with what we are able to *do* overseas.

*Budget Sights*

The present lowering of budget sights for our foreign information activities is, I think, not accidental. No doubt it is in part a reflection of the evident disinclination of the Congress to make heavy investment in these activities. That disinclination in turn is a reflection of a general apathy toward a Government program overseas, about which the public so far has little understanding, which is praised by some and criticized by others, which the people of the United States themselves never hear and never see. If our people ever get an understanding that winning a "cold war" may be a practical way of avoiding or largely reducing the needs of continuous gigantic investments in the means of "hot war" there will be less public indifference. That is the reason that I have said: "That time is not here. But it will come." All this involves not merely the International Information Administration and the Department of State, but also . . . [3] a formidable prospect which I hope will be explored.

Many of the improvements in the overseas information program which I have mentioned can be accomplished, however, within the funds now proposed. During the year 1952 we have much improved the "housekeeping" of many of our operations. The savings next year should be even more substantial. There are also other opportunities for economies. These are being systematically explored with the aid of outside experienced surveyors. From the standpoint of good management and "dollar value" you are turning the foreign information and educational exchange program over to your successor in a much stronger condition than at the first of this year when you established the U.S. International Information Administration.

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[3] Ellipses in this document are in the source text.

*Semi-Autonomous Agency*

The framework of organization, the administration of which a year ago you asked me to undertake, was established by you last January in Departmental Announcement No. 4. It provided for a "semi-autonomous" agency within the Department of State. The expected extent of autonomy in the sense of opportunity of IIA to determine its information policies and to develop and execute its information programs overseas has materialized satisfactorily. The planned "semi-autonomy" with respect to (1) the selection, assignment and management of personnel and (2) the control of its own finances has not worked out satisfactorily. To achieve such "semi-autonomy" implies a high degree of consolidation of authorities and responsibilities which heretofore have been widely dispersed. There is within the Department a reluctance to accept these changes, and if not a resistance, at least a formidable inertia.

. . . A full year's experience appears to justify a strong doubt that an extent of "semi-autonomy" for IIA such as you aimed at a year ago can be achieved within the framework of the Department of State. Possibly it may be achieved (1) if a separate IIA personnel unit and a separate IIA personnel authority are established; and (2) if authority to make arbitrary assessments against IIA funds for the use of other services of the Department is terminated.

. . . In my six months' report to you last summer I mentioned the importance of attracting better talent into this program. At that time, for example, out of 65 so-called "super-grades" in the Department of State only one was in IIA, notwithstanding the fact that IIA included 40 per cent of the Department's total personnel. Since then, due to your help, the number has been increased to three. That is not enough. The pending proposed amendments to Public Law 402 (Smith-Mundt) should be helpful. I hope that these amendments will be pressed to early enactment.

. . . This program needs more experienced executives who are not fearful of prejudicing a career by doing something "different" and are not too timid about tampering with "vested interests" which should be tampered with.

*"Voice of America"*

I have spoken of the present "lower sights" for the investment of public funds in this program. All of our activities accordingly are under budget review. Perhaps I should comment specifically on the "Voice of America"—the International Broadcasting Service. It is our largest single feature, the most spectacular, the most widely known. It has strong friends—in Congress and elsewhere—and ardent critics. In terms of expenditures it is our most inflexible media service. Its "fixed charges" (operation and maintenance of 29 domestic transmitters and 38 relay transmitters overseas) are a half of the total cost of the radio service. The ratio will be greater this year as several new and more powerful transmitters come into operation.

Under the stimulus of the apparent receptivity of the Congress in 1950 to an expanded "Campaign of Truth", the Voice of America was rapidly expanded by 1952 to a level of 46 languages. Last year decision was reached not to expand further the language programs by an additional six as proposed by VOA. The number of languages now on the air is 45 and will be further reduced. Meantime we should soon be enabled in many countries to deliver a more audible signal. Our single most useful new relay is the 150 k.w. transmitter on the "Courier" now harbored on the Island of Rhodes and broadcasting daily to the Balkan countries and the southern tier of the Soviet Union.

The Voice of America now has the dual task of (1) operating within its funds and (2) maintaining as best it can the means by which the United States Government through facilities *under its own control*, can speak to people in crucial areas overseas. Accordingly we are now seeking to establish this general pattern for our radio service:

1. To concentrate VOA services more on the Iron Curtain countries.
2. In other countries, where practicable, to put our VOA broadcasting *over its own facilities*, on a more limited or a "stand-by" basis.
3. Wherever practicable to establish access, in each country, to the use of its own radio broadcasting facilities to which its own people are accustomed to listen. This will mean more local and regional origination of programs and less of dependence on live programs originated in New York.

Because of its relatively high ratio of fixed charges and its proportionately heavy investment in radio language program talent recruited from all over the world, the "Voice of America" has a formidable problem in making substantial budget readjustments when these are necessary. Fortunately it has equally formidable executive talent.

*"Educational Exchange"*

The Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange in a letter to me dated December 24, 1952[4] has raised a serious question of the relation of "educational" to "information" activities. In general it identifies the former with long range and cultural objectives and the latter with short range propaganda or political objectives. It expresses the view that the former have been and are being subordinated to the latter. The Advisory Commission asks consideration of the feasibility of some further form of "separateness" in the administration of the educational exchange and related educational phases of the program under Public Law 402.

For this purpose it has proposed for consideration these four possibilities:

1. A separate administrative unit outside the Department of State;
2. Giving the Advisory Commission itself or a new board or commission to be created, certain executive or administrative authority and function;
3. An administrative unit within the State Department, separate from IIA;
4. A separate administrative unit within IIA.

This, I understand, has been a more or less active issue for many years. Many eminent American educators have been uneasy over what they conceive to be the hazard of domination of the educational exchange activities by the "propaganda" motives of the information program. I have, however, no reason to think that the Board of Foreign Scholarships itself has shared this sense of uneasiness.

As yet I have merely acknowledged the Commission's letter and have urged that a copy of it be sent to the "Fulbright Committee" now investigating for the Senate the entire foreign information and educational exchange service of the United States. This has been done. I do not regard as wholly valid the implied distinction between education as "long range" and information as "short range"; or between the one as "cultural" and the other as "political". Such a conception, I think, is not compatible with the philosophic and moral basis of the "Campaign of Truth", a basis to which we should steadfastly adhere. I doubt that a useful purpose would be served by any organic separation. An administrative separation within the framework of IIA might, however, be serviceable. On October 4 before I left for the Orient, I asked our Office of Management to explore the "assets and liabilities" of the possibility of establishing such a consolidated unit under such title perhaps as Division of Educational Exchange or Educational Services. I expect its report soon. My judgment is that we should seek to establish a basis of organization and function which will have the genuine confidence of American educators generally. In these times of growing uneasiness especially among our colleges and universities about intrusion of Government into public education, I hope that IIA may be kept clear of any such implication.

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[4] Not found in Department of State files.

### *Advisory Commissions and Program Policy*

Public Law 402 states, with respect to the Advisory Commissions on Information and on Educational Exchange, that they shall "formulate and recommend to the Secretary policies and programs for the carrying out of this act". In my judgment it would be a gain to the program if for these purposes the Commissions would undertake an even greater responsibility than heretofore. The commission members are rendering an important public service at considerable inconvenience to themselves and without compensation. Most of them are able and willing to devote considerable time to this enterprise. I can not too much stress the importance to this program of well-informed objective criticism and suggestion. During the month of January 1953 the terms of two members each, of the two Advisory Commissions, will expire. I hope that the nominations to the President for successor appointments will be made with these facts in mind.

### *Private Cooperation*

It seems to me also that we should increase our efforts to encourage private cooperation in furthering the objectives of our overseas information and educational exchange activities. After all the historic "voice" of America has been the ordinary trade, travel, communications, emigration and immigration, which have been our normal stream of contact with the people of other nations. We should seek to restore the flow of this stream. The ordinary voice of the people, in many ways, is a more potent source of international understanding and good will than is the "voice" of the Government itself. We have an exceptionally able and ingenious Private Cooperation Staff. But it needs more tools to work with and more encouragement.

### *Loyalty and Security*

Regarding loyalty and security we have used, as you know, every available means of assuring that we do not employ, and do not keep in employment, any person of doubtful loyalty to the United

States. So far as I have reason to believe, the International Information Administration is rid of all of its "security risks".

*A Congressional Joint Committee*

Some months ago after our appropriation hearings, I suggested to some members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that it would be helpful to the guidance and progress of our work and to more satisfactory understanding with the Congress if a Congressional Joint Committee on Overseas Information Services might be established. That idea is not new. But it has never been implemented. So far as I know it has not been thoroughly considered. I hope that the feasibility of such an arrangement will be explored.

During the past year I have been impressed by the evidences that lack of more clear-cut statement of Congressional intent tends to encourage our services to "scatter" their shot—seeking to do something which will satisfy each point of view. Public Law 402 states general objectives. Appropriation legislation expressly or by implication sometimes stresses additional or different objectives. Applicable National Security Council instructions propose even different standards for our guidance. I do not believe that statutory declarations of Congressional intent, however precise these may be, can be expected to solve this problem. There still is a great area within which opportunity for regular consultation with representatives of both parties in both Houses might be helpful.

If, as I think likely, the ultimate solution of our "cold war" problems will include more and more a division of labor between the . . . activities of IIA and the . . . services of other agencies, such a device as the proposed Congressional Joint Committee may be of even greater importance. I should think that it might follow the general pattern of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

*Future of International Information Administration*

There are, of course, continuing speculations about the "future" of the International Information Administration; its relation to the information services of the Mutual Security Agency; the distinctions between "information" and "education"; and the prospects of "separation" of the information program from the Department of State. These are issues of national policy which will be determined by the Administration and by the Congress. The sooner they are settled the better. Especially so, the policies with respect to these matters on the part of the incoming Administration.

The establishment of the International Information Administration, of itself, was a big gain; and its establishment has made possible other important gains. But it is not a "last word". The foreign information program preferably should be administered within the framework of the Department of State, especially overseas. There is otherwise the hazard of two "foreign offices". But this is not conclusive. Unity in the spokesmanship overseas of the United States Government is primary. The choice of mechanics is secondary. The important objective is that this issue be decided as promptly as deliberate decision may be reached.

*Offices of IIA*

May I make one final suggestion? Availability of suitable space has been a continuing plague upon the entire Department of State. On the whole I think space allocation has been well handled by the Administrative Office. The offices of IIA are now scattered over seven buildings. It has no offices in the New State Building. Conferences of IIA officers with principal policy and administrative officers of the Department, however important, are accordingly inconvenient and time-consuming. This condition has tended to discourage a kind of collaboration which should be encouraged; and has tended to make IIA a sort of "island", at least separated from the "mainland". If the International Information Administration is continued as a part of the Department of State, I believe that a useful purpose would be served if at least its Policies and Plans Staff and the immediate Office of the Administrator were to be accommodated in the New State Building.

It is just a year ago that you asked me to "pull my cap down over my ears" and tackle what you described as one of the most "difficult" jobs in the Government. I have found it so. Also I have found in it a great challenge to the impulse of public service. As I have said around the world to my colleagues: "This is a mission." During the year we have made progress—on the whole, I think, good progress. We have better organization, better management, better "housekeeping". We have a stronger world-wide program. Our Congressional relations are better. We are learning how to make the dollars "count for more". We are, I am confident, making more runs, more hits, fewer errors; not so many are left on bases; and we have a long way yet to go!

511.00/1-1953: Circular telegram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 19, 1953—6:31 p.m.

779. Verbatim text. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 237:

*Eisenhower:* Inaugural Address [2] provides subject and themes for heaviest, continuing exploitation by all US foreign information media and US official publicity outlets overseas during coming weeks.

We maintain tone of output, in originating and selecting comment as well as in reporting, on same level of dedication to high moral purpose as is set by tone of speech itself.

It is essential that we make clear to all areas a fully balanced picture of the address. The new President has outlined principles of a world-wide approach in which all major elements are interdependent. Therefore we must avoid over-regionalization in initial states of exploitation, and seek, wherever possible, to overcome any tendency by other media to give any area only those sections of address which deal exclusively with that area. Regional aspects, emerging after initial full treatment, will be the subject of further guidance.

We should stress that this address is a non-partisan document; that the President has stated a creed incorporating basic principles to which Americans, regardless of politics, can and do adhere. Be alert for all comment along this line, and use it to build a picture of a united America, ready now under new leadership, to rededicate its dynamic energies toward a plainly-stated goal.

In treatment generally, we bear always in mind that this is statement principles repeat and underline principles, not repeat not policies. Fuller definition of projected policies repeat policies, both foreign and domestic, must await "State of Union" message, which may be sometime in preparation. [3] Pending that message, therefore, we carefully avoid any comment, foreign or domestic, which seeks speculatively to interpret any particular phrases or passages Inaugural in terms of future actual policy Eisenhower Administration, or to commit new Administration to policies in advance their official enunciation by qualified spokesmen.

Above caution applies particularly to passages dealing with "joint effort" (principle 1), economics and trade (principle 6) and

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[1] Drafted by Edward P. Montgomery and Edward V. Roberts of IIA. Cleared in draft by W. Bradley Connors of IIA and Phillips of P, telegraphed to 16 posts, and pouched to 73 others.

[2] President Eisenhower's inaugural address, Jan. 21, 1953, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 1-8.

[3] President Eisenhower's first Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, Feb. 2, 1953, is printed *ibid.*, pp. 12-34.

"regional groupings" (first paragraph principle 7) which may be subject intensive speculation certain areas.

For later condensation and amplification in original and selected comment, these are key-notes, themes and passages most useful our purposes abroad.

Key-notes: (a) "We are called, as a people, to give testimony, in the sight of the world, to our faith that the future shall belong to the free";

(b) "It is our faith in the deathless dignity of man, governed by eternal moral and natural laws";

(c) "The peace we seek, then, is nothing less than fulfillment of our whole faith among ourselves and in our dealings with others";

(d) "Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those who threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace".

We give major emphasis in output in general to themes expressed in following passages (listed for convenience in order of appearance in speech, not in order of priority for emphasis):

(a) Passage beginning "At such a time in history, we who are free etc.", and ending "that make all men equal in His sight".

(b) Passage beginning "It decrees that we, the people, elect leaders etc.", and ending "faith in our country and in the watchfulness of a divine Providence".

(c) Immediately following passage beginning "The enemies of this faith know no god but Force, etc.," and ending "This conflict strikes directly at the faith of our fathers and the lives of our sons".

(d) Passage beginning "The faith we hold belongs not to us alone etc.," and ending "the American life given in Korea".

(e) Passage beginning "No free people can for long cling to any privilege etc.," and ending "thousand-fold intensity in the event of war".

(f) Passage beginning "So it is proper that we assure our friends again etc.," and ending "spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies".

(g) Passage beginning "We wish our friends the world over etc.," and ending "capital offense against freedom, a lack of staunch faith".

(h) Passage beginning "Abhorring war as a chosen way etc.," and ending "and so make possible drastic reduction of armaments" (principle 1).

(i) Passage beginning "Realizing that common sense and common decency etc.," and ending "soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains" (principle 2).

(j) Passage beginning "Honoring the identity and heritage of each nation etc.," and ending "our own cherished political and economic institutions" (principle 4).

(k) Passage beginning "In the Western Hemisphere etc.," and ending "fraternal trust and common purpose" (principle 7).

(l) Passage beginning "In Europe, we ask, etc.," and ending "its spiritual and cultural treasures" (principle 7).

(m) Passage beginning "Conceiving the defense of freedom, etc." and ending "in any sense inferior or expendable" (principle 8).

(n) Passage beginning "Respecting the United Nations etc.," and ending "nor tire, nor ever cease" (principle 9).

(o) Passage beginning "The peace we seek, then, is nothing less etc.," and ending "and with prayer to Almighty God".

ACHESON

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "VOA & IBS"

### *The Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations (Taber) to the Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Compton)* [1]

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1953.

DEAR DR. COMPTON: So that you may have an opportunity to make a little record and perhaps find out something more about your department, I would suggest that you go into the question of the advisability of installing the so-called Baker East–Baker West Projects any further until after the Appropriations Committee can look into the situation and see what the interest of the Government requires at this time, and whether sufficient results could be obtained by modest expenditures in improving transmitting facilities already in existence.

I have been terribly disappointed in the failure of representatives of the State Department to realize their responsibilities. We must have a reappraisal of this problem and an intelligent approach to it.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN TABER

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[1] The source text and Compton's response, p. 1656, were attached to a covering memorandum from Compton to Humelsine transmitting the correspondence for Humelsine's information.

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511.00/1-2653: Circular telegram

### *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 26, 1953—4:06 p.m.

801. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 241:

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[1] Drafted by Irving R. Wechsler and E. Lewis Revey of IIA; cleared in draft by Ralph Block and Joseph Gerrety of IIA, and in substance by Merritt Cootes of EE

*Continued*

*USSR: Communist Hate Campaign:* Henceforth basic element in our treatment Soviet-Communist "Hate" campaign is to interpret it as general assault on non-Communist Governments and peoples. Purpose this approach is to (a) counteract developing Communist efforts to identify US as only "real" enemy of USSR and to alienate and isolate non-Communist countries from US; (b) broaden understanding of Communists opportunistic use of "Hate" propaganda as instrument of Communist imperialism, directed now and in past at many other nations and groups. Demonstration latter point should be one of our major continuing purposes.

Where "Hate America" campaign is considered to have been effective, we should address ourselves to correcting specific misapprehensions created and to component parts of "Hate" campaign as necessary. We also continue our emphasis on our own positive themes. While general references to Communist "Hate" techniques may be useful, misconceptions can best be corrected by specific practical presentation of materials offsetting Communist charges rather than by general refutations.

In accordance with above, we should avoid (a) mounting campaign against Soviet "Hate America" propaganda which would tend to emphasize that Soviet Hate campaign is directed primarily at US and not at others; (b) giving further publicity, especially among non-Communist peoples, to term "Hate America"; (c) expressing indignant responses to Soviet campaign of atrocious vilification of US.

Comprehensive and regional (especially USSR and Communist China) discussion and policy treatment this subject in IA Special Instruction upcoming.

DULLES

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and Huyler of P; approved by Joseph Polakoff of IIA; telegraphed to 12 posts, pouched to 61 others.

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501/1-3053: Circular airgram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 30, 1953—1:50 p.m.

"A MI PARECER"

The International Press Service is initiating this week a regional column to be transmitted, henceforth, regularly on Tuesday in the

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[1] Drafted by Charles V. Hurtado of IIA, cleared by Gene Karst of IIA, sent to 13 missions in Latin America.

Latin American Wireless Bulletin and specifically designed to project positive themes spelled out in IA Instruction PO–2, November 28, 1952, "Positive Content in IIA Programming to the Other American Republics". [2]

The column, titled "A Mi Parecer" and bylined by Hugo Martin, will be transmitted in Spanish. Since other columns and stories in the bulletin supply a balancing amount of anti-communist material, the Latin American column will rarely ever deal directly with this subject but will concentrate on sections A and B of the referenced instruction.

The psychology serving as the keystone of this column can be summed up by the phrase—"The Americas are one." In projecting this concept the column will deal with personalities, events and policies of direct interest to the Americas. The fact that the column will not be basically an anti-communist column does not mean that this theme will be ignored. It does mean that attacks on Communism will be indirect and aimed to clarifying and debunking major misconceptions about the United States and Inter-American relations which Communists throughout the Americas are exploiting. The column will be written in informal and friendly style and will avoid the "pundit" approach.

Missions are urged to make comments and suggestions to IPS after receiving the first three columns. Moreover, IPS believes firmly that the effectiveness of this column can best be maintained and strengthened on the basis of continuous suggestions from the field.

DULLES

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[2] Not found.

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "VOA & IBS"

## *The Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Compton) to Representative John Taber* [1]

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. TABER: I have received and I appreciate your letter of January 22, 1953. [2] In this letter you question the advisability of proceeding further with the installation of the so-called "Baker East" and "Baker West" projects.

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[1] Copies to various offices and individuals within IIA and also to the Secretary of State; Thurman L. Barnard of the Office of the Secretary of State; Humelsine; George Gray, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; and Donold Lourie, Under Secretary of State for Administration.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1654.

Within the scope of my authority and my instructions from the Secretary of State, I will cooperate with any effort which the Appropriations Committee may undertake toward a review by the Congress of the authorities, instructions and appropriations pertaining to these projects. I am sure that you would expect me to do that.

The two stations, Baker East and Baker West, at each of which there will be two one megawatt transmitters, are an integral and essential part of a global radio broadcasting network known as the Ring Plan. These two plants will, when completed, be the primary feeder stations to our existing overseas stations and those to be completed within the present fiscal year.

This Administration, within the past few months, has employed an independent engineering management firm to survey all of the domestic transmitting facilities of the International Broadcasting Service. It was made with a view to eliminating ineffective equipment and establishing new operating procedures and standards. The report recommended that consideration be given to the rehabilitation of some facilities and the elimination of others. We now have these projects under engineering consideration.

At this time it is planned to build only two of the six domestic megawatt plants included in the original plan. Overseas only 8 or 9 at most are under construction or serious consideration out of an original plan which called for fourteen. Qualified radio advisors have informed me that it would be unwise to eliminate the two megawatt plants now being constructed in this country. It is not possible to obtain this superpower with the equipment presently available or by any changes which could be made economically in existing plants.

A majority of the existing domestic facilities were built before and during World War II. The commercial stations that were taken over during the war were largely intended for experimental purposes and broadcasts to relatively few selected world areas. They were not intended as permanent, high quality components of a broadcast network. For this reason I have viewed the installations at Baker East and Baker West as the minimum augmentation to our existing facilities to put the United States in a position to deliver an adequate radio signal to strategic areas, especially to areas behind the Iron Curtain which we will reach by radio if we reach them at all.

Contracts have been let for the construction of these two plants and work is under way. Suspension of construction would involve considerable expense; cancellation of these contracts would, of course, entail heavy liquidation costs and damages.

I have forwarded to the Secretary of State a copy of your letter of January 22. I am advised that Mr. Lourie, the Under Secretary-Designate for Administration, also has been informed of your views in this matter.

As a matter of firm intention and practice, I have been able to establish a workable understanding and, I hope, a relation of mutual confidence with the Appropriations Subcommittee concerned in these matters. I am quite concerned if anything has occurred during my absence from the United States which would cause you to regard the administration of the International Information Service as having been unmindful or neglectful of its responsibilities. I hope that I may have opportunity at your convenience to correct any misunderstanding either on my own part or on the part of the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

WILSON COMPTON

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501/2-453: Circular airgram

## *The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 4, 1953—7:10 p.m.

### CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE WIRELESS BULLETIN

Recent communications from USIS field posts and the recently completed field trip by the Director of the International Press Service (IPS) indicate an immediate need for:

1. A restatement of the basic purposes of the Wireless Bulletin and its role in the overseas information program.
2. Certain adjustments in style, content and technique to make this product more effective as the program's fastest channel of communication to the field operations.

Most Public Affairs Officers and their staffs are familiar with the history of the present Wireless Bulletin, but a brief recapitulation might serve as useful background. The Wireless Bulletin was started in 1946 as a combination of the former State Department daily overseas file for the information of Foreign Service personnel and the news and features file sent abroad by cable and wireless by the former Office of War Information. Thus, it was designed to serve a dual purpose: (a) To provide USIS staffs with fast official news and background material for placement in the foreign press, and (b) To keep post staffs informed of daily domestic and foreign developments to assist them in their official duties.

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[1] Drafted by Charles P. Arnot of IIA, cleared by various offices in IIA, and sent to 69 missions and 33 consulates. Secretary Dulles was in Western Europe at this time on a tour of various capitals. For documentation on this visit, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1548 ff.

The Campaign of Truth brought two significant changes: (a) Increased field staffs, both U.S. and local personnel, so that Department products such as the Wireless Bulletin could be edited, adapted and translated locally, and (b) A greater program emphasis on awakening the world to the dangers of communist aggression. This latter responsibility brought an increase in the amount of negative or anti-communist material carried in the Wireless Bulletin as well as throughout the program generally. Simultaneously, the USIS field need for a greater selection of material from the Department necessitated a certain reduction in the Bulletin's Foreign Service or "information only" section so that more wordage could be sent overseas for local adaptation, translation and press placement.

During the past year, and more notably during the past six months, there has been another highly significant and commendable change relevant to the Wireless Bulletin and its field usage. As the enlarged field staffs have become more experienced and more familiar with their local problems, there has been a decided trend away from the mass-distribution or "assembly-line" type of field operation and toward the selective-servicing, personal-influence method of operation.

On his field trip, during which he visited 24 overseas operations, the Director of IPS found that some USIS posts had discontinued entirely a bulk daily distribution of the Wireless Bulletin and several others were contemplating similar moves. In many countries, he found, the availability of foreign exchange had enabled local editors to purchase more commercial news and feature services, thus decreasing their former dependence upon USIS for daily official news and background material about the U.S. This situation, of course, does not apply world-wide, but it can be viewed as a significant trend.

Several USIS posts had discovered that editors no longer had time to read several thousand words of daily USIS "packets" and that the more important items in the Wireless Bulletin were being lost in the daily flow of words crossing editors' desks. Further, the daily processing of the complete Wireless Bulletin for mass distribution was found in some countries to be: (a) Costing more in terms of staff (for editing and translation), reproduction and distribution than could be measured in comparable results of audience impact, and (b) Keeping key U.S. staff members desk-bound during much of the working day and thus preventing them from carrying out an effective personal-contact program with influential editors and opinion leaders.

The effectiveness of local Wireless Bulletin usage cannot be—and should not be—measured in terms of column inches of material placed in the local press. The same applies to press features and other printed materials serviced by the International Press Service. Frequently, it may be more effective—from the viewpoint of audience impact—to assure the printing of a single paragraph of important policy material in a newspaper's editorial page than to place an entire column of less significant material on some other inside page. Whether the material is or is not attributed to USIS depends entirely upon local circumstances. The Director of IPS found on his trip that an increasing number of USIS posts were finding unattributed material more effective.

It is recognized that conditions and circumstances vary greatly from area to area and post to post. However, IPS has noted—from recent reports and field trips—a trend on the part of many posts toward some version of the following "formula" in the use of the Wireless Bulletin as a file of source material.

1. *Press Releases:* Instead of editing, adapting and translating the entire Wireless Bulletin file (of 5,000 to 7,000 words), an increasing number of posts are reducing their daily output to the issuance of several press releases, the number depending entirely upon the available material. Press Officers in these posts select carefully from the Bulletin material those items of immediate importance and edit, adapt and translate them for priority-rush distribution—as *single* items. These posts have found that editors will give more attention to single, shorter items than to the bulky package-type complete Bulletin. There is also the advantage in this system of being able to process each important item as it is received instead of awaiting the transmission of the final Bulletin article. Distribution of these press releases is confined to newspapers, radio stations and possibly some selected periodicals; i.e., *only* those outlets which carry fast-news material. There is no distribution of these press releases from USIS direct to the general public. Some posts report they do not issue a press release every day, but on some days the number may reach four or five, depending entirely on the urgency of the available material. Important official texts always are handled on the fast press-release basis, or as supplements to summary leads, which are released immediately.

2. *Official Bulletin:* The second daily product of this "formula" is the daily "official Bulletin." On the average, this will consist of about 2,500 to 3,000 words of Wireless Bulletin (and perhaps locally-prepared) material distributed to a select group including the Embassy (Legation, Consulate) staff, key local government officials,

other foreign diplomatic missions and a small number of important opinion leaders. This generally is distributed only in English and may include selected portions of the Foreign Service Section clearly marked "Not For Publication." The "official Bulletin" is distributed generally in not more than 100 copies and is designed for official information and background usage. It may or may not be sent to local editors as a later supplement to the press releases, depending upon the local situation. Those parts of the Foreign Service Section concerning only the U.S. "official family" such as foreign service changes or "information only" articles are reproduced and distributed separately in sufficient copies to meet Embassy (Legation, Consulate) needs.

3. *Weekly Newsletters:* More and more posts are finding that their most effective means of reaching their priority audiences directly is through a locally-tailored (and largely locally rewritten) weekly or biweekly newsletter. Instead of reaching this audience with the full daily Wireless Bulletin, many posts have found it is more effective to prepare a weekly or biweekly background and summary product to give not only the "what" but the "why" element in their written output. These newsletters are now appearing in several different forms: (a) Australia produces a weekly mimeographed "American Newsletter" locally written and edited by the Information Officer from material saved during the week from the Wireless Bulletin, plus certain airmail feature material and articles originated locally to conform with policy directives; (b) India produces a biweekly tabloid-size newspaper (proposed distribution 600,000 copies) complete with background articles on the news, editorials and a letters-to-the-editor column with staff-written replies; Lebanon produces a weekly small-magazine size "U.S.A. News Review" combining pictures and features and a news roundup. All of these weekly and biweekly roundups, according to the posts, have enabled USIS to focus more attention on the longer-range significance of official U.S. news developments and tie their output more closely in with policy guidances. They also have the secondary advantage of not being competitive with local daily newspapers or with commercial press agencies. Some other larger posts (specifically Germany) have a series of such weekly newsletters, including those designed for special-interest groups—women, labor, youth, farmers.

4. *Special Article Placement:* The discontinuance of the large-scale servicing of the full daily Wireless Bulletin has enabled several posts to devote more staff time to the placement in key local newspapers and periodicals of important special articles with outstanding success. From the daily Bulletin file, these posts select certain policy-keyed background and commentary items (including

the bylined commentaries) and place them through personal contact with influential local editorial writers, commentators and the free-lance writers. An increasing number of posts are finding that the U.S. policy story can be told most effectively by providing well-documented background material to respected local writers whose articles then appear in various publications under their own names with no attribution to USIS. This technique has been employed successfully by many posts for some time, but other posts have not given the personal-contact operation sufficient emphasis largely due to lack of time and staff. Some posts also are finding that influential local citizens are willing to write letters to newspapers for letters-to-the-editor columns if provided with sufficient background information. The Press Officer in one post manages to have luncheon with at least two editors or writers weekly. As a result of these luncheons, background articles are provided the editors on key policy subjects, and the placement rate has been reported at more than 90 per cent. Other posts have developed on their staffs qualified local employees who visit the offices of local editors regularly with feature and article materials. If the proferred features and articles are not accepted, the editors generally make special requests for certain other material, these posts report.

Again, the Department recognizes that the foregoing "formula" cannot apply to every post. But it requests all posts to reexamine the present method of operation to determine whether greater results could be achieved from a more selective, personal-contact type of service. One post which recently discontinued the daily mass distribution of Wireless Bulletin material reported that it now gets nearly 100 per cent usage of Bulletin material (through the "formula" outlined above) whereas less than 30 per cent of the Bulletin was found to be effectively used previously.

Consistent with field needs to meet the new placement and usage trend, the Department desires to emphasize that it does not consider the Wireless Bulletin to be a "package product" ready for unedited and untailored field distribution. Instead, the Bulletin should be regarded as a fast service file of source material for careful field selection, editing, adaptation and translation to meet local needs. The Bulletin represents a fast transmission facility; in other words, it is the facility by which the Department can put into the hands of USIS posts overseas that official material which, in the judgment of the Department, the field most needs during a 24-hour period to strengthen and explain the policies of the United States. If the most important policy development of the day is a lengthy speech by the President or the Secretary, the entire Bulletin may be devoted to the text of that speech. The Department is in no way obliged to carry in any Bulletin a great variety of material, and thus the Bulletin can in no sense be considered to be in competition with U.S. or other commercial wire services, nor will the Wireless File ever attempt to "beat" commercial wire services. Major policy stories will be handled as speedily as careful, responsible reporting and editing will permit. They will be transmitted in time to follow as closely as possible actual news developments to assure maximum timely impact abroad.

For such major posts as Bonn, Vienna, London, Paris, Rome and New Delhi, the daily Bulletin now is supplemented (five days a week) by a special fast file. Army Signal Corps facilities, where available, and commercial communications facilities supplement the Bulletin to all posts, including those listed above. To meet specific field needs for special material, the Bulletin transmissions are supplemented by IPS facilities for special request articles and background stories.

All of these supplementary services, plus the regular flow of airmail features and reprints, should, the Department believes, provide the posts with sufficient source material from which to fashion their own press and publications output to meet specific local needs consistent with the policy guidance. The Bulletin itself is carefully keyed to the policy lines of the information program. During his trip, the Director of IPS was told by responsible USIS officers that the past year's reorganization of IPS had resulted in improvement in the Wireless Bulletin, ranging from "some" to "100 per cent."

There may be instances when a post will elect not to use a certain item in the regular section of the Bulletin due to local circumstances. However, all "discretionary" or "for information only" items generally are confined to the Bulletin's Foreign Service or "Not For Publication" Section so that the posts may determine how they shall be used.

This Airgram will be followed shortly by a formal Foreign Service Information and Educational Exchange Circular restating the purposes and intended uses of the Wireless Bulletin. Meanwhile, the posts should note carefully the following list of proposed changes which are being made to meet current field needs as detailed in recent reports and as stated to Department personnel during recent field conferences and tours:

### *Change from "Bulletin" to "File"*

Effective February 15, 1953, the "Wireless Bulletin" henceforth will be known as the "Wireless File" consistent with the accepted concept that it is not a package product but a fast file of up to 8,000 words maximum daily of source material from which the posts design their own local output. There will be four completely different regional files five days a week (European, Middle Eastern, Far Eastern and Latin American) and a single world file on Sunday. There will be no Wireless File on Saturday. Those posts which now are operating only five days a week are urged to reexamine their staffing schedules so that a skeleton staff may be available on the sixth day (Saturday in the Far East, Sunday elsewhere) to give immediate attention to important policy material. As a general rule, IPS editors are attempting to balance the present ratio of positive to negative material on a 70–30 basis; i.e., 70 per cent positive material supporting the policies and goals of the U.S. and the free world as against 30 per cent negative or anti-communist material.

*Types of Material in File*

The Wireless File will consist, as previously, of two basic sections: (a) The regular "for publication" section averaging 5,000 to 7,000 words, depending upon the news flow, and (b) The Foreign Service or "Not For Publication" Section averaging 1,000 to 1,500 words. These sections will include:

A. *Regular Section:* There will be seven types of material in the regular "for publication" section as follows:

1. *General Items:* These, ranging from 150 to 750 words, will cover in accepted wire-service news style the general range of U.S., UN and foreign developments which strengthen, clarify and explain U.S. foreign policy. Efforts will be made to keep these items shorter and crisper to meet field requirements. They will be datelined as to source and identified as to time by the use of "today" in the lead, or by the use of the day of the week if referring to prior or future dates. All IPS editors have been alerted to field requests—as stated in reports and during recent field conferences and trips—for a more "tightly written" Bulletin.

2. *Newsbriefs:* These will consist of a series of brief items, 50 to 100 words each, which support U.S. policies and can be used as "fillers" or as each post elects. This addition to the Wireless File during the past year has met with widespread field approval.

3. *Commentaries:* Since repetition is the key to effective emphasis of those policy points the program is designed to make with audiences abroad, the commentary offers a valuable technique for reviewing and recapitulating after the "spot news" elements have been exhausted. Field reports show that many regular newspaper and periodical "customers" have been developed by important posts for these commentaries, largely through the personal-contact technique described earlier in this Airgram. Certain posts also receive special regional and country-targeted commentaries in the regional Wireless File serving their area or via radio-teletype, Army Signal Corps or commercial cable facilities. A separate Airgram on commentaries will reach the field shortly. Meanwhile, the following commentaries will continue to reach all posts regularly in the Wireless File:

"The World Today" (By Paul L. Ford)—A general background and commentary column dealing with world developments consistent with U.S. policy. Three columns weekly, one of which will replace the discontinued weekly David C. Brooke column.

"The U.S. This Week" (By John Kerigan)—A summary commentary dealing with major developments in the United States. One column weekly.

"Economic Letter from the United States" (By Guy Sims Fitch)—A discussion of economic trends and developments. One column weekly.

"Behind The Curtain" (By Benjamin West)—A semi-intelligence report of how the police state system is affecting the peoples, economies and cultures of the Curtain countries. One column weekly.

4. *Backgrounders:* To meet field needs for more background and factual material for locally written articles and for use in the personal-contact programs, the Wireless File will carry a minimum of three items weekly identified as "Backgrounders." These will be keyed closely to policy developments and will be designed to meet stated field needs for more "unclassified guidance" type of material. It is planned to run two such background pieces in each Sunday's Wireless File, and the other when wire space permits. They should be found useful particularly for local editorial writers and commentators and for speech material.

5. *Editorial Roundups:* Nearly every post has, from time to time, requested a greater flow of world editorial comment on major U.S. policy issues and developments. The Wireless File now carries and will continue to carry such roundups whenever sufficient pertinent editorial comment is available. Many posts have requested that more non-U.S. editorial comment be carried. This, of course, depends upon the filing to IPS by the posts of all available editorial comment which could be used in such roundups. Key paragraphs of direct quotes are required— not summaries or paraphrases. The editorial roundups filed to the Department by Political Sections are not often usable because they do not include enough direct quotes, and, due to cable processing, frequently do not arrive on time. It is the responsibility of each post to provide IPS with a regular flow of editorial comment, utilizing Signal Corps channels where available. A daily roundup would be desirable, but material frequently is not available. In this connection, the Wireless File will, from time to time, carry at the end of a major policy speech or statement (or following a significant policy story) an "Editor's Note" requesting that the posts file *collect* to IPS subsequent local editorial comment. These "Notes" should be regarded as reminders and are in no way intended as a reflection on any of the posts which faithfully file local editorial comment—and other important local coverage.

6. *Texts:* The Wireless File will, as a standing rule, carry the full texts of all major foreign policy speeches by the President and the Secretary of State. These texts will be supplemented by summary leads of up to 750 words. Other texts will be carried in full depending upon their policy importance. Major excerpts and summary leads will be carried on all those key speeches where it is decided

not to carry complete texts. The text treatment will vary according to the importance of each speech or statement to a particular world area.

7. *"X" File Material:* The regionalization of the International Press Service and the four completely-regional Wireless Files five days weekly enable IPS to deliver more area and post-tailored items. The Wireless File thus will continue to carry, in each of its area editions, certain items considered of interest only to one or two posts. So that field operators and editors are not burdened with handling items of specific interest to one or more other posts, IPS will identify such items as "X" File Material. Thus, the Far East Wireless File may carry an item of specific interest *only* to Manila, and such an item would carry the heading: "X" File Material—Manila Only." Radio operators at other posts would then not be required to monitor this item. The use of the "X" File identification will vary according to the amount of such material available, the urgency of getting such material to the post or posts concerned and the availability of other transmission facilities. When other transmission facilities are available, special single-post request articles ordinarily will not be included in the Wireless File.

B. *Foreign Service "Not For Publication" Section:* There have been recent field requests for certain expansions in the Foreign Service "Not For Publication" Section to keep the "official family" more fully informed of news and policy developments of importance to Foreign Service personnel in discharging their official duties. This Section was reduced somewhat because of a one-hour reduction, for budgetary reasons, in the total wireless transmission time. By shortening certain items and more carefully editing others, it will now be possible to expand certain parts of the Foreign Service Section. Effective February 15, 1953, there will be five types of material in the Foreign Service "Not For Publication" Section of the Wireless File as follows:

1. *Newsroundup:* The Newsroundup will be expanded to an average of 600 to 800 words daily and will include brief items of importance covering the day's domestic and foreign news developments, including major sports results. These items are taken from commercial news agencies and major U.S. newspapers, and the Department does *not* guarantee their accuracy any more than it can guarantee the accuracy of items in the daily press. This roundup is *only* for the information of Embassy (Legation, Consulate) staffs abroad and must in no way be included in the material serviced by USIS to the local press or public.

2. *Newsletter:* The Newsletter, averaging 500 to 600 words, will be carried five days weekly (Monday through Friday). This will be an IPS prepared summary of what U.S. columnists are saying, what significant articles U.S. magazines are carrying and reports of "behind-the-scenes" developments in the U.S. and abroad. It will be designed primarily for the background and information of Foreign Service personnel abroad, but should find a certain usefulness in the USIS personal-contact program with editors and opinion lead-

ers. It is *not*, however, designed for general distribution as part of the regular USIS output and should not so be used.

3. *Opinion Summary:* This weekly review of opinion trends on major policy issues in the U.S. will be carried regularly in the Foreign Service Section of the Sunday Wireless File. It is prepared by the Department's Division of Public Studies and is intended for the field's background and information use only.

4. *FYI Items:* These "For Your Information" Items can and will cover a wide range of subjects—and, in each instance, it will be for the Public Affairs Officer and his staff to determine how they will be used. They will include, for example, reports of Congressional action on Departmental and program appropriations, accounts of speeches by program officials on new program techniques, and certain background items which may require discretionary treatment in the field. In this latter category, for example, IPS will make available background material setting the record straight on issues which may be deliberately distorted by the opposition. The Public Affairs Officer and his staff, after gauging the effectiveness of the opposition's campaign, then may elect to use or discard the material as the situation requires.

5. *Foreign Service Changes:* Beginning February 15, the Wireless File will carry Foreign Service changes including both assignment and grade changes.

On the basis of the above, USIS personnel may wish to review the present system of distributing the Foreign Service "Not For Publication" Section of the Wireless File to see that it will reach all key post personnel. Every post should make certain that this section is clearly marked "Not For Publication." Failure of certain posts in the past to identify this material as being only for the "official family" has brought complaints from commercial news agencies that USIS was in the competitive news field.

The Department has given careful consideration to certain field suggestions and requests that the Wireless File carry more "unclassified guidance material," perhaps in the form of a regular column (identified with a byline such as "By Our Diplomatic Correspondent") in the Foreign Service "Not For Publication" Section. Consideration also has been given to suggestions that this section of the Wireless File carry regularly a feature called "Today's Headlines" and listing in order of importance the current developments which require priority policy emphasis by the field. It has not been found feasible to include either of these suggested guidance items in the Wireless File as of February 15. These two suggestions will be thoroughly reviewed in the light of the recommendations made at the recent conferences of Public Affairs Officers. The Wireless File closely follows information policy guidance as transmitted to the field in classified telegram form. Wireless File material is prepared in close consultation with the Department's information policy staff and, to this extent, may be considered unclassified guidance.

The Wireless File can only serve field needs effectively if the field keeps the Department informed regularly of those needs. It must be recognized however, that each of the four regional Files must serve a number of countries, some of which have needs unlike others. Decisions as to content, style and the handling of each Wireless File item are made for each of the regional files on the basis of how the majority of countries needs can best be served, giving all high priority countries foremost consideration.

The Department's attention has been invited to the fact that some USIS posts are sending the present Bulletin (except for the "Not For Publication" Section) directly to newspapers, radio stations and periodicals before it has been checked or edited by a U.S. editorial staff member. This practice should be discontinued, since certain Bulletin items are carried to meet only the specific policy needs of certain countries or of similar language areas. These items, if given general distribution in other countries, might lead to unnecessary friction or even embarrassment. No Bulletin item—or any other USIS material— should be permitted to reach a local editor or the local public without first having been checked and approved by a responsible American staff member. [2]

MATTHEWS

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[2] Department of State file 501 contains several lengthy and detailed comments on this circular airgram from posts abroad.

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511.00/2-1153: Circular telegram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 11, 1953—7:45 p.m.

862. Following is Infoguide Bulletin 260:

*Rosenbergs:* [2] US output should give matter-of-fact treatment in news and comment to announcement February 11 President's action sustaining death sentence imposed on Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, indicating in tone and content that decision is ordinary exercise of Presidential power based on scrupulously fair process of law. We do not adopt apologetic, defensive tone, but concentrate our efforts on serious, factual presentation of facts of case and its judicial history.

In reporting and accompanying comment on President's decision we cast discussion in judicial framework, explain President's constitutional responsibility (Art. II, Par. 2, Sect. 1, ". . . he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment") as highest executive authority to receive and pass on appeals for clemency by individuals found guilty and sentenced by courts of United States; carefully establishing fact that President cannot change verdict of jury, may only relieve sentence in cases where in his judgment justice should be studied. Review of case has failed to develop any additional grounds to question soundness of decision of court which might have justified act of clemency. Major considerations are:

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[1] Drafted by George Jaeger of IIA; cleared by Flexner of L, MacKnight of P, Harris of FE, Sanger of NEA, Cootes of WE, Cox of EUR and Herron of ARA; approved by Montgomery of IIA; telegraphed to 27 posts, pouched to 51 others.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 1640.

(a) Review of legal history of case establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Rosenbergs did procure and pass atomic secrets of major significance to agents of Soviet Union . . . Rosenberg defense at trial limited to wholesale denials of all charges levelled against them and failed to produce any witnesses who able to substantiate their testimony.

(b) Rosenbergs had and took advantage of every possible legal right to appeal verdict of jury even to Supreme Court, in legal process lasting almost two years, and as last resort appealed for Presidential clemency to modify sentence. Proper conduct of trial sustained at every level. Rosenbergs' own lawyer said to Judge Kaufman at end of trial that "I, and all my co-counsel feel that you have been extremely courteous to us and you have afforded us lawyers every privilege that a lawyer should expect in a criminal case."

(c) Sentence, however severe, well in proportion to enormity of their deliberate and premeditated crime which in Judge Kaufman's words "dwarfs contemplated murder by comparison". By delivering essential atomic secrets to Soviet Union, Rosenbergs compromised not only security of United States, but security of other countries free world by speeding progress Soviet atomic research. This done in full knowledge aggressive and hostile intentions Soviet regime toward US and free world.

(d) Neither during trial, nor any time since have Rosenbergs by their attitude or actions provided extenuating considerations which might constitute grounds for clemency.

In reporting President's decision, we do not link directly with Communist trials, avoiding parallelism Rosenbergs who are convicted spies, and Communist victims of Communist purges. We may however, where necessary, encourage indigenous sources compare travesties of justice, with painstaking progress protecting rights of accused and aiming toward highest possible degree of justice.

Efforts to impugn sentence on grounds anti-Semitism should be met by presentation legal history; reference, only where necessary, to June 3, 1952 statement National Community Relations Advisory Council on behalf all US Jewish community relations agencies, which condemned Communist efforts "to mislead the people of this country by charges that the religious ancestry of the defendants was a factor in the case".

In areas where particular efforts to counteract Communist distortions appear necessary efforts should be concentrated on inducing indigenous comment and analysis. Official US sources should avoid being drawn into open controversy, maintain serious factual attitude.

For further reference this case see IA Special Instruction PO-53-34 December 11, 1952, entitled "The Rosenberg Case". [3]

DULLES

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[3] Not found, but see the memorandum by Phillips, Dec. 11, 1952, p. 1640.

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Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, "Telephone Conversations"

## *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation* [1]

[WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1953.

### TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GEORGE SOKOLSKY [2]

Mr. Sokolsky telephoned Feb. 11 and said that whenever Mr. Dulles had a moment he would like to talk with him. The Secretary returned his call today.

Mr. Sokolsky said that the investigation now going on in New York (Sen. McCarthy) would touch on the VOA material. [3] The interpretation is that they are still pro-left and this will come out in the hearings. He wanted Mr. Dulles to know about it.

The Secretary pointed out that he took office less than a month ago and that none of his assistants were sworn in until much later and that it was impossible for him to personally study the VOA material. He pointed out that Mr. Lourie was still not in office, [4] although he would be in a position to do something about this had he been confirmed.

Mr. Sokolsky said that the investigation had brought out that instructions were sent to an O'Connor to use Howard Fast (a Communist) as an example or expression of America. [5] He just wanted Mr. Dulles to know these things and that he will be protected.

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[1] Drafted by Secretary Dulles' personal secretary, Burnita O'Day.

[2] George E. Sokolsky, nationally syndicated newspaper columnist, radio commentator, and lecturer.

[3] The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which McCarthy chaired after January 1953, conducted hearings into the operations of the Voice of America in February and March 1953 as part of its more general inquiry of the Department of State information program. See the editorial note, *infra*.

[4] Donold Lourie was confirmed as Under Secretary of State for Administration by Senate action on Feb. 13, 1953.

The Secretary explained that the President has set up a Committee to study the status of VOA, [6] whether it should be included in the State Department. He is hesitant to do anything about it until he knows whether it is his responsibility.

Mr. Sokolsky said that McCarthy is in New York, that they are going ahead with the investigation. The Secretary said he did not object to that, he thought they might be helpful, if they do not unfairly try to blame him for things he has had nothing to do with.

The Secretary also mentioned Mr. Humelsine's resignation. [7] Mr. Sokolsky said, "Isn't he one of the Hiss men?", JFD said he knew nothing about that. Sokolsky said he would tell Sen. McCarthy, he thought he would be interested. He will keep in touch with the Secretary if anything comes up.

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[5] For information on this incident, see the testimony of W. Bradley Connors, Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans, U.S. International Information Administration, in 83d Cong., 1st sess., U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations. *Hearings: State Department Information Program—Voice of America*, Part II (Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 126–143. Further documentation on the instructions concerning the works of Howard Fast issued in 1952 and 1953 is found in the paper prepared in the Department of State entitled, "Chronology of Pertinent Directives", July 13, 1953, USIA files, lot 58 D 581, "Material for McCarthy Hearings".

[6] For information on the reorganization of the foreign information program in June–July 1953, which led to the abolition of the U.S. International Information Administration in the Department of State and the creation of the U.S. Information Agency, see the editorial note, p. 1709.

[7] Carlisle H. Humelsine resigned as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration on Feb. 13, 1953.

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## *Editorial Note*

On February 13, the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee, under its new chairman, Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wisc.), began hearings regarding charges that the Voice of America's anti-Communist propaganda had been weakened, that some employees of VOA were Communist sympathizers, and that its engineering projects had been badly managed. The hearings were conducted in New York City and broadcast nationwide on radio and television. For the published record of these hearings, see 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953, *Senate Committee on Government Operations, State Department Information Program—Voice of America: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations* (Government Printing Office, 1953).

The Permanent Investigations Subcommittee continued to meet throughout the first session of the 83d Congress, and it eventually broadened its initial hearings on the Voice of America to include the entire Department of State overseas information program. After the 83d Congress reconvened its second session, the subcommittee filed three reports, early in 1954, dealing with the overseas information program in general. These were: 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, *Senate Committee on Government Operations. Waste and Mismanagement in Voice of America engineering projects; Senate Report 880 made by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations* (Government Printing Office, 1954); 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, *Senate Committee on Government Operations. Voice of America; Senate Report 928 made by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations* (Government Printing Office, 1954); 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, *Senate Committee on Government Operations. State Department information program . . .; Senate Report 879 made by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations* (Government Printing Office, 1954).

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## *Editorial Note*

On February 18, the Secretary of State announced the resignation of Wilson Compton as head of the International Information Agency. Secretary Dulles stated that Compton's resignation had been submitted the previous month and was being accepted in line with the new administration's policy of bringing in new people where major policy changes or views were involved. (*New York Times*, February 19, 1953, page 1)

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## *Editorial Note*

Senate Resolution 44 (83d Congress), passed on February 20, gave the special subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigating overseas information programs (see the editorial note, page 1627) an extension to June 30, 1953. Under the chairmanship of Senator Hickenlooper, the senior Republican member who had replaced Senator Fulbright, the subcommittee began hearings on March 6, 1953. These hearings continued sporadically through May 13 and on June 5 the subcommittee submitted Senate Report No. 406. For documentation on the 1953 hearings of the subcommittee, including a brief legislative history of the subcommittee to that date with the pertinent Senate Resolution, see 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953, *Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Overseas Information Programs of the United States; Hearings before a Subcommittee* (Government Printing Office, 1953). The Report of the subcommittee was transmitted to the Senate and printed as Report

No. 406, 83d Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 1953 (Government Printing Office, 1953).

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "IIA, 1953"

### *Memorandum by the Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans of the United States International Information Agency (Connors) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Scott)*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1953.

Subject: Controversial Persons

This office has issued a policy directive that no materials by any Communists, fellow-travellers, etc., will be used under any circumstances by any IIA media or mission.

There is no official list available to IIA which authoritatively discloses all those persons known or alleged to be in one way or another Communists or fellow-travellers.

I need urgently advice as to the possibility of procuring a list of such persons.[2]

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[1] Copies to Bracken of L/P, Phleger of L, McCardle, and Compton.

[2] On Feb. 23 Scott transmitted Connors' memorandum to Samuel D. Boykin, the Special Assistant to the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, with the request for an appropriate reply. In his covering memorandum to Boykin, Scott wrote, *inter alia*, "The problem seems to have two phases—American authors and non-American authors. Wouldn't the House Un-American Activities files be the best place to start? It seems to me we should also see what assistance we can get from the FBI and the CIA. I am sure there are other sources which I haven't thought of offhand." (A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "IIA, 1953") For Scott's replies to Connors' memorandum, see *infra* and p.1674.

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "IIA, 1953"

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Scott) to the Assistant Administrator of the Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Agency (Connors)*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

Subject: Controversial Persons

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[1] Drafted on Feb. 26 by Herbert F. Linneman, Deputy Director of the Office of Security, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Copies to Bracken, Phleger, McCardle, and Harris of IIA.

I refer to your memorandum of February 20, 1953. [2] I am advised that a complete authoritative list of Communists or fellow-travellers does not exist and that it would be virtually impossible to compile and maintain such a list.

A possible solution to your problem would be to have the several IIA offices request the Office of Security to make name checks of the authors whose works it is proposed be used. SY would then furnish to the responsible official the results of the name check and a decision could then be made upon the basis of the information disclosed. If this solution appears to you to be feasible, I would suggest that you get directly in touch with John Ford in SY to work out the details. One very important detail would be the extent of the name check coverage. This will depend entirely upon the amount of time available to SY to make the checks. I would urge that the fullest checks possible be made in order that all pertinent security information in the files of other security agencies could be made available for the use of IIA. If the volume of requests for name checks is to be large, it will be necessary that funds be made available to cover the costs of these checks.

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[2] *Supra.*

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "IIA, 1953"

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Scott) to the Assistant Administrator of the Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Agency (Connors)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1953.

The Office of Security has been doing everything possible to be of assistance with reference to your memorandum dated February 20. [1] They have been in contact with the FBI, CIA and House Un-American Activities Committee and have been informed that these agencies do not have any such list as you request. If IIA will submit a list of people whose work has been used in the past as well as a list of people whose work IIA intends to use in the future, the Office of Security will take these lists and conduct "name checks" with the FBI, CIA, House Un-American Activities Committee and the Division of Biographic Information in the Department. The results of these checks could then be passed along to IIA for their guidance and use.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1673.

It may be necessary that funds be made available by IIA to cover the costs of these checks, particularly if the number of names submitted is large. [2]

W.K. Scott

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[2] On Mar. 2, Scott transmitted to Scott McCleod, the new Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, copies of this memorandum and of the Connors memorandum of Feb. 20. In a covering memorandum, Scott wrote that in view of McCleod's assumption of office it was important that McCleod be apprised of "this important problem promptly". (A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "IIA, 1953")

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511.00/2-2753

## *Memorandum by the Director of Congressional and Public Information of the United States International Information Administration (Crosby) to Francis B. Stevens, Staff Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities* [1]

Washington, February 27, 1953.

Subject: Public and Congressional Criticisms of IIA

You asked me several days ago to give you a list of the major criticisms directed at this program by the Congress and the public. Many of these have been aired recently in the McCarthy investigations [2] and others probably will be heard at future hearings. These criticisms have been aimed primarily at the broadcasting service (Voice of America) of the International Information Administration.

1. *Waste and Inefficiency:* The construction program of the Voice of America's radio transmitting facilities has been under fire for some years. It began late in 1951 when the Department asked for $98 million and was granted $9 million. This budget was prepared on short notice and not adequately studied. Consequently the House Appropriations Committee directed that the Department review the entire proposal. Last year the Administrator of the information program had two major surveys made of the Voice of America operation. One was on management and administration of the New York operations and the other on domestic transmitting facilities. These investigations uncovered many failings and errors, which to a considerable degree have been corrected at the present

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[1] The final report of this Committee, issued June 30, is printed on p. 1795.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 1671.

time. Attached is an interim progress report on the management and administration document.[3]

2. *Communists and Left Wingers:* The Voice of America has been severely criticized for having questionable persons in its employ. I do not think it is necessary to expand on this.

3. *Blunderbuss Approach:* The program is still being criticized for not having designed its overseas operations to conform to the needs of the different countries. Great progress has been made in this direction during the last year, and I think that the criticisms are no longer valid.

4. *Content:* For some years the information program attempted to give a picture of America's material wealth and power. This approach did not accomplish the desired objective. In fact it only served to create general envy and jealousy overseas. Criticism is still directed at the program for following this line.

On the other hand, the program has been criticized for *not* presenting a full and fair picture of America's material wealth to our audiences abroad.

5. *The Red Tape of the State Department:* Many people have said that this program will never be effective until it is separated from the diplomatic bureaucracy of the Department of State. At the same time, there is an articulate segment of opinion that emphasizes the need of more closely integrating the program within the framework of the Department.

6. *Location of the Voice of America:* Several influential members of Congress keenly feel that the Voice of America should be more carefully controlled policy-wise and that this cannot be accomplished as long as it remains in New York. Consideration has been under way for some time concerning this question of moving the Voice to Washington or some other location.

7. *Quality of Personnel:* Criticism has been directed at the calibre of the personnel engaged in the information program. At the present time it is true that there is no major reservoir of trained propagandists. The Department has maintained a brief course of training, but has not been satisfied and has not been able to devise an adequate training course.

There is also the view that the program should make use of professional advertising, public relations, and newspapermen. Many people who hold this view regard the information program as a gigantic selling proposition which must utilize salesmanship techniques.

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[3] Not found.

8. *Overstaffing:* Members of Congress have contended that the Voice of America could run with 100 people rather than the approximately 2000 presently employed.

9. *Not Sufficiently Anticommunist:* The information program has not, according to many people, carried sufficient anticommunist material in its various media. Much of this criticism stems from the fact that few Americans have placed themselves in the position of the foreign nationals whom we are trying to reach. Unquestionably, however, there have been instances where program content was not sufficiently directed or purposeful.

10. *The Voice of America is Not Objective:* This criticism is to the effect that the Voice of America carries too much propaganda and does not have the results of the BBC. This criticism usually comes from people who have a general understanding of some of the problems of this world-wide program.

The last two items mentioned are cases in point of the fact that the International Information Administration has on occasion been "damned if it does and damned if it doesn't" follow a particular approach.

Psychological operations have become much more important during recent years. However, Congress, which was extremely busy, has not been able to establish a means of being kept informed of the problems and of the program. Strong recommendations have been made to the effect that there should be either a joint committee on propaganda and psychological operations or two selected committees. I think this would be of tremendous help to the program.

In closing I urge that you study the attached reports, particularly the recent report of the Advisory Commission on Information.

BEN G. CROSBY

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USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Info Guide Bulletin 303"

## *Summary Memorandum Prepared by the Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Administration* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

### BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE IIA INSTRUCTION OF THE USE OF MATERIALS BY CONTROVERSIAL PERSONS

The purpose of this instruction was to establish criteria to govern the use in the IIA program of already existing books, writings,

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[1] Source text is accompanied by a covering memorandum from W. Bradley Connors of the Office of Policy and Plans to IIA Acting Administrator Johnson dated

*Continued*

paintings, music, etc., produced by persons who are subjects of public controversy.

The instruction restricted a recommendation from the US Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange which recommended in the case of books for USIS libraries abroad that the criterion be based on content without regard to authorship.

Considering these recommendations too all inclusive, Dr. Compton directed that specific criteria be established to govern the use of materials by controversial persons, and to state that controversial authors would be used only under exceptional circumstances.

Criteria established to govern the exceptions are listed in the instruction which states that materials produced by persons whose ideologies or views were questionable or controversial would not be used unless:

a. It supported importantly, not incidentally, a specific psychological objective and none of the content was detrimental to the objectives of the US Government.

b. It was substantially better than other material available for the purpose.

c. Failure to include it would impair our general credibility.

To illustrate, works by Howard Fast, some of which are favorable to the US were cited. The idea was to use such materials, in exceptional circumstances, particularly to influence a left winger or fellow traveler who knew that some of Fast works were Soviet endorsed, and we could use the materials favorable to the US as opening bait. A copy of the instruction is attached. [2]

2. On February 12 Mr. McCardle was informed that the Voice [3] had been instructed to use Soviet endorsed writers like Howard Fast. Mr. McCardle asked Mr. Connors who found the instruction of February 3 which mentioned Mr. Fast.

3. On February 13 Mr. McCardle ordered the instruction rescinded. This was done. Mr. McCardle also asked that the works of all communist, fellow travelers and the like be banned.

4. On February 18 a written instruction [4] was issued to all IIA media stating: "In connection with IA Instruction PO-9 dated February 13, 1953, rescinding IA Instruction PO-5 of January 30, 1953, concerning use of materials by controversial persons, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, no repeat no materials by any controversial persons, Communists, fellow-travelers, etc., will be used under any circumstances by any IIA media."

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Mar. 3, which reads: "Attached for your information is a summary of the background of this instruction and the action taken to date."

[2] Not found attached.

[3] Voice of America, New York.

[4] The reference instruction cannot be further identified.

5. On February 19 an Infoguide Bulletin (attached)[5] was issued to the Media and the field repeating the above instruction but with the deletion of the phrase "controversial persons." This instruction was approved by Mr. McCardle and Mr. Phleger.

6. February 20, teletype message from Morton (Voice Director in New York) to Connors referring to Infoguide Bulletin 272 and stating:

> "IBS in accordance with existing policy will continue to use the works and words of Communists, fellow-travellers, etc., to expose them or to make them eat their own words or in furtherance of the American national interest.
>
> "As an example of the implementation of the above standing procedure: IBS will quote Stalin, Vishinsky, Gromyko and other Communists to the extent that the use of such material advances our causes."

7. February 20, teletype message to Morton New York from Connors stating:

> "Reference your 4:15 p.m. memo, Infoguide Bulletin 272 of February 19 is binding policy and under no circumstances can be amended. IBS will not, repeat not, use the works or words of any Communists, fellow-travellers, etc."

8. February 21, Mr. Lourie on the Hill was informed by Mr. Flannagan (Chief Counsel to McCarthy Committee) that a message had been sent either to New York or Washington (between Morton and Connors) to disregard Secretary's instruction. Mr. Connors provided the exchange of messages to Mr. Lourie.

9. On February 21 after a telephone conversation, New York sent down a draft of a proposed VOA directive quoting Infoguide Bulletin 272 in full and making several suggestions for approval. This was received at 5:12 p.m.

This was discussed by Mr. McCardle, Mr. Phillips and Mr. Connors.

Clarification as approved here and issued in New York provided:

> "The news desk will continue to report accurately and within the frame of established policies, legitimate news emanating from Communist sources based on credible news services. Original shirt-tails quoting Communists or fellow-travellers for any purposes will be suspended.
>
> "Original comment using Communist or fellow-traveller authors for any purpose is banned.
>
> "IBS will make maximum use within the framework of US policies of material appearing in US published sources to refute Communist propaganda.

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[5] Not attached. Presumably this was Infoguide Bulletin 272 a copy of which is in file 511.00/2-1953 as circular telegram 889.

"IBS will make maximum use of statements by administration officials and Members of Congress to refute Communist propaganda.

"A maximum effort to present positive Americana of an unreproachable nature will provide us with ample material to bridge the gap until our directives regarding psychological warfare are clarified."

Because of the week-end holiday, IBS did not issue this directive until February 23rd.

10. February 25, special arrangements made for coverage of General Assembly.

*Compliance with Infoguide Bulletin 272*

1. The attached memoranda indicate the action taken. The media activities affected are outlined in Connors' memorandum to Mr. Phillips of February 26. [6] It involves, for example, whether or not we can use the words of communists to refute their own stories on such subjects as forced labor in the Soviet Union, germ warfare charges and the prisoner of war issue in Korea.

2. Informational Media Guaranty Program: The question arose as to whether this instruction pertained to magazines which are bought on contract and which may include articles or quotations from communists. ICS was advised not to cancel the contracts until further consultation with the legal advisor. The opinion of the legal advisor was transmitted to Mr. Humphrey. [7] Meanwhile, however, a letter was written on February 24 [6] to all the contractors under the guaranty program requesting that they give assurance that none of the materials they provided fell within the prohibited categories. This letter was based upon a misinterpretation of the instruction, which did not contain the phrase controversial persons, and was rescinded on February 27.

3. Ruling on Communists, fellow-travellers, etc.: Connors has asked that the A area provide us with a list of such persons. He has been informed that no such list is in existence. It was suggested that IIA submit a list of all materials which it now uses or is considering using for a name check. This is done on a routine basis by the press and motion picture service. In the case of libraries, however, some tens of thousands of authors are involved. Also it is not feasible that the list of articles in all magazines bought on subscription be submitted for advance checking.

4. In addition to program activities, this instruction also raises questions relating to the publication and use of a number of docu-

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[6] Not found.

[7] Presumably Richard A. Humphrey, Acting Assistant Administrator of the International Information Center Service, U.S. International Information Administration.

ments produced by the intelligence area of the Department, including Soviet Affairs notes which is based almost entirely upon the writings and statements of Communists.

5. We have recommended that in view of the above considerations, Infoguide Bulletin 272 cannot be fully applied without a serious cut in both the nature and effectiveness of IIA operations, and should be amended.

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511.00/3-553: Circular telegram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 5, 1953—7:53 p.m.

925. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 285:

*Stalin:* This is supplement to Infoguide Bulletin 283 of March 4, 1953. [2] (FYI begins: Stalin's illness has naturally caused enormous interest in free world mainly on question who will control Soviet Communist world. Little doubt this uncertainty paralleled among Soviet orbit peoples (including bulk party activists) who have never been permitted speculate openly about this eventuality; this state of mind will become more acute when Stalin dies. Among Kremlin clique, we may assume feelings may be classified into one of two general categories: confusion and anxiety—in case problem "succession" has not already been adequately settled; or rivalries—in case regime has already prescribed solution. Seems unlikely that regime has been able to evolve clear-cut succession plan which both eliminates uncertainty and satisfies all potential aspirants.

In output to Soviet orbit, it is within our psychological objectives to capitalize on emotions which may be presumed exist among these various classes. Regarding uninitiated Soviet masses we seek isolate them further from regime. With regard to initiated elite we seek exacerbate their confusion and rivalries in order complicate delicate succession question and thus weaken regime.

In regard to Soviet popular masses, our actions must not appear offend their sensibilities or exceed bounds good taste, thereby confirming Soviet propaganda image of Americans as crude barbarians, and tending unite popular opposition to US. Specifically, we must take into account fact that for generation Stalin has been only leader people have known; he has been carefully sheltered from popular resentment against bureaucratic, dictatorial regime; moreover, he has been systematically built up as symbol of power and prestige acquired by Soviet state in war and peace.

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[1] Drafted by Lewis Revey of IIA, James Pratt of EE, and Huyler of P; cleared by Bohlen, Nitze, Harris, Boughton of NEA/P, Cox, Barbour, Pratt, Phillips, Connors, and Godel of Defense; approved by Montgomery; telegraphed to 11 posts, with a copy to the Department of Defense, and pouched to 64 other posts.

[2] Not printed; it was transmitted in circular telegram 919 of Mar. 4 and contained "interim guidance pending detailed governmental consideration and determination re important and complex issues created by Stalin illness". (511.00/3-453) For a summary and guide to further documentation concerning the response of the U.S. Government to the illness and death of Stalin, see the editorial note, p. 290.

While same considerations apply to ruling clique, more important is fact we know little about intricacies of succession problem. There is no evidence that succession has not already been settled, at least temporarily. Even if it has not we do not know that it cannot be settled without bloodshed. Accordingly, we must confine ourselves to questions and hypotheses, without committing ourselves to any one solution, creating doubt, suspicion, distrust, and jealousy. Ends FYI)

*Treatment:* In order assure maximum psychological advantage, and permit sustained psychological exploitation of situation as it may develop over coming critical period—possibly of considerable duration—output should: (a) maintain tone of controlled, deliberate restraint, taking cue from White House statement March 4th, [3] avoiding stridency or vituperation; (b) keep such balance in our attention to subject that it does not give impression of constant, predominant preoccupation on part of free world with issues arising from Stalin illness.

Care should be taken not to make positive assertions re probable course events. Intent should be to raise questions and cause doubts, but strictly to avoid direct forecasts which will prevent or complicate exploitation of situation as it unfolds in USSR.

Following list of themes should be developed where possible through selected comment, with full attribution to source, and, where such selected comment is unavailable, may be developed sparingly in restrained factual original material which does not repeat not commit US information output to any single or overriding interpretation:

1. To Soviet Orbit and China:

a. General review of Stalin's own coming into power including accurate historical detail and review of internal dissensions at that time.

b. Balanced presentation of alternative possibilities for succession including:

(1.) Impracticability of "committee directorate".
(2.) Possibilities of triumvirate rule.
(3.) Balanced comment re relative merits and deficiencies individuals within Soviet system and their claims to succession.

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[3] "Statement by the President Concerning the Illness of Joseph Stalin, March 4, 1953" in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, p. 75.

(4.) Careful balanced comment upon various protagonists' "right to succession".

c. Sympathy for Soviet peoples who placed in their present uncertain position by secretive and dictatorial nature of regime.

d. Doubt as to ability of any of known aspirants to fill adequately position which Stalin consolidated under his personal direction over years.

e. Questions as to why regime had to wait 48 hours before informing people of event which so gravely concerned them.

f. Suggestion it is not endurable demand more sacrifices from Soviet people to build up power of successor inevitably weaker than Stalin.

g. Doubts as to whether system would survive were it submitted to vote of Soviet people.

h. Questions as to ability, good faith, trustworthiness of any and all would-be successor or successors.

i. Intimations, based on history, concerning possibility of overt or covert purges of any actual or potential rivals or non-supporters of successor or successors.

j. Questions as to competence and prudence of possible successors.

k. Statement that even elaborate ritual of detailed medical examination and report may not save certain party leaders from possibility of second Moscow "doctor's plot".

l. Only recent guide to action left by Stalin for his successors is verbose "Bolshevik" article, whose reactionary tone and confused reasoning have caused it be treated gingerly by Soviet theoreticians.

m. Speculation as to whether Mao Tse-tung may now become ideological theoretician and spokesman for world Communism.

2. Specifically to European Satellites:

a. Suggestions to satellite leaders that their ties to Moscow are likely be loosened by trouble there.

b. Suggestions that tenure of satellite leaders is now even more uncertain since they cannot know definitely whom to back.

c. Hints that satellite leaders, whose performance record so far is not good, will be among first to feel new broom of successor Moscow.

*Caution:* Output to Soviet satellites must endeavor restrain and moderate any excessive hopes of immediate Soviet collapse and liberation.

3. Specifically to China:

a. Doubts as to ability of any new Soviet leader to understand and cope with Asian problems.

b. Questions as to ability of USSR to pursue actively an Asian policy while faced with such huge problems at home.

c. Doubts as to claims of any would-be successors who are inferior to Mao Tse-tung in experience, ability and perhaps age.

4. Specifically to free world:

Output to free world, in giving balanced picture of US and free world reaction, should place strongest emphasis on following points:

a. Fact that Stalin's passing does not indicate any lessening of tensions or Soviet pressures.

b. Particularly in output to Europe, pick up selected official and unofficial comment with full attribution to source, emphasizing fact that prompt effective ratification EDC and support NATO objectives no less imperative at this time.

*Caution:* Avoid any comment suggesting possibility that Stalin's passing increases likelihood of actual warfare.

DULLES

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511.00/3–653: Circular telegram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 6, 1953—8:27 p.m.
PRIORITY

931. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 287:

*Stalin:* In light Moscow announcement new governmental organization following death Stalin, [2] all US information output on subject overall, in addition to reporting factually hard news of developments and backgrounding personalities involved with suitable biographical material, should concentrate on following themes, developed in form of insistent questioning:

(a) Is Malenkov competent to succeed Stalin, in terms political experience, ideological leadership, and party and state authority and control? Malenkov's whole personality and record shows he no Stalin No. Two.

(b) Are party seniors now subordinated to Malenkov going to reconcile themselves to present relative positions in new governmental party structure; to seeing Malenkov sitting in Stalin's chair? May not period of another struggle for power be expected?

For subsidiary themes, those outlined Department Circular Telegram 925 (Infoguide Bulletin 285) of March 5, still stand, except for obviously outdated portion FYI section and themes relating to "succession".

It should be emphasized that it continues be our major objective to sow doubt, confusion, uncertainty about new regime not only among both Soviet and satellite elites and masses, but among local Communist parties outside Soviet Union.

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[1] Drafted by Montgomery and Huyler; cleared in draft by McCardle, Pratt, and Connors; in substance by Phillips and Bohlen; and approved by Montgomery. Distribution was same as for circular telegram 925, *supra*.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 290.

DULLES

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Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Bookburning"

## *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (McCardle) to the Acting Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Johnson)*

CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1953.

Subject: Directives to the IIA concerning use of material by Communist Authors

I have your memorandum of March 5. [1] The Secretary's decision is as follows:

1. Material produced by Communists or their agents or sympathizers should be used only with great care and when responsible persons judge them to be an effective way—and the uniquely effective way—to confound international Communism with its own words, to expose its fallacies and refute its doctrines.

2. It should be our policy not to identify by name any living international communist unless absolutely necessary. This must not be carried to the point of absurdity in treatment of straight news but even here a conscious effort not to build up our living opponents by naming them should be made. As often as possible, writings or statements of living persons can be ascribed to some such anonymity as "a leading international communist or Stalinist". Skillful use of this treatment in commentary and in our anti-communist publications can be especially effective.

Our own press and radio have in the past built up Soviet personalities to such an extent that whatever they do or say commands widespread attention. I believe we should replace individual buildups with anonymity to those hostile to us.

3. Reputable, responsible U.S. periodicals of program value may be included in USIS overseas libraries. However, the Mission should withdraw any individual issues containing any material detrimental to U.S. objectives. Periodicals, which are receptive to in-

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[1] Not found. Johnson had also written to Dulles about this matter; see Dulles' memorandum for the President, June 27, p. 1715. Dulles' own personal reply to Johnson, also dated Mar. 17, 1953, was subsequently released on June 25, in conjunction with responses to Congressional queries concerning book policies in overseas libraries (see footnote 3, p. 1716); for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1953, p. 59.

ternational communist propaganda, have no place in the program and cannot be used.

4. I do not think we should make the works of Communist authors a part of our public libraries.

5. If you find these ideas acceptable, I must rely on you to translate them into what is an appropriate and practicable "working-level" directive.

CARL W. MCCARDLE

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USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Info Guide Bulletin 303"

### *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 17, 1953.

Following is Infoguide Bulletin 303:

Department circular telegram 889 (Infoguide Bulletin 272) [2] of February 19 is herewith canceled.

Following effective immediately:

1. Material produced by Communists or their agents or sympathizers should be used only with great care and when responsible persons judge them to be an effective way—and the uniquely effective way—to confound international Communism with its own words, to expose its fallacies and refute its doctrines. Responsibility for this judgment rests with directors of media services, PAOs and their designated alternates.

2. Our policy is not to identify by name any living international Communist unless absolutely necessary. This must not be carried to the point of absurdity in treatment of straight news but even here a conscious effort not to build up our living opponents by naming them should be made. As often as possible, writings or statements of living persons can be ascribed to some such anonymity as "a leading international Communist or Stalinist". Skillful use of this treatment in commentary and in our own anti-Communist publications can be especially effective.

Our own press and radio have in the past built up Soviet personalities to such an extent that whatever they do or say commands widespread attention. We should replace individual buildups with anonymity to those hostile to us.

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[1] This message was transmitted as circular telegram 961, Mar. 17. The central file copy of this circular telegram (511.00/3-1753) was removed in July 1953. A notation on the source text reads: "Copied from carbon tissue, March 18, 1953." The source text also indicates this message was drafted by W. Bradley Connors of the Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. International Information Administration, and by Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Carl W. McCardle, and was approved for transmission by IIA Administrator Robert L. Johnson.

[2] See footnote 5, p. 1679.

3. Reputable, responsible US periodicals of program value may be included in USIS overseas libraries. However, the Mission should withdraw any individual issues containing any material detrimental to US objectives. Periodicals, which repeatedly publish international Communist propaganda, have no place in the program and cannot be used.

4. Works of Communist authors are banned from all USIS public libraries and information centers.

PAO in each country mission has responsibility for taking all reasonable efforts for removal of individual issues of periodicals "containing material detrimental to US objectives". PAO must immediately carry out the ban against use of periodicals "which repeatedly publish international Communist propaganda" and the "works of Communist authors" by removing all material known to him or his staff to be within these categories. (For the purposes of this instruction authors who obviously follow the Communist line or participate in Communist front organizations will be considered Communists and their works banned.)

Realizing that the PAO and his staff may not be aware of all Communist authors or publications which repeatedly publish international Communist propaganda, the Department will attempt as promptly as possible to furnish specific guidance on individual periodicals and books to be banned. To facilitate review of material acquired locally, all posts which have not already done so, should provide Department with list of these acquisitions.

This directive also cancels any previous directives or sections thereof that may conflict with the instructions herein.[3]

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[3] Infoguide Bulletin 303 was supplemented by two further instructions. Circular telegram 1065 of Apr. 28 reads as follows: "Ref. Depcirc. 961 (Infoguide Bulletin 303) dated March 17, 1953 books of persons taking refuge behind the Fifth Amendment in refusing to testify as to their political affiliations before a Congressional Committee should be removed from the shelves of Information Centers. IIA hearing Wireless File FS section since March 16, 1953 contains names of persons seeking such refuge before McCarthy subcommittee. Further information will be furnished by IIA as secured from records of previous hearings and other Congressional committees." (511.0021/4-2853) For documentation on the foreign policy aspects of Congressional loyalty and security investigations and concern over declining prestige abroad, see vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1379 ff. On June 18, certain diplomatic posts were told in circular telegram 1213 that, in reference to Infoguide Bulletin 303, "pending further instructions names, authors or titles books removed should not be made public." (511.0021/6-1853)

103 USIA/3-2353

### *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Cabot) to the Acting Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Johnson)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1953.

Subject: Information and Educational Exchange Program in Latin America.

My attention has been called to anticipated reductions in funds to be requested for fiscal year 1954, particularly as they would apply to USIS operations in Latin America. I have asked members of my staff to furnish me with certain data which are embodied in this memorandum and which I hope you will consider in reaching a decision on the proportion of such funds to be made available by Congressional appropriations for USIS field operations in Latin America. It was my hope to send you soon carefully considered recommendations with regard to the program in the area, but have deemed it necessary to send you this incomplete memorandum in view of the development noted above.

I should like to say first of all that I have every confidence in the information and educational exchange program and consider it an exceedingly important part of our overall effort in the other American republics. It is for this reason that I am particularly disturbed to learn of the proposed action.

The one area of the world which has proportionately suffered the most, in allotment of IIA funds and attention, over the past seven years, has been Latin America. The Secretary recently stated that Latin America compared in some respects to the China of 1930 and the President and he both have stated the intention of the new administration to intensify our efforts in Latin America. I have, in fact, recently discussed with the Secretary a number of possibilities for expanding the program in certain phases, the cultural program and motion pictures in general, and high calibre professors and lecturers to go to the area in particular. The fact is that improvement of our relations with these countries is seriously handicapped because of charges of neglect upon which Communists and ultra-Nationalists play for their own ends. Some of the steps I understand have been proposed would directly contribute to increasing the bases for such charges.

I am informed that the field program budget in Latin America is to be cut 25 percent from present levels. The seriousness of this proposed cut is apparent when some of the program history is observed. Specifically, it is proposed to cut authorized American positions in Latin America from the presently authorized level of 146 to about 110. This cut would put the Latin American operation at a level below that which it enjoyed on June 30, 1946. At that time the entire USIS operation was conducted with an expenditure of about 22 million dollars. On June 30, 1946, there were 122 American USIS positions authorized for Latin America (excluding 11 American librarian positions now included in the proposed 110.) In other words although the total funds available for USIS have increased since June 1946 by almost four hundred percent, USIS personnel authorized for Latin America will have been decreased by over ten percent.

It is my understanding also that the proposal has been made to eliminate support to all bi-national centers in Latin America. This decision, I fear, is being taken without sufficient thought to the nature of these centers and to the effect such a move would have on U.S. foreign policy objectives in the area. (It is worth recalling that no such cut was deemed necessary in 1948 when the entire USIS had a mere 12 million dollars, less than fifteen percent of the money anticipated as being available next fiscal year.)

Our missions in Latin America are almost unanimous in considering the bi-national centers one of the most important phases of their IIA program; several consider the centers the most important of all media. Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum made available to IIA several months ago which states the Bureau's views on the subject. [1] Almost all our missions have reiterated the need for increasing cultural activities as opposed to strictly informational if we are to win our battle. Yet this proposed action would eliminate the basic arm of the cultural program.

Budgetary decisions made in haste frequently result in bad judgment. It may also be difficult for some officials to change a point of view which has been allowed to continue for seven years. Yet the realities of the situation, as you so well know, make it imperative that this way of thinking be changed if we are to do everything expected of us in meeting the administration's increased concern with Latin America.

May I say here that the Bureau has no objection to cutbacks in a great deal of the materials now being sent to the field (many missions have complained about receiving quantities of material which they cannot handle) and even to further cutback in shortwave broadcasts to the area (in view of the fact that, as our Ambassadors have informed us, the most effective work in the radio field is done locally by missions). In other words, I consider it of vital importance to preserve as nearly intact as possible the present field organization in preference to retaining Departmental personnel whose job it is to backstop the field. After all, it does little good to have a large staff to backstop on operation, whereas the field organization can always on its own do a great deal of effective work with relatively little backstopping.

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[1] A notation at the bottom of the source text indicates that the reference memorandum was dated Jan. 29, 1953, and was from Philip Raine of ARA/P to Elinor Reams of IAE/S. It has not been found.

I certainly hope that it will not be necessary to take such drastic action with regard to the program in Latin America as has been proposed. If you consider that such a reduction is necessary, I hope that we can discuss this further before a decision is taken.

Let me reiterate that it is my deep concern for the important role which the IIA program plays in Latin America and my personal desire to see you succeed in this exceptionally difficult undertaking that prompts me to bring the foregoing to your attention. You can count on my full cooperation for any assistance which this Bureau, with its lengthy experience in observing, administering, and now advising the informational and educational exchange program, can give you.

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511.0021/3–3153

## *Senators William E. Jenner and Pat McCarran to the Secretary of State* [1]

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the April 1953 issue of *The American Legion Magazine*, Mr. Karl H. W. Baarslag, of the National Americanism Commission of The American Legion, calls attention to the fact that libraries of the United States Information Service abroad do not have copies of the hearings and reports of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

As the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, respectively, of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, we respectfully request your advice as to whether you believe these publications properly should be made available through the USIS libraries abroad. If you believe they should be made available, the committee will, we are sure, be glad to arrange to provide copies of these publications and documents to the State Department for distribution to the USIS libraries. If you hold the view that these publications and documents should not be made available through USIS libraries abroad, we ask that you inform us of the reasons why you take such a position.

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[1] Senator Jenner (R., Ind.) was Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary; Senator McCarran (D., Nev.) was ranking minority member. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "acknowledged by phone, 4/9/53." A more formal, written reply was made on Apr. 23 by Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs Thruston B. Morton, printed on p. 1706.

With highest esteem and all best regards, we are

Sincerely,

William E. Jenner
Pat McCarran

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PSB files, lot 62 D 333, "Psychological Strategy Board"

## *Memorandum for the President by the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization* [1]

Memorandum No. 14 Washington, April 7, 1953.

Subject: Foreign Affairs Organization

*Introduction*

The security and welfare of the Nation have become increasingly and critically dependent on the successful conduct of our foreign affairs in all its aspects: political, military, economic, and psychological. In the conduct of our foreign policies and programs, it is not enough simply to react to developments as they occur; it is imperative that all our material and intellectual resources and skills be harnessed to the formulation and execution of positive and effective efforts designed to achieve the National goals.

The organization of the Federal Government for this task can be materially strengthened.

The Committee considers it of the highest importance that the Secretary of State have sole responsibility (subject to the President) for the formulation and control of foreign policy and that he be freed from foreign program operations in order that he may concentrate on his primary function.

The foreign policy primacy of the Secretary of State should be maintained through clear Presidential mandate and through the President's consistent practice of employing the Secretary of State as the Executive's channel of authority on foreign policy questions. This relationship should, of course, be sustained on specific issues by the President.

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[1] President Eisenhower established his Advisory Committee on Government Organization on Jan. 29, 1953, naming Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York as chairman. President Eisenhower subsequently discussed the purpose of this Committee at some length in his first Annual State of the Union Message to Congress, Feb. 2, 1953 (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, p. 25) and in his memoirs (*Mandate for Change* (New York, 1963), p. 133). For the list of Committee members and a résumé of the Committee's work, see *U.S. President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization; Report of Nelson A. Rockefeller . . . summarizing the Committee's principal activities from January, 1953 to date* (Government Printing Office, 1958).

At the same time, within the framework of foreign policy, the Secretary of Defense (subject to the President) should have clear primacy in the formulation and direction of military policy.

The Committee considers that to achieve this clarity of responsibility and to assure the proper coordination and execution of our foreign operations, it is essential that there be a single agency in which all foreign assistance and economic operations, to the greatest degree practicable, shall be centralized or coordinated, and that a similar consolidation be effected in the administration of the foreign information programs. These agencies should exercise their functions subject to foreign policy as determined by the Secretary of State, and military policy as determined by the Secretary of Defense.

Accordingly, the following steps are recommended:

[Here follow recommendations 1, 2, and 3 dealing with a proposed foreign operations agency to oversee the Mutual Security Program. These recommendations are printed in volume I, Part 1, page 615.]

*Recommendation No. 4*—Hereafter the term "Voice of America" should be applied only to statements of the official United States' positions, including those on current developments, for use abroad.

The State Department should have responsibility for development of this program. The material should be given to a new foreign information agency (to be established as set forth in Recommendation No. 5) for dissemination abroad as directed by the Department of State.

No other material, regardless of its nature, origin, or medium used for its dissemination, should be identified as the "Voice of America".

*Recommendation No. 5*—Establish a new foreign information agency, in which would be consolidated the most important foreign information programs and cultural and educational exchange programs now carried on by the United States International Information Administration, by the Technical Cooperation Administration, by the Mutual Security Agency, and by the Department of State in connection with the Government of Occupied Areas.

Under this proposal, the major activities for interpreting abroad United States policies and practices (with the exception of formulating materials for the official "Voice of America" program which shall be handled as outlined in Recommendation No. 4) together with foreign cultural and educational exchange programs, would be placed under a new foreign information agency. This transfer would not apply to foreign information and educational exchange services which are an integral part of technical assistance programs. The new agency would be established under the National Security Council under arrangements paralleling those set forth in the National Security Act for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The above would require legislation or action through Reorganization Plan.

The head of the new agency would be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He would have full administrative authority for the operations of the agency, including development of programs, budget, administrative procedures, and the hiring and dismissal of personnel, but subject to foreign policy as determined by the Secretary of State and to such other instructions as may be furnished by the National Security Council. With respect to the official "Voice of America" program, the new agency should accept responsibility for dissemination abroad, including necessary services of translation, technical preparation, transmission, and distribution, for which services the new agency should provide within its budget.

Since the successful functioning of this agency will depend upon the skill and wisdom of its operations no less than upon its adherence to U.S. foreign policy, it is important that its Director receive expert counsel upon operating procedures. Public Law 402, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, created the United States Advisory Commission on Information and the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange to formulate and recommend to the Secretary of State policies and programs for carrying out this Act, and to report to Congress upon the effectiveness of these efforts. Under the proposed reorganization, these two Commissions logically would counsel the head of the new information agency instead of the Secretary of State. Legislation or action under the Reorganization Plan would be necessary to effect this change.

These Commissions should play an even more active role than in the past, since the collective wisdom and practical experience of their members would be invaluable to the new information agency.

There is a second commission in the field of international educational exchange—the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships, established under Public Law 584. Congress and the Executive Branch might wish to give consideration to the merger of this Board with the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, since both groups operate in the same field.

The head of the new agency would attend meetings of the Psychological Strategy Board when appropriate, and would be authorized to provide staff services for the PSB upon foreign information matters.

The authority and responsibility now vested in the Secretary of State pursuant to appropriate National Security Council papers and Executive Orders for interdepartmental coordination of foreign information activities should also be transferred to the new agency.

The responsibilities now exercised by the Secretary of State with respect to informational media guaranties should be transferred to the head of the new information agency by an amendment of Executive Order 10300.

*Recommendation No. 6*—Organize the structure of the foreign economic operations agency and of the foreign information agency so that their operations will be responsive to foreign policy determination by the Secretary of State and to military policy determination by the Secretary of Defense.

a. At the Washington level, the line organizations of the two operating agencies should be organized as far as possible on a common pattern with those of the Department of State, with the sub-divisions of each dealing with parallel areas of the others.

b. Regional staffs should be established only in cases where there is a regional organization or multilateral activity of sufficient importance to warrant the establishment of a diplomatic mission.

c. At the country level the field staffs of the agencies should be organized in such a manner as to provide for effective foreign policy direction and coordination of their operations by the United States Mission Chief (the Ambassador or Minister). The field staff of the economic agency would perform the major economic staff assignment in the development of country programs and in estimating economic capabilities and requirements.

The Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, should have authority and responsibility to review plans and policies relative to military and economic assistance programs and foreign information programs, and legislative proposals of the foreign economic operations agency and the foreign information agency, to assure that, in their conception and execution, such plans, policies and proposals are consistent with and further the attainment of foreign policy and military policy objectives.

The heads of the new agencies should furnish information to the Secretaries of State and Defense in such manner and form as may be agreed between the head of the agency and the Secretary concerned to insure that the programs of the agencies and the implementation of such programs conform with foreign policy and military policy objectives.

To assure to the new economic agency its proper role with respect to the coordination and direction of the military assistance programs, the Secretary of Defense would be required to keep the agency currently informed on the status of such programs, including military end item procurement and deliveries, both domestic and offshore.

*Recommendation No. 7*—Executive Order 10338, [2] relating to overseas personnel relationships, should be extended to cover the representatives of the new economic and information agencies, and when amended should be supplemented as stated below.

Executive Order 10338 defines the authority of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission (Ambassador or Minister) to coordinate the activities of United States personnel in his area who are engaged in carrying out programs under the Mutual Security Act and provides that he shall exercise general direction and leadership of the entire effort. This Order should be amended to cover the representatives of the new economic and information agencies, and when amended should be supplemented as follows:

a. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission would have the authority, through appropriate official channels, to effect the withdrawal of U.S. personnel in his area;

b. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission shall be kept fully and currently informed, as he desires, by all U.S. representatives, including the representatives of the new economic and information agencies and the chiefs of military assistance advisory groups, on all matters, including prospective plans, recommendations, negotiations, and actions, relating to the programs of such agencies; and

c. The Secretary of State should have the right to veto the proposed appointments of the chief representatives abroad of the foreign economic and information agencies.

The Committee strongly recommends that at the country level, where mutually agreed among the agencies concerned, there be an integration of personnel performing related functions under a single top official, as is now the case where the Chief of the MSA Mission also performs the duties of the Counsellor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, or where the Public Affairs Officer directs the foreign information activities of the MSA and the U.S. International Information Administration.

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[2] Executive Order 10338, Apr. 4, 1952 dealt with coordination procedures under section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. It is printed in 17 *Federal Register* 3009.

*Recommendation No. 8*—The Secretary of State should retain his position on the NAC to assure that the foreign loan policies of the U.S. are consistent with and further the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The foreign policy responsibility of the Secretary of State in matters involving loans and credits is of equal importance to his responsibility in matters involving grants. They represent alternative forms of financial assistance designed to implement foreign policy.

*Reorganization Plan or Legislation?*

Many of the above recommendations, it will be noted, can be carried out either by Reorganization Plan or by legislation. The decision as to which course shall be followed, if the recommendations are approved, is one of considerable political importance. The advantages and disadvantages of each course may be summarized as follows:

The Reorganization Plan approach would have the following advantages:

1. It would enable the President clearly and specifically to set forth the organizational arrangements which he desires for the administration of foreign affairs and programs.
2. The Reorganization Plans would become effective unless rejected by a Constitutional majority of either House. While the Plans could be rejected in their entirety, they could not be amended as in the case of legislation.
3. Responsibility of the Administration for the reorganizations would be clearly fixed.
4. The Reorganization Plan procedure (if the plans are submitted promptly) might be a quicker method of putting the recommendations into effect, since it would undoubtedly take more than 60 days to obtain legislation.

The principal advantages of proceeding by legislation are as follows:

1. Legislation must be requested, in any event, for certain basic authorities under the Mutual Security Act which expire on June 30, 1953, and must be renewed.
2. This has been the traditional method of determining organizational structure in the field of foreign affairs and might be preferred by the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. In the last two years the committees which handle these programs have shown a concern about organization at least equal to their concern about the magnitude of the programs and are therefore likely to desire to consider all aspects of these programs at one time.
3. It has been suggested that a more sympathetic consideration of Administration proposals concerning organization for foreign affairs would be given by the legislative committees than by the Government Operations Committees.

If the legislative leaders concur, the Committee believes that it would be preferable for the President to effectuate the contemplated reorganization by Reorganization Plan.

Before reaching a decision on this matter the President may wish to consult with the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Director for Mutual Security, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and probably others among his advisors; and, after obtaining their views, with legislative leaders.

In the course of the Committee's study, the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce have raised certain issues which the Committee has not had time to explore thoroughly. These should be dealt with later. [3]

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[3] On Apr. 16 Howland H. Sargeant, in the Office of the Secretary of State, transmitted to Ralph Burton, Assistant Division Chief of the Bureau of the Budget, four documents "drafted in the Department of State" as requested at the "meeting of April 10, 1953." The four documents were: a draft reorganization plan concerning international information and educational exchange; a draft message of the President transmitting the reorganization plan to Congress; documents to effect a division of responsibility between the Department of State and the Mutual Security Agency for multilateral aid programs (alternatives "A" and "B"); and draft material for inclusion in the President's letter to agency heads entitled the Voice of America program. In his memorandum of transmittal, Sargeant added that the documents, though drafted in the Department, did not represent official views and were drafted on an individual basis as requested by the Bureau of the Budget. He concluded by stressing the "understanding" that the Bureau would afford the Department an opportunity "at the appropriate time" to express its official views. The memorandum under reference and the enclosed documentation is in the A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "IIA, 1953". The Apr. 10 meeting referred to above cannot be identified.

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Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "D–E"

### *The Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate (McCarthy) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Two members of my staff, Mr. Cohn and Mr. Schine, [1] have been visiting various State Department libraries and taking statements from some of those active in the Information Program in Europe. Last night via long distance telephone they gave me the very encouraging information that under your administration the books of Communist authors are being removed from the shelves of our libraries abroad. I am sure it will be encouraging to the American people to know that the works of Communist authors, which were purchased by the Acheson administration and stocked in our libraries throughout the world, are being removed under your administration of the State Department.

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[1] For documentation concerning the Western European tour of Roy V. Cohn and G. David Schine during April 1953, see vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1379 ff.

Over the past several weeks we have been questioning the various Acheson lieutenants to obtain the names of the individuals who were directly responsible for purchasing and placing in our libraries throughout the world the books of some seventy-five different Communist authors like William Z. Foster, Earl Browder, Agnes Smedley, etc. To date we have encountered nothing but bad memories, evasion, and no cooperation whatsoever from them.

As you know, the Information Program has been heralded and publicized by the Acheson–Truman regime as a weapon with which they fought Communism. To date none of the Acheson–Truman team have come forward to explain how they thought they were fighting Communism by purchasing, distributing, and placing the U.S. stamp of approval on a vast number of well known Communist authors. Incidentally, a number of those authors have appeared before our Committee and have refused to testify as to whether they have been engaged in espionage or sabotage against the United States, on the ground that if they truthfully answered the question it might tend to incriminate them.

Louis Budenz, who as you know has been of almost untold value in convicting and deporting Communists, testified that the placing of these Communist works in our libraries throughout the world was most likely the work of hidden Communists in the State Department. Therefore, I would very greatly appreciate it if you could designate someone in your department to run down the purchase orders of these various Communist books to their sources, or if the books were accepted as gifts, then the names of the individuals who accepted them and placed them on the shelves. I am sure you are as interested as my Committee in determining the names of the individuals and whether they are still in the State Department.

At the earliest possible moment we shall give you a report upon what our Committee has discovered in its current investigation of the Information Program. Incidentally, one of the matters that my staff is looking into in Paris is what appears to be waste and duplication in connection with the Voice of America and MSA Information Programs both operating out of Paris. I think it should be made clear that the MSA Information Program was not initiated by MSA Director Stassen, but by his predecessor Harriman. Mr. Stassen, having recently taken over, obviously has not had sufficient time to clean up the matter. [2]

Sincerely yours, JOE MCCARTHY

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[2] Dulles replied on Apr. 10 as follows: "My Dear Senator McCarthy: I have your letter of April 7th. I think the point you make about works of Communist authors

Continued

511.00/4-2253: Circular airgram

## *The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 22, 1953—5:05 p.m.

### THE SOVIET "PEACE OFFENSIVE"

Following is Infoguide Bulletin 342.

USSR: President Eisenhower's speech of April 16, [2] designed to seize the political and psychological initiative from the USSR at the current critical juncture in international relations, sets the framework of United States' principles and overall policies looking toward settlement of outstanding issues and relaxation of world tensions. In the words of Secretary Dulles (in his speech April 18 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors) [3] the President's speech has thrown back the so-called Soviet "peace-offensive" and turned it into a "peace-defensive".

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on State Department bookshelves abroad seems well taken and I am asking Don Lourie to look into this matter and let your Committee know what we find. I shall also be happy to have any additional information which your current investigation may supply on the workings of our Information Program. Of course, I recognize that, as you say, the present conditions were created some time in the past under a previous Administration and the responsibility for these conditions may now be difficult to pin down. We shall, however, endeavor to do so, and in this connection, I trust that the efforts of your Committee will be helpful.

"Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles." (Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "M")

[1] Drafted by Montgomery and Revey; cleared by Phillips, Pratt, Raine, Straus, Sanger, Connors and by Ray L. Thurston and Walter J. Stoessel of EE, Henry B. Cox of EUR/P, Lawrence W. Wadsworth of FE/P, and Major Kelleher of Defense; sent to 98 posts and the Department of Defense.

[2] Reference is to the speech entitled "The Chance for Peace" delivered by President Eisenhower before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. It is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179-188. Circular telegrams 1035 and 1044 of Apr. 16 and 17, 1953 respectively, had earlier stressed the importance of promoting the President's speech. Circular telegram 1035 stated, *inter alia*, that the "Address should be made occasion exceptional efforts to assure its importance recognized and intent correctly interpreted. Diplomatic officials of all overseas missions have been instructed present copy speech to Foreign Ministers and to discuss widely with diplomatic colleagues." Circular telegram 1044 asserted that the President's address "is policy statement of major importance. Trust you will make every effort under leadership Ambassador to insure its importance and deep sincerity is fully appreciated". (511.00/4-1653 and 4/1753)

[3] Reference is to the address by Secretary Dulles entitled "The First 90 Days" printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 603-608.

Information policy guidance on continuing exploitation of the President's speech and subsequent planned developments to maintain the political and psychological initiative vis-à-vis the USSR has been, and will be, given as circumstances require.

Meanwhile the Soviet Government and other members of the Soviet bloc, including the Chinese Communists, may be expected to continue the current campaign of "peace" gestures and "peace" overtures. The guidance below, based upon a consensus of Department thinking in estimating the motivations and significance of the current Soviet "peace" moves given in the immediately following FYI section, is intended to set a general pattern for information output in dealing with continuing manifestations of Soviet-Communist "peace" attitudes.

(FYI begins: While it is still too early to determine the exact meaning of recent Soviet gestures of a seemingly conciliatory nature, the Department is inclined to doubt that they indicate any change in basic Soviet long-range objectives. In analyzing these moves it must be kept in mind that Soviet policies are basically determined not so much by individuals as by the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state structure and by the doctrines of Communist ideology. There has been no evidence that these factors have changed. Moreover, the new Kremlin leaders were trained in the Stalinist school; they have long participated in the formulation of Soviet policies and have never, so far as is known, disagreed with Stalinist objectives. It must be recognized that the death of Stalin has probably created strains and tensions which the new regime needs time to overcome. The achievement of a "breathing spell" by a tactical retreat would simply be an application of standard Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

On the other hand, it is possible that the new regime does not regard itself as irrevocably bound by the positions of the previous regime. It may even be that in their efforts to establish themselves and consolidate their power the new leaders in the USSR have special and personal interests which, in their judgment, can conveniently be advanced by departure from established Stalinist policies. However, we cannot assume that they need or desire any general settlement or that they would readily abandon their long-range objectives.

Whether the new leaders are playing for time in which to consolidate their position or whether it is their intent to employ new tactics in an effort to accomplish what earlier Soviet aggressive policies could not accomplish—namely to disrupt and disarm the coalition of free nations—we cannot exclude the possibility that they may find it both convenient and useful to make certain adjustments of accommodation. While it is most unlikely that a general settlement of international tensions can be obtained at this time, it is possible that by remaining ready to respond if genuine offers are made we may obtain certain advantages from the new Soviet attitude.

Whatever may be the real significance of current Soviet maneuvers, it is clear that the almost universal fear of war throughout the world may cause many people to feel that the present Soviet gestures constitute "peace offers" which if properly responded to would lead to an easing of tension. Even the less credulous may feel that future sacrifices would be more bearable if all honorable and reasonable means to achieve a settlement had been explored. In these circumstances it would be unwise to appear to reject Soviet gestures out of hand and thereby to invite the onus of obstructing peace. Ends FYI).

In light of the above, it is highly important at this critical stage that all United States information activities, both in public projection and in private contacts and conversations, make every effort to:

(a) explain clearly and positively the United States' position with respect to Soviet moves of apparent conciliation;

(b) maintain a posture which does not jeopardize exploitation by our diplomacy of whatever opportunities the unfolding situation may present for resolution of substantive issues;

(c) exercise caution with respect both to tone and content of output so as to give no ground for subsequent accusations, particularly on the part of allied and neutral powers, that it was United States' intransigeance or bellicosity which ruined the chances of desired accommodation;

(d) make clear that some time may elapse before we can form a reliable impression of the intentions of the new Soviet regime and that, in the meantime, particularly in the light of demonstrated Soviet capabilities, the free nations cannot afford to relax their efforts to build collective strength.

*Treatment:*

The basic attitudes of the United States towards the whole complex of Free World-Soviet orbit relations and the fundamentals of United States' policies looking toward the settlement of outstanding issues and relaxation of international tensions have been set forth in President Eisenhower's speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, and Secretary Dulles' supporting speech to the same body April 18. Further high-level utterances implementing the major themes of the President's speech may be expected in the near future.

Specific United States' attitudes towards the current Soviet "peace" gestures were set out in President's press conference statement April 2 (Annex 1) and Secretary's press conference statement April 3 (Annex 2). [4]

Taken together, these official high-level utterances set a general posture for United States official information output for treatment of current and future developments of the so-called "Soviet peace offensive". This posture may be summed up as follows:

The United States genuinely desires peace and has consistently acted on the basis of that desire. Examples are our efforts to achieve an armistice in Korea, to conclude an Austrian treaty, to reach a satisfactory German settlement, to work out a reliable formula for reduction and regulation of armed forces and armaments, etc.

We do not presume to pass judgment on Soviet "peace" gestures before the USSR has had sufficient opportunity to prove their sincerity. We accept all signs at face value while we await clarification of Soviet intentions. We cannot, of course, disregard the history of frustrations and disappointments of the past eight years, and the many lessons we had to learn through bitter experience of Soviet duplicity and intransigeance. If we are disposed to caution and reserve that is justifiable in the light of recent history and of demonstrated Soviet capability to menace the security of the community of free nations. It is natural that we should be careful.

The Soviet Government is in a position to demonstrate the sincerity of its peaceful intentions, not by "concessions" on minor or peripheral matters which are normally resolved by conciliation as a matter of routine international comity, but through actions of substantive significance. It is clearly within the power of the USSR to take such actions.

If the Soviet leaders demonstrate constructive *action*—as differentiated from mere propaganda—on serious matters of substance they will not find us wanting. President Eisenhower has stated flatly that the United States is prepared to go "at least halfway" to meet all sincere, serious and constructive overtures. In his speech of April 16, he set forth in impressive detail what the United States is prepared to do. The question now is: "What is the Soviet Union ready to do?"

While reflecting both in tone and content of output the general posture set out above, treatment should also conform to the following specific points:

1. In general, we should make careful distinction in output between our treatment of developments concerning actual diplomatic

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[4] The President's press conference of Apr. 2, 1953 is printed in full in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 147–160. The excerpts from Secretary Dulles' Apr. 3 press conference are also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 524.

negotiations, and our treatment of developments in other fields. Output with respect to actual diplomatic negotiations should be factual, scrupulously correct in tone, and should not attempt to score debating points on tactical issues.

2. Output should avoid discussions which attempt to lump together or catalog the various actions which make up the Soviet "peace defensive". We should analyze such actions individually, each on its own merits, while referring to the "peace defensive", where necessary to speak of it in general terms, in some such description as "recent Soviet overtures, many of them essentially only of token character".

3. We should emphatically not attempt to specify any particular issue as constituting "the acid test" of Soviet good faith, or what order of priority must be observed in the resolution of substantive issues, except that we should emphasize the President's statement that "the first great step . . . must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea".

4. Wherever the facts justify our doing so, we should point out that this or that Soviet gesture is not a "new offer" made on Soviet initiative, but is actually a belated response to suggestions or proposals originally made on the initiative of the free world. A clear-cut example of this is the proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners-of-war in Korea.

5. We should, as opportunity offers and particularly in output to non-Communist areas, remind audiences that the Soviet gestures to date, either individually or in their totality, give no assurance whatever of Soviet abandonment of long-range Communist objectives; they are instead all consistent with the standard Marxist doctrine of "tactical retreat". In this connection we can usefully recall pertinent elements of Communist doctrine, particularly Stalin's pronouncement on "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", published on the eve of the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party last October. That pronouncement reaffirms the need to promote conflicts and exploitable weaknesses in the non-Communist world. Where used, however, material of this type should be balanced by appropriate references to United States' willingness to go at least halfway to meet all sincere, constructive overtures.

6. In the past Soviet "peace" gestures have frequently been counterbalanced by Soviet actions demonstrating continued aggressiveness. If such aggressive actions occur in the future, they should be characterized as raising legitimate questions as to Soviet intentions and as justifying continued free world skepticism.

7. It is essential at this critical juncture to maintain our own capabilities and freedom of action adequately to meet shifts—easily

made by a totalitarian dictatorship like the USSR—in the intentions of the Soviet power bloc with which we have to deal. Output to non-Communist areas should, therefore, continue to carry factual material setting forth the relationship of Soviet capabilities to intentions. We should also cross-report statements of prominent free world spokesmen warning of the continued need for caution and vigilance, and of the dangers of relaxation of free world efforts.

8. Output to the USSR should continue to use materials designed to exploit the situation created by the death of Stalin and the transfer of power in the USSR to new hands. Encouragement of whatever divisive forces may emerge in the new Soviet power setup should, however, be promoted without stridency, and preferably in the form of raising questions relating to concrete Soviet-orbit developments.

9. Materials exposing the true nature of the Soviet system should be continued in output, e.g., forced labor, police-state methods, denial of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Handling of these standard themes should be neither belligerent nor hortatory.

10. While output to the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe should devote no more attention to Soviet "peace" gestures than is strictly necessary for credibility, it should give strong emphasis to the theme expressed in President Eisenhower's April 16 speech, calling upon the USSR to "allow other nations, including those in Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own form of government".

*Cautions:*

a. We do not reflect alarm or anxiety with respect to the implications of current or future Soviet "peace" moves. Our attitude is: we have faith in our ability to cope with situations regardless of how they may develop. If Soviet gestures are not followed by deeds of substantive significance, we will have incontrovertible evidence that their peace protestations are fraudulent.

b. We should not attempt to take propaganda credit for Soviet moves whose *bona fides* have not been established. We should avoid suggesting that the Soviet world is suffering from serious internal weaknesses, a suggestion which might be seized upon as excuse for relaxation of free world defense efforts. We may, however, suggest in appropriate contexts that the Soviet conciliatory attitude may have been influenced in part by their realization of the growing strength and unity of the free world, particularly as evidenced by NATO, EDC, and progress towards unity in Europe.

c. We should not react impulsively to tactical moves such as Vishinsky's apparent reversal on the repatriation of Korean POW's. It is particularly important to avoid drawing "final conclusions" concerning the exact meaning of Soviet "peace" gestures from tactical moves of this kind.

*Annex 1:* Extract from Transcript of President Eisenhower's Press Conference, April 2, 1953.

Q. Mr. President, what is your estimation of the analysis of the recent peace overtures from Russia and Communist China?

A. The President said it was very difficult to say that any speculation on this affair should be dignified with the term "analysis", and that you were really doing some pretty definite guessing. But, he said, he thought that in this whole business of the peace approach in which the hearts of America were so deeply involved, we should take at face value every offer which was made to us until it was proved not to be worthy of being so taken; and that by that, he did not mean we ignored the history of the past, and some of the frustrating experiences we have had in trying to promote peaceful arrangements with some of the people with whom we would now have to deal. But he did say, the President remarked, that here was something which when the proffer came along, we should go right at it like it was meant exactly as it was said.

Now, in the proposal made by the Chinese Commanders in Korea, the President said, which was in response to a request made by General Clark in February, and in line with the recommendations which the United Nations side of the negotiations had repeated over and over again, it was stated it was believed that the free exchange of sick and wounded prisoners during hostilities would do much to promote negotiations for an armistice. Now, the President continued, we have therefore the hope that this exchange of sick and wounded prisoners will be quickly accomplished, which, certainly, to his mind would be clear indication that deeds rather than words and more frustrating conversations were now to come into fashion—something which certainly every right thinking person would welcome very heartily.

*Annex 2:* Extract from Transcript of Secretary Dulles' Press Conference, April 3, 1953.

Mr. Dulles: "Nothing that has happened, or which seems to me likely to happen, has changed the basic situation of danger in which we stand. There are three basic facts, which, I think, we should always have in mind as long as they are the facts.

"The first is this: The Soviet Union is a heavily armed totalitarian state, subject to the dictates of a small group, whose total control extends to one-third of the people and the natural resources of the world.

"The second fact is that the leaders of the Soviet Union are basically and deeply hostile to any other state which does not accept

Soviet Communist control. That is part of their fanatically-held creed.

"The third fact is that the Soviet Communist leaders do not recognize any moral inhibitions against the use of violence. In fact, they do not admit the existence of such a thing as the moral law.

"Now those facts combine to create a grave danger, and, as I said, nothing that has happened, or seems likely to happen in the near future, ends that danger, or our need, or the need of the free world generally, to take precautions against it. That, however, does not prevent accommodations from time to time which may be useful—useful, if, but only if, they do not blind us to the persistence of the danger.

"At the moment I see nothing which ends that danger or would justify us in changing any of our basic defensive policies, either alone or in conjunction with our allies. Now, there are, as I have said, possibilities of useful accommodation that could relate to such matters as the exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war in Korea, and if good faith is shown in relation to that, then there may be the possibility of an armistice in Korea. . . .

"The point I want to make is that so long as these three conditions persist, to which I referred, we must not, in my opinion, assume that the danger is over, and that we are living in a peaceful world which requires neither armament nor our allies. . . ."

SMITH

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511.0021/3-3153

### *The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate (Jenner)* [1]

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1953.

MY DEAR SENATOR JENNER: Reference is made to your letter of March 31, 1953, [2] also signed by Senator Pat McCarran. In this letter, acknowledged by telephone, you inquire about the inclusion of publications of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in the libraries of the United States Information Service.

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[1] Drafted by Thomas W. Simpson, Acting Chief of the Center Operations Division, International Information Center Service, U.S. International Information Administration. The source text indicates this letter was "edited" by Virginia L. Davenport of the Office of Congressional and Public Information, U.S. International Information Administration and was cleared by Albert Sims, the Acting Deputy Administrator for Field Programs, U.S. International Information Administration.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1690.

As the publications of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee deal primarily with matters affecting the internal security of the United States, they have not hitherto been considered of direct service to United States objectives overseas. You may be interested in knowing, however, that 500 copies of the Subcommittee's report "Documentary Proof that the Communist Party, U.S.A., Teaches and Advocates the Overthrow and Destruction of the United States Government by Force and Violence" were sent to USIS libraries on August 7, 1952. Of this total, 48 copies were sent to Germany and 10 to France.

Should the Subcommittee wish to make its publications available more generally, the Department would be happy to receive for use in its overseas libraries copies of such publications as the members believe would be of interest to foreign readers and of service to United States objectives overseas. Three hundred copies are considered necessary for a complete distribution.

The Department appreciates your interest in this matter and your kind offer.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
THRUSTON B. MORTON
*Assistant Secretary*

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511.00/4-2753: Circular airgram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 27, 1953—4:05 p.m.

### "SECRET HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR"

I.F. Stone's book, "Secret History of the Korean War," is being used with considerable effect as an instrument of Soviet and International Communist propaganda in various parts of the world, including Japan and Latin America.

Addressee posts are requested to inform the Department if and when this book appears in their areas, with comment upon the extent to which it constitutes a problem. The Department is collecting refutatory materials which it will make available to posts where Stone's book has any influence.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Ellsworth R. Mosman of FE/P; cleared by Cox, Sanger, FE, P, Henry Kellermann of GER/P, and Raymond Fisher of IIA; sent to 48 missions and 9 consulates.

USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Notes on McCarthy Hearing"

### *The Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Johnson) to the Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate (McCarthy)* [1]

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1953.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARTHY: I have read with interest your letter of April 17, 1953, [2] and want to assure you that I have instructed my staff to give your Committee the fullest cooperation in obtaining information which may have a bearing upon the present investigation. If books by Communist and pro-Communist authors have been placed upon the shelves of our Information Centers overseas with subversive intent, then I am most anxious to identify the guilty parties and institute appropriate action. I shall of course work closely with Mr. Lourie and his associates in this matter.

The situation with respect to the case you mention is somewhat complicated. The printed catalogue of the Amerika Haus collection (1950) indicates that three Heym titles, number of copies unspecified, were on German and Austrian shelves at that time. Two of these (see attached summary) [3] appear to have been acquired as gifts or by transfer from Army surplus troop libraries. The third, a collected German edition of poems, was probably acquired from German sources. There is no record of International Information Administration purchases of any of the foregoing.

Outside Germany and Austria, our records show that there are eighteen copies of three different works by Heym on the shelves of sixteen libraries. One title (three copies) appears to have been acquired locally, since International Information Administration Washington does not purchase translations published abroad. A second title (one copy) appears to be an Army surplus item.

As you know, on March 17, 1953, we ordered the removal of all works by Communists from USIS libraries. Pursuant to that order, on April 16, the High Commissioner's office in Bonn instructed all regional offices in Germany to remove works by Heym. A similar order was issued by this office on April 23 to the other sixteen posts involved.

All of this does not go to the point of who put the books on the shelves in the first place. I believe you will agree, however, that because of the many reorganizations which this program has undergone and the variety of sources from which books are acquired, it is no simple matter to determine personal responsibility. I am having a thorough analysis made, however, with the view of determining those individuals who were responsible for the book selections. In the meantime, please be assured of my continuing desire to cooperate.

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[1] Drafted by Thomas W. Simpson and by Melvin A. Weightman of the Office of the Administrator, IIA.

[2] Not found.

[3] Not printed.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT L. JOHNSON

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USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Europe, Field Replies in re Info Guide 303"

## *Operations Memorandum by the Public Affairs Officer in the Consulate at Sydney (Evans) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL SYDNEY, April 30, 1953.

Subject: IIA: ICS—Removal of Books, et cetera, from circulation

Ref: Department's Circular 1041, April 17, 1953, 6 p.m. [1]

The Consulate General wishes to report that all books requested to be withdrawn from the USIS Sydney collection because their contents or authors were following the Communist Party line were withdrawn as guidance was received.

None of the authors or titles criticized and so labeled in the current Senate inquiry was included in the Sydney USIS library collection, hence no new withdrawals were necessary.

Earlier in the year, following the Department's directives, the librarian withdrew two novels by Howard Fast, *The American* and *Patrick Henry and the Frigate's Keel;* a volume by H.A. Overstreet entitled *The Mature Mind;* and a biography of Paul Robeson, *Paul Robeson, Citizen of the World,* by Shirley Graham.

All catalog cards and shelf list cards were withdrawn and destroyed. The books were destroyed by burning.

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[1] Not printed; it further elaborated on Infoguide Bulletin 303 (p. 1686), and reads as follows: "Department needs interim report action taken to comply with Infoguide 303. Report airpouch soonest books by author and title and periodicals, single issues or entire files, removed from circulation. What disposition made of these items. Wireless File, FS section, has carried names persons who invoked 5th amendment in recent testimony before Congressional committees. What books by these persons are in USIS library. Posts which have provided Department with above information need not repeat." The circular was telegraphed to 18 posts and pouched to 66 others. (511.0021/4-1753)

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## *Editorial Note*

In a Special Message to Congress on June 1, President Eisenhower transmitted Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 "Relating to the

Establishment of the U.S. Information Agency". In a separate message to Congress that day concerning both Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 of 1953, the President stressed the need to meet the challenge of unprecedented foreign policy burdens and commitments "effectively—to convert intent into constructive fact," and he urged that this be done through achievement of "the most efficient and cohesive possible organization for the conduct of our foreign affairs." In discussing specifically the establishment of the United States Information Agency under Reorganization Plan No. 8, the President noted that the Agency would be responsible for information activities formerly administered not only by the International Information Administration within the Department of State, but also by "the information programs financed in connection with government in occupied areas; the information program of the Mutual Security Agency; and the Technical Cooperation Administration information program." The establishment of these various information programs in one agency, the President added, "seems the one sound way to provide real unity and greater efficiency. This action, moreover, brings under single management all the funds to be expended on these foreign information activities." To insure that adequate authority be vested in the new Director of the United States Information Agency, Reorganization Plan No. 8 provided, in the President's words, that the Director "may, in carrying out his functions, exercise such administrative authorities of the Secretary of State and of certain other officers as the President may specify." For the President's Special Messages to the Congress on the Organization of the Executive Branch for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs and Transmitting Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8, all dated June 1, 1953, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pages 342-350.

In a memorandum to the heads of all executive departments and the Director for Mutual Security, the President further defined "relationships which will govern executive branch officials in the conduct of our international responsibilities." Concerning the United States Information Agency, the President wrote:

> "The reorganization plan which creates the United States Information Agency also assigns exclusive responsibility to the Secretary of State for the control of the content of a program designed to assure accurate statements of United States official positions on important issues and current developments. It is my desire that this program be so administered as to keep these official United States positions before the governments and peoples of other countries. No material which is not a statement of official United States views, regardless of its nature, or origin, or the medium used for its dissemination, should be identified by the exclusive label which is provided.

"The United States Information Agency will be the normal outlet for this program, but the Secretary of State may use other channels for disseminating this program abroad when in his judgment the use of such channels is required. The Director of the United States Information Agency should give full cooperation in providing the services and facilities necessary for the preparation, translation, transmission, and distribution of materials for this program.

"The Director of the United States Information Agency shall report to and receive instructions from me through the National Security Council or as I may otherwise direct. I am directing that the necessary changes be made in existing arrangements for Government-wide coordination of foreign information activities to enable the Director of the United States Information Agency to serve as Chairman of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pages 351–354)

For a discussion of Reorganization Plan No. 7, see the editorial note, volume I, Part 1, page 628.

President Eisenhower's decision to establish the United States Information Agency as a separate and preeminent agency in the field of overseas information followed the recommendations of his Advisory Committee on Government Organization which were forwarded to the President on April 7, 1953 (see the memorandum to the President, page 1691). At the same time, the President rejected the recommendation of his Committee on International Information Activities that overseas information functions be retained in the Department of State with the provision that the Director of such activities be given broader authority and greater prestige. The President's Committee on International Information Activities first put forth this recommendation in a letter of May 2, 1953, and reiterated it in Chapter 7 of its report of June 30, 1953. The June 30 report is printed on page 1795, and the letter of May 2, 1953, is printed as Appendix III thereto, page 1868.

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511.00/6–1353: Circular telegram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 13, 1953—12:05 p.m.

1201. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 378:

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[1] Drafted by Jaeger and Cootes; cleared in substance by Cox, MacKnight, Connors, Boughton, and Mosman; approved by Montgomery; telegraphed to 24 posts, and pouched to 59 others. A covering memorandum from Montgomery to the Telegraph Branch reads: "Please note that Department of Defense is not an addressee for distribution of the attached Infoguide Bulletin. Please make sure that Defense does not receive distribution either electronically or by information copy."

*Rosenbergs:* (FYI begins: As Rosenberg case moves into final stages, noticeable intensification Communist exploitation appears aimed not only rally sympathy Rosenbergs, cast doubt on validity verdict, justification sentence; more importantly, exploit case to portray US as gripped by irresponsible political hysteria, of which "witch-hunting" is symptomatic but not exclusive outlet. US propaganda problem further complicated widespread intensive non-Communist emotional opposition extreme penalty, in case which, however erroneously, suspected of having been affected by pressure public opinion. This confusion partly due (a) extended, although frequently misinformed, public discussion details of case high-lighted by various Rosenberg supporters which have tended obscure long, painstaking judicial history on which justice of sentence ultimately rests; (b) consistent denial Rosenberg appeals to courts and for executive clemency, adding to belief actions in case motivated by political considerations, or at least lacking restraint, magnanimity with which Anglo-Saxon law commonly associated. As expected date execution approaches strong reaction must be expected, fully augmented by Communist propaganda.

With respect probable legal developments, Rosenberg defense may introduce several further appeals in last-minute efforts delay or commute execution, possibly including new appeal executive clemency. Execution now set June 18. Supreme Court may hand down decision on latest appeals Monday, June 15, after which it scheduled adjourn. Defense may then file new motions for Supreme Court review of lower court decisions and appeal for further stay execution pending hearing new motions. With court adjourned, appeal for stay of execution can be considered by any Supreme Court Justice. Ends FYI)

1. In dealing this situation US official information output should continue report developments factually, following general approach outlined Department Circular telegram 862 (Infoguide Bulletin 260) February 11, [2] endeavoring reflect in tone and content integrity, scrupulous impartiality with which this trial been conducted.

2. Our objective should be continue make clear, without appearing apologetic or undignified, that Rosenbergs were tried fairly under US laws, by impartial, honorable courts, and found guilty of crime which undermined US and free world security; that they have been afforded every opportunity for defense and appeal; that so far no evidence has been presented to alter judgment of courts.

3. In areas where Rosenberg case particular center controversy we should at this stage try avoid being drawn into detailed public

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[2] *Ante*, p. 1668.

controversy which tends obscure major issues leaving choice of areas of contention to opposition.

4. If detailed rebuttal required by local situation, make primary use court statements, especially Judge Kaufman's oral opinion on motion for new trial based "new evidence" (carried European Wireless File No. 136 June 9); recall where necessary President's statement rejecting Rosenberg clemency appeal (text carried Wireless Bulletin No. 35, February 11).

5. Wireless File will continue provide as much useful material as possible based on developments as they occur.[3]

DULLES

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[3] In circular telegram 1220, June 19, sent priority to 16 posts, Dulles "forwarded for your information" the "guidance [which] has been given to US-based media" regarding the Rosenberg case. This guidance included (a) the decisions of the Supreme Court; (b) President Eisenhower's reply to the Rosenbergs' request for executive clemency; and (c) "When it takes place, fact of Rosenbergs' execution, maintaining complete silence thereafter on the topic unless given further guidance." (511.00/6-1953) The Rosenbergs were executed several hours after this last guidance telegram was transmitted.

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511.4321/6-1753: Telegram

## *The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Sydney*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953—2:37 p.m.

239. Verbatim text. UP dispatch datelined Sydney June 16 states director USIS Australia denied Washington reports library books burned there. Evans quoted as follows: "I think we can properly state no USIS library books been burned or otherwise destroyed by, at instruction of, or with knowledge any USIS office in Sydney or Melbourne. I am puzzled by remarks attributed to State Department as quoted in Australian press".

This complete contradiction your OM April 30[2] which basis Department spokesman's remarks to press. Wire full explanation urgently.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted and approved for transmission by Henry F. Arnold, Director of the Office of European Programs, U.S. International Information Administration; cleared by Albert G. Sims, the Acting Deputy Administrator for Field Programs of IIA, by Donhauser of BNA, and by Phillips of P; repeated to Canberra.

[2] The Operations Memorandum by Evans is printed on p. 1709.

511.4321/6–1853: Telegram

## *The Consul General at Sydney (Smith) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY SYDNEY, June 18, 1953—8 p.m.

412. Re Deptel 239, June 17. [2] Evans' statement press unauthorized and in my opinion entirely unwarranted as I have expressly directed all members my staff issue no statements without prior clearance which definitely not given this case. When matter came my notice I called for file and directed his attention to April 30 OM which he drafted and I initialed and which he had apparently overlooked. Action taken in referenced OM was in accordance with USIS interpretation Department's directives of circular No. 25, March 7, 1952, circular 42, May 21, 1952 and unnumbered circular dated July 31, 1952. [3] Latter specifically instructed "disposal" of certain books.

To best my knowledge, no books burned or otherwise destroyed recent months. I believe it was reputed statement of Department's spokesman to effect USIS Sydney had burned books about eight weeks ago as result Senate Committee investigations to which Evans' statement directed.

For Department's information, there follows verbatim text UP sent New York which quotes Evans' actual statement:

> "I am puzzled by the remarks attributed to the Department of State as quoted by AAP. We prefer to make no comments before receiving clarification from the Department. We feel certain that some misinterpretation is involved.
> However, I think we can properly state that no USIS library books have been burned or otherwise destroyed by, at the instruction of, or with the knowledge of any officer of USIS in either Sydney or Melbourne during the year 1953".

Evans' statement and explanation follows by mail. [4]

SMITH

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[1] Pouched to Canberra.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Circular 25, Mar. 7, 1952, entitled "Use of Books by Howard Fast in United States Information Center Book Collections", directs the immediate removal of all of the author's works but two which "may be continued whenever in the judgement of the post it is desirable." Department of State records indicate that circular 25 is in file 511.0021, but it has not been found. The above summary of the telegram was provided by Gillespie Evans in Enclosure "G" to his "Report on 'Book Burning' Statements" discussed in footnote 4 below. Circular 42, May 21, 1952, entitled "Removal of *Paul Robeson, Citizen of the World* by Shirley Graham from United States Information Center Book Collections" directs all posts to remove the book, which implies in its account of Robeson's initial visit to the Soviet Union that communism should be embraced by black Americans. (511.001/5–2152) No record of the unnumbered circular of July 31, 1952, under reference has been found.

[4] Gillespie S. Evans' 13-page "Report on 'Book Burning' Statements" with 9 enclosures was forwarded in despatch 518 from Sydney, June 24, 1953, a copy of which is

*Continued*

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Bookburning"

## *Memorandum for the President by the Secretary of State* [1]

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1953.

Subject: Overseas Libraries

You asked me to put in a memorandum the substance of what I said yesterday at Cabinet meeting on the above subject.

1. The overseas libraries are not the usual reference libraries but are "special purpose" libraries designed, as prescribed by the "United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948", to

> "disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs."

2. On February 24, 1953, we appointed Dr. Robert L. Johnson to become Director of the International Information Administration. He took office with the understanding that we planned as soon as practicable to take that Administration out of the State Department and make it an independent agency, and with the further understanding that in the meantime he, as Director of the Administration, would have a large measure of autonomy. Early in March, however, he asked me for my general views as to the handling by the libraries of Communist material. Having in mind the above Congressional directive, particularly that portion dealing with policies of the Congress, the President and the Secretary of State, and having in mind the anti-Communist nature of these policies, I suggested that material produced by Communists should be used "only with great care"; that without carrying the matter "to the point of absurdity" we should avoid the buildup of Soviet personalities to such an extent that they command widespread attention; that, while United States periodicals of program value may be included,

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in file 511.4321/6-2453. Telegram 8 to Sydney of July 14 commenting on despatch 518 stipulated, *inter alia*, that no further press release on the subject of bookburning should be "made by post." However, "should subject again enter public discussion, it is possible IIA may issue statement saying original field report in error." (511.4321/6-2453) Airgram 9 to Sydney, July 31, reminded the Consulate "that withdrawal from the library and destruction of all publications issued by organizations on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations was directed by the Department's Circular Airgram of February 28, 1951, provisions of which are still in force. Destroy by pulping." (511.4321/6-2453)

[1] A copy of this memorandum, without the annex, is in Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "President".

the mission should avoid issues "containing any material detrimental to United States objectives", as well as periodicals which are receptive to international Communist propaganda." I expressed doubt that works of Communist authors should be made part of these libraries. I concluded:

> "If you find these ideas acceptable, I must rely on you to translate them into what is an appropriate and practicable 'working-level' directive."

I annex a complete copy of the above memorandum to Dr. Johnson. [2]

3. Dr. Johnson did find acceptable the ideas contained in my memorandum and, without reference to me, he issued various "working-level" directives designed to carry out these ideas.

4. These directives and related publicity produced results which were not intended and which were not called for by any reasonable interpretation of the directives. The extreme results which have come about from one or another of the 189 overseas libraries seem to have been due primarily either (a) to fear on the part of the librarian of having on his shelves books which might be displeasing to some member of Congress and lead to inquisition, or (b) to a deliberate effort to discredit the anti-Communist policy by trying to make it appear absurd.

5. Dr. Johnson is now trying to get up new directives with the assistance of a committee of eminent librarians and, at his request, I have given him complete discretion in this matter.

I am sending copies of this to the Cabinet group. [3]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[2] Dated Mar. 17, p. 1685.

[3] Dulles had previously (June 25) made the same points as above in letters to Senators Thomas G. Hennings (D., Mo.) and Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) in response to letters from the two Senators both dated June 18 complaining of recent public and Congressional confusion concerning policies of book selection in overseas libraries and demanding public clarification. The Hennings and Jackson letters are in file 511.002/6–1853 as is the Dulles response which was immediately made public on the Secretary's orders and printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1953, pp. 58–59.

USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Info Guide Bulletin 303"

## *Memorandum Prepared in the United States International Information Agency* [1]

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1953.

### OVERSEAS BOOK REMOVALS

The records of the Union Catalogue of U.S. Information Center holdings compiled and maintained by the Library of Congress showed that as of February 1, 1953, prior to the issuance of directives on books by Communist authors, a total of thirty-nine (39) volumes, representing twenty-five (25) titles by eight (8) authors whose affiliations with the Communist cause is a matter of reasonably public knowledge, were in the collections of eighteen (18) of the U.S. Information Centers overseas. This was out of total holdings of over two million (2,000,000) volumes representing over a hundred thousand (100,000) titles by over eighty-five thousand (85,000) authors in the one hundred ninety-six (196) U.S. Information Centers functioning overseas on January 1, 1953. There is no record that any of these books was ever purchased by this Service. A full list of the authors, titles and posts involved is appended. [2] It is assumed that all were immediately removed after issuance of the first directive to the field on non-use of materials by Communist authors on February 18, 1953. [3]

Subsequent to the decision of the Department that works of authors taking refuge behind the Fifth Amendment as to their political affiliations should be removed from Center collections, a list of sixteen (16) such authors was sent to the field with specific orders for removal of their works from U.S. Information Center shelves, if found there. Two (2) other authors whose recent public actions gave conclusive evidence of Communist affiliations were named in separate (but similar) cables to the field. These cables resulted in ordering removal of seventy-six (76) titles by the eighteen (18) authors involved.

Field reports to the Department from overseas posts indicate that the general directives from the Department have been variously interpreted at the different Embassies, Legations, Consulates and USIS posts. As of June 23, 1953 communications to the Department from the field indicated that 319 titles (thirty-eight (38) anthologies and two hundred eighty-one (281) individual titles by one hundred forty-four (144) authors) had been removed from one or more of the U.S. Information Centers overseas. The Department has no information to indicate that the removals, in addition to those described in paragraphs one and two preceding, have any relation to the affiliations or loyalty of the authors.

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[1] Identity of the drafting officer(s) or office(s) not indicated on source text.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See the undated summary memorandum prepared by the Office of Policy and Plans of the IIA, p. 1673.

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USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Notes on McCarthy Hearings"

## *The Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate (McCarthy) to the Administrator of the International Information Administration (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1953.

DEAR DR. JOHNSON: Since our Subcommittee started to expose the number of books by Communist authors which were purchased by the old Administration and placed in our Information libraries abroad, there have been a great number of conflicting news stories as to the policy to be followed with respect to such books by the new Administration.

For that reason, I feel that it would be very helpful if you could manage to appear before our Subcommittee at your earliest convenience to clarify some of the issues raised.

I have noted with some interest the various news stories and editorials to the effect that there is being invoked a ban against the use of books by "controversial authors" in the Information program. As you are aware, our Subcommittee has never used that term. Various members of the Subcommittee, including myself, however, have strongly objected to the use of books by Communist writers in this program which, of course, is not a general public library program by any means but is designed to illustrate the American way of life to people abroad.

As the Subcommittee made clear in the course of its hearings, we are equally distressed at the failure to utilize the writings of proven anti-Communists and ex-Communists to expose Communism for what it is. Such writings are an essential part of any program of education on this subject. To this end we would be most interested in any information you could give us as to the identification and activities of those who reportedly removed from the shelves some effective writings exposing Communism, especially *Witness* by Whittaker Chambers.

We look forward to your appearance at the earlist possible time.

Sincerely yours,

JOE MCCARTHY

USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Notes on McCarthy Hearings"

## *The Administrator of the International Information Administration (Johnson) to the Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Operations of the United States Senate (McCarthy)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1953.

DEAR JOE: Thank you for your letter of June 30.

I am delighted at the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee [1] and bring you up to date on all developments since full responsibility for writing a new book directive was given me on June 26.

I suggest that my appearance be scheduled for Wednesday or Thursday, July 8 or 9, the time and place to be fixed by you. If you will be good enough to ask your secretary to telephone, I will see that it is placed on the calendar.

In order that your Subcommittee may be as fully informed as possible, I plan to bring with me Martin Merson and Richard Humphrey who are familiar with all phases of the book program.

With all good wishes.

Cordially yours,

ROBERT L. JOHNSON

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1671.

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## *Editorial Note*

On June 30, the President's Committee on International Information Activities presented its Report to President Eisenhower. This Committee had been established on January 24, 1953 as a result of a Presidential Directive which stipulated "a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related thereto, with particular reference to the international relations and the national security of this country." The Committee, chaired by William H. Jackson, and including Robert Cutler, Gordon Gray, Barklie McKee Henry, John C. Hughes, C. D. Jackson, Roger M. Kyes, and Sigurd Larmon, interpreted its mandate so broadly that the final Report of June 30 was devoted to the entire range of national cold war policies, covert as well as overt, with the stress decidedly upon the psychological, as opposed to the strictly informational or propagandistic aspects of international information activities. For this reason, and to avoid separating the report into several parts published in several compilations, it has been decided to print the full report; see page 1795.

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USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "McCarthy Hearings"

## *Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Administrator in Charge of the International Information Center Service of the United States International Information Administration (Humphrey) to the Special Assistant to the Administrator of the United States International Information Administration (Merson)* [1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1953.

Subject: Reports by the ICS to the Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigation, U.S. Senate [2]

You will want to be informed of a problem which has arisen in connection with the reports on Information Center holdings of works by certain authors whose names have been sent to ICS by the Senate Sub-Committee. To date, reports on our holdings of the works of some 370 authors have been submitted by ICS to the Sub-Committee, the information having been obtained from our Union Catalog and our purchase records.

The first 303 names were sent to the staff of our Union Catalog at the Library of Congress in typewritten form, in the envelopes but not on the letterhead of the Sub-Committee. These first names were accompanied by a note to the Library of Congress, signed by Senator McCarthy, requesting the report.

Since that time about 70 additional names have been conveyed to the Catalog Staff by telephone, a few names at a time. ICS has repeatedly requested the courtesy of typewritten lists of names, while reaffirming its willingness to render the reports themselves promptly and accurately. These requests from ICS have been relayed to the Sub-Committee by the Library of Congress employee in charge of the operation, since the Sub-Committee presents its own requests in this way and not directly to ICS. This LC staff member was told yesterday that these lists could not be presented in typed form because of pressure of time; Mr. Buckley of the Sub-Committee himself receives the names of authors by telephone, telephones them to his assistant, Mr. Feeney, who in turn telephones them to the Catalog staff, from which they are relayed, also by telephone, to ICS.

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[1] Drafted by Thomas W. Simpson. Copy to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

[2] ICS was the office symbol for the International Information Center Service. The "Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations" refers to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, chaired at this time by Joseph R. McCarthy.

This method of transmitting proper names greatly reduces the degree of accuracy which is necessary in bibliographical work. The ICS staff which prepared the report is never sure whether it is reporting on the author the Sub-Committee had in mind, and much time is wasted in this way. If mistakes are made, ICS has no written record to which the error can be traced. For example, a report was made on Center holdings of the works of Bernard Berenson, when Bernard Berelson was the author in whom the Sub-Committee was interested. (In this case Mr. Feeney wrote the list by hand, and the name could easily have been misread.) Ring Lardner's name was given on the telephone, though Ring Lardner *Jr.* was correct. Sidney Finkelstein's name was submitted twice; we had no way of knowing whether the same person was meant in both cases, since an identifying middle initial might well have been dropped in the telephoning.

On the first list (which was typed) Center holdings of the works of Albert Williams were requested. We did not know if the request was for Albert Nathaniel Williams or for Albert Rhys Williams, but since the list gave no middle initial, we reported on both names.

Mr. T. W. Simpson, Chief of the Center Operations Division of ICS, telephoned Mr. Drury of SCA to inform him of this problem and to ask his cooperation in transferring our request for typewritten lists to the Sub-Committee. Mr. Drury told Mr. Simpson that he considered the request a reasonable one.

In the meantime ICS is at work on reports of the works of about 20 more authors whose names were transmitted to the Catalog staff by telephone on June 30 and July 1. We will not, of course, allow reports to the Sub-Committee to be delayed by our wish to receive the names in typed form. However we would greatly appreciate your support in this matter. [3]

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[3] Additional information on the blacklistings may be found in Box 4, Editorial Correspondence, *The Nation*, 1952-59, and Box 25, Miscellaneous Articles Files, *The Nation*, 1952-66, Frederick Kuh Papers, Special Collections Division, The George Washington University Library, Washington.

PSB files, lot 62 D 333, "PSB Minutes"

## *Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (Morgan) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 6, 1953.

Subject: PSB Recommendation on Policy for USIS Libraries.

At its informal meeting on July 1, 1953, the Psychological Strategy Board noted the serious effects on world opinion produced by reports of "book-burning" in connection with USIS libraries, and agreed to recommend to the Department of State that such libraries be conducted on the same basic policy with respect to freedom of reading as are American libraries in this country.

GEORGE A. MORGAN

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## *Editorial Note*

On July 15, Martin Merson, Special Assistant to the Administrator of the International Information Administration, read to the press the text of a statement by Robert L. Johnson, the IIA Administrator, publicly clarifying the International Information Administration's policy for selection and retention of material in the book and library program. This public statement was accompanied by the text of instructions issued that day by the IIA further amplifying and clarifying policy in this field for members of the IIA staff. Both the text of the Johnson statement and the text of the instructions are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 27, 1953, pages 121–124. The statement and instructions were first summarized for field personnel in circular telegram 39 dated July 15. (511.0021/7-1553) That same day, Johnson forwarded to Under Secretary of State for Administration Donold B. Lourie a "package" containing the statement and instruction along with two earlier policy statements dated July 8 and 9, 1953, and a 44-page "Report on the operations of the Book and Library Program". A copy of this "package" is in file 511.0021/7-1553.

"Information Center Libraries" were discussed at the Cabinet meeting on July 10, 1953, President Eisenhower presiding, as follows:

> "Secretary Dulles commented briefly on the recent statement of Mr. Robert Johnson [presumably that of July 8 or 9] concerning the policy on books in American Libraries abroad. He emphasized that solution of the problem will actually depend upon its administration by the person chosen to direct the new Information Agency.
>
> "The Cabinet discussed at length what should be the purpose of American libraries abroad and what policy should govern the selec-

tion of the books. Mr. Wilson suggested the possibility of getting the Government out of the business of operating these libraries. Messrs. Dulles and Stassen defended the responsibility of the Government in this respect and urged that the libraries should be allowed to contain any books deemed suitable for libraries in the United States, but that public money should not be expended to acquire books alien to the purposes of the libraries. Secretaries Hobby and Humphrey urged that the function of the libraries should be limited to presenting 'Americana'.

"The Vice President forecast that Congress would never vote funds for general purpose libraries and that when the appropriation for Information Services came up again there would have to be a rider to the effect that any one who refused to testify before a Congressional Committee should not have his books on the shelves of U.S. libraries abroad.

"Mr. Jackson suggested that the Johnson memorandum seemed the most practical solution to the problem, for it provided that future selection of books would be in accord with existing law and it avoided ordering a screening of books already on the shelves, a practice which would lower the prestige of the United States." (Minutes of Cabinet meeting, July 10, 1953, Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, "Jackson Committee Report"

## *Memorandum by Walter A. Radius and Howland H. Sargeant to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1953.

Subject: Proposed NSC Directive to the USIA

The attached proposed NSC Directive to the United States Information Agency is submitted to you as a suggested paper which would resolve some of the organizational problems arising out of the status of the USIA as reporting to the NSC and also tie together some of the loose ends concerning relationships between the USIA and the proposed Operations Coordinating Board, the CIA and State. This paper could also be a focus for discussion of some of the Jackson Committee recommendations, since it includes a statement of the mission of the USIA as derived from the Jackson Committee Report. [2]

This paper does not purport to be the State Department's position on the points it covers, but rather presents the framework for developing those positions.

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[1] Radius was Director of the Management Staff in the Department of State and Sargeant was in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.

[2] For the Jackson Committee Report, see p. 1795.

We would suggest that this paper be referred for substantive comment to the P area principally for the statement of the USIA mission, to G for USIA-State-CIA relations with respect to covert operations and to R for the intelligence backstopping. You may feel that other areas would also be concerned.

[Attachment]

## *Paper Prepared in the Department of State* [3]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1953.

### PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE TO THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253) and the provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, [4] the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1) The primary purpose of the United States Information Agency in carrying out the functions now or hereafter assigned to it shall be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States. This will require that the United States find out what other peoples want, relate their wants to those of this country, and explain these common goals in ways that will cause others to join with the United States in their achievement.

2) In carrying out the functions transferred to the United States Information Agency by Section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, and such other functions as may be assigned to the United States Information Agency, it is essential that the USIA develop detailed operational plans to carry out approved policies in appropriate coordination with the development of plans by other agencies having related responsibilities in respect of such approved policies. The United States Information Agency shall look to the Operations Coordinating Board to receive its assignment of detailed

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[3] The identity of the drafting officer is not indicated on the source text; however Department of State files contain an earlier draft of this proposed directive dated July 13 which varies in only a few essentials and contains the notation "H[owland] B. S[argeant] Draft". (A/MS files, lot 54 D 291," Jackson Committee Report")

[4] See the editorial note, p. 1709.

planning responsibilities where several agencies have functions in carrying out an approved national security policy.

3) The Director of the United States Information Agency shall act as an adviser to the Operations Coordinating Board. The Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board should invite him to attend those meetings of the Board at which the subjects under discussion relate to his function.

4) The Director of the United States Information Agency in his relationships with other agencies will be guided by the Reorganization Plan No. 8, the President's Message to Congress of June 1, 1953, the President's letter to heads of agencies of June 1, 1953, [5] and related Executive Orders.

5) Appropriate arrangements shall be made as promptly as possible to carry out the instructions of the President that "the Secretary of State has an obligation to develop means of providing foreign policy guidance fully and promptly . . . the United States Information Agency must seek such guidance and establish appropriate means of assuring that its programs at all times conform to such foreign policy guidance". The USIA information guidances directed to its staff in the field and in the United States shall rely upon and conform to such foreign policy guidances as furnished by the Secretary of State.

6) To assure coordination of unattributed propaganda, the United States Information Agency shall adhere rigorously to the principles agreed to by all United States information agencies under date of November 1, 1951. Since coordination of unattributed propaganda is vital, and as a general rule it is in the interests of the United States that a much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed, appropriate arrangements shall be made to place the responsibility for the coordination of unattributed propaganda on the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission in each country.

7) Covert propaganda operations shall be centralized in the Central Intelligence Agency. . . . .

8) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of State shall make arrangements with the Director of the United States Information Agency to provide the special intelligence requested by the United States Information Agency.

9) The Operations Coordinating Board will take immediate steps to determine the classified information essential to the performance of the mission of the United States Information Agency and will recommend to the National Security Council, as necessary, the

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[5] See the editorial note, p. 1709.

authorization of distribution to the United States Information Agency of such classified information.

10) The United States Information Agency shall be responsible for providing the services and facilities necessary for the preparation, translation, transmission and distribution of materials for the program assigned as the exclusive responsibility of the Secretary of State and designed to assure accurate statements of United States official positions on important issues and current developments.

11) The Director of the United States Information Agency shall report to and receive instructions from the President through the Operations Coordinating Board, except in those instances in which the Operations Coordinating Board shall recommend that the National Security Council provide the mechanism or except as the President may otherwise determine.

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511.00/7–2453: Circular airgram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 24, 1953.

### UNREST IN SATELLITE COUNTRIES [2]

CA–345. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 409: (FYI begins: Following, which supplements earlier guidance this subject, constitutes, together with InfoGuide Bulletin 405, [3] first installment of comprehensive regionalized guidance on Unrest in Satellite Countries. Remainder will be moved in segments as it is completed and cleared. We have been asked to indicate that the White House attaches significance to appropriate exploitation, in all areas, of the current unrest in Eastern Europe. Ends FYI)

### BACKGROUND

For the first time since the extension of Soviet power to that area, massive anti-regime demonstrations and large scale rioting has taken place in Soviet dominated Eastern Europe. These events, confined largely to East Germany, were of a scope and intensity which a short time ago no one would have believed possible. As the

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[1] Drafted by Revey; cleared by Thurston, Straus, Montgomery, and Harold Vedeler of EE; sent to 31 missions and 3 consulates.

[2] For documentation concerning the disorders in the German Democratic Republic, see volume VII. For documentation concerning the disorders in Czechoslovakia, see volume VIII.

[3] Not printed; it provided an outline of publicity policies to be pursued or inaugurated concerning the disturbances in East Germany. (511.00/7–1753)

*Economist* pointed out nothing more damaging to Communist prestige has happened since the war.

The satellite countries have been experiencing severe strains for some time. These strains emerged, inevitably perhaps, from the program of forced industrialization and collectivization pursued in this area. Shortages in food stuffs and consumers goods, systematic increases in worker's norms and forced deliveries of agricultural goods as well as pauperization through currency revaluation, all accompanied this ruthless policy. Popular reaction to these measures included labor slow-downs, absenteeism, peasant resistance. Repression and material hardship combined to crystallize popular hatred of the Communist regimes although there is reason to believe that rioting itself in East Germany took on significant proportions only after the populace sensed the indecision and/or impotence of their puppet regime.

In general press reports concerning the scope of unrest in the satellite countries have exaggerated the gravity of the situation as assessed by reliable on-the-spot observers. In view of the unexpected character of the East German events and the general desire to believe that the Soviet empire is crumbling, these exaggerations are natural and human. Despite outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany however, there is little evidence of organized overt defiance of state authority in the other satellite countries. With the exception of Czechoslovakia and East Germany no unusual security measures have been reported by reliable observers. It is the view of qualified experts that the control exercised by satellite regimes appears as firm if not as confident as in past.

The pattern of current developments in Eastern Europe indicates an absence at this moment of a uniform Soviet policy re their European satellites. In East Germany and Hungary Soviet policy appears to be characterized by moderation of earlier political and economic programs, accompanied, however, by warnings that activities directed against the regime will not be tolerated. In Poland and Bulgaria, on other hand, there are as yet no clearly discernible signs that similar changes are imminent there. Limited adjustments on specific problems made in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Albania can scarcely compare with the rather impressive concessions and "reforms" promised in East Germany and Hungary.

It is, of course, impossible at this point reliably to predict the influence of Beria's [4] fall on future satellite developments. At the present juncture, however, it would appear that the recent policy changes in Soviet dominated Europe may not be countermanded as a result of Beria's elimination.

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[4] Lavrentiy Pavolovich Beriya was from March to June 1953 Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR and Member of the Presidium of the CPSU. He was removed from office and later executed for alleged high crimes against the state.

So far as the non-Communist world is concerned the events of East Germany have

a. exposed the exploitation and suppression by the East German government of the very working classes which it professes to represent, conversely it has demolished the myth concerning the workers "paradise."
b. demonstrated that the Soviet satellite regimes do not enjoy any real popular support.
c. exposed the satellite governments not only as unpopular tyrants but as impotent puppets maintained in power only by Soviet troops and by local security forces of uncertain reliability.
d. demonstrated that the puppet satellite regimes can be challenged by a population aroused.
e. indicated that although the workers demonstrated against objectionable conditions of work, they rioted for freedom and against Soviet domination, the root cause of their hardship and degradation.

It is not clear how the satellite people view the East German developments. We may legitimately assume, however, that in addition to being impressed and heartened by the daring of the East German populace they may be considering

a. what were the true origins of the demonstration-rioting and how they relate to the Soviet "peace offensive," particularly the manifest Soviet objective to prevent the buildup of Western power and unity. Many may assume that the rioting made it psychologically impossible for West Germans to subordinate German reunion to West European integration.
b. whether the rioting can list accomplishments of lasting significance.
c. whether the accomplishments justify their cost as measured in terms of lives lost, injuries sustained and arrests of an indeterminate number of actual or potential leaders.
d. what significance to attach to the absence of overt Western support despite the fact that the drama unfolded in full view of Western observers with American, British and French troops close at hand.
e. what important differences exist between their own position and that of the East German population. For example, the East Germans were in a position indirectly to contribute to their own eventual liberation from Soviet domination by limited actions imparting new urgency to the moral obligation of the Fedrep and the Western powers to explore the practical possibilities of German unification.

In the light of the background considerations set forth above we should set ourselves the following basic objectives:

a. To persuade the peoples of the Soviet satellite countries, through facts, reports and interpretations which are both credible and convincing that Soviet power in the satellite world is not impregnable, and that the resistance manifested by the East Germans has achieved concrete successes.

b. To strengthen the confidence of the satellite people in the potentials of their own strength and in this way to fortify the spirit of resistance in the satellite countries.

c. To make the problem of Soviet control over the satellite people in the critical period which lies ahead as difficult as possible, without, however, inciting to revolt which might well lead to bloody reprisals and without jeopardizing the reputation for credibility and reliability which we have taken great pains to establish and maintain.

d. To reflect United States opposition to the enslavement of the satellite peoples and United States determination that true liberty be restored to the countries of Eastern Europe. (See communiqué of Three Foreign Ministers, July 14, 1953) [5]

e. To maintain in the satellite lands a climate of resistance calculated to encourage exploitation of whatever opportunities unfolding developments in the Soviet orbit may present for effective action against the edifice of Soviet power.

It is essential in this connection to keep in mind that while the United States, as noted above, has stated its desire to see true liberty restored to the countries of Eastern Europe, the President has indicated (his news conference of July 1, 1953) that he did not believe there was any thought of taking, for such purpose, any physical action of any kind that could be classed as intervention. [6]

## TREATMENT

### *To the European Satellites of the USSR*

a. We continue to cross-report reliable news concerning unrest in the satellite lands and popular resistance to the puppet satellite regimes.

b. We seek serious comment emphasizing that the current indications of Soviet weakness and uncertainty vis-à-vis the satellite countries foreshadow the eventual failure of Soviet policy in that area.

(1) The carefully nurtured pretense of monolithic strength has been shaken by the dramatic, open manifestations of inner weakness in the Soviet system.

(2) The puppet "quisling" regimes installed by Moscow have failed to win any real popular support. Far from winning the voluntary compliance of the people, they have succeeded only in intensifying the will of the people to resist. The behavior of the East

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[5] For documentation on the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at Washington, July 10–14, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

[6] See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 468–469.

German police should destroy any illusions, if there were any, concerning the reliability even of the satellite security forces.

(3) Failure of the Soviets to achieve their objectives in the satellite countries must be attributed primarily to the resistance developed by the East European people themselves. The myriad forms of resistance which devoted and staunch patriots throughout the satellite world have devised and employed with ingenuity has begun to reap dividends. A factor in this resistance is, of course, the determination of the Free World, as epitomized in NATO, for example, to stand up to the challenge of Soviet power.

(4) The USSR must now recognize the dangers of the policy which they have pursued since 1945.

c. When appropriate we employ the theme that the people of Eastern Europe have steadfastly adhered to the European tradition despite the temporary barriers imposed arbitrarily by the USSR to isolate them from their European brethren.

d. We report in detail and comment as opportunity permits, to the other satellite countries on the "concessions" promised the people by the puppet regimes of Eastern Germany and Hungary. Comment should emphasize the theme that nothing is so dangerous as necessary concessions delayed too long.

e. In output to Hungary we question both the sincerity and the capability of the reorganized government to implement its promises concerning "reform." Particular attention should be devoted to the matter of peasant withdrawal from agricultural collectives.

f. Commentaries interpreting the significance of the events of Eastern Germany should utilize available German or other statements indicating

(1) that Soviet control of the situation in their zone of occupation has been permanently undermined by the failure of the SPD, their chosen political instrument in Eastern Germany.

(2) the emergence among the people in East Germany of a new spirit of self-confidence.

(3) satisfaction of the East German population that they have contributed indirectly to their own eventual liberation. Handled with appropriate care the point may be made that through their dramatic action the East German people have focussed world attention upon their own plight, in particular their urgent desire to be united in freedom with their brethren in free West Germany.

g. We continue to publicize useful statements of escapees and report arrival in the West particularly of defecting Vopo's.

h. We give full publicity to free world expressions of solidarity with both the suppressed East German people and the enslaved peoples of the satellite countries.

i. Useful statements by reliable emigre groups such as the recent memorandum of the Christian Democratic Union of Central

Europe and the statement by the Conference of the Socialist Union of Central and Eastern Europe should be given appropriate play.

j. We continue to emphasize the United States desire to see free and unfettered elections held in the European countries under Soviet domination expressed by the President in his April 16 speech and reiterated more recently by himself and by the Secretary.

k. We continue, as appropriate to make points relating to Beria's downfall and the intensified struggle for power being waged at the core of the Soviet empire, set forth in earlier guidance.

DULLES

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511.00/7-2553: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 25, 1953—1:26 a.m.

57. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 411:

*Armistice: Note:* This guidance becomes operative only upon official announcement armistice is signed. [2] (FYI begins: Difficulties raised by Rhee [3] and other ROK officials should not be allowed divert attention from fact and significance of armistice as viewed from our standpoint.

In establishing and projecting our own view of significance armistice we avoid becoming involved in differences with Rhee in our information output; similarly we undercut Communist attempts misinterpret armistice, viz., claiming victory for Communists or for Asians over whites, claiming credit for bringing peace, etc.

Whatever compulsions have brought Communists to armistice in Korea, we welcome termination hostilities but remember that their concessions must always be seen as part their larger global strategy to achieve unchanging Communist objectives. World is gratified that UN has elicited compliance with first part of first great step specified by Eisenhower April 16 [4] as requirement for relaxation tensions; nevertheless Communist agreement to armistice must be viewed in context of larger purposes Moscow's "peace offensive" (Review Department's circular airgram Control 2995, InfoGuide Bulletin 342, April 22, 1953). Communists' shift from use armed hostilities Korea as principal instrument their expansionist aims, at least for present, may be calculated bring neutral and some Allied pressure on US to relax opposition to (a) trade with China and other Soviet orbit countries, (b) admission Communist China to UN, and (c) other Communist political and economic goals. We guard against world opinion being taken in by face which Communists will place upon their action. We seek forestall Communists anticipated attempt make virtue of UN's frustration of their Korean aggression, their attempt present their agreement to armistice as major concession which would make it free world's turn to make major concessions in Asia and Europe. Ends FYI)

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[1] Drafted by Frederick M. Fisher of the Office of Policy and Plans, IIA; cleared in draft by Huyler, Pratt, Mosman, Montgomery, and Allen Haden, Chief of the Area Policy Planning Staff in the Office of Policy and Plans, IIA, as well as by Louis Henkin of UNA, Robert McClurkin of FE, and Major Kelleher of Defense; approved by Wechsler; telegraphed, priority, to 38 posts and the Department of Defense, and pouched to 49 other posts.

[2] The armistice terminating hostilities in Korea came into effect on July 27, 1953. For documentation on Korea and the Korean war, see volume xv.

[3] Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea from 1948 to 1960.

[4] Reference is to President Eisenhower's address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors entitled "The Chance For Peace". See InfoGuide Bulletin 342, Apr. 22, p. 1699.

*Information Policy and Treatment:*

Our strategy upon signature of armistice is to explain its terms, to establish our view of its significance, and to use occasion to review history of Korean conflict and drive home its lessons: (a) Soviet orbit will resort to unprovoked armed aggression in pursuit of its objectives at any time or place cheap victory appears possible, (b) collective security measures under UN met and stopped aggression, (c) aggression does not pay.

*I. Terms*

A. We explain terms by circulating full text widely as possible, plus appropriate summaries of varying length in all useful forms and media. In summaries to North Korea and Soviet orbit emphasize factually arrangements giving reasonable assurances against ROK renewal of hostilities; also recall tri-partite Foreign Ministers' Washington statement July 14 on renewal of aggression.[5]

*II. Significance of Armistice*

A. Destruction and bloodshed have ceased, we hope for good. We identify ourselves with human feelings of relief and joy that fighting has been halted on honorable terms—an end we have long and patiently sought. (1) Emphasize appropriate passages in President's and other official statements; (2) Pick up US press and radio comment making point; (3) Report in proper perspective religious observances, sermons, articles in religious press, avoiding obvious extremes. *Caution:* Avoid exaggerated emphasis, any suggestion full peace achieved, or any implication that "now it's all over, we can bring the boys home".

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[5] For documentation on the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, held July 10–14, 1953 at Washington, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

B. The armistice registers UN success. It is military agreement registering fact that unprovoked aggression has been stopped and repelled by collective action under UN, thus fulfilling purposes which motivated UN military action.

1. Use selected and original material which recalls: (a) Creeping, piecemeal aggression such as led to World War II was met and stopped by resolute, prompt collective security action by free nations under UN; (b) First North Korean aggression was routed. When Soviet orbit threw power of Communist China into second act of wanton aggression this too was stopped.

2. Without gloating or boastful talk of "victory", make plain that free world has said unprovoked armed aggression against a free country, even though small and weak, shall not succeed and has made good. *Caution:* Keep treatment simple and broad, avoid arguments about fine points of precisely what various UN resolutions meant as to UN military objectives, also arguments about crossing 38th parallel, etc.

C. Armistice makes further progress possible. With fighting stopped on honorable terms, now becomes possible pursue by peaceful means common political objective of UN, US and ROK—a free, united and independent Korea. It is further possible turn more attention to efforts toward solution other problems creating tension and dangers to peace. (1) Use official statements, US and foreign, demonstrating common objective and making point we can now pursue it by peaceful means; (2) Document division of Korea, a Soviet act, enforced by Red Army, contrary to our purposes and understandings. Recall our efforts (1945–50) to achieve united, free Korea, frustrated by arbitrary Soviet actions; (3) Refer to political conference as provided for in armistice terms and as treated in official US statements (e.g. Eisenhower, Dulles) keeping a positive, constructive—but not unduly hopeful—attitude toward possibility of a successful outcome. *Cautions:* Avoid speculations. Treat political conference relatively lightly in keeping with our intention to use conclusion of armistice to focus attention on lessons learned in Korea. Limit to official UN, UNC and US statements any treatment re date, place, membership or agenda of conference.

D. This is honorable armistice. Besides registering success in stopping aggression, armistice embodies fundamental principle, overwhelmingly approved by free men and nations of world, that men shall not be forced return to slavery against their will. (1) Recall UN resolutions and overwhelming free world support for UNC stand against forcible repatriation despite tremendous Communist pressure; (2) Foreign statements and comment making this point particularly useful; telegraph Washington for cross-reporting.

To Soviet orbit countries, that principle of no forcible repatriation was sustained should constitute main theme.

*Caution:* Do not commit US–UN prestige to high number of eventual non-repatriate Communist POWs, nor comment on numbers of captured UN personnel whom Communists may claim refuse repatriation. Do not refer to release of POWs by Rhee.

E. Armistice is *not* political settlement, a peace, or conclusive evidence Communist intentions are peaceful. It is agreement between military commanders to cease fighting. It also recommends a conference to seek a peaceful and final solution of remaining Korean problems. (1) Since armistice is only an armistice, there can be no relaxation of vigilance, strength, and unity of purpose among free nations in Korea or elsewhere; (2) Use statements and selected and original comment making clear that although Communists have been forced to halt, they have still to demonstrate future intentions; (a) Agreement to armistice does not indicate Soviet orbit has changed basic objectives or abandoned use of armed aggression; (b) Agreement to suspend illegal armed aggression is not an act deserving rewards or concessions on our part, e.g. admission of Communist China to UN; (3) Foreign statements and comment this point particularly useful; Telegraph Washington for cross-reporting.

*Caution:* Avoid discussing whether armistice is deed in terms of Eisenhower's April 16 speech. If necessary we may point out his formulation of whole "first step": "The first step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea. This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea".

### *III. Lessons of Korean Conflict*

A. Communist attempt to conquer South Korea by violence and outright armed aggression after withdrawal US forces illustrates necessity of strength, vigilance and unity of purpose on part of free nations. Mere suspension of aggression does not justify any relaxation. (1) Review and recall reactions to 1950 attack among free nations, with spirit of determination to cooperate in arming and guarding against threat of Soviet attack; (2) Recall communiqué of three Foreign Ministers in Washington, July 14, 1953.

B. Collective security is workable and has worked. (1) Give credit to UN which took action, to overwhelming majority of UN members who approved and supported action, and especially to ROK and other nations with contingents in UN forces in Korea whose heroic sacrifices made this effort of collective security under UN work; (2) Review difficulties and skill with which UNC surmounted them in welding these units into an effective fighting force; (3) Emphasize UNC responsibility and restraint in conducting successful military action without allowing conflict to grow into world conflagration.

C. UN has upheld values of human freedom and dignity above all else; stress: (1) UNC good treatment of prisoners; (2) Patience, skill and determination of UNC in conducting negotiations for armistice, our repeated initiatives and Communist obstruction, our refusal compromise on Communist demand for forcible repatriation, entailing many months of sacrifice, finally acknowledged by Communist agreement to present terms.

*Overall Cautions:*

1. Avoid interpretations precise legal purport of specific armistice terms beyond official US-UNC statements.

2. Avoid tone and material which would lay official US information output open to charge of prejudicing successful implementation of armistice terms or prejudicing success of political conference.

3. Avoid any suggestion that when armistice is signed US troops will be returned home; play down predictions of or developments in reductions of US draft calls.

DULLES

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## *Editorial Note*

On July 31, the Department of State announced in circular 45 the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA). The text of this circular is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 24, 1953, pages 239-240. The previous day, President Eisenhower had named Theodore C. Streibert of Locust Valley, New York, as the USIA's first director. The text of the White House announcement of Streibert's designation is printed *ibid.*, page 238.

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511.00/8-1553: Circular telegram

## *The Director of the United States Information Agency (Streibert) to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 15, 1953—12:57 p.m.

Usito 21. InfoGuide: Russians In Korea: Statements by returned POWs, when convincing first-hand accounts, should be used widely, to keep clearly before world public opinion the supportable facts of USSR involvement in Korean hostilities: (a) the Soviets instigated

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[1] Drafted by George A. Mann of the Office of Policy and Programs, USIA; approved by Connors; and sent to 13 posts.

North Korea's aggression, (b) the USSR supplied and trained forces involved and supplied planning and direction for the invasion, (c) Soviet technical and advisory personnel were active in rear areas, including operation of anti-aircraft equipment. Statements purporting to show that Russians piloted enemy fighting planes or participated in ground combat other than rear-area anti-aircraft operation should not repeat not be used, since information through other channels so far provides insufficient substantiation.

STREIBERT

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511.00/8-1853: Telegram

## *The Information Attaché at the Embassy in the Netherlands (Casler) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, August 18, 1953—11 a.m.

Tousi 10. USIS has received paper bound Death House letters of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, plus packet containing United States Supreme court transcript of record, in 8 paper bound booklets, addressed to Librarian, USINFO Library, The Hague, from Committee to Secure Justice in Rosenberg Case. Mimeographed letter signed by Joseph Brainin, chairman, advised of impending arrival of "verbatim transcript" and a copy of "letters" with additional copies available.

Foregoing would indicate possibility reopening agitation campaign at several points through instructing Communist sympathizers to inquire at USIS Information Centers for these documents in effort discredit or embarrass with ulterior motives unclear.

USIS naturally will not include this matter in its library collection. Inquiries will be met by statement that materials available for public use are provided only under United States Government auspices. [1]

CASLER

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[1] The Department of State and USIA replied jointly in telegram 220 to The Hague, Aug. 18, as follows: "Upon receipt 'verbatim transcript' referred Tousi 10 August 18 please airpouch Department for comparison with original. Please list Supreme Court transcripts contained 8 booklets. USIS action approved." (511.00/8-1853)

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## *Editorial Note*

On September 2, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10483 establishing the Operations Coordinating Board. In a simultaneous press release, the White House announced that the Board was an interagency group designed "to provide for the integrated implementation of national security policies by the several agencies" of the Federal Government. As such, the Operations Coordinating Board was to be considered an adjunct of and direct auxiliary to the National Security Council. Texts of the Executive order and the White House press release are in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 28, 1953, pages 420–421.

The creation of the Operations Coordinating Board followed directly from recommendations made to the President by his Committee on International Information Activities in its report of June 30, 1953 (particularly in Chapter 7). The report is printed on page 1795.

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USIA files, lot 56 D 581, "Notes on McCarthy Committee"

## *Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Administrator in Change of the International Information Center Service of the United States Information Agency (Humphrey) to the Acting Chief of the Center Operations Division, United States Information Agency (Simpson)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1953.

Subject: Restoration of Works by Fifth Amendment Authors

The re-evaluation of materials by authors taking refuge behind the Fifth Amendment called for in the July 15, 1953 Report on the Book and Library Program, [1] and our recent discussions of the program utility of the works involved lead me to the conclusion that the Agency should not authorize restoration of any of the materials previously removed from the libraries under instructions by the Department of State. This conclusion does not, of course, affect the authorization given in that Report for the restoration of the works of Dashiell Hammett.

Accordingly, it is to be the position of this Service that subject authorization is not granted. Any indications which we may have that the field may have undertaken restoration on its own responsibility should be appropriately dealt with.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 1722.

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## *Editorial Note*

By memorandum to the National Security Council of October 1, Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr. circulated a Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board on the Report by the President's Committee on International Information Activities (June 30, 1953). The Progress Report, which contains considerable discussion of the foreign information program, is printed on page 1882.

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Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "President"

## *Memorandum for the President by the Secretary of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1953.

Subject: The Official Label Information Program

In preparing to carry out the section of Reorganization Plan No. 8, which makes the Secretary of State responsible for an information program on official U.S. positions "identified as official positions by an exclusive descriptive label", account has been taken of the recommendations of your Committee on International Information Activities. [2]

In accordance with these recommendations, the U.S. Information Agency is being reorganized so that its output will emphasize factual news reporting and will reflect the attitude of the U.S. Government in a responsible manner.

In view of this change in the character of USIA output the problem has been to develop a special program which will have the advantages of an official label but which will not, at the same time, discredit the USIA by implying that the rest of its output does not reflect Government policy.

I have concluded that the presentation of official positions within the following framework would best accomplish these ends:

1. Statements or speeches by the President and the Secretary of State on foreign affairs are the most authoritative possible and do not need an official label. However, they will be given an advance buildup and subsequent follow-through in accordance with the impact which they wish them to have abroad.

2. The State Department will prepare at periodic intervals programs to be disseminated by USIA, preceded and followed in each program by the statement that they have been produced by the Department as a special statement on U.S. foreign policy.

3. As general practice, these programs will be produced to meet one or more of the following circumstances:

a. When it is desired to emphasize an especially important policy development.

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[1] Drafted by Phillips. Two brief memoranda, attached to the source text, indicate that Dulles asked McCardle on Oct. 8 to draw up a memorandum to the President on the subject, and that McCardle forwarded the memorandum to Dulles on Oct. 14 for his signature. A copy of this document and the accompanying two memoranda are also in file 103 USIA/10–1453.

[2] Reference is to the Jackson Committee Report, p. 1795.

b. When it is desired to present a periodic review of foreign policy developments.

c. When conflicting statements by prominent Americans have produced confusion abroad.

Mr. Streibert, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, and Mr. C.D. Jackson of your staff, concur in these conclusions.

It is recommended that you approve the presentation of official U.S. positions on foreign policy within the above framework.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "POW's 1953"

*Paper Approved by the Operations Coordinating Board* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1953.

## NATIONAL OPERATIONS PLAN TO EXPLOIT COMMUNIST BW HOAX, MISTREATMENT OF POW'S AND OTHER ATROCITIES PERPETRATED BY COMMUNIST FORCES DURING THE KOREAN WAR

### OBJECTIVE

To develop an integrated national program which will effectively expose the nature of Communist motives, character, methods and ambitions by coordinated exploitation of all available materials on the Soviet fabrication of bacteriological warfare propaganda, the character of Communist exploitation and mistreatment of prisoners of war and other atrocities perpetrated by the Communists during the Korean War.

*I. Requirements:*

a. To establish in authoritative fashion, without supplying the Communists with further propaganda opportunities, the falsity of Communist charges that the United States engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea and Communist China.

b. To neutralize unfavorable publicity concerning the U.S. treatment of its returned prisoners of war and to undermine Communist propaganda exploitation of any necessary disciplinary or penal actions taken against any repatriated U.S. prisoner of war.

c. To make clear in the United States that this government does not condone cowardice or treasonable acts on the part of its military personnel and that those individuals who avoided capture, or who, having been captured, withstood Communist pressures, are more to be praised than those who, even though they were subjected to limited physical or mental duress, succumbed to Communist pressures and collaborated in the germ warfare hoax.

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[1] This paper was circulated to OCB members by Col. Byron K. Enyart, USAF, Acting Deputy Executive Officer, under cover of a memorandum of Oct. 14, which indicated that the OCB had approved the paper on that date. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "POW's 1953") For information on the establishment and functions of the Operations Coordinating Board, see the editorial note, p. 1736.

d. To provide for the necessary medical treatment and protection from U.S. public scorn of military personnel who succumbed to Communist pressures under excessive duress while also providing for appropriate explanations and information output with respect to punitive action against those who are found to have been guilty of treasonable acts.

e. Through objective, factual information output, expose all provable cases of atrocities or mistreatment and violations of the existing rules of war which may be ascribed to the Communists, both against prisoners of war and other military personnel in Korea.

*II. Actions Currently Completed or Under Way:*

a. As a result of experience gained from Operation Little Switch, it has been agreed by all agencies that no distinctive medical or psychical treatment or segregation should be accorded to returned prisoners of war on the basis of apparent collaboration as revealed in Communist propaganda.

b. Considerable material has been obtained from psychological warfare, medical, psychiatric, or sociological interrogation of such prisoners while these personnel were enroute from the Far East Command to the United States. Additional material will be sought as required.

c. It has been agreed that specific depositions denying participation in bacteriological warfare and outlining the conditions and forms of duress by which such confessions were obtained are to be acquired from the personnel involved and transmitted to the OCB for the Department of State and other agencies as appropriate, for their use.

d. It has been determined that the Department of Defense will obtain such other information and intelligence materials as may be desired and make them available to all interested executive agencies of the Government immediately upon receipt.

e. A special panel of intelligence and information officers has been established to provide documentary and intelligence material required by the U.S. United Nations Delegation, and this panel is apparently operating effectively.

f. A special panel of the Operations Coordinating Board which had been established to prepare a national plan for the exploitation of Communist mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war, has been dissolved and a new panel constituted to plan for and coordinate all aspects of the POW exchange.

g. The Department of Defense has agreed to make available to the Operations Coordinating Board all material which has been or may be collected concerning any aspect of this problem.

h. The Department of Defense has also agreed to prepare story and White Paper material, radio, TV and movie material for such utilization as may be required.

i. The Department of Defense has released an announcement outlining its position with respect to distinction between those prisoners who succumbed to duress, those who refused to do so, and those who collaborated openly.

j. The Department of Defense has made available to the Department of Justice all pertinent information on possible subversive elements involving U.S. military personnel returning from Korea.

*III. Specific Programs or Additional Actions Required:*

a. A specific program of U.S. action to discredit the Soviet bacteriological warfare campaign. (Title: *Basic Plan For U.S. Action to Discredit the Soviet Bacteriological Warfare Campaign.*) This program will integrate the aspects of completed, continuing, and new actions which relate to this purpose, including especially the bacteriological warfare aspects of prisoner of war experience.

b. A specific program to exploit to the maximum degree appropriate all provable cases of atrocities or mistreatment and violations of the existing rules of war which may be ascribed to the Communists, both against prisoners of war and other military personnel in Korea. (Title: *National Plan For Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.N. Prisoners of War.*) This program will integrate the aspects of completed, continuing and new actions which relate to this program.

c. A specific program to exploit to the maximum all evidence pertaining to U.S. personnel in Korea captured by the Communists who steadfastly withstood Communist coercion, threats of death—and other forms of physical and mental pressure, without falsely confessing to actions which could be used by the Communists against the interests of the United States; such personnel to be given appropriate public recognition by citation and decoration of their courage and devotion to the national interest and to their duty, and that such recognition by citation and decoration be given thorough exploitation in the United States and abroad as a significant reflection of the morale and discipline of United States military personnel, and of the values of American national life. The citation should in each case provide a detailed account of the physical and mental pressures used by the Communists in their efforts to obtain "confessions" or statements from U.S. personnel, and the responses of the Americans to these pressures.

d. A domestic program to re-establish that the United States does not condone cowardice or treasonable acts on the part of its military personnel and to establish an understanding of the disposition of the several categories of U.S. military personnel returning from Korea.

e. Material required by the Department of State for the United States United Nations Delegation and United States delegations to other international bodies should continue to be provided.

f. All other materials required for the implementation of these programs and obtainable from military sources should be obtained by the Department of Defense and provided to other interested agencies.

g. All of these requirements and programs should be coordinated by a single authoritative point of contact.

*IV. Recommendations: (To become actions when approved by OCB)*

a. That the Operations Coordinating Board note the actions already completed and approve the two specific programs called for in III a. and III b., above.

b. That the Board note the requirements in III c. and III d., above, and designate the Department of Defense as the action agency.

c. That the Operations Coordinating Board designate a member of the OCB staff as a single point of contact to provide for the coordinated exploitation of all these programs; that this officer will act as Chairman for an interdepartmental working group; that the Department of Justice be invited to sit with this group; and that the Chairman act as the point of contact to receive all requests for information and disseminate all information obtained to the interested agencies.

d. Member agencies should advise this group with respect to policies to be followed in the implementation of this plan.

e. That the Department of Defense and other agencies provide to this point of contact all pertinent information collected to date, that this provision continue in the future, and that the departments or other agencies undertake to satisfy requirements for further information submitted to them by the designated point of contact only.

Tab "A"

## *Paper Approved by the Operations Coordinating Board*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1953.

### BASIC PLAN FOR U.S. ACTION TO DISCREDIT THE SOVIET BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN

*1. Problem and Opportunity*

a. Through manufactured "evidence", ostensible confessions extracted from U.S. prisoners of war by physical and mental torture, investigations and reports by pseudo-scientific groups, and intensive propaganda hammering, the Communists have achieved in the Free World, as well as within the Soviet orbit, some degree of belief in their allegations that the United States has engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea and Communist China.

b. While various U.S. Government agencies have made efforts at counter-action, the U.S. Government has not supplied the world with authoritative documentation to refute the charge, and to exploit this example to discredit Soviet propaganda in general.

c. While the various agencies of the U.S. Government have separately accumulated extensive amounts of information about this Soviet campaign, the current return of prisoners of war in Korea provides very important additional information especially useful as specific propaganda and as foundation for the development of concerted U.S. action on this matter.

*2. Definition of General Objective*

a. Under the supervision of the Operations Coordinating Board to assure integration with overall U.S. foreign and military policy, and to assure government-wide integration of action on this subject, the U.S. Government will undertake at once a program utilizing documented evidence to expose the false and fabricated character of Communist propaganda in general and Communist bacteriological warfare charges in particular, as a demonstration of the insidious nature of Communist propaganda and the brutal and destructive character of Communist methods.

b. The purposes of this program will be:

(1) To discredit this example of Soviet propaganda so effectively that it can be used throughout the Free World and the Soviet orbit to demonstrate the viciousness and falsity of Communist propaganda in general.

(2) To undo and reverse any belief in their allegations which they may have achieved.

(3) To cause the Soviet bacteriological warfare propaganda campaign to so boomerang that it will not be reasserted.

(4) At the proper stage of success in such U.S. counter-action, to use this example to the maximum for the broad purpose of general destruction of the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda effort.

*3. Guiding Considerations*

a. The objectives defined above differ sharply from the view that the Soviet campaign has been overdone to the point of self-exposure, that its true character will in time be naturally apparent, and that the best U.S. course is to let the Soviet campaign run out without concerted and positive U.S. counter-effort. The statement of objective established here is a conclusion that U.S. interest now requires concerted positive counter-effort.

b. The Soviet bacteriological warfare campaign is based on the inhuman mental and moral breakdown of a small number of the U.S. personnel who have been captured in Korea. In this connection it is necessary to note that Soviet methods of psychological coercion are capable of compromising most individuals whom they are determined to break. Whether this reason is justification for the action of any individual is a matter strictly for agencies of military or civil justice, as the case may be. However, there is a possibility of conflict between the general propaganda objectives of the U.S. Government and the need for disciplinary or penal action in individual cases. This plan will not attempt to prejudge individual cases but the following considerations will be carefully weighed in each case prior to initiation of penal or disciplinary action.

(1) The overall propaganda objectives of the U.S action set forth here are best served by the avoidance of punishment of military or civilian personnel who have been so exploited by the Soviet bacteriological warfare propaganda campaign.

(2) If the risk of adverse propaganda effect cannot be avoided in cases of clear necessity for disciplinary or penal action, the employment of public or publicly known investigations and proceedings should be kept to the minimum required under law.

*4. Courses of Action*

a. The assembly of additional information and the development of detailed courses of positive action by U.S. departments and agencies will be accomplished by an inter-agency task force, as provided in paragraph 5.

b. The processing of information will include:

(1) The identification and detailed study of the sources and methods used by the Soviets in the development of the subject matter of this campaign.

(2) The identification of the propaganda mechanisms and targets used by the Soviets as a basis for specific U.S. counter-action. Special attention will be given to the identification of those influential persons and specialized opinion groups throughout the Free World who have been especially susceptible to this campaign.

c. The development of the U.S. positive action program will assume the following general framework of timing, approach, mechanism and target selection:

(1) On the basis of the best current operational judgment, without waiting for completion of an exhaustive analysis of the total problem, counter-propaganda and efforts to induce credence in U.S. innocence of the BW charges, and the falsity of those charges, will be initiated as a matter of urgency against persons and groups where the Soviet campaign has been especially effective.

(2) A dignified, continuing flow of corrective factual information will be launched widely throughout the world, under overt U.S. responsibility, increasing in tempo, intensity, and subject coverage as the development and evaluation of information is accomplished. Covert supplement to such overt action will be added as appropriate.

(3) The analysis of Soviet treatment of captured personnel will be completed as a matter of high priority, the results to be used as appropriate for both general propaganda and official action through diplomatic instrumentalities and official international organizations.

(4) A special effort will be made to carry U.S. propaganda to the people of the Soviet orbit, by overt and covert means, wherever possible with the cooperation of other Free World governments and especially by the neutralist nations.

(5) As appropriate, a campaign will be launched by overt and covert means to neutralize, over-ride, and destroy the Soviet propaganda instrumentalities which purvey the myth, giving priority attention to those which are currently and effectively active.

(6) The concentrated attention of official and non-official U.S. facilities will be directed to the development of methods for successful personal resistance to the Soviet techniques of psychological coercion.

### 5. *Implementation*

a. Under the chairmanship of a member of the OCB Staff as its representative, an inter-agency working group is established to monitor the development and execution of this plan. The membership will be representatives designated by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of Foreign Operations, and representatives of such other agencies, on a continuing or *ad hoc* basis, as the membership herein designated may determine. Major aspects of such development and execution will be referred for OCB or NSC action as appropriate.

b. All departments and agencies of the U.S. Government will contribute to the procurement and assembly of information and the provision of operational facilities, as determined by the working group, including the selective extraction of additional material from or other use of returned prisoners of war.

c. In the development and execution of the positive action program, the primary responsibility of participating departments and agencies will be to advise the working group with respect to policies to be followed in the implementation of this plan. In addition, with collateral participation and support from other departments and agencies as determined by the working group with the approval of the OCB, specific responsibilities include:

(1) *USIA:* To develop and conduct the overt propaganda actions indicated above.

(2) *The Department of State:* To develop and conduct the aspects of the campaign to be accomplished through the instrumentalities of diplomatic action or official U.S. interjection of this issue where appropriate into official international bodies, with particular attention to the benefits and limitations of discussion of these issues, in international bodies.

(3) *The Department of Defense:* To furnish the working group and participating agencies, as rapidly as possible, the material obtained from returned prisoners of war. With the cooperation of the CIA, the FBI, and such medical agencies as appropriate, the Department of Defense will analyze the experience of captured U.S. personnel with Soviet methods of personality destruction, the responsibility for devising counter-techniques to be separately determined and assigned by the OCB.

(4) *CIA:* As a matter of special emphasis in its intelligence responsibilities, to identify, describe, and evaluate the Soviet effort, instrumentalities and targets, and to provide such intelligence for the purpose of determining tactical priorities; and to plan and conduct all covert operational aspects of the general program.

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Tab "B"

## *Paper Approved by the Operations Coordinating Board*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1953.

### NATIONAL PLAN FOR EXPLOITING COMMUNIST MISTREATMENT OF U.N. PRISONERS OF WAR

#### I. OBJECTIVES

1. It is in the national interest that the full story of Communist mistreatment of POWs be made known to the American people. Implementation of any plan to inform the American audience must take account of certain foreign policy considerations. Any official campaign directed to overseas audiences should be developed by the OCB working group on the basis of a full evaluation of the evidence. U.S. efforts should be directed initially at making information available and stimulating public discussion of this evidence

through private channels in the United States. Where use of such materials will contribute to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad or in international bodies, they should be so utilized.

2. In general, it should be the purpose of the United States Government in its programs for exploiting Communist mistreatment of UN POWs to:

a. Provide the American people with an accurate sober account of the treatment accorded U.S. and other UN personnel captured by Communist forces in Korea, particularly with respect to the cynical Communist efforts to intimidate and pervert these prisoners for political ends as a part of the whole Communist conspiracy against the Free World.

b. To disseminate the substantive materials on a global basis when such dissemination is to our advantage.

c. Educate U.S. troops regarding the U.S. experiences in the POW field in the Korean war, and develop guidances appropriate for their conduct as prisoners in possible future hostilities.

d. To negate the effect of Communist propaganda developing from their mistreatment of POWs.

e. To educate U.S. military personnel concerning the nature of the Communist conspiracy with regard to mistreatment of POWs and to increase their fighting spirit.

f. To inform the American public and peoples of the Free World why UN soldiers are still missing after the completion of the prisoner of war exchange.

g. With regard to the POW and BW issues, to support and reinforce political actions and propaganda materials flowing from the activities of the U.S. delegation to the 8th Session of the UN General Assembly.

h. To minimize the attention given to UN personnel refusing repatriation or returning as Communist sympathizers.

i. To contribute to the determination of the free peoples of the world to fight Communism.

## II. OPERATIONS

3. The exploitation of Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war, and the illegal retention of those not returned during the prisoners of war exchange, is a positive and dynamic project which can achieve definite psychological gains. To be successful, the program must be one of continued and coordinated actions rather than a single-shot saturation effort. In exploiting atrocities, the program should emphasize actual atrocities and omit cases of malnutrition, lack of medical care, and other hardships common to both Communist troops and prisoners of war. At the same time, the program should not generate war hysteria or take on the nature of a rabble rousing campaign. Foreign exploitation of the program should emphasize the implications, for all individuals and nations, of the cynical and calculated way in which Communists exploit POWs to

serve their political interests and that this, among other things, justifies the resolute opposition of the American people to Soviet Communist and Communist aggression.

4. In order to focus national and world-wide attention on this issue and to stimulate continuing press coverage, a person of national television prominence should initiate the program of exploitation of Communist mistreatment of UN prisoners of war in a televised panel discussion at the earliest practicable date with a selected group of prisoner of war returnees and atrocity investigators. This television broadcast should be preceded by calculated rumors and hints that such a program is coming and will contain previously classified material which has now been downgraded and released by the Department of Defense.

5. The program will then be kept alive and followed up by:

a. Illustrated talks to domestic civic organizations, clubs and similar groups by selected prisoner of war returnees.

b. Domestic radio and television interviews of selected prisoner of war returnees by radio and television commentators.

c. Domestic magazine and newspaper articles by-lined by prisoner of war returnees.

d. Official domestic news releases of incidents and factual data as compiled, including official photographs.

e. Exploitation by the U.S. delegation to the UN.

f. Appropriate distribution of the stories to foreign audiences.

6. The following tasks will be performed:

a. *The Operations Coordinating Board will:*

(1) Accomplish over-all coordination of plans and, as appropriate, timing of activities of the Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA, FOA and USIA.

(2) Advise action agencies of necessary changes in plans and activities.

b. *The Department of State will:*

(1) Furnish national foreign policy guidance to participating agencies, to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and to U.S. missions abroad;

(2) Provide the U.S. delegation to the UN and U.S. missions abroad with available documented information on atrocities and prisoners of war illegally retained by the Communists;

(3) Furnish the Department of Defense with all available current information concerning:

(a) Foreign reaction to the program of exploiting Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war;

(b) Communist intentions regarding prisoners of war being illegally held since the completion of the prisoner of war exchange;

(4) Coordinate as appropriate with foreign governments for additional exploitation of Communist atrocities against prisoners of war.

c. *The Department of Defense will:*

(1) Take all necessary action to insure that the American people receive factual information through all media in order to achieve the objectives set forth in paragraph 2, *supra;*

(2) Prepare the script and select the personnel to participate in the initial telecast referred to in paragraph 4, *supra;*

(3) Take necessary action to implement the follow-up phase of the program as indicated in paragraph 5a through 5d;

(4) In cooperation with other governmental agencies, assist in the development of a coordinated over-all effort to exploit Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war;

(5) Cooperate with the Department of State and USIA to insure coordination of domestic exploitation of Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war with exploitation arranged by the Department of State through foreign governmental and/or information agencies;

(6) Provide the Department of State, the USIA, and CIA with available documented information on Communist atrocities against prisoners of war;

(7) Maintain continuing liaison with the Department of State and CIA to procure all available current information concerning:

(a) Foreign reaction to the program of exploiting Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war;
(b) Communist intentions regarding U.S. prisoners of war being illegally retained since the completion of the prisoner of war exchange;

(8) Collect and make available to all agencies all exploitable military information concerning Communist atrocities against prisoners of war.

d. *The Central Intelligence Agency will:*

(1) Utilize available means to procure and appropriately distribute current information concerning:

(a) Communist atrocities against prisoners of war;
(b) Number, location and identity of UN prisoners of war being illegally held by the Communists since the completion of the prisoner of war exchange;

(2) Utilize available means to procure current information to support the accomplishment of the objectives stated in Section I;

(3) Assist in determining Communist reaction to the program;

(4) Make available to participating agencies all other information pertinent to the program.

e. *The U.S. Information Agency will:*

(1) Provide world-wide distribution of information appropriate to the support of the program of exploiting Communist mistreatment of UN prisoners of war;
(2) Assist in determining foreign reaction to the program.

f. *The Foreign Operations Administration will:*

(1) Participate in this program in such fashion as from time to time appears feasible.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 167th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 22, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 167th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; Judge Barnes for the Attorney General (Item 4); the Acting Secretary of Commerce (Item 4); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (Item 1); the Director, U.S. Information Agency (Items 1, 2 and 3); William A. Porter, Office of Defense Mobilization (Item 1); Ralph L. Clark, Central Intelligence Agency (Items 1 and 6); Gen. Porter, Foreign Operations Administration (Items 6, 7, 8 and 9); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

*3. Mission of the United States Information Agency* (NSC 165) [2]

After Mr. Cutler had explained the statement of policy in the report, Secretary Dulles suggested the desirability of revising paragraph 1. He pointed out that in its present form the paragraph could be interpreted as providing a blank check for U.S. support of all the aspirations of all peoples everywhere for freedom and independence. While we indeed wanted to support the legitimate aspirations of peoples to this end, the statement was too broad, and should be confined, therefore, to American endorsement of the legitimate aspirations of these peoples.

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[1] Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Oct. 23.
[2] Not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 165 Series.)

Mr. Streibert agreed to accept the introduction of the word "legitimate", though he felt that to do so watered down the force of the statement.

Secretary Dulles repeated his view, and illustrated it by reference to the dangers which would arise if the populations of Morocco and Cambodia were to assume that the United States was giving blanket endorsement to all their aspirations.

The President commented that the word "legitimate" was widely used and was certainly somewhat vague in meaning, and required an exercise of judgment when it was used. Nevertheless, we clearly were not in a position to endorse everything everywhere.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that two whole afternoons had been devoted to formulating this statement, and that its purpose was to make clear to the peoples in the so-called uncommitted areas of the world that the United States was not engaged in dictating to them but rather in trying to help them.

The President agreed that we should certainly try to persuade these peoples that our policies would help advance their welfare, but we could not do this without qualification.

Expressing agreement with the President, Secretary Wilson said that the idealism in this statement, as presently written, was too far up in the clouds for practical operations.

The Director of Central Intelligence said that the last sentence of this paragraph gave him the most concern, since it seemed to suggest that foreign governments were expected to strive to achieve U.S. objectives. Mr. Streibert suggested a change to common objectives, but after further discussion the Council agreed to strike the entire sentence.

After further discussion and amendment of the paper, the President declared it acceptable.

*The National Security Council:*[3]

Adopted the statement of policy contained in the reference report, subject to the following revisions:

> a. Revise paragraph 1 to read: "The purpose of the U.S. Information Agency shall be to submit evidence to peoples of

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[3] The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 936. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action, 1953")

other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace."

b. Revise paragraph 2 as follows:

(1) In the 2nd line, add "primarily" after "carried out".
(2) In subparagraph b, insert "legitimate" before "aspirations".
(3) In subparagraph d, delete "favorable".

c. In paragraph 3, 4th line, change "its audiences" to "other peoples".

*Note:* NSC 165 as amended subsequently approved by the President, circulated as NSC 165/1,[4] and referred to the Director, United States Information Agency, for implementation.

. . . . . . .

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[4] *Infra.*

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S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 165 Series

*Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 24, 1953.

NSC 165/1

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

References:

A. NSC 165 [2]
B. NSC Action No. 936 [3]

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Director, U.S. Information Agency, at the 167th Council meeting on October 22, 1953, adopted the statement of policy contained in the reference report, subject to the changes in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 thereof set forth in NSC Action No. 936. The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 165, as amended and adopted and enclosed herewith, with the understanding that the first two paragraphs thereof should be considered as unclassified information.

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[1] Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget, Central Intelligence, and the United States Information Agency.

[2] Dated Oct. 9, not printed. (S/S files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 165 Series)

[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

Accordingly, the enclosure is being referred to the Director, United States Information Agency for implementation.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

*Statement of Policy by the National Security Council*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

### MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

In carrying out its responsibilities in accordance with pertinent statutes and Presidential directives, the U.S. Information Agency shall be guided by the following:

1. The purpose of the U.S. Information Agency shall be to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace.

2. The purpose in paragraph 1 above is to be carried out primarily:

a. By explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government.
b. By depicting imaginatively the correlation between U.S. policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world.
c. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States.
d. By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.

3. Where considered advisable, and except in the case of operations of the Voice of America, the U.S. Information Agency is authorized to communicate with other peoples without attribution to the United States Government on matters for which attribution could be assumed by the Government if necessary. To assure coordination of communications unattributed to the United States Government, the Operations Coordinating Board will agree upon the principles that will govern such communications. Until such principles are mutually agreed upon, those contained in Foreign Service Information and Educational Exchange Circular No. 4, November 1, 1951 shall govern.

4. This statement supplements and in no way modifies the relationships or responsibilities of the U.S. Information Agency as set forth in the President's Message to Congress of June 1, 1953, by President's letter to heads of agencies of June 1, 1953 and related Executive Orders.

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USIA files, lot 60 D 322, "1953"

## *The Director of the United States Information Agency (Streibert) to the President* [1]

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On August 1 of this year, by authority of your Reorganization Plan No. 8 approved by the Congress, the U.S. Information Agency came into being as a separate independent agency reporting to you through the National Security Council.

The operations of the Agency—embracing among others the Voice of America, the U.S. libraries overseas, the motion picture service, and the press and publications service—were all formerly activities of the Department of State. We receive daily foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

Since August 1, we have been engaged in organizing the Agency under the new set-up and reprogramming our activities within the limitations of the present appropriation. The new statement of mission for the Agency, adopted at last week's meeting of the National Security Council, is a great stride forward. It is of supreme importance to us—and indeed to the American people—because it clearly defines the broad lines within which, I am convinced, our overseas information service can do an effective job.

It reflects the recommendations of the Senate's Special Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs chaired by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, which proposed on June 15, 1953 certain changes to strengthen the foreign information program.

It also embodies the concept of the President's Committee on International Information Activities (William H. Jackson Committee). [2] This concept is that psychological activities and psychological strategy do not exist apart from official policies and actions.

Under this new mission, avoiding a propagandistic tone, the Agency will emphasize the community of interest that exists among freedom-loving peoples and show how American objectives and policies advance the legitimate interests of such peoples.

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[1] Drafted by Abbott Washburn.

[2] See Appendix I, Jan. 24, to the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, p. 1867.

We shall therefore concentrate on objective, factual news reporting and appropriate commentaries, designed to present a full exposition of important United States actions and policies, especially as they affect individual countries and areas.

In presenting facts we shall see to it that they are not distorted and that their selection does not misrepresent a given situation.

We shall make sure that the tone and content of our material is forceful and direct, but we shall avoid a strident or antagonistic note.

This does not, of course, preclude us from making forceful, factual refutations of false accusations such as those that come from the Soviet communist portion of the world.

The new approach will be harder hitting than previous more diffuse approaches because it is based on the idea of getting across a message that will be convincing. Facts, and comment associated with facts, are more compelling than accusations and unsupported assertions on a wide variety of issues.

From here on the Agency will pinpoint its activities on fewer but more vital programs.

As pointed out by the Jackson Committee, the American people share fundamental beliefs and values with millions of other men and women we are attempting to win to our side, which should be made clear to other peoples. These include belief in a Deity, in individual and national freedom, in the right to ownership of property and a decent standard of living, in the common humanity of all men, and in the vision of a peaceful world with nations compromising their differences and cooperating in the United Nations.

We must make every effort to show the mutuality of our interests and goals with the legitimate goals of other peoples. We must explain those goals in ways that will cause other peoples to join with us in achieving them.

I am also pleased that under these more clearly defined objectives there will be greater opportunity for us to use the resources of patriotic private American business and non-Governmental groups in support of the information program. Private groups have given splendid support in the past, and we plan an intensive drive to further increase this support and thus multiply the effectiveness of the program.

The content of the new directive has been transmitted to all our posts in 77 countries throughout the world, so that they may have the immediate benefit of this guidance.

With deep appreciation,

Sincerely,

THEODORE C. STREIBERT

511.00/10-2653: Circular telegram

## *The Director of the United States Information Agency (Streibert) to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 26, 1953—6 p.m.

Usito 112. Infoguide: U.S. Indictment in U.N. General Assembly of Communist Treatment of POW's.

1. (FYI Begins: On October 26 U.S. Delegation to U.N. General Assembly will present an indictment of Communist actions and methods in war in Korea. Principal address will be made by Dr. Charles W. Mayo of Rochester, Minn., Alternate U.S. Representative to 8th Session UNGA. [2] This refutation of Communist lie about biological warfare, documented by sworn statements, will be one of points of departure for penetrating to the heart of Communist philosophy, exposing it with evidence of the inhuman and criminal practices by which its purposes are supported. Information output of this kind in the past has not been utilized in some USIS areas for reasons related to receptivity. In this instance, character of this presentation in UNGA and audience to which it will be addressed suggests that more than ordinary efforts be made to see that materials received from Washington receive dissemination in all appropriate ways. Effective exploitation particularly important in countries which are represented by military forces in the U.N. Command. List of 16 nations in the U.N.C., besides U.S., included in this telegram. GA presentation will be part of a domestic and overseas campaign respecting Communist actions in Korea in which other U.S. government agencies, besides USIA, will participate; and on which further guidance will be provided. This will be an effort to place upon the record in U.S. and abroad a volume of first hand testimony to Communist inhuman practices, and distortions of contemporary and historical truth. Anticipated that there

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[1] Drafted by Block of USIA; approved by Andrew H. Berding of USIA; sent to 13 posts, pouched to 40 others. A note to the telegraph branch by Streibert, Oct. 27, requested that the circular telegram be repeated to the Department of Defense. (511.00/10-2753)

[2] Dr. Charles W. Mayo was a noted surgeon and governor of the Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota. He was an alternate delegate to the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly and delivered his address of Oct. 26, entitled "The Role of Forced Confessions in the Communist 'Germ Warfare' Propaganda Campaign", to the Political and Security Committee (Committee I) of the General Assembly as "U.S. Representative to the General Assembly". The text of Dr. Mayo's address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 9, 1953, pp. 640–647; followed on p. 648 by an article by Ambassador Lodge concerning allegations of biological warfare entitled "Statement by U.S. Officers Transmitted to United Nations".

will be a spill-over from newsreel, documentary and magazine presentations in United States. A supplementary Infoguide will provide full information on all materials, which may be applicable to the continuing effort, extending into and possibly beyond next 90 days. UNGA presentation will place upon the record of General Assembly ten sworn statements of U.S. military personnel who were POW's of the Communists and subjected to typical Communist brutalities in effort to obtain statements conforming to Communist political and propaganda purposes. The News File and VOA will provide coverage on Mayo speech and accompanying exhibits. Full documentation will be pouched to posts receiving this Infoguide. Newsreel coverage will also be provided where feasible. End FYI.)

2. Material provided by Media should be used demonstrate:

a. Nature of Communism, its real objective, theories and practices as exemplified by testimony returned U.S. POW's. It should be made clear that Communist practice of obtaining "confessions" is principal propaganda instrument supporting Communist policy objectives; and is used indiscriminately against any who oppose Communism, either outside of or within Communist periphery.

b. Communist bacteriological warfare campaign not merely an incidental propaganda "gimmick" but considered and carefully constructed lie engineered by total Communist system. (See Mayo speech for documentation part played by Moscow.)

c. B.W. lie largely discounted world over, particularly by Communist refusal to permit impartial investigation by U.S., but the new evidence of its falsity provides a new, clear view of Communist edifice.

d. Complete disregard of all established conventions about treatment of POW's, with documented evidence of physical and mental torture to obtain "confessions".

e. Mechanics of forced confession and political indoctrination in the attempt to use POW's as transmission belts of Communist propaganda; violation of Geneva convention concerning the person of the POW.

f. Role played by Communist stooges and fellow travelers in furthering the Moscow-Peiping lie; i.e. the phony "International Scientific Commission" set up by Communists to "investigate" B.W.

g. Relation between these forced "confessions" and similar forced "confessions" under Communist direction in satellite countries and USSR; always to serve political and propaganda purposes of Communist regime.

h. Roles played by Winnington and Burchett, correspondents for English and French Communist papers, in preparing "confessions" statements and suborning signatures. (See Evans, Mahurin statements.)

3. *Treatment*

a. Presentation of documentation should be factual. However, appropriate selected and original comment should be used to emphasize facts significant to themes.

b. Primary objective is to expose Communist machinery, and complete absence of moral standards; facts are only evidence supporting this thesis.

c. In areas where target audiences are not receptive to refutation of B.W. lie, or where no longer news, or has been long discounted, emphasis should be on other aspects of the recorded documentation, such as refusal of U.S. POW officers and men among the ten statements (Lts. Stanley, Strieby, Simonsen) to yield to Communist threats, even in face of death.

d. In all areas tone and method of treatment and use media materials should be carefully discussed in light of area foreign policy considerations with Chief diplomatic mission.

e. PAO's invited send comments on receptivity of the materials their areas, and suggestions for effective use for cross reporting purposes.

4. Governments providing troops for United Nations Command:

Australia
Belgium
Great Britain
Canada
Colombia
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Republic of Korea
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
New Zealand
The Philippines
Thailand
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United States

STREIBERT

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511.00/12–853: Circular telegram

### *The Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 8, 1953—6:42 p.m.

Usito 164. InfoGuide: President's UN Speech. [2] This is Joint State-Defense-USIA message.

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[1] Drafted by Berding, Phillips, and Colonel Hirsch of OCB; cleared by Allen Haden of USIA, Sanger, Montgomery, Robert Murphy, Raine, Meyers, Stegmeier, Godel, and Gordon Arneson of S/AE; and sent to 69 posts.

[2] Reference is to President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address before the UN General Assembly on Dec. 8. The speech is printed in *Public Papers of the Presi-*

*Continued*

1. Essential that all recipients make maximum effort to insure that President's historic offer of sharing the benefits of peaceful use of atomic energy with the entire world achieves the sharpest and most lasting impact.

2. While premature to speculate on nature of any detailed plan, essential for all media to carry and cross-report the wide variety of comment, both in US and abroad, which will be generated as result this offer. In so doing media should strive to serve as international forum, of balanced comment, aiming at widest possible coverage.

3. Speech makes clear humanity now shares present danger but has also capability changing situation to one of hope. Do not minimize grim picture delineated first part of speech. Important that sense of urgency aroused by the President be accurately reflected, yet be offset by offer to take tangible first step towards international use of AE for peaceful purposes which will strike massive blow against root causes of war and international tension.

4. Stress that atom-sharing concept is product of maturing plans, reflects continuity of dynamic policy stemming from April 16 speech, [3] and is aimed at breaking international log jam on disarmament proposals.

5. While the bid to the Soviet Union to join in "private conversations" must be underscored, the speech under no circumstances should be interpreted as "psychological warfare". Nor do we commit Soviet Union to an early reply, keeping in mind the delicacy and difficulty of any ensuing negotiations. To avert the pitfall that the issue of global war or peace depends on the immediate fate of the proposal, we continue to present it as a step forward in steady long range effort in UN and elsewhere as appropriate, to establish a basis for eventual disarmament, including prohibition of atomic weapons, when settlement of other issues and consequent relaxation of world tension permits. The proposal demonstrates the sincerity of our purpose but we avoid committing ourselves or others to achieve an early agreement at the expense of a fully dependable disarmament plan.

6. In line with foregoing our objectives are:

a. To impress upon world opinion, seriousness with which the US seeks world security through reduction of the arms burden.

b. To follow up 16 April impact by making another breach in the Soviet's near monopoly of "peace" propaganda. Hitherto Soviets have benefitted by simple, though spurious, approach while West has been handicapped in explaining rather complex proposals. Speech fills this latter gap, and by stress on Atomic Energy Au-

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*dents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pp. 813–822. For documentation on this speech, see pp. 845 ff.

[3] See the unnumbered circular airgram, Apr. 22, p. 1669.

thority and A-Bank proposal will help combat previous Soviet atomic propaganda.

c. To give to the peoples of Russia dramatic evidence of US peaceful intentions, while making clear at same time US resolve to resist aggression by all means at its disposal.

d. To seek to persuade the enslaved peoples of satellite Europe that their best interests will be served through international cooperation and understanding, which can be enhanced by international acceptance of the President's proposals.

e. To convince our NATO partners, and other friends that we are ready to take positive, vigorous steps to achieve world peace and security by the sharing of peaceful benefits of atomic energy and by eventual disarmament.

f. To convince neutrals less directly involved in the cold war that we aim to achieve a peaceful world in which the threat of global atomic war is removed and that our offer provides a new approach to the economic development which many of them so desperately seek.

7. Of equal importance with foregoing is exercise of appropriate safeguards to avoid in our output:

a. Any stimulation of false optimism regarding immediately realizable substantive disarmament.

b. Any impression that the proposals are "cold war" maneuvers and are purely propagandistics.

c. Any impression that we are offering a final proposal whose rejection would increase the danger of global [war].

d. Any indication that we have abandoned UN atomic energy control plans. Commentary might refer (1) to the US position supporting the UN plan or any other equally effective plan, (2) to Secretary Dulles' September 17 statement at UNGA that our joint proposals are not immutable, but any proposal must meet essential tests of adequate safeguards.

WASHBURN

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511.00/12-2153: Circular telegram

## *The Director of the United States Information Agency (Streibert) to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 21, 1953—7:14 p.m.

Usito 180. InfoGuide: Soviet Response to President's UNGA Speech. This is joint State-Defense-USIA message. The US is pleased that the Soviet Union has indicated willingness to participate in the private conversations called for by the President in his December eighth UNGA speech. [2]

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[1] Drafted by Edward V. Roberts of USIA and Meyers; cleared by Godel, Arneson, Huyler, and Colonel Hirsch; approved by Allen Haden; and sent to 34 posts, pouched to 34 others.

With regard to USSR counterproposal for simultaneous discussion of ban on atomic weapons, it should be emphasized that the President's proposals were not intended to solve all the complex problems in the vast disarmament field. Quite to the contrary, the President made plain at the conclusion of his speech, that his plan was intended to encourage development of most effective peaceful uses of fissionable material; begin to diminish potential destructive power of world's atomic stockpiles; show all peoples that great powers were interested primarily in human aspirations rather than building up armaments; and finally open new channel for peaceful discussion and new approach toward peaceful settlements.

Because it obviously not in US interest to give currency to propaganda points which comprise the bulk of Soviet statement, we do not stress, comment on, or rebut points concerning Big Five Meeting, Red Chinese UN membership, and elements of Soviet propaganda position on disarmament, etc.

Pending further guidance and official statements, we should use Soviet statement mainly as peg for reviewing President's proposal, stressing potential benefits to mankind thereof, and reaffirming American determination to make utmost effort to carry proposal forward.

STREIBERT

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[2] See Usito 164, Dec. 8, *supra*.

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103 USIA/3-154

## *The Director of the United States Information Agency (Streibert) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 1, 1954.

DEAR BEDELL: Although it is with considerable trepidation that I enclose some 18 pages of reading material, it sets forth our concept of the Strategic Principles we are employing—our working hypotheses—and will intrigue you, I hope, into looking into it.

We have developed these over-all ideas to assure a unified effort both in Washington and in the field, in view of our primary emphasis on specific country objectives, which originate in the field and represent the principal purposes of our operations in each country.

We conclude with a statement about our Global Theme (p. 16): *Unite the free world in order to reduce the communist threat with-*

*out war.* This will be receiving special emphasis during the months to come.[1]

Sincerely,

THEODORE C. STREIBERT

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[Enclosure]

## *Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

### U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

### STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

#### *1. Function of USIA*

USIA is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. It is employed in combination with the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments at the command of the U.S. Government, supporting their action and supported by their action. Its function is to affect the actions of governments of other countries by using communication techniques to influence effective public opinion within those countries, in order to further the aims of U.S. foreign policy.

#### *2. Basic Authority*

The foreign information program derives its basic legislative authority from Public Law 402, which states:

> "The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this Act are to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries."

A directive issued by the President and the National Security Council, "Mission of the United States Information Agency",[2] states that the Agency shall be guided by the following definition of purpose:

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[1] Under Secretary Smith replied on Mar. 12, thanking Streibert, assuring him that the paper had been "read with attention in the Department" and stressing its usefulness as a statement of principles governing overseas information activities. Smith added: "I was particularly interested in your development of the idea of economizing our information resources 'to secure maximum advantage from the segment of information we control'. This seems an intelligent estimate of the limitations of USIA activities. Within this framework, I know you are doing everything possible to provide the tactical information support to major foreign policy developments, regardless of their immediate bearing on East-West problems, which is so important to their implementation." (103 USIA/3–154)

[2] NSC 165/1, Oct. 24, p. 1752.

"The purpose of the U.S. Information Agency shall be to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace."

### *3. Public Role*

The authoritative public statements cited define and govern the general purposes of the USIA, and prescribe its techniques and broad content. They also provide, along with similar official statements, a public "masthead". The activities of the Agency must be consistent with these avowed purposes.

### *4. USIA as an Instrument of Political Warfare*

The hostile intentions of the leaders of the Soviet Union impose upon the operations of the U.S. Information Agency a special character and special responsibilities. Although our publicly assigned mission does not explicitly point to our role as a weapon of political warfare, the current conflict of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which each seeks its aims by methods other than the use of armed force, constitutes political warfare. The activities of USIA, as an instrument of national policy, must be viewed in the light of this fact.

### *5. Presentation of the U.S. and Its Policies*

Our National Security Council directive stipulates that we carry out our general mission, in part, "By explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government", and "By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States".

In presenting U.S. policy, we must look to officially constituted sources and authorized channels to provide that policy. Although we have a continuing duty to contribute to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, in terms of information considerations, we cannot anticipate policy developments or promulgate U.S. policy and objectives on our own responsibility. Neither can we present to foreign audiences, in order to attract support, versions of U.S. policy so colored by regional adaptation or diversities in emphasis that the integrity of our policies and their global consistency is called into question.

The important aspects of American life we present are selected for a specific prescribed purpose. We are not required to present all facets of American life, nor is it our aim to create and foster an orthodox official version of America, a fixed detailed stereotype, although effective propaganda will require that we deliberately foster certain general assumptions about the U.S., and preserve an overall consistency.

Appropriate subjects of information programs are those aspects of the U.S. which show its people sharing fundamental beliefs and basic values with the millions of men and women the U.S. is attempting to win to its side. Examples include belief in a deity, in individual and national freedom, in ownership of property and in human rights, in a peaceful world and the common humanity of men and nations compromising their differences and cooperating in the United Nations. The military strength of the U.S., its economic system, its standard of living, its technical development and productive capacity make fruitful and effective subjects of propaganda if presented without self-praise in ways which show U.S. capacity to resist aggression and to give powerful assistance in the creation of a peaceful world order.

The test is whether the information or interpretation regarding America which we supply will serve as evidence to other peoples that "the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace"—that we have common goals.

### *6. USIA as a Government Organ*

The role assigned to the USIA creates major sources of effectiveness and imposes specific limitations.

USIA is an official and responsible spokesman for the Government of the United States. What we say and do gains thereby a certain automatic significance because it is received as an authoritative and responsible reflection of official U.S. policy and views. We implicitly assert that we present only truthful material, and seek to create understanding on the basis of fact, not through distortion, deception, or suppression. But our official nature means we cannot purport to be an independent purveyor of completely objective information. Inevitably we will be viewed in some measure as special pleaders.

### *7. The Factual Approach*

USIA is required to rely primarily on presentation of evidence, adherence to fact, and creation of understanding. The USIA is thus barred from the purely manipulative approach of totalitarian propaganda. It is deprived of the devices of convenient falsification, concealed omission, manufactured evidence, and spurious consistency which have been powerful weapons of expediency in totalitarian propaganda. It must instead depend upon convincing the minds and emotions of those it reaches that the facts it presents are accurate and the interpretations it proffers are consonant with those facts. USIA, as an instrument of the Government, is committed to the proposition that it must be content with the facts, and the facts will in the long run be the most effective arguments for our national interest.

### *8. The Problem of Unfavorable Facts: Credibility vs. Policy*

Our commitment to the facts also commits us to reflecting some inevitable unfavorable facts: aspects of our national life which some in our audience find objectionable; apparent inconsistencies in aspects of our foreign policies; and policies which may seem inimical to the particular interests or views of certain nations or groups. The occasional apparent conflict between preservation of our reputation for accuracy and objectivity on the one hand, and the need to avoid national self-embarrassment or to support certain national decisions on the other, is a working condition that will and *should* continue. USIA would destroy its effectiveness if it either purported to provide all the facts, or visibly attempted to deceive world opinion about them. The conflict cannot be resolved finally and completely by any general principles or rigid criteria.

Two essential factors, however, must be taken into account. First: USIA is under no compulsion to provide all the facts, to disseminate all the news, or to report events merely because they command public attention. Second: USIA can take no action which would compromise its publicly-assigned role as a supplier to foreign public opinion of reliable evidence on U.S. foreign policy.

As particular problems arise, they must be settled on the basis of the particular situation and our assigned mission; neither "protection of our credibility" nor a particular policy aim is an absolute. A decision must be made with the full spectrum of our national interests in view, by those in the Agency who are responsible for ensuring that information activities are consonant with national policies.

### *9. Tone: Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda*

We further seek to avoid the ready application of the propaganda label by the tone and character of our output. This means that we avoid exaggeration, implausibility, and broad generalizations not convincingly supported, as well as strident polemic, blatant self-justification and shrill invective. We must preserve constantly in our output a general tenor of reasonableness, objectivity, and moderation. Thus we also underline the difference between USIA and what it stands for, and the propaganda of Soviet-Communism and other hostile forces. Our audiences' awareness of this differentiation is a long-run psychological gain that we cannot sacrifice for the short-run satisfaction of answering like with like. We must guard against the temptation constantly to answer blow-by-blow, hostile propaganda. To do so would permit the USSR to control the content and emphasis of our program. So far as possible, in fact, we must avoid activity that is visibly and obviously counter-propaganda—a conspicuous reaction to hostile propaganda stimulus. We do not seek to score propaganda "victories" for their own sake.

This does not, of course, bar us from vigorous refutation of falsehoods or distortions of U.S. policies and objectives. These must be countered—in our own terms, on grounds of our own choosing, and in keeping with our general mission. And where a hostile element presents a psychological vulnerability or target, we can and should take every advantage of it if it advances our policies.

Further reinforcing these considerations, we must maintain the tone and posture that befits an official agency of the U.S. Government.

These restrictions are not intended to make USIA a simple colorless transmitter of official announcements. Dullness will not prove we have not been grinding an ax. We are no less engaged in propaganda because we are to minimize the propagandistic. Within the limits given, we must exercise our best imaginative resources and ingenuity, in order to give our message and activities emotional as well as reasonable appeal, and deepen and extend our impact by increased subtlety, control, and insight.

### *10. Relations to U.S. Public Opinion*

Our concern is with foreign audiences only. It may be part of our legitimate activity, however, to reflect or report domestic U.S. public opinion on international issues of importance to U.S. foreign policy, or on domestic issues of particular interest to foreign audiences, where reflecting or reporting such opinion advances the national interest and is required by our information policy. However, official national policy is the source of our direction, not individual judgments of U.S. public opinion or current domestic U.S. attitudes.

### *11. The Limited Segment of Influence: Its Strategic Use*

U.S. official foreign information programs constitute a very small segment of the total impact of the U.S. on foreign peoples and governments. The impact of the U.S. on other peoples is made by a vast number of sources largely beyond our control. This fact shapes our mission, and is part of the difference between the conduct of our political warfare and information activities, and the almost total propaganda and political warfare instruments at the disposal of Soviet power.

To secure maximum advantage from the small segment of influence we control, we must keep that fact constantly in mind, and direct our efforts with the utmost deliberateness, economy and precision. We must:

(a) Secure the fullest possible coordination with other elements of U.S. power in the field of foreign affairs. The direction taken by USIA must coincide with the general tendency and tenor of all U.S. official actions designed to influence public opinion abroad. Unless our program rests firmly on a basis of national action, and derives from and is consistent with national policy guiding other arms of U.S. power, it becomes visibly "propaganda" by its very isolation, and ineffective through lack of supporting action.

(b) Ensure that our resources are so deployed that areas and countries whose attitudes and actions are of greatest importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives receive greatest emphasis in our activities. Ensure also that our resources in any country are not diffused but are concentrated on those audiences which can best produce the actions desired. Our long-range interest must be considered as well as our short-term concern. At the same time, we must maintain certain minimum operations in order to demonstrate U.S. interest, or preserve audiences, facilities, or investments of past effort.

(c) In allocating our resources, balance the political significance of an area or country or audience-grouping against our capacity to influence it. Political significance of an area does not justify effort to reach audiences that cannot be made significantly responsive. Similarly, the ready accessibility and responsiveness of an audience does not in itself establish that audience as a primary target for us. On particular occasions or issues we may wish to make what would normally be uneconomical use of our resources to reach a difficult special audience. Or an available audience may for some operations or issues present a target of opportunity which it would be wasteful to ignore. Such efforts must be the exceptions, however, each carefully weighed and judged on its merits in terms of policy goals.

(d) Ensure that non-official, private channels for carrying the impact of the U.S. abroad are given fullest opportunity to cooperate in making that impact serve our purposes. This cooperation must be conducted under safeguards that will protect us from charges that private U.S. activities abroad are controlled or sponsored by the Government and serve official propaganda purposes. The use of private channels and the ends to which they cooperate must be guided as fully as any of our activities by considerations of national policy.

(e) Employ to the fullest all intelligence and research resources related to our activities, increase their availability to us, and seek the largest measure of support and cooperation from them.

(f) Coordinate our activities with those of other free-world nations and international organizations so far as this is politically desirable and practically expedient. This will promote both more economical and effective use of our own resources, and more consistent, integrated, and maneuverable use of the resources of free-world propaganda.

In addition, we are authorized to use certain materials and carry on certain operations without attribution to the United States Government. Such unacknowledged communication with foreign peoples must scrupulously observe the limits and criteria established in the relevant official classified instructions and statements of policy.

### *12. The Adversary*

Our political warfare opponent is not exclusively definable as either

(a) The Soviet Union, or
(b) World Communism.

The conflict is not simply an opposition of two world powers, or a conflict of ideologies. The leaders of the totalitarian system in Russia—the leaders of the Communist party of the Soviet Union—effectively control two instruments. One is the world Communist movement, comprising the Communist Parties of other countries; the international and national Communist front organizations governed and often created by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In a sense it also includes fellow-traveling individuals or groups who, from a variety of motives, serve as vehicles, supporters, or even camouflagers of Soviet-Communist operations.

The other instrument through which Soviet-Communism operates is the administrative machine and the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

### *13. Soviet-Communist Political Warfare*

If the USSR were controlled by an aggressive group seeking world domination, *without* Communism, it would be a menace still, but different in kind and degree, and our defense against it would correspondingly differ. If the world Communist movement were not the tool of an immense world power controlled by a group bent on world domination, it would remain a menace to the free world, but a menace to be met in different ways. What gives special character to the political warfare waged by the leaders of Soviet Communism is that it is conducted with the joint leverages of power politics and a comprehensive supranational ideology, in itself antagonistic to the free world.

The political warfare tactics of the Soviet Union's leaders are:

(a) To ensure their own freedom of action by controlling the political outlook of the peoples of the Soviet orbit and the information that reaches them.

(b) To keep the outside world as far as possible ignorant of the real conditions in a Communist state.

(c) To influence the peoples of the free world over the heads of their governments, by all the resources of propaganda at its broadest definition, and to build up the largest possible network of channels for bringing this influence to bear.

(d) To maintain very large armed forces, thus permitting a permanent threat of the use of force, and helping to produce a compliant and intimidated public opinion, as well as lower living standards through increased armaments necessitated in countries threatened.

(e) To foment opposition to the consolidation of Western Europe, to further the belief that the economy of the European NATO area is threatened by the requirements of NATO, and to intensify economic stresses in the area in order to disrupt the West's defense effort.

(f) To exploit Asian and African nationalism, in order to gain allies and make economic, political and military difficulties for the Western powers.

(g) To build up suspicion of and hostility to United States foreign and domestic policies, in order to isolate the United States and disrupt any world-wide organized resistance to Soviet-Communist policies.

(h) To intensify or create both divergencies among the non-Communist nations, and disunity and stresses within them.

### *14. The Role of Communism*

The Kremlin's political warfare seeks to use Communist parties and front organizations to make non-Communist opinion subservient to or acquiescent in the ends of Soviet policy. Its propagation of Communist doctrine is designed to serve these ends. The Soviet Union can vary its ostensible policies toward other countries as expedience dictates, and thus mask the threat it presents to them, while continuing to pursue its purposes through the apparatus of Communism. To do this, it must conceal the fact that Communism is in actuality the servant of the Soviet Union's leaders and of their ambition of world dominance.

### *15. The Strategic Audience*

The public opinion we seek to influence, in order to produce changes in the international conduct of the Soviet Union's rulers, is not simply, or in present circumstances preponderantly, public opinion within the Soviet Union or the Soviet Orbit. These audiences are, of course, special and important elements in our strategy, and a primary concern of our radio operations. For the present, however, a very important determinant of the success with which Soviet Communism can advance its policies is public opinion in the non-Soviet world, and particularly, public opinion among those who are not fully committed to opposition to Soviet Communism. This target includes those who do not recognize the danger presented to their interests by the imperialist expansive threat of Soviet Communism; who do not recognize that Communism is an instrument wielded by the rulers of the Soviet Union to secure assent to or support for their aims; who consider that they can advance their interests by avoiding commitment to either side, and thus perhaps secure advantages from both sides, or avoid the limitations and obligations that commitment would incur. The uncommitted also include those who do not consider that either side is identified with their interests, or are attracted by a belief that "neutrality" affords a position allowing them to brake the conflict between Soviet Communism and the Western Powers.

So long as the conflict between the free world and the leaders of Soviet Communism remains in the present phase of political warfare, we are in competition with Soviet Communism primarily for the opinion of the free world. We are (especially) concerned with the uncommitted, the wavering, the confused, the apathetic, or the doubtful within the free world. Insofar as Soviet Communism seeks its objectives by means short of direct use of armed force it must gain the effective acquiescence of non-Communist opinion to the actions it takes or induces other governments to take in fields outside its own boundaries. It is in this arena that we can prevent further Communist advances, and thus induce its retreat. Communism cannot survive as a static system; deprived of the "victories" that nourish the myth of inevitable success, it must retreat. As that phase emerges, the strategic pattern of our political warfare can be expected to alter.

### *16. Propaganda Toward the Soviet Union*

Our propaganda toward the Soviet Union is primarily straight, factual, unemotional news reporting, especially presenting a full exposition of U.S. actions and policies as they affect the USSR. This is supplemented by calm and reasoned commentary analyzing and interpreting important world developments and important U.S. policies and actions, and non-polemical materials correcting distortions and misconceptions about the U.S. The tone of our propaganda to the USSR is designed to be forthright, non-propagandist, and consonant with acceptance by the U.S. Government of official responsibility for this output.

We seek to demonstrate the peaceful and constructive nature of the policies of this Government, which are not opposed to the true and legitimate interests of the peoples of the USSR. We point out that the U.S. has no quarrel with the Russian peoples, but with the small hardened group of Kremlin leaders. We seek to show that the aggressive and reckless nature of Soviet policies, besides threatening the security of the U.S., also in fact threatens the best interests of the Russian peoples.

We preserve a distinction between the people of the USSR and the regime, and we avoid using material likely to offend any significant section of our USSR audience on national or patriotic grounds. We show awareness of the historical and cultural backgrounds of the various national groups within the Soviet Union.

### *17. Propaganda Toward the Satellites and the Baltic States*

Toward these areas, where the Communist system has prevailed for a relatively short time, where many retain a strong Western orientation, and memories of life free of Communism are still strong, we pursue a different course. Our propaganda here seeks:

(a) To maintain hope and prevent demoralization under the weight of Soviet oppression, by evidencing continued free world concern for the peoples of these areas, emphasizing growing Western strength, reiterating our faith in their eventual liberation, and illustrating our conviction that the Soviet-dominated system will not meet the test of history.

(b) To resist the inroads of Sovietization, by keeping before these areas their national and religious traditions, and fostering knowledge of free institutions.

(c) To provide reliable, accurate, and relatively full coverage of developments in the U.S. and the free world, and accurate commentary on Communist activities in the satellites.

### *18. Central Content*

The strategic use of the narrow segment of impact we control, and our limited resources, require that we carefully select the material which we bring to the attention of our audiences, and the devices by which we seek to influence them. The content of our operations—our "message"—must serve our special political warfare needs as well as our generalized long-term mission directly and concurrently. We must concentrate our efforts and present this content with maximum consistency, continuity, and coherence, in order to achieve cumulative effect, avoid diffuseness, fragmentation, and confusion.

To these ends, a sharply limited number of Global Themes will be developed and will provide the central and authoritative statement of our message for all areas and all media. These themes are not intended to serve as slogans, to be proclaimed as our message, or to be presented primarily as overt or explicit statements. They are statements of the views which we desire to see our audiences hold. In influencing them to hold these views we will most frequently be effective largely through indirection, through allowing the inference to appear as the inevitable conclusion to which audiences are impelled by their own interests, circumstances, and special characteristics.

The first of these themes, Global Theme I, follows. As additional themes are authorized, standing themes may be modified or withdrawn, or given different priorities.

## GLOBAL THEME I

### *1. Purpose*

To set a single, dominant propaganda line, globally applicable, of continuing long-range importance, capable of development by all U.S. information resources, in order to give greater consistency, continuity, and cumulative effect to U.S. information efforts.

### *2. Theme*

*Unite the free world in order to reduce the Communist threat without war.*

(In his State of the Union address, January 7, 1954, [3] President Eisenhower said: "In the unity of the free world lies our best chance to reduce the Communist threat without war.")

### *3. Objectives*

a. To consolidate, extend, and strengthen the free world alliance.

b. To create in the minds of our audience acceptance of the concept that the free peoples and nations are united by basic common interests; to convince them that these interests and those of the U.S. correspond; and to secure the greatest possible identification of the interests of important individuals, groups, and peoples with the free world-community.

c. To counter Soviet-Communist efforts to destroy free world unity by fostering or creating divergencies, by fomenting internal political, economic, and social disunity among free world peoples, and by disrupting the progress and functioning of free world instruments of cooperation.

### *4. Related Lines*

In promoting and supporting a free world-community, the following concepts contribute to the objective:

a. Soviet-Communism is hostile to the interests, aspirations, values, and security of the free world-community.
b. The free world-community must act together to defend and advance those interests which unite it.
c. The policies and actions of the U.S. are in the legitimate interests of the free world-community.
d. The true interests of the enslaved peoples within the Soviet Orbit are identified with the interests and aspirations of the free world-community.
e. Free world unity is a fruitful association sharing the advances men and nations achieve in freedom.

### *5. Lines of Development and Exploitation*

In our exploitation of this theme, we

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[3] Printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 6–23.

a. Encourage cooperation and collaboration with spheres in harmony with U.S. major interests such as regional defense groupings, regional or international economic organizations, and UN.

b. Secure a solidarity in the free world based on a sense of positive shared goals rather than on fear of the USSR.

c. Present "East" and "West", or Asia and Europe, as interdependent parts of a whole united in basic interests, to avoid the danger of a two-front psychological war.

d. Develop a psychological entity with which significant groups and individuals can more readily identify their interests (e.g., free labor, the professions, etc.).

e. Present the United States not as the leader of an anti-Soviet alliance but as identified with the positive and basic interests of free peoples everywhere (including the voiceless peoples behind the Iron Curtain) by emphasizing U.S. *responsibilities* within the free world-community. This meets the psychological problem of how to present U.S. leadership without irritating sovereign peoples.

f. Counteract the contention that the dominant political fact in the world is the US-USSR confrontation and conflict, by encouraging the idea that the solution of free world problems and the creation of free world strength are vital concerns of free people in their own terms and interest, rather than aspects of U.S. policy, or derivatives of Soviet ambitions which many in our audience may feel are remote from their interests.

g. Foster the concept of "free world opinion", as a psychological weapon, both to strengthen the bonds of common cause in the free world, and to isolate the Soviet-Communist regime morally and psychologically.

h. Prevent the growth of neutralist and third-force sentiment, by *implicitly* including all uncommitted areas and groupings, and by identifying their legitimate interests with the free world entity.

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A/MS files, lot 54 D 291, USIA-Cultural Study: Circular airgram

### *The Director of the United States Information Agency (Streibert) to All USIS Posts* [1]

No.: USIA CA-8 WASHINGTON, July 6, 1954.

Subject: Cultural Program

Because of the fundamental importance and lasting quality of cultural relations I have been firmly convinced that this side of the Agency's work must be strengthened, and strengthened in a practical way which will achieve results. My recent trip to South Asia and the Far East has reemphasized this conviction. We must develop an understanding and appreciation of the culture of our people, as a people. A realization of American cultural achievement and aspirations can influence political attitudes and actions.

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[1] The source text is an unsigned typed copy on which drafting information is not indicated.

In the past the Soviets have fanned the suspicion that the United States is a nation of materialists interested primarily in mass production products, that we have no culture, and for this reason cannot be trusted with political leadership. We must seek to overcome this suspicion.

We are now observing, too, an immense effort by the Soviets in the cultural field. They are spending vast sums of money in a "cultural offensive" to send their ballet and theater on tour, to finance the trips of Soviet artists to many countries (particularly in the Near and Far East where the culture of the West is comparatively little known or is regarded as part of the European colonialism of the past century) and to engage in a variety of other undertakings with a cultural impact.

Our own cultural work must be carried forward in the spirit of paragraph 2 d of the statement of basic mission established by the President on October 22, 1953. [2] This stated that the purpose of the Agency should be carried out, in part, "by delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States".

It is important to note that, in accordance with this mandate, we are interested in portraying the culture of the people of the United States—not the culture of an elite or an intelligentsia.

Too often in the past a cultural program has been thought of as something which is conducted by cultural officers, almost completely separate from anything else we do. The cultural heritage of our people, however, must be and necessarily is reflected in innumerable actions of our Government and of our Agency, and all program activities should be planned in this knowledge.

The job I am asking our Agency to carry out will cut across all of our work and all elements of the Agency. I hope we will be able to get outstanding people to further these programs in our posts abroad. We will also make a determined effort to secure maximum utilization of the cultural resources already available through foundations, universities, museums, and the like. We will establish closer contact with the leader grants exchange of persons program in the Department of State.

To work out the programming of the Agency in this endeavor, we are creating a new function, that of Cultural Affairs Adviser in the Office of Policy and Programs. To this post we have appointed Dr. Jacob Canter, now Public Affairs Officer in Havana. In order to get the benefit of long experience and acquaintance in this field, we have obtained the services, as a consultant, of Dr. Guy Snaveley, who is now retiring as President of the Association of American Colleges and Universities.

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[2] Reference is to NSC 165/1, Oct. 24, 1953, p. 1752.

We cannot spend millions of dollars, as the Soviets are doing, to finance and publicize trips of our most famous artists. But we certainly can create an awareness abroad of the long cultural heritage of the United States, growing out of the European tradition and contributing something more to it, a heritage which is worthy of our role in the world today. The help and ideas of our staff here and abroad are needed toward this end.

We shall require time to develop a set of working instructions in this field, but I should like to make one point clear now. Culture is a broad term which encompasses not only scholarly and artistic fields but all significant manifestations and aspirations of the spirit of America, from athletics to political oratory. The cultural program is not the exclusive concern of the cultural officers, although they have certain essential responsibilities, but it should be an integral part of all our efforts and activities.

STREIBERT

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511.00/7-2354

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State*

PERSONAL NEW YORK, July 23, 1954.

DEAR FOSTER: Herewith my suggestions, submitted in accordance with the President's request at the last Cabinet meeting, for U.S. exhibits abroad:

1. Best of U.S. industrial products.
2. Exhibits showing U.S. excellence in science, notably medical.
3. Quality music, such as Boston Symphony, New York Philharmonic. American opera singers, pianists, violinists, ballet dancers, etc.
4. Paintings, sculptures (this last can be troublesome at home).

*All* must be skillfully keyed to the taste of the country in which shown. There must be no vulgarity—no matter how funny or clever or interesting the program which contains such vulgarity may be. I would even avoid jazz music, acrobats, and the Fred Waring type of thing at first and later work it in only as a part of a fairly highbrow program.

Action along this line is vital and it should be done in a hurry.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.

511.00/7-2354

## *The President to the President of the Senate* [1]

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1954.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith for the consideration of the Congress a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1955 in the amount of $5,000,000 for Funds Appropriated to the President, as follows:

*Funds Appropriated to the President*

For expenses necessary to enable the President to take such measures as he deems appropriate to meet extraordinary or unusual circumstances arising in the international affairs of the Government, $5,000,000 to remain available until expended for use in the President's discretion and without regard to such provisions of law as he may specify: *Provided,* That the President shall transmit to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, not less often than quarterly, a full report of expenditures under this appropriation.

No existing program or appropriation is available to meet the numerous unforeseen and unexpected contingencies, both great and small, which arise constantly in the day-to-day conduct of the international affairs of the Government. The small emergency fund which has been provided for the President in connection with national interest, security or defense is inappropriate for dealing with many situations which, although highly important, do not come within the purview of this fund.

An example is the participation in international trade fairs. Frequently a need arises for coordination by the Federal Government to insure that the exhibits of American business firms do not lose their national identification through association only with local distributors and agents. In 1954 there will be about 75 international trade fairs of particular significance and size. We would not expect to take part in all of these, but during the next twelve months the really important hard core of about 30 do constitute a valuable spring board for promoting a wider understanding of American products and our private enterprise system.

In the cultural and artistic fields as well we need greater resources to assist and encourage private musical, dramatic and other cultural groups to go forth and demonstrate that America too can lay claim to high cultural and artistic accomplishments. The enthusiasm with which this type of cultural offering is received abroad is demonstrated by the fabulous success of *Porgy and Bess*, playing to capacity houses in an extended tour of the free countries of Europe. The contribution which such presentations make toward a better understanding of America can scarcely be exaggerated. I consider it essential that we take immediate and vigorous action to demonstrate the superiority of the products and cultural values of our system of free enterprise.

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[1] A notation on the source text reads: "Estimate No. 82 83rd Congress-2nd Session".

Just as it is impossible to anticipate the precise purposes for which the proposed appropriation would be used, so it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of the exact amount necessary to carry out those purposes. For this reason, the amount herein requested is not limited to a particular period, but would remain available so long as necessary to meet unforeseen and unanticipated needs. The Congress could, of course, at any time rescind any portion of the appropriation which remained unused.

In requesting the Congress to provide broad authority of this nature, I believe that the Congress will want to be kept informed of the precise uses to which these funds will be put. Accordingly, the proposed appropriation language would provide that full reports of expenditures be made quarterly to the respective committees on appropriations of the two Houses.

I trust that the Congress will give most careful consideration to the proposed appropriation.

Respectfully yours,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5430

## *Report to the National Security Council* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET
NSC 5430

[WASHINGTON, August 18, 1954.]

### STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF JUNE 30, 1954

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[1] For information on this report as a whole, see the editorial note, p. 632. Part 7, printed here, was actually dated Aug. 12, 1954, but was circulated with certain other sections of NSC 5430 under one cover on Aug. 18, 1954.

## PART 7—THE USIA PROGRAM

January 1, 1954, Through June 30, 1954
Prepared by the United States Information Agency

[Here follows a short table of contents.]

### I. SUMMARY OF USIA OPERATIONS

With its representatives now attending meetings of the NSC Planning Board and meetings of the Operations Coordinating Board and its working groups, the Agency, during the last six months, has been better enabled to intensify its efforts to adapt its policies and programs to the mission assigned to it under its year-old charter within the NSC area. Organizational and program plans covered in the Agency's NSC 5407 report [2] under the headings of Mission, Information Policy and Programs, and Reorganization and Reprogramming, have been carried out and need not, therefore, be covered here.

The Agency's task varies from area to area in response to area problems. Most area problems, whether in Europe, Asia or elsewhere, call for an application, in one way or another, of the Agency's central theme: "Unite the Free World in order to reduce the communist threat without war." There is, of course, a corollary to this: "Expose Red Colonialism—the Communist conspiracy as a foreign force directed from Moscow or Peiping for expansionist purposes."

One specific world-wide application of these two themes has been the compilation of two Shelves of Basic Books, one on Democracy (33 books with emphasis on its manifestations in the United States), the other on Communism (54 books subjecting that movement to analysis and sober, factual questioning). These two shelves have been shipped to all USIA libraries throughout the world. In addition, preparation of three basic books on Democracy, Communism and the American Economic System is well advanced. These shelves of basic books and these single basic books are evidence of the Agency's determination to engage not in a multiplicity, but in a unity, of theme-approaches. Every wire story, every feature article, photograph, exhibit, film and broadcast sponsored by the Agency is now, with due adaptation to the character of local audiences and local issues, closely related to these theme-approaches.

*Western Europe:* With budgets and staffs reduced from the 1953 level, USIA now concentrates greater effort toward influencing leaders who are judged capable of influencing, in turn, that mass audience which, because of limited funds, the Agency cannot regularly reach directly. One type of leader intensively cultivated by USIA representatives in the area consists of publishers, editors and writers. Another type is the president, chairman or executive secretary of a private organization which has either a sizeable membership or a potentially sizeable audience. Through such people, USIA has sought to combat neutralism, the blandishments of the USSR in the matter of East-West trade, and the indecisiveness of France and Italy in the matter of EDC. It has also sought to expound U.S. foreign policy in general, to promote greater support for NATO, and to publicize President Eisenhower's offer to pool atomic energy products for peaceful uses. On this last theme, the Agency opened in Rome an Atomic Energy Exhibit which is already attracting not only an elite audience but a general one. Now touring other cities in Italy, it will also be shown in other countries in Europe.

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[2] Regarding NSC 5407, "Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1953", see the editorial note, p. 633.

*Soviet Orbit:* To the Soviet Union itself, the Agency has continued, under established NSC directives, to broadcast (1) detailed expositions of U.S. policy and its peaceful objectives and (2) expressions of the sympathy which the American people feel for the average Soviet citizen. Soviet developments exploited during the period under review were (1) the first anniversary of Stalin's death and (2) the crisis in Soviet agriculture.

To the Soviet Satellites of Eastern Europe, broadcasts have continued to encourage (1) popular resistance to Soviet consolidation and (2) faith in eventual liberation from Soviet control. Developments which were specially exploited were (1) the hearings of the Kersten Committee on the Soviet takeover of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, (2) stories about escapees from the Iron Curtain, and (3) accounts of how escapees have been resettled in the Free World.

To Communist China, the themes most often broadcast have been (1) the friendship of the American people for the Chinese people themselves, (2) the undemocratic nature of the Communist Party's draft constitution, (3) the violence of the Party's economic measures, (4) the frequent subservience of the Party's higher command to the Kremlin, and (5) the shipments of Chinese food to Russia, a country traditionally distrusted by the Chinese people.

*Near East, South Asia and Africa:* Following Vice President Nixon's visit to the Far and Near East in late 1953, the Agency cooperated with the OCB in steps to increase the number of U.S. books in this part of the world, where Soviet-produced publications are many and cheap. It has cooperated with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency in preparations for a spectacular U.S. cinerama exhibit, to compete for prestige with an exhibit expected to be set up by Russia at the international fair to be held in Damascus this coming September. In the NEA areas, as in other parts of the world, the Soviets have been using fairs as a means of disseminating propaganda and impressing the audience with the wonders of life in the Soviet Union. The Agency has also carried on educational publicity for the UN-sponsored plan, represented by Ambassador Eric Johnston, [3] for unified Jordan–Israel development of the Jordan Valley. It has obtained wide coverage among Arabs and Israelis for Assistant Secretary of State Byroade's declarations of U.S. impartiality vis-à-vis those two sensitive peoples. It has directed to the Government of Iran, which has re-directed it to the Iranian populace, extensive propaganda in favor of an oil settlement in that country. In Pakistan, it has obtained wide coverage for the U.S. purposes behind military assistance extended there. It has been directly responsible for the reaffiliation, away from Communism, of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress with the ICFTU. And throughout the Near East, South Asia and Africa it has exploited the Supreme Court decision on racial segregation.

*Far East:* Here, as in the Near East, following Vice President Nixon's recommendation that the U.S. compete more actively with the Soviet in the field of publications, the Agency expanded its book presentation program. Increased attention was also given to discrediting Red China among the Overseas Chinese and to featuring the achievements of Free China. In Japan, the program was aimed mainly at countering heavy anti-American Communist propaganda. In Korea, the emphasis shifted from the armistice and prisoner-of-war issues to U.S. and UN reconstruction. In Thailand, a comprehensive program of educating the people on the nature of the Communist menace was inaugurated, with Ambassador Donovan, [4] in effect, playing the leading role for USIA and members of the Thai Government publicly supporting him.

Because of a great degree of illiteracy in the Far East, and because of limited funds, concentration of program efforts was mainly on influential leaders. The non-colonial nature of U.S. foreign policy and the expansionist nature of Soviet and Red Chinese aggression were themes which were continuously stressed.

*American Republics:* As tensions increased between Latin America and the U.S., and as Soviet propaganda was stepped up in most of the area, the Agency acted promptly to divert resources on two crucial occasions: the Caracas Conference and the revolt in Guatemala. Agency activities centering around the Conference, and during the period preceding the revolt, succeeded in getting into many Latin American communications media the story of Communism as an international conspiracy.

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[3] Eric A. Johnston, Special Representative of the President with personal rank of Ambassador.

[4] William J. Donovan, Ambassador in Thailand.

Coincidental with the effort directed against Communist penetration in the hemisphere, the Agency expanded and emphasized the economic content of its program in accordance with the report of Dr. Milton Eisenhower.

High priority attention was given to the five Central American countries and Panama. Among the measures taken to strengthen the Agency's effort in those six countries was the establishment of a subregional arrangement whereby the small countries could draw upon the large facilities (both USIS and commercial) in Mexico City.

Moves to improve the operation in the Caribbean area included the establishment of an office in Trinidad, with responsibilities involving British Guiana, and the strengthening of the program for the French West Indies and French Guiana, based in Martinique, where in the last election the Communists polled 41% of the vote.

*Domestic:* Preparations for the transfer of the "Voice of America" from New York to Washington are under way. Elaborate circuits and electronic equipment are being installed in the Health, Education and Welfare Building, and arrangements have been made for increasing the volume of commercial news-service intake at 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, where the editorial room of the "Voice" will be located.

## II. AMPLIFICATION OF SUMMARY

Although the area programs and activities just summarized were budgeted in advance as carefully as possible, the fluid nature of events compelled the Agency to divert funds from important projects to others considered even more important. Under these diversions of funds more than two million dollars were allocated to the following projects:

1. Program Expansion in S.E. Asia . . . . . $820,000

The countries covered by this project were Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Burma. The theme was—and continues to be: "Resist Communism." Provision was made for documentary films, newsreels, photo displays, radio programs and pamphlets.

2. Atoms for Progress and Peace . . . . . $500,000

This project covered the production of two films, four mobile exhibits, two stationary exhibits, 200 exhibit panels, and pamphlets for distribution in connection with the exhibits and the films. The exhibits and the films will be useful for months and years hence and will be routed throughout all areas to reach mass audiences.

3. Expanded Latin American Programs . . . . . $340,000

These funds were used to strengthen the program in critical areas. Activities included the financing of special service operations in the Caribbean and for the Central American countries, increased emphasis on economic information programs as recommended by Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and support for increased activities to meet the situation created by the crisis in Guatemala.

4. Special Book Program in Asia . . . . . $325,000

Undertaken as a result of Vice President Nixon's survey of the area. The funds have gone into an expansion of the USIA book program in the Near and Far East, where Soviet activity in the field of publications is immense.

5. Doctrinal Program . . . . . $140,000

Aimed at both qualitative and quantitative improvement in the Agency's approach to the leader audience. The funds will make possible the publication of 100,000 copies each of 2 basic books: "What Do You Know About Democracy?" and "What Do You Know About Communism?"

6. Guatemalan Crisis . . . . .———

Actual expenses of the Agency's coverage of the crisis have not been estimated. Some people were shifted on temporary detail from New York to Washington; others were ordered from Latin America to the United States. For a time, almost all of the resources of the American Republics operation of the Agency were used in this effort.

7. Program Expansion in Indonesia . . . . . $20,000

In order to reach certain literate, energetic and influential people in this neutralist country, two Reading Rooms were opened, one in Sumatra and one in Celebes, for the distribution of pamphlets, magazines and leaflets.

*A. Western Europe*

1. In this area, which includes Scandinavia, the UK and the Commonwealth in addition to the Western European continent, a major theme was to promote greater support for collective security and for economic and political integration. Since progress in these fields depends primarily on European rather than American initiative, the USIS missions in this area stepped up the "indirect" approach of encouraging and assisting indigenous groups and individuals willing to work on behalf of these policy objectives.

2. In Denmark, for instance, a widely-distributed publication promoting support for NATO and pegged to NATO's Fifth Anniversary was prepared by a Danish organization in collaboration with the USIS staff in Copenhagen. The publication was so well regarded that the Danish Government called it to the attention of elements of the U.S. Department of State which were not familiar with the

project. Equally impressed, the Department of State drew it to the attention of USIA, with the suggestion that the Agency might wish "to utilize it in some way." A project maintained throughout as an indigenous operation had come full-circle.

3. Meanwhile, in France, USIS planned a series of ceremonies and projects commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the Liberation of France by the U.S. and other allied forces under the leadership of General Eisenhower. The series was inaugurated on the Normandy beaches on June 5, when Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, on behalf of President Eisenhower, presented a flaming Torch of Freedom as a symbol of friendship between France and the United States. Publicity on this entire project—designed to emphasize the need for combined effort in the face of aggressive intent by a common enemy—will continue throughout the summer and autumn of 1954. Also in France, USIS was instrumental in the publication of a book, written by a well-known, retired French army general, designed to promote French support for EDC.

4. As a follow-up to the Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin last February, the Agency prepared a pamphlet using the Soviet delegates' own statements to demonstrate the falsity of Moscow's professions of peace and its determination to pursue its plans for world domination. Distribution of this pamphlet included other areas of the world in addition to Europe.

5. Another problem which received increasing attention was the need for greater Franco-German *rapprochement* as the answer to one of the major factors which continues to adversely affect U.S. policy objectives in the European area.

6. In Italy, one of the Agency's major efforts was the atomic energy exhibit mentioned earlier in this report. Its aim was to convince the Italian people of the economic benefits that could be derived from a world-wide adoption of President Eisenhower's proposals for putting the atom to work for peaceful purposes and to show them how Soviet obstructionism in this matter is frustrating economic betterment.

7. In Spain, USIS took advantage of its additional responsibilities and opportunities growing out of the signing of the base agreement. With preparation of these military bases progressing steadily and with increasing numbers of Americans going to Spain on business or for pleasure, Spanish people have been showing a greater interest than ever in the United States. By increasing its programs of lectures, photograph exhibits, film showings, and cultural activities, the Agency has attempted to turn this additional curiosity to advantage.

As one example, it has undertaken a radio program, "Bob y Maria", which is somewhat unique in the field of USIS activities abroad. A young American husband, "Bob", and his Spanish wife, "Maria", travel throughout the United States, during which time Bob teaches her English as a device to describe significant aspects of American way of life, institutions and policies. Broadcast over the Spanish national network and five other stations, the program consists of three series of twelve English lessons each. So far 135,700 requests have been received for the three USIS pamphlet word-lists and grammar rules which are offered in connection with the lessons. Thousands of letters have been received without one adverse comment. Each letter writer receives a reply. Analyses disclose that 74% of the listeners are male, 26% female, with the majority in the medium educational level and the clerical-business category. The response has been such as to realize USIS objectives in five months and to enable new objectives to be attained by expansion of the basic program. Ten additional Spanish stations have requested broadcast rights.

8. In Great Britain, the Agency's London staff concentrated further on personal contacts with publishers and molders of opinion in a stepped-up effort to increase understanding of U.S. policies and minimize U.S.-UK differences on certain foreign policies.

9. In Finland, Norway and Sweden, some program emphasis was shifted to the northern areas, where backward economic conditions and inadequate communications with the Western World have invited increasing Soviet propaganda activity.

10. With regard to Switzerland, the Agency completed plans for reopening its Bern office at the request of the U.S. Embassy. The office fills an urgent need to work in close contact with the internationally influential Swiss press and counter growing Communist efforts in that field.

### *B. Soviet Orbit*

The themes broadcast to this area have been covered in the Summary above. Seventy-five percent of the total programming of the "Voice of America" is beamed at the USSR, the Eastern European satellites and Red China. Local jamming continued to a considerable degree in the large urban centers of the USSR and to a lesser degree in the satellites. Evidence indicates that passable reception of the VOA is fairly commonplace in rural areas. In these areas, factual broadcasts on the Soviet agricultural crisis, of which the peasants are so aware, strengthen the VOA's claims to reliability.

A daily additional 30-minute Russian language broadcast to the Far East was undertaken on the Berlin and Geneva Conferences. Also, at the beginning of the Geneva Conference, a 15-minute period daily was added to the Mandarin, Cantonese and Amoy language services and also to the broadcasts to North Korea.

Of concern to USIA at the end of fiscal 1954 is the success of the Chinese Communist regime in instilling a sense of the regime's permanance among Chinese people and a pride in its rising international prestige. This undoubtedly cancels out a measure of the effect of the growing disillusionment with Communism that so far has been felt in China.

There is, however, one continuing and tragic situation which, by way of countering the regime's prestige, the Agency has been able to exploit: food problems in the USSR, food problems in China—and Chinese food, nevertheless, being shipped to the USSR regularly. In exploiting this situation, the Agency is always careful, while condemning Red officials, not to gloat. Sympathy with the average Chinese man, woman and child is always expressed.

*C. Near East, South Asia and Africa*

1. A challenge emanating from the military aid program in Pakistan arose across the border in India. Fortunately, the uproar of protest in that country reached a crescendo while the aid program was still in the rumor stage; it had largely spent itself before the aid agreement was actually signed. Nevertheless, USIA planned in advance a major campaign to assure the Indians that the aid was not directed against India and to explain the philosophy of collective Free World strength as a guarantee of peace. While the Indians continue to harbor a serious and deep resentment over the issue, the fact that India did not react more strongly against the American action may be attributed in part to the Agency's thorough treatment of the subject.

2. In early 1954, USIA undertook a campaign (1) to persuade the Arabs to regard favorably the granting of military aid to Iraq by the U.S. and (2) to spread knowledge among the Israelis of American reasons for doing so. Through unattributed materials and cross-reported comment on the indigenous nature of the Turkish-Pakistan pact and its being a deterrent to Soviet aggression, Iraq's eventual participation in the pact was prepared for. Reaction in the Arab world has been more favorable than was expected, and while Israel has been critical, U.S. motives have been made plain.

3. Throughout the NEA area, USIA exploited to the fullest the anti-segregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, but this decision was of especially far-reaching importance in Africa and India. In Africa, for example, the decision is regarded as the greatest event since the Emancipation Proclamation, and it removes from Communist hands the most effective anti-American weapon they had in Black Africa. Articles on the decision were placed by the Agency in almost every African publication, and its post in Accra published a special edition of the *American Outlook* for distribution

in British West Africa and Liberia. Throughout NEA, the initial effort is being followed up with reports of how the decision is being put into effect.

4. In supporting the Jordan Valley project, the Agency over the "Voice of America," broadcast a series of talks in Arabic on the history, geography and possibilities of the Valley. The scripts were later made available for magazine articles. Pamphlets in Arabic were published by USIA's Near East Regional Service Center in Beirut. Ambassador Johnston was encouraged to make several speeches on the subject in the U.S.; these were then transmitted to the area by Agency press and radio services. Motion pictures of hydro-electric and irrigation projects in the U.S. were shown to government leaders, agricultural experts and engineers. By June, 1954, when Mr. Johnston made his second visit to the area, the climate of opinion on the issue, among both Arabs and Israelis, had notably improved over that which existed at the time of his first visit in October, 1953.

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Iran listenership to the Persian program of the "Voice of America" has risen, judging from a tremendous increase in "fan mail". A significantly large proportion of these letters came from the leadership group within the country.

6. In Africa, the reaffiliation of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress with ICFTU and away from Communist influence was primarily the result of USIA educational labor lectures and film showings. Prime Minister Nkrumah's [5] historic anti-Communist policy statement was nurtured by a USIA staff member and, in part, drafted by him.

*D. Far East*

1. In Thailand, the program for anti-Communist indoctrination of the whole national structure began in Bangkok with an impressive and fully-documented exhibit exposing Communism's record of crimes in Asia and Europe. The exhibit, part of a national police fair attended by an estimated 180,000 persons, was sponsored by the police and was unattributed to USIS. Besides being the first major undertaking of the psychological offensive, it represented the strong public position of the government against Communism, leaving no doubt in the public mind that the Government had made an all-out commitment in the anti-Communist fight.

The intensive indoctrination of the government apparatus began in mid-May when 28 senior officials representing all Thai ministries and administrative areas began the first formal course. These officials form the leadership nucleus from which the indoctrination will ultimately penetrate to the provincial and village level. The opening session of the six-week course was addressed by Police General Phao Sriyanond, one of the most influential figures in Thailand, who stressed the significance of the program and the necessity of continuing cooperation and understanding between Thai and American participants in the face of the Communist danger.

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[5] Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of the Gold Coast.

Much of this Agency activity in Thailand, greatly assisted by the U.S. Ambassador, has already radiated from Bangkok to other areas of Southeast Asia, and the collection of photographs on Communism, first assembled for Bangkok specifically, will be useful throughout the USIA program generally.

2. In the Philippines, the Agency aided the Philippine Army in its drive against the Huk rebels. General Jesus Vargas, Philippine Chief of Staff, termed the loan of three USIA mobile film units "a most welcome addition to the meager resources at our command in winning the people to our side." He added, "These instruments shall continue to pave the way towards popular endorsement of the ways of democracy."

3. Strengthening of the Agency program in Burma was begun early in 1954 when arrangements were made to open a new information center at Moulmein to reach the Karen minority; another center at Taunggyi to penetrate into the Shan states; and a library extension at Rangoon University to counter Communist influence among the students. The program has also made progress toward its anti-Communist objectives through a newly-developed association with the Ministry of Information, to which it furnishes assistance and material for the Burmese Government's drive to reduce Communist influence among minorities.

4. Increasing attention has been given to the large, extremely important but widely scattered group of Overseas Chinese located throughout Southeast Asia. This program has been put on an area-wide basis, with responsibility for coordinating the production of suitable materials centered in Hong Kong. Vital to the program is the campaign to dissuade young Overseas Chinese from going to Red China for higher education and Communist indoctrination. The campaign includes providing textbooks to supplant Communist books in Chinese schools and, through the medium of translations, a constantly increasing volume of evidence of U.S. and Free World economic and military strength and cultural maturity.

5. The Agency's Far East Regional Production Center in Manila, so essential to providing information posts in the Far East with editorial and printed matter, was hard hit by budgetary reductions at the beginning of fiscal 1954; but towards the end of the year, funds were diverted to it, positions were restored, and supplies of paper increased. Since, along with Far East posts, Near East posts in

India, Pakistan and Ceylon also call upon it for services, the Center is not able to fill all requests. But it is filling two-thirds of them and it is operating at the full capacity for which it is budgeted. It is extremely important to the Agency's accelerated programs in Thailand, Burma, and Indochina.

6. In Japan, the biggest single event with which the Agency had to cope was the fall-out of hydrogen bomb ash on a Japanese fishing vessel. The role of USIA in this was to replace hysteria, rumor and intensive Communist propaganda, with temperateness and fact.

7. One of the Agency's principal publications addressed to the leadership audience is the magazine *Problems of Communism,* published in English, French and Spanish under attribution of the Agency itself. There is also a Japanese edition, partially subsidized by the Agency but under the attribution of a Japanese cultural organization, which now circulates 10,000 copies per issue.

*E. Latin America*

There were four major developments in the area during this period: an increased economic information program, organizational arrangements to strengthen the program in Central America and the Caribbean, the Caracas Conference, and the Guatemala crisis.

1. In recognition of the growing urgency of inter-American economic problems, of serious misunderstandings and distortions of the U.S. economic system and philosophy throughout Latin America, and of the opportunity to be provided at the economic conference to be held in Rio de Janeiro in November, 1954, a special project has been established to increase the flow of economic information to the area. Operations underway include immediate preparation of additional press material, a motion picture, sets of 30-odd books on economics for presentation and for translation, special radio and TV material for local use, and selection of U.S. economists and businessmen for speaking tours. Private enterprise cooperation efforts will be further stimulated, and pertinent material from other areas will be sought. The program is long-term, with special emphasis now upon preparation for the Rio conference.

2. The five Central American countries, plus Panama, were given high priority consideration and one method of strengthening the Agency's effort among them was the establishment of a sub-regional office in Mexico City, upon which they could call for the superior facilities, both USIA and commercial, available in that city. This regional office is a device, already working well, to give six small USIA posts some of the advantages of a large post. A similar device, with offices in Trinidad, has been set up for Trinidad and British Guiana.

3. As for the Caracas Conference, in the absence of determined U.S. policies on key economic issues, the Agency concentrated its pre-Conference efforts on stimulating regional sentiment against the foreign direction of the Communist movement in Latin America and its aspects of an illegal conspiracy. Existing policy precluded issuance by the Agency of its identifiable output of any original comment containing accusations against the Guatemalan Government; however, a series of articles exposing certain Guatemalan officials and policies as Communist were prepared and placed through indirect channels in various countries, including Venezuela, where they appeared in a leading paper after the Conference was opened.

The task of explaining and interpreting U.S. positions to the public of Latin America, encouraging support of the anti-Communist resolution, and portraying the Conference to all areas as an expression of inter-American cooperation and fundamental unity required temporary reinforcement of the resources of the Agency's Latin American operation. Shortwave broadcasts were instituted through Station WRUL, and an information team was sent to Caracas to produce news stories, feature articles, photographs and recorded interviews. These were disseminated throughout Latin America in a continuous flow, and on a more selective basis to Western Europe. The speeches of the Secretary of State on the subject of the Communist danger to the Americas were given extensive coverage by the press and radio media, issued in pamphlet form in Spanish translation, and further exploited through the production of a motion picture, "Caracas: Resolution and Reality."

4. In Guatemala, during the early stages of the Armas revolt, some ten days of discriminatory censorship imposed by the Arbenz Government favored the world-wide Communist version of conditions in that country.

To meet this situation, the Agency set up a small operation in Honduras whereby a daily account of events within Guatemala, assembled from intelligence sources, was informally passed on to selected correspondents, with marked improvement in the quality of news coverage. During the month of June, more than 200 articles and radio scripts were transmitted for press and radio placement abroad. These were developed partly from public sources and partly from declassified intelligence supplied by the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Content ranged from developments in Guatemala, Washington, the UN and elsewhere, to original verified exposés of Communist penetration and documented articles counteracting specific charges against the U.S. Illustrative of numerous pamphlets issued, "Chronology of Communism in Guatemala", written within the Agency and printed in

Havana in 100,000 copies, was distributed throughout the continent. In addition, approximately 27,000 pieces of anti-Communist cartoon and poster material were transmitted to Latin America for selective placement. WRUL broadcasts were increased for the duration of the crisis. Newsreel coverage of events in the UN and the OAS was released world-wide and, when circumstances made it possible, film photographers were assigned to Guatemala to gather tactically useful material of permanent value to the information program. As this report is submitted, information treatment of the Guatemalan incident has entered the phase of disseminating the documentation only now available from within the country, which confirms the Communist nature of the Arbenz regime and vindicates the actions and assertions of the United States.

### III. THREE NOTES ON ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

1. Technical preparations for the transfer of the "Voice of America" from New York to Washington have already been summarized above. Recruitment of new employees to replace those who will not be moving from New York has already begun.

2. Personnel during the reporting period remained fairly constant. As of June 30, 1954, there were 2,207 employees in the United States and 7,332 abroad. Of those abroad, 1,028 were Americans and 6,304 were nationals of other countries.

3. In response to a request from USIA, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a survey to identify USIA Intelligence needs and to recommend the action required not only by USIA but also by all the other Intelligence agencies. The principal administrative recommendation affecting USIA resulted in the consolidation of four separate units into a single Intelligence unit to service USIA. This unit will tailor the intelligence required from other agencies to the specific needs of USIA.

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511.00/8-1854

## *The President to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1954.

DEAR FOSTER: Congress today acted favorably upon my special supplemental request of July 27, copy of which is attached,[1] for $5 million to be used at my discretion to meet extraordinary or unusual circumstances arising in the international field.

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[1] Same as the request from President Eisenhower to the President of the Senate, July 27, p. 1776.

Among the purposes of this fund, as you know, is to provide for more intensive United States participation in international trade fairs and to encourage private American groups to travel abroad and share with other nations our cultural and artistic achievements.

To assist me in making effective and immediate use of these funds, I am asking that an action group be established including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of the United States Information Agency. The Secretary of State will serve as Chairman, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget will act as advisor to the group, and the Director of the United States Information Agency is charged with action as Executive agent. Other departments and agencies may be asked to participate as appropriate.

It is my intention to authorize this action group to appoint such special advisors as may be necessary to inaugurate this program and secure the maximum cooperation of American industry and cultural organizations.

Due to the pressing need for early action, I hope you will find it possible to keep in close personal contact with the development and progress of this program.

Sincerely,

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511.00/9-1054

## *The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Streibert)* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1954.

DEAR MR. STREIBERT: On August 18 the President by letter established a special Cabinet Committee to assure effective and immediate use of a $5 million fund voted by Congress for stepped-up U.S. participation in international trade fairs and for increased travel abroad by American cultural and artistic groups. The Director of the U.S. Information Agency was designated as Executive Agent to carry out this program.

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[1] Drafted by Staats of OCB and cleared with Washburn of USIA. A notation on the source text reads: "Identical letter to Director, FOA." A similar letter was sent by Smith to Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks the same day, and a notation on this letter notes that copies were sent to Cutler and to the Director of the Budget.

At the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on August 20,[2] it was agreed that action responsibility would be lodged in the Department of Commerce with respect to trade fairs and in the Department of State with respect to cultural groups—both, however, working through the Executive Agent.

Subsequently, the Department of Commerce established an operating committee on trade fairs composed of interested Government agencies and chaired by the Department of Commerce. This committee has moved ahead rapidly in the development of a concrete program.

The Department of State, in like manner, has formed an interagency operating committee on cultural group activity. This group, too, has proceeded actively. Meanwhile the Director of the U.S. Information Agency has appointed two special advisors to serve full time with the operating committees of Commerce and State.

The Cabinet Committee named by the President includes the agencies which regularly participate at meetings of the Operations Coordinating Board—Department of State, Foreign Operations Administration, and USIA. In addition, it includes the Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare—and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget who was named as advisor to the Committee. Inasmuch as the membership of the Committee duplicates to a large extent the membership of the OCB, which has had responsibility for coordinating overseas programs of this type, I would like to suggest that matters requiring the attention of the Cabinet Committee in the future be taken up at regular meetings of the OCB.

I believe this suggestion will result in a saving of time and will prevent overlapping between the work of the Cabinet Committee and the OCB. In addition it will provide for regular participation by two other members of the OCB—the Department of Defense and CIA—which in the past have contributed significantly to the development and carrying out of trade fair programs, and which can also make valuable contributions to the cultural group activity. Furthermore, the staff facilities of the Board would be available to assist in the coordination of these programs with other activities related to the implementation of our foreign policy.

Under this plan the two operating committees under the chairmanship of the Department of Commerce and the Department of State referred to above will become regular working groups within the framework of the OCB. Action responsibility on trade fairs remains in Commerce, and on cultural groups in State. The Director of USIA continues as Executive Agent for the over-all program.

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[2] A summary memorandum of this meeting is in Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "Notes, UM-N".

Will you please let me know whether this arrangement will be satisfactory to you? [3]

Sincerely,

WALTER B. SMITH

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[3] Streibert replied on Sept. 16 as follows:

"We are fully in accord with the recommendations in your letter of September 10 that President's Fund matters be dealt with by OCB.

"I regret that I did not bring up the question of implementation through OCB originally, and am glad that it is being worked out satisfactorily to all concerned." (511.00/9-1654)

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511.00/11-454: Circular telegram

## *The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1954—4:39 p.m.

227. Joint State-USIA telegram. InfoGuide: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. (Begin FYI: On November 5, in Committee One (Political and Security) of UNGA, Ambassador Lodge expected be first speaker on peaceful uses of atomic energy item. Speech will be in nature of report, and will review history of proposal, including President Eisenhower initiative December 8, 1953, Dulles UN statement September 23, 1954, [2] negotiations with USSR and other countries. Lodge expected review and discuss developments in atomic science and technology, and describe substantial steps United States has already taken and expects to take in order share advances in peaceful applications atomic knowledge. Lodge will introduce resolution most significant parts of which currently expected to (1) Note negotiations in progress among states engaged in establishing an international atomic energy agency, and (2) call for convening by United Nations of international conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy. Resolution will not call for establishment by UN of international agency, but will suggest that after agency is established, agency should negotiate appropriate agreement with UN perhaps similar to those of specialized agencies. Proposed in-

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[1] Drafted by John Z. Williams of USIA; cleared in USIA and by Meyers of UNA, Philip Farley of S/AE and Jean Jerolaman of P; approved by David Wainhouse, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs; and sent to 29 posts.

[2] Regarding President Eisenhower's Dec. 8, 1953, address to the United Nations, see telegram Usito 164, Dec. 8, 1953, p. 1758. Regarding Secretary Dulles' address before the UN General Assembly on Sept. 23, 1954, entitled "Partnership for Peace", see the editorial note, p. 1519. Regarding Ambassador Lodge's address on Nov. 5, 1954, see the second editorial note, p. 1551.

ternational conference would be held under UN auspices and include governmental representatives from states members of UN or of any Specialized Agency, as well as some individual experts from these states who will not be governmental representatives. Conference and creation of agency would be related only in that report of conference may assist agency, as well as national programs, in determining types of activity which could most profitably be pursued. Text of speech and resolution not fully established. End FYI)

Initial information handling should (a) concentrate on encouraging widest circulation of and earnest attention to speech and resolution, (b) underscore US determination press actively ahead in turning atomic energy to peaceful service of mankind, and advance international cooperation in this effort. While we continue restrain unwarranted hopes for immediate large-scale benefits, substantial progress in peaceful uses which Lodge will report and further steps he will indicate US is prepared to take should be cited as evidence this move in UN is backed by practical realities offering sound basis for peaceful world progress.

Posts should keep Department and Agency informed of significant local reaction.

President's announcement November 3 of note to USSR on peaceful uses should be treated as in line with reiterated US position of hoping for Soviet cooperation despite their past lack of interest in this effort, while we keep perfectly clear our determination to proceed with project whether or not Soviets participate. We continue to differentiate carefully between problems of disarmament and peaceful uses, stressing that progress in latter need not await developments in former.

(*Caution:* Avoid describing proposed international conference as "scientific" since purely scientific conference would raise question of UNESCO auspices.)

DULLES

# THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES, JUNE 30, 1953 [1]

Eisenhower Library, White House Office records, "Project 'Clean Up' "

*Report to the President by the President's Committee on International Information Activities*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1953.

[Here follow a table of contents and a list of appendices, of which all but Appendix II are printed.]

## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

JUNE 30, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We submit herewith the report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

On January 24, 1953, you directed us "to make a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related thereto, with particular reference to the international relations and the national security of this country." This directive in the form of a letter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council is attached to the report as Appendix I. You also directed that the Committee's final report and recommendations be in your hands not later than June 30, 1953.

In directing us to prepare this report, you indicated that it should be made in the light of the general capabilities and intentions of the Soviet system and of the United States and its allies. In Part I of the report, therefore, we have considered the nature of the conflict with the Soviet system, the Soviet drive for world domination and the United States program for world order. We have not attempted to reach independent judgments on many of the matters discussed in this Part, believing them to be beyond both our assignment and our competence. In respect to them, we have relied on expert testimony and on relevant official documents.

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[1] The Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, submitted June 30, 1953, presented recommendations regarding not only information policy but also the conduct of national security-related economic and political activities and special operations. Due to the length and nature of this report, it is presented in its entirety in this separate compilation. Regarding its preparation and the implementation of its recommendations, it should be considered in connection with the compilations on national security policy, pp. 1 ff., and foreign information program, pp. 1591 ff.

A copy of this report was transmitted to the Department of State. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "PCIIA") For the White House press release issued on July 8, 1953, summarizing the report, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 27, 1953, pp. 124–126.

In the light of the relative capabilities and the conflicting objectives of the free coalition led by the United States and the imposed coalition dominated by Soviet Russia, we have surveyed and evaluated the international information policies and activities and related policies and activities of the United States. They include overt and covert information activities, overt and covert economic and political activities, and clandestine military or quasi-military operations. We have studied this complex of activities in the world conflict in Part II.

We do not believe that the terms "cold war" and "psychological warfare," which are so frequently used, contribute to a clear understanding of the world struggle. The phrase "cold war" is an inaccurate description of the present conflict. Moreover, when used by officials of the United States Government it is helpful to Soviet propaganda. There seems to be particular confusion in regard to "psychological warfare" and "psychological activities." We have found that psychological activity is not a field of endeavor separable from the main body of diplomatic, economic, and military measures by which the United States seeks to achieve its national objectives. It is an ingredient of such measures.

The Committee held its first meeting on January 30, 1953. At this and subsequent meetings the Committee and its staff have interviewed over 250 witnesses, including many representatives of government departments and agencies. Numerous individuals and organizations have submitted written suggestions.

We have received the complete cooperation of all government departments and agencies concerned with the Committee's work. They have complied fully with our requests for written material and have made their officials available for questioning. We have also benefited from consultation with Members of Congress, particularly the Senate Subcommittee for Overseas Information Programs of the United States. Its staff studies and report make a most important contribution on the subject of overt information activities considered in Chapter Five of our report.

The Committee has received most valuable assistance from Abbott Washburn, its Executive Secretary, from Robert Blum, Director of the Staff, and from the members of the staff, whose names appear in Appendix V and who were assigned to us in large part from various government departments and agencies.

In preparing our report we have been inspired by your conviction that a "unified and dynamic effort" in the field covered by the report "is essential to the security of the United States and of the other peoples in the community of free nations."

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. JACKSON, *Chairman*
ROBERT CUTLER
GORDON GRAY
BARKLIE MCKEE HENRY
JOHN C. HUGHES
C. D. JACKSON
ROGER M. KYES
SIGURD LARMON [2]

# PART I

## CHAPTER ONE

## THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The policies of the United States are based on the assumption that the purpose of the Soviet rulers is world domination. There are various theories concerning the reasons behind this purpose. One theory points to the ideology of world communist revolution as the principal reason. Another stresses the ambitions and belief in a world mission long held by the Great Russians. A third emphasizes the view that the Soviet rulers feel a basic insecurity so long as any power center remains outside their control and therefore regard any such center as a threat which they must strive to remove.

All these factors may play a part in motivating the Soviet drive for world domination. Whatever their relative importance, it is necessary to base American policy on the premise that the drive exists and will continue until the free world has induced (1) a substantial reduction in Soviet capabilities, at least relatively, or (2) a basic change in the objectives of the Soviet rulers.

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[2] William H. Jackson, a New York investment banker, had served with Army Intelligence during World War II. He participated in the preparation of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of Jan. 1, 1949, and in 1950–1951 had been Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Robert Cutler was Administrative Assistant to the President from January to March 1953, and thereafter Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Gordon Gray, President of the University of North Carolina, had served as Secretary of the Army, 1949–1950, Special Assistant to the President, 1950, and Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, 1951. Barklie McKee Henry was a New York banker associated with a number of foundations. John C. Hughes, a manufacturing executive, became U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council on June 12, 1953. C. D. Jackson was Special Assistant to the President. Roger M. Kyes was Deputy Secretary of Defense. Sigurd S. Larmon, an advertising executive, was a member of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Information.

The Soviet rulers are employing and almost certainly intend to rely heavily on political warfare techniques in carrying out their drive. In present circumstances they prefer the process of encroachment to the risks of total war. Because the United States is the major center of power in the free world and is therefore the principal obstacle in the path of the Soviet drive, the isolation of the United States as a preliminary to its destruction or domination is a major goal of Soviet policy.

The purposes of the United States in its actions abroad spring from two basic concerns: first, for the physical security of the United States; second, for the development of a world environment favorable to the survival and flourishing of free institutions. The United States must, therefore, adopt not only those policies necessary to its military security but also those essential to the creation of world conditions consistent with the maintenance of these free institutions.

National security can ultimately be assured only in conjunction with strong and resolute allies throughout the world. A world order of free and peaceful nations has become a general objective of United States policy. The Soviet drive for world domination blocks progress toward such a world order and consequently the relative reduction of Soviet capabilities to the point where they are inadequate to sustain this drive is probably a necessary step in the pursuit of the general objective.

The nature of the conflict lies in this fundamental clash, and the conflict will continue until one side or the other drops behind in the development of capabilities or loses its will to continue the struggle. This view is widely held, but there has not always been a full recognition of the measure of the task imposed upon the United States, and there are important differences of opinion as to the policies by which United States objectives can best be pursued.

### *The Relationship Between Objectives, Capabilities and Policies*

The general objectives of the United States—such as national security and a just and peaceful world order—do not change. They can be defined only in general terms, and can never be wholly attained, once and for all. They can only be approached. The measure of progress toward them is the accomplishment of subsidiary, specific goals. These specific goals of national action abroad—such as a certain level of forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the destruction of communist influence in the French labor unions, or an increase in agricultural production in Pakistan—should be defined in as precise political, diplomatic, economic, military or psychological terms as possible. They may be regarded as points which must be reached on the way to the ultimate objective. They should be consistent not only with the ultimate objective but also with capabilities.

The Government has often failed to define its specific goals clearly and precisely, and this failure has been an important obstacle to progress. There has been a tendency, as in the case of NATO force levels, to set specific goals which exceeded United States and allied capabilities and this has led, through the creation of unrealistic expectations, to an unwarranted sense of failure. In the field of political warfare the announcement of unrealizable goals and the arousing of excessive hopes in the satellite countries or elsewhere, may have serious adverse consequences for the world position of the United States.

The policies by which the United States pursues its goals should be harmonious not only with its general objectives but also with its capabilities. In practice, failure to understand this principle is a source of controversy and misunderstanding. Some witnesses who have appeared before the Committee have revealed in their testimony that they had failed to take adequate account of the capability factor by advocating courses of action which exceed the present capabilities of the United States and its allies. The United States will be judged not only by the things it is able to do and does, but also by the gap between these and its announced policies. The distinction should be clearly made between policies and objectives with respect to which the United States commits itself to act and those ends to which we, as a nation, aspire but regarding which the Government is not committed to take action. In the conduct of political warfare it is important that the United States avoid confusion between its specific policy objectives and its aspirations.

The Committee has not attempted to determine what capabilities the United States and its allies need to have in order to assure their security, make progress toward a peaceful world order, and bring about a substantial relative reduction in Soviet capabilities or a basic change in Soviet objectives. Clearly the answer depends largely on the capabilities of the Soviet system. The estimation of relative capabilities is a difficult task, but it is an essential step in determining what additional efforts are required and what specific goals are both desirable and feasible. The Committee recognizes the steady improvement of national intelligence estimates under the direction of CIA. However, these intelligence estimates must be continually and carefully matched against United States and allied capabilities and defensive plans, to produce realistic "net" estimates of the capabilities of the Soviet system. The current appraisal* of the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet air attack is an important advance, but so far as can be ascertained it is the first net estimate of relative military capabilities which has been available to the National Security Council as a basis for its policy recommendations. We recommend that the necessary measures be taken to provide net estimates of political, economic and military capabilities.

In the absence of a satisfactory net estimate, it is our general impression, based on the available intelligence estimates, (1) that the ability of the Soviet Union to wage general war is improving and (2) that the Soviet rulers will probably not deliberately initiate or provoke general war in the near future, but will continue courses of action which involve an appreciable danger that general war might result. A recent estimate states that if the Kremlin believes "the security of the USSR is jeopardized by a Western action, it will probably resort to such counteractions as it considers necessary, even though it recognizes that these counteractions involve grave risk of global war."† According to the same source "it is impossible to estimate the view of the rulers of the USSR concerning the outcome of a global war during the period of this estimate." It is our belief that the Soviet rulers will strive to avoid general war, primarily because of fear that their regime could not be maintained in power after a devastating atomic attack and because the opportunities for expansion by political warfare still seem good. We believe, therefore, that provided the United States and its allies maintain a strong military position, general war can be avoided and that the greatest danger of Soviet expansion lies in political warfare and local communist armed action.

The power relationship between the Soviet system and the free nations is such that the Soviet rulers will be most reluctant to run deliberately a grave risk of general war. However, we agree with the estimate that "the USSR will continue its efforts to undermine and destroy the non-communist world by political warfare."‡ In the circumstances, the United States must intensify its effort to achieve a greater measure of strength and unity in the free world. The United States and its allies need sufficient military strength and unity of purpose to make the Soviet rulers unwilling to pursue courses of action involving appreciable danger of general war and to induce the Soviet Union to live up to its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

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*NSC 140/1. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NSC 140/1, see p. 328.]

†National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 64, Part II. This estimate dealt with "Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action through Mid-1953" and was published several months prior to Stalin's death. However, the main lines of Soviet action are not likely to change substantially, despite tactical shifts. [Footnote in the source text. NIE–64 is not printed.]

‡NIE–64, Part II, paragraph 2. Its political warfare techniques include "political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, the action of communist parties and communist-party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc, sabotage, exploitation of subversive and revolutionary movements and of civil wars, and psychological warfare." Because it is not subject to the pressure of public opinion and can control the flow of information to the subject peoples, the Soviet system has a freer hand in political warfare than have free societies. [Footnote in the source text.]

A basic feature of the conflict—one that underlies and largely determines the conduct of the struggle—is that it is a conflict between coalitions, the one an imposed coalition dominated by the Kremlin, the other a voluntary coalition led by the United States. It is of transcendent importance that the American people understand this and also corollary fact that the security of the United States cannot be achieved in isolation.§ Several important countries in the free world are as yet uncommitted; and as neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can alone gain the power position required to make significant progress toward its objectives, the conflict will probably be most intense in the areas which lie between these two poles of great power. The Kremlin will intensify its efforts to isolate the United States and to promote dissension within and between members of the free coalition and also attempt to exploit the weaknesses and gain control of other non-communist countries. In order to make the free world invulnerable to such efforts, and to reduce and retract Soviet power and influence, the United States must seek to strengthen the existing coalition, to win new allies and to find and exploit weaknesses in the Soviet system.

## CHAPTER TWO

## THE SOVIET DRIVE FOR WORLD DOMINATION

An understanding of the main elements of Soviet strength and weakness and of the main lines of Soviet attack is basic to the improvement of the United States organization for and conduct of the conflict with the Soviet system.

### STRENGTHS

#### *Political System*

The key to Soviet strength is the tightly organized political system which permits the effective manipulation of Soviet resources in pursuit of the basic objective of world domination. It presents the classic advantages of a tyrannical system: the ability to conduct its affairs with a minimum regard for public opinion, the lack of moral constraint in its choice of means to implement its policies, the power to speak with one voice in its public declarations while following contradictory courses of action.

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§See Chapter Eight. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Soviet Union has additional advantages deriving from its geographical situation and resources, its system of government, and its internal policies. It has great maneuverability; it can advance, hold, or draw back as circumstances dictate. It is able to devise a strategic plan, keep it secret, and adhere to it, at the same time springing tactical surprises and taking tactical advantage of any opportunities which arise. A free society, which needs wide understanding and support for its policies, cannot match it in these respects.

The economic structure of the country, and in large measure of the satellites as well, is so centralized that the government can determine with great precision the proportion of the gross national product which is to be devoted to military requirements and capital investment. The degree of internal control which the regime possesses is so great that it is able effectively to isolate its populations from all but the most limited contact with the outside world. The whole system is tightly controlled by a single political party which brooks no opposition and in which absolute power rests in the hands of one man surrounded by a small group at the top. Unless conflicts arise within the group, the prospects for weakening the system from within are remote. A significant element of strength which derives from the nature of the system is that the Soviet rulers have the ability to employ the satellites for aggressive purposes with minimum involvement of the power and prestige of the Soviet Union.

### *Economic Factors*

The ability of these rulers to control the Soviet economy, together with the fact that the economies of the free nations tend to be highly responsive to the state of international relations, is a factor of Soviet strength. To the extent that the Soviet rulers can alternately provoke the free nations to undertake large preparedness programs and induce them to relax these preparations, they can introduce a major unstabilizing factor into the economies of the free nations while maintaining the Soviet economy on substantially a war footing.

The Soviet system is rapidly expanding its economic base. In 1952 its gross national product was about one-third that of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the same year, the gross national product of the system was more than one-third above pre-war, and by 1957 it is estimated that it will be from 90 to 100 per cent above pre-war. This is a very rapid rate of economic growth, and unless there is a drastic change in Western economic progress, the rate will almost certainly remain higher than that of the United States or any other great power, except possibly West Germany. If this rate of increase continues, the Soviet system could eventually overtake the Western states, but probably not within a generation. During the next few years the absolute increase in production in the NATO states may continue to be greater than the increase in the Soviet system.

The Soviet Union has been diverting a much larger proportion of its total output to military purposes and to expansion of industrial facilities than has any Western state; nevertheless, the output of Soviet consumer goods will probably increase by one-fourth to one-third by 1957. Soviet industrial production will probably expand by 40 to 50 per cent during the next four years; although this rate is more than twice that of the United States, the Soviet base is so much smaller that the United States will retain a substantial margin of superiority.

With the growth of its industrial potential the Soviet Union will be better prepared in three or four years to survive an atomic attack or to support a major war effort along conventional lines than it is now. If general war is avoided, the major significance of its rate of economic growth will lie in the strengthening of Soviet political warfare capabilities. A steady improvement in living standards would have important political consequences in the free world. The rate of economic growth of the satellites and Communist China, though it will be slower than that of the Soviet Union, will probably be comparable.[||]

*Military Factors*

The military strength of the Soviet system and the ability of its rulers to threaten the use of military force to achieve their objectives are potent factors in its political warfare capabilities.

The Soviet system now has a significant quantitative superiority over the Western Powers in standing and reserve forces and in conventional ground and air armament. The size of the standing forces, including those of Communist China, will probably not be appreciably increased by 1957 above the present level of about 9 million men. The estimated present strength of the system's air forces is about 21,500 aircraft, including 8,600 jet fighters; by 1957, the total will probably be 26,000 aircraft, including 10,000 jet fighters. The number of long-range submarines will probably increase by 1957 from 106 to 175. The cumulative Soviet stockpile of atomic

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[||] The material in this section on Soviet Strengths is largely drawn from corresponding sections of NIE-65, dated June 16, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. NIE-65, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through 1957," is scheduled for publication in volume VIII.]

weapons (30 to 100 kiloton yield) is estimated to be 120 in mid-1953 and is tentatively projected to be 500 in mid-1957, by which time the Soviet Union will also have more and better long-range bomber aircraft. The estimates of the atomic stockpile may be too high or too low, but there will probably be not less than 80 weapons in mid-1953 and not more than 1,000 in mid-1957. The over-all effectiveness of the ground, naval and air forces of the system will almost certainly continue to improve during the intervening period.

Soviet scientific and technical capabilities have increased rapidly since World War II, and the Soviet Union will doubtless continue to devote a higher proportion of these capabilities to military purposes than the West. The Committee believes that the estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities are of special significance in light of the vulnerability of the United States to attack, as shown in the report of Project East River.[3]

*Internal Security*

The security arrangements in the Soviet system constitute an essential strength on the one hand and evidence of great weakness on the other. They provide the force required to protect the position of the party leadership and they are also a measure of the regime's fear of the latent strength of opposition and resistance in the population.

A totalitarian state can permit no internal opposition and requires a reliable instrumentality of repression to enforce its will. A powerful and ubiquitous secret police provides such an instrumentality. Under the present regime the internal security forces perform a variety of functions. Their foremost responsibility is to ensure the personal safety of the men in the Kremlin. They are expected to deal ruthlessly with all forms of opposition to the regime; in the past they were successful to the point where public expression of disagreement with government policies had almost disappeared. Recent outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany show, however, that all resistance has not yet been suppressed.

Another function of the internal security forces is to maintain the degree of control over the satellites which Moscow desires. In the governments established in eastern Europe after the war, which were usually labeled "governments of national unity" and were actually coalitions, the Kremlin always made certain that the Minister of Interior was a communist, thereby ensuring control of the police. From this vantage point, Russian advisers, usually themselves members of the Soviet MVD, were introduced into key positions in the satellite regimes until full Moscow control could be established and maintained.

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[3] For information on Project East River, see footnote 2, p. 20.

Finally, the internal security forces are charged with the task of maintaining the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers. A similar function is performed by the police organizations in each of the satellites. The resulting "Iron Curtain" is so impenetrable that residents of the countries of the Soviet system are effectively cut off from any type of contact with the outside world. Contact within the system itself is not appreciably easier. Travel between the Soviet Union and its satellites is virtually non-existent except on official business, while within the individual countries internal passport controls, assignment to places of work and limited transportation facilities make movement extremely difficult.

Although security arrangements of the magnitude needed for these operations require forces numbering approximately one million men in the Soviet Union alone and constitute a substantial drain on manpower resources throughout the Soviet system, they are obviously considered essential by the party leadership for the maintenance of their power. As long as they preserve their present level of effectiveness, they will constitute a formidable obstacle to any efforts to penetrate the system and establish contact with its people.

*Political Warfare Capabilities*¶

The Soviet system has impressive political warfare capabilities for use against the free world. On the assumption that the Soviet rulers will seek to accomplish their objectives by means short of general war, the problem of countering their efforts and of developing an appropriate counteroffensive becomes of decisive importance.

A major weapon in the Soviet drive for world domination is the communist apparatus in the free world. The main instruments are the foreign communist parties. These are the central mechanisms for controlling and coordinating other activities, such as the operations of "front" organizations, the infiltration and manipulation of non-communist organizations, the penetration of governments, and the preparation of secret groups for violent action. Wherever possible, the communist parties also attempt to advance their purposes by participation in political activities as legal parties. This line was strongly emphasized by Stalin in his concluding speech to the 19th Communist Party Congress in October, 1952.

The membership of the foreign communist parties reached a peak of about six million in 1948 and has since steadily declined to about three and one half million. This trend was reversed in recent elections in France and Italy. Membership in any event is not an accurate indication of the threat posed by these parties. The communists have proved that numbers are less important than discipline, direction and the penetration and control of key points.

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¶ For a more complete description of the political warfare capabilities of the Soviet system, see NIE-65. [Footnote in the source text.]

A second weapon of major importance in the drive for world domination is the communist ideology. This ideology—despite all the evidence of the realities of life in the Soviet system—still has a significant appeal to many people outside the system. Most of the recruits are people who believe that they are underprivileged, discriminated against and exploited, and whose religious faith or loyalty to existing institutions has been weakened or broken. The ideology also attracts many opportunists who believe that the expansion of communism cannot be stopped and that power and position will be the rewards of those who assist the expansion. The importance of its intellectual and national appeal, especially in Asia and Africa, should not be underestimated. In part, this appeal derives from the association of the colonial heritage with capitalist exploitation. It also derives from the desire for economic development and the belief that communism has made possible the Soviet Union's rapid economic growth.

The foreign communist parties have sought, often with much success, to identify themselves, according to local conditions, as the working class party, the anti-imperialistic party or the anti-discrimination party. The Soviet Union has moved to exploit discontent through its foreign communist apparatus. Its readiness to create conditions of anarchy as a preliminary to seizing power is in itself an important advantage in the conflict.

## WEAKNESSES

### *The Foreign Communist Apparatus*

At this stage of the conflict the most vulnerable point in the world communist movement is its apparatus in the free world. In fighting this apparatus the policies and programs of the United States are of primary importance. These include programs of economic and military assistance, cooperation for mutual security, support of the United Nations, resistance to communist aggression in Korea, support of resistance by others in Indochina and Malaya and support of the European Defense Community and the Schuman Plan. These policies and programs have been and can be effectively supplemented by political warfare operations. By helping to expose the true nature of communist activities, by penetrating, undermining and dividing the foreign apparatus and by hampering its access to funds, the basic weakness of the apparatus can be exploited: that it is subservient to the Kremlin and employed as an instrument of conquest and domination. The decline of communist party strength in Western Europe, the Philippines and in other countries indicates what can be accomplished by a combination of constructive policies and political warfare.

### *The Communist Record*

The gap between communist ideology and Soviet practice is also a source of weakness. An important task of political warfare is to call attention to this gap and to make more and more apparent, especially to the largely uncommitted peoples of free Asia, that the Soviet Union is an aggressive power seeking to dominate them, and that its system, far from being superior, cannot stand free and open comparison with other societies.

The failure of communist regimes to live up to their promises is a major weakness which should be exploited by United States political warfare. The failure to produce the extra bowl of rice, or to carry through a satisfactory land reform program, or to meet the many specific desires and remedy the many specific grievances of the subject peoples is highly important material for political warfare, not only within the communist countries but also in the free nations in which communism is making headway.

### *Internal Weaknesses*

Probably the most serious internal weakness lies in the basic character of a totalitarian society. Because this form of social organization involves the concentration of power in the hands of one man, it tends to be inflexible in the execution of his orders and dependent on his personal capabilities. The Soviet system produced striking successes under Stalin; it may be far weaker under his successor or successors.

There may now be a genuine effort to govern by committee. Should it succeed, this would itself be indicative of a highly significant change in the Soviet system. It is more likely that at present there is an uneasy balance of power at the top level of the regime and that a struggle for power will go on, even if it results in some weakening of Soviet power, until Malenkov or someone else has established a dominant position. This struggle will be waged in an atmosphere of suspicion and rivalry.

The present Soviet regime may desire a period of relaxation of international tensions while it consolidates its position.** A relax-

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**Both Lenin and Stalin, at times when they were preoccupied with the problems of consolidating their internal positions, appeased the Soviet people by various political and economic measures and also attempted to improve their relations with the outside world. [Footnote in the source text.]

ation of tensions may also represent only a shift in Soviet policy along the lines indicated by Stalin as the best means of weakening and breaking up the free world coalition.

The relationship between the Soviet regime and the satellites and Communist China is another source of weakness. Soviet exploitation has created resentments among the captive peoples. Satellite rulers maintain themselves in power only by force and are dependent on the support of the Kremlin. A struggle for power in the Kremlin may make it difficult for the Soviet regime to act promptly and decisively toward the satellites and there may be corresponding struggles within these countries. As a result, opportunities may arise for satellites to break away from the Kremlin, though this would seem unlikely before an internal Kremlin conflict had reached an advanced stage.

Communist China appears to have more the position of ally than satellite.†† The alliance has probably been advantageous to each partner. There are deep and historic conflicts of interest, however, which might in time lead to open rivalry. The Soviet rulers will attempt to gain domination over Communist China because of concern over its present capabilities for independent action. The Chinese Communist regime is almost certain to resist Soviet efforts to reduce it politically and economically to satellite status; moreover, Mao Tse-tung may now regard himself as the independent leader of the communist movement in Asia and may be reluctant to take directions from the new Soviet rulers.

Despite these latent sources of conflict, the Chinese Communists probably attach great importance to maintaining the Sino-Soviet alliance and may be willing to make some sacrifices to accommodate their aspirations to Soviet policies. There is small likelihood that a split will develop between them in the near future. It also seems unlikely that the regime can be overthrown from within by popular resistance, even with such covert support as might be provided. . . .

The attitude of the Russian and satellite peoples toward their rulers is another major weakness, especially in times of crisis. Millions of Soviet citizens were ready, for example, to regard the Germans as liberators in World War II. The suppression of religion is an important source of discontent, especially in the satellite countries. The large-scale use of terror and of slave labor is also a divisive force within the Soviet system. There may not be opportunities to exploit this situation within the Soviet system by means short of war so long as the present rulers hold the loyalty of the internal security and armed forces. However, the attitude of the regime toward religion and the use of terror and of slave labor are elements of weakness which can be used to discredit the Soviet system in many countries in the free world.

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†† See NIE-65. [Footnote in the source text.]

Finally, although the Soviet system is developing its economic base rapidly, it is still far inferior in this field to the free nations. It is known that Stalin attached great importance to the economic disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union, regarding it as a factor of perhaps decisive importance. The new regime probably shares this view and clearly intends to maintain the rate of economic growth. The Western Powers have been trying to slow down the increase in Soviet military potential by restrictions on trade. New opportunities to build up these pressures may arise, but it is doubtful whether additional restrictions could materially reduce the rate of Soviet economic growth. Efforts to intensify these restrictions may well be resisted by allied countries who regard them as harmful to their own economic interests.

The Soviet economy is already severely strained by the present demands upon it and has much smaller margins within which it could expand its military strength than the Western Powers. It also has the weaknesses inherent in a totally planned economy. Although such an economy can achieve a high rate of growth, it lacks the flexibility, resilience, and initiative of a free economy.

## MAIN LINES OF SOVIET EFFORT‡‡

### *Within the System*

Within the Soviet system there will continue to be great emphasis upon the expansion of productive capacity, especially in those industries basic to industrial growth and to military production; upon the enlargement of the atomic stockpile and the improvement of means of delivery; upon the strengthening of Soviet defenses, particularly against air attack; upon the integration of the European satellites and the strengthening of their internal security. The regime's principal preoccupation, however, is likely to be the problem of the succession to Stalin. An intense struggle for power is possible. The United States and its allies should exploit this situation, particularly by confronting the regime with difficult policy choices.

### *Outside the System*

The Soviet rulers will certainly continue their effort to undermine and destroy the non-communist world by political warfare. They may be prepared to bring about some relaxation of international tensions. They probably will make no major concessions such as the reduction or withdrawal of Soviet power and influence from areas where it is now established. In fact, a state of international tension and of hostility toward the outside world is probably necessary to justify the imposition of the totalitarian police system on the Soviet people. The regime will be unable to live in genuine peace with the free nations so long as it must maintain such controls over its own people.

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‡‡ In this section the Committee has relied heavily on NIE-64, Part II. [Footnote in the source text.]

Although it is of course impossible to foresee clearly how and where the Soviet rulers will move and although it is likely that they will be able to spring surprises in the future as in the past, it seems probable that their objectives will remain constant. Sharp changes in the tactics used in pursuit of Soviet objectives may occur, some of which may pose new and difficult problems for the United States. The following principal lines of Soviet action are based on the best available government estimates, however, and it is believed that they will not be substantially modified.

With the exceptions of Southeast Asia and Iran, world conditions are not now favorable for successful communist armed revolts; and there appear to be no significant areas which the communists can hope to bring into the system by armed aggression without incurring serious risk of general war. The Kremlin may be expected to rely upon other methods. Foreign communist parties will seek to exploit neutralist, nationalist, racial and anti-American sentiments and to stimulate demands for more extensive East-West trade.

In Western Europe, the principal lines of Soviet attack will be designed to prevent or delay Western European unification and rearmament, to use economic pressures and inducements and other political means to gain control of Germany and to divide the United States and its NATO allies. The several communist parties in Western Europe will be used to further all of these purposes. The present political strength of these parties, however, indicates that in the immediate future their capabilities to achieve their objectives will be limited.

In Asia, the principal lines of communist attack will be designed to strengthen communist organizations, to weaken Asian ties with the West and to exploit Asian neutralism and anti-colonialism; to use the Viet Minh to expel the French from Indochina, but without that direct support or participation which would risk a wide extension of the war; to use economic pressures and inducements and other means of political warfare to increase communist influence in Japan; to achieve a truce without major concessions in Korea and to use a post-truce political conference to make progress toward the foregoing objectives. During the last year, however, an increasing awareness of the communist threat has been shown by Asian leaders, especially in India.

Throughout the Middle East and Africa, the Kremlin is likely to conduct an increasingly active political warfare campaign, the first goal being a Tudeh victory in Iran. Up to now, however, the communist parties in the area have been able to conclude working arrangements with nationalist forces in no country except possibly Iran.

In Latin America, the Kremlin will give the major part of its attention to building up and strengthening its organization and to fomenting hatred of the United States as a means of weakening the inter-American system.

In summary, we expect an intensification of Soviet political warfare during the period immediately ahead. We believe, however, that the Kremlin will avoid initiatives involving serious risk of general war, especially since it may hope to make additional gains by political warfare methods without such risk.

## CHAPTER THREE

## THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR WORLD ORDER

Only the collective strength and determination of the free world, under United States leadership, can eventually overcome the challenge we have just described. Only if the free world gains and maintains a power position which the Soviet Union cannot safely challenge would it be possible to bring pressures on the Soviet system which would lead to a reduction and retraction of its power and influence and eventually to a change in the nature of the Soviet system. To do this successfully, however, it will be necessary for the United States and its allies not only to agree on general objectives but also to develop and carry out common policies consistent with these objectives. In the past there has often been a discrepancy between the actions necessary to accomplish agreed objectives and the specific courses of action undertaken.

Political warfare is an instrument of national policy by which pressures can be applied. Its employment should always be adjusted to the needs of foreign policy. The best way of affecting Soviet behavior is to confront the Kremlin with difficult choices on matters of great importance. Political warfare should be designed to bring pressure on the regime to choose a course favorable to United States interests by demonstrating in appropriate ways the advantages of such a decision to the Soviet regime and the disadvantages of a different one.

This principle—demonstrating to others their self-interest in decisions which the United States wishes them to make—is generally applicable in political warfare. Decisions are made only in situations where there is a choice, and the aim is to present alternatives, both to allies and enemies, in such a way that the one favorable to United States interests seems desirable in terms of the self-interest of those who have the power of decision.

On the basis of the analysis presented in Chapters One and Two, the United States and allied and friendly nations face the prospect of a protracted conflict with the Soviet system. The United States cannot at present reasonably anticipate the collapse or drastic alteration of that system from either internal or external causes. The policies of the United States should be planned to maximize the chance of collapse, but it cannot be safely assumed that this result can be produced for many years even by the best efforts of the free nations. The United States must place its chief reliance on strengthening the free world, while maintaining pressures on the Soviet system.

In considering the conduct of national security policies and the role and contribution of political warfare, the Committee has examined the program for world order within which political warfare plays its part. This program is not a detailed blueprint, but a set of policies which, although the ultimate objective is constant, must be adapted to changes in the international situation. We recognize that these policies are now being reviewed and revised. The essential objectives, however, will not be changed. In this chapter consideration is given first to the elements of free world strength which should be developed and to the elements of weakness to be overcome. The second part of the chapter presents an outline of the major courses of action by which the United States is seeking to build that position of strength in the free world which is the necessary basis for weakening the Soviet system and for progress toward a peaceful world order.

## STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

### *Economic Factors*

The economic strength of the free nations is one of their most important assets in the conflict with the Soviet system. At present, the ratio of the gross national product of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to that of the Soviet system is about three to one. On the basis of the principal indices to economic strength, such as the production of steel, aluminum, coal, oil and electric power, the number of skilled workers, transportation, agricultural production, and so forth, the comparisons are also favorable to the West.§§ In the event of atomic attack, these margins of superiority could be of great importance, for there would be undestroyed facilities |||| which, with proper planning and preparation, could be reorganized to meet wartime needs. The Soviet Union does not have such an economic cushion, although it is believed to have large stockpiles of essential military items.

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§§See Chapter Two, pages 7 and 8. [Footnote in the source text.]

The strength of the American system of free enterprise has been proven in peace and war. Its flexibility, initiative and resilience are qualities which a totally planned economy cannot match. Among the free nations, however, the economic vitality of the United States is so great and taken so for granted that complacency over its strength is a real danger. The rate of economic growth of the Soviet system is not fully appreciated. The ability of its rulers arbitrarily to allocate its resources for military and related purposes, moreover, is not matched in peacetime by a comparable willingness of the free nations to use their superior resources to similar effect.

The free world can maintain its present economic advantage only if the magnitude of the Soviet effort is realized and determined steps are taken to remedy the economic weaknesses of the free world. The United States has not yet successfully adjusted to its position as a large and growing creditor, with the result that the rest of the free world experiences a chronic dollar shortage. Western Europe, on the other hand, has had great difficulty in adjusting to its position as a debtor on international account. Its principal problem is the unsatisfactorily slow rate of economic growth. This problem makes it difficult for these countries to deal with inflationary pressures, military requirements, various social and economic rigidities and demands for improved living standards. The older industrial countries, particularly Germany and Japan, face increasingly difficult problems of markets and sources of supply. This latter fact, to which Stalin drew attention in his address to the 19th Party Congress, has great political significance.

The underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and (to a lesser extent) Latin America are in political ferment which is, in part, economic in origin. These countries need capital and technical assistance to develop their natural resources. Communism will continue to gain ground in these countries unless the peoples learn that free institutions enable them to achieve more rapid economic improvement. These difficulties could be overcome to the mutual advantage of all. The United States needs the sources of raw materials which can be built up in the underdeveloped countries. In the process these countries will be enabled to buy industrial and other products from Western Europe and Japan which need growing

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||||For a more complete consideration of this subject, see NSC 140/1. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NSC 140/1, May 18, see p. 328.]

markets for their output. Attention to this problem is one of the most urgent tasks in a constructive program for world order.

*Military Factors*

Although the combined military strength of all free nations is essential to progress toward the principal objectives of the free world, United States military strength is the vital factor. It is the indispensable underpinning of the whole free world position. At present, the United States has approximately 3,600,000 men under arms of whom about one-half are in the Army and Marine Corps, nearly one-quarter in the Navy and a little more than one-quarter in the Air Force. About one-third of its ready military strength is deployed in the Far East; about one-fourth in Western Europe; most of the rest is stationed in the Western Hemisphere. There are nine United States divisions in Korea and Japan and large supporting air forces in the Japan–Ryukyu–Korea area. The 7th Fleet is on duty in Far Eastern waters. There are six United States divisions in Europe supported by powerful air and naval forces. The 6th Fleet is on duty in the Mediterranean, but there are no United States military forces east of Suez.¶¶

It is recognized that the ability of the United States to deter local aggression will continue to depend upon a position of general strength plus readiness to counter local aggression by the rapid deployment of forces to the scene of the trouble and the potential aggressor's awareness thereof. Although there has been a rapid and continuing build-up of United States military strength since 1950, the weight of military commitments, particularly in Korea, has created a situation in which it is estimated that the United States "general military reserve is at present so small that the use of any part of it would require its immediate reconstitution either by further mobilization or by the redeployment of existing forces now committed elsewhere. . . . This involves acute risks in the cold war."*

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¶¶NSC 141. This paper was prepared in January 1953 by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security of the last Administration. It has been considered by the NSC, but not approved by the NSC or the President. The data cited refer only to the United States and do not include other free world strength and are therefore not comparable with the data in Chapter Two for the Soviet system as a whole. Although the free nations may approach approximate military equality in numerical terms with the Soviet system, this comparison is misleading because the forces of the free nations are scattered and not subject to central control and because there is inadequate strength in certain vital areas adjoining the Soviet system. [Footnote in the source text. For extracts from NSC 141, "Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security", Jan. 19, 1953, see p. 209.]

*NSC 141. [Footnote in the source text.]

It is also recognized that the ability of the United States to deter general war will continue to depend in substantial measure upon the acknowledged capability of the United States to deliver an effective atomic offensive against the USSR under all foreseeable conditions. In this regard, the United States is greatly increasing its own atomic strength and its development of the thermonuclear weapon will further increase this power: "There is every indication that the free world's present lead in numbers and power of atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be increased and that the U.S. will continue to possess substantially greater variety and flexibility of means in the delivery of such weapons. By 1954–55, the air force as a whole and the naval air arm will be substantially modernized, and with improvements in electronics equipment our air penetration capabilities should be enhanced."†

The same sources warn, however, that although "U. S. offensive striking power is now substantial and is improving . . . some doubt exists whether it is improving relative to the strengthened Soviet defenses and to the increasing Soviet capability to damage bases in the continental United States and U.S. bases overseas by surprise atomic attacks. This doubt leads to the finding that the present strength and readiness of (U.S.) offensive striking power would involve acute risks for the United States in the first critical stages of a general war." There is, in fact, reliable evidence that the vulnerability of the United States to atomic attack is increasing as the Soviet power to attack increases without offsetting additions to United States air and civil defenses.‡

As for the military position of the rest of the free world, the Committee notes the estimate that "no one of the three major areas outside the Western Hemisphere has yet achieved adequate security against the several threats posed by the Soviet system."§ Substantial progress however, has been made in European rearmament, although significant deficiencies exist in the effectiveness of many NATO units. Under presently funded programs, some seven or eight billion dollars worth of military end items should be delivered to Europe by 1955. This should result in further progress in the development of effective forces, although Western Europe will probably not by 1955 have reached a security position which would be adequate to assure its defense against a determined Soviet attack.

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†NSC 141; see also NSC 135/2. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 135/2, Sept. 16, 1952, was amended and adopted on Sept. 25. For text of NSC 135/3, "Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security", the report in its approved form, see p. 142.]

‡ NSC 141; Project East River; the report on Armaments and National Policy by the State Department's Panel of Consultants on Disarmament (Oppenheimer Committee); and the report to the Secretary of Defense by the *Ad Hoc* Study Group on Continental Defense (the Kelly Report). [Footnote in the source text. For the report of the Panel of Consultants, see p. 1056. For documentation on continental defense, see pp. 1 ff.]

§NSC 141; see also NSC 135/2. [Footnote in the source text.]

In the Far East, the United States military aim is to make the off-shore island chain secure at minimum cost and to resist communist aggression on the mainland of Asia. The South Korean army has now been raised to 16 active divisions and a further build-up is planned. The United States is continuing to assist in developing the military capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, but Formosa could not now be defended against a determined Chinese Communist attack without substantial United States participation. The United States is giving further impetus to the development of Vietnamese forces, but it is doubtful whether Indochina could be defended against a large-scale Chinese Communist attack unless several Western divisions were securely placed in the area prior to the attack.

Potentially, Japan can again be a major military factor in the Far East. With United States assistance, the Japanese have planned a 10-division ground force and a small air force, but for many internal reasons, including the explicit prohibition against rearmament in the Japanese constitution, the development of these forces will probably be slow. In general, the strength of local and Western forces in the Far East, with the exception of Korea, is not in proportion to the dimensions of the military threat. There is very little local or Western military strength in the Middle East.

We recognize that these estimates are not wholly up-to-date, that they are not based on a thorough net estimate and that ways may be found to use the military strength of the free nations more effectively. Relative military capabilities are, however, a most important factor in calculating the risks involved in political warfare offensives against the Soviet system and in determining the degree of risk which the United States can prudently accept. The immediate problem is the prevention of further Soviet territorial expansion, particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia where there is serious danger of continued deterioration of the free world's position. This danger derives in part from the military weakness of the free nations in these areas.

### *Political Factors*

There is today a degree of cooperation among the free nations which is altogether unprecedented except in time of general war. This cooperation finds its expression in the United Nations, in NATO, in the Inter-American system, in the Pacific pacts, and in various economic programs. Nevertheless, the economic strains, the burden of military requirements and the long-continued political tensions between the Soviet system and the free nations and between the free nations themselves, are producing an unhealthy political climate in the free world. The conflicts of interest are manifest in the French reluctance to grant Western Germany a position of equality, the Arab-Israeli tensions, the Anglo-Egyptian difficulties, and the deteriorating relationships between the United Kingdom and France on the one hand, and their dependencies or former dependencies in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa on the other hand. In general, the free nations, because they are free, are necessarily more open to communist penetration and subversion than the Soviet system is to Western political warfare.||

### COURSES OF ACTION

The objectives of the United States were discussed in Chapter One and can be summarized as: (1) the security of the United States; (2) a peaceful world order of free nations and (3) a substantial relative reduction of Soviet capabilities or a basic change in Soviet objectives. The possibility of war involving large numbers of atomic bombs has become so appalling that the importance of avoiding it imposes drastic limitations on the policies by which the United States seeks to make progress toward these objectives. The United States will fight a general war if this becomes essential to the survival of the United States and the free world. But recognizing as the President has said, that the only way to win a third World War is to avoid it, the United States will attempt to conduct itself so that general war can be avoided while it moves toward its objectives.

Further expansion of the Soviet system would risk the creation of a situation in which no adequate free coalition could be assembled. Therefore, the first task of United States policy is to prevent such expansion. This will involve continuous efforts to strengthen the military power, political unity, and the economies of the free nations. Only the ability to accomplish this will provide the basis for efforts to bring about the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence and eventually a change in the nature of the Soviet system.

At present, the United States and its allies may not have the capability to prevent by local action the further expansion of the Soviet system at various points which are under attack or threatened, notably in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The United

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||The political strengths and weaknesses of the free world are discussed more fully below in describing courses of action with respect to individual areas. [Footnote in the source text.]

States and other free nations may, therefore, find themselves dependent on the threat of general war to deter Soviet expansion into such areas.

If the United States is to retain the freedom of action necessary to meet and counter Soviet threats and to make progress toward its own objectives, it must possess, in conjunction with its allies (1) the military strength required to win local conflicts and (2) the military strength necessary to prevail in the event of general war. These two essential capabilities are closely related. The willingness to commit military force to local conflicts will depend in large measure upon United States readiness for general war. Without reasonable assurance of the capability to cope with the consequences of general war, including attacks on the United States, the concern of the American people for their own security will limit the risks which the United States is willing to accept. The desire of America's allies to limit their risks is already discernible. In light of the growing Soviet atomic capability, therefore, the development of more effective air and civil defenses at least for the continental United States may become a precondition to continuing freedom of action.

In recognition of these basic facts the United States has undertaken large programs of military assistance to other countries, is strengthening its alliances with other free nations and is developing its own military strength. Military programs, however, are not only very expensive but are, by themselves, inadequate. It has become increasingly clear that the vulnerability of a country to direct or indirect aggression and its ability to resist them are closely related to its underlying political, social, and economic health. For this reason, the United States is seeking, by a wide variety of cooperative measures, to help the free world gain not only military strength but also moral, political and economic strength. In places like Berlin, Korea, and other areas where direct comparison of conditions under free government and communist control can be readily made, it is especially important that the United States seek to assure that the comparison is favorable to the free way of life by providing economic assistance and by otherwise strengthening morale in the free area.

*Support of the United Nations*

One of the ways of describing the basic objectives of the United States is to say that it desires an international order conforming to the spirit and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. It is, therefore, a major United States goal to strengthen the United Nations. It is the policy of the United States to cooperate with other members of the United Nations and through the United Nations to resist aggression, settle international disputes by peaceful means, work for the improvement of social and economic conditions, promote cultural interchange and international understanding, and meet the aspirations of dependent peoples for control of their own affairs.

Much has been said about the advantages which accrue to the Soviet rulers because they have an ideology that is alleged to be universally valid. The free nations have no such doctrine, for diversity, not only in customs and practices but in the deepest interpretations of life, is the essence of freedom. The Charter of the United Nations represents a very wide area of agreement on the proper conduct of international relations. The universal appeal of the Charter and the self-interest of all free peoples in a world conforming to its spirit could be a powerful unifying force among free nations.

The United States should, therefore, continue to support the United Nations, honor fully its obligations under the Charter and call attention to the persistent failure of the Soviet rulers to honor theirs. It should seek to persuade colonial or dependent peoples that the United States supports their desire to have growing control over their own affairs in accordance with the Charter.

### *Western Europe*

The Western European policies of the United States are designed to assist in accomplishing the following major goals:

1. The political, economic and military unification of the Western European countries and the linking of a unified Western Europe with the United Kingdom (and thus with the British Commonwealth) and with the United States in an effective coalition.
2. The realization by the Western European countries of their full potentialities, including maximum military and economic strength.
3. The recognition by the Western European countries of the need for, and their full cooperation in working toward, a substantial relative reduction of Soviet capabilities or a basic change in Soviet objectives.
4. The development of stable and mutually satisfactory patterns of cooperation, including common effort in resisting direct and indirect communist aggression, between the Western European countries and their present or former dependencies overseas.
5. The restoration and renewal, in these and other ways, of the vitality, self-respect, and confidence which once characterized Western Europe.

There are serious obstacles to the accomplishment of these goals: Franco-German rivalries and suspicions; the relations of France and the United Kingdom to their dependencies and former dependencies, especially those in the Middle East, South and Southeast

Asia, and Africa; the slow rate of economic growth in Western Europe; the problem of adequate markets and sources of supply in the free world, particularly for Germany; the pressure of population in Italy; communist strength, especially in France and Italy, and so on. Difficult as these problems are, the Western European countries can deal with them if they can generate the will and confidence to tackle them vigorously.

The governments and peoples of Western Europe are proud of their heritage and of their contribution to Western civilization; they resent the shift of power westward to the United States and eastward to the Soviet Union. They fear war because of their exposed and weak position and their concern over atomic attack. They are envious of the material richness of the United States and feel overwhelmed by the burdens of defense which they think it is pressing on them. They dislike the "cold war" and many of them think that it could be settled if the United States would take a less rigid position toward the Soviet Union.

To attain its goals in Western Europe the United States must gain support for its policies, instill confidence in its leadership, encourage a sense of shared responsibility and equal participation in decisions and actions, and develop an understanding of the Soviet threat; it must also expose the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to reach a settlement genuinely consistent with the security of Western Europe.

### *The Middle East, South Asia and Africa*

There is a widespread opinion that further deterioration in these areas is likely. It has been estimated that, with respect to the Middle East and Africa, Soviet political warfare is the main external threat, and that an armed attack, which could only be made by Soviet forces, is unlikely except as a subsidiary action in the event of general war. These areas are all in ferment, striving to break away from ancient patterns and to develop new political, social and economic institutions. They are areas in which there are great animosities—between Arab and Jew, between Hindu and Moslem, between white and colored, between present or former colonial powers and present or former dependencies. These areas of economic and strategic value in which any Soviet expansion would have dangerous consequences are particularly vulnerable to Soviet political warfare.

The immediate tasks are to prevent Soviet gains, particularly in Iran, to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions, and to bring about a better understanding between India and the West. Beyond this, there are important long-range tasks, such as assisting economic development, encouraging political stability and developing adequate defense arrangements.

It will be necessary for some time to work with the groups now in power in much of the Middle East and with the colonial authorities in much of Africa. New groups, however, are gaining power or will in time win power and the United States must be prepared to work with and encourage these new elements. It would be tragic if pseudo-revolutionary communism were to gain ground in this area by capturing the new independence movements and appearing as the spokesman of social and economic reform. So far as possible, the United States should be a champion and defender of the genuine independence movements.

*Latin America*

The situation in Latin America has some similarity to that in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. There are also important differences, including the fact that the United States has a dominating position in the area.

Since the end of the second World War, a number of factors have contributed to a deterioration in relations between the United States and the Latin American nations. The amount of aid given to Latin American nations has been minute in comparison with that extended to other parts of the world. Strong movements for the nationalization of resources have appeared in several countries where American companies have played a leading role in development projects. In Guatemala a pro-communist government has emerged. In Argentina a violently anti-American government is seeking with at least covert communist support to create a Latin American bloc based on enmity to the United States.

Against these difficulties, the Organization of American States has strengthened the general political framework for inter-American relationships. Latin American nations also support the United Nations, where they can speak with a relatively equal voice. American policy should emphasize support for the principles of individual freedom and national independence and work to overcome the conditions of economic backwardness and political instability which may make the area a fertile ground for communist penetration and agitation.

*The Far East*

The United States has made progress in developing a collective security system in the Far East. The treaties with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand provide the organizational framework for this system, and are supplemented by the arrangements with the Chinese Nationalist Government. Once Japan overcomes its constitutional obstacles, the development of its defensive strength can proceed and Japan will become a significant factor in the Far Eastern balance of power.

For the time being, the main efforts of the United States are concentrated on resistance to communist aggression in Korea and Indochina and on strengthening the defenses of the offshore island chain. The United States is transferring as much of the defensive burden to the Far Eastern states as possible by assisting allied and friendly states to develop military strength. In time it should be possible to build up substantial local forces in this vital area. It is also United States policy to assist the free Asian countries in economic development and in the expansion of their trade with each other.

Although there are many favorable factors, the intelligence estimates foresee the likelihood of a further deterioration in the Far East, especially in Southeast Asia. There are two main threats: armed communist action in Indochina, Malaya, and Korea and communist political warfare in other countries.

All of the countries of the Far East have serious economic problems. In Korea, this problem might become so acute as to interfere with the effort to build up the Korean armed forces. The communist rebellions in Indochina and Malaya have badly hurt the economies of these potentially rich countries. Japan must find larger markets and sources of supply in the Far East and elsewhere in the free world in order to support an expanding population. There are nevertheless great opportunities for economic cooperation among the countries of the Far East if political barriers can be lowered.

Difficult problems of policy lie ahead. Differences over Far Eastern policy are an important factor in the relations of the United States with its European allies. There are also obstacles to political and military cooperation between the Western European countries and many Asian countries, as is illustrated by the problem of Indochina. Following a Korean truce, many of these problems will come to a head in a post-armistice political conference. Effective political influence will be difficult or impossible to exert until the United States has been able to formulate clear policies on many important issues.

If these immediate problems can be dealt with, there should be significant opportunities to develop strength in the Far East. There, as in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, where there are also young nations seeking to develop their institutions and strengthen their independence, the United States should be a champion and defender of genuine independence movements and in general a progressive influence. These countries have gained their independence largely as a result of the influence of the

United States on world affairs and many of them look largely to the United States for the external support necessary to maintain their freedom. For these reasons the United States must work out stable patterns of cooperation with them.

The United States program, as developed and modified by the President and the National Security Council, is designed to build growing strength and cohesion in the free world, so that the free nations will have the unity of purpose and action, backed by power, to create a world order of free and peaceful nations. The ultimate objective of the United States program is the eventual inclusion of the countries now comprising the Soviet system in such a world order.

The execution of American policies demands a constant awareness of one easily ignored fact: the actions of the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes are partially determined by what the United States does. United States policy is part of the environment in which these regimes live and operate. Whether or not a regime emerges in Moscow prepared to negotiate a serious settlement with the West; whether or not Mao Tse-tung splits from Moscow; and whether or not the satellites regain their independence will be determined in part by the alternatives held out by American policy. Political warfare designed to diminish communist capabilities must constantly bear in mind this intimate connection between United States actions and the choices open to Moscow and Peking.

The United States must have a base of national security to practice political warfare successfully. Unless United States and allied military strength, defensive and offensive, is sufficient to make general war unacceptable to the Soviet rulers, and unless the United States can maintain its political alliances effectively, it will not have this secure base. This is not merely a military task, but also a task of diplomatic, economic and moral leadership addressed to the problems of the coalition as they are, not as the United States might wish them to be.

If the United States can succeed in maintaining a secure base and denying the Soviet system the alternative of cheap success by aggression or subversion, then we believe that political warfare holds great promise of success in forcing a reduction and retraction of Soviet power and a change in the nature of the Soviet system.

## PART II

### Chapter Four

### Operations Against the Soviet System

The various operations discussed in this Chapter are intended to contribute primarily to a reduction of Soviet capabilities and a retraction of Soviet power.¶ Very little progress has been made in this direction, and although research may develop new and more effective techniques, these operations must be considered unsuccessful to date. It may reasonably be asked whether these operations serve a useful purpose, whether they may be conducted more effectively with a view to making a greater contribution toward the achievement of national objectives, or whether they should be modified or abandoned. Each operation is examined with these considerations in mind.

Because of the diversity of operations directed against the Soviet system, it is not easy to present them as components in a coordinated effort to accomplish the national objectives of the United States. Lack of effective coordination partly explains the failure to make progress. Instances have been cited, for example, in which different information agencies of the American Government have extended support to the same foreign group, thereby resulting in waste of government funds, confusion of purpose, and, where some portion of the support was covert, increased risk of exposure. The Committee hopes that its recommendations on questions of organization (Chapter Seven) will help to remedy these defects.

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*Voice of America*

Because of the variety of conditions existing in various parts of the Soviet system, it would be misleading to discuss the question of radio broadcasting to the area as a whole. For the purposes of this report the system is divided into three parts: the Soviet Union, the eastern European satellites, and Communist China. The amounts budgeted for broadcasting to these three areas for the fiscal year 1953 are, respectively: $6,554,000; $4,132,000; and $2,455,000; or a total of $13,141,000. This represents 63 per cent of the total budgeted cost of VOA operations; the balance is allocated for broadcasting to the free world.

1. *The Soviet Union*

In its most recent policy guidance the International Information Administration (IIA) sets forth the following objectives for VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union:

> "*Objectives:* 1) Emphasizing to Soviet rulers and peoples the reckless nature of Soviet policy and its consequences; 2) establishing a reservoir of good will between the peoples of the USSR and those of the free world; 3) making the Soviet people conscious of and intensifying the conflicts and divergencies of interest which exist between them and their rulers; 4) providing the people of the Soviet

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¶See Chapter One, page 5 and Chapter Three, page 17. [Footnote in the source text.]

Union with accurate and full information of news and conditions in the United States and the free world."

These objectives represent the latest in a series of efforts to sharpen the tone of VOA's Russian-language broadcasts and to use VOA as an instrument of psychological warfare against the Soviet regime. When broadcasts to the Soviet Union were begun in 1947, emphasis was almost exclusively on the fourth objective stated above, that is, to provide the Soviet people with accurate news reports concerning the United States and the free world. This original concept has been gradually abandoned as international tensions have mounted, but serious doubt remains whether the more aggressive line now taken in Russian-language broadcasts is effective with Soviet listeners.

One of the handicaps under which Russian-language broadcasts have labored from the outset is the difficulty of devising any practical method of measuring audience reactions. The programs themselves have been subject to several limiting factors. Principal among these are the scarcity of short-wave receivers, the personal risk incurred by listeners to VOA programs, and the physical difficulty of reception as a result of the intensive jamming operations conducted by the Soviet Government (although new technical developments may permit this problem to be overcome).

In addition to these limiting factors, broadcasting to the Soviet Union also involves the delicate political question of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. VOA broadcasts not only in Russian but also in a number of minority languages. In theory these broadcasts present the same type of material carried on the Russian-language broadcasts and are not intended to encourage separatist tendencies. In practice the mere existence of programs in these languages emanating from an official United States station is frequently interpreted by Soviet propaganda and by Russians in the Soviet Union to mean that this Government favors a policy of dismemberment. Furthermore, the content of programs in these obscure languages is difficult to control. Finally, the problem of measuring audience reaction which exists in the case of the Russian-language programs is compounded to the point where little or nothing in the way of evaluation data is available for the minority language programs.

In view of the limitations on effective broadcasting to the peoples of the Soviet Union and the inadequate data on audience reaction, a serious doubt arises whether the United States Government should continue to devote resources on the present scale to this operation—namely, almost one-third of the total VOA budget. The

Committee believes that if its recommendations are approved, this proportion would automatically decline.

Even if a clear signal could be delivered to the Soviet listener, it is difficult to envisage any positive results which could now be achieved by provocative propaganda, and the risk of losing the audience would be ever present. It is believed, therefore, that VOA output to the Soviet Union should be modified in the following ways:**

(a) The basis for VOA output to the Soviet Union should be objective, factual news reporting. It is as a source of truth and information about world events that VOA has value for the Soviet listener. If a Soviet citizen listens to VOA outside the scope of his official duties, he must be presumed to do so in a serious effort to obtain news and information not otherwise available to him. Selection and treatment of news should be designed to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies, especially as they affect the Soviet Union.

(b) While straight news should comprise the bulk of VOA output, it should be supplemented by commentaries serving to interpret news events and to provide fuller explanations of United States actions and policies than would be apparent from the news reports themselves.

(c) Although objectivity should be paramount, VOA output should be forceful and direct both in tone and content. As official relations with the Soviet Government are on a plain-speaking basis the same should be true of the United States informational approach to the Soviet people.

(d) VOA should stress directness in its approach, but should avoid a propagandist note. The fact that it is the official voice of the United States Government argues for restraint and dignity in its tone. All material intended for purposes of political warfare against the Soviet regime should be diverted to Radio Liberation or other non-official stations.

(e) While programs of the type suggested above might be broadcast in one or two of the principal minority languages, it is felt that American objectives will not be furthered by expanding this program and it is suggested that serious consideration be given to reducing the number currently in use.

In the event of war, radio will be a political warfare weapon of major importance, especially in the initial phase. It is essential, therefore, that the facilities and personnel available to the United States not be reduced to the point where it would be difficult or impossible to respond to the exigencies of a war situation.††

2. *The Eastern European Satellites*

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**See Chapter Five for recommendations on VOA broadcasts to the free world. [Footnote in the source text.]

†† . . .

The objectives of VOA in eastern Europe as set forth in IIA guidance are the following:

> "*Objectives:* 1. To maintain hope and prevent demoralization under the weight of Soviet oppression by (a) providing continuing evidence of United States and free world concern for their fate; (b) emphasizing growing western strength; (c) reiterating our faith in their eventual liberation; (d) expressing our belief that the Soviet-dominated order will not meet the test of history.
>
> "2. To resist the inroads of Sovietization, particularly of satellite youth, by articulating the national and religious traditions of the area, and educating them concerning the meaning of free institutions.
>
> "3. To provide reliable, objective and relatively full coverage of developments in the United States and the free world, and accurate commentary on communist activities in the satellites."

The situation in the eastern European satellites with respect to radio broadcasting differs in many respects from that in the Soviet Union itself. The populations of these countries have been subjected to the communist system for a relatively short time and retain vivid memories of a different kind of life. Most of the countries, especially Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Rumania, still have a strong western orientation. Radio receivers are much more generally available to the population than in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the relative proximity to relay stations on the Soviet periphery makes it possible to deliver a medium-wave signal which is fairly good in spite of jamming operations.

Because of the greater number of refugees from most of the satellite countries than from the Soviet Union and the greater ease of communication, it is also possible to form a more accurate impression of the effectiveness of VOA broadcasts directed to this area. VOA programs are widely heard and news transmitted through this channel is passed on to a much larger audience by word of mouth. It appears that VOA is having a considerable measure of success in accomplishing its objectives in this part of the world. It is therefore believed that no major modifications of VOA programs to the eastern European satellites are required.

Three recommendations are made for guidance in future operations:

(a) A clear line of demarcation should be drawn between the legitimate spheres of VOA and RFE. The former speaks with the authority of the United States Government; the latter purports to be the voice of the freedom forces of the respective target countries. VOA should accordingly confine itself to the type of program for which the United States Government is prepared to accept responsibility, and all material not included in that category should be handled by RFE.

(b) Should the Soviet Union pursue a policy of moderation toward the West, it may be expected that the satellites will follow suit. In this event VOA will be obliged to revise the nature of its broadcasts, and an additional responsibility will consequently be placed on RFE.

(c) The effectiveness of VOA programs to the satellites can be greatly increased if guidance is received from the American missions in these countries. Although the size of mission staffs is sharply restricted by the satellite governments, probably no staff member can make a greater contribution than a competent officer who will provide the responsible VOA desk with up-to-the-minute information on local developments and suggest themes which would be most effective with the audience in his particular country. Such an officer should be assigned to the mission staff in each satellite country. VOA broadcasts have attained their highest effectiveness in countries where the Chief of Mission has devoted some of his time to providing advice and guidance.

3. *Communist China*

Radio listening facilities in Communist China are extremely limited and broadcasting is an inadequate medium for reaching the people of this area under present conditions. VOA claims to have an audience comprising government officials and local leaders, businessmen, teachers and students, and is presently engaged in increasing its transmitting facilities to the mainland of China. Meanwhile, as the result of a survey conducted by CIA of radio listening within Communist China, Radio Free Asia has decided that results do not justify broadcasting to this area and has discontinued its programs to the mainland. There are obvious advantages in maintaining a channel to the Government and influential circles in Communist China, and pending more complete evaluation we believe that present transmission facilities are adequate for this purpose.

As in the case of the Soviet Union, broadcasts to Communist China over VOA facilities should consist of factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries serving to interpret the news and to provide fuller explanations of our actions and policies than would be apparent from the news broadcasts themselves.

*RIAS—(Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)*

This station is operated under the direct supervision of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany. Appropriations for operating costs for fiscal year 1953 were $866,000, which permitted a staff of eight American citizens and 648 Germans.

Berlin provides the most direct confrontation of Soviet and Western power and has become a symbol of Western resistance to Soviet imperialism. RIAS has made an important contribution in impressing on the population of eastern Germany the determination of the

West and in sustaining their hopes for eventual liberation from the Soviet Union.

By virtue of its strategic position in Berlin, RIAS has unrivaled facilities for the collection of information concerning developments in eastern Germany. It has built up a large and devoted following among the German population in the Soviet Zone, and is generally believed to be accepted by many of its German listeners as a bona fide German station. Until recently it has been able to blanket the Soviet Zone with its program, but jamming operations initiated in 1952 have now been stepped up to the point where the audible range of the RIAS signal is limited to the City of Berlin and the Province of Brandenburg. An effort should be made to strengthen the signal in order to overcome jamming.

In view of the reputation of RIAS as a German station, the question has arisen whether it should not be turned over to the German authorities for operation. There are several factors militating against such a step at this time. Both the Bonn Government and the municipal authorities in West Berlin agree that RIAS performs a useful function, but feel that they would not be able to underwrite the cost of operation. This attitude may change after Germany regains her sovereignty. The participation by the United States in the operation of the station is a factor contributing to the maintenance of morale of West Berliners. A further consideration is the fact that as long as the United States is directly involved, the station is in a much stronger position to withstand Soviet pressures. The Committee accordingly recommends that the United States continue to operate RIAS and that the present type of program be maintained without substantial modification.

The situation of RIAS is unrivaled for broadcasting to Soviet occupation forces in eastern Germany. The suggestion that it also be utilized for Russian-language broadcasts directed to the audience has been resisted by the authorities in Berlin on the ground that it would compromise the reputation of the station as a true German voice. The Committee does not find this argument compelling. By accepting the argument the United States has deprived itself of one of the most effective media at its disposal for communication to Soviet occupation troops. We believe that Russian-language programs could be broadcast by RIAS without materially diminishing the impact on its east German audience, and it is recommended that such broadcasts be given serious consideration.

*The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc.*

The Committee was founded in 1951 for the purpose of attempting to utilize the forces of the Soviet emigration against the Soviet regime. The Committee is under CIA sponsorship and guidance, and has not attempted to raise funds publicly, which would assist in providing plausible cover for its activities. Policy has been determined in close coordination with the Department of State.

The American Committee has assumed that the most effective propaganda against the Soviet regime can be conducted by former Soviet nationals speaking in the name of a united emigration. Proceeding on this assumption, a great deal of time and effort has been expended in attempting to bring together in one political center the diverse political groups existing in the emigration, which themselves have no leader of recognized stature.

The difficulties in the way of accomplishing this aim are twofold: first, the extreme hostility existing between Great Russian groups and those composed of the various non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union; and second, basic political differences between Marxist and non-Marxist elements in the emigration, regardless of nationality. After long and arduous negotiations, agreement was finally reached in October, 1952, for the formation of a coordinating center composed of four Great Russian and five nationality groups. The entire right wing of the Great Russian emigration and such important minority groups as the Ukrainians and Belorussians have thus far held aloof.

It is the declared purpose of the American Committee to proceed with propaganda activities utilizing the present coordinating center, and to attempt gradually to broaden the base of the center by the inclusion of additional groups as circumstances permit. Activities of the center include Radio Liberation, a Russian-language station which went on the air from Munich on March 1, 1953, broadcasting initially to Soviet occupation forces in Germany and Austria, and a Russian Institute intended to utilize the knowledge and skills present in the emigration for research on the Soviet Union. A newspaper, addressed primarily to the Soviet emigration and published in the name of the coordinating center, is planned.

In the fiscal year 1953 $———‡‡ was allotted for support of this project. Of this figure $——— was for Radio Liberation and $——— for the conduct of the other activities of the Committee. Ninety-six Americans and 218 aliens were employed.

The results to date have not been noteworthy. Undoubtedly more rapid progress could have been made if the idea of a political center had been abandoned and activities on the RFE pattern begun without regard to political considerations. From the outset there have been many advocates of such a course who argued that the whole history of the Russian emigration since 1917 has demonstrated the futility of attempting to persuade its diffuse elements to coalesce in a common undertaking. The prevailing view, however, has been that the psychological impact of a united voice of the Soviet emigration would so much outweigh that of a station under transparent foreign control that the time and effort expended on the formation of a coordinating center were justified.

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‡‡Figures in this and subsequent chapters have been omitted at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence in all copies of this report except the President's copy, Number 1. The figures will be furnished by the Director of Central Intelligence if required. [Footnote in the source text. "President's copy, Number 1" has not been found.]

In a situation short of war the project can probably make its greatest contribution by de-emphasizing its political activities and devoting its major effort to the improvement of broadcasts from Radio Liberation. This station should use Soviet émigrés in an effort to weaken the Soviet regime and should concentrate on the Soviet military, government officials, and other groups in the population which harbor major grievances against the regime. Present plans call for the provision of new transmitting facilities in Spain. It is important that these or other facilities be developed in order to enable Radio Liberation to reach a wide audience within the Soviet Union.

Pending a final determination of its effectiveness, we believe that the activities of the American Committee should be continued. Because results can be expected in the immediate future only from broadcasting, however, it is recommended that major attention should be concentrated on Radio Liberation. Expenditures on the coordinating center can be reduced but should be maintained at a level adequate to keep the organization in being, without active efforts to broaden the base of the center. If through the efforts of the present membership of the center additional émigré groups can be persuaded to participate, such moves should receive the encouragement and support of the Committee.

*National Committee for a Free Europe*

The National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) was created by CIA in 1949 with the following purposes:

1. to create an institution in which the émigrés from the satellite nations could find employment which would utilize their skills and, at the same time, document for the world at large the actions of the satellite governments and Soviet Russia;
2. to utilize the political figures of such emigrations as rallying points and as symbols of unified opposition to communism in this country and abroad;
3. to relieve the Department of State of the need to deal with émigré political leaders whom they could not endorse as "Governments in Exile" at a time when the United States officially recognized the satellite governments; and
4. generally to "aid the non-fascist, non-communist leaders in their peaceful efforts to prepare the way toward the restoration in

Eastern Europe of the social, political, and religious liberties, in which they and we believe."

The activities of NCFE fall into six categories: the organization and support of refugee political groups; Radio Free Europe (RFE), which broadcasts from Munich and Portugal to the eastern European satellites; research projects on eastern Europe; the Free University in Exile located at Strasbourg; the compilation of an information digest of current developments behind the Iron Curtain; and assistance to refugees from the satellites now residing in western Europe.

In the fiscal year 1953 $——— was allotted for the support of these activities. Most of this support was furnished by CIA. Of this amount $——— was allocated to RFE, $——— to the Free University in Exile, and $——— to the support of the other activities conducted by NCFE. The following personnel are engaged in these operations: RFE: 252 Americans and 1,526 aliens; Free University in Exile: 8 Americans and 45 aliens; other activities: 183 Americans and 345 aliens.

The bulk of available evidence indicates that RFE is widely heard, particularly in its three primary target areas, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and that its programs are well received by its audience. There is less agreement on the effectiveness of other NCFE activities. Efforts to form national councils composed of political leaders from the various emigrations have largely been frustrated by the bickerings and jealousies common to émigré politicians. The Free University in Exile, which was established to train refugee students for future leadership in their own countries after liberation, has found it difficult to provide proper motivation and the whole project is currently under re-examination. The research and news-gathering activities provide material for broadcasting operations and are also a source of information regarding developments behind the Iron Curtain. Aid to satellite refugees in western Europe, which is designed to supplement the activities of regular relief agencies by assisting refugees to adapt to their new environment while preserving their national consciousness and national culture, is a program now in its initial phases.

In the original plan the various national councils were to be responsible for broadcasts over RFE facilities to their respective countries. Since the complexities and rivalries of émigré politics made the organization of national councils difficult, it was decided to set up RFE on a non-political basis. Emigré staffs were hired for competence rather than political affiliation and programs to various countries are now id entified as the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia, Poland, and so on. Although this reason for the national councils no longer exists, they do have potential value in exile relations. If the émigré leaders are prepared to create national councils of their own volition, NCFE should assist them to engage in such propaganda activities as they may be qualified to conduct. Primary attention, however, should be given to the broadcasting phase of NCFE activities. The Committee recommends that the rest of these activities be reviewed by CIA to determine whether they should be continued or modified.

As in the case of the Russian emigration, support operations which enable refugees from the satellites to live decently either in the United States or in western Europe have a certain long-term value even though their short-range advantages are not apparent. These individuals might constitute a useful cadre in the event of hostilities in eastern Europe and the research work they do may prove of value, both now and in the future, if suitable arrangements can be made for better distribution of the results to appropriate agencies.

Certain specific problems arise in connection with NCFE activities, particularly RFE. There is first the question of cover. It has been suggested that, because the present cover has worn thin, RFE's official connections be freely admitted. Such a course, however, would vitiate the principal reason for the existence of RFE as a separate organization. So long as its government connections are not officially admitted it can broadcast programs and take positions for which the United States would not desire to accept responsibility. The Committee believes that the present cover is adequate for this purpose.

A second problem is the question of relations with the West German Government. RFE's European headquarters and several of its transmitting facilities are located in West Germany. By the very nature of its activities it is inevitable that there should be conflict between the interests of RFE and those of the large number of ethnic Germans who have been displaced from their homes in eastern Europe. These German refugees are critical of some of the eastern Europeans employed on RFE and frequently disagree with the political solutions which are advocated or implied with respect to the future organization of this area. They constitute a compact political pressure group in western Germany and are in a position to influence the attitude of the Bonn Government. This will be a continuing problem and may be expected to become more acute as Germany moves toward full sovereignty. It is therefore imperative that every effort be made by RFE to work out and maintain the best possible relations with the Bonn Government.

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*Committee for Free Asia*

Although the Committee for Free Asia (CFA) is usually considered to be similar to NCFE in organization and functions, and although the two organizations have joined in the Crusade for Freedom in appealing for public support, CFA differs from NCFE in that its activities are directed primarily to the free countries of Asia rather than behind the Iron Curtain. In its work in these countries CFA operates on the concept that a private organization, particularly in Asia, can accomplish results which an official agency by its very nature cannot. It presupposes that the more it obscures its American label the more effective it will be. It seeks to foster among Asian peoples a sense of their importance as individuals, to develop in Asia a community of interest in resisting communism, and to encourage and promote native leadership of activities which will strengthen freedom. In working toward these objectives CFA encourages individuals and groups to act in their own right as Asians, in Asian self-interest, for Asian objectives.

In May, 1951, Radio Free Asia (RFA) went on the air short-wave over leased facilities in three Chinese dialects and English. Surveys revealed that on the Chinese mainland the audience was restricted to government officials and others specifically authorized to listen to short-wave broadcasts.§§ Because of this situation RFA concentrated on the overseas Chinese audience in Southeast Asia. This audience was not thought to justify the expense of the program and it was recently decided to discontinue RFA entirely. The amount allocated for the operation of RFA in the fiscal year 1953 was $———.

The other activities of CFA, which are directed almost entirely toward the free countries of Southeast Asia and Japan, are discussed in Chapter Five.

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## ECONOMIC DENIAL PROGRAM

Another phase of operations against the Soviet system is the economic denial program by which the volume of strategic materials exported to the Soviet system from the free world has been substantially reduced.

In order to limit the war potential of the Soviet system and to increase its economic difficulties, the United States has for the past several years been engaged in an extensive program "to prevent the flow to countries supporting the communist imperialist aggression of those materials, goods, funds, and services which would serve materially to aid their ability to carry on such aggression."|||| Under this program, there has been a complete embargo on arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials. There has also been an embargo—with certain exceptions—on industrial and transportation materials of primary strategic significance. Additional items are added to the embargo list as agreement is achieved among the free nations.¶¶

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§§See page 37 above. [Footnote in the source text. For the passage under reference, see p. 1828.]

It is believed that the Soviet military build-up has been slowed by the denial program. A recent analysis* of the economic consequences of a complete severance of East-West trade concluded that the amount of commerce still carried on between the Soviet system and the West is so small in relation to the total productive capability of either side that its severance could not have a significant effect on the general level of economic activity of either the system or the West. This estimate also concludes that, with the possible exception of natural rubber and electronic tubes and components, the Soviet system would be capable of replacing, within about four years, all goods presently imported from the West.

The Committee understands that the Planning Board of NSC has been directed to review the entire denial program and submit recommendations to the Council in the near future. In the light of this current NSC review, the Committee has not attempted to arrive at independent conclusions concerning the strategic importance of the program or its potential contribution to the United States effort against the Soviet system.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

## PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN THE FREE WORLD

This Chapter is devoted to a review of the information and propaganda activities conducted by four government agencies: The Departments of State and of Defense, the Mutual Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. We discuss the mission of the propaganda and information programs, note the size and distribution of the effort, make a general appraisal of the program and finally a more detailed appraisal of the various media.

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||||Letter from the President to the Secretary of State dated December 28, 1950, reproduced in NSC 104 dated February 12, 1951, pp. 1-2. [Footnote in the source text. For NSC 104, "U.S. Policies and Programs in the Economic Field Which May Affect the War Potential of the Soviet Bloc," see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 1023.]

¶¶Second Report to Congress, January 1953, by the Battle Act Administrator, pp. 3-5. [Footnote in the source text.]

*NIE-59. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see vol. I, Part 2, p. 949.]

### MISSION OF PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION

There is a wide difference of opinion concerning the role of propaganda and its inherent limitations. The most enthusiastic advocates of propaganda consider it to be a weapon in its own right—to have the capability, if skillfully employed, of changing the opinions of foreign peoples and influencing the actions of foreign governments. The Committee believes, however, that propaganda cannot be expected to be the determining factor in deciding major issues. The United States is judged less by what it says through official information outlets than by the actions and attitudes of the Government in international affairs and the actions and attitudes of its citizens and officials, abroad and at home. American policies, both foreign and domestic, may guarantee the security or set the standard of living of entire nations. Extreme statements made by Americans, often for domestic effect, are prominently displayed abroad and can create serious doubt as to the maturity, stability, and constancy of purpose of the United States.

Propaganda is most effective when used as an auxiliary to create a climate of opinion in which national policy objectives can be most readily accomplished. It must perform the function of informing foreign peoples of the nature of American objectives and of seeking to arouse in them an understanding and a sympathy for the kind of world order which the United States and other free nations seek to achieve. To be effective, it must be dependable, convincing, and truthful. In particular situations propaganda, overt or covert, may play a role of decisive importance in the attainment of specific goals, but too much or too blatant propaganda can be harmful.

One of the principal handicaps under which United States information and propaganda activities have suffered is confusion regarding their mission. This has been particularly true of the foreign information service of the Department of State known as the International Information Administration (IIA). Upon the abolition of the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1945, its functions were transferred to the Department of State, which was directed to provide foreign peoples with a "full and fair picture" of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government. The Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402) in 1948 established, in addition, an educational exchange service and emphasized the need to increase mutual understanding by the dissemination abroad of information about the United States. In 1950 a "Campaign of Truth" was launched by the President in an effort to counter hostile Soviet propaganda. After the outbreak of the Korean War, NSC 68 [4] set the propaganda objective of deriving "the maximum psychological effect from the political, diplomatic, economic and military measures undertaken by the United States and its allies." In 1951, the primary mission of the information service was defined as deterring the Soviet war effort.† To facilitate the attainment of this objective five tasks were assigned to IIA which have been reaffirmed in subsequent NSC documents:

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[4] For text of NSC 68, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security", Apr. 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 234.

(1) To increase psychological deterrents to communist aggression.
(2) To intensify, particularly in Western Europe, the growth of confidence in the free world's ability to stop communist aggression.
(3) To combat neutralism, particularly in Asia.
(4) To maintain hope of liberation among the peoples behind the Iron Curtain.
(5) To maintain, particularly in Latin America, a recognition of the mutual interdependence of this area and the United States.

In Germany, in addition to IIA activities, an extensive and in large measure independent information program has been conducted since the end of the war, first under the Department of Defense and subsequently, since 1949, under State Department direction (HICOG). In 1951 the Department of State declared that the objective of the HICOG information program was "to serve as an instrument of the occupation," and that its "normal function" was the "full and fair projection of the United States."‡ The mission was changed in 1953 to that of "affecting the attitudes and actions of the German people" and assuring the "acceptance of our objective."§

The aims of the other agencies engaged in information work have been more precise and constant. MSA has been charged with persuading Europeans to increase their productivity, to develop their economic and military strength, and to integrate their economies. The objectives of CIA covert propaganda in the free world are to combat communist subversion, counter neutralism, and generally promote United States and Western concepts and interests. The mission of the Department of Defense information activities in the free world is to furnish information to troops stationed overseas and to encourage friendlier relations between the troops and foreign populations.

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†NSC 114/2. Annex 5. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 114/2, "United States Programs for National Security", Oct. 12, 1951, is printed in part in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 182. NSC 114/2, Annex 5, "The Information Program", same date, is also printed *ibid.*, p. 942.]

‡Statement of Policy Concerning the Revision of the Public Affairs Program for Germany and the Conclusion of a Cultural Treaty," July 25, 1951. [Footnote in the source text. The statement of policy under reference is not printed.]

§Public Affairs Plan for Germany, January 1953. [Footnote in the source text. The plan under reference is not printed.]

There is still no unanimity of opinion regarding the over-all mission of the United States information agencies. Some consider the mission to be the dissemination of truth, particularly about the United States; some emphasize the importance of winning friends for the United States; and others view the information services as a weapon against communism. These differing points of view have emerged in the prolonged public debate on the mission of the information program and have contributed to the uncertainty and confusion among information personnel which has proven such a serious handicap to the development of a coordinated and purposeful program.

The dissemination of truth is not enough. Friendship for the United States is neither a prerequisite to nor a guarantee of action in the interest of the United States. Anti-communist propaganda may antagonize more foreigners than it convinces. While all of these elements have a legitimate place in an information program, the Committee believes that any program supported by government funds can only be justified to the extent that it assists in the achievement of national objectives.

The primary purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States.

It must be the concern of the United States to find out what other peoples want, to relate their wants to those of this country and to explain these common goals in ways that will cause others to join with the United States in their achievement.

This goal can be achieved only on the basis of clear and consistent statements of the American position on major issues. Too often the United States speaks with a multitude of voices. Conflicting interpretations of national objectives are a serious handicap to successful persuasion in foreign countries.

### SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Because of the complexity of departmental budgets and the transfer of appropriated funds within agencies, the total cost of propaganda and information activities in the free world can be stated only in general terms. A figure of . . . for operating the program in fiscal year 1953 appears to be a reasonable approximation. This is divided among the principal agencies as follows:

State Department—$120,000,000||
Mutual Security Agency—$50,000,000¶

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Defense Department—$10,000,000**

The share of the Department of State for activities in the free world is allocated among three organizations:

International Information Administration (IIA)—$82,000,000||
High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG)—$30,000,000††
Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA)—$11,000,000

Thus, while IIA is the largest agency in the information field, it expends only 40 per cent of the total amount appropriated for propaganda and information activities in the free world.

In geographical terms . . . or two-thirds of the annual total is spent in Western Europe . . .

In terms of personnel, both American and alien, IIA has the largest staff, with more than 9,000 employees. HICOG now has 4,000 employees compared to its earlier maximum of 7,000. The MSA information staff is 700. IIA has the heaviest concentration in the United States, one-third of its personnel being stationed here in comparison with only five per cent of the MSA information staff. IIA also relies to a greater degree on American personnel, one-half of its staff being citizens. The comparable figures are 20 per cent for MSA and 10 per cent for HICOG.

### APPRAISAL OF PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS

Any appraisal must take into account the principal characteristics of Soviet and American propaganda. These derive chiefly from differences in governmental structure and philosophy and from the wide divergence in national objectives.

For the last 30 years the Soviet propaganda program has been large and centrally directed. From the time they seized power, the Bolsheviks have given high priority to propaganda, both internal and external. As a result of this long experience, the Soviet Union possesses a large group of propagandists which is continually replenished by new and well-trained recruits. They are inhibited neither by the need to tell the truth nor by public opinion at home. In

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||An additional $14,000,000 is allotted for propaganda behind the Curtain. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶ One-half of this amount is for the productivity and technical assistance exchange program. [Footnote in the source text.]

**This is not a budgetary figure, but is a rough approximation of the cost of activities related to propaganda in the free world. So many activities of this department have propaganda overtones that it is impossible to determine an accurate figure. [Footnote in the source text.]

††Funds for information activities in Germany are appropriated separately from IIA. [Footnote in the source text.]

addition, the Soviet propaganda machine has an effective apparatus abroad in the foreign communist parties, which contribute their own funds and labor.

The United States also has advantages. Its people share fundamental beliefs and basic values with millions of the men and women the United States is attempting to win to its side: belief in God, belief in individual and national freedom and the right to ownership of property, belief in a peaceful world and in the common humanity of men and nations compromising their differences and cooperating in the United Nations. Sharing such beliefs, the United States has partners and allies abroad, not subservient satellites held by force.

The military strength of the United States, its economic system, its standard of living, its technical development and productive capacity are appropriate subjects of information programs as showing the capability both to resist aggression and to give powerful assistance in the creation of a peaceful world order. Of fundamental importance, however, the program should speak in terms of the deeper spiritual values uniting this nation with the rest of the world.

*Central Direction*

The national information program has suffered from the lack of effective central direction. In spite of the establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board, coordination has been lacking and the various agencies concerned have largely gone their separate ways. Opportunities have been missed to take the offensive in global propaganda campaigns. Too often, the program has been merely defensive. Lack of coordination has resulted in the haphazard projection of too many and too diffuse propaganda themes. No single set of ideas has been registered abroad through effective repetition. This is in sharp contrast to the technique of the Soviets, who have consistently hammered home a few carefully selected central themes: land reform, peace, anti-imperialism, youth. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate more on the conception, planning and coordination of global campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.

Another serious problem has been confusion regarding the guidance provided by the information agencies in Washington to their staffs in the field. Each has issued detailed guidances to its own field staffs, usually after some coordination by the interdepartmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC). The agency primarily concerned, IIA, in order to meet media deadlines, has often issued its information guidances before political guidances were prepared in the Department of State. Such guidances have not always been in agreement.

The Committee believes that, although guidance on specific or local objectives of information activities may often be required from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined to global or regional themes. When United States policy and objectives have been explained to the field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting their information activities to particular local situations.

### *Adaptation to Local Conditions*

One aspect of IIA activity which has been repeatedly criticized is the mass preparation and distribution of material. Frequently, there has been insufficient concentration on particular targets and programs have not been best calculated to achieve the desired result. Much of the material prepared in the United States is of little use for any foreign audience. This criticism applies with particular force to short-wave broadcasts by the Voice of America to the free world and to publications prepared in the United States. Insofar as possible, information material should be prepared abroad to meet local needs.

More decentralization of tactical control of the information program to the country level and the local preparation of more material should permit a substantial reduction in the information staffs located within the United States. This is particularly true of IIA.

Audiences often do not believe information provided by any foreigner and are particularly quick to take offense at advice and exhortation received from abroad. They are likely not only to reject such an approach but to complain of interference in their internal affairs. Not all of the free world is prepared to view its problems in the context of a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The note of self-praise and the emphasis on material achievements by the United States frequently creates envy and antagonism.

### *Attribution*

As a general rule, information and propaganda should only be attributed to the United States when such attribution is an asset. A much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed.

Attribution to the United States can be prevented not only by avoiding the use of specific labels, but also by the utilization abroad of personnel other than American in the preparation and dissemination of material. In certain countries the large number of Americans engaged in information activities is a handicap rather than an asset to effective work. Competent and experienced local employees are usually far more familiar than Americans with conditions and personalities in their own country. They are in much better position to establish the type of personal contacts through which unattributed propaganda can be disseminated. In countries where there are large concentrations of Americans engaged in information activities, their number should be substantially curtailed and they should be replaced where necessary by qualified local employes.

Another method of avoiding official attribution in propaganda is the utilization of the numerous private American organizations active abroad. This very substantial asset has been insufficiently exploited by Government information agencies. While only a few companies, such as the wire services, are directly engaged in the dissemination of information, many participate in activities which are important to the local population. American business firms often comprise a significant segment of a foreign country's industry. American universities and foundations have a long and impressive record in the exchange of students and encouragement of scientific research. American missionaries, particularly in Asia and Africa, have brought spiritual guidance and material assistance. In recent years, American labor groups have established direct relations with foreign trade unions. Far greater efforts should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over content.

Although the United States is a leading member of the United Nations and an active participant in numerous other international organizations, its propaganda appeals to the rest of the free world have been largely couched in strictly American terms. There has been reluctance on the part of the United States to participate in coordinated international information efforts lest the content of its propaganda be controlled by its foreign partners. The United States, however, is associated with numerous nations of the free world in various joint endeavors, all of which are primarily intended to strengthen the free world against the Soviet Union. The partners of the United States should be able to make a substantial contribution to the achievement of American propaganda objectives, and increased emphasis should be placed on this form of international cooperation.

### *Control at the Country Level*

While maximum decentralization of information activities is required to provide meaningful and purposeful programs suited to the requirements of local audiences, effective centralized control is needed in each country. In some countries the various United States agencies engaged in information work have conducted their programs independently of one another. In other countries, an effective and coordinated information program has been worked out under the direction of the Chief of Mission and a country team composed of the senior representative of each agency.

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*Continuity and Flexibility*

An effective foreign information program can only be achieved and maintained if firm executive and congressional support is accorded to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations, and flexibility in management.

Lack of agreement regarding the information program has resulted in frequent and often drastic changes in organization. Since 1945 the major information effort has been vested successively in an independent agency (OWI), in the Department of State under the direction of an Assistant Secretary, and in a semi-autonomous organization under an administrator reporting to the Secretary of State. Under the reorganization plan now under consideration, the information program would again be placed in a separate agency combining the functions of IIA with the information activities of MSA and TCA. Irrespective of the merits of the various organizational arrangements, these frequent changes have resulted in great uncertainty, impaired the continuity of policies and programs, hurt morale and hamstrung effective management. The Committee's views on organization of the information activities are stated in Chapter Seven, pages 99-102.

Both the executive and the legislative branches of the government have lacked any firm conviction with respect to the nature and extent of the program, with the result that appropriations have fluctuated irregularly from year to year and continuity of effort has been impaired. MSA's information program has undergone rapid expansion and contraction. IIA's annual budget has varied irregularly between $20,000,000 and $120,000,000. Fluctuations of this magnitude have made efficient management almost impossible.

While the adoption of the recommendations in this report would result in less spending in some portions of the program, particularly within the United States, spending might be increased in other sections. The Committee, therefore, recommends that appropriations not be drastically reduced until the new principles and procedures have been tried.

Lack of flexibility in budgetary and personnel matters has handicapped IIA and made management even more difficult. The information program requires more flexibility to permit decentralization as well as rapid concentration on targets of opportunity. Flexibility is also essential for the successful utilization of unattributed propaganda due to the diversity of channels and techniques.

*Public Support*

Another disability under which the information program has labored has been a lack of understanding of its purpose on the part of the American people and of official American representatives abroad. While the latter difficulty is gradually being overcome through association and cooperation in the field, the role of the information program remains something of a mystery to the American public. The degree of misunderstanding of the purposes of the program is revealed in current investigations. This misunderstanding results in part from the provision of the Smith–Mundt Act (PL 402) which enjoins IIA from informing the American people of the nature of its activities. The Committee supports the recommendation of the United States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning the program.

*Security Handicaps*

The information program of the United States, both in the free world and behind the Iron Curtain, has been severely handicapped by certain current security policies and practices. This has affected the information program in three distinct ways. First, it has interfered with the recruitment of qualified personnel and contributed to the prevailing low state of morale among information personnel. Second, it has hampered the implementation of certain phases of the program such as resettlement of Iron Curtain refugees, exchange of persons, and selection of books for overseas libraries. Finally, the administration of the security program in the United States has had unfavorable repercussions abroad, particularly among our Western European allies, which cut directly across the objectives of the information program. Although the security program and immigration regulations are not within the jurisdiction of the Committee, we wish to point out the damage to the information and propaganda program which has resulted from certain aspects of each.

## CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA SERVICES

For the sake of convenience, the following five sections follow the media breakdown employed by IIA. Although this organization is not used by other agencies with information programs, their activities are also discussed under the appropriate headings.

*Radio*

Three agencies, the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, own radio broadcasting facilities. All United States agencies with information programs make some use of local stations in foreign countries. The Voice of America (VOA), part of IIA, provides the most extensive radio coverage and is the most controversial portion of the IIA program. VOA operates about 70 transmitters, most of which are short-wave, and has some 2,000 employees, three-quarters of whom are Americans. The VOA effort is concentrated on countries behind the Iron Curtain, only $9,000,000 of its total operating budget of $22,000,000 being spent on broadcasting to the free world. At the peak of the Campaign of Truth, it broadcast in 46 different languages. Since funds to complete its transmitter network have not been appropriated, it has not been able to provide an adequate signal in many areas. VOA is attempting increasingly to utilize local stations for radio broadcasts, some of which are not attributed to the United States.

The Department of Defense also operates extensive radio facilities in the free world. The Armed Forces Network (AFN) has 70 stations, mostly medium-wave. There are 22 in the Far East and 13 in Europe. The remainder are chiefly in United States possessions. The annual cost of operations in foreign countries is roughly $4,300,000. Although AFN broadcasts only in English and aims its programs at American troops, it reaches a large foreign audience. A Swiss radio magazine declared in 1953: "The Armed Forces Radio Service programs are in much larger measure than the Voice a reflection of American life because they represent Americans speaking to Americans, which requires no special slant."

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There are three methods for transmitting radio programs. Each has its advantages and disadvantages for disseminating propaganda and information.

1. Short-wave transmitters controlled by the United States.

Short-wave is the only type of radio broadcasting which provides intercontinental coverage and permits the transmitters to be located in territory which is firmly controlled by the United States although it may be a great distance from the audience. The United States can, therefore, control the program content without interference by the foreign government, except for jamming. Short-wave radio is the only available method of providing information to most of the Soviet Union and to other unfriendly countries remote from the point of transmission.

Programming is done far from the audience, however, which poses serious problems in adapting programs to suit foreign interests and attitudes. The size of the audience for short-wave programs is limited by the fact that special receiving equipment is necessary which is beyond the means of most people in foreign countries.

2. Medium-wave transmitters controlled by the United States.

The range of medium-wave radio is relatively limited and transmitters must therefore be located closer to the audience. Medium-wave is the normal channel for radio broadcasting and is heard on standard receivers. Consequently, it reaches a much larger audience within a given area than does short-wave. Since most governments will not permit the operation of foreign transmitters on their territory, the areas where United States medium-wave transmitters may be located are restricted. American relay and medium-wave facilities abroad are now largely concentrated in Germany and Austria by virtue of the privileged position resulting from the occupation. This is a situation which may not long continue. Whereas short-wave programs are fully under control of the United States, programs broadcast on medium-wave must be careful to avoid offense to the government on whose territory the transmitter is located.

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The Soviet Union relies more heavily on short-wave radio than does the United States. Due to a more favorable geographic location, the Soviet Union is able to provide a strong signal with fewer and less powerful transmitters. Soviet short-wave broadcasting concentrates on Asia. Moscow is on the air approximately twice as much as the United States in about the same number of languages. Roughly the same ratio applies if the total short-wave radio output of the Soviet Union and its satellites is compared to that of the free world. Such large use of short-wave radio may be for purposes of frequency denial.

Local radio programs on medium-wave always far exceed those from foreign sources. In most countries, medium-wave programs originating in foreign countries of the free world are more numerous than those from communist countries. France, for example, has 500 hours a week of locally originated programs and 200 hours from other non-communist countries. There are less than 40 hours from behind the Iron Curtain.

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The Committee recommends that the continuance of short-wave programs to the free world be reviewed on a country basis in consultation with the Ambassadors concerned, to determine the areas in which there is some expectation of accomplishing propaganda objectives through the use of this medium. We recommend that short-wave broadcasts be discontinued to those areas where such an expectation cannot be demonstrated, . . .

Attributed American broadcasts, particularly those of VOA, should concentrate on objective, factual news reporting. Selection and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies, especially as they affect the target country. While a tone of exhortation and abuse should generally be avoided, VOA should not be precluded from making dignified, forceful, and factual refutations of Soviet accusations. Satire and humor may also have their place. Music, entertainment, and such other miscellaneous program material as may be considered necessary by United States chiefs of mission to maintain audience interest in individual target countries may properly be used.

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We recommend that consideration be given to changing the name "Voice of America," since the name is associated both in the United States and in many foreign countries with programs which have been widely criticized and discredited.

*Exchange of Persons*

Nineteen different Federal agencies‡‡ are engaged in the exchange of persons with free world countries for various types of training. There are four major programs, each designed to meet a different need, which altogether annually bring about 18,000 foreign nationals to the United States and send 2,000 Americans overseas. The total cost, exclusive of the large military exchange program, is about $60,000,000.

Annually, IIA and HICOG together spend about $22,000,000 to bring in 7,000 foreign nationals and to send some 1,600 American citizens abroad. Half of the exchanges are students, the remainder adult specialists. German and Austrian citizens predominate because $6,000,000 of the total annual appropriation is earmarked for these countries by Congress.

With a view to increasing productivity in backward countries, TCA spends in the order of $10,000,000 per year to provide technical training in the United States for approximately 1,000 foreign government employees, most of whom are roughly equivalent in rank to a county agent.

Roughly $25,000,000 annually is currently being spent by MSA to train 4,000 foreign specialists and 400 workers in the United States in order to increase foreign industrial productivity. Some 700 United States technicians are sent abroad annually to train and teach in Europe and the Far East.

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‡‡Four agencies conduct exchange programs of some magnitude. They are: IIA (State), TCA (State), MSA and Defense. Smaller programs are conducted by five agencies: CIA, Atomic Energy Commission, National Institutes of Health (Department of Health, Welfare and Education), National Science Foundation, Maritime Commission (Commerce). Ten additional agencies cooperate in the carrying out of primary exchange programs on a paid basis. They are: Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, Health, Welfare and Education, Interior, Housing and Home Finance, Federal Communications Commission, General Services Administration, Bureau of the Budget and Veterans' Administration. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Department of Defense brings to the United States each year roughly 6,000 foreign nationals. Ninety per cent of these exchangees receive low echelon military training. One hundred fifty senior officers and 100 newspaper editors and other leaders receive special training or are taken on tours of the military establishments. While the Defense program is intended primarily to increase military preparedness in the free world, it has the by-product of increasing firsthand knowledge of the United States.

CIA and other Federal agencies have exchange programs of limited scope for special purposes.

In addition to the programs financed by the Government, there are numerous exchanges arranged by foreign governments and by private groups, both American and foreign. The aggregate of these may well be greater than the Federal program.

Exchanges play a major role in the Soviet effort to influence foreign peoples in the Soviet interest. It is estimated that 45,000 persons are brought to the Soviet Union annually from the free world for training, not only in propaganda but in many forms of political action and clandestine operations. This large group is augmented by others, especially from backward areas, who are brought to the Soviet Union for technical training or merely on good will visits. This form of activity has been successfully developed by Moscow to provide skilled local communist leaders in foreign countries and to win friends and sympathizers for the Soviet Union.

. . . The Committee agrees with the policy of not exposing exchangees to open propaganda indoctrination. It further believes that all agencies concerned should exercise great care in placing and looking after exchangees. Cases have been reported where the attitude of the local American community was so hostile as to jeopardize any beneficial effects which might have been anticipated from the exchange.

There has been difference of opinion among administrators of the exchange program concerning the criteria for selection of candidates, particularly the relative importance of short and long-term objectives, and whether candidates should be chosen primarily for their academic or technical ability rather than for their potential usefulness to the United States. The Committee considers that the long-term exchanges, particularly of students, have been worthwhile and should be continued, but we also believe that more use should be made of exchanges to influence the attitudes of important local individuals. The Chief of Mission should supervise exchanges of a short-range political character conducted by United States agencies within his country.

*Press and Publications*

The United States is carrying on a large program utilizing press, pamphlets and miscellaneous printed propaganda. . . .

The Wireless File is prepared and distributed by IIA to provide American missions throughout the world with a fast news service. In many countries it is in competition with the commercial wire services, but provides more complete texts of official statements. There has been considerable criticism of this activity. The Committee recommends that it be reviewed and continued only to those countries where Chiefs of Mission have expressed a desire for its retention.

Dozens of magazines and hundreds of pamphlets are produced by IIA. Volume is in the tens of millions of copies and until recently has been constantly growing. Much of the output is still labeled American; most of it is prepared outside the country in which it is distributed, largely in the United States. The sheer volume of material bearing the American label is harmful, and the Washington services have largely failed to produce the type of publication required to meet the specific problems of the field.

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The Soviet Union makes extensive use of publications for foreign propaganda purposes; its effort in this field considerably exceeds that of the United States. Furthermore, through local communist parties and front groups the Soviet Union controls many newspapers and magazines and is able to carry on large-scale leaflet and poster campaigns. In most areas, however, local non-communist publications far overshadow all foreign efforts.

Publications are one of the most important propaganda weapons, but they can be used to much better advantage than in the past in advancing national objectives. IIA should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever possible, so that material can be prepared which is more responsive to local needs. The programs of all agencies should also be reviewed to determine whether publication activities have been too highly concentrated in Western Europe with a resultant loss of opportunities in the remainder of the free world.

*Motion Pictures*

Films are used by all overseas information agencies of the Government, although the dollar volume is less than for any medium except libraries. It probably is less than $20,000,000 per year.

Overt documentary films comprise the bulk of IIA output, although IIA has also financed a few excellent unattributed films. Most IIA films are exhibited not through commercial outlets but in

United States Information Centers and by means of mobile units. . . .

Soviet-produced motion pictures have little propaganda effect in the free world. Communists, however, have been successful in infiltrating local film industries—both in the United States and throughout the rest of the free world. By this tactic they have been able to influence a large number of commercial films.

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*Libraries and Information Centers*

For over ten years, the United States Government has operated or participated in information centers overseas at a cost of about $6,000,000 annually. IIA, which is now the principal Government agency participating in this activity, maintains approximately 250 information centers, some of which are operated in conjunction with the host country. The information centers contain sizeable libraries, consisting primarily of the works of American authors, and engage in a wide range of community activities. In most foreign countries access to indigenous libraries is on a very restricted basis. By making their books available to the general public the libraries in United States overseas information centers have made American authors accessible to a wide foreign readership, thus making a valuable contribution to the information program.

A book translation program is supported by IIA to supplement the output of commercial publishers. IIA has recently taken over from MSA the administration of a $10,000,000 revolving fund which was established to stimulate the commercial export of American titles by guaranteeing that publishers will be able to recover the proceeds of their foreign sales in countries restricting foreign exchange transactions. The operations of the fund have materially augmented the sale of American books, and it should be increased to permit larger exports.

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The communist book program is large and extends to many countries. Although the Soviet Union operates only a few reading rooms in foreign countries, it assures a wide circulation for communist authors by selling books at prices well below cost, conducting large-scale translation programs and subsidizing local book stores. In most areas of the free world the communist effort exceeds that of the official American program, and in some areas surpasses the combined official and commercial American volume.

Libraries, information centers, and books are an essential part of the United States information effort. Cheap communist books must be prevented from dominating local markets by making available equally inexpensive non-communist books. The Government should cooperate with private industry and be prepared to subsidize exports where necessary. While the Government should guard against distributing or aiding in the distribution of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life.

*Television*

Use of television is expanding rapidly outside the United States and offers a new propaganda medium of potential effectiveness which Government information agencies have thus far hardly attempted to utilize. Outside the United States, television networks exist in over 20 countries of the free world, with a total of about 3,000,000 sets. Twenty additional countries are expected to enter the television field by 1956. The Soviet Union is steadily expanding its television facilities, and Soviet programs can be received in parts of Western Europe along the periphery of the Soviet orbit.

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### RECOMMENDATIONS

*General*

1. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States.

2. A continuing, coordinated effort should be made to inform the world clearly of the American position on major issues.

3. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate more on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.

4. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of information activities may often be required from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined to global or regional themes. When United States policy and objectives have been explained to the field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting their information activities to their local situations.

5. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material should be prepared abroad to meet local needs.

6. The number of operating information personnel in the United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially reduced.

7. Propaganda or information should be attributed to the United States only when such attribution is an asset. A much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed.

8. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial reduction in American information personnel overseas in countries where they are heavily concentrated. They should be replaced where necessary by qualified local nationals.

9. Far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over content.

10. Both international organizations and allied governments should be able to make a substantial contribution to American propaganda objectives. Increased emphasis should be placed on this form of international cooperation.

11. More effective tactical control of the information and propaganda program of the various United States agencies is needed at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the Chief of Mission with the advice of a country team composed of the senior representatives of each agency operating information programs.

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13. An effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in management. The Committee recommends that firm executive and congressional support be extended in order to stabilize the organization and size of the information program. Regulations should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility in the allocation of funds and recruitment of personnel.

14. Appropriations for the information program should not be drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended have been tried.

15. Public understanding and support of the program is vital. The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its programs.

16. Consideration should be given to reducing, where possible, the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigration regulations.

*Media Recommendations*

17. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention . . . .

(b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting and seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies.

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(d) Consideration should be given to changing the name "Voice of America."

18. (a) Exchange of persons, particularly students, for long term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued.

(b) More use should be made of the medium of exchange of persons in influencing the attitude of important local individuals.

19. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs. The programs of all agencies should be reviewed.

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21. (a) The Information Centers fill a cultural need and should be continued.

(b) The Government should cooperate with the commercial publishing industry and subsidize its exports when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world.

(c) While the Government must not aid in the distribution of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life.

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

## ORGANIZATION FOR A MORE UNIFIED EFFORT

*The Need for More Effective Coordination*

There is need for a better integrated direction of the program of the United States in the world struggle so that the "unified and dynamic" effort called for by the President will be made. We believe that there exists a serious gap between the formulation of general objectives and the detailed actions required to give effect to them. This gap can, in our opinion, be filled by the creation, within the National Security Council structure, of a group capable of assuring the coordinated execution of national security policies.

The National Security Council having recommended a policy and the President having approved it, continuing executive responsibility should be delegated to an operations coordinating body which would:

1. coordinate the development by the departments and agencies of detailed operational plans to carry out the approved policy;
2. assure the timely and coordinated carrying out of such plans;
3. initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and other changes in the situation;
4. assure that each project or action is so executed as to make its full contribution to the particular "climate of opinion" which the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.

The Psychological Strategy Board does not fill the need which we have described. We believe that the present conception of the Psychological Strategy Board is unsound.[5] The Psychological Strategy Board is charged with planning, coordination, and evaluation of "psychological operations," a term which is nowhere adequately defined. We find that while the Psychological Strategy Board has concentrated heavily on planning it has possessed neither sufficient power to exercise effective coordination nor the techniques adequate to produce meaningful evaluations. Even the planning function has been carried on in the midst of ambiguity and serious interdepartmental controversy.

The directive which created the Psychological Strategy Board assumes that in addition to national objectives formulated by the National Security Council, there are such things as "over-all national psychological objectives"; PSB is indeed charged with the formulation and promulgation of these. The PSB directive also speaks of "psychological policies" and the Board has been working to develop "a strategic concept for psychological operations." We believe these phrases indicate a basic misconception, for we find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is not separable from policy, but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a "psychological" implication in every act, but this does not have life apart from the act. Although there may be distinct psychological plans and specific psychological activities directed toward national objectives, there are no "national psychological objectives" separate and distinct from national objectives. There is no "strategic concept for psychological operations" separate and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining national aims without war. When PSB has developed, for example, a "regional psychological plan," it has really formulated a plan for the achievement of national aims involving the use of propaganda, diplomacy, economic pressure and military strength in various combinations. It is this fact which has caused so much controversy between PSB and the established planning agencies within the State Department.

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[5] For text of the Presidential Directive of Apr. 4, 1951, establishing the Board, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 58.

For these reasons, we believe that the Psychological Strategy Board was improperly conceived and that it has not, under its charter, been able to contribute materially to the national effort. We accordingly recommend that it be abolished.

We have also studied the changes in the composition and functions of the NSC staff, as approved by the President on March 17, 1953.[6] In our view, these provide for more systematic and detailed policy planning and contribute as well to the achievement of coordinated execution of policy in the following respects:

1. the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is provided with a staff which shall make an "independent analysis and review" of each policy paper emanating from the Planning Board in order to determine (among other things) that "the conclusions reached are meaningful as operational guidances"; and
2. after a national security policy has been approved by the President and "assigned among cabinet members for performance", the Special Assistant has the task of bringing to the President's attention "situations where progress is delayed, with recommendations for action."

These changes are useful, but do not by themselves accomplish a fully coordinated execution of policy, nor were they intended to do so. The appointment by the President of a Special Assistant with particular responsibility in regard to "cold war" activities constitutes a further recognition of the need for better coordination. There remains, however, a need for a central operations coordinating body within the NSC structure.

*Operations Coordinating Board*

We therefore recommend that the President establish, within the NSC structure, an Operations Coordinating Board to provide for the coordinated execution of approved national security policies—specifically to carry out the functions listed on the first page of this chapter and such other functions as the NSC may from time to time prescribe.

Coordination of departmental execution of national security policies would be the principal task of the Operations Coordinating Board. Detailed operational planning for the activities to be carried out pursuant to approved policies would continue to be done by the departments. The distinctive role of the Operations Coordinating Board would be to assign detailed planning responsibilities to departments, to examine the resulting plans for adequacy, consistency with policy and with each other, and then to coordinate and follow up the execution of such plans, seeking in the process to achieve the maximum advantage for the United States. This would require a shift to the Board of the "follow-up" responsibility now vested in the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The Board would also make progress reports to the NSC from time to time.

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[6] See the letter from President Eisenhower to Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President, Mar. 17, p. 257.

We recommend that the members of the Operations Coordinating Board should be:

The Under Secretary of State;
The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
The Deputy Director for Mutual Security;§§
The Director of CIA; and
The Special Assistant to the President (for "cold war planning").

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should have the right to attend meetings of the Board. The head of the foreign information program should act as an advisor to the Board and should be invited to attend those meetings of the Board at which the subjects under discussion relate to his function. In addition, appropriate members of other departments and agencies should be invited to attend those meetings of the Board at which the subjects under discussion bear directly upon the responsibilities of those departments and agencies.

The Operations Coordinating Board cannot be effective without continuing and vigorous leadership and without its own staff. In order to ensure such leadership, we make the following recommendations:

1. The Under Secretary of State should be Chairman of the Board. He should be the presiding officer at meetings of the Board.

2. A person appointed by the President should be the principal executive officer of the Board. He should serve full-time in this capacity. He should attend all meetings of the Board, but should not be a member thereof. His duties should include among others:

(a) determining the agenda for, and presenting material for discussion at, Board meetings, subject to the approval of the Chairman;
(b) supervising the work of the staff of the Board;
(c) maintaining the flow of work through the Board, the standards of presentation, and the quality of the staff work;
(d) insuring, in the name of the Board, that its decisions are put into effect;
(e) in the event of lack of progress in carrying out a responsibility that has been assigned to the Board, bringing the matter to the attention of the National Security Council, after consultation with the Board, with recommendations for appropriate action;

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§§Until he designates his general deputy to serve on the Board, the Director for Mutual Security should represent his agency. [Footnote in the source text.]

(f) preparing for the Board's consideration reports to the National Security Council;

(g) maintaining liaison with the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in order to insure coordination of the Board's work with the activities of the National Security Council.

3. The principal executive officer should be assisted by a staff responsible to him which should have such duties as he may assign and the Board approve. The staff should include persons qualified in the political, economic and military matters considered by the Board and persons competent to advise on the psychological implications of the problems before the Board.

In order to provide continuity and independence, a substantial part of the staff should be permanent employees of the Board. The balance should comprise persons on assignment from departments and agencies. Each department should make internal arrangements for the continuous handling of Board matters.

The Board would replace the PSB as the agency responsible for assuring coordination between the foreign information program and covert activities. With respect to the latter, NSC 10/2 [7] states that the Director of Central Intelligence shall receive policy guidance from the Secretaries of State and Defense. The present Consultants Group was established to provide a channel for such guidance. We believe that the general coordinating and review functions of the Operations Coordinating Board would render it logical to abolish the Consultants Group and make its function a responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board and the OCB staff. For the same reason, we think it would be appropriate to rescind paragraphs 2 and 3 of NSC 10/5 [8] which relate to PSB responsibilities for the review of covert programs.

The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC) was created pursuant to NSC 59/1 [9] to provide a mechanism through which the State Department could coordinate the overt foreign information program. We believe there is a manifest need for this coordinating function, but recommend the POC be abolished and its function be made a responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board and the OCB staff.

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[7] NSC 10/2, "Covert Operations in the Interest of National Security", is not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 10 Series)

[8] NSC 10/5, Oct. 23, 1951, is not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 10 Series)

[9] NSC 59/1, "The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning", Mar. 9, 1950, is not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 59 Series)

*Coordination in the Field*

Coordination in the field is essential to the effective carrying out of the plans developed at home. If lines of authority for United States representatives in a foreign country are confused, if these representatives speak with conflicting voices, then the impression created will not inspire confidence and the United States will dissipate its efforts.

We have based our consideration of coordination in the field on the assumption that there will continue to be a separation of authority for foreign activities in Washington. This means that the authority of a chief of mission in the field will continue to be qualified by the fact that his economic, military, and intelligence officers, who are nominal subordinates, have direct communication with Washington through separate channels of command. The proposed setting up of the foreign information program outside the State Department would create still another separate channel of communication.

This difficulty was one of the major factors that led us to consideration of the proposal to create a federal structure under the Secretary of State comprising three operating departments headed respectively by a Secretary of Foreign Political Affairs, a Secretary of Foreign Economic Affairs and a Secretary of Foreign Information. The Secretary of State (and his Under Secretary) would have the power of direction over the three departments, although a broad delegation of operational responsibility would be implicit. This arrangement would lend itself well to projection into the field. The Ambassador would report through the Secretary of State and would, therefore, represent not only the embassy staff, but the economic and public affairs interests as well. He could have three ministers under him, each corresponding to one of the functions grouped under the Secretary of State. While we recognize that it may not be feasible in present circumstances, such an arrangement would, in our opinion, greatly improve the coherence of the national performance in overseas areas. We therefore urge that it be given continuing study and consideration.

Since, for the present, however, a continued separation of authority in Washington is the realistic premise, it is of particular importance to establish the Ambassador as the principal field authority. This is provided for in the President's message to Congress, June 1, 1953, accompanying Reorganization Plans Numbers 7 and 8, and in the President's letter of the same date to the heads of all executive departments and the Director for Mutual Security.[10]

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[10] See the editorial note, p. 1709.

From the information we have received, it appears that the "country team" idea has worked best in those countries where the United States has had an Ambassador who regarded his post as one of action, rather than merely of observation. We believe there are important implications in this for the kind of men selected as United States mission chiefs in countries whose proper orientation is crucial to success in the present conflict. The increasing intensity of the world struggle, particularly the fact that it has blurred the previously clear dividing line between peace and war, is a compelling reality to which the United States has not yet fully responded organizationally. The control of United States policy has been rendered very much more difficult by the active participation (and therefore the necessary coordination) of a large number of separately administered governmental agencies which either had not previously existed at all, or had not previously exerted any influence on foreign relations. In each country of major importance, this new condition has imposed different and heavier responsibilities on the United States chief of mission. To be successful he has had to add executive functions to his traditional tasks of observation, negotiation and communication. We believe that these broad new tasks are not passing obligations, but will last for many years. Accordingly, more emphasis should be given to breadth, force and executive competence in the selection of United States mission chiefs, although we do not mean to imply that these qualities are in any way substitutes for political training and acumen. The ideal Ambassador would possess all of these qualities.

In a number of countries where United States armed forces are stationed, it is important that the military commander be a member of the country team. In such places as Japan and Germany, his role will be of major importance. The degree to which American military personnel harmonize their activities with local civilian life will have great effect on the political mission of the Embassy. In the next section, we discuss the conditions which we believe must be established to bring about a more systematic military participation in the effort to achieve political objectives.

### *Political Implications of Military Activities*

The activities of the Defense Department are a major factor in the success or failure of the national effort in the political struggle with the USSR. They have a marked impact upon foreign attitudes and actions. A million and a half Americans are serving overseas in military uniform and coming into daily contact with foreign peoples. Additionally, the reality of United States military power—whether it is an adequate deterrent; whether it is a source of reassurance or anxiety to friendly nations; the way in which United

States leadership is exercised in the several military coalitions now formed; the way in which such military assistance programs as off-shore procurement are administered—all of these affect the success of United States policies.

The contribution of the armed forces to political warfare has been limited by the lack of definition of the military role by higher authority, and by an inadequate understanding on the part of military authorities that they and their commands are full participants in the political aspects of the present struggle and must conduct themselves accordingly. Military commanders and planners tend to regard the allocation of military resources to current political operations as an unauthorized diversion from tasks for which the armed forces are explicitly responsible. They naturally resist efforts to utilize these resources in ways which might be disadvantageous in the event of war, because the primary military task is preparation for hostilities.

The activities of military forces abroad must, however, be conducted in such a manner as to enhance the prestige of the United States, produce maximum support for its policies and minimize the unfavorable aspects of the presence of its military forces. Good troop behavior is essential. Troop maneuvers, fleet visits and fly-overs can be helpful if skillfully timed. Military transport and similar resources can be used to assist in solving problems of the local communities in which United States troops are stationed—to transport school children or to repair roads which have been damaged by American military activity. United States military authorities have not always used these resources with political imagination. They have been slow, for example, to use the off-shore procurement program as an effective anti-communist weapon in Western Europe, which it could undoubtedly become if managed with flexibility and imagination. They have argued that their aim is only to obtain military equipment which meets their specifications and that they cannot impose the burden of political judgments upon relatively low-ranking procurement officers in the field. In part, this attitude reflects the rigidity of military procurement regulations, but it also illustrates the failure to recognize and determine the full part that should be played by the military services in supporting United States political objectives.

The employment of military resources for political effect in the present situation of tension and partial war is essential; and success in this endeavor requires an understanding by military commanders of the contribution which military forces can make to the achievement of political objectives. We believe such understanding can be improved by a more precise definition of the military role. Fuller participation of United States military commanders abroad in the "country teams" headed by the American Ambassador would also help.

The armed forces have developed for use in wartime certain specialized assets, such as Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Companies and Air Resupply and Communications Wings, which might further assist in the conduct of current political activities. The fuller utilization of such assets should receive continuing attention.

We recommend that the Operations Coordinating Board, in its plans for the implementation of national policies, ensure that military activities make their full contribution to the attainment of political objectives.

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*The Foreign Information Program*

In Chapter Five of this report, we have examined the information program. In this section we discuss our views on the proper location of the foreign information program within the government. We have already communicated to the President, by letter dated May 2, 1953, our views on this subject (see Appendix III). Three distinct proposals have been considered by us, and we have summarized them below, together with our principal reasons for accepting or rejecting them.

1. *The separation of IIA from State and its establishment as an independent agency under the NSC. This agency would also assume the information activities of MSA and TCA.*

This proposal involves the claims that the propaganda function, like the military and economic, is sufficiently different from diplomacy to warrant separate administration; that propaganda should serve national policy, which is made by the member departments of NSC rather than the State Department; and that any information program operated by the State Department will tend to be timid and unimaginative because diplomacy operates primarily through contact between governments, whereas propaganda must involve large-scale operations directed at whole peoples.

We believe this proposal is based upon a misconception of propaganda and greatly exaggerates its role in the national effort. Overt propaganda conducted by a free society is necessarily based upon policy and has no life apart from it. While it is true that national security policy is formulated by the member departments comprising the NSC, rather than by State alone, the fact remains that State is primarily responsible for carrying out those policies to which information activities can be of assistance. Moreover, the NSC is not organized to provide day-to-day policy guidance. To create an independent agency to conduct propaganda and related activities, even if some provision were made for policy guidance from the State Department, would be to risk the emergence of contradictory interpretations of foreign policy. Moreover, it would strongly imply the belief that propaganda is a separate element of policy, rather than a subsidiary instrument thereof.

The nature of the propaganda problem requires close and frequent interchange between policy people and operators during the development of a program, and this is difficult when the policymakers and the propagandists are separated by jurisdictional boundaries. We fear that if IIA were independent, the level of liaison with State would be so high as to leave a number of significant issues of policy to be dealt with by IIA as "operations."

An argument for this proposal to which we attach more weight involves the claim that effective management of IIA is impossible so long as it remains within the State Department. This claim is based upon an antagonism on the part of some political officers in the State Department toward the entire information effort and personnel engaged in it. There is also some evidence of the use of IIA funds for general State Department purposes and a refusal to yield the promised autonomy to the Administrator of IIA in the matters of recruiting, assigning, and managing IIA personnel. There is little doubt in our minds that the information program has been administered under great difficulties and we agree that these must, insofar as possible, be removed. However, we are not convinced that a remedy lies in separating IIA from the State Department and re-creating it as an independent agency. The weakness and vulnerability of new, untried government agencies is attested by long experience; the history of OWI is instructive and discouraging on this point. Moreover, we believe that understanding between IIA and the regular political officers of the State Department has been steadily improving and that it is entirely possible to provide the IIA with sufficient administrative flexibility within the State Department to permit effective management.

2. *Retention in State of most of the educational exchange programs and establishment in an independent agency of all "fast media" (radio, press, movies) together with responsibility for the interchange of books and periodicals and aid to libraries and information centers.*

It is the widely held view that the State Department is handling the educational exchange programs very well and that they should accordingly continue to be the responsibility of that Department. The proponents of this proposal accept this view. They argue, however, that those elements of the information program which have a day-to-day impact abroad should be placed in an independent agency. We have rejected this proposal for substantially the same reasons as we rejected the first proposal above—because propaganda should be a servant of policy and should therefore be clearly subject to policy guidance. The "fast media" are precisely the tools which the State Department needs to explain and exploit policy on a day-to-day basis. The library and information center programs are not, of course, propaganda and therefore this line of argument does not apply directly to them. But we would doubt the wisdom of placing segments of the information program under separate administration.

3. *Retention of IIA in State, but with higher rank for the Administrator and with effective provision for autonomy in the selection, assignment and management of personnel and in the control of IIA appropriations.*

It is our conclusion that this proposal embodies a sound approach to the problem of locating and properly organizing the foreign information program. This arrangement facilitates policy guidance and provides the necessary unity of program through the inclusion of all media within a single administration.

In our opinion, the most satisfactory arrangement would be to retain within the Department of State those functions now assigned to the IIA and to combine with them the information activities heretofore conducted by MSA and TCA. Under such an arrangement the Committee would favor higher rank (equivalent to that of Under Secretary) for the Administrator of the information agency and provision for autonomy in the selection, assignment and management of personnel and in the control of its own appropriations.

In the interest of the closest possible integration of foreign information activities with the development of foreign policy, the Committee believes that the program should be left within the Department of State. We recognize, however, that there are strong arguments in favor of taking the information program out of the State Department. Inasmuch as the Department itself is reluctant at this time to exercise the operating functions involved and a reorganization plan has been sent to Congress, the Committee does not make any recommendation on this point.[||||]

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[||||] In considering this subject, the Committee had before it the several staff studies and the Report of the Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Hickenlooper Committee); the memorandum of recommendations of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization dated April 7, 1953 (Rockefeller Report); and the Seventh Semiannual Report to Congress of the United States Advisory Commission on Information dated January 1953 (Mark May Report). [Footnote in the source text. For information regarding Congressional interest in the overseas information program during 1953, see the second editorial note, p. 1672. That portion of the Rockefeller Report dealing with foreign affairs organization is printed on p. 1691.]

### *Personnel*

While we have not been able to give close attention to the problem of personnel, it is clear that no organizational arrangements for a more unified effort will be effective unless the agencies concerned are manned by capable and dedicated people. This problem should be recognized as crucial to the achievement of the national objectives. The wise and successful conduct of United States external policies is dependent upon expanding the numbers of trained people in the field of national security affairs and making more effective use of them.

The personnel problem of the government in this field is largely one of leadership and continuity, the need being to produce a clear understanding of the national policies and an individual determination to support them. If the proper motivation is provided through the example of leadership, we believe the Government will not want for able and dedicated people to work for the realization of United States objectives abroad.

More specifically, better efficiency and morale in the ranks of the public service will, in our view, depend upon new efforts to:

1. Improve training programs for those entering into the field of national security affairs so as to provide not only greater technical competence and language and area knowledge but also a broader understanding of the significance of their own assignments.
2. Broaden and strengthen the concept of career service so that well-motivated personnel, having received specialized training and experience, can be retained in government service. This requires, among other things, the protection of individuals from unjustified attack.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Psychological Strategy Board should be abolished.

2. The President should establish, within the National Security Council structure, an Operations Coordinating Board to provide for the coordinated execution of approved national security policies.

3. The Consultants Group, established under NSC 10/2, should be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB and the OCB staff.

4. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC) should be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB and the OCB staff.

5. Every effort should be made to strengthen the position of the Chief of Mission as the principal United States authority in overseas posts.

6. The Operations Coordinating Board should ensure that military activities make their full contribution to the attainment of political objectives.

. . . . . . .

10. Inasmuch as a reorganization plan with respect to foreign information activities has been submitted to Congress for consideration, the Committee makes no recommendation on this point.

11. New efforts should be made to improve personnel training programs in the field of national security affairs and to broaden and strengthen the concept of career service.

## Chapter Eight

## Informing the American Public

In Part I of this report we have attempted to analyze the nature of the conflict with the Soviet system, the Soviet drive for world domination, and the United States program for world order. We have emphasized the fact that the conflict is a struggle between coalitions, one an imposed coalition dominated by the Kremlin and the other a free coalition led by the United States. We believe that the United States must base its policies on the assumption that the purpose of the Soviet rulers is world domination and that this purpose will constitute the fundamental motivation of all its actions. The basic objectives of the United States program for world order are (1) to assure the security of the United States, (2) to attain a reduction or retraction of Soviet power or a fundamental change in Soviet objectives, and (3) to achieve a peaceful world composed of free nations.

The drive and resources which the Government can put behind this program depends upon the national will. The national will consists of the composite thought of the American people. They do not yet grasp the import of the President's recent words that we live in an age, not an instant, of peril. They do not fully understand the dangers that confront them, and the power of the enemy, the difficulty of reducing that power, and the probable duration of the conflict.

It is the belief of the Committee that a greater degree of candor toward the American people is necessary.

The American public needs information concerning the rapid growth of the Soviet atomic capability. This development brings the communities of the United States into the front lines; it places in doubt the claim that quantitative atomic superiority is a conclusive deterrent to attack; it threatens to limit the ability of the nation to maintain its full freedom to act vigorously against the enemy overseas. In formulating public statements on this matter, consideration would have to be given to their impact upon other nations of the free world, particularly in Europe. This presents a delicate problem, but a balance can be struck between providing the American people with information that will permit them to grasp one of the basic realities of their world, and driving more vulnerable and therefore nervous allies into neutralism. Such information is the vital prerequisite to public support for the development of countermeasures to this threat, a matter with which the Government must be increasingly concerned.

The public needs to be informed of the steady growth of the Soviet economy and the corollary fact that the rate of its growth is much more rapid than that of the United States and the NATO allies. Authoritative discussion of these trends would help to make clear the magnitude of the effort required on the part of the United States. It should tend also to spur increased productivity both here and in Western Europe.

There is confusion in the nation regarding the ways in which the United States can most wisely meet the communist threat. Methods of fighting communism at home and abroad are advocated, and in some cases practiced, which are poorly adapted to the true nature of the threat. They risk doing more harm than good. The concepts that have been urged throughout this report—that it is not enough just to be anti-communist, that the United States must appeal to foreign nations in terms of their own self-interest, that alliances with other nations of the free world are critical to the survival of the United States—are not fully understood by the American public. As a result, the effectiveness of national policies and programs is reduced.

There is need for authoritative information concerning the Government's position with respect to the Department of State and the foreign information program. The Committee, during the five months of its existence, has seen the Department of State and the foreign information program harassed and assaulted by criticism, much of which is inaccurate, unfair and destructive. As a result, the morale of the Department has been lowered and the information program has been seriously weakened. The American people should know what the Administration's position is with respect to such criticism and what its policy is with respect to the future of the program.

In order to obtain the common understanding between the people and the Government which is so important, it is also desirable that there be less confusion among the voices that speak for the Government on matters of foreign policy and national security. It should be possible to achieve a greater unity of expression, at least within the Executive Branch of the Government, so that the public does not receive a picture of conflicting claims and contradictory interpretations of important policy matters. Information and guidance can, of course, come most authoritatively from the President himself.

In order to accomplish these results, it is important that security regulations not be allowed to restrict the flow of information except in those cases where the need for security is clearly demonstrable. The Committee is aware that this problem has been of concern for a long time. It is sufficiently important to national policy to warrant continued study at the highest levels of Government.

Only a clear and consistent exposition of the United States program can produce that measure of public understanding and support which will constitute the great moral foundation required for the effective conduct of external relations.

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### Appendix I

### *The President to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 24, 1953.

DEAR MR. LAY: I have today established a Committee, to be known as the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

I have authorized and directed it to make a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related thereto with particular reference to the international relations and the national security of this country. It shall make recommendations to me for such legislative, administrative, or other action, respecting the said policies and activities as in its opinion may be desirable.

It has long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of the United States and of the other peoples in the community of free nations.

The Committee's final report and recommendations are to be in my hands not later than June 30, 1953, and the Committee will cease to operate thirty days after submitting its final report.

All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed, as a matter of common concern, to cooperate with the Committee in its work and to furnish the Committee with such assistance not inconsistent with law as it may require in the performance of its functions. The establishment of this Committee and the scope of its inquiry were discussed at the Cabinet meeting Friday morning [11] and received full and complete support.

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[11] Jan. 23.

I am today appointing the following members of the Committee:

William H. Jackson, Chairman
Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President
C.D. Jackson, representing the Secretary of State
Sigurd Larmon, representing the Director for Mutual Security
Gordon Gray
Barklie McKee Henry
John C. Hughes

Abbott Washburn has been designated as Executive Secretary of the Committee.

The appointments of C.D. Jackson and Sigurd Larmon were respectively made after consultation with, and at the designation of, Mr. John Foster Dulles and Mr. Harold E. Stassen. A designee to represent the Secretary of Defense will be named to the Committee before the end of the month.¶¶

The Committee will have its offices at 901 Sixteenth Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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### Appendix III

## *The President's Committee on International Information Activities to the President*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your Committee on International Information Activities has given a good deal of thought to the organization of the Government's foreign information activities. This subject will be discussed in detail in the Committee's report. However, in view of the recommendations for the reorganization of the International Information Administration which have been placed before you by the Rockefeller Committee [12] and the proposals for the implementation of these recommendations which are now being prepared in the Bureau of the Budget, the Committee desires to submit certain recommendations to you at this time.

In determining the most satisfactory organization of international information activities, the Committee has attempted to define the mission and to agree on principles under which these activities can be most effectively operated. The Committee has reached the following conclusions:

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¶¶On February 19, 1953, the President appointed Roger M. Kyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense, a member of the Committee upon the designation of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. [Footnote in the source text.]

[12] See the memorandum for the President by the President's Committee on Government Organization, Apr. 7, p. 1691.

(1) Propaganda should be a flexible instrument of policy. It is a basic misconception to regard it as an independent instrument separate from policy.

(2) The cold war cannot be won by words alone. What we do will continue to be vastly more important than what we say.

(3) The principal objective of our information activities is to increase support abroad for those policies and programs which we consider necessary to pursue in the national interest and to persuade foreign governments and peoples that such U.S. policies and programs are also in their interest. While friendship for the United States may be a useful means of persuasion, it is not in itself a necessary objective of our propaganda efforts.

Regardless of organizational arrangements, the Committee believes that the following operating principles would further the attainment of our objectives:

(1) The presence abroad of large numbers of Americans in government employ tends to impair the effect of our foreign information programs. Every effort should be made, therefore, to reduce the size of American establishments abroad to that necessary for the efficient conduct of the business of this Government in foreign countries.

(2) Evidence presented to the Committee indicates that the effectiveness of U.S. information programs in foreign countries is enhanced by the employment of local personnel. For this reason, as well as in the interest of a general reduction in American personnel abroad, American information staffs should be composed of local employees insofar as possible.

(3) People resent and reject advice or criticism from foreigners. The United States foreign information media should accordingly avoid undue use of exhortation. In particular, the acknowledged U.S. broadcasts should be restricted to news, official pronouncements and the entertainment programs essential for the maintenance of audiences.

(4) New impetus should be given to the trend toward decentralization of authority and responsibility. While the need for a central nucleus of media services in Washington is recognized, the conduct and initiation of information programs should as far as possible occur at the country level under the guidance of the Ambassador. The delegation of increased initiative to the field should permit a considerable reduction of information personnel in the United States.

The Committee has considered a variety of proposals for the organization of the international information activities of the Government. It has concluded that the most satisfactory arrangement would be to retain within the Department of State those functions now assigned to the International Information Administration and to combine with them the information activities heretofore conducted by MSA and TCA. Under such an arrangement the Committee would favor higher rank for the Administrator of the information agency and provision for autonomy in the selection, assignment and management of personnel and in the control of its own appropriations.

In reaching this conclusion, the Committee has been guided by its conviction that information activities conducted by a free society are necessarily based upon foreign policy and have no life apart from it. The Department of State is primarily responsible for the development of such policies. In the Committee's judgment the creation of an independent agency to conduct foreign information activities, even if provision were made for policy guidance from the Department of State, would risk the emergence of contradictory interpretations of foreign policies. The nature of the problem requires close and frequent interchange during the development of the programs between those responsible for the formulation and conduct of policy and those responsible for its interpretation and projection to foreign audiences. The Committee feels that this problem, which has presented difficulties even while IIA has been within the Department of State, would be further complicated by placing responsibility for the conduct of foreign information activities on an independent agency.

In the interests of the closest possible integration of foreign information activities with the development of foreign policy the Committee would, therefore, prefer to leave the program within the Department of State. The Committee recognizes, however, that there are strong arguments in favor of taking the information program out of the State Department. Inasmuch as the Department itself is reluctant to exercise the operating functions involved, the Committee therefore does not oppose the recommendations submitted by the Rockefeller Committee.

The Committee wishes however to submit certain comments with respect to the proposed reorganization plan based on the recommendations of the Rockefeller Committee. The Committee concurs in the importance of providing the Director of the new agency on a current basis with full guidance concerning the foreign policy of the United States. It questions, however, the desirability of assigning to the Secretary of State responsibility for the preparation of program material to be utilized on the information media. In the view of the Committee any official statements regarding the position of the United States emanating from the Secretary of State will in the very nature of things be utilized by U.S. information media. It is the conviction of the Committee that program responsibility should rest exclusively with the information agency subject to foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Accordingly, we recommend that Sec. 202 (b) (2) of the proposed reorganization plan be deleted.

The role of an independent information agency in the conduct of the whole information effort of the U.S. Government and the content of U.S. information programs will be dealt with at greater length in the Committee's final report.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM H. JACKSON
*Chairman*

## Appendix IV

## RECOMMENDATIONS

. . . . . . .

### CHAPTER FIVE

### PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN THE FREE WORLD

*General*

21. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interests to take action consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States. (page 58)

22. A continuing and coordinated effort should be made to inform the world clearly of the American position on major issues. (page 58)

23. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations. (page 60)

24. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of information activities may often be required from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined to global or regional themes. When United States policy has been explained to the field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting it to their local situations. (page 60)

25. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material should be prepared locally to meet local needs. (page 61)

26. The number of operating information personnel located in the United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially reduced. (page 61)

27. Propaganda or information should be attributed to the United States only when such attribution is an asset. A much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed. (page 61)

28. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial reduction in American personnel overseas in countries where they are heavily concentrated. They should be replaced where necessary by qualified local nationals. (page 62)

. . . . . . .

31. More effective tactical control of the information and propaganda program of the various United States agencies is needed at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the Chief of Mission with the advice of a "country team" composed of the senior representatives of each agency operating information programs. (page 63)

32. More coordination of all types of unattributed propaganda is necessary to prevent both waste and compromise of the covert portion. Covert propaganda should be centralized in CIA. The responsibility and authority for such coordination should be placed in the Chief of Mission. (page 63)

33. An effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in management. The Committee recommends that firm executive and congressional support be extended, in order to stabilize the organization and size of the information programs. Regulations should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility in the allocation of funds and personnel. (page 63)

34. Appropriations for the information program should not be drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended have been tried. (page 64)

35. Public understanding and support of the program is vital. The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its program. (page 64)

36. Consideration should be given to reducing, where possible, the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigration regulations. (page 65)

*Media Recommendations*

37. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention. . . .

(b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting. Selection and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies. (page 68)

. . . . . . .

(d) Consideration should be given to changing the name "Voice of America". (page 69)

38. (a) Exchange of persons, particularly students, for long term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued. (page 70)

(b) More use should be made of the medium of exchange of persons in influencing the attitude of important local individuals. (page 70)

39. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs. The programs of all agencies should be reviewed. (page 72)

. . . . . . .

41. (a) The Information Centers fill a cultural need and should be continued. (page 74)

(b) The Government should cooperate with the commercial publishing industry and subsidize its efforts when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world. (page 74)

(c) While the Government must not aid in the distribution of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life. (page 74)

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

## ORGANIZATION FOR A MORE UNIFIED EFFORT

49. The Psychological Strategy Board should be abolished. (page 90)

50. The President should establish, within the National Security Council structure, an Operations Coordinating Board to provide for the coordinated execution of approved national security policies. (page 91)

51. The Consultants Group, established under NSC 10/2, should be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB and the OCB staff. (page 93)

52. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC) should be abolished and its functions assumed by the OCB and the OCB staff. (page 93)

53. Every effort should be made to strengthen the position of the Chief of Mission as the principal United States authority in overseas posts. (page 94)

54. The Operations Coordinating Board should ensure that military activities make their full contribution to the attainment of political objectives. (page 97)

. . . . . . .

58. Inasmuch as a reorganization plan with respect to foreign information activities has been submitted to Congress for consideration, the Committee makes no recommendation on this point. (page 101)

59. New efforts should be made to improve personnel training programs in the field of national security affairs and to broaden and strengthen the concept of career services. (page 102)

## Appendix V

## The President's Committee on International Information Activities

### STAFF

*Executive Secretary*
Abbott Washburn

Frank C. Cook
(Central Intelligence Agency)
Evelyn K. Hall
(Central Intelligence Agency)
Townsend W. Hoopes
(Department of Defense)
Wayne G. Jackson
(Central Intelligence Agency)
Franklin A. Lindsay
(Central Intelligence Agency)
Henry Loomis
(Central Intelligence Agency)

*Director of Staff*
Robert Blum
(Mutual Security Agency)
Robert L. Lounsbury
(Central Intelligence Agency)
Lewis C. Mattison
(Office of Defense Mobilization)
A. Atley Peterson
(Department of Defense)
Ellis L. Phillips, Jr.

Francis B. Stevens
(Department of State)
Robert W. Tufts
(Department of State)

S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "Jackson Committee"

### *Memorandum by Howland H. Sargeant to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1953.

Subject: Chapter Seven of the Jackson Committee Report [2]

At the July 2 NSC meeting, Chapter Seven of the Jackson Committee Report, "Organization for a More Unified Effort", will be discussed.[3] If Chapter Seven recommendations are approved, the necessary Executive Order will be prepared and issued.

The eleven recommendations are set out concisely on pages 102-103.[4] *It is recommended that the Department approve these recommendations.*

*Discussion*

1. The recommended Operations Coordinating Board follows the pattern already discussed informally by you with the President and others. OCB's main task would be to coordinate departmental execution of national security policies. OCB would replace PSB for assuring coordination between the foreign information program and covert activities, and would assume POC functions as well. OCB would take over the "follow-up" responsibility now vested in the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

2. *Abolitions:* the PSB; the POC; the Consultants Group established under NSC 10/2.

. . . . . . .

4. *Relationship of these Recommendations to Reorganization Plans 7 and 8:* [5]

Recommendations 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 have some bearing on the President's proposals embodied in Reorganization Plans 7 and 8. Since the letter of Mr. William H. Jackson, of May 2 to the President [Appendix III—p. 114] [6] had anticipated some of the problems that would arise in connection with the plans that were then being recommended by the Rockefeller Committee,[7] most of the problems are adequately taken care of. Although the Jackson Committee Report makes it quite clear that the Committee itself would have preferred a consolidation of foreign operating programs within an expanded Department of Foreign Affairs, Recommendation No. 10 quite appropriately takes the position, in view of the reorganization plans approved and forwarded by the President, that the Committee will make no recommendation on this point. Specifically:

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[1] Sargeant, who had served as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from February 1952 to January 1953, was at this time attached to the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. Walter Bedell Smith had succeeded David K.E. Bruce as Under Secretary of State on Feb. 9, 1953.

[2] For Chapter Seven of the Jackson Committee Report, June 30, see p. 1853.

[3] The pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at the 152d meeting of the National Security Council, July 2, is printed *infra*.

[4] Reference is to the original pagination of the report; for text of the recommendations, see p. 1873.

[5] For documentation on Reorganization Plan No. 7, see vol. i, Part 1, pp. 628 ff. For information on Plan No. 8, see the editorial note, p. 1709.

[6] Brackets in the source text. Reference is to the original pagination of the report; for text of the letter, see p. 1868.

a) Abolition of the Psychological Strategy Board—this in no way conflicts with the understandings or with the specific language of the President's reorganization proposals embodied in the various documents which accompanied Plans 7 and 8.

b) The Committee's criticism of giving to the Secretary of State the responsibility for "a program" setting forth official United States positions for use abroad was taken care of in the final revision of the reorganization papers and the existing language of Reorganization Plan No. 8 seems completely in accord with the Jackson Committee Recommendation. (This language is: "The Secretary of State shall direct the policy and control the content of a program, for use abroad, on official United States positions. . . .")

c) The recommendation to abolish the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee and to transfer its function to the OCB and the staff of the OCB would require the President to modify the instruction contained in his June 1 letter to the Heads of all Executive Departments, which reads as follows: "I am directing that the necessary changes be made in existing arrangements for Government-wide coordination of foreign information activities to enable the Director of the United States Information Agency to serve as Chairman of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee".

The Department has no objection to the functions of the POC being made an OCB responsibility. We should be clear, however, that these functions are those set out in NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 [8] for the POC, and that the recommendation does not affect the Secretary of State's responsibility for the formulation of national psychological warfare policy in time of national emergency or war.

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[7] Reference is to the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, Nelson A. Rockefeller Chairman.

[8] NSC 127/1, "Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities", July 25, 1952, is not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 127 Series)

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

## *Memorandum of Discussion at the 152d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 2, 1953* [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 152d meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States;[2] the Acting Secretary of State;[3] the Acting Secretary of Defense;[4] the Director for Mutual Security;[5] the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization.[6] Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury;[7] the Attorney General (for Item 1);[8] the Director, Bureau of the Budget;[9] the United States Representative to the United Nations[10] (for Item 6); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;[11] the Director of Central Intelligence;[12] Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Military Liaison Officer; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

### 7. *Report to the President by the President's Committee on International Information Activities Dated June 30, 1953* [13]

Mr. Cutler briefly discussed the contents of Chapter 7 of the subject report as the portion which affected the National Security Council and which the President desired the Council to consider. Mr. Cutler noted that the proposal in Chapter 7, to create an Operations Coordinating Board, had had rough handling in the Planning Board, which had raised objections to its content and to the fact that the chapter was being considered without adequate prior staff work. In the light of these objections, Mr. Cutler continued, he recommended that the Council make no decision at this meeting with regard to the proposals in Chapter 7 for an Operations Coordinating Board, and that Chapter 7 now be referred to the Bureau of the Budget for preparation of a draft Executive Order which could be brought to the Council for consideration. The balance of the report should be referred to the Planning Board for its suggestions and comments, which will be reported back by July 17.

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[1] Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, on July 3.

[2] Richard M. Nixon.

[3] Walter Bedell Smith.

[4] Roger M. Kyes.

[5] Harold E. Stassen.

[6] Arthur S. Flemming.

[7] George M. Humphrey.

[8] Herbert Brownell, Jr.

[9] Joseph M. Dodge.

[10] Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

[11] General of the Army Omar N. Bradley.

[12] Allen W. Dulles.

[13] *Ante*, p. 1795.

The President said that it seemed to him that the Operations Coordinating Board was a necessary parallel to the Planning Board, and we needed it. Nevertheless, there was a gap in this thing. Chapter 7 proposes to abolish the Psychological Strategy Board. In that case, how could we make sure that the psychological factor in important Government actions was not overlooked, since the OCB would have as its primary responsibility the coordinated execution of national security policies?

Mr. Cutler attempted to point out that the burden of the whole Jackson Committee report indicated that there was no such separate entity as a psychological factor, but that all actions of the Government had psychological repercussions which could not be separated.

The President stated that, while he certainly was not asking for a new PSB, he wanted to be assured that someone was going to keep track of the psychological side as of major importance.

Mr. C.D. Jackson pointed out that there would be a small "think staff" in the Operations Coordinating Board which would have the responsibility of keeping track of the psychological factor, and the President expressed himself as satisfied as long as the matter were not overlooked.

Secretary Kyes said that what was proposed in Chapter 7 was actually what the PSB was now doing and the adoption of Chapter 7 would merely legitimize present practices. Looking around at Secretary Smith, Mr. Stassen, Mr. Allen Dulles, and Mr. C. D. Jackson, Secretary Kyes said, "Your PSB is right here." He added that an adequate staff for psychological purposes would certainly be continued.

The President said that in any case he wanted the whole problem very carefully studied. While he had given his blessing generally to the proposals in Chapter 7, he certainly did not want to act in a cursory way.

Secretary Smith said that theoretically this was a very sound position, but that the President must realize that if the Planning Board began to work on Chapter 7 they would find all kinds of bogeymen. He then inquired whether the Executive Order which would be drafted by the Bureau of the Budget would be shopped around among the interested agencies before it was brought to the Council for consideration.

Mr. Cutler assured Secretary Smith that this would be the case, and then raised the issue of possible scrutiny or interference in war plans, which, he said, disturbed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary Smith answered by stating that there was not the slightest implication that the new Operations Coordinating Board would make any determinations with regard to war plans, or would be involved in them in any way except in so far as the Secretary of Defense had responsibility for them. Indeed, the Board was not at all interested in war plans except in so far as any military movement would have psychological overtones.

On this point the President commented that if we were unable to devise techniques to safeguard the secrecy of our war plans we had been reduced to a sad state.

Mr. Allen Dulles inquired whether the coordinating functions of the proposed Board would apply to a national security policy which involved a single department of the Government, or only in the event that several departments were involved.

The President quickly replied that if one department had responsibility for the execution of a policy, that department alone would coordinate the implementation of the policy.

*The National Security Council:* [14]

a. Discussed Chapter 7 of the subject report, with respect to the abolition of the Psychological Strategy Board and the establishment of an Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Noted the President's interest in the recommendations contained in Chapter 7 of the subject report; in continuing attention to the psychological impact of significant governmental action; and in receiving the views of the Council in regard to Chapter 7.

c. Referred Chapter 7 to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for the preparation of a draft Executive Order suitable for implementing the recommendations contained in Chapter 7, to be submitted in the near future for Council consideration.

d. Referred the balance of the report to the NSC Planning Board for consideration and subsequent report to the Council by July 17.

e. Agreed that any proposed press release on this subject be postponed pending further consideration of the report.

*Note:* The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Director, Bureau of the Budget for implementation.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[14] Paragraphs a–e constitute NSC Action No. 836, July 2, 1953. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action")

S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "Jackson Committee"

## *Memorandum for the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 20, 1953.

Subject: Report by the President's Committee on International Information Activities dated June 30, 1953 [2] (except Chapter 7)

Reference: NSC Action No. 836-d [3]

1. This report is made in accordance with NSC Action No. 836-d: "Referred the balance of the report (the above-referenced report except Chapter 7) to the NSC Planning Board for consideration and subsequent report to the Council by July 17."

2. The Planning Board makes the following recommendations to the Council:

a. That action be deferred on Report Recommendation No. 1 ("The necessary measures should be taken to provide net estimates of political, economic and military capabilities") pending receipt of the report by the Continental Defense Committee which will include recommendations relative thereto.[4]

b. That Report Recommendation No. 20 ("Current consideration of this problem (electromagnetic warfare) by the NSC should be vigorously pressed") be noted as consistent with action taken or planned by the Council on this subject.

c. That all other Report Recommendations, excluding those relating to Chapter VII, be referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for such implementation by the responsible departments and agencies as is deemed appropriate, reporting back to the Council in sixty days on progress made in this regard.

d. That further consideration be given by the Psychological Strategy Board to Report Recommendation No. 9 ("Russian language programs should be carried by RIAS addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany") in order to insure that its implementation shall not compromise the position of RIAS.

e. That, in connection with NSC Action No. 799-d,[5] the Psychological Strategy Board give attention to Chapter VIII of the Report.

f. That the Planning Board prepare and submit a draft Directive, for Council approval, defining the purpose, responsibilities, and relationships of the United States Information Agency in accordance with the pending Reorganization Plan.[6]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[1] Copies also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1795.

[3] For NSC Action No. 836, see footnote 14, *supra*.

[4] For documentation on continental defense, see pp. 1 ff.

[5] For NSC Action No. 799, see footnote 4, p. 1174.

[6] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1591 ff.

S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "Jackson Committee"

### *Memorandum for the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)* [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1953.

Subject: Progress Report on Implementation of the Recommendations of the Jackson Committee [2]

References:

A. NSC Action No. 866 [3]

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject "Report by the President's Committee on International Information Activities dated June 30, 1953 (except Chapter 7)" dated July 20, 1953 [4]

The enclosed progress report by the Operations Coordinating Board on implementation of the recommendations of the Jackson Committee report referred to in subparagraphs 2 c and d of the reference memorandum is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council and will be scheduled on the agenda of an early Council meeting.[5]

In accordance with the request of the Director of Central Intelligence Annexes E and F [6] of the report, containing "Eyes Only" material, are included only in a very limited number of the copies of the report which are being distributed.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[1] Copies also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] For text of the Jackson Committee Report, June 30, see p. 1795.

[3] In NSC Action No. 866, taken by the Council at its 157th meeting, July 30, 1953, the NSC approved the recommendations of the Planning Board contained in the memorandum by Executive Secretary Lay of July 20, *supra*. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action")

[4] *Supra*.

[5] At its 167th meeting, Oct. 22, 1953, the National Security Council noted this progress report. (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action")

[6] Annex F is not printed.

[Enclosure]

SEPTEMBER 30, 1953.

## OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD PROGRESS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE (NSC ACTION 866)

1. This report is submitted in accordance with NSC Action 866 transmitted by memorandum to the Psychological Strategy Board from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council dated August 3, 1953,[7] asking PSB to arrange for "such implementation by the responsible departments and agencies as is deemed appropriate, reporting back to the Council in sixty days on progress," with respect to all Jackson Report recommendations except Nos. 1, 20, and those in Chapter VII.

2. With the five exceptions listed below, implementation of all the recommendations is deemed appropriate by the responsible departments and agencies. Ten have been implemented already. The implementation of twenty-five more has been initiated. Thirteen others are the subject of further study by the appropriate department or agency as to how implementation can best be carried out. Further details are submitted in the appended reports from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, and the Foreign Operations Agency.

3. The exceptions referred to in Paragraph 2, above are:

*Recommendation No. 2* (VOA broadcasts to USSR): The United States Information Agency is making a detailed study of what this recommendation would mean in operational terms.

*Recommendation No. 9* (Russian language programs by RIAS): The Psychological Strategy Board was enjoined to ensure that implementation of this recommendation "should not compromise the position of RIAS." Both the Department of State and United States Information Agency agree that to implement this recommendation would run the risk of compromising the position of RIAS, and accordingly the Board has decided that, instead of being carried by RIAS, Russian language programs of this type should be handled by VOA's CAST facilities at Munich.

*Recommendation No. 12:* Since the problem referred to is being solved in a more effective manner than that proposed in Recommendation No. 12, this recommendation is considered no longer effective. (See specially classified Annex E, page 1)[8]

*Recommendation No. 18:* The responsible agency has in effect a number of programs for dealing with this matter, and will give all effect possible to this recommendation within budgetary and other capabilities. (See specially classified Annex E, page 2)

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[7] Not printed.

[8] For Annex E, see p. 1898.

*Recommendation No. 37d* (Name of "Voice of America"): After giving full consideration to the question, it was concluded by all the responsible departments and agencies that the name "Voice of America" should not be changed.

4. In implementation of *Recommendation No. 17* (U.S. Psychological Warfare Operations in Korea), it is anticipated that the Operations Coordinating Board may make certain positive recommendations to the National Security Council concerning over-all improvement in similar operations which may become necessary in the future.

Annex A

## REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT (LIST A)

### OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET SYSTEM

*Radio*

2. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to the Soviet Union should consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented by commentary. The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandist note should be avoided.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that broadcasts of the Voice of America should consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries designed to provide sober and responsible interpretations of events treated in the news and of the policies and the actions of the United States relevant to them.

3. A reduction in the number of non-Russian languages used in broadcasts to the Soviet Union appears desirable.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that no further expansion take place in the number of languages in which broadcasts to the Soviet Union are made. At the same time, it does not favor the elimination of broadcasts in Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, Ukrainian and Georgian. It has concurred in the decision of the United States Information Agency to continue broadcasts in Armenian and to stop broadcasts in Azerbaijani, Turkestani, and Tatar.

5. Maximum guidance for VOA programming to the Soviet satellites should be provided by the American diplomatic missions in these countries.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that guidance from the United States missions in the countries concerned be provided on an increased scale for broadcasts to the satellites of Eastern Europe. At the same time, before utilization by the media, such guidance should be coordinated with guidance provided to the United States Information Agency by the Department in order to assure its conformity with the broad objectives of foreign policy.

6. VOA broadcasting facilities to Communist China should not be expanded.

Subject to the possibility that electromagnetic warfare requirements may dictate otherwise, the Department concurs in the recommendation that no expansion be undertaken in the broadcasting facilities of the Voice of America to Communist China.

7. Radio programs to Communist China should consist of factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that broadcasts to Communist China consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries designed to provide sober and responsible interpretation of events treated in the news and of the policies and the actions of the United States relevant to them.

8. The United States should continue to operate Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS) with the present type of program. The Department concurs in the recommendation that the United States continue to operate RIAS and that it continue to broadcast without substantial modification programs of the type now being broadcast.

9. Russian language programs should be carried by RIAS addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany.

The Department does not concur in the recommendation that RIAS broadcast programs in Russian directed at the Soviet occupation forces in East Germany. It considers the recommendation to be contradictory to the recommendation that RIAS continue to broadcast without substantial modification programs of the sort now being broadcast. The Department suggests that the facilities of VOA at Munich might be examined to determine if by antenna and other plant adjustments, more attention might not be given to the Soviet occupation audience in East Germany. It should also be noted that existing facilities of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism to some extent service this audience.

*Psychological Warfare Operations under Military Auspices in Korea*

17. The National Security Council should initiate a study of United States psychological warfare operations in Korea, including policy with respect to prisoners of war.

If the NSC wishes to initiate such a study, the Department, in consultation with USIA, will be prepared to provide any available information.

*Defector, Refugee, and Related Activities*

19. The necessary legislative and organizational measures to provide adequately for the care and resettlement of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain should be taken.

The Department concurs in the response by the Foreign Operations Agency.

### PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN THE FREE WORLD

*General*

21. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interests to take action consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States.

The Department agrees in general with the statement of purpose of the information program, although it believes that " foreign peoples" constitutes too broad and too inclusive a target, particularly for a contracting program. The Department would prefer a statement of mission indicating that the program is directed at groups and individuals capable of significantly influencing governmental actions and popular attitudes in other countries.

22. A continuing and coordinated effort should be made to inform the world clearly of the American position on major issues.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that a continuing and coordinated effort be made to inform the world clearly of the United States position on major issues. It believes that this can be carried out within the framework of other recommendations in the report.

23. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information activities should concentrate on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations, but the expectation cannot be justified that the headquarters staffs will be wholly exempted, in the course of executing propaganda campaigns, from advising on details. This is true of the execution of military, economic and political programs. It will continue to be true of propaganda campaigns.

24. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of information activities may often be required from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined to global or regional themes. When United States policy has been explained to the field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting it to their local situations.

The Department concurs in the recommendation when United States policy has been explained to the field, information officers should be permitted discretion in adapting it to their local situations, subject to the proviso that the Information Officer follows the foreign policy guidance of the Chief of Mission.

25. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material should be prepared locally to meet local needs.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that, insofar as possible, information and propaganda materials should be prepared locally to meet local needs.

26. The number of operating information personnel located in the United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially reduced.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the number of operating information personnel located in the United States, particularly within the USIA, should be reduced, but not to the point of sacrificing essential activities. Careful consideration should be given to reassigning such personnel throughout the program to avoid dissipating hard-earned experience and unique professional skills.

27. Propaganda or information should be attributed to the United States only when such attribution is an asset. A much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that propaganda or information should be attributed to the United States only when such attribution is either requested or, in the absence of such a requirement, is an asset. The Department concurs in the view that a much greater percentage of information activity than at present should be handled without attribution in accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in the Department's instruction of November 1, 1951.[9] At the same time, the Department points out that production and the distribution of unattributed material will require the employment of skillful and tactful personnel, not all of whom can be, in the nature of the case, indigenous personnel. . . .

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[9] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, p. 954.

28. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial reduction in American personnel overseas in countries where they are heavily concentrated. They should be replaced where necessary by qualified local nationals.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that a substantial reduction should take place in United States personnel in countries where they are now heavily concentrated. The Department believes that a foreign information operation gains in effectiveness to the degree that it avoids drawing attention to itself. At the same time, reductions can be carried to a point where efficient and secure operations, as in placing unattributed materials, become difficult.

29. Far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over the content.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. This effort will be the more productive if it is concentrated upon stimulating activities in fields in which private activity is currently limited rather than seeking to increase activity in fields in which private activity currently is fairly extensive. The need for stimulating substantially increased private activity in the exchange of cultural and artistic materials is a notable case in point. In the stimulation of activity by private organizations, care should be taken to gear such activity closely to foreign policy objectives.

30. Both international organizations and allied governments should be able to make a substantial contribution to American propaganda objectives. Increased emphasis should be placed on this form of international cooperation.

The Department concurs in the belief that international organizations and allied governments should be able to make contributions to American propaganda objectives. At the same time, the Department points out that the contribution may be less substantial than is suggested by the recommendation. Even in the case of a close ally such as the United Kingdom limitations exist with regard to degree of successful collaboration that can be achieved. These limitations are even more marked when two or more other countries are concerned.

The limitations are of the following nature:

(1) A wide disparity in capabilities for conducting foreign information activities. At the present time, only the United Kingdom

among the nations of the free world has capabilities approaching those of the United States.

(2) A wide disparity in attitude toward the use of propaganda as an instrument of national policy. Many of the allies of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization regard propaganda directed against the USSR, Communist China, and the satellites of Eastern Europe as potentially, if not actually, provocative and hence undesirable.

(3) Differences in national policies which result in differences as to the treatment to be given specific matters in propaganda.

(4) Doubts as to the security of other national information agencies, which render difficult an effective exchange of policy guidance.

(5) The tendency in allied and international relationships to resolve differences at the expense of propaganda effectiveness, thereby subjecting United States output to restraints imposed from without.

Within these limitations the United States has since 1950 maintained close relations with the information services of the United Kingdom both at the capitals and at the missions in third countries. Collaboration with the United Kingdom and with France has been especially close in the Federal Republic of Germany. Less intensive but growing collaboration is being carried with Canada and with Australia. The U.S. maintains close relations with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, especially with regard to information directed at Eastern Europe.

The United States has consistently supported the work of the Information Service of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Information Service, and it has sought especially to direct its efforts to the stimulation of individual and governmental action that will make the NATO a success.

The United States has also continuously endeavored to broaden informational activities of the Organization of American States as carried out through the Pan American Union. A draft agreement for increased informational activity on the part of the members has been prepared within the Department.

In view of the peculiar difficulties surrounding the information activities of the United Nations, the United States has concluded that it can most effectively utilize its services by assuring that the position of the United States is fully presented in the deliberations of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the specialized agencies, reports of which are regularly disseminated over the facilities of the United Nations information service. The efforts of the Department in conjunction with other agencies of the government to provide the Delegation of the United States to the United Nations with effective material for use in debates contributes to this end.

31. More effective tactical control of the information and propaganda program of the various United States agencies is needed at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the Chief of Mission with the advice of a "country team" composed of the senior representatives of each agency operating information programs.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that tactical control over the information program of the country should be achieved at the country level by the Chief of Mission acting with the advice of a "country team" consisting of the senior representative of each agency operating information programs in the country. The carrying out of this recommendation should be the easier because such arrangements are already in force.

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33. An effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in management. The Committee recommends that firm executive and Congressional support be extended, in order to stabilize the organization and size of the information programs. Regulations should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility in the allocation of funds and personnel.

The Department concurs in the statement that an effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to assure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and a flexibility in management. This will require a consistent program of public and Congressional relations participated in by the Executive Branch at all levels and through all appropriate spokesmen.

34. Appropriations for the information program should not be drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended have been tried.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that appropriations for the information program should not be further drastically reduced until new procedures now being enforced have been subject to thorough trial.

35. Public understanding and support of the program is vital. The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its program.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the USIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its program, as well as that officers of the USIA and of other appropriate agencies be permitted to speak to audiences in various parts of the country with regard to the work of the program.

36. Consideration should be given to reducing, where possible, the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigration regulations.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that consideration be given to reducing where possible, the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigration regulations. The Department believes that considerable progress in this direction can be made through appropriate action on the part of the Operations Coordinating Board.

*Media Recommendations*

37. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention. . . .

The Department concurs in the recommendations that short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to the areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention . . . subject to the following revisions:

. . . . . . .

. . . That the recommendations of the Chief of Mission be reviewed in the Department for political considerations of a regional or global nature of which the Chief of Mission may not be fully aware.

37. (b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting. Selection and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies.

The Department concurs in the recommendations that broadcasts attributed to the U.S. Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting and that the selection or treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of U.S. actions and policies. At the same time the Department understands that concentration upon objective factual news reporting does not exclude appropriate commentary in explanation of U.S. actions and policies.

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37. (d) Consideration should be given to changing the name "Voice of America."

The Department does not see the necessity for the recommendation that the name "Voice of America" should be changed. The name "Voice of America" has over a decade won wide acceptance in all parts of the world, the choice of a new name would be difficult and perhaps confusing to foreign listeners and the controversy that has lately surrounded the Voice of America has not been of a sort to permamently discredit or to devalue it.

38. (a) Exchange of persons, particularly students, for long term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued.

The Department concurs that the exchange of persons, particularly of students, for long term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued in adequate numbers as an integral part of a balanced national propaganda program.

38. (b) More use should be made of the medium of exchange of persons in influencing the attitude of important local individuals.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that more use should be made of the medium of exchange of persons in influencing the attitude of important local individuals. In this connection importance attaches to assuring that exchanges are entitled to per diem expenses commensurate with their dignity and their importance. Furthermore, the point is noted that the good effects of the exchange of leaders are sometimes weakened by the official character of the exchange. Consideration might be given to the possibility of exchange programs conducted in such a way as to make possible the visits of important individuals to the U.S. under strictly unofficial auspices.

39. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs. The programs of all agencies should be reviewed.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the program of publications be reviewed with the view to decentralization to the maximum possible extent so that material be more responsive to local needs. The Department points out in this connection that local production may sometimes be more expensive than mass production in the United States or at a regional production center.

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41. (a) The information Centers fill a cultural need and should be continued.

The Department concurs in the observation that the information Centers fill a cultural need and should be continued.

41. (b) The Government should cooperate with the commercial publishing industry and subsidize its efforts when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the Government cooperate with the commercial publishing industry and subsidize its efforts when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world.

41. (c) While the Government must not aid in the distribution of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution

of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the Government, while not assisting in the distribution of subversive books, should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution of books which may contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life where such distribution is considered to be useful in advancing the achievement of United States objectives abroad.

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## Annex B

## REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT (LIST A)

### OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET SYSTEM

*Radio*

2. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to the Soviet Union should consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented by commentary. The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandist note should be avoided.

The U.S. Information Agency is making a detailed study of what this recommendation would mean in operational terms.

3. A reduction in the number of non-Russian languages used in broadcasts to the Soviet Union appears desirable.

Reduction of non-Russian languages in broadcasts to the USSR is currently taking place. Azerbaijani, Turkestani and Tatar services are being terminated. The Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian and the three Baltic Services are being continued.

5. Maximum guidance for VOA programming to the Soviet satellites should be provided by the American diplomatic missions in these countries.

A circular instruction (as well as an informal-personal letter setting forth in detail the reasons why recommendations on the handling, particularly of fast-breaking news developments is required) has been sent to our missions in the Soviet-satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

6. VOA broadcasting facilities to Communist China should not be expanded.

Agree. No further expansion will be made of our facilities for broadcasting to Communist China. In accordance with a PSB decision we will study the possibility of additional programming over existing facilities.

7. Radio programs to Communist China should consist of factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries.

We agree that the major proportion of our broadcasts to Communist China should comprise news and commentaries, but this should not exclude other effective techniques which are useful for this audience.

The Committee recommendation appears to be based upon the fact that the limited audience in Communist China is composed almost entirely of Communist Party and government officials. While we do not know definitely, we believe it is safe to assume that there also is a clandestine listening audience, many of whom are thoroughly out of sympathy with the communist rulers.

8. The United States should continue to operate Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS) with the present type of program.

Agree.

9. Russian language programs should be carried by RIAS addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany.

We do not believe it advisable, at this time, to initiate over RIAS facilities, Russian language programs addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany. When this question was raised, shortly after the June 17 demonstrations, Ambassador Conant interposed objections on the grounds that East Germans have come to accept RIAS as a joint German-American radio station and that the effectiveness of RIAS would suffer if programming of this nature were initiated.

We propose to undertake Russian language programs to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany over CAST facilities. CAST is now relaying Munich Relay Center Russian language programs. These programs can be designed primarily for Soviet occupation forces.

## PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN THE FREE WORLD

### *General*

21. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interests to take action consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States.

We are in complete agreement with this recommendation. The forthcoming instruction on the 1954 program will include this conception.

22. A continuing and coordinated effort should be made to inform the world clearly of the American position on major issues.

Agree.

23. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.

We agree with this recommendation and believe it will be accomplished in the organization of the new agency which will put full responsibility on the field for the execution of its own programs.

24. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of information activities may often be required from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined to global or regional themes. When United States policy has been explained to the field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting it to their local situations.

Agree. Occasionally, however, foreign policy decisions necessitate a very specific guidance which defines what can and cannot be said on a given subject.

25. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material should be prepared locally to meet local needs.

It is our intention to produce an increasingly large amount of our materials locally or at regional production centers at the direction of the PAO.

26. The number of operating information personnel located in the United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially reduced.

Personnel in the United States has been substantially reduced.

27. A much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed.

We agree that unattributed materials and activities are among the most effective means of getting our point of view across.

28. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial reduction in American personnel overseas in countries where they are heavily concentrated. They should be replaced where necessary by qualified local nationals.

There has been a substantial reduction in American personnel overseas. We agree that qualified locals should be used and are giving flexibility to PAO in hiring qualified locals.

29. Far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over the content.

The need of increasing this type of activity is recognized by doubling the budget of the private enterprise cooperation staff at a time when the entire Agency is undergoing drastic reductions. Particular stress will be put on the development of local cooperation from private American enterprise, foundations, etc., in individual countries overseas.

31. More effective tactical control of the information and propaganda program of the various United States agencies is needed at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the Chief of Mission with the advice of a "country team" composed of the senior representatives of each agency operating information programs.

We believe that the country team concept and a unified country program will be a result of the establishment of the U.S. Information Agency. The information activities of MSA and TCA have been transferred to the new agency and a consolidated field program will be directed by the U.S. Information Service country director working closely with the Ambassador.

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33. An effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in management. The Committee recommends that firm executive and congressional support be extended, in order to stabilize the organization and size of the information programs. Regulations should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility in the allocation of funds and personnel.

Agree.

34. Appropriations for the information program should not be drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended have been tried.

Agree.

35. Public understanding and support of the program is vital. The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United States Advisory Commission on the Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its program.

We agree that the need to inform the American public is vital to the success of this program.

*Media Recommendations*

37. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention. . . .

We agree to the extent that our budget permits us to accept the recommendations of the Chiefs of Mission. In addition to the recommendations of the Missions, . . . there are certain other factors to be taken into account in maintaining or cancelling short-wave programs. For example, the desirability of maintaining, at least at a minimum level, a world-wide news program in English, and the desirability of maintaining shortwave transmissions where facilities are available to use to relay these programs over long or medium wave.

37. (b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting. Selection and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies.

Agree.

37. (c) Radio should be used for exhortation in the free world only on a non-attributed basis. In order to lessen attribution and to reach the largest audience, maximum use should be made of local broadcasting facilities.

We agree that maximum use should be made of local broadcasting facilities providing that we are able to place material which contributes to our objectives. Frequently the limitations on the content which may be included in local programs are so severe that material placed does not achieve anything except possibly good will.

37. (d) Consideration should be given to changing the name "Voice of America."

We do not believe the name Voice of America should be changed. The VOA is an established name throughout the world and to change it would mean rebuilding an audience acceptance.

39. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs.

As stated in connection with the recommendation on local production, publications will also be produced in the field missions or in the regional production centers at the direction of the Public Affairs Officer.

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41. (a) The information centers fill a cultural need and should be continued.

We agree. In the Fiscal 54 budget reductions, information centers were cut the least of all media. Only ten of the 143 centers were cut. Of the ten cut, five are in Japan, leaving nineteen.

. . . . . . .

41. (c) While the Government must not aid in the distribution of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution

of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life.

We agree.

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Annex C[10]

## REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT (LIST A)

### *Psychological Warfare Operations under Military Auspices in Korea*

17. The National Security Council should initiate a study of United States psychological warfare operations in Korea, including policy with respect to prisoners of war.

The Department of Defense has submitted a preliminary report on its activities in this field, and if the National Security Council wishes to initiate a coordinated study of the subject, will be prepared to provide any available information.

Annex D

## REPORT OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT (LIST A)

### OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET SYSTEM

### *Defector, Refugee, and Related Activities*

19. The necessary legislative and organizational measures to provide adequately for the care and resettlement of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain should be taken.

On December 20, 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board approved PSB D-18a,[11] which provided policy and authority for a program "insuring or arranging the employment, resettlement or care of all escapees from the Soviet Orbit . . . ".[12] The Department of State was assigned administrative responsibility. Legislative authority was provided under Section 101 (a) 1 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and funds were made available for operation of the program by Presidential directive on March 22, 1952, authorizing the transfer from MSA to the Department of State. The Program has been fully operational since May 1952, after the establishment of

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[10] Annex C carries a secret classification.

[11] Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume IV.

[12] Ellipsis in the source text.

Escapee Program missions in all of the major countries of reception, including Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Trieste. By June 30, 1953, over 22,500 escapees had been registered and assisted through care, maintenance and resettlement activities under the Escapee Program. Of these, over 5,000 have been resettled in either the United States, Canada, Australia, or Latin America. By action of the PSB, the Program for Fiscal 1954 was expanded to include certain Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, Yugoslav escapees, Kazakh and Turki escapees in the Near East, and Greek refugees-escapees from Albania and Rumania. The Program budget authorized for Fiscal Year 1954 is $9 million. In accordance with the reorganization of all foreign operations, the Escapee Program was transferred on July 1, 1953 from the Department of State to the Foreign Operations Administration.

Since the inception of the Program, considerable progress has been made in all phases, but particularly in the care and maintenance aspects of the Program. Outstanding results have been achieved in Austria, Italy and Turkey. In view of the magnitude of the problem, progress in the Program in Germany has come somewhat slower than in other countries. Within the scope of existing policy, organizational measures are adequate to provide for the care and resettlement of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. From the psychological standpoint, existing legislation is not adequate for the resettlement of some escapees because, generally speaking, former members of the Communist Party or the Communist apparatus are not permitted entrance into the United States. From an operational point of view, the Refugee Relief Act legislation is inadequate because it does not now provide for the financing of ocean transport for refugees eligible under the Act.

## Annex E

## REPORT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT (LIST B)

### OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET SYSTEM

*Radio*

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Close coordination has been established with the new USIA and at present there appear to be no problems with respect to broadcast material to the Soviet system which cannot be readily resolved. Discussions, however, are continuing and any unresolved issues will be submitted to the OCB.

10. The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., should concentrate on the improvement of Radio Liberation and reduce expenditures on the émigré coordinating center.

The operation of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc. has been under particularly close review for the past three months. This review has included trips by responsible officials to Germany, plus discussions in Washington between the Chairman of the American Committee, representatives of the Department of State, and senior CIA officials. Efforts have been and are being made to improve the quality of Radio Liberation broadcasts. Consequently, serious consideration has been and is being given to the improvement of Radio Liberation and to the reduction of expenditures on the émigré coordinating center.

11. The National Committee for a Free Europe should devote primary attention to RFE. The other activities of NCFE should be subjected to review by CIA.

The activities of NCFE have been and are being reviewed by CIA and greater emphasis has been placed on the development of Radio Free Europe. This has come about as the result of direction and the effect of budgetary limitations.

12. The possibility of providing international sponsorship for RFE . . . should be studied . . . .

In view of the fact that the problem of the sponsorship for RFE being solved in a more effective manner than that proposed in the original Jackson Committee recommendation, Recommendation No. 12 is considered no longer effective.

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# INDEX

BES

# INDEX

- Acheson, Dean G., 68*n*, 118, 138*n*, 164*n*, 197, 238*n*, 851*n*, 883*n*, 885*n*, 947*n*, 964*n*, 1021*n*
  - Armaments regulation policy:
    - Armed forces limitations, 859-863, 904, 941, 943, 954*n*, 957-958, 982-984
    - Development of, 894-895
    - Disclosure and verification, 900, 918, 926, 928, 932, 945
    - Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, 876
    - French proposals, 979-980
    - Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 896-898, 901-902, 995, 1008, 1056
    - U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 854-855
  - Atomic energy policy:
    - Approved policies, 1046
    - Atomic weapons, responsibility for, 863*n*, 964, 969*n*, 970, 972, 981, 984, 1010
    - Atomic weapons production, 933-934
    - Combined Development Agency, 891
    - Fissionable materials, 852, 886, 888-890, 893, 1026, 1029-1032
    - Hydrogen bomb production, 878, 1017-1018
    - Hydrogen bomb testing, 958, 989*n*, 991-992, 1032, 1034, 1036, 1050-1051, 1053-1055
    - Sharing of information with Allies, 846, 988*n*
  - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 202
  - Continental defense program, 125
  - Economic and military assistance programs, 126, 127*n*, 184, 209-222
  - Foreign information program, 1616-1620, 1625-1627, 1641, 1652-1654
  - General war, 197*n*
  - Indigenous forces, development of, 134, 136-137
  - International Information Agency, 289, 1628-1629
  - National security policy, 88, 278, 289
  - Trade policy, 119-120, 122-125
- Achilles, Theodore C., 1133-1134, 1291
- Acts of Congress:
  - Atomic Energy Act of *1946*, 274, 847*n*, 965, 972, 1116, 1125-1126, 1129-1133, 1245-1246, 1264-1265, 1269-1274, 1277-1279, 1281, 1284, 1361, 1456, 1471, 1492-1493
  - Atomic Energy Act of *1954*, 1477*n*, 1507-1508, 1524
  - Defense Production Act of *1950*, 33-34, 36, 46
  - Espionage Act, 1264-1265
- Acts of Congress—Continued
  - Internal Security Act, 1264-1265, 1281
  - McMahon Act, 1302, 1437
  - Mutual Security Act of *1951*, 174, 1603
  - National Security Act of *1947*, 179, 246, 1724
  - Omnibus Immigration Act of *1952*, 180
  - Supplemental Appropriation Act of *1953*, 989
  - United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of *1948*, 1591, 1601, 1632, 1646, 1648-1650, 1693, 1715
  - Universal Military Training and Service Act, 607
- *Ad Hoc* Committee on Armaments and American Policy. *See under* Armaments regulation policy.
- Adenauer, Konrad, 459, 533, 557
- Administrative transition, 181, 186
- Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, U.S., 1693
- Advisory Commission on Information, U.S., 1693, 1852
- Afghanistan, 391
- Africa, 131-132, 192-193, 426-427, 561, 795-796, 1780, 1785-1786, 1820-1821
- Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 1407, 1450
- Air Force, U.S. Department of the, 3, 9-10, 22, 24-26, 31-33, 167-168, 260, 310, 627
- Albania, 439, 1727
- Alberto, Adm. Alvaro, 1143
- Aldrich, Winthrop W., 1379, 1431-1432
- Alexander, Archibald S., 880-881
- Allen, Leo E., 829
- Allen, Ray, 869-871, 925
- Allen, Ward P., 897
- Allison, John M., 17*n*
- Alphand, Hervé, 1234
- Alsop, Joseph and Stewart, 122, 635
- Aluminum, 158
- American Civil Liberties Union, 1640
- American Committee for Liberation for Bolshevism, Inc., 1829, 1884, 1899
- American Institute of Architects, 1450
- *The American Legion Magazine*, 1690
- American Republics. *See* Latin America.
- Amory, Robert, Jr., 324, 327, 1230, 1482*n*, 1539, 1540
- Anderson, Dillon, 268-269, 273, 280
- Anderson, John, 1252
- Anderson, Orville C., 1616*n*
- Anderson, Robert B., 238*n*, 672*n*, 680, 1437-1438, 1448
- Arab States, 267, 751
- Arends, Leslie C., 827

T AVAILABLE COPY

- Argentina, 195, 562, 1143
- Armaments regulation policy (*see also* Atomic energy policy; Atoms for Peace proposal; *and* Armaments regulation *under* United Nations):
  - *Ad Hoc* Committee on Armaments and American Policy, 323, 1114, 1134-1137, 1150-1160, 1240, 1257*n*, 1259-1285
  - Allied cooperation, importance of, 1081-1083, 1115-1116, 1156-1157
  - Armed forces limitations, 859-863, 903-906, 909-913, 915-917, 920-921, 938-939, 941-945, 954-955, 957-958, 982-984, 1091-1092, 1103-1108
  - Arms race, 1063-1069
  - Atomic stocks, reductions in, 1089, 1118-1120
  - Atomic weapons. *See under* Atomic energy policy *and under* National security policy.
  - Bacteriological weapons, 994, 1094
  - British atomic weapons ban proposal, 1393-1397, 1421-1423
  - Continental defense, role of, 1083-1085, 1116, 1137, 1172
  - Conventional weapons, 1090, 1118-1120, 1585-1587
  - Development of, 497, 584-585, 670, 687-688, 717-718, 775, 894-910, 916-926, 1061-1062, 1088-1091
  - Disarmament (*see also* Panel of Consultants on Disarmament *below*):
    - Atomic, 1329-1331, 1333, 1342-1343, 1358-1360
    - Comprehensive program, 940-941
    - Principles of, 1105, 1393-1397, 1399-1401
  - Disclosure and verification, 872-875, 877-878, 883-885, 900, 905-908, 914-915, 917-918, 923-924, 926-932, 945-946, 1046-1048, 1089-1090, 1092-1093, 1530-1531
  - Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, 876-877, 910*n*, 912-913, 932, 954, 1160-1169
  - Great Powers conference, possible, 1207-1208
  - Hydrogen bomb. *See under* Atomic energy policy.
  - Interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission, 902, 910*n*
  - Interdepartmental review of, 1211-1212, 1378, 1383-1384, 1386, 1537-1540, 1563-1566, 1580-1589
  - International regulation, 1073-1076, 1200-1201
  - Panel of Consultants on Disarmament (*see also Ad Hoc* Committee on Armaments and American Policy *above*), 232-233, 319, 896-910, 915-926, 988, 992-1010, 1013-1016, 1056-1091, 1096, 1107, 1110-1121
  - Political considerations, 918-924

Armaments regulation policy—Continued

  - Public information policy (Project Candor), 1077-1081, 1110-1115, 1136-1137, 1151-1155, 1157-1160, 1170-1174, 1184-1185, 1223-1227, 1240-1243, 1250
  - Savings used for world aid ("The Chance for Peace" speech), 1144-1145, 1176, 1193, 1198-1199, 1204-1206
  - Soviet atomic weapons ban proposal, 861-862, 1238, 1304-1305, 1310-1312, 1316-1318, 1358-1360, 1367-1368, 1387-1392, 1413-1416, 1421-1423, 1473-1477, 1525-1526, 1534-1537, 1568
  - U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 854-855, 1013-1014, 1040, 1048, 1086-1087, 1117-1118
- Armed Forces Network, 1845
- Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., 562*n*, 646-647, 1336*n*
- Army, U.S. Department of the, 3, 22-23, 25, 235, 259-260, 310, 821
- Arneson, R. Gordon, 58, 234*n*, 607*n*, 846-848, 882, 890, 894, 964-968, 969*n*, 981, 989-991, 993, 1017-1025, 1026*n*, 1029-1037, 1049, 1055, 1056*n*, 1125-1126, 1134, 1157, 1179, 1215, 1247-1248, 1251-1256, 1265, 1298-1300, 1305*n*, 1322*n*, 1333, 1334*n*, 1336*n*, 1349*n*, 1352*n*, 1355-1356, 1367, 1370-1372, 1540, 1758*n*, 1760*n*
- Arnold, Henry F., 1713*n*
- Arnot, Charles P., 1658*n*
- Atomic Energy Commission, U.S.:
  - Advisory duties, 1177-1179
  - Armaments regulation, 872-875, 1378, 1384, 1386, 1566, 1580, 1583-1584
  - Atomic weapons:
    - Production, 866-867, 937, 949-950
    - Responsibility for, 868, 947-953, 964-968, 985-987, 1011-1013, 1577
    - Use of, possible, 607-608
  - Expansion program, 1112
  - Fissionable materials:
    - Acquisition of, 853, 855-858, 886-887, 890-894, 1026-1032, 1098-1103
    - Supplies for Allies, 1297-1486
  - Funding for, 169, 274-276, 286, 538-540, 989
  - Hydrogen bomb production, 879-881
  - Hydrogen bomb testing, 991, 1016-1017, 1025, 1036-1037, 1054, 1420, 1428, 1450, 1464
  - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1298, 1357, 1372-1376, 1406-1407, 1560
  - International control of atomic energy, 945-946
  - Military Liaison Committee, 851
  - Oppenheimer security clearance, 1472-1473
  - Practical uses of atomic energy, 1121-1128, 1132-1133, 1137-1139

- Atomic Energy Commission, U.S.—Continued
  - Program cutbacks, 292, 294-295, 314-315
  - Public information policy, 871-872
  - Reactor construction and regulation, 1146-1149
  - Reactors abroad, construction of, 1482*n*
  - Sharing of information with Allies, 846-847, 849-850, 951-952, 985-986, 1263, 1269-1274, 1277-1278, 1281-1282, 1508-1511
- Atomic energy policy (*see also* Atoms for Peace proposal; International Scientific Conference; Atomic weapons, possible use of *under* National security policy):
  - Aircraft propulsion program, 1146-1149
  - Approved policies, 1046
  - Atomic weapons (*see also* Weapons information *under* Sharing of information with Allies *below*):
    - Military strategy re, 1069-1073, 1397*n*, 1401, 1440-1442, 1576-1577
    - Production, 866-867, 933-938, 949-950, 966, 968, 971, 987, 1013, 1112, 1180
    - Public information policy, 869-872
    - Responsibility for, 863-868, 947-953, 964-979, 981, 984-988, 1010-1013, 1577
    - Testing, 1001-1003, 1437-1440
  - Combined Development Agency, 890-892, 1098, 1100-1101, 1141-1144, 1255, 1510
  - Combined Development Trust, 1252
  - Combined Policy Committee, 867, 885-894, 951, 1026-1032, 1252*n*, 1253, 1255, 1275, 1277, 1513
  - Fissionable materials:
    - Acquisition of, 851-858, 865, 886-894, 1026-1032, 1098-1103, 1141-1144, 1183, 1254-1255, 1555-1558, 1559*n*
    - Supplies for Allies, 1296-1297, 1483-1492, 1497-1498, 1555-1558, 1559*n*
  - Hydrogen bomb production, 878-883, 955-957, 963-964, 1017-1019, 1470-1471
  - Hydrogen bomb testing, 991
    - Ban on, 959-961, 992-993
    - British position, 1036-1037, 1382-1383, 1418-1420, 1448, 1463
    - Effects testing, 1449-1452
    - Foreign protests, 1379-1380
    - Moratorium on, 1383-1387, 1418-1420, 1425-1429, 1445-1472, 1478-1479, 1584-1585
    - Notification of Allies, 1036-1037, 1424
    - Postponement of, 989-1008, 1020-1021, 1032
    - Publicity re, 1019-1020, 1049-1055, 1408-1409

- Atomic energy policy—Continued
  - Hydrogen bomb testing—Continued
    - Results of, 881-883, 1025, 1042
    - Soviet Union, considerations re, 1004, 1016, 1022-1025, 1034-1036
  - International control of atomic energy, 926-932, 945-946, 1018-1019, 1021-1022, 1035-1036, 1182-1183
  - Morality questions, 1153, 1160
  - Nuclear fuel production, 1586, 1588
  - Practical uses of atomic energy, 274-276, 855, 1112, 1121-1133, 1137-1139, 1180-1183
  - Private industry involvement, 1124-1125, 1129-1132, 1147-1149, 1247-1248, 1296-1297, 1498
  - Reactor construction and regulation, 1123-1125, 1131-1132, 1146-1149
  - Reactors abroad, construction of, 1460-1461, 1481-1482, 1489-1492, 1496-1501, 1541-1542, 1550-1551
  - Security concerns, 1108-1109
  - Sharing of information with Allies:
    - Australia, 1283-1285, 1289
    - Bilateral agreements, 1570
    - Canada, 848-851, 975, 1116, 1244-1246, 1252-1255, 1268, 1275-1277, 1279-1285, 1289, 1507-1511
    - Categories of information, 1257-1262, 1264-1265
    - Communication concerns, 1271-1272
    - France, 1292
    - Free World alliance, importance to, 1081-1083, 1220-1223
    - Guidelines for, 867-868, 951-952, 1489-1499
    - Intelligence information, 1284-1285, 1289
    - Joint declassification program, 1280
    - Legislation re, 966-968, 972, 985-986, 1183, 1245-1246, 1264-1266, 1268-1271, 1277-1279, 1360-1361, 1456-1457, 1471-1472, 1477, 1492-1493, 1505
    - Medical research information, 1519-1520
    - Memorandum of Intent of *1945*, 1252-1255
    - New Zealand, 1283-1285, 1289
    - Objectives of, 1260-1261, 1264
    - Raw materials data, 1279
    - Restricted data, 1272-1274, 1360-1361
    - Security concerns, 1262-1263, 1266-1269
    - Training schools, 1498, 1519-1520, 1552
    - United Kingdom, 846-848, 975-976, 988, 1116, 1245-1246, 1251-1255, 1267-1269, 1275-1277, 1279-1285, 1289, 1301-1302, 1355-1356, 1507-1511, 1542
    - Weapons information, 1115-1116, 1156-1157, 1282-1284

Atomic energy policy—Continued
  Soviet hydrogen bomb capabilities, 457, 479, 614, 628, 879-881, 998, 1185-1188, 1213-1214, 1219-1220, 1454-1455, 1458, 1464-1465
  U.S.-Soviet inspections of atomic facilities, 1530-1531
Atomic weapons. *See under* Atomic energy policy *and under* National security policy.
Atoms for Peace proposal:
  British position, 1286
  Conventional weapons, questions re, 1314-1316, 1321-1322
  Development of, 1213*n*, 1224-1235, 1309-1310, 1526-1527
  Foreign notification, 1289-1291, 1294-1295
  French position, 1291-1292
  Implementation of, 1293-1294, 1297-1300, 1376-1378, 1385, 1387, 1435-1436
  Indian position, 1291
  Information efforts re, 1758-1761, 1781, 1793-1794
  International Atomic Energy Agency proposal:
    Allied reaction to, 1503-1504
    British position, 1320-1321, 1341-1342, 1353-1355, 1361-1363, 1370-1371, 1458-1459, 1503, 1513, 1515-1517, 1528-1529
    Canadian position, 1344-1345, 1370-1371, 1412, 1503, 1513, 1515-1517, 1528-1529
    Contributions of fissionable materials, 1341-1342, 1485-1486, 1545-1548, 1553-1554, 1560, 1577-1578
    Country representation, 1361-1363, 1366-1367
    Formation, plans re, 1511-1517, 1519-1520, 1523-1524
    Future actions re, 1574-1576
    Indian position, 1554-1555, 1559-1560
    Legislation re, 1247-1249, 1442-1445, 1504-1505
    Negotiations for, 1527-1529, 1547-1549, 1560-1563, 1571-1573
    Organization and function of, 1218-1219, 1235-1240, 1246, 1298-1299, 1312-1314, 1357, 1372-1376, 1448, 1489-1491, 1495-1496, 1501-1502, 1506-1507, 1549-1550
    Ratification conference, 1554-1555, 1559-1560
    Reactor construction in the United States, 1530-1532
    Soviet participation, question of, 1443-1445, 1458-1463, 1473-1475, 1479-1480, 1493-1495, 1528-1529, 1542-1543, 1544*n*, 1545-1549
    Soviet position, 1376-1377, 1413-1418, 1462-1463, 1479-1480, 1522-1523, 1560-1563, 1567-1574

Atoms for Peace proposal—Continued
  International Atomic Energy Agency proposal—Continued
    United Nations, relation to, 1370-1371, 1436-1437, 1481, 1484-1485, 1505, 1530, 1532-1533, 1540, 1544-1545, 1562, 1567-1568
    U.N. resolution re, 1579
  Presidential speech re, *1953*, 1285-1287, 1291-1292, 1300, 1344
  Publicity re, 1317-1318, 1403
  Soviet position, 1287-1288, 1291-1292, 1295, 1302-1305, 1398-1399, 1401-1403, 1412, 1424-1425
  U.S.-Soviet private discussions:
    Additional participants, possible, 1327-1328, 1332-1334, 1337-1338, 1340, 1346, 1350-1353, 1364-1365, 1368-1369
    British position, 1305-1306, 1316, 1332-1333, 1339-1341, 1347-1352
    Canadian position, 1347-1351
    Dulles-Molotov meetings, 1355, 1413-1416
    French position, 1327-1328, 1332-1334, 1340, 1347-1348, 1351-1353
    Preliminary meetings, 1322-1328, 1335-1339, 1345-1347, 1349, 1368-1369
    Proposal of, 1304-1309, 1319, 1320*n*
    Publication of documents, 1518-1525
    Site of, 1331-1332, 1337
Attlee, Clement R., 1252, 1254
Austin, Warren R., 1140
Australia, 496, 584, 1027-1028, 1031, 1101, 1283-1285, 1289, 1382, 1498, 1504, 1661
Austria, 175, 218
Automobile Manufacturers' Association, 1450
Azores, 619

Baarslag, Karl H. W., 1690
Bacon, Ruth E., 957*n*
Barbour, Walworth, 58*n*, 1681*n*
Barco, James W., 883*n*
Barkley, Alben W., 118, 136, 271, 1635
Barnard, Thurman L., 1635, 1656*n*
Barnes, Tracy, 925
Baruch, Bernard M., 895*n*, 1059
Battle, Lucius D., 1625*n*
Bechhoefer, Bernard C., 846, 872, 883*n*, 912*n*, 916, 932*n*, 954*n*, 957*n*, 982*n*, 1014, 1046-1049, 1096*n*, 1139*n*, 1175*n*, 1307-1308, 1334*n*, 1370-1371, 1378*n*, 1384*n*, 1393*n*, 1429*n*, 1433-1434, 1478, 1570*n*
Begoügne de Juniac, Gontran, 1351-1353
Belgian Congo, 1028, 1031, 1098, 1141
Belgium, 1098-1099, 1327-1328, 1461, 1483, 1491, 1498-1499, 1503-1504, 1555-1558, 1559*n*
Bendetsen, Karl R., 324
Benton, William B., 1627
Berding, Andrew H., 1756, 1758*n*
Beriya, Lavrentiy Pavlovich, 1178, 1727*n*

Berlin, 191, 496, 584, 1828-1829, 1884, 1893
Berlin Conference, *1954*, 1355
Bermuda Conference, *December 1953*, 608-609, 1250, 1251*n*, 1285-1286, 1289, 1292, 1301
Bernau, Phyllis D., 1379*n*
Berry, Burton Y., 17*n*
Bhatnagar, S. S., 886-887
Bickel, Alexander, 1387*n*, 1402-1403
Bidault, Georges, 1291, 1333, 1334*n*, 1340, 1398
Bissell, Richard M., Jr., 202
Black, Lt. Col. Edwin F., 1265
Black, James B., 270, 280
Blakeney, F. J., 1382
Block, Ralph, 1654*n*, 1756*n*
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., 1008*n*, 1014-1016, 1056*n*
Blum, Robert, 1796, 1874
Board of National Estimates, 186-196
Boegner, Jean-Marc, 1292
Boggs, Marion W., 435*n*, 440, 700*n*, 715, 1184*n*, 1185, 1482*n*, 1488, 1537*n*
Bohlen, Charles E., 5-9, 11-18, 57, 58*n*, 68*n*, 87-88, 134-135, 164*n*, 197-198, 200*n*, 242-245, 1226, 1286-1288, 1291-1292, 1295, 1302-1305, 1310-1312, 1319, 1323-1324, 1335-1336, 1417, 1518-1522, 1578, 1681*n*, 1684*n*
Bolivia, 562
Bonbright, James C. H., 58*n*, 1345*n*, 1346*n*, 1348, 1349-1353
Bonesteel, Col. Charles H., III, 324, 352, 391, 1229, 1482*n*, 1539
Bonnet, Henri, 1144, 1334, 1336*n*, 1340
Borel, Paul A., 186*n*
Boughton, James H., 1681*n*, 1711*n*
Bowie, Robert R., 324, 370-371, 441-442, 456*n*, 529, 565-567, 598, 607*n*, 609, 648*n*, 699-700, 736, 1211, 1215, 1220, 1227, 1235-1240, 1250, 1251*n*, 1297-1300, 1307, 1312-1315, 1322*n*, 1329, 1330, 1336*n*, 1344, 1349*n*, 1352*n*, 1371-1372, 1416, 1419-1420, 1435*n*, 1448, 1473*n*, 1481, 1482*n*, 1501*n*, 1537-1540, 1544*n*, 1564-1566, 1570, 1586-1587, 1723
Boyer, Marion, 890-891, 1143-1144
Boykin, Samuel D., 1673
Bracken, Katherine W., 1673*n*
Bradbury, Norris, 1050
Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., 20, 37, 113-114, 257*n*, 260, 263, 272, 281*n*, 305*n*, 326, 328*n*, 355*n*, 372, 378*n*, 399*n*, 437, 852*n*, 879, 894, 931, 981, 985-987, 1082, 1103*n*, 1108, 1149*n*, 1161*n*, 1174
Brainin, Joseph, 1736
Brazil, 562, 886, 888, 1029, 1143
Bridges, H. Styles, 829
British Guiana, 562
Browder, Earl, 1698
Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 328*n*, 355*n*, 399*n*, 438, 472, 475*n*, 489*n*, 522, 536*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 609*n*, 647*n*, 667*n*, 715*n*, 729*n*, 738*n*, 759*n*, 802, 806*n*, 1456
Bruce, David K. E., 164-165, 954-955, 989, 993, 1051, 1091-1096, 1625, 1640
Buckley, 1720
Budenz, Louis, 1698
Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 124, 261-262, 491*n*, 500*n*, 503*n*, 507*n*, 515-518, 522-524, 537-538, 725, 729-731, 732*n*, 733-736, 813, 817*n*, 820*n*, 1409, 1644, 1878
Bulgaria, 1727
Bull, Lt. Gen. Harold R., 330*n*, 368
Bundy, McGeorge, 924-926, 941, 988, 992-993, 1014-1015, 1058
Bundy, William P., 1134, 1157
Burgess, Carter, 823-824, 829
Burma, 194, 560, 1787
Burns, Arthur F., 488*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 667*n*, 713, 738*n*, 759*n*, 798, 800, 806*n*
Burns, Gen. James H., 1267
Burton, Ralph, 1697*n*
Bush, Vannevar, 896*n*, 899, 906-908, 917, 919-922, 924, 988, 992-993, 1058, 1096, 1114, 1134-1137, 1150, 1170-1172, 1174
Byrnes, James F., 897
Byroade, Henry A., 441*n*, 1780

Cabell, Lt. Gen. Charles P., 324, 350
Cabot, John M., 1688-1690
Caccia, Harold, 1412, 1418
Caldwell, Millard, 20*n*, 54*n*, 80*n*, 142*n*, 869
Campbell, John C., 736-738
Canada:
  Armaments regulation policy, 884, 908-909, 1381
  Continental defense, 235, 319, 368, 474, 482-483, 616-620, 627
  International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1344-1345, 1370-1371, 1412, 1503, 1513, 1515-1517, 1528-1529
  U.S. hydrogen bomb testing, 1036-1037
  U.S. sharing of atomic energy information, 848-851, 975, 1116, 1244-1246, 1252-1255, 1268, 1275-1277, 1279-1285, 1289, 1507-1511
  Uranium ore sales, 1027-1028, 1031, 1101
Cannon, Cavendish W., 1030
Carlier, Georges, 1503
Carney, Adm. Robert B., 326-327, 444-445, 449, 454, 570-573, 639-640, 643
Carns, Brig. Gen. Edwin H. J., 565
Carroll, Col. Paul, 325
Carson, Col., 1547
Carter, Brig. Gen. Marshall S., 878
Casler, Harry S., 1736
Central Intelligence Agency, 50-53, 181, 186*n*, 247-248, 356-357, 436, 551*n*, 676-678, 812*n*, 1263, 1428, 1482*n*, 1509, 1674, 1725, 1746, 1749, 1790, 1829, 1831, 1835, 1837, 1898-1899
Charpentier, Pierre, 1333-1334
Chase, Warren, 909, 1014, 1056*n*
Cherwell, Lord, 846-848, 1286, 1289, 1301-1302, 1342, 1356, 1454, 1527

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 392*n*, 696, 839, 841
Chidlaw, Gen. Benjamin W., 800
Chile, 562
China, People's Republic of:
  Armaments regulation, 1208
  Foreign policy, 60, 94, 108, 772-773, 811
  Indochina, involvement in, 560
  International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1367
  Korean war, 922-923
  Military strength, 104, 188-189
  Political situation, 188
  Prestige of, 650, 725, 754
  Project Solarium recommendations re, 408-409, 421, 424-425
  Soviet Union, relations with, 493, 580, 773, 1683, 1808
  U.N. Disarmament Commission, 1382, 1398
  U.S. information efforts re, 1785, 1828, 1884, 1892-1893
  U.S. policy re, 776, 817, 957-958
China, Republic of, 175, 215, 218, 221-222, 421, 429, 496, 498, 559, 584, 586, 811
Churchill, Winston S., 4, 439, 533, 546, 608, 695, 697, 846-847, 848*n*, 885*n*, 890*n*, 1251-1253, 1285-1286, 1289, 1291, 1301-1302, 1328, 1341, 1355-1356, 1379, 1383, 1467, 1528
Civil Aeronautics Administration, 632
Civil Defense Program. *See* Federal Civil Defense Program.
Civil Service Commission, 180
Clark, General Mark W., 1705
Clark, Ralph, 1265
Clarkson, Gen. Percy W., 1025, 1033
Coast Guard, U.S., 487-488
Cockroft, John, 1142, 1513
Cogan, Thomas J., 1429*n*
Cohen, Benjamin V., 883-885, 894-896, 898-900, 903-909, 912, 914, 916-917, 919, 979*n*, 989, 992, 1008*n*, 1013-1014, 1046-1048, 1052, 1055-1056
Cohn, Roy V., 1697
Cole, W. Sterling, 1109, 1113*n*, 1185-1188, 1247-1249, 1442-1443, 1504-1505, 1511, 1523-1524
Collins, Gen. J. Lawton, 259-263, 326, 373, 1033, 1132
Colonialism, 377, 408
Combined Policy Committee. *See under* Atomic energy policy.
Commerce, U.S. Department of, 1297, 1792-1793
Committee for Free Asia, 1834
Committee of Three, 238*n*
Committee on International Information Activities, 455
Communist Party, U.S., 336-337
Compton, Wilson M., 1591*n*, 1595, 1628-1638, 1641-1651, 1654, 1656-1658, 1672, 1673*n*, 1678
Congress, U.S. (*see also* Acts of Congress):
  Armaments regulation policy, 1155, 1207*n*
Congress, U.S.—Continued
  Continental defense, 234
  Economic and military assistance programs, 271, 296-297
  Foreign information program, 1627, 1776-1777
  House of Representatives:
    Appropriations Committee, 9, 1630-1631, 1654, 1657-1658, 1675, 1776-1777
    Un-American Activities Committee, 1674
  International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1442-1443, 1504-1505
  International Information Administration, 1630-1632, 1635-1636, 1650, 1654, 1656, 1672-1673
  Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 853*n*, 879, 892, 1108, 1122, 1127, 1129, 1180, 1186-1188, 1247-1249, 1254, 1270, 1277-1278, 1442, 1456, 1462, 1472, 1484, 1504-1505, 1524, 1576-1577
  Military appropriations, 9*n*, 10*n*
  Mutual Security Program, 278, 298-299
  National security funding, 316-317
  Redeployment of forces abroad, 448
  Senate:
    Appropriations Committee, 933, 937, 1630-1631, 1776-1777
    Foreign Relations Committee, 1627, 1635, 1650, 1672-1673
    Internal Security Subcommittee, 1690, 1706-1707
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1670-1672, 1679-1698, 1708, 1718, 1720
    Subcommittee for Overseas Information Programs, 1754, 1796
Connors, W. Bradley, 1632, 1652*n*, 1670*n*, 1673-1674, 1677*n*, 1678-1680, 1681*n*, 1684*n*, 1686*n*, 1699*n*, 1711*n*
Conolly, Adm. Richard L., 324, 352, 392-393, 398
Continental defense:
  Armaments regulation, role in, 1083-1085, 1116, 1137, 1172
  Canada, agreements with, 235, 319, 368, 474, 482-483, 616-620, 627
  Early warning system, 138-142, 164-165, 168-169, 182-184, 232-235, 318-323, 337-338, 368-370, 375, 468, 471, 473-474, 479, 484-485, 615-616, 619-620, 625-628, 638, 673-674, 800-801, 1040
  Funding for, 480-481, 615-616
  Inadequacies of, 213-214, 231-234, 477-479, 613-615
  Intelligence operations, 482, 617
  Internal security, 339, 465, 486-487, 621-623
  Manpower shortages, 469
  Objectives of, 114-117, 120-122, 125-126
  Programs for, 482-484, 611-613, 617-619, 629, 703-705
  Progress reports, 698

Continental defense—Continued
  Public support, 472-473
  Research and development, 617
  Urban vulnerability, 375-376, 489, 623-624
  Weapons systems and force requirements, 467, 471, 620-621, 703-705
Continental Defense Committee, 614
Controlled Materials Plan, 38, 174
Cook, Frank C., 1874
Cootes, Merritt, 1654*n*, 1668*n*, 1711*n*
Copper, 158
Cornell, S. Douglas, 324, 351
Council of Economic Advisers, 490, 500*n*, 713, 806*n*, 820*n*
Court of Appeals, U.S., 1640
Cowen, Myron M., 1031, 1625
Cowles, John, 270, 280
Cox, Henry B., 1668*n*, 1699*n*, 1707*n*, 1711*n*
Coyne, J. Patrick, 358, 802
Craig, Horace S., 1134, 1157, 1265
Craig, Lt. Gen. H. A., 349-350, 354*n*
Crosby, Ben G., 1675-1677
Cutler, Robert, 5*n*, 236-237, 245-247, 258*n*, 259, 264-265, 268, 272-273, 276, 278-281, 288, 291-294, 297, 300, 302, 323-328, 349, 354*n*, 367, 373-374, 387-388, 393, 397-398, 435-438, 440-442, 444, 448, 451, 453, 455-457, 466-467, 471-472, 474, 515-516, 520, 522-523, 525-526, 528, 530-533, 536-538, 540-541, 543, 545-548, 568-570, 572-573, 599-603, 624-627, 629, 631-632, 635-636, 638-639, 641-643, 648*n*, 686-691, 693, 698, 701-708, 710-713, 736*n*, 737-738, 763-764, 766-769, 781, 784, 788, 790-792, 794-801, 804, 833, 836, 839-840, 842-843, 1107, 1110-1111, 1113-1114, 1128, 1130-1131, 1137, 1146, 1170, 1172, 1174, 1177, 1180, 1184, 1210-1214, 1217-1218, 1227, 1230-1234, 1245-1246, 1296-1297, 1378, 1424, 1427-1428, 1438, 1453, 1459-1461, 1468, 1470-1471, 1481, 1483-1486, 1500, 1527, 1537, 1539, 1580-1581, 1719, 1750-1751, 1791*n*, 1797, 1855, 1868, 1877-1879
Cyprus, 193
Czechoslovakia, 1398, 1727, 1804, 1832

Damon, G. Huntington, 1626*n*
Davenport, Virginia L., 1706*n*
Davis, Vice Adm. Arthur C., 1342*n*
de la Grandville, Jean, 1399
De Palma, Samuel, 1560
De Rose, François, 1334*n*
Dean, Gordon E., 851*n*, 964*n*, 969*n*, 1021*n*, 1149*n*, 1161*n*, 1162, 1190*n*
  Armaments regulation policy, 876, 899, 1113-1114
  Atomic energy policies, 1046, 1112
  Atomic weapons, 863*n*, 869, 933, 937, 947, 970, 972, 981, 986-987, 1010
  Combined Development Agency, 890-891
Dean, Gordon E.—Continued
  Fissionable materials, 852, 855-858, 887, 889, 892-894, 1026-1029, 1031-1032, 1098-1103
  Hydrogen bomb production, 878-879, 1017
  Hydrogen bomb testing, 991*n*, 1033, 1035-1036, 1042
  National security policy, 274-276, 294
  Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 1110
  Practical uses of atomic energy, 1121-1122, 1128-1133, 1137-1138
  Sharing of atomic energy information with Allies, 847, 849-850, 985, 988
Deane, Maj. Gen. John R., 324, 351
DeChant, John, 1265
Defense, U.S. Department of (*see also* Military program), 20*n*, 37, 622, 813, 820*n*
  Armaments regulation policy, 894-895, 1378, 1384, 1386, 1537-1540, 1563-1566, 1580-1584, 1586
  Atomic energy policy:
    Atomic weapons, responsibility for, 863-868, 947-953, 964-973, 1010-1013, 1577
    Atomic weapons production, 934-937
    Fissionable materials, 852, 887, 892, 1026-1032, 1486
    Hydrogen bomb development, 879-880, 1017
    Hydrogen bomb testing, 990-991, 1025, 1036-1037, 1420, 1428, 1464
    Practical uses of atomic energy, 1128
    Public information policy, 869*n*
    Reactor construction and regulation, 1146-1149
    Reactors abroad, construction of, 1482*n*
    Sharing of atomic energy information with Allies, 847, 985-986, 1273-1274, 1277, 1509
  Atomic weapons, possible use of, 533, 607-608
  Continental defense, 120-122, 142, 164-165, 183-184, 318, 611, 625-628
  Foreign information program, 1694-1695, 1740-1742, 1746, 1749, 1835, 1837-1839, 1845, 1848, 1859-1861, 1897
  Free World military posture, 672-675
  Funding of programs, 2-4, 9-10, 265, 278-281, 286-289, 296, 315-316, 541-549, 597-598
  International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1315-1316, 1371-1372, 1407
  Military Liaison Committee to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 851
  Military program, 21, 46, 169, 260-261, 301, 306, 814*n*, 823-824
  Mobilization program, 137, 174, 712-713, 725, 732*n*, 733-736, 739*n*, 766, 768
  Negotiation policy, 513*n*
  Political warfare, 513*n*

- Defense, U.S. Department of—Continued
  - Redeployment of forces abroad, 573, 597–599
- Defense Mobilization, Office of, 70*n*, 137, 503*n*, 513*n*, 532, 600, 602, 622, 626, 629-632, 678–680, 733–736, 739*n*, 740, 766, 768, 813*n*, 821*n*, 1263, 1297, 1408
- Defense Production Administration, 34, 37, 39, 45
- Defense Transportation Administration, 45–47
- Denmark, 1782
- Dickenson, Edward T., 350, 352
- Dickey, John, 896*n*, 900, 906, 909-910, 919, 921, 988, 1008, 1058, 1096
- Dillon, C. Douglas, 1535
- Dirksen, Everett M., 1246
- Disarmament. *See* Armaments regulation policy.
- Dixon, Pierson, 1382*n*
- Dodge, Joseph M., 237, 257, 258*n*, 261-262, 281*n*, 305*n*, 372*n*, 378*n*, 399*n*, 475*n*, 489*n*, 536*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 604*n*, 609*n*, 644*n*, 647*n*, 648*n*, 667*n*, 715*n*, 731*n*, 738*n*, 759*n*, 806*n*, 808*n*, 1296*n*, 1791*n*, 1879, 1880*n*, 1881*n*
  - Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 295, 538
  - Atomic energy policy, 1122, 1129, 1148, 1256
  - Continental defense, 630
  - Defense programs, funding for, 543
  - Economic and military assistance programs, 296, 525, 526
  - Economic policies, 524, 536–538, 547-548, 574
  - Fiscal and security balance, 516, 518, 522-523
  - Mutual Security Program, funding for, 298–299, 300, 541
  - National security funding, 244, 265, 297, 304
  - Negotiation policy, 529
  - Soviet atomic capabilities, 540
- Donegan, 328*n*, 355*n*, 358–360, 475*n*, 534*n*, 609*n*, 759*n*
- Donhauser, Robert, 1713*n*
- Donovan, William J., 1780, 1787
- Doolittle, Gen. James H., 327
- Douglas, Paul H., 1246
- Draper, William, 324
- Drury, L. Mason, 1721
- DuBridge, Lee A., 626–627
- Dulles, Allen W., 257*n*, 281*n*, 305*n*, 328*n*, 355*n*, 372*n*, 378*n*, 399*n*, 475*n*, 477, 489*n*, 536*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 604*n*, 609*n*, 644*n*, 647*n*, 667*n*, 715*n*, 731*n*, 738*n*, 759*n*, 788*n*, 800*n*, 806*n*, 1149*n*, 1161*n*, 1190*n*, 1256*n*, 1296*n*, 1429, 1437–1438, 1449*n*, 1488*n*, 1580*n*, 1752*n*, 1830, 1880*n*, 1881*n*
  - China, People's Republic of, U.S. policy toward, 778
  - Continental defense, 232, 473, 800
  - Countersubversion activities, 776, 781
  - Hydrogen bomb testing, 1445–1448, 1471

- Dulles, Allen W.—Continued
  - Information Agency, U.S., 1751, 1878
  - Intelligence program, 268
  - Mobilization program, 793
  - Negotiation policy, 530, 793
  - Operations Coordinating Board, 1879
  - Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 896*n*, 900, 904–906, 908, 919, 923-925, 988, 992, 1008–1009, 1058, 1096, 1111, 1170
  - Project Solarium, 327, 349*n*, 435, 438, 441
  - Sharing of atomic energy information with Allies, 1471
  - Soviet atomic capabilities, 531, 540, 693, 701, 1454
  - Soviet bloc economic situation, 777–778
  - Soviet capabilities to injure the United States, 356–357, 602, 776–777
  - Soviet peace offensive, 778–780
- Dulles, John Foster, 372*n*, 463*n*, 562*n*, 565, 597*n*, 633, 648*n*, 690*n*, 699, 1043*n*, 1106*n*, 1142*n*, 1184*n*, 1223*n*, 1456
  - Armaments regulation policy:
    - Armed forces limitations, 1107–1108
    - Conventional armaments, 1585–1586
    - Disarmament, atomic, 1343, 1359
    - French proposals, 1144–1145
    - Interdepartmental review of, 1212, 1383, 1580, 1583, 1584*n*, 1588
    - Panel of Consultants on Disarmament report, 1056*n*
    - Public information policy, 1224–1225, 1227, 1250
    - Soviet atomic weapons ban proposal, 1367, 1388, 1389, 1473*n*, 1535
    - U.N. actions, 1175–1176, 1179, 1189, 1206–1209, 1215–1217, 1218*n*, 1334–1335, 1380, 1382*n*, 1384, 1429–1433
  - Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 292, 539
  - Atomic energy policy:
    - Fissionable materials, 1098, 1484, 1486
    - Hydrogen bomb testing, 883, 1379, 1380, 1418–1419, 1424, 1425, 1428–1429, 1437, 1448–1449, 1453, 1457, 1459, 1461–1471, 1478–1479, 1584–1585
    - Practical uses of atomic energy, 1125, 1130–1131
    - Private industry involvement, 1247-1248
    - Sharing of information with Allies, 1245, 1477, 1542
    - Soviet hydrogen bomb testing, 1186*n*, 1454
  - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 533, 545–546, 707
  - Atoms for Peace proposal:
    - Conventional weapons, 1315, 1321
    - Development of, 1232, 1234–1235, 1527
    - Implementation of, 1385, 1387

- Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  - Atoms for Peace proposal—Continued
    - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1235, 1320-1321, 1341-1342, 1357, 1361-1363, 1372, 1376-1378, 1417-1419, 1442, 1462-1463, 1480-1481, 1506-1507, 1512, 1519-1520, 1532, 1541, 1544-1545, 1546*n*, 1547*n*, 1549, 1559-1560, 1575, 1577-1578
    - Presidential speech, 1286-1287, 1291-1292
    - Soviet position, 1398-1399, 1401-1402
    - U.S.-Soviet private discussions, 1305-1308, 1316, 1319, 1322-1334, 1337-1340, 1345-1352, 1355, 1363, 1365, 1413-1417, 1518
  - Bermuda Conference, 608
  - Colonialism, 377
  - Continental defense, 233, 369, 704-705
  - Economic and military assistance programs, 228, 266-267, 271, 303-304, 525, 772, 788, 841-842
  - Economic policies, 524, 536, 547
  - European Defense Community, 1301
  - Fiscal and security balance, 370, 517-519, 522-523
  - Foreign information program, 1654-1656, 1668-1670, 1681-1685, 1699, 1705, 1707, 1713, 1715-1716, 1723, 1726-1736, 1775, 1790, 1793-1794, 1835, 1868
  - Free World alliance, 452-453, 693-695, 711
  - General war, 265, 462*n*, 602, 639, 642, 706, 788
  - Indochina, 696, 795, 835-836
  - Information Agency, U.S., 1711, 1738-1739, 1750-1751
  - International Information Administration, 1670-1672, 1685*n*, 1686-1687, 1690, 1697, 1698*n*, 1699*n*, 1722
  - Korean war, 272
  - Massive retaliation doctrine, 609
  - Middle East, 835
  - Mutual Security Program, 289, 300, 302-303
  - National security policy, 289, 460, 716
  - Negotiation policy, 529-530, 694-695, 842
  - North Africa, 793
  - North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 289
  - Project Solarium, 349, 354*n*, 436-438
  - Redeployment of forces abroad, 445-446, 450-451, 453-454, 456-457, 526-527, 549-550, 570, 572, 575, 597*n*
  - Soviet atomic energy capabilities, 540-541
  - Soviet Union, attitude toward, 374, 703, 707-709, 712, 789-790, 794, 836-837
  - Trade policy, 799
- Duncan, 1297, 1298
- Dunn, James Clement, 979, 1142
- Dunworth, J. V., 1143
- Early warning system. *See under* Continental defense.
- East-West trade, 389, 555
- Economic Cooperation Administration, 1601-1602
- *Economist*, 1727
- Eden, Anthony, 546, 695, 697, 833, 1301, 1332, 1350-1352, 1355-1356, 1361, 1363, 1367-1368, 1381, 1382, 1384-1385, 1396-1398, 1401-1402, 1418-1419, 1421-1422, 1424-1425
- Edwards, Lt. Gen. Idwal H., 207, 329-331, 368-369
- Edwards Committee, 320
- Egypt, 192-193, 221, 561, 862
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 232, 268, 457*n*, 576-578, 597*n*, 648*n*, 703, 711, 716, 740, 798, 807, 825, 1184*n*
  - Administrative transition, 181, 186
  - Armaments regulation policy:
    - Disarmament, atomic, 1342
    - Interdepartmental review of, 1212, 1378
    - Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, 1107
    - Principles of, 1105
    - Public information policy, 1110-1113, 1171, 1173-1174, 1185, 1223-1224, 1250
    - Savings used for world aid ("The Chance for Peace" speech), 1144-1145, 1176, 1193, 1198-1199, 1204-1206
    - Soviet atomic weapons ban proposal, 1387, 1388
    - U.N. actions, 1218, 1387
    - U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 885, 898, 905
  - Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 292, 539, 540
  - Atomic energy policy:
    - Approved policies, 1046
    - Atomic weapons production, 1112
    - Fissionable materials, 1484, 1486-1487
    - Hydrogen bomb testing, 1051, 1426-1429, 1469-1471
    - Practical uses of atomic energy, 1121, 1129-1130, 1133, 1296
    - Reactor construction and regulation, 1131-1132, 1147-1149
    - Security concerns, 1108-1109
    - Sharing of information with Allies, 1244, 1246, 1256, 1289, 1301, 1302, 1356, 1360, 1361, 1471, 1477, 1505, 1507
    - Soviet hydrogen bomb capabilities, 1185, 1188*n*, 1213, 1219, 1454-1455
  - Atoms for Peace proposal:
    - Conventional weapons, 1314, 1321-1322
    - Development of, 1213, 1234, 1309-1310
    - Implementation of, 1385, 1436

- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
  - Atoms for Peace proposal—Continued
    - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1218, 1342, 1462, 1474, 1485, 1511, 1547*n*, 1553
    - Soviet position, 1398
    - Speech re, 1285-1287, 1291-1292, 1300, 1344
    - U.S.-Soviet private discussions, 1306, 1322-1323, 1325, 1329, 1365
  - Bermuda Conference, 608, 1285
  - "The Chance for Peace" speech, *1953*, 1144-1145, 1176, 1193, 1198-1199, 1204-1206
  - Colonialism, 377
  - Committee on International Information Activities, 393
  - Continental defense, 465*n*, 466-471, 475-477, 610*n*, 630-632, 698, 703-705, 801-802, 807*n*, 823
    - Early warning system, 234, 368-370, 627, 638*n*
  - Defense programs, funding for, 542
  - Economic and military assistance programs, 186*n*, 228, 273, 296-297, 303-304, 524-526, 842
  - Economic policies, 269-297, 523-524, 536-538, 546-548, 709, 713
  - Federal Civil Defense Program, 274
  - Fiscal and security balance, 378, 515-516, 518-519, 520, 522
  - Foreign information program, 1691, 1705, 1711-1713, 1715, 1776-1777, 1790-1791, 1795, 1835*n*, 1836, 1855
  - Free World alliance, 695, 697, 711
  - General war, 601-603, 606, 635-636, 640-643, 646*n*, 687-693, 706-707, 804-805
  - India, 838
  - Indochina, 696
  - Information Agency, U.S., 1709-1711
  - International Information Agency, U.S., 1671, 1722, 1735, 1738, 1751, 1754
  - Joint Chiefs of Staff, 326-327, 535
  - Korean war, 272
  - Military program, 260-264, 279, 293-294, 543-545, 807*n*, 823-824, 825-829
  - Mobilization program, 295-296, 600, 763-764, 766-770, 793, 807*n*
  - Mutual Security Program, 278, 297-299, 541
  - National Security Council, 5*n*, 245-246, 257-258, 535
  - National security policy, 521-522, 838-841
    - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 532-533, 545-546, 568-569, 607-608, 689-690, 707, 737, 806, 1576, 1577
    - Funding for, 236, 272, 274, 276, 288, 316-317, 710
    - Public support for, 460-462
  - Negotiation policy, 529-531, 843
  - North Africa, 796
  - North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 289, 540-541
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
  - Operations Coordinating Board, 455, 1736, 1877-1879
  - President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1867-1868
  - Project Solarium, 323-324, 327, 349-350, 360, 374, 376, 386, 396, 398, 436-439, 441
  - Redeployment of forces abroad, 394, 451, 454, 456, 526-528, 549-550, 570-574, 597-598
  - Soviet atomic capabilities, 531, 540, 575
  - Soviet expansion, 708-709, 791-792, 794
  - Western European military situation, 570
- Eisenhower, Milton, 1781-1782
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 1524
- Eldorado Mining Company, 1101
- Eniwetok Atoll, 882
- Enyart, Byron K., 1739*n*
- Esposito, Col. V. J., 352
- European Defense Community, 190-191, 389, 432, 549, 558, 1234, 1290, 1301
- Evans, Gillespie S., 1709-1711, 1713
- Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments. *See under* Armaments regulation policy.

- Facilities Protection Board, 180
- Far East:
  - Alliance of free nations, 498, 507, 586, 592
  - Communist activities in, 60, 77-78, 154, 193-194
  - Military situation, 107, 220-222, 558-560
  - Project Solarium recommendations re, 421
  - U.S. information efforts re, 1780, 1786-1788
  - U.S. policies and programs, 130-131, 671, 748-749, 1816, 1821-1823
- Farley, Hugh D., 1216*n*
- Farley, Philip J., 1512-1517, 1523-1524, 1527-1528, 1793*n*
- Fast, Howard, 1670, 1671*n*
- Faulkner, Rafford L., 1142-1143
- Fechteler, Adm. William M., 259, 263, 326
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, 487, 1638-1639, 1674
- Federal Civil Defense Administration, 20*n*, 44, 47-49, 124, 176, 183-184, 490, 622, 626, 1113, 1263, 1408, 1449-1452
- Federal Civil Defense Program:
  - Effectiveness of, 66, 87, 213-214, 340
  - Function of, 44, 47-49, 70, 83, 146, 322
  - Funding for, 273-274, 472
  - Modifications in, 488, 623
  - Status report, 176-177
- Federal Housing Administration, 1450
- Feeney, 1720-1721
- Ferguson, John H., 87*n*, 197*n*, 904, 921-922, 924, 982*n*, 992-993, 1114*n*, 1134
- Finland, 694, 1784

Finletter, Thomas K., 126, 880-881, 1050, 1053
Finley, Robert L., 1231
Fischer, D. A. V., 1503
Fisher, Fredrick M., 1731*n*
Fisher, Raymond, 1707*n*
Flanagan, Francis D., 1679
Flemming, Arthur S., 305*n*, 328*n*, 355*n*, 372*n*, 378*n*, 697, 710, 798, 1149*n*, 1161*n*, 1212, 1456
  Continental defense, 465*n*, 470-472, 482, 611, 626-627, 629-633, 705, 800-802
  Mobilization program, 295, 532, 599-602, 604-605, 689, 691, 712-713, 763-770
  National security policy, 449, 452, 519, 522, 536, 574, 603, 781-783, 790-791, 843
Flexner, Magdalen G. H., 1668*n*
Foley, Edward H., Jr., 122
Food and Drug Administration, 1450-1451
Ford, John W., 1638*n*, 1639, 1674
*Foreign Affairs*, 609
Foreign information program (*see also* Information Agency, U.S.; International Information Administration; President's Committee on International Information Activities; Voice of America):
  Africa, 1780, 1785-1786
  Allied contribution to, 1887-1888
  Assessment of, 1642-1644
  Atoms for Peace proposal, 1409-1410, 1758-1761, 1781, 1793-1794
  Attribution of Information, 1841-1842, 1886, 1894
  Berlin, radio broadcasts in, 1828-1829, 1884, 1893
  Book burning, 1713-1714, 1715*n*, 1722
  Cold war functions, 1644-1645
  Congressional report re, 1627
  Country-level administration, 1598-1599, 1641-1642, 1841-1843, 1858-1859, 1886, 1889, 1894, 1895
  Cultural program, 1773-1777, 1790-1793
  Defectors and refugees, 1885, 1897-1898
  Exchange of persons programs, 1648-1649, 1847-1848, 1891
  Far East, 1780, 1786-1788
  Free World, efforts in 1835-1853, 1885-1897
  History of, 1600-1601, 1613-1614
  Indochina, 1781
  Korean war, 1731-1736, 1739-1750, 1756-1758, 1884, 1897
  Latin America, 1655-1656, 1688-1690, 1780-1782, 1788-1790
  Libraries and information centers, 1850-1851, 1891-1892, 1896-1897
    Book selection, 1722-1723
    Communist literature in, 1673-1675, 1677-1681, 1685-1687, 1697-1699, 1707-1709, 1715-1721, 1737
Foreign information program—Continued
    Senate reports in, 1690-1691, 1706-1707
  Middle East, 1779-1780, 1785-1786
  Military, role of, 1859-1861
  Motion pictures, 1625-1626, 1849-1850
  Organization and function of, 1595-1598, 1601-1604, 1652-1654, 1836-1838, 1840-1841, 1843-1844, 1853-1865, 1875-1879, 1889, 1895
  Private organizations, involvement of, 1649, 1887, 1894-1895
  Public support for, 1844, 1865, 1889-1890, 1895
  Publications, use of, 1849, 1891, 1896
  Radio, 1845-1847, 1890, 1895-1896, 1898-1899
  Rosenberg case, 1640-1641, 1668-1670, 1711-1713, 1736
  Security handicaps, 1844
  Slansky trial, 1640-1641
  South Asia, 1780-1781, 1785
  Soviet bloc, 1726-1731, 1771, 1779, 1784-1785, 1823-1835, 1883-1884, 1892-1893, 1897-1899
  Soviet propaganda techniques, exposure of, 1626-1627, 1654-1655, 1699-1706, 1801-1811
  Soviet Union, 1768-1770, 1779-1780, 1785-1786
  Stalin, death of, 1681-1685
  Television, use of, 1851
  Theme approaches, 1616-1625, 1655-1656, 1778-1781
  United Nations, activities re, 1818-1819, 1888
  U.S. official positions, 1738-1739
  U.S. program for world order, 1811-1823
  U.S.-Soviet conflict, nature of, 1797-1801
  Western Europe, 1778-1779, 1782-1784
  Wireless Bulletin, 1658-1668
Foreign Operations Administration, 513*n*, 514*n*, 725, 813*n*, 820*n*, 1407, 1885, 1897-1898
Foster, Paul, 1547
Foster, William C., 137, 139-140, 878-880, 981, 987, 1050-1051, 1053-1054
Foster, William Z., 1698
Fowler, Joe, 137-138, 140
France:
  Armaments regulation policy, 845, 859-860, 884, 898-899, 908, 914-917, 954, 979-980, 989, 1046-1049, 1144-1145, 1167
  Atomic weapons, possible use of, 534, 1440-1441
  Economic situation, 191
  Fissionable materials, 1028, 1100-1101
  Hydrogen bomb concerns, 1188-1189
  Indochina, involvement in, 93, 194, 266, 410, 459, 498, 559-560, 586, 795, 797

- France—Continued
  - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1291-1292, 1327-1328, 1332-1334, 1340, 1347-1348, 1351-1353, 1503, 1513
  - International control of atomic energy, 1021
  - North Africa, involvement in, 561, 795-796
  - Outside obligations, 84, 107, 132, 146
  - Political situation, 389, 558, 694
  - Project Solarium recommendations re, 407, 419
  - U.S. information efforts re, 1783
  - U.S. sharing of atomic energy information, 1292
- Franco y Bahamonde, Generalissimo Francisco, 696, 1101
- Free World:
  - Alliance of, 452-453, 494-499, 505-508, 555-556, 583-587, 591-593, 654, 659-660, 693-698, 711-712, 719-721, 728, 748-751, 758, 810, 816, 818
  - Economic situation, 1812-1814
  - Military capabilities, 106-108, 653-654, 727-728, 757-758, 1814-1816
  - Military posture, U.S. policy re, 62-64, 672-675
  - Political situation, 1816-1817
  - Political warfare, vulnerability to, 97-98
  - U.S. information efforts in, 1835-1853, 1885-1897
  - U.S. role in, 384-385
- Fuchs, Klaus, 880
- Fulbright, J. William, 1627, 1635, 1672

- General war. *See under* National security policy.
- Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, *1954*, 1416-1417
- George, James, 1381*n*
- Gerhart, Gen. John K., 1230
- German reunification, 406-407, 557
- Germany, Democratic Republic, 432, 492, 580, 1726-1730, 1804
- Germany, Federal Republic of, 107, 110, 191, 299, 389, 419, 432-433, 499, 533, 557, 565, 587, 750
- Gerrety, Joseph, 1654*n*
- Gillette, Guy M., 1627, 1635
- Gilman, Robbins P., 1306-1309
- Glasstone, Samuel, 883
- Glazebrook, George, 1459*n*, 1503, 1515-1517, 1528
- Gleason, S. Everett, 125, 201*n*, 236-237, 258*n*, 264, 281, 287, 290, 291*n*, 301, 302*n*, 305, 366*n*, 370, 372, 373*n*, 374, 378, 388*n*, 443*n*, 455, 464*n*, 475, 514*n*,
- Gleason, S. Everett—Continued
  534, 549, 567, 576, 599*n*, 604, 611, 624, 633, 635, 637, 686*n*, 698, 762, 770, 787*n*, 802, 803*n*, 806, 844, 863*n*, 882, 973*n*, 1106*n*, 1109*n*, 1110*n*, 1133, 1145, 1149*n*, 1169*n*, 1174, 1179*n*, 1180, 1210*n*, 1212, 1244*n*, 1247, 1364*n*, 1365, 1423*n*, 1429, 1452, 1456, 1467, 1472, 1580, 1750*n*, 1752, 1877*n*, 1879
- Glennan, T. Keith, 1027-1028, 1036
- Global war. *See* General war *under* National security policy.
- Godel, William H., 1681*n*, 1758*n*, 1760*n*
- Gold Coast, 1780, 1786
- Goldschmidt, Bertrand, 1021, 1334
- Goodpaster, Col. Andrew J., Jr., 351, 1576-1577
- Gorrie, Jack, 114, 120-122, 124-125, 138-142, 164
- Gowing, Margaret, 846*n*
- Graves, Alvin C., 1033
- Gray, George, 1656*n*
- Gray, Gordon, 393, 1719, 1797, 1868
- Greece, 175, 192, 217, 696
- Gregg, Alan, 467, 474-475
- Grocery Manufacturers' Association, 1451
- Gromyko, Andrei, 1518, 1519*n*, 1520-1522
- Guatemala, 438-439, 562, 694, 1789-1790
- Guillaume, General of the Army Augustin, 793
- Gullion, Edmund A., 352, 1114-1121, 1265, 1435*n*

- Hackett, Col. R., 352
- Haden, Allen, 1731*n*, 1758*n*, 1760*n*
- Hagerty, James C., 536-537, 1295*n*
- Hall, Evelyn K., 1874
- Hall, John A., 1037, 1103, 1142-1143, 1501*n*, 1504, 1547*n*, 1556, 1558*n*, 1566
- Halle, Louis J., 197, 200-202
- Halleck, Charles A., 829
- Hallstein, Walter, 1234
- Hamilton, J. Bruce, 1141-1144
- Hammarskjold, Dag, 1398*n*, 1520, 1525
- Hannah, John A., 531-532
- Harriman, W. Averell, 4, 55, 119, 122-125, 126*n*, 209-222, 1698
- Harris, Reid, 1668*n*, 1673*n*, 1681*n*
- Hawaii, 619
- Hayden, Carl, 829
- Hazlett, E. E., Jr., 1309
- Health, Education and Welfare, U.S. Department of, 1408
- Heeney, Arnold, 1335*n*, 1340, 1344-1345, 1348, 1350-1351
- Henkin, Louis, 1731*n*
- Hennings, Thomas G., 1716*n*
- Henry, Barklie McKee, 393, 1719, 1797, 1868
- Herron, Francis W., 1668*n*

Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 988, 1109, 1113*n*, 1442-1443, 1627, 1635, 1672, 1754
Hickerson, John D., 58*n*, 872, 877, 883, 894, 897-898, 900, 902-903, 905-906, 908-910, 912-914, 918, 927, 932, 938, 945*n*, 946, 979, 982*n*, 1056*n*, 1096-1097, 1106*n*, 1139-1140
Hirsch, Col., 1758*n*, 1760*n*
Hitler, Adolf, 519, 805
Hobby, Oveta Culp, 1723
Hoffman, Paul, 460
Holman, Eugene, 273
Hong Kong, 498, 586, 1787
Hoopes, Townsend W., 1874
Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 1534, 1540-1542, 1558-1559
Hoover, J. Edgar, 328*n*, 354*n*, 355*n*, 357-358, 475*n*, 534*n*, 609*n*, 1109
Hoppenot, Henri, 1318
Horwitz, Leonard J., 915*n*
Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1450-1451
Howe, C. D., 1027, 1031
Howe, Fisher, 634, 699*n*
Hughes, John C., 393, 710, 769, 798, 1719, 1797, 1868
Hughes, Rowland R., 1449*n*, 1488*n*, 1580*n*, 1752*n*
Hull, Gen. John E., 324, 596
Humelsine, Carlisle, 1595-1596, 1629, 1641*n*, 1654, 1656*n*, 1671
Humphrey, George M., 236-237, 257*n*, 281*n*, 305*n*, 328*n*, 355*n*, 372*n*, 378*n*, 399*n*, 475*n*, 489*n*, 536*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 604*n*, 647*n*, 667*n*, 715*n*, 731*n*, 738*n*, 759*n*, 806*n*, 839, 1103*n*, 1149*n*, 1161*n*, 1190*n*, 1296*n*, 1348, 1445, 1449, 1488*n*, 1580*n*, 1752*n*, 1880*n*, 1881*n*
  Armaments regulation policy, 1111, 1172-1173
  Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 275, 539-540
  Atomic energy policy, 1130-1132, 1147-1148, 1256, 1455
  Atomic weapons, possible use of, 548
  British presence in Iran, 439
  Continental defense, 470-471, 609*n*, 630-631, 704
  Defense programs, funding for, 280-281, 543
  Economic and military assistance programs, 525, 842
  Economic policies, 265, 271-272, 523-524, 537, 547, 709
  Fiscal and security balance, 516-519, 521
  Foreign information program, 1723
  Free World alliance, 697
  General war, 601-603, 605, 642-643, 644*n*, 689, 692, 805
  Military program, 261-263
  Mobilization program, 532, 600, 764-765, 767-769
  Mutual Security Program, 304, 541
  National security policy, 288-289, 292, 317, 837-839
Humphrey, George M.—Continued
  Negotiation policy, 530
  Project Solarium, 436-437
  Redeployment of forces abroad, 447-454, 527, 570-573
  Soviet Union, attitude toward, 374, 709, 836-837
  Western Europe military strength, 569
Humphrey, Richard, 1680, 1719-1721, 1737-1738
Hungary, 1727, 1832
Hurtado, Charles V., 1655*n*
Huyler, Coulter D., 1289*n*, 1640*n*, 1655*n*, 1681*n*, 1684*n*, 1731*n*, 1760*n*
Hydrogen bomb. *See under* Atomic energy policy; Soviet Union.

Ignatieff, George 1037
India, 192, 215, 220-221, 267, 409, 525, 561, 671, 838, 890, 1291, 1383, 1398, 1419, 1445-1446, 1463, 1478, 1530 1554-1555, 1559-1560, 1661, 1785
Indochina (*see also* Vietnam)
  British policy re, 696
  Communist activities in, 78, 154, 560
  French involvement, 93, 194, 266, 410, 459, 498, 559-560, 586, 795, 797
  Military situation, 559-560, 696
  Project Solarium recommendations re, 409-410, 421, 429-430
  U.S. information efforts re, 1781
  U.S. policy, 175, 215, 221, 390, 584, 671
  Viet Minh, 560, 795, 811*n*
Indonesia, 560, 835, 863, 1782
Industries Evaluation Board, 180
Information Agency, U.S. (*see also* International Information Administration):
  Atoms for Peace proposal, 1409-1410
  Economic development program, 784
  Expenditures, 1781-1782
  Formation of, 1709-1711, 1723-1726, 1735, 1750-1752
  Function of, 1753-1755, 1762-1764
  Korean war, 1750
  President's Committee on International Information Activities recommendations, 1892-1897
  Strategic principles, 1761-1773
  Summary of operations, 1778-1790
  U.S. official positions, 1738-1739
Information and education program. *See* Foreign information program.
Intelligence Advisory Committee, 50-53, 186*n*, 551*n*, 634, 646-647
Interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission, 872*n*
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, 180, 248, 358-360, 465*n*, 536*n*
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 180, 248, 331, 357-358, 465*n*, 536*n*
Interdepartmental Stockpiling Committee, 177
Internal Security Program, 180-181

- International Atomic Energy Agency proposal. *See under* Atoms for Peace proposal.
- International Broadcasting Service. *See* Voice of America.
- International Information Administration (*see also* Information Agency, U.S.):
  - Administration of, 1592-1593, 1597-1598, 1604-1607, 1672
  - Building operations, 1610
  - Communications systems, 1607-1608
  - Congressional investigation of, 1630-1631, 1672-1673
  - Congressional relations, 1635-1636, 1650
  - Country-level administration, 1594-1595, 1598-1600, 1606-1607, 1611, 1614-1616
  - Establishment of, 1591-1595
  - Foreign information policy, 1605-1606
  - Function of, 1629, 1836-1837
  - Funding for, 1608, 1629-1631, 1644-1646, 1688-1690, 1839
  - Internal organization, 1612-1613, 1631-1632
  - Language services, 1610
  - Loyalty investigations, 1637-1639, 1649-1650, 1670-1672
  - New York operations, 1610-1611
  - Office space, 1651
  - Personnel, 1609, 1632-1634, 1646, 1864
  - Program planning, 1598
  - Progress reports, 1628-1638, 1641-1651
  - Regional bureaus, responsibilities of, 1593, 1606
  - Salaries in, 1611-1612
  - Security concerns, 1608
  - State Department, relation to, 1593-1594, 1599, 1607-1611, 1634, 1646, 1861-1863
  - Supplies, procurement of, 1609-1610
  - Transmitting facilities, 1654, 1656-1658
- International Materials Conference, *1951*, 39-40, 178
- International Motion Picture Service, 1619-1620, 1655-1656
- International Press Service, 1655-1656
- International Scientific Conference, 1486, 1491, 1496, 1513, 1516-1517, 1519, 1533, 1541, 1551-1552, 1579-1580
- Iran, 175, 193, 220-221, 267, 439, 507, 561, 592, 1780, 1786, 1811
- Iraq, 561, 1785
- Israel, 175, 192, 220, 267, 561, 751
- Italy, 191, 1783

- Jackson, C. D., 288-300, 393, 438-439, 448, 470, 473, 520, 529, 536, 569, 572, 577*n*, 636, 642-643, 1174, 1184*n*, 1185, 1213*n*, 1219, 1223-1226, 1234*n*, 1240, 1293-1294, 1314-1319, 1321, 1342, 1403-1404, 1406-1407, 1409, 1526, 1544, 1719, 1723, 1797, 1868, 1878
- Jackson, Henry M., 1*n*, 1716*n*
- Jackson, Wayne G., 1874
- Jackson, William H., 393, 455, 1719, 1754, 1797, 1868, 1871, 1875
- Jackson Committee. *See* Committee on International Information Activities.
- Jaeger, George, 1668*n*, 1711*n*
- Japan:
  - Economic situation, 498, 560, 586
  - Project Solarium recommendations re, 409, 421, 428-429
  - Reactors in, 1498
  - Rearmament of, 107, 110, 499, 587
  - Security of, 203, 221-222
  - U.S. hydrogen bomb testing, 882, 1419-1420
  - U.S. information efforts re, 1780, 1788
  - U.S. relations with, 215, 266-267, 458, 496, 584, 1816
  - Western alliance, 194
- Jebb, Gladwyn, 1341
- Jenner, William E., 1690-1691, 1706
- Jerolaman, Jean, 1793*n*
- Johnson, Eric, 1625, 1780, 1786
- Johnson, Jesse, 1027-1028, 1141-1143
- Johnson, Joseph E., 350, 896*n*, 899-900, 905-907, 917, 920, 922, 988, 1058, 1096
- Johnson, Robert L., 1677*n*, 1686*n*, 1708-1709, 1715-1716, 1718-1719, 1722
- Johnstone, William C., 1632
- Joint Chiefs of Staff:
  - Appointment of new staff, 326-327
  - Armaments regulation policy:
    - Armed forces limitations, 941-945
    - Disclosure and verification, 878, 927-932
    - Public information policy, 1174, 1240-1243
  - Atomic energy policy:
    - Atomic weapons, responsibility for, 863-868, 947-953, 964-973, 977-979, 985-987
    - Fissionable materials, 852
    - Hydrogen bomb production and testing, 879-880, 1438-1440
    - International control of atomic energy, 927-932
    - Sharing of information with Allies, 847, 851, 1258, 1263, 1266
  - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 545-547
  - Concept of, 535
  - Continental defense, 319-321, 465*n*, 467-469, 638
  - Defense programs, funding for, 3*n*, 4*n*, 541-549
  - Fiscal and security balance, 516, 519-520
  - General war, 372-373, 638-640, 804-806
  - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1357
  - Military assistance program, 175
  - Military program, 113-114, 166, 260, 814*n*
  - Mobilization program, 600, 602-603, 759*n*, 760-764, 769
  - National security policy objectives, 813, 826-830
  - Negotiation policy, 512*n*, 680-686, 694-695, 819

- Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continued
  - Political warfare, 513*n*
  - Redeployment of forces abroad, 394, 444-457, 526, 528, 570-574
  - Soviet capabilities to injure the United States, 206, 355-356
  - Soviet expansion, 785-787, 791-792
  - Western European military strength, 562-565, 569
- Joliot-Curie, Frédéric, 1533
- Jones, Paul W., Jr., 1462*n*
- Joxe, Louis, 1526
- Joyce, Robert P., 352
- Justice, U.S. Department of, 487, 490, 1408, 1741

- Karst, Gene, 1655*n*
- Kelleher, Maj. J. J., 1699*n*, 1731*n*
- Kellerman, Henry, 1707*n*
- Kelly Committee. *See* Continental Defense Committee *under* National Security Council.
- Kennan, George F., 350, 388, 391, 393
- Key, David McK., 1335*n*, 1336*n*, 1349*n*, 1352*n*, 1358-1360, 1376, 1393, 1421, 1433, 1440-1442, 1506-1507, 1535-1537, 1544-1545
- Keyserling, Leon H., 20*n*, 54*n*, 80*n*, 142*n*
- Kimball, Art, 1639
- King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 1252
- Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 647*n*, 989*n*, 1351*n*
- Knapp, Burke, 352
- Knight, Ridgway B., 1188-1189
- Knowland, William F., 829
- Koons, T. M., 323, 328, 352, 388*n*
- Korea, Republic of, 217, 221-222, 427-428, 496, 498, 559, 584, 586, 797, 1780
- Korean war, 194, 272-273, 276, 421-422, 559, 597, 921-923, 1731-1736, 1739-1750, 1756-1757
- Kreps, Col. K. R., 851
- Kyes, Roger M.:
  - Atomic energy policy, 1149
  - Continental defense, 369, 375-376, 627-631
  - Mutual Security Program, 296-297, 299-300, 302-303
  - National security policy, 293-295, 303
  - President's Committee on International Information Activities, 393, 1719, 1797, 1868*n*, 1878
  - Redeployment of forces abroad, 447-448, 453

- Labor, U.S. Department of, 1407
- Lacy, Dan T., 1632
- Lalor, Rear Adm. William C., 355-356, 945
- Landry, Gen. R. B., 9-10
- Laniel, Joseph, 607, 1285, 1301*n*
- Lanphier, T. J., Jr., 324
- Larmon, Sigurd, 393, 1719, 1797, 1868
- Latin America:
  - Fissionable materials, sales of, 1029, 1102, 1143-1144
  - Political situation, 561-562, 584
  - Reactors in, 1532
- Latin America—Continued
  - U.S. information activities re, 1655-1656, 1688-1690, 1780-1782, 1788-1790
  - U.S. policy re, 194-195, 496, 584, 751, 1821
- Lawrey, L. J., 1503
- Lawton, Frederick J., 20*n*, 54*n*, 55, 80*n*, 142*n*, 851*n*, 852, 858
- Lay, James, S., Jr., 20-21, 54, 55*n*, 68*n*, 73*n*, 80-81, 88-113, 114*n*, 118, 122, 124-127, 134*n*, 136-137, 142-143, 165, 181, 184, 199, 205-207, 209-210, 223, 236, 257*n*, 258*n*, 274, 281*n*, 288, 292, 305-307, 328-329, 331*n*, 355-357, 378-379*n*, 396*n*, 399, 435, 443, 466*n*, 467*n*, 475-477, 489-490, 535*n*, 562*n*, 577-578, 597*n*, 604-605, 629, 633, 638*n*, 646*n*, 647-649, 667-668, 672*n*, 678*n*, 699*n*, 715-716, 731-732, 736*n*, 737-739, 759, 766*n*, 772, 776*n*, 784*n*, 785, 807, 833, 848*n*, 849, 851, 852*n*, 859, 863, 870, 933-934, 937-938, 947, 964, 969*n*, 974, 988, 991*n*, 1010-1011, 1016, 1021, 1036, 1042*n*, 1046, 1056*n*, 1091, 1096*n*, 1103, 1107*n*, 1110*n*, 1121, 1134-1135, 1140, 1150, 1160, 1161*n*, 1184*n*, 1190, 1256-1257, 1296, 1438, 1445, 1449, 1460*n*, 1463, 1468, 1482, 1488, 1540, 1737, 1752-1753, 1880-1881
- Leach, W. Barton, 598-599
- Lebanon, 1661
- LeBaron, Robert, 847, 863, 889-890, 892-893, 981, 985-987, 1029, 1036, 1328
- Leith, C. K., 1142-1143
- Lemnitzer, Lt. Gen. L. L., 327, 351
- Lenin, Vladimir I., 6-7, 90-91
- Lewis, John L., 641
- Libya, 193
- Lilienthal, David E., 879
- Lincoln, Col. George, 324, 350
- Lindeman, John, 351
- Lindsay, Franklin A., 1874
- Lindsay Light and Chemical Company, 887-888
- Linneman, Herbert F., 1673
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 882, 1056*n*, 1096, 1139, 1175-1177, 1179, 1291, 1307, 1358, 1360, 1365, 1376-1377, 1378*n*, 1381, 1382*n*, 1383, 1385, 1397-1398, 1420, 1429, 1462, 1463*n*, 1507, 1512, 1520, 1522-1523, 1530*n*, 1532-1533, 1540, 1544-1546, 1550-1555, 1560-1563, 1571, 1575, 1578, 1775, 1783, 1793
- Lombardo, Maj., 234*n*, 235
- *London Observer*, 1535
- Loomis, Henry, 1874
- Loper, Brig. Gen. H. B., 852, 854, 1384, 1537-1539, 1547*n*, 1565-1566
- Lounsbury, Robert L., 1874
- Lourie, Donold, 1656*n*, 1658, 1670, 1679, 1699*n*, 1708, 1722
- Lovett, Robert A., 126*n*, 324, 947*n*, 964*n*, 1021*n*

Lovett, Robert A.—Continued
  Armaments regulation policy:
    Armed forces limitations, 859, 941-942, 982
    Development of policy, 894
    Disclosure and verification, 876-878, 926-927, 932, 945-946
    Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, 876
  Atomic energy policy:
    Approved policies, 1046
    Atomic weapons, responsibility for, 863, 964, 969-970, 972, 984, 1010
    Atomic weapons production, 934-937
    Combined Development Agency, 890
    Fissionable materials, 852-857, 887-889, 891-893, 1026-1028, 1031-1032
    Hydrogen bomb production and testing, 880, 989*n*, 990, 1017-1018, 1032-1033, 1035-1036, 1051, 1054
    Sharing of information with Allies, 847, 851, 988*n*
  Continental defense, 120-122, 125, 139-142
  Defense programs, funding for, 2-4
  Economic and military assistance programs, 123, 127*n*, 184, 209-222
  General war, 198
  National security policy, 20, 55, 88, 113, 118, 124, 135

MacArthur, Douglas, II, 325, 351, 1251*n*, 1292, 1336*n*, 1347-1348, 1349*n*, 1352*n*
McCardle, Carl W., 1673*n*, 1678-1679, 1684*n*, 1685-1686, 1738*n*
McCardle, James, 1340, 1399
McCarran, Pat, 1690-1691, 1706
McCarthy, Joseph R., 1670-1671, 1697-1699, 1708, 1718-1720
McCleod, Scott, 1675*n*
McCloy, John J., 351, 1380
McClurkin, Robert, 1731*n*
McCormack, Maj. Gen. James, 324, 351, 390-391, 398
McDonnell, W. Barrett, 330*n*
McGranery, J. P., 20*n*, 54*n*, 80*n*, 142*n*, 205*n*
Mackenzie King. *See* King, William Lyon Mackenzie.
MacKnight, Jesse M., 1668*n*, 1711*n*
McMahon, Brien, 853, 858*n*, 879, 955-957, 963
McNeil, Wilfred J., 542-543, 610*n*, 824, 829
McSweeney, John M., 1560
MacVeagh, Lincoln, 1031
McWilliams, William J., 1625-1626
Makins, Roger, 847, 1142*n*, 1305, 1316, 1320-1321, 1328, 1330, 1332-1333, 1335, 1340-1341, 1350, 1351-1354, 1356, 1361-1362, 1363*n*, 1419, 1421, 1448, 1542
Malaya, 194, 497, 560, 589
Malenkov, Georgiy M., 1186*n*
Malik, Charles, 1291
Malott, Deane W., 276
Mann, George A., 1735*n*
Marks, Herbert, 897
Marshall Islands, 882, 1419
Martin, Edwin W., 957*n*
Martin, Hugo, 1656
Martin, Jacques, 1334, 1459, 1503
Martin, Joseph W., Jr., 317
Marx, Karl, 7, 91
Matthews, H. Freeman, 58, 68*n*, 87*n*, 125*n*, 164*n*, 242*n*, 967, 993, 1055, 1625*n*, 1658-1668
Mattison, Lewis C., 1874
Maybank, Burnet R., 933
Mayer, René, 266
Mayo, Charles W., 1756
Meat Institute, 1450
Meeker, Leonard C., 957*n*, 1300
Mendès-France, Pierre, 696, 1355, 1535
Menon, V. K. Krishna, 1291, 1554-1555, 1559
Merchant, Livingston T., 441*n*, 1188, 1251, 1305-1306, 1328, 1330-1333, 1335-1341, 1345, 1347-1348, 1350-1353, 1361-1363, 1366, 1372, 1376-1377, 1412-1418, 1425*n*, 1448, 1473*n*, 1501, 1578*n*
Merson, Martin, 1719-1720, 1722
Mexico, 1143
Meyers, Howard, 904, 909, 912*n*, 938*n*, 979*n*, 1014, 1043-1046, 1139*n*, 1175*n*, 1179*n*, 1189, 1206*n*, 1214*n*, 1294*n*, 1297-1300, 1306-1309, 1358*n*, 1360*n*, 1366-1367, 1378*n*. 1380*n*, 1381*n*, 1386*n*, 1393*n*, 1399-1400, 1421*n*, 1422*n*, 1429*n*, 1435*n*, 1440*n*, 1534*n*, 1535*n*, 1540*n*, 1559, 1563-1566, 1585-1589, 1758*n*, 1760*n*, 1793*n*
Middle East:
  British policy re, 835-836
  Colonialism in, 561
  Communist activities in, 77-78, 153-154
  Military situation, 107, 220-221
  Political situation, 508, 591-592
  Project Solarium recommendations re, 410, 426-427
  U.S. information efforts re, 1779-1780, 1785-1786
  U.S. policy re, 131-132, 192-193, 215, 751, 835-836, 1820-1821
Middle East Defense Organization, 220
Military program:
  Air warfare, 168-172, 338-341
  Antisubmarine warfare, 170
  Buildup of, 106, 113-114
  Career Incentive Program, 821-824, 829
  Cutbacks in, 259-264, 278-279, 293-297, 309-312
  Force levels, 21-26, 284, 807*n*, 814-816, 823, 828*n*
  Force structures, 301, 306, 543-547
  Funding for, 27-28, 284
  Ground combat, 171-172
  Manpower needs, 502, 589-590
  Objectives, 166-168, 825-829
  Reserve program, 133-134, 823, 829

- Miller, Charles P., 1616*n*
- Millikan, Max, 324, 926
- Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr., 822-825, 1305*n*
- Mitchell, William, 1142
- Mobilization program:
  - Adequacy of, 72-73, 86, 149-150
  - Allies, support for, 761
  - Atomic weapons policy, effect of, 678-680
  - Capabilities of, 100-103, 663-666
  - Civilian economy, effect on, 35-36, 42-44, 162-163
  - Continuity of governmental and industrial functions, 44-45, 486, 489, 621, 623, 629-632, 801
  - Dispersal of production facilities, 763-765, 767-769
  - Funding for, 45-47, 712-713
  - General war planning, 599-607
  - Industrial base, 33-35, 70, 83, 140, 146
  - Manpower requirements, 41, 531-532, 582, 821
  - Matériel production, 29-33, 41, 75-76, 137-138, 151-152, 156-163, 259-296, 311, 731-736, 760-761, 766, 783
  - Military base, 70, 83, 146
  - Objectives, 29, 173-174, 582-583, 759-770
  - Strategic materials, 36-40, 157-161, 174, 177-178, 821
- Moch, Jules, 914-915, 979*n*, 980, 1021, 1046-1049, 1144-1145, 1440, 1534-1537
- Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 1227, 1286*n*, 1287-1288, 1292, 1302, 1304, 1307, 1319, 1320*n*, 1323-1324, 1335-1336, 1338-1339, 1347, 1349, 1350-1351, 1353, 1355, 1358, 1362-1363, 1369, 1377, 1388-1389, 1399, 1401, 1413-1417, 1424-1425, 1479, 1526, 1567*n*, 1578
- Monazite, 886-890, 1029
- Monnet, Jean, 4
- Montgomery, Edward P., 1652*n*, 1668*n*, 1681*n*, 1699*n*, 1711*n*, 1726*n*, 1731*n*, 1758*n*
- Montgomery, Maj. Gen. John B., 351
- Morgan, George A., 1293*n*, 1722
- Morgan, Marthlyn, 61
- Morocco, 454, 1028-1029, 1100-1101, 1142
- Morris, Joe Alex, 1356*n*
- Morton, Gerald, 1679
- Morton, Thruston, B., 1442, 1690*n*, 1707
- Mosely, Philip E., 351
- Mosman, Ellsworth R., 1707*n*, 1711*n*, 1731*n*
- Mossadegh, Mohammad, 439
- Mundt, E. Karl, 1627
- Murphy, Robert D., 699*n*, 1050, 1053-1055, 1189*n*, 1298, 1300, 1307-1308, 1320-1321, 1322*n*, 1336*n*, 1340-1342, 1352*n*, 1353-1354, 1358, 1367, 1371-1372, 1380-1382, 1393, 1421, 1435*n*, 1440, 1442, 1501*n*, 1586-1588, 1758*n*
- Murray, Thomas E., 847, 892, 1036, 1100-1101, 1148, 1177-1179, 1464, 1584
- Murrow, Edward R., 1406
- Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 27-28
- Mutual Security Agency, 297, 1835, 1837, 1839
- Mutual Security Program:
  - Expenditure reductions, 313-315
  - Funding for, 265, 269, 271, 273, 276-278, 286, 289, 296-300, 302-305
  - Matériel supplies, 306, 541
  - Objectives, 312-313
  - Revised program, 283
  - Status report, 174-175

- Nagle, Arthur C., 1043*n*
- Nash, Frank C., 202, 243, 260, 264, 877, 912, 927, 941, 1056*n*, 1128, 1137, 1229, 1241, 1315, 1327, 1445*n*
- *The Nation*, 1721*n*
- National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 169
- National Association of Home Builders, 1451
- National Automobile Dealers' Association, 1450
- National Canners' Association, 1450
- National Committee for a Free Europe, 1831-1833, 1899
- National Indications Center, 800-801
- National Intelligence Estimates:
  - NIE-*31*, 12*n*
  - NIE-*95*, 553*n*
  - NIE-*99*, 551-562
  - NIE-*100-54*, 646-647
  - Research for, 50-52
- National Intelligence Survey, 52
- National Psychological Program, 178-179
- National Retail Dry Goods Association, 1450
- National Security Council:
  - Civilian Consultants on national security, 268-273, 276, 280-281
  - Continental Defense Committee (Kelly Committee), 320, 375, 465*n*, 477-479
  - Documents:
    - NSC *20/4*, 13, 225-226, 325*n*, 386
    - NSC *68* series, 11, 13, 17-20, 54-55, 62, 226, 1018-1019
    - NSC *79*, 197-200
    - NSC *112*, 859-863, 926*n*, 928, 1091-1096, 1103-1108
    - NSC *112/1*, 1190-1206, 1210-1212, 1217-1218
    - NSC *114* series, 11, 13-14, 17-21, 54-55
    - NSC *120/2*, 848-851
    - NSC *126*, 869-872
    - NSC *131* series, 47
    - NSC *135* series, 56-57, 80-87, 89-113, 119-126, 134-139, 142-156, 210-212, 226-228, 325*n*
    - NSC *139*, 319, 477*n*
    - NSC *140* series, 205-208, 328-349, 355-360, 369-370, 1177-1178
    - NSC *141*, 209-222, 228-230, 232, 319-320, 520-521
    - NSC *145*, 274, 1121-1133

- National Security Council—Continued
  - Documents—Continued
    - NSC *149* series, 149, 281, 288-289, 291-317
    - NSC *151* series, 323, 546*n*, 1149-1160, 1170-1174, 1184-1185, 1256-1285
    - NSC *153* series, 370-386
    - NSC *159* series, 465-489
    - NSC *161*, 443, 535-549
    - NSC *162* series, 488-534, 545-546, 562-597
    - NSC *165/1*, 1752-1754
    - NSC *172* series, 599-607
    - NSC *5407*, 633
    - NSC *5408*, 609-633, 638
    - NSC *5410* series, 635-646
    - NSC *5422* series, 647-680, 686-731, 759-770
    - NSC *5430*, 1777-1790
    - NSC *5431* series, 1481-1499
    - NSC *5440*, 806-822, 828-832
  - Meetings:
    - Armaments regulation policy, 1106-1108, 1110-1114, 1169-1174, 1184, 1210-1212, 1216-1218, 1246
    - Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 538-540
    - Atomic energy policy, 1108-1109, 1128-1133, 1145-1149, 1179-1180, 1244-1246, 1425-1429, 1452-1456, 1467-1472, 1482-1488
    - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 532-534, 688-690, 706-707
    - Atoms for Peace proposal, 1423-1425
    - Continental defense, 120-122, 138-139, 164-165, 367-370, 375-376, 464-475, 624-633, 637-638, 698, 703-705, 800-802
    - Defense programs, funding for, 541-549
    - Economic and military assistance programs, 267-268, 524-526, 788-789, 797-798, 841-842
    - Economic policies, 299, 523, 536-549
    - Fiscal and security balance, 514-524
    - Free World alliance, 694-699, 711-712
    - General war, 638-644, 688-693, 706-707, 803-805
    - Guidelines for, 250-251
    - Indigenous forces, development of, 136-137
    - Information Agency, U.S., 1750-1752
    - Military program, 291-297, 807*n*
    - Mobilization program, 531-532, 599-604, 762-770
    - Mutual Security Program, 265, 297-299, 302-305, 541
    - National security policy, 236-237, 244-245, 268-281, 287-290, 710-711, 834-836
    - Negotiation policy, 528-530, 843-844
    - Operations Coordinating Board, establishment of, 1877-1879
    - Political warfare, use of, 530-531
    - Project Solarium, 387-388, 394-398, 432-440, 490*n*

- National Security Council—Continued
  - Meetings—Continued
    - Recall of documents, 118
    - Redeployment of forces abroad, 443-455, 526-528, 570-574
    - Soviet expansion, 373-375, 700-703, 707-709, 790-796, 832-834
    - Soviet Union, relations with, 836-837, 840
    - Trade policy, 119-120, 122-125, 798-799
  - Organization and function of, 1*n*, 245-258, 535-536
  - Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 851-858, 863, 865, 933, 969-970, 973-979, 984-988, 1011, 1017-1018, 1021, 1032-1036, 1052-1053
  - Special Committee on Development of Thermonuclear Weapons, 878-879, 881
  - Special Evaluation Subcommittee on Soviet capabilities, 206*n*, 207-208, 329-349
- National security policy (*see also* Continental defense; Federal Civil Defense Program; Military program; Mobilization program; Project Solarium), 181, 736-759
  - Adequacy of, 834-836
  - Atomic parity, 62, 771, 781-783
  - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 110-113, 202-205, 447-448, 509, 532-534, 545-548, 566, 593, 607-608, 656-657, 678-680, 688-690, 706-707, 718, 1440-1442
  - Containment policy, 66-68
  - Economic and military assistance programs, 71, 84-85, 126-134, 147, 175, 184-186, 209-222, 228-230, 266-268, 273, 296-297, 303-305, 524-526, 663, 722, 753, 770-772, 788, 797-798, 841-842
  - Economic development programs, 660-661, 670-671, 721-722, 752, 784, 817
  - Economy, effect on, 262-263, 265, 269-272, 281-282, 299-300, 316, 383, 500-502, 518-524, 536-549, 588-589, 709, 713, 817-818
  - Evolution of, 225-231
  - Fiscal and security balance, 370-371, 379-385, 500-505, 510-511, 515-524, 582, 588-590, 593-594, 745-746
  - Foreign apprehensions re, 498-499, 586-587, 646-647, 796-797
  - Free World alliance, importance of, 452-453, 494-499, 504-507, 583-587, 591-593, 659-660, 693-698, 711-712, 719-721, 748-750, 816, 818
  - Free World military posture, 62-64, 672-675
  - Funding for programs, 54-56, 236-237, 244-245, 268-290, 292, 306, 309, 315-317, 666-667, 710-711, 729-731
  - General war:
    - Deterrents to, 70, 83, 145-146, 265-266, 655, 687-688, 716-717, 774

National security policy—Continued
  General war—Continued
    Planning re, 133, 197-201, 202*n*, 386, 599-607, 635-646, 656-658, 687-693, 706-707, 718, 774-775, 789-790, 804-806
    Soviet initiation of, possible, 7-9 16-17, 60-62, 73-78, 92-93, 109-110, 150-154, 186-187, 491-494, 578-581, 616, 812
  Indigenous forces, development of, 71, 134-137, 147
  Intelligence program, 50-53, 179, 268, 582, 821,
  Isolationism, 452-453
  "Key Data" book on national security programs, 165-181
  Massive retaliation doctrine, 609, 1071-1072
  Negotiation policy, 72, 79, 85, 149, 155, 495-496, 512-513, 528-530, 566-567, 584-585, 594-595, 680-686, 694-695, 747-748, 775, 818-819, 829, 843-844
  Objectives of, 64-65, 224-225, 307-309, 440-441, 521-522, 596-597, 813-814, 828-832, 838-841
  Political programs, 130-131
  Political warfare, 72, 78-79, 155, 513, 530-531, 595, 818
  Public support for, 72, 85, 148, 460-462, 502, 511, 590, 594, 820-821
  Reappraisal of, 17-20, 54-73, 87-88
  Redeployment of forces abroad, 394, 443-457, 508-509, 526-528, 549-550, 566, 570-574, 593, 597-599
  Soviet Union (*see also under* General war *above*):
    Atomic capabilities, 12-17, 110-113, 202-204, 651, 677, 725, 755, 1064-1066, 1159-1160
    Capabilities to injure the United States, 205-208, 328-349, 355-360, 364
    Coexistence with, 836-837, 840-841
    Destruction of system, 68-69, 79-80, 144-145, 155-156, 200-201, 202*n*, 267-268
    Expansion, 66-68, 93-94, 373-375, 658-659, 700-703, 707-709, 718-719, 743-747, 757, 780-781, 785-787, 789-796, 803, 831-832
    Peace offensive, 778-780, 811-812, 1699-1706
  Trade policy, 119-120, 122-125, 148, 663-664, 722, 752-753, 798-799, 817
  Underdeveloped countries, 499-500, 587-588, 660-661, 721
  U.S. prestige abroad, 407
National Security Resources Board, 20*n*, 44, 114, 164, 183-184, 940
Navy, U.S. Department of the, 3, 22-25, 167, 235, 259-260, 310
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 1383, 1419, 1463
*New York Times*, 826*n*, 1052*n*, 1376
New Zealand, 496, 584, 1283-1285, 1289
Nichols, Kenneth D., 1472
Niemeyer, Gerhart, 1014
Nitze, Paul H., 125*n*, 1114*n*, 1681*n*
  Armaments regulation policy, 918-923, 992
  Atomic weapons, possible use of, 202-205
  Atomic weapons, responsibility for, 967
  Continental defense, 140, 142*n*, 164*n*, 165, 182-184, 318-323
  Economic and military assistance programs, 127*n*, 184-186
  General war, 197, 199
  Hydrogen bomb testing, 958-963, 1034-1035, 1054
  Indigenous forces, development of, 135
  National Security Council, functioning of, 237-243
  National security policy reappraisal, 17, 58-59, 68-73
  Project Solarium, 324, 350
Nixon, Richard M., 287, 296, 300, 398, 438, 444-445, 447-448, 451, 453, 466, 472-473, 696, 1108-1109, 1210, 1217, 1427, 1723, 1776, 1779-1780, 1782, 1791*n*
Nkrumah, Kwame, 1786
Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., 234*n*, 441*n*, 699*n*
North Africa, 192-193, 561, 795-796
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31, 454, 541, 775
  Civil Defense Committee, 1452
  European obligations, 190-191, 289-290
  Force goals, 4, 106-107, 109
  Information Service, 1888
  Internal difficulties, 450, 458, 556-558
Norway, 569, 1784
Noyes, Charles P., 124, 127*n*, 1134, 1157
Nuclear weapons. *See hydrogen bomb subheadings under* Atomic energy policy *and under* Soviet Union.

O'Connor, Roderic L., 1351*n*, 1477, 1501*n*
O'Day, Burnita, 1670*n*
Operations Coordinating Board (*see also* Psychological Strategy Board), 455, 512*n*, 536*n*, 1293, 1403-1412, 1724-1725, 1736-1737, 1739-1750, 1753, 1792, 1855-1858, 1875, 1877-1879, 1882-1883
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 896*n*, 901, 903-908, 917, 920-921, 925-926, 988, 992, 994*n*, 1008, 1013-1014, 1035, 1047-1049, 1058, 1096, 1170-1171, 1173-1174, 1472
Organization of American States, 1821, 1888

Pace, Frank, Jr., 126
Page, Arthur W., 466, 474
Pakistan, 192, 215, 217, 220-221, 409, 508, 561, 593, 671, 862, 1530, 1780, 1785
Panel of Consultants on Disarmament. *See under* Armaments regulation policy.
Parodi, Alexandre, 1535
Passive defense. *See* Continental defense.

Patterson, Morehead, 1387, 1429, 1523-1524, 1544*n*, 1560, 1570-1571
Patterson, Robert P., 1252
Paul, Gen. Willard S., 631
Pawley, William D., 886-890
Pearson, Lester B., 1097, 1412
Penfield, James K., 351, 1355
Perkins, George W., 17*n*, 125*n*, 957*n*, 1031
Perrin, Francis, 1021
Petersen, Howard C., 1323, 1325
Peterson, A. Atley, 1874
Peterson, Val, 273-274, 276, 305*n*, 328*n*, 355*n*, 372*n*, 378*n*, 375-376, 474*n*, 489*n*, 522, 536*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 609*n*, 647*n*, 667*n*, 705, 715*n*, 730*n*, 737*n*, 798, 801, 805*n*, 1161*n*, 1172, 1190*n*, 1256, 1449-1452
Philippines, 175, 194, 495, 560, 584, 1787
Phillips, Ellis L., 1874
Phillips, Joseph B., 1289*n*, 1294*n*, 1626, 1640-1641, 1652*n*, 1679, 1680, 1681*n* 1684*n*, 1699*n*, 1713*n*, 1738*n*, 1758*n*
Phleger, Herman, 1673*n*, 1679
Pike, Sumner, 891
Plowden, Edward, 4, 1542
Plutonium, 275, 852
Point Four Program, 175
Polakoff, Joseph, 1655*n*
Poland, 694, 1094-1095, 1727, 1832
Popper, David H., 1358*n*
Porter, Gen. H. E., 1230
Portugal, 1030, 1100, 1503
Potier, Augusto, 1503
Pratt, James, 1681*n*, 1684*n*, 1699*n*, 1731*n*
President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, 1691-1697, 1711
President's Board of Foreign Scholarships, 1693
President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1711, 1719-1720, 1737-1738, 1754
  Establishment of, 1867-1868
  Implementation of recommendations, 1875-1899
  Recommendations of, 1868-1874
  Report of, 1795-1874
Project Candor. *See* Public information policy *under* Armaments regulation policy.
Project Corrode, 618*n*
Project East River, 20*n*, 183, 232, 319
Project Solarium:
  Implementation of recommendations, 387-388, 394-398, 432-442, 490*n*, 577*n*
  Plenary Session, 388-393
  Political warfare against the Soviet Union (Task Force C), 392-393, 416-431, 433-434
  Project summaries, 398-434
  Reports based on, 463-464
  Strategic offensive by the United States (Task Force A), 388-390, 399-412, 432-434
  Task force selection and functions, 323-328, 349-354, 360-366
Project Solarium—Continued
  Warning of general war as sanction against Soviet aggression (Task Force B), 390-391, 412-416, 432, 434
Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, 1638, 1840, 1857, 1876
Psychological Strategy Board (*see also* Operations Coordinating Board), 178, 248, 451-452, 455, 490*n*, 576*n*, 869-872, 989*n*, 1019, 1021-1023, 1050-1051, 1150, 1152, 1174, 1184-1185, 1601, 1603, 1694, 1722, 1840, 1854-1855, 1876, 1880, 1897
Public Buildings Service, 1450
Puerto Rico, 1530

Quarles, Donald A., 627

Rabi, Isidor I., 1513, 1516, 1541
Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 326, 394, 475*n*, 489*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 604*n*, 609*n*, 667*n*, 684, 715*n*, 731*n*, 738*n*, 759*n*, 799, 806*n*, 830, 1190*n*, 1223*n*, 1256*n*, 1296*n*, 1445*n*, 1449*n*, 1488*n*, 1526, 1580*n*, 1752*n*, 1880*n*, 1881*n*
  Armaments regulation policy, 1218, 1224, 1243
  Atomic weapons, possible use of, 533, 545-547, 1576
  Continental defense, 466*n*, 467, 469, 471, 473-474, 610*n*, 627
  Fiscal and security balance, 521
  General war, 636, 639-640, 643, 644*n*, 647*n*, 687-689, 692-693, 792
  Hydrogen bomb testing, 1427, 1440, 1455
  Indochina, 795-796
  Military assistance programs, 797
  Mobilization program, 760*n*, 767, 793
  Redeployment of U.S. forces abroad, 444-451, 453-454, 526, 528
  Soviet expansion, 791-792, 794
  U.S. military forces, restructuring of, 543-544
Radio Free Asia, 1834
Radio Free Europe, 1832-1833, 1899
Radius, Walter, 1293*n*, 1723-1724
Raine, Philip, 1689*n*, 1699*n*, 1758*n*
Rand, William M., 297
Rand Corporation, 235
Rayburn, Sam, 828-829
Raynor, G. Hayden, 1382*n*, 1542
Reams, Elinor, 1689*n*
Reed, Daniel A., 524
Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 351
Reston, James, 1052*n*, 1376
Revey, E. Lewis, 1654*n*, 1681*n*, 1699*n*, 1726
Rhee, Syngman, 696, 1731
Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 326-327, 394, 444, 447, 454, 526, 533, 541, 639-640, 643, 804-806
Roberts, Edward V., 1652, 1760*n*
Robertson, David B., 272-273, 280
Robertson, Walter S., 441*n*
Robeson, Paul, 1714

- Robilliart, Hermann, 1028, 1031, 1503
- Robinson, Howard A., 1333
- Rockefeller, Nelson A., 1691*n*
- Romania, 1277
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 885*n*, 890*n*, 1251-1253, 1355*n*
- Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 1640*n*, 1668, 1736
- Ruffin, Henri, 1144
- Rusk, Dean, 327, 350
- Russell, Bertrand, 61
- Russell, Richard, 829
- Ryckmans, Pierre, 1099, 1536, 1557, 1558

- Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 1030, 1100
- Salt, Barbara, 1382*n*, 1393, 1399, 1422*n*, 1503, 1515-1516
- Saltonstall, Leverett, 628, 824, 829
- Sanders, William, 883*n*, 905, 907, 914-916, 932*n*, 938-940, 957*n*, 1014, 1096*n*
- Sandifer, Durward V., 1008-1010, 1214-1215
- Sanger, Richard H., 1668*n*, 1699*n*, 1707*n*, 1758*n*
- Sargeant, Howland H., 939, 1697*n*, 1723-1724, 1875-1877
- Savage, Carlton, 142*n*, 182-184, 231-235, 318-323, 1265
- Sawyer, Charles, 20*n*, 54*n*, 80*n*, 142, 849
- Schine, G. David, 1697
- Schwartz, Harry H., 12-17, 370
- Scott, Robert, 1381, 1382*n*, 1556-1558
- Scott, Walter K., 1293*n*, 1638-1639, 1673-1675
- Sengier, Edgar E. B., 1028, 1031
- Shepherd, Gen. Lemuel C., Jr., 259-260, 263
- Shulman, Marshall D., 1055
- Simpson, Thomas W., 1706*n*, 1708*n*, 1720*n*, 1721, 1737
- Sims, Albert G., 1706*n*, 1713*n*
- Slansky, Rudolph, 1640*n*
- Smedley, Agnes, 1698
- Smirnovsky, Michail N., 1336
- Smith, Bromley K., 87, 1128
- Smith, David W., 1714
- Smith, Gerard C., 1336*n*, 1349*n*, 1352*n*, 1402, 1435, 1442-1445, 1453*n*, 1458-1459, 1461*n*, 1473*n*, 1477, 1480*n*, 1481-1482, 1501*n*, 1503-1505, 1506*n*, 1512, 1515-1517, 1523-1524, 1529-1532, 1542-1547, 1549-1551, 1558, 1570*n*, 1577-1578, 1587
- Smith, H. D., 1016
- Smith, Rear Adm. H. P., 350, 1215, 1229
- Smith, Robert, 1026
- Smith, Walter Bedell, 323*n*, 646, 1056*n*, 1506*n*
  - Armaments regulation policy, 1103, 1107, 1140, 1161, 1173, 1214, 1217-1218, 1223-1224, 1358, 1384-1386, 1397, 1416
  - Atomic energy policy, 846-847, 988*n*, 1180-1183, 1247, 1249, 1302*n*, 1418
  - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 607-608
- Smith, Walter Bedell—Continued
  - Atoms for Peace proposal, 1289-1291, 1294-1295, 1297, 1347-1348, 1369, 1398, 1401, 1524
  - Continental defense, 466
  - Economic assistance programs, 301
  - Foreign information program, 1699-1707, 1722
  - Information Agency, U.S., 1761-1762, 1791-1793, 1875, 1879
  - Mobilization program, 295
  - Mutual Security Program, 298-299
  - National Security Council, functioning of, 237, 242
  - National security policy, funding for, 292-293
  - Project Solarium, 327, 349, 441
  - Soviet capabilities to injure the United States, 206-208, 634
- Smyth, Henry D., 847, 872, 946, 1036, 1051, 1054, 1056*n*
- Smythe, Horace, 896*n*
- Snapp, Roy B., 1134, 1157, 1265, 1482*n*, 1539
- Snyder, John W., 20*n*, 54*n*, 80*n*, 142*n*, 205*n*, 849-850, 869
- Sobolev, A. A., 1560, 1562, 1571, 1574
- Society of Automotive Engineers, 1450
- Sohm, Earl O., 164*n*
- Sokolsky, George, 1670-1671
- Solarium Project. *See* Project Solarium.
- Sontag, Raymond, 324
- South Asia, 77-78, 131-132, 154, 192, 215, 220-221, 1780-1781, 1785, 1820-1821
- Southeast Asia. *See* Indochina.
- Southwick, Rodney L., 882
- Soviet bloc:
  - Capabilities and foreign policies, 553-555
  - Economic situation, 189, 777-778, 809-810
  - Internal instability, 381, 834, 1726-1731
  - Political situation, 187-188
  - Project Solarium recommendations re, 425-426
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 492-493, 579-580, 648-649, 725, 753
  - U.S. information efforts re, 1726-1731, 1771, 1779, 1784-1785, 1823-1835, 1883-1884, 1892-1893, 1897-1899
- Soviet Union (*see also Soviet subheadings under* Atoms for Peace proposal *and under* United Nations: Armaments regulation):
  - Armaments regulation policy:
    - Armed forces limitations, 897-900, 954
    - Atomic weapons ban proposal, 861-862, 1238, 1304-1305, 1310-1312, 1316-1318, 1358-1360, 1367-1368, 1387-1392, 1413-1416, 1421-1423, 1473-1477, 1525-1526, 1534-1537, 1568
    - Atomic weapons testing, 959-960, 1002, 1446-1447

- Soviet Union—Continued
  - Armaments regulation policy—Continued
    - Disclosure and verification, 906-907, 1047-1048
    - Great Powers conference, possible, 1207-1208
    - Negotiation strategy, 1060
    - Savings used for world aid proposal, U.S., 1199
    - U.S. public information policy, 1226-1227
    - U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 854-855, 1013-1014, 1040, 1048, 1086-1087, 1117-1118
  - Atomic weapons capabilities, 12-17, 110-113, 202-204, 540, 651, 677, 725, 755, 856, 1064-1066, 1159-1160
  - China, People's Republic of, relations with, 493, 580, 773, 1683, 1808
  - Destruction of political system, U.S. plans for, 68-69, 79-80, 144-145, 155-156, 200-201, 202*n*, 267-268
  - Economic situation, 51, 1802-1803, 1809
  - Foreign information activities, 1846, 1848-1850
  - Foreign policy, 91-92, 491-492, 578-579, 681-682, 772-773, 810-812
  - Future actions, U.S. estimate of, 195-196
  - General war, possible initiation of, 7-9, 16-17, 60-62, 73-78, 92-93, 109-110, 150-154, 186-187, 491-494, 578-581, 616, 812
  - "Hate" campaign, 1654-1655
  - Hydrogen bomb capabilities, 457, 479, 614, 628, 879-881, 998, 1185-1188, 1213-1214, 1219-1220, 1454-1455, 1458, 1464-1465
  - Internal security, 1804-1805
  - International control of atomic energy, 1021-1022, 1035-1036
  - Korean war, 1735-1736, 1743-1746
  - Military capabilities, 104-105, 650-652, 677-678, 726-727, 754-756, 776-777, 808-809, 1803-1804
  - Mobilization capabilities, 98, 103-104
  - Negotiation policy, 682-683
  - Peace offensive, 778-780, 811-812, 1699-1706
  - Political situation, 5-7, 89-92, 1074, 1681-1685, 1807-1808
  - Political warfare:
    - Use of, 94-96, 494, 581, 653, 727, 1805-1806
    - Vulnerability to, 96-97
  - Power struggle with the United States, 64-65, 67-68, 108-109
  - Satellite unrest, 1726-1731
  - Soviet bloc, relations with, 492-493, 579-580, 648-649, 725, 753
  - Stalin, death of, 290, 1681-1685
  - Strategic materials stockpiling, 103
  - United States, capabilities to injure, 205-208, 319, 321-322, 328-349, 355-360, 368, 634
  - U.S. arms buildup, 919-920
- Soviet Union—Continued
  - U.S. hydrogen bomb testing, 1004, 1016, 1022-1025, 1034-1036
  - U.S. information efforts re, 1768-1770, 1779-1780, 1785-1786, 1824-1826, 1883-1884, 1892
  - World domination policy, 93-94, 480-481, 701-703, 707-709, 757, 1801-1811
- Spaak, Paul-Henri, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559*n*
- Spain, 175, 1030-1031, 1101, 1142, 1783-1784
- Special Estimates:
  - SE-*10*, 12*n*
- Special National Intelligence Estimates:
  - SNIE-*11-2-54*, 634
- Sprague, Robert C., 628, 698, 801-802
- Sriyanond, Gen. Phao, 1787
- Staats, Elmer B., 122, 1293*n*, 1403*n*, 1791*n*
- Stalin, Iosif V., 6, 61, 90, 92, 267-268, 290, 491, 554, 923, 1052*n*, 1113, 1136, 1681-1685
- Stassen, Harold E., 698, 1223*n*, 1500*n*, 1698, 1791*n*
  - Armaments regulation policy, 1108, 1112, 1217, 1224
  - Atoms for Peace proposal, 1407
  - Colonialism, 377
  - Continental defense, 369, 469, 474, 704-705, 793-794
  - Defense program funding, 279
  - Economic and military assistance programs, 228, 303-304, 437, 770-772, 788*n*, 797-798, 842
  - Fiscal and security balance, 519, 521
  - Foreign information program, 1710, 1723, 1868, 1878
  - Free World alliance, 711
  - General war, 690-692, 706, 805-806
  - Hydrogen bomb testing, 1379, 1456
  - Indochina, 696
  - Military program, 260-262
  - Mutual Security Program, 276-278, 290, 297, 300-304, 541
  - National security policy, funding for, 237
  - Negotiation policy, 530
  - North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 289, 540
  - Peaceful uses of atomic energy, 1485
  - Project Solarium, 436-437, 439
  - Redeployment of forces abroad, 455
  - Soviet expansion, 708-709
  - Trade policy, 799
- State-Defense Military Information Control Committee, 1258-1259, 1263, 1266-1267, 1281-1282
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 237*n*, 238*n*
- Steel, Christopher, 847
- Steelman, John R., 28, 138, 142*n*, 143, 156-163, 184-185, 205*n*, 849-850, 851*n*, 852, 869, 938
- Steffan, Roger, 257
- Stegmeier, John L., 1758*n*

- Stelle, Charles C., 1220-1223
- Stephens, Tom, 387, 457
- Stevens, Francis B., 1675, 1874
- Stevens, Adm. Leslie C., 324, 328
- Stevens, Robert T., 787
- Stimson, Henry L., 1073
- Stoessel, Walter J., 1368-1369, 1524*n*, 1699*n*
- Stone, I.F., 1707
- Strategic Air Command, 16, 338-341, 347-348, 458, 864
- Strategic materials, 36-40, 103, 157-161, 174, 177-178, 821
- Straus, Richard, 1726*n*
- Strauss, Lewis L., 305*n*, 328*n*, 355*n*, 372*n*, 378*n*, 399*n*, 475*n*, 489*n*, 562*n*, 577*n*, 609*n*, 644*n*, 647*n*, 667*n*, 715*n*, 731*n*, 738*n*, 759*n*, 806*n*, 1223*n*, 1296*n*, 1297*n*, 1305*n*, 1383*n*, 1445*n*, 1449*n*, 1488*n*, 1551, 1580, 1584*n*
  - Armaments regulation policy, 1185, 1211-1212, 1215, 1217, 1224, 1235, 1238-1239, 1248, 1531, 1576-1577
  - Atomic energy policy:
    - Fissionable materials, 1483-1484, 1486, 1556-1558
    - Hydrogen bomb testing, 882, 1379, 1380, 1418, 1425-1429, 1437-1438, 1448, 1453, 1464, 1469, 1470-1472
    - Practical uses of atomic energy, 1496
    - Private industry involvement, 1249
    - Reactor construction and regulation, 1146-1149, 1246, 1550
    - Reactors abroad, construction of, 1460-1461, 1481
    - Sharing of information with Allies, 1245, 1256, 1289, 1302, 1356, 1361, 1477, 1507-1508
    - Soviet hydrogen bomb testing, 1213, 1454, 1455
  - Atoms for Peace proposal 1321, 1398, 1406, 1527
    - Development of, 1213*n*, 1218-1219, 1291
    - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1342, 1357, 1511, 1530, 1543, 1550
    - U.S.-Soviet private discussions, 1306, 1326-1329, 1347-1348, 1365
  - National security policy 275-276, 293-294, 531, 538-539, 568, 574-575, 628
- Streibert, Theodore C., 642, 784, 788*n*, 797, 800, 1735-1736, 1751, 1752*n*, 1754-1758, 1760-1762, 1773-1775, 1791, 1793, 1881*n*
- Strong, Gen., 907
- Supreme Court, U.S., 1640, 1712
- Suydam, Henry, 1340
- Sweden, 1498, 1784
- Switzerland, 1784
- Syria, 863

- Taber, John, 296, 829, 1654, 1656
- Tactical Air Command, 864
- Taft, Robert A., 317, 858
- Taiwan. *See* China, Republic of
- Talbott, Harold E., 704-705, 787
- Templer, Gen. Gerald, 1267
- Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, *1954*, 835*n*
- Thailand, 175, 560, 1780, 1786-1787
- Thermonuclear weapons. *See Hydrogen bomb subheadings under* Atomic energy policy *and under* Soviet Union.
- Thomas, Charles A., 270, 274, 276, 280, 1130
- Thompson, Leland W., 352
- Thorium oxide, 887-888
- Thorp, Willard L., 17*n*, 125*n*, 135
- Thurston, Ray L., 1699*n*, 1726*n*
- Tito, Josip Broz, 7
- Tomkins, Edward E., 1037, 1367*n*, 1458-1459, 1528
- Trapnell, Edward R., 1504*n*
- Treasury, U.S. Department of the, 262-263, 265, 491*n*, 500*n*, 503*n*, 505*n*, 510*n*, 516, 518, 523-524, 727-729, 811, 815*n*, 818*n*, 1408
- Treaties, conventions, agreements, etc.:
  - Geneva Protocol of *1925*, 1094
  - Hyde Park Agreement on atomic energy, *1944*, 1252
  - Memorandum of Intent on atomic energy, *1945*, 1252-1255
  - *Modus Vivendi* on atomic energy cooperation, *1948*, 1244, 1275, 1279, 1282, 1509-1510
  - Quebec Agreement, *1943*, 975, 1251-1253, 1255, 1355-1356, 1383
  - Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, *1954*, 773*n*
  - Templer-Burns Agreement, *1950*, 1267-1268
- Tritium, 275
- Truman, Harry S.:
  - Administrative transition, 181, 186
  - Armaments regulation policy:
    - Armed forces limitations, 199, 859, 954, 983-984
    - Development of, 894-895, 898, 929-930
    - Disclosure and verification, 918
    - U.N. actions re, 883*n*, 1056
    - U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 854-855
  - Atomic Energy Commission, 989
  - Atomic energy policy:
    - Approved policies, 1046
    - Atomic weapons production, 933-934
    - Atomic weapons, responsibility for, 863, 969-970, 972-973, 975-976, 981, 1011
    - Fissionable materials, 851-853, 855-858, 892
    - Hydrogen bomb production, 879, 955, 963-964, 1017-1018, 1186
    - Hydrogen bomb testing, 991, 1032-1033, 1042*n*, 1050, 1052-1054, 1055*n*
    - Public information policy, 869, 870*n*, 872
    - Sharing of information with Allies, 846-850, 988, 1252, 1254

Truman, Harry S.—Continued
  Continental defense, 114, 121, 125, 138-140, 164, 182*n*
  Defense programs, funding for, 2, 3*n*, 4, 9-10
  Economic and military assistance programs, 186*n*, 209
  Economic policy, 547
  Indigenous forces, development of, 136-137
  "Key data" book on national security programs, 165-166
  Military program, 21, 27
  Mobilization program, 28, 138
  National security policy, 20, 54-56, 59, 88, 289, 317
  Soviet atomic capabilities, 13, 1113
  Soviet system, destruction of, 81
  Special Evaluation Committee on Soviet capabilities, 207-208
  Steel strike of *1952*, 158*n*
  Trade policy, 119-120, 122-125
  United Kingdom, relations with, 4
Tufts, Robert W., 18-20, 58*n*, 920-921, 992, 1874
Turkey, 175, 192, 217, 267, 507, 593, 696
Tuttle, Elbert P., 1231
Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 326, 444, 448, 627, 830, 840

Union of South Africa, 886, 888, 1027, 1099-1100, 1498, 1503
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union.
United Kingdom:
  Armaments regulation policy, 898-899, 906, 914-917, 954, 989, 1393-1397
    U.N. actions re, 845, 859-860, 884, 1380-1382, 1384-1385
  Atomic weapons, possible use of, 533, 1401
  Atomic weapons ban proposal, Soviet, 1367-1368, 1393-1397, 1421-1423
  Atoms for Peace proposal, 1286
    International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1320-1321, 1341-1342, 1353-1355, 1361-1363, 1370-1371, 1458-1459, 1503, 1513, 1515-1517, 1528-1529
    U.S.-Soviet private discussions, 1305-1306, 1316, 1332-1333, 1339-1341, 1347-1352
  Economic situation, 191
  Fissionable materials, 1027, 1098-1100, 1142-1143, 1254-1255, 1555-1558
  Indochina policy, 498, 586, 696
  Iran, relations with, 439
  Middle East policy, 835-836
  Outside obligations, 71, 84, 107, 132, 146
  U.S. hydrogen bomb testing, 1036-1037, 1382-1383, 1418-1420, 1448, 1454, 1463
  U.S. information efforts re, 1784, 1887-1888
United Kingdom—Continued
  U.S. sharing of atomic energy information, 846-848, 975-976, 988, 1116, 1245-1246, 1251-1255, 1267-1269, 1275-1277, 1279-1285, 1289, 1301-1302, 1355-1356, 1507-1511, 1542
  Weapons production, 171, 191
United Nations:
  Armaments regulation policy (*see also* Disarmament Commission *below*):
    Dulles speech, 1215-1216
    Soviet proposal, 1525-1526, 1534-1537
    U.S. proposals, 859-863, 1091-1096, 1103-1108, 1140-1141, 1191-1206, 1210-1212, 1529
    U.S. strategy, 1085-1086, 1096-1097, 1116-1117, 1206-1209, 1217-1218
  Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 845, 895*n*, 910, 1018
  Commission for Conventional Armaments, 845
  Disarmament Commission (*see also* Armaments regulation policy *above*):
    Four-Power Working Party, 1393-1394, 1397
    French proposals, 979-980, 1144-1145, 1167
    Functioning of, 845-846, 861-863, 1043-1046, 1250, 1551
    Indian proposal, 1383
    Meeting site, 1384-1385, 1397-1398
    Participants, 1397-1398
    Soviet proposals, 1093-1095, 1139-1140, 1164-1166
    Subcommittee of Five, 1307-1309, 1328, 1351-1352, 1380-1382, 1386-1387, 1393-1397, 1399-1400, 1429-1435, 1448, 1536
    U.S. proposals, 872*n*, 877, 895-932, 938-945, 954-955, 957-958, 982-984, 989, 1091-1096, 1105-1106
    U.S.-Soviet discussions, 1298-1300, 1305-1306, 1334-1335
    U.S. strategy, 883-885, 1045-1046, 1160-1169, 1139-1141, 1175-1177, 1179, 1189
  General Assembly Resolutions:
    *502* (VI), on armaments regulation, 845, 1092
    *704* (VII), on armaments regulation, 1140-1141, 1209
    *715* (VIII), on Disarmament Commission, 1250
    *808* (IX), on armaments regulation, 1551
    *810* (IX), on peaceful uses of atomic energy, 1578-1580
  International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1291, 1436-1437, 1481, 1484-1485, 1505-1507, 1516, 1519-1520, 1530, 1532-1533, 1540, 1544-1545, 1551-1552, 1560, 1562, 1567-1568, 1571, 1579
  International control of atomic energy plan, 930, 976, 1181-1182, 1202-1204, 1214-1215

- United Nations—Continued
  - International Scientific Conference, 1541
  - International tensions, Dulles speech re, 462-463
  - Korean war, 1756-1757
  - U.S. information activities re, 1818-1819, 1888
- University of Michigan Survey Research Center, 1451
- Uranium, 275, 888, 1026-1032, 1098-1103, 1141-1144

- Van Hollen, Christopher, 197*n*, 372*n*
- Van Zeeland, Paul, 1099
- Vandenberg, Arthur, Jr., 1356*n*
- Vandenburg, Gen. Hoyt S., 260-261, 263, 326, 852, 854, 856-857
- Vargas, Gen. Jesus, 1787
- Vedeler, Harold, 1726*n*
- Vietnam, 215, 217, 498, 586, 795, 811*n*
- Vladykin, Nikolai A., 1346*n*
- Voice of America:
  - China, People's Republic of, broadcasts into, 1828, 1884, 1892-1893
  - Criticism of, 1675-1677
  - Funding for, 1647-1648, 1845
  - Investigation of, 1638-1639
  - Name change proposal, 1890-1891, 1896
  - Program development and content, 1619, 1637, 1640-1641, 1670-1672, 1678-1680, 1692, 1845
  - Soviet bloc, broadcasts into, 1784, 1826-1828
  - Soviet Union, broadcasts into, 1824-1826, 1883-1884, 1892
  - Transmitting facilities, 1657
- Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, 44
- Vyshinsky, Andrey Y., 860-861, 906, 920, 1200, 1324, 1358-1360, 1382*n*, 1397-1398, 1522-1523, 1525, 1534, 1560-1563, 1571-1574

- Wadsworth, James J., 122, 124, 205*n*, 206*n*, 1335*n*, 1341, 1529
- Wadsworth, Lawrence W., 1699*n*
- Wage Stabilization Board, 43
- Wainhouse, David W., 1043*n*, 1298-1300, 1334*n*, 1371-1372, 1376, 1377-1378, 1382*n*, 1393, 1435-1437, 1507, 1544, 1549*n*, 1793*n*
- Walmsley, Walter, Jr., 87, 125-126, 134*n*, 1567*n*
- Washburn, Abbott, 1754*n*, 1758-1760, 1791*n*, 1796, 1868
- Washington, George, 544
- *Washington Post*, 122
- Watts, Philip H., 372*n*, 441-442, 1134, 1135*n*, 1157
- Waugh, Samuel, 441*n*
- Webster, Maj. Gen. Robert M., 330*n*, 331*n*
- Wechsler, Irving R., 1654*n*, 1731*n*
- Weeks, Sinclair, 628, 1296, 1791
- Weightman, Melvin A., 1708*n*
- Wells, A. A., 1141
- Western Europe:
  - Atomic vulnerability, 203, 1072
  - Economic and political situations, 76-77, 153, 190-192
  - Military capabilities, 219-220, 497-498, 507, 562-565, 569, 585-586, 592
  - Project Solarium, recommendations re, 426
  - U.S. economic and military assistance, 215-216, 273
  - U.S. information efforts, 1778-1779, 1782-1784
  - U.S. policy re, 528, 671, 749-750, 1819
  - U.S. troops in, 598-599
- Western hemisphere, U.S. defense of, 132-133
- Whiston, Lish, 330*n*
- White, Max, 1143
- White, Lt. Gen. Thomas D., 324
- Whitehair, Francis P., 880-881
- Whitman, Ann, 1234*n*, 1301*n*
- Wiley, Alexander, 829, 1181*n*, 1627, 1635
- Williams, John Z., 1431, 1793*n*
- Wilson, Charles Edward, 20*n*, 28, 54*n*, 80*n*, 140, 856-858, 938
- Wilson, Charles Erwin:
  - Armaments regulation policy, 1107, 1161, 1212, 1217
    - Interdepartmental review of, 1383-1384, 1386, 1580, 1583-1584
    - Public information policy, 1111, 1172-1174, 1224, 1240-1241, 1243*n*
  - Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 274, 292, 539-540
  - Atomic energy policy:
    - Atomic weapons, 1180, 1576-1577
    - Fissionable materials, 1484, 1485, 1486
    - Hydrogen bomb testing, 1418, 1426-1427, 1429, 1437-1438, 1457-1458
    - Practical uses of atomic energy, 1128-1129
    - Reactor construction and regulation, 1132, 1149
  - Atomic weapons, possible use of, 533, 545
  - Atoms for Peace proposal, 1398
    - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 1357, 1481
    - U.S.-Soviet private discussions, 1326, 1327, 1348
  - Continental defense, 466, 469-470, 472, 704-705, 794, 802
  - Defense programs, funding of, 265, 278-279, 541-543, 707
  - Economic and military assistance programs, 228, 273, 303, 525
  - Economic policy, 271-272, 523, 536, 538, 547-548, 709
  - Fiscal and security balance, 516, 520-521
  - Foreign information program, 1723, 1751, 1868, 1878
  - General war, 602-605, 690, 692-694, 706-707, 804-805
  - Indochina, 795-796

Wilson, Charles Erwin—Continued
  Military program, 260-261, 263-264, 290, 294, 822
  Mobilization program, 532, 600, 712-713, 732*n*, 759*n*, 760*n*, 763-770, 798
  Mutual Security Program, 289, 297, 300-301
  National security policy, funding for, 288-289, 292, 710
  Negotiation policy, 530, 680, 695-697, 843
  Project Solarium, 437-439
  Redeployment of forces abroad, 444, 526, 528, 548-549, 571, 573-575
  Soviet atomic capability, 531
  Soviet Union, attitude toward, 372, 703, 708, 785-787, 790-791, 793, 839-840

Wilson, Charles Erwin—Continued
  Trade policy, 799-800
  Western European military capabilities, 562, 569
Wisner, Frank G., 351
Womble Board Report, 674
Wood, C. Tyler, 350

Yoshida, Shigeru, 446
Yugoslavia, 107, 175, 557

Zarubin, Georgi N., 1324-1325, 1328, 1332, 1334*n*, 1335*n*, 1336-1341, 1345*n*, 1346-1348, 1350, 1352, 1354, 1363, 1367*n*, 1369, 1371, 1376-1378, 1385, 1389, 1415, 1436, 1458*n*, 1473*n*, 1546*n*, 1547*n*, 1560